Broad Doctrinal Implications of CSR for Religion and Theology

7/29/2019 Broad Doctrinal Implications of CSR for Religion and Theology

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2008 University of Oxford

Broad doctrinal implications of CSR for religion and theologyGeneral questions

To what degree is cognitive science of religion (CSR) relevant to theology? Does CSR onlyexplain the groundwork of religion, leaving theology proper largely untouched? Are the claims

of CSR and theology consonant with one another or are they in conflict? Does the believer who

accepts the claims of CSR have to jettison purposiveness in their theological vision? Is religiononly compatible with CSR on the assumption of some sort of theistic determinism? Does the

CSR claim that beliefs are (often) rationalisations of intuitions force a theological recognition of

the primacy of the will in the determination of belief? Does CSR suggest a demotion of therole of reason in religion? What are the implications for doctrinal instruction? Are certain belief

systems more compatible with the findings of CSR than others? Is CSR only genuinely

compatible with naturalism?

Summary

Theological discussion about the broad doctrinal implications of CSR is in its early stages, and

there is some disagreement about how relevant the findings of CSR are to matters of theological

importance, and, where they are agreed to be relevant, what manner of engagement with CSR isappropriate. Some scholars (e.g., Bielfeldt [1]) have cast doubt on the ability of CSR or the

cognitive sciences in general to contribute anything substantially new to topics as important as

the divine nature, divine action, and the nature of the self, whereas others have begun to stressthe relevance of the findings of CSR and the importance of engagement (e.g., Oviedo [2]) but

differ about what form the engagement should take. While some have supposed that thehypotheses and findings of CSR can be shown to be in substantial concord with traditionalreligious claims [2, 3], others (e.g., Peterson [4]) suggest that CSR is basically hostile to these

claims and the appropriate theological response should be fundamental critique. The CSR

approach to religious belief and behavior is often perceived as an attempt to 'explain away'religion, an impression encouraged by occasional statements by some cognitive scientists of

religion to that effect (e.g., Boyers claim in Religion explained[5] that people who think that

we have religion because religion is true...will find little here to support their views). Thereseems to be general agreement that theologians should neither accept the entirety of the CSR

view nor fail to engage with those parts of it which demand very serious consideration, but that

this latter middle way (Oviedo) may require revisions of important religious doctrines, with

opinions differing on the extent of the revision required.

Examples of philosophical and theological issues

According to Peterson [4], one example of a central theological doctrine potentially undermined

by the findings of CSR would be what he refers to as the received or humanist view of the

person shared by theists and humanists alike and traceable back to the biblical doctrine of imagodei. On the assumption of evolutionary naturalism we would we stripped of our sense that we

were made for some purpose or other [cf. 6], but even assuming some sort of consonance

between evolutionary theory and theism, CSR explanations of religious belief and behaviour


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might still be regarded as casting doubt on the traditional doctrine of human free will. Brelsford

[7] has argued that CSRs claim that religious beliefs derive from (unconscious) intuitions

arising from basic evolved structures of mind need not imply complete determinism, sinceintuitions need not be seen merely as fixed outcomes of structures of mind but as capable of

being consciously reformed or overridden via intentional reflection and practice. Nevertheless,he sees it as a consequence of the findings of CSR that religious beliefs do not typically or easily

result from conscious mental processes, and actions and behaviours do not derive from and are

not readily governed by conscious beliefs, a finding which does carry implications, e.g., fortraditional approaches to religious instruction, since what one would actually think or do will

more obviously be constrained by ones intuitions than by any taught religious content [cf. also

8]. Other examples of central theological doctrines in the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic traditionpotentially affected by the findings of CSR are beliefs about the afterlife (see Afterlife beliefs

and mind-body dualism summary) and the divine-human relationship (see Agency

detection/HADD summary).Some scholars might doubt whether the findings of CSR can plausibly be made

consistent with the main claims of the Abrahamic traditions and argue instead that CSR claims

are more compatible with a straightforwardly naturalist view or perhaps with non-Abrahamicreligious approaches. Kurland [9], focussing on the implications of evolutionary theory for

religion, has suggested that the Abrahamic notion that humans are created in the image of God

and capable at least in principle of pure altruism must yield place to a recognition that we are theevolved result of a balance between cooperative and competitive instincts. In light of these types

of considerations an argument could be made that Buddhism appears much more compatible

with the findings of CSR than the Abrahamic traditions and their assumptions about humanpersonhood, since it enables us to accept the reality of an indifferent nature (including persons).

Moreover, according to Kurland and others Buddhism may be more compatible with a modularunderstanding of mind, since from the Buddhist perspective the self is an illusion, and theillusion could potentially be explained as the result of discrete mental modules producing the

deceptive appearance of a unified consciousness.

Outstanding issues

Are CSR and religion consonant or do they conflict? Is CSR more compatible with theistic or non-theistic religions, or with naturalism? Which theological doctrines are potentially affected by CSR findings? Which are not? Does CSR only explain superstition? What are the implications for theological anthropology? What are the implications for free will/reason? Do the findings of CSR carry lessons for religious instruction? What are the implications of the CSR view of religious belief formation for theology? Can the findings of CSR illuminate how the believer is supposed to come to knowledge of

God?

See also

Afterlife beliefs and mind-body dualism; Agency detection/HADD


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References

1. Bielfeldt, D., Three questions about minding God. Zygon, 2004. 39(3): p. 591-604.2. Oviedo, L.,Is a complete biocognitive account of religion feasible? Zygon, 2008. 43(1):

p. 103-126.3. Barrett, J.L., Why would anyone believe in God? 2004, Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira

Press.

4. Peterson, G.R., Theology and the science wars: who owns human nature? Zygon, 2006.

41(4): p. 853-862.

5. Boyer, P., Religion explained: the evolutionary origins of religious thought. 2001, New

York: Basic Books.6. Bering, J.M., The folk psychology of souls. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2006. 29: p.

453-498.

7. Brelsford, T., Lessons for religious education from cognitive science of religion.Religious Education, 2005. 100(2): p. 174-191.

8. Lawson, E.T., A new look at the science-and-religion dialogue. Zygon, 2005. 40(3): p.

555-563.9. Kurland, J.A., Toward an evolution of mind: implications for the faithful? Zygon, 1999.

34(1): p. 67-92.

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Broad Doctrinal Implications of CSR for Religion and Theology