Broadcasting, Advertising Finance, and the Rationale for

Public Broadcasting

Simon P. AndersonHans Jarle Kind

Guttorm Schjelderup

Bologna, 5th Media Economics Conference

October 16-17 2007

background• 2-sided market performance: may not serve

segments of low value to high-paying side

• Steiner, Beebe models

• Allow for viewers worth different amounts

• Role of public broadcaster

• Extension to ad competition (nuisance)

Model the product differentiation structure

• Armstrong-Weeds; Anderson-Gabszewicz

Steiner, 1952

• Principle of Duplication• Single program type per viewer type• 700,000 watch only game show• 300,000 watch only operaPeople equally valuable to advertisers• 2 stations, duplicate GameShow• Monopoly would air both with 2 channels• Public Broadcaster: air Opera (private airs GS) • (do not succumb to pressure to serve majority)

Duplication

• Steiner. Duplication.

riddle

• Like Boulding Principle of Minimum Diff

For spatial model

• Suppose 2 private, 1 public firms

• private: max market length

• Public: maximize social welfare

• What equilibrium locations ?

Differing values to advertisers(disenfranchised viewers)

• 51%, 20+, prefer Sitcom• 49% OAPs prefer Nature

20+ are each worth 3 times as much

• 3 channels – all SitComs• Make 1 Public; air Nature:

20+ no worse off; advertisers neither!

Advertisers better off if Public accepts ads

JUST replace market size with economic worth in S

LCD tastes

• Beebe. Lowest Common Denominator.

Country-rock; talk-rock; news-rock

Monopoly may provide only rock (LCD)

Competition caters to individual groups

Beebe and the Lowest Common Denominator

Group 1st choice 2nd Choice

1 (33.5% ) Sports Game Show

2 (33.5% ) News Game Show

3 (33% ) Drama Game Show

Beebe Table

• 2 competing each air GS (LCD)

• Duplication, now at a lower level

• Make 1 Public – should air S or N

• More pronounced version:

Beebe and the Lowest Common Denominator (2)

Group 1st choice 2nd Choice

1 (33.5% ) Sports Game Show

2 (33.5% ) News Game Show

3 (33% ) Sports Game Show

Beebe Table (2)

• 2 competing each air S (not LCD)• Make 1 Public – should air N; now all served!

• Variations of above when viewer worth differs …

• Next: intro ad nuisance and comp into above

Steiner: with ad nuisance

• u i = r – γiai i = 1,…,K; u 0 = 0

• γi nuisance/ad; ai ads on channel i,

Ni potential viewers on program type i

• Res price, r, uniform on [0, Ri]

• Hence number of viewers:

Di = (1 – γiai/Ri) Ni

CSi = (Ri – γiai)2 Ni /2Ri

Steiner; ad nuisance

• Profits: πi = vi ai Di with

Di = (1 – γiai/Ri)Ni • So choose aM

i = Ri/2γi

• πi* = vi Ri Ni/4γi

• So, if Bertrand in niche; choose those for which this is greatest

• Can consider Cournot variant (ad levels adjust)• Next: Public Broadcaster; also, extending Beebe

Public Broadcaster in Steiner

• Public carries ads iff γi < vi

• Surplus:

Si = (viai + (Ri– γiai)/2) (Ri– γiai)Ni /Ri

• Gives optimal ads

- below monopoly level as it internalizes the ad nuisance

(ad market power effect has been shut down here) • Which channel ?

- where incremental surplus highest; e.g. high γi

LCD structures

• 1 LCD program, M others• “Hotelling” on each arm• Can also do LCD with other duopoly models.

• Ad revenues proportional to ads• Nuisance $γi/ad: set γi = 1• Ni viewers per arm, worth vi each

• Suppose first all arms are occupied, later deal with “empty” arms

Preliminaries to Beebe-Hotelling

• Recall:

ui = R + qi – ai – t|x - xi|, xi = {0, 1}

xind = ½ + [(q0 – a0 )- (q1 – a1 )]/2t

Hence best-reply:

0 = ½ + [(q0 – 2a0 ) - (q1 – a1 )]/2t or

a0 = t/2 + [(q0 - q1 ) + a1 ]/2 and

a1 = t/2 + [(q1 – q0 ) + a0 ]/2

(strategic complements) So

a*0 = t +(q0 - q1 )/3 and a*

1 = t + (q1 – q0)/3

For Monopoly segments

• For segments without a competitor:

xind = [Ri + (q0 – a0)]/t

Hence best action.

Putting together: markets linked through LCD, although not a direct strategic link.

Solution (qualities suppressed):

• a0 = (4ΣERi vi + 3t ΣFvi ) / (8ΣEvi + 3ΣFvi ) • Familiar forms when:

- Single empty market: a0 = Ri / 2

- Single full market: a0 = t

Otherwise, multi-market contact spillovers.

[non-LCD profit is simply vi [a0+ t ]/4t, so tend to take high valuation slots]

Now, suppose one private is rendered public

Setting one station public

• As with Steiner analysis, Public wants lower ad level to internalize viewer nuisance

• Here we have strategic complements, so

Lower LCD ad level

Lower ads on other stations

Raises welfare throughout

Which station? Add low value/nuisance; substitute one with a high nuisance.

Riddle solution

• 2 private companies at ¼

• Public broadcaster at ¾

• Public serves ½ the market

• Existence in pure strategies

conclusions

• Extend Steiner and Beebe to different viewer worth and Ad nuisance

• Illustrated performance shortcomings with public firm

Further work needs to addressDoes monopoly perform better than comp?Which program type(s) to produce?• Positive theory of Public Broadcaster• NPR (voluntary contributions) business model

The role for Public TV• Early history: control info (cold war, WWII)

• Weak ad demand, exclusion infeasible: public good

• Stronger ad demand: disenfranchisement problem

• With exclusion now possible, is there a role?

• Provide for disenfranchised poor

- are these the programs we see?

• arts subsidy, cultural export, local content

• Altering performance of private sector

• Modeling issue: citizen candidate, SW max?