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2012Jananan Nandakumar 090137918
Biology with Psychology C1C8
[ARE ANIMALS CONCIOUS?]
SBS2 Project skills in the Life Sciences
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 2
Table of Contents
(Note: All figures and tables were created by the author unless otherwise stated
The “Abstract” is the Summary we had to include; “146 words”
Word Count: 4,375
Acknowledgments 3 .........................................................................................
1.0 Abstract 4 ................................................................................................
2.0 Introduction 5 ...........................................................................................
2.1 Definitions of Consciousness 5 ........................................................................
2.2 Foundational Theories on Consciousness 7 ..........................................................
2.3 Metaphysical Theories of Consciousness 7 ..........................................................
2.3.1 Dualist Theories 7 ....................................................................................
2.3.2 Physicalist Accounts 8 ................................................................................
2.4 Specific Theories of Consciousness 9 ................................................................
2.4.1 Neurofunctional Accounts 9 .........................................................................
2.4.2 Representationalist Accounts 10 .......................................................
2.4.3 Higher-Order Theories 10 ...........................................................................
2.4.4 Cognitive Theories 12 ................................................................................
2.5 Measurement of Consciousness 13 ...................................................................
2.6 Recognising Consciousness in Animals 19 ............................................................
2.6.1 Experience of Pain and Suffering 19 ...............................................................
2.6.2Animal Emotions & Perceptual Phenomenology 20 ...............................................
2.7 Self-consciousness 20 ...................................................................................
2.8 Implications of Animals Being Conscious 21 ........................................................
3.0 Conclusion 22 ............................................................................................
4.0 Reference List 24.......................................................................................
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 3
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to Dr Keith Jensen for his advice and
general teaching within Psychology. His last year of teaching within the principles of Psychology
was fascinating and allowed me to develop a passion to further learn topics around the subject. I
would also like to express my gratitude to Dr Nathan Emery who expanded my knowledge with
his initial help and advice for this project which was greatly appreciated.
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 4
1.0 Abstract
The question of whether animals possess consciousness has intrigued philosophers, scientists,
and lay people for many years, yet the answer remains unresolved. Furthermore, no clear
definition of the meaning of consciousness has been agreed upon to date. It has, however, been
suggested that consciousness can be defined as having a state of awareness of oneself and the
surrounding environment (Bermond, 2001). Numerous theories have been put forward that argue
for the presence of consciousness in animals, and tremendous achievements have been made in
establishing consciousness in animals with the available techniques, such as neurological
analysis, the mirror test, and neuroimaging. Additionally, a number of naturally occurring
phenomena, including mental time travel, blind sight, and metacognition, have provided means
via which to investigate animal consciousness Evidence for animal consciousness has had major
implications for the formulation of laws that govern the animals and institutions of animal rights.
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 5
2.0 Introduction
Whether animals possess consciousness has been contested for many years. The answer, of
course, has implications for how humans perceive their place within the world, and for policies
that consider how non-human animals are treated. The question, therefore, is of importance.
Consequently, many philosophers and scientists have developed ways in which animal
consciousness can be investigated. However, various perceptions of the existence of animal
consciousness remain. For example, some individuals perceive the animals to be mere automata
while others acknowledge that indeed animals have consciousness that is perhaps somewhat
analogous to our own (Papineau et al., 2002).
2.1 Definitions of Consciousness
It is probable that the nature of consciousness takes various forms across the multitude of known
species. In certain animals (e.g. Placozans, jellyfish), it is conceivable that consciousness simply
confers upon the organism the ability to perceive sensations. In other animals (e.g. great apes),
however, perhaps consciousness comprises other capacities such as thinking, or the capacity to
experience emotions, in addition to the ability to perceive sensations (Bermond, 2001). However,
despite the contributions from scientists and philosophers, there remains no precise definition of
consciousness. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the best way to understand the meaning of
consciousness is through the separation of various aspects of consciousness, which include the
explicit (phenomenal), implicit (self-consciousness) and access consciousness (Papineau et al.
2002).
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 6
The explicit aspect is the experiential aspect of consciousness and is composed of all the
information that the animals need to know about themselves, their senses and the environment
around them (Brigandt et al., 2005). On the other hand, implicit consciousness is composed of
the functions of cognition that occur without awareness. It is essential to note that no intentional
choices are made in this aspect of consciousness. Access consciousness is a more technical form
of consciousness. It arises when the phenomenal consciousness fails. It occurs in instances when
mental representations have been poised for use in rational control of actions and speech (Horgan
and Tienson 2002).
Given that consciousness appears to consist of different aspects, it is possible to conceive of
states of consciousness in terms of varying levels of complexity, whereby the quantity of facets
present in an organism’s conscious experience reflects the complexity of their consciousness.
Indeed, Edelman and Seth (2009) suggest that consciousness exists in four basic levels. These
levels include consciousness with only one sense, consciousness with all the sensory systems
integrated, consciousness with all sensory systems integrated with emotions, and consciousness
that integrates sensory systems, emotions, and in which thoughts are in symbolic language
(Gennaro et al, 2004).
In trying to establish the presence of consciousness in animals, it is relevant for one to
understand its concepts. Consciousness is composed of numerous senses. Thus, the presence of
these senses is what makes an animal be identified as having consciousness (Chalmers et al,
2003). The following considers are range of broad perspectives, as well as more specific theories,
of consciousness that have been derived from various commonly-used methodological paradigms
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 7
developed to establish whether consciousness – or aspects of it – is present in a number of
different species.
2.2 Foundational Theories on Consciousness
Various theories have been postulated that to try to explain consciousness in animals. There are
two broad categories of theories: the metaphysical and consciousness theories (Sufka et al,
2009).
2.3 Metaphysical Theories of Consciousness
The metaphysical theories are composed of the Dualist and Physicalist accounts. The former,
essentially, argues that the mind and body are distinct, whilst the later, conversely, postulates that
there are no non-physical phenomena.
2.3.1 Dualist Theories
Cartesian dualism posits that the human body embodies the Cartesian mind – where the mind
and body are able to interact. (Fig 1)Accordingly, the perspective argues that since animal
behaviour does not require a non-mechanistic explanation, it is not necessary to confer upon
animals the cognitive capacities required for a Cartesian mind (Tye, 2000). That is, since animal
behaviour can be explained in mechanistic terms, it makes no sense to attribute them with
consciousness. This theory does not attempt to prove that humans lack the fundamental mental
properties or substances. Why would you expect it to? In addition, the theory does not suggest
that the model be used to establish the absence of presence of consciousness in animals.
Examples of dualistic theories include substance dualism, property dualism, fundamental
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 8
property dualism, emergent property dualism, neutral monist property dualism and panpsychism
(Van Gulick, 2003).
Property dualism, in contrast to Cartesian dualism, asserts that, whilst there are only physical
substances, these consist of two properties – physical and mental. Fundamental property dualism,
on the other hand, suggests that consciousness has properties that form the basic constituents of
realities together with physical properties such as electromagnetic charge. The emergent theory
suggests that consciousness arises from complex organisations of physical constituents that are
neither predictable nor explicable in terms of their physical properties (Smith and Washburn,
2003). Neutral monist property dualism on the other hand, treats both the properties of
consciousness and physical properties as derivatives of real life. Both the physical properties and
the properties of consciousness depend on real life for existence. Finally, Panpsynchism theory
regards the properties of reality to differ from those of physical properties (Kouider et al., 2010)
(Fig 1).
2.3.2 Physicalist Accounts
Physicalist theories acknowledge the presence of consciousness in animals. However, they argue
that the qualitative nature of that consciousness depends on the biological, chemical and physical
principles that animals are built upon (Terrace 2009). The theory points out the level of
consciousness are highly particular in the mammal populations of the animal kingdom (Papineau
2002).
Examples of the physicalist theories include eliminativism, identify theory and the type-type
identify theory. The eliminativism theory terms consciousness as non-existent. This is attributed
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 9
to the lack of clear merit in separating consciousness from unconsciousness (Seth et al. 2003).
The identity theory on the other hand relates consciousness to the neurophysiological nature. The
type-type identity theory, in contrast to elimitavism, postulates that for every mental state there is
a distinct, corresponding physiological process. Presumably, therefore, advocates of this
perspective would accept that an animal experiences a given state of consciousness if it can be
established that the animal exhibits a physiological process that is known to correlate with a
specific mental state in humans.
2.4 Specific Theories of Consciousness
Various theories have been sectioned and outlined below that highlight specific theories of
consciousness (Figure 1). The following section considers the relevance of these theories -
neurofunctional accounts, representationalist accounts, higher-order theories, cognitive theories,
and quantum theories – to the question of animal consciousness.
2.4.1 Neurofunctional Accounts
Neurofunctional accounts support the existence of consciousness in the animal population. The
theory singles out the mammal population as having the most elaborate consciousness compared
to all the other animal groups (Sutton and Shettleworth 2008).The theory is based on the findings
of neuroscientists who have studied recurrent feedback in the sensory cortex. According to this
theory, the level of consciousness is directly proportional to the neuronal activity (Papineau
2002).
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 10
2.4.2 Representationalist Accounts
Representationalist accounts of consciousness link phenomenal consciousness to the
representational content of the mental state. The first order representationlist account
acknowledges that an organism with, for example, visual system state, is considered conscious
since the property represents functionally appropriate phenomena (O’Regan and Noe 2001).
Furthermore, the account suggests that the internal states that are present in animals have the
requisite functional and representational properties, and, therefore, animals are considered to
possess consciousness. The theory points out that consciousness in animals are directly
proportional to its capacity to perceive and respond to features in its environment (Horgan and
Tienson 2002). Whist there is something of an intuitive logic to this premise – from an
evolutionary perspective, indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the complexity of consciousness
in an organism would reflect the demands of its environment – it is appears difficult, if not
impossible, to use credible criteria via which extents of perception or responses could be
assessed.
2.4.3 Higher-Order Theories
The higher-order theory was formulated in response to dissatisfaction with the first order
theories. Whilst first order theories distinguish between phenomenal and reflective
consciousness, for example, higher order theories suggest that they form part of some higher, all-
encompassing representation. The higher order account is potentially more attractive in that
whilst it appears to make little sense to doubt that we have phenomenal experiences, one cannot
be as certain that what we might term reflective consciousness is distinct from phenomenal
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 11
experience. The theory points out that consciousness in animals is directly proportional to the
creatures’ theory of mind – the capacity, essentially, to consider another organism’s mental state
(Washbirn et al. 2006). Furthermore, the theory denies that many animals have phenomenal
consciousness. The theory does not support the existence of the non-human theory of mind.
However, according to the higher-order perspective, a limited number of animals, such as
chimpanzees, are considered to possess phenomenal experience (Papineau 2002).
Using theory of mind as a basis for establishing consciousness in animals is, however,
problematic for a number of reasons, including, for example, whether methodological
approaches can establish without doubt whether the animal in question possesses theory of mind.
Indeed, Penn and Povinelli (2007) argue that the methods that have often been employed by
researchers of animal theory of mind are inherently incapable of establishing its presence or
absence. Moreover, they suggest a tendency to anthropomorphize. Establishing evidence for
animal consciousness using the higher-order perspective’s criterion of theory of mind is,
therefore, at best, challenging.
Nagel’s (1974) now famous article, “What is it like to be a bat?” expresses a similar sentiment to
Penn and Povinelli (2007). Nagel argues that, whilst one might be able to imagine what it might
be like if they were a bat, they cannot, however, really experience what the bat experiences.
Nagel’s use of a bat – an organism that, of course, is now known to navigate with great accuracy
with the use of sonar – provides a powerful illustration of the limits of our imagination and
highlights, as Penn and Povinelli do, the potential pitfalls faced by those who conduct research
on animal consciousness.
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 12
Despite various philosophical theories having been put forward for the existence of
consciousness in animals, the theories still do not provide the most effective way of establishing
its presence (Rose, 2002). The explanation of consciousness still remains uncertain. All the
theories rely on various accounts of consciousness with none being sufficiently decisive to
endorse the actual existence or absence of consciousness among the animals. Most of the
proponents and the opponents have facts to back their arguments for the absence or existence of
animal consciousness (Van Gulick, 2003).
2.4.4 Cognitive Theories
This theory aims to elaborate consciousness in terms of cognitive processes. One cognitive
theory is the multiple draft model of consciousness, which combines both represenationalism,
and higher order theory. The theory aims to explain consciousness based on content relations and
is similar to that of higher order theories (Papineau, 2002).
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 13
Figure 1: The Theories of Consciousness from www.itsasmallweb.wordpress.com)
2.5 Measurement of Consciousness
The question of whether animals are conscious presents researchers with the task of establishing
empirical means of measuring it. Consciousness in animals can be assessed in many ways. The
techniques work in some animals, though are not applicable to all (Mellor et al. 2012).
One widely-used test is the mirror test which tests for self-recognition was developed by Gallup
(1970). It entails placing some sort of marker on an animal (e.g., a spot of paint) and seeing
whether, if placed in front of a mirror, the animal touches it. It has been argued that this
Own parallel “realm” of existence outside reality
Consciousness and its states are functions the brain performs
Functionalism
Physical property of matter (electromagnetism) Property Dualism
Simply, mental states are physical events seen in brain scans
Identity Theory
A sensation that “grows out of complicated brains Emergent Dualism
Just behaviour in certain ways Behaviourism
The idea of quantum mechanics and its effects on structures
Quantum Consciousness
The most significant thoughts that are highlighted Cognitivism
Higher order thoughts processed via conscious decisions
Higher Order Theory
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 14
behaviour indicates that the animal has some form of self-awareness (Radick, 2000). It has been
used to assess self-recognition in great apes (e.g., Gallup, 1970), cetaceans (e.g., Marten &
Psarakos, 1995), and solitary elephants (e.g., Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006). However this
technique has attracted various forms of criticism. For example, the mirror test relies solely on an
animal’s visual system. Consequently, it might not provide a suitable method for investigating
self-recognition in animals that primarily rely upon senses other than sight, such as canines,
which are known to be heavily dependent on their sense of smell (Mellor et al. 2012). Similarly,
it is conceivable that animals that are visually-orientated are simply not motivated to touch the
spot. Again, the tendency of researchers to anthropomorphise is revealed in the mirror test; whilst
it might be intuitive for humans to investigate an unfamiliar mark their body, this is not
necessarily the case for other animals.
A second approach used in the assessment of consciousness is metacognition which entails
thinking about one’s thoughts. Metacognition has been effective in providing evidence for
consciousness in dolphins, great apes and rhesus monkeys. In addition, it appears that these
species are fully aware of their mental strengths as well as their memories (Metcalfe and Kober
2005). The technique relies heavily on the images of the body and the ability of the animal to
demonstrate self awareness. The technique also seeks to establish the success or failure of the
subject’s cognitive capabilities. The behavioural criterion considered by metacognition is vital in
the analysis of animal consciousness. The technique has been key to establishing consciousness
in human beings but it uses verbal methods to establish consciousness (Jozefowiez et al. 2009).
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 15
A behaviourist account of consciousness provides a useful model for investigating animal
consciousness (Figure 2). Techniques that are based on the behaviourist account are founded on
the ability of the animal to perceive stimuli (Plotnik et al. 2006). Observations are made of the
behaviour elicited from an animal when a stimulus is introduced. This behaviour may lead to a
higher payoff. This behaviour change is measurable.
Another measurable parameter is the perception of pain which, in animals, is always
characterised by noise. During the study, painful stimuli are timed and the values plotted using
the Gaussian distribution (Jozefowiez, et al. 2006). In addition, metacognition can be measured
using the delayed matching to sample procedure. It entails the presentation of a stimulus,
followed by a brief delay, followed by the presentation of an array of stimuli; the participant is
required to indicate which stimulus was previously presented. The test, therefore, depends on the
ability of the animal to make decisions based on its internal representation rather than a direct
representation of a stimulus (Jozefowiez et al. 2009). That is, passing of the test requires that the
animal is capable of a type of consciousness that is not merely the product of the immediate
environment thus allowing evaluation of consciousness.
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 16
!
Figure 2 (above): The behaviour economic model of consciousness in animals: A flow chart highlighting the
impact a stimulus presents on an organism and its receptive response in the aftermath.
Some techniques attempt to test for whether an animal possesses theory of mind. Some of the
attributes include the beliefs, desires and knowledge. The attributes in animals are then compared
to the attributes of human beings. The theory of mind is founded on the presumption that humans
comprehend the existence of the mind based on introspection (i.e. the self-examination of one’s
conscious thoughts) (Pessoa et al. 2003). However, there is no direct mechanism of accessing the
mind of another animal. The theory implies links to the mental state of an animal with its
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 17
behaviour. It has been tested though, in chimpanzees since they are thought to understand the
goals, perceptions, intentions and knowledge of others. However, the theory has one issue as it
does not have the ability to attribute false beliefs (Tomasello 2008).
Interestingly, animal consciousness has been investigated in terms of their use of ‘mental time
travel’; this refers to the ability of the mind to travel back and forth in time. It is, of course, easy
to imagine how this capability can be tested in humans, though it is more difficult to measure use
of mental time travel in other animals (Mellor et al., 2012). Birds have proven to be a good
model for these studies. However, in actuality, mental time travel has been investigated quite
extensively in a range of animals, including, for example, birds. It has been shown that corvids
(e.g., jays) are able to remember what, where, and when they buried food, indicative that they are
able to store and subsequently represent in the present events that occurred in the past (Clayton
and Emery, 2009). Consequently, it is apparent that certain animals possess consciousness that is
more than merely a product of immediate sensory inputs.
The phenomenon of ‘blindsight’ has also provided insights in to the nature of consciousness.
Blind sight occurs when there is an injury to the occipital lobe that is responsible for vision.
According to this phenomenon, people will often be perpetually blind in certain areas of their
visual field. They will thus exhibit variations on the way they perceive certain stimulus (Barbas
et al. 2003). There are various types of blind sight category. Type-1 blind sight is composed of
the people who are able to predict the aspect of the visual stimulus such as their location and
type. These people have now awareness of the stimulus. The response offered in this category is
a forced response or a response that is arrived at by guess work. In type-2 blind sight, people
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 18
have some awareness about the stimuli. However, these individuals lack visual perception
(Tamietto and de Gelder 2010
Neuroimaging has also been used to investigate consciousness. Specifically, neuroimaging has
been used to study neural activity in the amygdala (which contains a collection of nuclei located
in the medial temporal lobe of the brain) and the ventral visual cortex. These studies have been
applied to animals. The amygdala plays a vital role in the ventral visual stream in primates by
enhancing levels of visual awareness (Anderson and Phelps 2002). It increases the activity of the
fisiform gyrus, thereby increasing the visual representation for the primates, thus they able to
have effective levels of awareness originating from the amygdala. The individuals with a lesion
in the amygdala will often have a decline in the fisiform gyrus. Thus, measuring activity of the
amygdala in primates offers a means of establishing the level of consciousness (Lahti et al.
1998).
Modern advances in functional brain imaging may now be the key to establishing the level of
consciousness in animals. Functional imaging (e.g., fMRI) refers to obtaining data regarding
activity within the nervous system, rather than measuring, for example, the size of physical
structures within the brain – as is with case with structural methods (e.g., MRI). The technique is
very useful in evaluation of consciousness in human beings (Robinson and Clore 2002) and
facilitates better understanding of the neuroanatomical organisation of behaviour. fMRI links the
behaviour of the animal to the neural activity after stimulation has occurred (Lahti et al. 1998).
Consequently, scientists can impute brain regions responsible for certain types of experience. For
example, the observation that different areas of the occipital cortex are active when animals are
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 19
presented with different types of visual stimuli suggests that the brain region is responsible for
visual experience. However, it is, of course, difficult to make any precise inferences regarding
the specific nature of the presumed experiences.
2.6 Recognising Consciousness in Animals
Neuroscience has gradually replaced the behaviourist techniques in psychology and ethology in
trying to establish the presence of consciousness in animals. However, cognitive abilities and
self-awareness are also being used to establish consciousness in animals (Mellor et al 2012).
2.6.1 Experience of Pain and Suffering
One of the strongest pieces of evidence of animal consciousness is found in their experience of
pain and suffering. Pain refers to interference in the psychological, neurological and behavioural
well being of animals (Mathews 2008). Studies show they also have a neurological system where
the pain begins when there is a clear differentiation between nociception and pain. In animals,
the capacity to respond to particular stimuli is one of the earliest forms of sensory capacity
(Barret et al. 2007, Tamietto and de Gelder 2010). However, it is necessary to distinguish
between the physical process of nociception and the subjective experience of pain.
Whilst it proves impossible, as Nagel (1974) argued, to actually know what it is like to be
someone or something else, it is possible to compare physiological responses and chart
behaviour. Such studies are highly suggestive that animals are conscious.
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 20
2.6.2Animal Emotions & Perceptual Phenomenology
If it were possible to prove that animals had emotions it could reasonably be taken as further
evidence of animals having consciousness. Emotions are considered an elementary component of
intelligence (Panksepp 2004) with perception also playing a part. Animals perceive things in the
natural environment and careful neural investigation reveals that animals are a product of
consciousness. Chiroptera (bat) is good example of an animal that uses perception (Smith 2009).
It is able to move around based on its ability to perceive echo vibrations, similar to that which
humans share when blind. Studies have shown that some visual field portions are subconsciously
altered as a result of consciousness (Roberts 2002).
2.7 Self-consciousness
Establishing the existence of self-consciousness in animals, in particular, chimpanzees have been
key to finding evidence for animal consciousness. They used the mirror test using untrained
chimpanzees and the chimps responded like humans (Sneddon et al. 2003). Interestingly, using
the mirror test, other non-human primates have been less promising. Modified versions of
Gallup’s (1974) experiment of the mirror test provide evidence that other non-primate species do
have self-consciousness. A prime example is in pigeons which were trained to peck on their
bodies that were visible in the mirrors. Similarly, dolphins have been shown to pass the mirror
test (Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007).
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 21
2.8 Implications of Animals Being Conscious
The implication that consciousness exists not only in humans but also in animals has had a
profound effect on how we view animal life. In humans the impact of consciousness, cannot be
underestimated (Trout, 2001). From our earliest developmental stages it can be identified, studies
suggest that foetuses have perceptions such as that of pain and that they experience sensations. In
the light of these data a major public debate has ensued about how consciousness is related to
rights of life for the foetus. The study has led to the establishment of welfare laws to cater for the
life of the foetus (Mellor et al., 2012.
It seems likely that our attitude to animals has been shaped by recent investigations into
establishment of animal consciousness. Evidence for animals experiencing pain as a consequence
of noxious stimuli has encouraged the development of animal rights. These rights are aimed at
protecting the animals from any form of violation of their bodies (Prinz 2005). Evolving views
concerning animal consciousness have led to significant changes in the law protecting animals.
Older laws were designed when little had been done to establish the presence of animal
consciousness (Leavens 2004).The change has been driven by studies showing that in the early
stages of life, the animals are capable of perceiving noxious stimuli. In countries, such as New
Zealand, the Animals’ Welfare Act protects even the foetuses of the mammals (Zeman 2003).
For some, animals are considered to have the same moral status as the humans. Activists argue
that the rights of the animals ought to be respected in the same way that the human rights are.
According to animal rights activists, animal rights should not be overridden by people to justify
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 22
their means. Therefore, people have to treat the animals in accordance with their rights (Mellor et
al. 2012).
3.0 Conclusion
Various studies have been carried out over time to try to establish the presence of consciousness
in animals. It is evident that indeed animals have variations of consciousness. The establishment
of consciousness in animals in some studies is based on the fact that they are able to perceive
stimuli. The perception of stimuli is only possible when a living organism has a central nervous
system and neuronal mechanisms that support the transmission of impulses. This raises the
question of whether non-vertebrates are susceptible to a conscious feeling.
Evidence for consciousness can be found in data that shows that animals are able to perceive
various forms of stimuli such as pain. In addition, the animals are able to mount an effective
response towards the stimuli (e.g. making a noise when the stimulus is noxious). Further
establishment of animal consciousness is based on self-consciousness. It is evident that during
the mirror test animals are able to recognize that there is a difference in their appearance. This
shows that animals have the capability of recognising themselves. Self-consciousness is only
possible when an animal has consciousness. Hence, these animals have consciousness even
though the level of consciousness differs from one animal to another.
Presently, neuronal analysis is providing a better way of establishing levels of consciousness in
animals. For instance, by using fMRI one is able to analyse the activity of the neurones.
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 23
The perception ability has also played a vital role in the establishment of consciousness in
animals. An example of such a technique is the blindsight test. The test is based on perpetual
visual ability of an individual. However, neuronal analysis is the best technique that is currently
used in establishing the presence of consciousness in animals. This technique is more effective
than other methods since it uses neuronal activity to establish animal consciousness.
The establishment of the presence of consciousness in animals has led to the introduction of
various laws that protect the animals. In addition, the ability of the animals to perceive noxious
stimuli has also made them giant in their own rights. According to this, laws and rights of the
animals have stemmed from evidence that they are conscious entities like us.
Jananan Nandakumar 090137918 | Are animals conscious? 24
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