Bunge - From Neuron to Mind

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NEWS IN PHYSIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Neuron to Mind

main approaches to the study of mankind, and the corresponding

of man, are sketched and examined. The systemic model of man

a biopsychosocial entity is recommended. Likewise the multilevel

is favored over the holistic, the analytic, and the synthetic

Finally, the question of the reducibility of psychology

neurophysiology is discussed.

there was little com-

between physiologists and

ists. Typical ly the former were

in the various systems and

stems of the organism, whereas the

studied behavior. Hardly anyone

interested in the mechanisms where-

neural systems control behavior,

less in the nonmotor and nonsen-

of the central nervous

tem (CNS) of higher vertebrates. Con-

mind nonexistent.

That gap is now closing. Neuroscien-

are becoming more interested in

or, perception, emotion, and idea-

while psychologists and ethologists

happily ignoring the paralyzing in-

“Do not neurologize ” and are

to speculate on that which con-

and does the mentation.

fusion of neurophysiology with psy-

ogy, which Karl Lashley demanded

half a century ago, is fina lly start-

to happen.

Neurophysiologists are becoming

re that the nervous system is only

subsystem of the whole animal-

most interesting of all-and

hologists are realizing that real ani-

not black boxes. The great wall

body and behavior is being

from within (starting with the neu-

and from without (starting with be-

r). As the boring proceeds we real-

that the wall is not in nature but in

and theology.

Yet the fusion or merger tactics have

far been delineated in vague terms.

should introduce some precision if

want to know how best to integrate

Bunge is Professor of Philosophy in the

and Philosophy of Scienc e Unit,

University, 3479 Peel St., Montreal,

I-DA 1 W7, C anada.

the various approaches, methods, and

results of the various sciences, from neu-

rophysics to sociology, concerned with

the problem of accounting for behavior

and mentation. In the firs t place we

should tackle the matter of the variety

of approaches to this problem and weigh

their comparative merits.

Five approaches to the study

of mankind

Humans can be studied from different

points of view: as a physical entity, as a

chemical system, as an organism, as a

psychosystem, and as a component of

social systems (family, firm, school, etc.).

Each of these approaches has its virtues

and shortcomings, and each suggests a

one-sided view of man.

Approach 1 (physical). No doubt this

is the basic approach and one that has

proved fertile. But restricting the study

of man to its physical components and

aspects, i.e., adopting physicalism, is ig-

noring whatever physics fails to explain.

And trying to reduce the supraphysical

features of man to physics is quixotic if

only for being impractical. The mere at-

tempt to write down, and even more to

solve, the Schroedinger equation for a

brain, or even a neuron or an amino acid

molecule, is mind boggling. But even if

such tasks were feasible, a number of

essential features of life , such as evolu-

tion, would remain in the dark. And

overlooking evolution amounts to for-

saking the understanding of the com-

plexities of the nervous system and the

mental and social peculiarities of hu-

mans.

Approach 2 (chemical). First the

chemical theory o f heredity, then molec-

ular biology, and finally neurochemistry

showed that biochemistry is just as im-

portant a tool as biophysics for under-

standing the nervous system. However,

the successes of the chemical approach

should not be exaggerated, if for no other

reason than that we stil l do not have an

adequate understanding of a single or-

ganic molecule. (To be sure chemists

have discovered the composition and

gross structure of millions of molecules,

but they still owe us accurate theories of

even the simplest of molecules involved

in cell chemistry. Bear in mind that not

even HZ0 has been calculated quantum

mechanically.) In short, chemism is in-

adequate.

Approach 3 (biological). This is of

course the approach characterizing the

life sciences. This platitude bears repe-

tition in view of the fact that the alter-

native approaches are still going strong.

(Thus most psychologists believe that

they can afford to ignore biology, partic-

ularly neuroscience and the theory of

evolution.) And it also goes without say-

ing that the biological approach can and

should be combined with the other ap-

proaches rather than being adopted to

their exclusion. The latter stand, namely

biologism, is one-sided for it tends to

forget the physical and chemical com-

ponents of living matter as well as the

psychological and social dimensions of

man.

Approach 4 (psychological). The

proper task of psychology is of course the

understanding of behavior and ideation

patterns. To be sure, all such functions

are biological: they are performed by liv-

ing organs; hence all good psychology is

basically psychobiology. However, the

functions of the nervous systems of com-

plex organisms are different from those

of simpler systems such as the cardio-

vascular or the digestive ones. For ex-

ample, the former can learn and per-

ceive, two functions that are far beyond

the capability of all but highly evolved

organisms. Yet such behavioral and

mental abilities should not lead to psy-

chologism, i.e., the claim that psychology

owes nothing to biology or to sociology,

which is what behaviorists and psy-

choanalysts have been saying.

Approach 5 [sociological) . There is no

understanding the social animal apart

from social science. In particular, con-

sciousness and language seem to be prod-

ucts (and in turn modifiers) of social life ,

and so are stress, moral conscience, and

organizational ability. However, it would

be a mistake to adopt sociologism, or the

Volume 4/0ctober 1989

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attempt to explain man in purely socio-

logical terms, For, although sociali ty has

iological and psychological roots, it

transcends them. Indeed, unlike inver-

tebrates and lower vertebrates, higher

vertebrates possess social plasticity, i.e.,

the capacity to readjust their patterns of

social behavior in the face of internal or

external difficulties.

So much for the main legitimate, al-

beit one-sided, approaches to the study

of man. The engineering approach has

not been included for the simple reason

that animals are not machines: they are

alive and have not been designed. To be

sure, there are some similarities between

man and machine, in particular the com-

puter; if there were none we would not

use them as labor-saving devices. How-

ever, no analog is a substitute for the real

thing, particularly when the analogies in

question are so superficial that they

overlook the speci fically physical , chem-

ical, biological, psychological, and social

properties of man, such as rational think-

ing, planning, and abil ity to set up and

dismantle social groups. In short, ma-

chinism is inadequate.

To sum up, there are fi ve legitimate

and frui tful approaches to the study of

man. But the adoption of any of them to

the exclusion of the others, while una-

voidable given the enormity of the task,

should be regarded as only a temporary

expedient. We should carry on work

along each of the five approaches and

should attempt to integrate them, fo r hu-

mans are complex systems exhibiting all

five aspects.

Eight models of mankind

The understanding of a thing begins

and ends with some conceptual model of

it. The model is better the more inclusive

and accurate that it is. But even rough

models can be used to guide-or block-

research. Each of the five approaches

examined in the last section has given

rise to a set of models of man, In addition,

technological and religious approaches

have resulted in a certain model. Finally ,

an eighth model is in the making, which

brings together all five scienti fic ap-

proaches.

The first , or religious model, is that of

Plato and Christian theology. According

to it man is a spiritual being that uses

his body as a tool during his temporary

sojourn on earth. (As Sir John Eccles put

it, the self is to the brain what the pianist

is to the piano.) This animistic model

was demolished by Darwin and by phys-

iological psychology, but it still lingers

on among philosophers, psychologists,

and even neuroscientists unable to

match their philosophy with their sci-

ence. It has effect ively slowed down the

merger of neurophysiology with psy-

chology.

The second, or technological model,

regards man as a complex information

processor, This model has captivated the

imagination of many neuroscientists and

psychologists . To be sure the neuroen-

docrine system is, among other things,

an information system; so is the neu-

roendocrine-immune supersystem. How-

ever, it happens to be a biosystem, i.e.,

one characterized by biological proper-

ties. And computer science has no room

for such speci fic properties, not even for

specifi c physical and chemical proper-

ties. (As far as computer science is con-

cerned an information system can be

built out of modules of almost any kind.)

Besides, it is a mistake to compare bio-

systems to artifacts, for this suggests that

the former, too, have been designed to

some purpose. Finally , machinism is in-

compatible with evolutionary biology,

for machines are not subject to genetic

mutation or natural selection.

The third, or physicalist model, pre-

supposes not only that physics is the

basic science, which is true, but also that

in principle no other science is neces-

sary, which is false. Not even chemistry,

the nearest neighbor, is reducible to

physics without further ado. First, this is

because chemical systems have peculiar

properties such as lack of inertia that

physics knows nothing about, and sec-

ond, physical theory, although necessary

to understand chemistry, is insuff icient:

one must add subsidiary assumptions

concerning, e.g., chemical composition

and structure, that go beyond physics.

The fourth or chemicalist model o f a

human as a chemical reactor fares better

than the physicalist model because i t

is richer and, after all, the cell is con-

stituted by chemical subsystems. But

of course there is more to life than

just chemistry. In particular, animals

equipped with a neuroendocrine sys tem

have neural and hormonal control sys-

tems in addition to the genetic control

system. To be sure all such control sys-

tems are physicochemical, but they hap-

pen to regulate biofunctions such as

feeding, reproduction, self-repair, and

defense.

The fif th or biologistic model of man

although far superior to the preceding

ones, is defective in that it neglects the

speci fically human abilities and short-

comings. In particular, it overlooks the

unique psychological and social features

of human beings. Thus i t fosters the an-

cient animistic doctrine of the soul as a

separate entity. The practical conse-

quence is clear, namely an unwilling-

ness to use physical , chemical, and bio-

logical means to modify behavior and

mentation and the insistence on the po-

tency of logotherapy.

Likewise the sociologistic model of

humans exaggerates one aspect at the

expense of all others. This has two un-

desirable consequences. One is to view

society as a whole rather than as a sy

tem and therefore as existing by itse

and above the individual. The other con

sequence is to deny that there are di

orders of nervous cells and neural sy

tems and blame all behavioral an

mental disorders on society as a whole

(This is of course the g ist of antipsychia-

try. ) Like psychologism, sociologism i

nores biology and thus is scient ifical ly

unacceptable.

Finally the eighth model, or system

ism, pictures man as a biosystem com

posed of numerous subsys tems, eac

with its own specific functions, as we

as a component of suprabiological (s

cial) systems. This view includes what

ever is valuable in previous models

indeed the systemic model of humans

acknowledges physical and chemical

properties as well as biological, psycho

logical, and social ones. In particular,

man as a whole as well as his ever

component possesses physical properties

such as mass, but from the cell upward

all the subsystems have peculiar supra

physical properties, i.e., features n

studied by physics. Also primates ca

feel and dream, imagine and plan,

well as enter into social relations an

thus modi fy other animal’s mentation

and behavior

-all of which lie beyond

physics and chemistry although rooted

to the peculiar physical and chemical

properties of living tissue.

In conclusion, there are (at least) eigh

models of man, or rather kinds of model

Two of them, the religious and the e

gineering models, are unscienti fic, an

five are scienti fic but one-sided, for eac

accounts for just one side of the whole

Only the systemic model brings together

whatever is valuable in each of the fiv

one-sided or partial scientific models, b

depicting man as a biopsychosocial sy

tem with physical and chemical compo

nents,

Systems and levels

Every concrete thing is either a system

or a component of a system, i.e., a thin

composed of interconnected things.

particular, a human being is a compo

nent of several social systems (family

firm, club, etc.) and is in turn composed

of a number of macrosystems, in partic

ular the nervous system, which are

turn composed of smaller subsystems

This “hierarchical” organization goes

to the world sys tem and down to the ce

level and even further, to the level

cellular subsystems (e.g.‘, ribosomes) an

their molecular components (see Fig.

This being so, to understand the behav

ior of each module we must understand

its components, environment, and struc

ture, as well as the supersystem of which

it is a component. One may despair

the complexity of the task but may tak

consolation in the fac t that the task is

Volume 4/0ctober 1989 NIPS

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performed by the entire scientific

nity, perhaps with the help of

eager to emphasize the

for integrating the various partial

Every leve l of organization is a set

material things, each of

ch is characterized by peculiar prop-

particular laws). The interlevel

ion in the “hierarchy” (or better

el structure) is this. Any system be-

to a given level is composed of

to preceding levels. The

ily of levels is thus ordered by the

relat ion defined in this way.

So far our sketch of the level structure

been static. But we know from var-

studies, in particular from studies

development and on evolution, that

leve l structure is far from being given

In fact we know that

stem has self assembled (or self

from things on the preceding

l (i.e., every system on a given leve l

preceded in time by its components,

ch are therefore rightly called its pre-

The systems of any given level have

properties in common with their

and others that the latter

are their emergent properties.

an atom has an energy

spectrum that its individual components

do not possess; likewise, a molecule has

an energy spectrum that is not the mere

superposition of the spectra of its com-

ponent atoms; and a neuronal system has

a connectiv ity that is absent from its

components. In short, at every level

some properties (in particular laws) are

gained (or emerge) while others are lost

(or submerge). In short, there is both

emergence and submergence along the

evolutionary process.

The methodolog ical morals of the pre-

ceding ontologica l considerations are

quite obvious:

1) identify the level(s)

crossed by your object(s) of study; 2) do

not skip any levels; and 3) recognize the

genealogy of the higher levels. These in-

junctions help evaluate research strate-

gies and projects. We may distinguish

four main such strategies or methodol-

ogies:

Holism. Holism is the study of every

thing as a whole and only on its own

level, e.g., the study of the brain as a

whole by means of the electroencepha-

logram or the holographic model of

memory.

Analysis. Analysis is the reduction of

the system to its components, or “top

down.”

Svnthesis. Synthesis is the bui lding up

J

World system

(e.g. hypothalamus)

(e.g. ribosomes)

Elementary particles and fields

The supersystems and subsystems of a human being.

Social levels

I

Biological levels

Chemical levels

hysical levels

of the whole from its components, or

“bottom up.”

Multilevel approach. The multilevel

approach is the study of every system on

its own level as well as a component of

a supersystemand ascomposedof lower-

level things.

Each of the first three strategies has

its virtues and shortcomings. Holism em-

phasizes that the whole has emergent

properties but refuses o explain them in

terms of composition and structure, so t

borders on irrationalism. The analytic

method stresses he importance of the

composition of a system but misses ts

emergent properties. The synthetic

method does not have the defects of the

other two methods but it is not always

practicable; for instance, so far biologists

have not synthesized a living cell. I sub-

mit that the multilevel approach is the

best of all four, for it recommends study-

ing each system on its own level as well

as on its adjoining levels.

The multilevel approach is an eclectic

or catch-as-catch-can strategy, allowing

one to use whatever approaches, tech-

niques, models, and data that may seem

promising. Hence it is integrative, al-

though not holistic, an undeniable merit

at a time when excessive specialization

leads to artificial fragmentation. In par-

ticular, it is the one strategy capable of

bringing together all the studies in neu-

roscience and psychology and thus the

one capable of bridging the gap between

neuron and mind.

The multilevel strategy has proved its

mettle in a number of domains. Thus the

solid-state physicist builds a mathemat-

ical model of his crystal structure the

ion lattice together with the electron

cloud) to explain such molar properties

as electrical and thermal conductivity.

The quantum chemist, even when intent

on adopting a purist or ab initio syn-

thetic or bottom up) approach, makesuse

of whatever knowledge he can get from

both classical chemistry and atomic

physics. And the neurobiologist studying

a particular system, such as the Wer-

nicke “area,” approaches it on at least

three levels: as a system of neurons, asa

molar system with peculiar properties,

and as the organ of the formation and

understanding of linguistic expressions.

Explaining behavior and mentation

The most ancient and popular expla-

nation of behavior is of course the an-

imistic or mentalistic one: it takes the

mind for granted and attributes to it the

ability to control behavior. The barren-

ness and untestability of mentalism

drove psychologists to the denial of the

mental, whereas the right attitude

should have been to regard the mental

assomething to be explained rather than

as self-explanatory. Behavioristic psy-

chology attempted to dispensewith the

NIPS Volume 4/0ctober 1989


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and to describe behavior in terms

stimuli. But, because it ignored the

system, behaviorism gave a su-

icial account of behavior-just as su-

as the description of motion

by pre-Newtonian kinematics.

Biopsychology, on the other hand,

admitting the valid results of be-

goes far beyond it by looking

(or neuroendocrine)

t “mediate” (actually

behavior. Thus it pro-

centr ifugal ly, from the CNS to be-

For example, it attempts to ex-

voluntary movement in terms of

specific activity of certain neuron

es located in the frontal lobes.

than regarding the CNS as a

information processor restricted to

(or encoding) external stim-

physiological psychology has learned

e CNS has a largely autonomous

activity, that nerv-

activity is modulated by environ-

rather than being

determined by them.

Physiological psychology is not re-

to the study of behavior: it also

s mentation where it exists, from

perception, and imagery to de-

n and self-consciousness. The

is the same in a ll cases, namely

tackle the data of observation and self-

as problems, to make neu-

mechanisms of behavior and subjec-

and to check such con-

by means of further observa-

measurements, or experiments.

ate goal is of course to put such

together into neatly stated

(or special theories) of the var-

behavioral and mental processes.

would like to know the modus

ndi of the smallest neuron assem-

feeling fear or anxiety, of

up a proposition, or of making

Traditional (mentalistic) psychology

s “pure” or untainted by physiology,

it dealt with the putatively immater-

oul or mind. Physiological psychol-

the other hand, is based on (pre-

poses) neurophysiology and, indeed,

other branches of biology as well,

h as endocrinology, immunology , and

besides, it needs social

nce to help explain some of the

functions, such as moral con-

Thus physiological psychology

effect brings together al l the studies

to the understanding of behav-

and mentation. In other words, phys-

gical psychology contributes power-

y to the synthesis we are after, the

capable of bridging the gap between

d whole animal , between pro-

sses at the subcellular leve l and bio-

Is this synthesis a reduction, in partic-

ular a reduction of psychology to neu-

rophysiology? Not quite , and this for the

following reasons. First, even at lower

levels the derivation of one theory from

another usually requires premises not

contained in the reducing theory. Sec-

ond, neuroscience itself needs the guid-

ance of psychology; thus the study of

perceptual systems is a matter not only

for neurophysiology but also for the psy-

chology of percept ion, which takes into

account characteristics of the environ-

ment, sometimes even of the social en-

vironment. (Recall that perceptual error

can be caused by social factors such as

social pressures.) Third , there is more to

neurobiology than neurophysiology,

namely developmental and evolutionary

biology. This poin t deserves clarifica-

tion.

Every contemporary organism is the

outcome of two different processes: the

result of an ontogenetic process and a

product of a mult imill ion year evolu-

tionary process. Either way nature ac-

complishes the integration we find so

difficult to conceptualize. Indeed the

processes leading from molecule to fer-

tilized ovum to adult primate, and from

primitive cell to highly evolved animal,

are processes of self-assembly (or self-

organization), hence integrative.

This has become a platitude, yet it is

apt to be temporarily forgotten by the

electrophysiologist or the psychologist.

In fact, the division of scientific labor has

reached such a ridiculous extreme that

many workers in neuroscience and psy-

chology tend to pay only lip service to

the importance of studies in develop-

ment and evolution for the understand-

ing of their subject. Such neglect of

development and evolution has had un-

desirable consequences, such as 1)

overlooking the biolog ical maturation of

the CNS, which, in the case of certain

systems such as the corpus callosum,

takes up to a decade, and 2) exaggerating

leaps at the expense of graduality (as is

the case with mentalistic psychology,

particularly of the information-process-

ing variety, and its refusal to learn from

animal psychology), or, conversely, 3)

exaggerating continuity at the expense

of quantitative novelty (as in the case of

animal psychologists who claim that hu-

man mental abilities differ only in de-

gree from prehuman ones).

To sum up, behavior and mentation

can be explained with the help of neu-

roscience and social science. The new

psychology, based on neuroscience and

willing to learn from social science, is at

the very heart of the attempt to explain

behavior and mentation in scientific

terms. And it constitutes a synthesis or

merger rather than a reduction, even

though the behavioral and mental proc-

esses are neurophysiological. (A philos-

opher would say that this is a case of

ontological reduction

temological reduction

without ful l epis-

.

1

Conclusion

Physiology and psychology share one

ultimate goal, namely the scientific un-

derstanding of behavior and mentation.

No one branch of physiology or of psy

chology can attain this goal single-hand-

edly, because he problem is a multilevel

one, and this becauseman himself exists

on all levels. Nor should philosophy be

left aside, because t too is interested in

the mind-body problem and can offer

valuable suggestions or facilitating the

integration or synthesis of disciplines

that the problem calls for.

Neurophysics, neurochemistry, neu-

robiology, psychology, and sociology

may be pictured as forming a pentagon

Philosophy lies at the center of it, some

times blocking the whole view, as in

psychophysical dualism; at other times

favoring the integration of research

fields; and at all times giving and receiv-

ing stimuli from the other disciplines.

To be sure one must specialize if one

wants to make original contributions to

knowledge. But specialization need not,

nay must not, exclude the elaboration of

a general scheme of things allowing one

to locate one’s problems and thereby to

make use of any relevant scraps o

knowledge found in other fields. Such

integration is indispensable in bridging

the gap between neuron and mind.

This paper is based on the author’s books

A World of Systems [Boston, MA: Reidel,

1979) The Mind-Body Problem [New York:

Pergamon, 1980), Philosophy of Science and

Techn ology, Part 2 (Boston, MA: Reidel, 1985),

and Philosophy of Psychology, with Ruben

Ardila [New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987), as

well as on his article s “From neuron to behav-

ior and mentation: an exercise in levelman-

ship,” in Information Proce ssing in the Nerv-

ous System, edited by H. M. Pinsker and W.

D. Will iam s (New York: R aven, 1980, p. l-16),

and “From mindless neuroscience and brain-

les s psychology to neuropsychology” (Ann.

Theor. Psych ol. 3: 115-133, 1985).

I 1

Volume 4/0ctober 1989 NIPS 20


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Fifty Years Ago in Physiology

In a real sense, 1989 has been the

anniversary of modern cellular

In 1939, J. Z. Young (3)

d the full description, given

shorter accounts two or three

s earlier, of squid giant axons.

lly arising from the fu-

of smaller fibers, they were rec-

as single nerve cells, a dem-

revolutionized the

. In that same year, building on

of Gasser and Erlanger,

o had developed the cathode ray

for measuring electrical poten-

nerves essentially free of time

acts, Hodgkin and Huxley (2)

st published together. They re-

from inside a giant fiber im-

ed with a Ag-AgCl-sea water

and showed directly that

potential is a transmem-

event and that its magnitude

overshoots the resting

l (50 mV). And Cole and

(1) succeeded in demonstrat-

that action potentials in squid

accompanied by a 40-fold

in membrane impedance with

change in capacitance, all new

omena in 1939 for which the

bases are now well established.

Cole, K. S., and H. J. Curtis. Electrical

impedance of the squid giant axon during

act ivi ty. J. Gen. Physiol. 22: 649-670,1939.

Hodgkin, A. L., and A. F. Huxley. Action

potentials recorded from inside a nerve

fibre. Nature Lond. 144: 710-711, 1939.

Young, J. Z. Fused neurons and synaptic

contacts in the giant nerve fibres o f ce-

phalopods. Phil. Trans. R. Sot. Lond. B

Ser. 229: 465-503,1939.

Forty Years Ago in Physiology

Almost every issue of every jour-

reporting on cell physiology and

biology contains at least one pa-

in which the authors describe

experiments. A com-

n purpose is to determine trans-

more and more experimen-

are using micropipettes for in-

mRNA into Xenopus oocytes

express a desired protein product.

inject fluorescent or other

into a variety of cells to

cell-cell communication,

antibodies to block specific cyto-

c functions, or foreign pro-

measure their interactions

h endogenous metabolites, or any

a myriad of other compounds lim-

NIPS

Volume 4/0ctober 1989

ited only by the experimenters’

imaginations. All of this was made

possible in 1949 by Ling and Gerard

(l), who used micropipettes as elec-

trodes to impale frog muscle cells.

Others, including Ralph Gerard and

colleagues, had attempted this be-

fore but had found that the pipettes

damaged the surface, resulting in lo-

cal short-circuiting current leaks

and, in consequence, disturbingly

variable, unstable, and transitory re-

sults. Ling and Gerard showed that,

given sufficiently small tip diame-

ters

(Cl

pm), the cell membrane

sealed around the impaling pipette

and permitted highly reproducible

and stable (days) determinations of

the membrane’s electrical proper-

ties. What followed is history.

1. Ling, G., and R. W. Gerard. The normal

membrane potential of frog sartorius fi-

bers. I. Cell. Comp. Physiol. 34: 383-396,

1949.

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Bunge - From Neuron to Mind