Briefs filed by Scott Morris against Cape Corl's fire services assessment

8/10/2019 Briefs filed by Scott Morris against Cape Corl's fire services assessment

1/51

Filing 11472066 Electronical ly

Filed

03/1 :4fl 54 145:38:59,

John A. Tomasino,

Clerk,

Supreme

Cour t

IN THE SUPREME

COURT

OF FLORIDA

CASE

NO:

SC14 - 350

Bond

Validation Appea l from a Final Judgment

ofth e Twent ieth Jud ic ia l Circui t ,

Lee County ,

Florida

SCOTT MORRIS ,

JOHN SULL IVAN , LARRY BARTON,

RICHARD

KUDLA

AND

WILLIAM

DEILE,

Appel lants,

V.

CITY OF CAPE CORAL,

Appellee.

APPELLANTS INITIAL

BRIEF

MORRIS LAW

FIRM,

P.A.

Scot t

Morr is ,

Esquire

Florida Bar

Number :

0083755

Post Office Box

152908

Cape

Coral,

FL 33915 -2908

239

772-1635

TELEPHONE

( 239 ) 772 -1524

F S I M I L E

Scot t@Morr isLawFi rm.ora

Counse l

for

Appe l lan ts


2/51

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

T a b l e

o f C o n t e n t s i

T a b l e

o f Authorit ies i i i

I n t r o d u c t i o n

S ta te m e n t of

J u r i s d i c t i o n 2

S t a t e m e n t

of th e s e

a n d th e F a c t s 3

S u m m a r y of th e A r g u m e n t 6

A r g u m e n t

I

TH E

T R I A L C O U R T C O M M I T T E D R E V E R S I B L E

ERROR

B Y

I N C L U D I N G F I N D I N G S OF F A C T IN

TH E F I N A L

J U D G M E N T

W H I C H

A R E

N O T S U P P O R T E D B Y S U B S T A N T I A L C O M P E T E N T

E V I D E N C E 9

II TH E TRIA L C O U R T S F IN DIN G T H AT C IT Y

C O UN C I L C O M P L I E D

W I T H

P R O C E D U R A L

D U E

PROCESS IS N O T

SUPPORTED

B Y

S U B S T A N T I A L C O M P E T E N T E V I D E N C E A N D IS

R E V E R S I B L E

E R R O R

7

III

TH E

TRIA L C O U R T

C O M M I T T E D REVERSIBLE

ERROR

B Y IT S

D E N I A L

OF TH E

PROPERTY OWNERS OR E TENUS M O T I O N

F O R C O N T I N U A N C E 2 4

IV T H E R E

IS N O S U B S TA N TI AL C O M P E T E N T E V I D E N C E TO

S U P P O R T

TH E

F I N D I N G B Y

C IT Y

C O U N C I L A N D

TH E T R I A L

C O U R T

T H A T TIER

OF

TH E F IR E A S SE S SM E N T C O M P L I E S

W I T H

TH E

R E Q U I R E M E N T S

OF

F L O R I D A

S T A T U T E

1 7 0 2 0 1 2 9


3/51

V. THERE

IS

NO

SUBSTANT IAL COMPETENT EV IDENCE TO

SUPPORT

TH E F IND ING BYCITY COUNC IL

AN D

TH E TRIAL

COURT

THAT

T IER 2 OF T HE FIR E A SS E S S ME NT C OM P LIE S

WITH

THE

REQUIREMENTS OF FLORIDA

STATUTE

170.201.........35

C o n c l u s i o n 4 2

C e r t i f i c a t e o f

S e r v i c e 4 4

C e r t i f i c a t e o f

C o m p l ia n c e 4 5


4/51

TABLE

OF

AUTHORITIES

Decisional uthority

City

of

Boca Raton,

Florida

v. State of

Florida,

5 9 5

S o .

2 d

2 5

F l a .

1 9 9 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0

Collier County,

Florida v.

State

ofFlorida,

7 3 3

S o . 2 d 1 0 1 2 F l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 , 4 1

De Groot v. Sheffield,

9 5 S o . 2 d

9 1 2

F la . 1 9 5 7 ) . . . . .. . . . . .. . . : . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . 1 6

Fisher v. Board ofCounty

Commissioners

ofDade County,

8 4

S o .

2 d 5 7 2 F l a . 1956 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 , 3 4 , 4 0

Fleming v. Fleming,

7 1 0 S o . 2 d 6 F l a . 4 * D C A 19 9 8 ) . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . 2 7 ,

2 8

Florida

Department

of

Revenue

v. New

Sea

Escape

Cruises

LTD,

8 9 4 S o . 2 d 9 5 4

F la . 2 0 0 5 ) . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . 2 0 ,

2 1

Holland v. Gross,

8 9 S o . 2 d 2 5 5 F l a .

1 9 5 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 , 1 5 , 1 7 , 2 9 , 3 5

In

the Interest of

D.S., B.R.,

R.R.

and C.R.

Children, M.R., m other v . Department

of

Children and

Fam ily Services,

8 4 9

S o . 2 d 4 1 1 F l a . 2 d D C A 2003 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8

Keys Cit izens for Responsible Government,

Inc ., v .

Florida

Keys Aqueduct

Authority,

7 9 5 S o . 2 d

9 4 0

F l a .

2 001 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 ,

1 8

Lake County ,

Florida

v . Wa ter

Oak Managem ent

Corporation,

6 9 5

S o . 2 d 6 6 7 F la .

1 9 9 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2

S e e

Dissent

11 1


5/51

Massey

v . Cha rlo tte County , Florida,

8 4 2 S o . 2 d 1 4 2 F l a . 2 d DCA

2 0 0 3 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7

Panama

City Beach

Commun i t y Redevelopment Agency v. State Florida,

8 3 1

S o .

2 d 6 6 2

F l a .

2 0 0 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1

Sanford

v. Rubin,

2 3 7

S o .

2 d 1 3 4

F l a . 1 9 7 0 ) . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . 2 3

Savage

v.

State

Florida

1 2 0 S o .

3 d 6 1 9

F l a .

2 d D C A 2 0 1 3 ) . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . 1 5 , 1 6 3 4

Sarasota

County v. Sarasota Church

Christ,

Inc.,

6 6 7

S o . 2 d 1 8

F l a . 1 9 9 5 ) . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . 4 1

S t . Lucie County - Fort Pierce Fire

Prevention

and

Control

Distr ict

v.

Higgs,

1 4 1 S o

2 d 7 4 4

F l a .

1962 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9

Strand

v.

Escambia

County, Florida,

9 9 2

S o .

2 d

1 5 0

F l a .

2 0 0 8 ) . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 9 ,

1 7

2 4 , 2 9 , 3 5

Universal Insurance Company North Amer ica v. Warfe l

8 2 S o 3 d

4 7 F l a . 2012 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Statutory

Authori ty:

F l o r i d a S t a t u t e s S e c t i o n

1 7 0 . 2 0 1 . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . 2 9 ,

3 5 , 3 9 ,

4 2 ,

4 3

F l o r i d a S t a t u t e s S e c t i o n 75 . 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

F l o r i d a S t a t u t e s S e c t i o n 75 . 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Other Author i ty :

Florida

Rule of

Appellate

P r o c e d u r e 9 .030 (a) (1 )(B) (i).............................................2

Florida Constitution

Article V ,

S e c t i o n

3 b ) 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2


6/51

B l a c k s L a w

D i c t i o n a r y Fifth

E d i t i o n 1 9 7 9 . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . 1 5 , 3 2 , 3 6

P a m e l a

M . D u b o v C i r c u m v e n t i n g th e

F l o r i d a C o n s t i t u t i o n :

P r o p e r t y T a x e s

a n d

S p e c ia l A s s e s s m e n ts T o d a y s

I l l u s o r y

D i s t i n c t i o n

3 0

S t e t s o n L . R e v .

1 4 6 9

2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42


7/51

I NTRODUCT ION

This

is

an

appea l

f rom

a f i n a l

judgment

in

a

bond

val idat ion

proceed ing

entered by th e Circui t

Cour t of

th e Twe nt ie th Judic ia l Circuit, in and

fo r Lee

County, Florida on

December

11, 2013 , and th e subsequent den ia l

of

th e

Appe l l an ts Mo t i o n fo r Rehea rin g o n January 10, 2014 .

Rather than util ize th e full par ty names, Defendants be l ow and Appe l l an t s

here a r e referred

to a s

the

Prop er ty Owners.

Rather than utilize the full

party

name,

the

Pla in t i f f

be low

and

Appel lee

here will

be

re fer red to

a s

C i ty

Counci l .

The .Append ix will

be

referred to

by

the

symbo l

A PP

fo l lowed b y

th e

page

number

of

the

appended document, e g (APP

0001. )


8/51

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Under

Florida

Statutes

sec tion 75 .01 ,

a Circui t

Court

has

jur isdic t ion

to

determine th e validity ofbonds, and all mat te rs connected therewi th . Pursuan t

to

Florida

Rule

ofAppellate Procedure 9.030(a)(1)(B)(i) ,

th is

Cour t has jur isdic t ion

over

f inal

orders

entered in

proceedings

fo r

th e

validation ofbonds where provided

by general law . Th is Cou rt h a s mandatory jur isdict ion to

hear

appeals from final

j udgments entered

in a proceeding fo r th e

validation

of

bonds.

Th e

Florida

Constitution

at

Article V,

section

3(b)(2)

and

Florida

Statutes

sec tion 75 .08 provides tha t either party

m ay

appeal th e tr ial court s decision on th e

complaint fo r validation.

2


9/51

STATEMENT

OF

THE

CASE

AND

THE

FACTS

This appea l a r ises

from

a

f ina l judgment

granting City Council s

p r a ye r to

val idate

its Fire Protection

Assessment

Revenue

Note, Series

2013 , in

a

pr inc ipa l amount not to exceed 1 ,500,000.

(APP

0878-0900. )

The

notes

are

to

fund in pa r t th e acquisit ion

of

cer ta in

capita l

equipment

fo r

th e

fire department.

The appea l a lso involves

th e

denia l

of th e

motion fo r

rehear ing.

The Proper ty

Owners

file this appea l requesting remand and/or reve rsa l of th e f inal

judgment.

City

Council

f irst

cons ide red the idea

of

a

fire

assessment

in

2009

a s

pa r t

of

a

report prepared by Bu rton

Associates,

a t

which

t ime

it was

decided

by

City

Counc il not to

proceed.

On pril

3,

2013 ,

City Counci l approved

Administ rat ive

Resolut ion 2013-13 to engage

the

services ofBurton

Associates

to update the

report from

2009. (APP 0789-0790.)

City

Counc il h e ld

a workshop on

J une 3 ,

2013 ,

where in th e

init ial results

of

the updated Burton Associates r epo r t dated Ma y 2 4, 2 01 3, we r e received. Af te r

the

workshop

the

City

Manage r rece ived the

f inal

study

dated

June 6 2013 . The

f inal study was

approved

by City Counci l on

June

1 2013 .

In addit ion

to

approva l

of

the f ina l study, City Counci l directed the City

Manager

to

bring

forth

1 A f inal r ev ised s tudy was issued by Bu r ton Associa tes on August 22,

2013 ,

th e re is

no subs tan tia l compe ten t evidence

in

th e r e co rd to suppor t th e

findings wh ich

City Counci l

made

concerning

th e

f inal r ev ised s tudy a t

th e

August

26 , 2013,

meeting.

(APP 1056-1204.)

3


10/51

an enab lin g o rd in a n ce fo r th e fire assessment a nd

a n

i n i t i a l assessmen t resolut ion.

(APP

0789-0790. )

City Counc i l

passed

Ord in a n ce 41 -13 , the Fire Protec t ion Asses smen t

Ord inance

on July 15 , 2013.

Ord in a n ce 41 -13

descr ibed

in deta i l th e

procedura l

due

process r ights a s created by C ity Counc i l fo r th e Prope r ty Owne rs c on c ern in g

th e

imp lemen ta t i on of

th e Fire

Protec t ion

Assessmen t .

(APP 0791- 0814.)

City

Counc i l passed Resolut ion 30-13 the Fire Protec tion

Assessmen t In i t ia l

A s s e s s m e n t

Resolution

o n

July

2 9

2013.

(APP

0815-0836.)

City

Counc i l

p a s s e d

Resolut ion

32-13

th e Fire Protec tion

Fina l Assessmen t

Resolut ion on

Augus t

26 , 2013. (APP 0837-0863.)

City

Council

p a s s e d

Note

Ordinance

47-13

on August 2 6 2013. (APP 0864-

0877.)

City

Counci l 's

Comp la i n t

fo r

Val idat ion

was

f i led in

th e

Circui t

Cour t

of

th e

Twent ieth Judic ia l Circuit ,

in

and fo r

Lee

County,

Florida

on

Augus t 28, 2 013 .

(APP

0878-0900, wi thout attachments. )

The Circui t Court

i ssued

a n Order

to

Show

Cause

on September

1 1 2013 ,

fo r a

one hou r

hear ing

on

October

7,

2013.

( APP 0901- 09 04.)

The one-hour

show cause

hear ing commenced

on October 7, 2013,

and

e n d e d

on October 9 2013. (

APP

0001-0489.) (APP 0901-0904.)


11/51

Based o n T a la n Corpora t ion s fi l ings after th e conclus ion

of

th e show cause

hear ing,

th e t r ia l court a l l owed an add i t i ona l hea ring on November 27 , 2013,

wh ich

was described a s both ev iden t ia ry and

non-evident iary

(APP 0490-0707. )

f ina l

judgment

was

entered by

th e

t r ia l court

on

December

11,

2013.

(APP 0708-0745 .)

Mot ion

fo r

Rehear ing was time ly filed on Decembe r 23,

2013.

The

Motion directed the tr ial

cou rt s attention

to the f inal

judgmen t s reliance on

facts

that were

not

in

evidence.

(APP

0746-0786.)

The.Mot ion fo r Rehear ing was

denied

wi thou t

hear ing

on

January

1 2014.

This

t imely a p p e a l

fo l lowed. (APP 0787.)

The

t r ia l court issued its ow n

order

styled

O rde r Sett ing Evident iary

Hear ing describing th e November 27, 2013,

hear ing

rega rd ing Ta lan s

fi l ings

fo r

th e

stated purpose to al low l imited evidence

and

arguments to T a la n s

apport ionment methodology

objection .

(APP 1018-1019.) Ye t a t

th e

hear ing, th e

t r ia l court

indicated it was

no t

rece iv ing add i tiona l evidence, and act ively

precluded

parties from

in troducing new evidence. (APP 0499 ,0500 ,0526 . ) In

th e

f ina l

judgment th e t r ia l court re l ied

on matters

beyond

th e

scope ofTalan

Corpora t ion s

partic ipation in

th e act ion which

were argued, but n o t in t roduced

into evidence, on November

27,

2013. (APP

0708-0745.)


12/51

S U M M A R Y O F T HE A RG U M EN T

Property O w n e r s

c o nte n d t he

trial c o u rt c o m m it te d

reversible

error

in m o r e

than on e area, an y ofw h i c h d e m a n d either remand o r reversal of th e trial cou r t s

final ju d g me n t .

Th e

trial co u r t

c o mmi t t e d

reversible e r r o r b y setting forth f md i n g s

in

th e

final j u d g m e n t w h i c h a r e n o t supported b y

substantial

competent evidence.

t is

abundantly clear that th e trial

cou r t considered

Resolution 5 6 - 1 3 , in

crafting

th e

final

j u d gm en t . Resolution

5 6-1 3 w as

passed

b y

City

C ounc i l

o n N o v e m b e r

2 5 ,

2 0 1 3 ,

o n ly tw o

days before th e N o v e m b e r 2 7 ,

2 0 1 3 ,

h e arin g o n T ala n s m o t io n .

Resolution 5 6 - 1 3 w as n o t in t ro d u c e d

a s evidence

at

th e

N o v e m b e r 2 7 ,

2 0 1 3 ,

hearing.3

City C ou n ci l s

attorney

tried

to

discuss

Resolution 5 6 - 1 3 at

th e

N ovemb er 2 7, 2 0 1 3 ,

hearing.

Since Resolution 5 6 - 1 3

w as n ot

plead in

th e

original

complaint ,

there

w as

a

concern

that

th e

matter

w o u l d

be

tried

b y

im pl ied

c o n s e n t

n o t objected

to .

Scott M orri s objected to n e w matters b e i n g b ro u gh t to th e trial cou r t s

attention w h i c h

h ad

n o t been f ramed b y

t h e p le ad in g s

in th e c a s e

since

there

h ad

A l th o u g h n o t i n t r o d u ce d a s evidence

in

th e c a s e Resolution 5 6 - 1 3 is part of

th e record

b y v ir tu e of

a

Notice

ofFil ing

b y

City

C ou nc il s

attorney o n N o v e m b e r

2 6 ,

2 0 1 3 . AP P 1 0 2 0 - 1 0 2 8 . ) t is included a s part of th e ap pe nd ix to p ro ve to th is

C o u r t

th e trial c o u r t relied o n it

in

crafting th e f m a l j u d g m e n t thus c o m m i t t i n g

reversible

error.

6


13/51

been no

r eques t

to

amend

th e or ig ina l co m pla in t. H e wa s gra n te d a con t i nu ing

ob je c tio n to

any d is c uss ion concern ing

Resolu t ion 56-13 Var ious por t ions of th e

t ranscr ipt

estab l ish

th e t r ia l cou r t

uni la tera l ly

created

u t te r con fus ion a s

to

th e

scope and na tu re of th e Novembe r 27 , 2013, hea r ing .

W as

it

ev iden t ia ry

o r not?

(APP 0001-0489 .) (APP 0490 -0707 .)

The t r ia l cour t fa ile d t o

recognize

the

Proper t y O wn ers w e re

den ied

impor tan t procedu ra l r ights of due p ro ce s s

a s

guaran teed b y the Uni t ed Sta tes

Const i tu t ion,

th e

Florida

Const i tu t ion

and

th e

Fire

Protec t ion

Assessmen t

Ord inance

41-13 in

several a r e a s

The f i rs t due

process issue is th e fa i lure of

the t r ia l

cou r t

to

recognize

t ha t

th e

Proper ty Owne rs d id n ot rece ive proper

not ice

b y

ma i l o r

b y publ icat ion

of

the i r rights of

procedura l

due process a s s e t fo r th

in

Ordinance

41-13.

The second

due

process issue

is

th e fa i lure of

th e

Ci ty

M a n age r to a pp oin t

an

Assessmen t Coo rd ina t o r r equ ir ed

b y

Ordinance

41 -13 ,

pr ior to any cour t

act ion

be ing f i led. The Assessmen t Coord ina to r is an impor tan t and necessa ry posi t ion

in

o r de r

fo r

th e

Prope r t y

Owne r s

to be ab le to

exerc ise t he i r

p rocedu r a l

r ights

of due

p r o c e s s

a s

established

b y

City

Counci l ,

in Ord inance 41 -13 . (APP

0791-0814. )

The th i rd due

process

issue arises as.a resu l t

of

th e t r ia l

cou r t s

den ia l of th e

o re te n us mo t i o n fo r con t i nuance mad e

b y

th e

P rope r t y Owne r s

o n O cto b er

8,

7


14/51

2013 .

A review

ofth e transcript

of

the proceedings

shows

that th e

tr ial court

was

apparently confused f rom th e

inception

about the proceed ings and the exact na tu re

ofwhat should take

place

procedurally dur ing th e

hearing.

(APP

0001-0489 . )

Addit ionally, Property Owners

contend the

fire a s s e s s m e n t methodology,

developed

b y Burton

Associates and

adopted

by

City

Counc i l is arbitrary in

construct

a n d . application, is

no t

supported by substant ia l competent evidence,

but

instead is b a s e d on

bald

conclusions devoid of

any record proo f

which will

satisfy

th e

tw o

prong

test

fo r

a

special

assessment.

(APP 0905-0951) .

The Property Owners contend

that

th e

two

t ier f ire

assessment

methodology

is no t fairly

apportioned

between the various parcels.

The

methodology

adopted

by City Council

is in

fact

arbitrary

in i ts applicat ion.

Finally,

Property Owners contend that Tier 2

of

th e fire assessment

methodology

adopted

by

City

Counci l

is

actually

a

property

tax

in

disguise

a s it

re lies on ad

valorem

valuation4 without an substant ia l

competent

evidence that the

special benefit

enhances

th e

value of th e structure in a

logical rela t ionsh ip to

th e

assessment

o r th at

the numbers relied upon are accurate.

4Structure

value

is defined in Resolution 32-13 a s

.

th e sum ofth e

building cost value and th e bui lding extra feature value associated

with

each Tax

Parcel

in th e City

a s determined b y

th e

City through reference to th e real property

database maintained

by th e Property Appraiser.

(Emphasis added.) (APP

0842.)

8


15/51

A R G U M E N T I S S U E

I.

TH E TRIAL C O U R T C O M M I T T E D

REVERSIBLE

ERROR B Y

I N C L U D I N G

FINDINGS

O F F A C T IN

TH E F I N A L JUDGMENT

W H I C H AR E NO T

SUPPORTED

B Y

SU BSTA N TI A L

C OM P ETENT

EVIDENCE.

STANDARD O F

R E V I E W ISSUE

N o l e s s t h a n five p a r a g r a p h s

in

th e f in a l j u d g m e n t contain f i n d i n gs

of fact

w h i c h

a r e n ot supported

b y

s u b s ta n tia l c om p e t e n t e v id e n ce . Th is C o urt

r e vie ws

th e

t r ia l court s

f i n d i n g

of fact fo r

s u b s ta n tia l c om p e t e n t e v id e n c e a n d its

conclusions

of

l a w, d e novo. St r a n d

v Escambia

County,

Flo ri da ,

9 9 2

S o

2 d 1 5 0

Fla . 2 0 0 8). Th e

findings will be erroneous

n ot

b a s e d

on substantial

evidence

H o l l a n d v

G r o s s

8 9

S o

2 d

2 5 5

Fla.

1 9 5 6 ) .

This

issue

concerns th e h e a r i n g w h i c h w a s h e l d on N o v e m b e r 2 7 ,

2 0 1 3 ,

involving Talan Corp orat ion s Motion to I n t e r v e n e a n d o t h e r p r o ce d u r a l motions.

A l t h o u g h n o t in t ro du c e d

a s

evidence,

Resolution

5 6 - 1 3

is

p a r t of

th e

r e c o r d in this

c a s e

AP P

1 0 2 0 - 1 0 2 8 . )

t th e c om m e n ce m e n t of th e h e a rin g on N o v e m b e r 2 7, 2 0 1 3 , th e t r ia l court

instructed a ll p a r t i e s of th e

sco pe

a n d p u r p o s e of th e h e arin g. Th e t r ia l court

stated

th e

f o l l o w i n g :

A g a i n

m y

i n t e n t fo r

p u r p o s e s

of today, h a v i n g

p r e v i o u s l y

c l o s e d

out

th e e vid e n ce , w a s

to h e a r

a n y

addit ional a r g u m e n t

b a s e d

u p o n th e e vid e nc e of r e c o r d a n d n ot to r e o p e n

9


16/51

every th ing a nd d ra g

this t h ing

on fo r ano the r mon t h , tw o

mo n th s , th re e mo n th s, e t ce te ra .

W e have

to

have

some

f inal i ty

to it based

upon

th e

s ta tu tory

scheme t ha t says

we

need to proceed

fo r thwi th . So

t ha t s m y

in tent ion

here

today. In regards to T a la n s r eques t a s i n t e r veno r

to

a t least

presen t

some

a rgumen t ,

wha t s

y o u r

r eques t

in tha t r ega r d, s ir ? (Emphas is added . ) ( APP 0496 . )

This

in ter jec ted con fus ion

f rom th e

ve r y beg inn ing

A t

th e s ta rt

of

the

hear ing,

Ci ty Co un c il s counsel ,

Ms. Chu ru t i

a t tempted

to

in t e r je c t n ew evidence

in to

th e hea r i ng based on th e fo l lowing:

And ,

You r

Hono r ,

in

th e in terest

of

j ud ic ia l

economy ,

w e d like to update you

on

fu r ther legislat ive act iv i ty

tha t

h a s

occurred wi th regard to

this

c a s e

( APP 0497.)

P ro pe rty Owne r Scot t Morr i s , ob jec ted a s fo l lows:

You r

Hono r , I need

to

pose an objec t ion

to th at

issue

part icular ly because t hey re

going

to ge t into

someth ing

that

is

n o t f r amed in

the or ig inal

pleadings.

The y re

going to ge t

into

a new resolu t io n ; and

j us t

fo r th e

record ,

I

need to

t ime ly make

an ob ject ion

accord ing

to c a s e la w t ha t I w o n t have imp l ied a consen t

to

tha t

issue be t r ied.

The re

is.no

ame n dme n t be fore

you at this

poin t ,

b u t th e issue t hey re

ra is ing

h a s

n o t been

raised in th e

or ig inal

comp la in t . (APP 0497.)

The t r ia l cou r t

agreed

and

sus ta ined

th e

ob ject ion

to

n ew ev idence

b y th e f o l l ow ing

s ta temen t :

W e re

n o t op e n in g th e ma t t e r fo r purposes of accep t ing

add i t i ona l ev idence . Tha t s

a l r eady come

a nd go ne .

(Emphas is added ) (APP

0499-0500. )

10


17/51

Counsel fo r Talan

Corporation stated,

I

though t t h is

was an

evidentiary

hear ing. To wh i ch th e trial cour t responded, Well,

and

it was not iced in

th e

event that

yo u

needed

to

present evidence with respect to present ing some

argument, 5 Th e tr ial

cour t

created u t ter

confus ion

in t he proceed ings .

How

can

you

present

evidence

to

support argument?

City Coun ci l s counsel,

Ms .

Churu t i again

tried t o in te rjec t new

evidence into th e

proceedings

with

th e

fol lowing

statement:

Your

Honor,

in

th e

interest

of

judic ial

economy, I

th ink we can

cu t

offa lo t of these

arguments

because

there has

been

fu r ther leg is la t ion that s

occurred by

th e

legislative body. The ci ty commiss ion, th e counci l , and

th e City of

Cape

Coral would .like

to

advise you of

that. (APP 0505-0506 .)

Property Owner, Scott Morris immediately responded

Again

each

t ime that

comes

up

I

mus t

voice an

object ion.

(APP

0506. )

In

response th e Court

s t a t e d I will

give

you

a standing objection to that

Mr. Morris.

(APP

0506.)

Talan s attorney then began to use

some

demonstrative aids

which

referred

to

th e

new reso lu t ion recen tly passed. In order

to make

sure th e objection

had

been

made c lear Scot t Morris stated

th e fol lowing:

So

I

don t

have

to

keep

popping

up eve ry s ing le

t ime,

Scott

Morris,

fo r th e

record.

Just s o maybe

yo u

can

allow me to have

a

standing objection. I believe

some

This

exchange is found

at. (APP

0500. )

1 1


18/51

of

h is

demonst ra t ive

aids i nc lude ta lk

abou t

Reso lu t ion

56 .13 ,

which

w as

just passed

las t

M o n d a y . I can

have

a s tand ing ob jec t i on

to

t ha t

( APP 0508 . )

The Cour t

responded

I ve

a lr eady ind ica ted

you have a standing

object ion.

Thank you sir. (APP 0508.)

A

little l a te r in th e h e a rin g o n No v e m b e r 27 , 2 0 13 , th e tr l

cou r t

again

s t a t e d

At th e p re s en t

t ime , I'm

n o t

reopen ing

the

ev idence. Tha t includes

an y

revis ions

to a t t emp t to

cu re de fec ts o r de f ic ien c ies .

(Emphas is

added ) ( APP

0526 . )

These s ta temen t s

b y

the

t r ia l

cou r t

l im i ted

the

scope

of

th e h e a rin g

on Novembe r 27, 2013 , to argumen t on ly and n o t fo r t he pu rpose

of

accep ting any

addi t iona l

evidence which

was

re in forced

b y grant ing Scot t

Mor r i s object ion.

A close examinat ion of

th e

paragraphs in the

f ina l

j u dgmen t t ha t a r e

labe led

th i r ty- f i rs t ,

th i r ty -second , th i r ty - th i rd and

t h i r t y -seventh

prove th e t r ia l cou r t re l ied

on matters which

were

improper ly

in ter jected

into th e

Novembe r

2 7, 2 01 3, hear ing

and

n o t

ra is ed o n Oc tobe r

7,

8

o r 9,

2013 . .Compare f i na l j u dgmen t , ( APP

0737 -

0741 .) to t ranscr ipt f rom Oc tobe r 2013 , ( APP 0001 -0489 .) and t ranscript f rom

Novembe r 27, 2 013.

(APP 0490 -0707 .)

The

th i r ty - f i rs t paragraph of th e f i na l j u d gme n t states in pa r t t ha t du r i ng th e

proceed ings th e

Ci ty

iden t i f ied

an

issue

r ega rd i ng

th e

va lua t ion da ta

se t fo r th in the

spreadshee t

ob ta ined

f rom th e

prope r t y

app ra i se r

in July 2013 , fo r purposes

of

12


19/51

preparing

the

assessment rol l . ( A PP 0 7 3 7-0 7 3 8.)

There is no subs tan tia l

com petent evidence in this c a s e to p rove this f inding. The only discussion this

valuation

data

occurred

during the

hearing

held

on

November 27,

2 0 1 3 , which

was

not ev identiary in nature, ( APP

0490 - 0707 . ) compared

to th e

transcript

October

2013 .

(APP

0 0 0 1 - 0489 . ) '

The thir ty-second paragraph

the f inal

judgment

s t a t e s

in part

that

S poradicerrors

in

data do not s ingular ly

constitute

a

basis

upon

which

th is Court

can

invalidate

the

Note or

a s s e s s m e n t

process...

( APP

07 38.) The sporadic

errors

were

not

a d d r e s s e d until

November

2 7, 2 0 1 3,

during

a

hearing

that was not

evidentiary in nature, (APP

0490-0707. )

compared to the

transcript

October

2013 . ( APP 0 0 0 1 -0 489 .)

The

thirty-third

paragraph

the f inal j udgment states in part tha t

the City

has

obtained

corrected data

from

the

Property App ra ise r

and

ha s

undertaken

corrective

measures. The

tr ial

court made

a

specific

f inding

a s

fo l lows:

. Such tes tim onyfur ther demonstrated that

th e

variance in

valuation data between the

corrected July

2 0 1 3 data

file

and a

similar file obtained

in

November 201 3 represented approximately

0 . 2 1

a ll Structure Value

in th e

City and

was, therefore,

a d e min imus

variation that

was

not attr ibutable to

errors in

6Resolution

56 -13 , Sec tion 3 , subparagraphs

(D )

and

(E )

appear

to conta in

a lmos t the exact language

used

by

th e

tr ial court in th e

thirty-f irst

paragraph. This

resolution

was

passed on

November 2 5,

2 0 1 3 , a s a

direct

result

Talan 's record

f i l ings pointing out

th e

many

mistakes

in

th e

data. ( APP 1020 - 1028 . )

1 3


20/51

preparation of

th e Assessment

Rol l

o r th e data files

obtained

by

th e

City f rom th e Property

Appraiser.

(APP

0738. )

The th ir ty- th ird paragraph

clearly

considers

errors

and th e correct ion of

errors

which

was

set

forth in

test imony

by

Mr.

Michael

Burton

on

November

27,

2013 ,

and which

was

contained

in th e

language

of

Resolut ion 56-13 .

( APP

0738-

0739.)

(APP 0607-0663 .)

The thirty-seventh paragraph

of

th e f inal judgment s t a t e s in part that th e

methodology makes u s e ofperpetual ranges

of

5,000.00 increments and

rounding

c onventio ns. T he

tr ial

court states fur ther that th e uncontroverted test imony

offered during this

proceeding demonstrated

that th e

use ofsuch ranges is a

well

established and common prac tice in assessment appor tionment methodo logy . (APP

0740-0741.)

This tes timony concern ing th e round ing methodology was elicited on

November 2 7 2013.

(APP

0636-0663.)

Property

Owners

surmise the tr ial court fo r th e most part adopted

verbatim

th e proposed f inal judgment submitted by City

Council 's

attorney.

Without th e

benefit

of

th e transcript of

th e ent ire proceeding

before it , th e court

had no way to

really ascertain th e

test imony came

during th e October evidentiary hearing

o r

th e

non-evidentiary hearing

on

November

27, 2013 .

As

a

result,

it

is

somewhat

understandable why such substantial errors were made.

However,

the errors

are

no t harmless in nature and justify reversal. Particularly since th e

confusion

in th e

14


21/51

p ro ceed ings was

caused

b y th e

t r ia l

cou r t and n o t

an y of t he pa rt ie s .

Blacks La w Dic t iona ry ,

Fif th

Ed i t ion , 1979,

def ines f in d ing

of fac t in par t

a s fo l lows:

A conc lus ion b y

w a y of

reasonable i n fe rence

f rom

th e

ev idence.

The Florida

Supreme Cou r t

was con ce rn e d

wi th f indings of fact b y

th e

t r ia l

cour t

and

whe the r

o r n ot there

was

substant ia l compe ten t evidence to suppor t a

f inding,

in

th e c a s e ofHo l l and v G ross, 89 S o

2d

255

(Fla.

1956).

The

appropr iate

s tandard

of

r ev iew was

expla ined b y

th e Cou r t a t p age

258

a s

fo l lows:

A

f ind ing

of

fact b y th e

t r ia l cou r t

in a non - j u r y c a s e

will n o t be

s e t

aside

on rev iew unless there is no substa n tia l

evidence

to

sustain

it , unless it is clear ly agains t the weigh t

of

th e

evidence, o r

unless

it

was

i nduced b y an er roneous

view of

th e

law.

A

fin d i ng wh i ch rests

on

conclusions

d rawn f rom

undisputed

evidence,

r a the r than

on confl icts

in

th e t e s t imony , does

n o t

car ry wi th it th e same

conclusiveness a s a f ind ing rest ing on probat ive disputed

facts,

b u t

is

ra ther

in th e n a tu re

of

a

lega l conc lus ion .

W he n

t he appe lla t e cou r t

is con vin c e d th a t

an e xp re s s

o r i n fe ren t ia l f i nd ing of

the

t r ia l cou r t is w i t h o u t suppo r t

of

a n y s u b sta n tiv e e vid e n ce , is clear ly against

th e

we igh t

of th e evid ence

o r

t ha t th e t r ia l cou r t has misappl ied th e

la w to the es tab lished fac ts , the decis ion is c lea r ly er roneous

and

t he appe lla t e

will

reverse

because

th e

t r ia l

cou r t

has

fa i le d to give l ega l ef fec t to th e ev i dence in it s ent i re ty .

The Second

Dist r ic t Cou r t of

Appea l

in th e c a s e

ofSavage v Sta te

of

15


22/51

Florida,

1 2 0

S o .

3d

619

(Fla. 2 d

DCA 2013 ) , s e t

forth

an

excellent

description of

the

competent

and substantial

evidence

standard which can be applied to the c a s e at

bar. The

court at

page

621

stated

the following: 7

The term com petent substantial evidence

does

not relate

to the quality, character, convincing power, probative

value

or weight of the

evidence

bu t

refers to

th e

existence

of some evidence

(quantity)

a s to each essential element and

a s

to

the

legality and

adm issibility of

that

evidence.

Competency

of

evidence refers to its adm issib ility under legal

rules of evidence. Substantial requires that there

be some

(more

than a

mere

iota, or scintil la), real, m aterial,

pertinent,

and

relevant

evidence

(as

distinguished

from

ethereal,

metaphysical,

speculative or m erely

theoretical

evidence or

hypothetical

possibilities)

having

definitive

probative value

(that is, tending to

prove )

a s to each essential element of

the offense charged.

The

trial

court

in

the

c a s e

at bar

has

committed reversible

error

by making

findings in

the final judgment

that

were

not based

on any

evidence, let alone

b a s e d on substantial competent evidence. The final

judgment should be

reversed

and remanded

for

further

evidentiary

proceedings.

Actually

relying upon the Florida Supreme Cou rt s definit ion in the

c a s e

of

De Groot v .

Sheffield, 9 5 S o .

2d

9 1 2 (Fla. 1 9 5 7 ) .

1 6


23/51

ARGUMENT ISSUE

II

II. THE TRIAL COURT S FINDING THAT CITY COUNCIL

COMPLIED

WITH PROCEDURAL

DUE

PROCESS

IS

NOT

SUPPORTED

BY

SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE

AND

IS

REVERSIBLE

ERROR.

STANDARD

OF REVIEW ISSUE II

This issue concerns City Council s failure to

follow

its own procedure for

im plem entation of

the

Fire Protection Assessment. This

Court

reviews

the

trial

court s

finding of fact

for

substantial competent evidence and its conclusions of

law, d e

novo.

Strand v . Escambia C o u n t y , Florida, 9 9 2 S o . 2d 1 5 0 (Fla. 2 0 0 8 ) .

The

findings

will be erroneous not based on substantial evidence Holland v .

G r o s s , 89

S o . 2 d 25 5

(Fla. 1956 ) .

The Court in Massey

v .

Charlotte

C o u n t y , Florida, 8 4 2

S o . 2d 1 4 2 ,

1 4 6

(Fla.

2 d

DCA

2003 ) , described procedural due process in part a s follows:

Procedural due process imposes constraints

on

governmental

decisions

that

deprive individuals of liberty or

property

interests...

Procedural due

process requires both fair notice

and

a real opportunity to be heard at a m eaningful t im e and

in

a

meaningful m anner . . .

The

specific

parameters

of the notice

and opportunity to be heard required by procedural

due process

are no t evaluated b y fix ed

rules of law,

bu t

rather

b y

th e

requirem ents of

the

particular proceeding.

. .

property rights are

particularly

sensitive

where residential property

is at

stake.

.

(Emphasis added.)

Keys Citizens ForResponsible Government , Inc., v . Florida Keys Aqueduct

1 7


24/51

Author i ty . 795 So.

2d

9 40 , 9 48

(Fla. 2001) ,

stated th e

fo l l ow ing

conce rn i ng due

process:

The ba sic due p rocess gua ran tee of th e Flor ida Const i tu t ion

p rovides tha t

[n ]o

pe rs o n s h a ll

be

depr ived

of

li fe , l ibe r ty

o r

proper ty without d u e

process

of l aw. Ar t . I, 9

Fla.

Const.

The

Fifth

Ame n dm e n t t o

th e Uni ted S t a t e s

Const i tut ion

guarantees th e same.

[p] rocedura l due process

serves a s

a veh ic le t o

ensure

fa i r t rea tmen t th rough

th e

p rope r

admin i s t ra t i on

of

just ice

where subs tan t ia l

r ights

a re

a t

i ssue.

Procedural

due process

requires

both fair not ice

and a rea l

oppor tun i ty

to

b e

heard.

th e

no tic e mus t be reasona b ly

calculated,

under

a ll the c ir cums tances , to appr i se

interested

par t ies

of

th e pe n den c y

of

th e

act ion

and

afford

them

a n

opp o r tun i ty t o present

thei r object ions.

The

n o tic e m u s t

be

of

such

nature

a s

reasonab ly

to convey

th e

required

i n fo rmat ion, and

it mus t afford

a

reasonable t ime fo r those interested

to

ma k e

thei r

appearance. Further,

th e oppor tun i ty

to be

heard

mus t be

a t a

mean ing fu l

t ime and

in a

mean ing fu l

m anne r .

The in i t ia l

fire

protect ion assessment ord inance was enacted

by City Counc i l

on July

1 5

2013. Ord in a n ce 41 -13 set forth th e la w a s it re la te d to th e fire

protect ion a s s e s s m e n t and

its im p lemen ta tio n . (APP 0791 -0814 .)

Several por t ions

of

th e

o rd in a n c e m us t be examined fo r

Prope r ty Owne rs to i l lus trate

t ha t

th e

den ia l

ofdue

process has occurred.

8-35 Def in i t ions , states

t ha t a n

As s e s smen t Coord ina to r (Emphas i s

added.) means th e

person

o r

ent i ty

des ignated

by

th e

City

Man a g e r t o

be

responsib le

fo r coord ina t i ng th e Fire

Protect ion

Assessments .

(APP

00794. )

One wou l d an t i c i pa te

th a t th is

c ruc ia l

pos i t i on

wou l d

h a ve b ee n filled

a t

th e

18


25/51

t ime

th e ordinance was

passed or

immediately

thereafter,

part icular ly s ince the

administration had known

fo r months that

it was pursuing

a f ire protect ion

assessment.

The Assessment

Coordinator

is th e po in t person

fo r proper

administrat ion of

the entire

fire

assessment

program

f rom the notices,

to hand ling

objections, to

preparation of

th e

roll, to billing

and

col lection, to appeals of

improper

s s e s s m e n t s

The

posit ion is

crucia l to handle due process i s s u e s

8-40 ofthe ord inance at subsection 6 ) s t t e s the Assessment

Coordinator

will

a)

prepare

the

init ial

Assessment

Roll,

s

required

by

8-41

hereof, b )

publish the notice required

by 8-42

hereof, and c )

mail

the notice required by

8-43 hereof using information

then

available

from

the

Tax Roll . APP

0799 . )

8-42

A ) of the ordinance requ ires the

Assessment

Coordinator to publ ish

or

direct the publication of

not ice regarding th e

fire

protection s s e s s m e n t

8-42

B )

s t t e s

that

the

publ ished notice

shall

conform

to

th e

requirements

of

the

Uniform Assessment Collection A c t and shall include 4 ) the procedure

fo r

objecting provided in 8-44 hereof . APP 0800 . )

8-43 A ) ofthe ordinance requires the Assessment Coordinator to

mail

or

d irect to be mailed

notice to p roper ty

owners of

the p roposed

fire

protection

assessment.

8 -43

B )

states

th e

notice shal l contain

B)

7 ) a

statement

that a ll

affec ted Ow ners have

r ight

to appear

at

th e

hearing

and

to file wri t ten objections

19


26/51

wi th

th e

City Counc i l wi th in 20 days of the no t ice .

(Emphas i s added.)

(APP

0800-0801.)

The ord inance a t 8-44 (C) states in pa r t th e fo l l ow ing :

All wri t ten object ions to th e F ina l Assessmen t Resolu t ion sha l l

be f i led

with th e A s se ssm e n t

Coord i na to r a t o r before th e

t ime

o r ad jou rned t ime of such hear ing .

(Emphas i s

added.)

(APP

0801.)

It is a fundamen ta l concept

in Florida

L a w that , where a statute is

clear

and

unamb iguous a nd

conveys a

clear a nd

defin i te

m ean in g , th e

statute mus t

be

given

it s

p la in and obvious

mean i ng .

Flor ida

Depa r tmen t

of

Revenue v .

N ew Sea

E s c a p e

C r u i s e s L T D . 8 9 4 S o .

2d 9 5 4

(Fla.

2005) .

The f irst den ia l ofth e Property

Owner s '

r ights of

due

process occurred

concern ing

th e

not ice of

pub l ica t ion at tached

to th e fire

pro tec t ion

i n i t i a l

a s s e s s m e n t resolut ion.

(APP

0833-0834.) The

pub lished no t ice

s t a t e s

in

paragraph

two , t ha t Allaffected

proper ty owners

have a r ight

to a p p ea r a t

th e

hear ing an d

to

il

wr i t ten

object ions

with the Ci ty w i t h in . twe n t y days of this not ice . (Empha s i s

added.) The

pub lished no t ice , in t roduced a s evidence, does

n o t

c omp l y with th e

manda t e

of 8-42

ofth e

ord inance wh ich required

wri t ten object ions

to be filed in

accordance

wi th

8-44

of

the o rd in a n ce ,

wh i ch

references

th e

Asses smen t

Coord ina tor , a s required

by

8-44

(C).

(APP 0800-0 8 01.)

Aga i n ,

a f u ndamen t a l

concep t

in

Flor ida

L a w th a t whe re a

s ta tu te is

clear

a nd unamb iguous a nd conveys

20


27/51

a clear

and

def in i te

mean ing, th e

statute

mu s t be

given

it s plain and obv ious

mean ing. T h e fa ilu r e t o fo l low th e publ ished

no tic e re qu ireme n t

is a fai lure to

follow th e plain mean i n g of th e

o rd inance .

Florida Depa r tme n t o fRevenue v New

S e a Escape

Cruises, L

TD.,

894

S o

2d

954

( Fla . 2005) .

The second den ia l

of

th e

Prope r t y

Owners r igh t s of due p ro ce s s

concerns

th e not ice

b y

mai l , attached to

th e

fire protec t ion in i t ial

assessment reso lu t ion .

( APP 08 35 -08 36 .) T he n otice ,

does

n o t

con ta in

th e la nguage manda t e d b y 8-43

of

th e

ord inance,

which

requ i red

object ions

to

be

f i led

wi th

Cape

Coral ,

n o t

th e

City.

( APP

0 80 0-0 80 1.) T h e n o tic e, con ta in s the s a m e

language

tha t

was in

th e

not ice

of

publ ica t ion,

and

ne i t he r compl ies wi th th e requ i rements

8-42,

8-43,

o r

8-44

of

th e

ord inance. (APP

0799-0802. )

T he fai lure to fo l low th e mai led

not ice

requ i remen ts is a

fai lure to fo l low

th e plain

mean i ng of

the o rd in ance .

Flo r i da

Depa r tmen t

of

Revenue

v New Sea

Escape

Cruises,

LTD. , 894

S o 2d 954

(Fla.

2005).

The th i rd den ia l of th e P rope r ty Ow ne r s r igh ts of due p ro ce s s conce rn s th e

fai lure

to a pp oin t

th e A s se s smen t Coord ina to r

pr io r to the

Show

Cause

hear ing in

Oc tobe r

2013 .

The f o l l ow ing

exchange

p ro ve s th e

poin t :

M r. Dei le : Okay , in th e d o cumen ts

tha t

establ ish this

a s s e s s m e n t it talks

abou t

a posi t ion cal led

th e

assessmen t c oo rd in a to r. Is

this

a

ful l -

t im e o r

a pa r t

t ime

j o b ; do

yo u k now?

21


28/51

M r.

S z e r l a g : F r an k l y ,

I m

n o t a w a r e

of

a posit ion

c a l l e d

a s s e s s m e n t c o o r d i n a t o r in th e City of

Cape

Coral. I t h i n k t h a t w o u l d r e f e r to

s o m e o n e

t h a t s

current ly

in

w i t h i n

th e

f i n an ce

d e p a r t m e n t

t h a t w o u l d b e

th e p o i n t p e r s o n

fo r

c o l l e c t i o n

of

this

as s es s m ent.

M r. D e i l e : In

th e

resolution, it says t h a t

th e

as s es s ment

c o o rd in a t o r, u sin g h is

g o o d j u d g m e n t , h a s

a u t h o rit y t o a d d p e op le

to

th e e x e m p t l ist,

a re

y o u

a w a r e of that?

M r.

S z e r l a g :

Y e s .

M r.

D e ile : W h a t

gu i d el i n es

h a v e

yo u

b e e n ,

will

b e

g i v e n

to this assessment coordinator?

M r. S z e r l a g : I

w o u l d

d e f e r t h a t question to o ur b o n d

counsel a s t h e y drafted th e resolut ion.

A P P 0 3 9 8 . )

Th i s e v i d e n c e

w a s n e v e r c o n tro v e rt e d

b y City

C o u n ci l a t th e

h ear i n g,

ye t

th e

t r ia l

co u r t

i g n o r e d

th e e v id e n ce w h e n it m a d e a

f i n d i n g ,

in th e f m a l j u d g m e n t ,

in

p a r a g r a p h s

n u m b e r e d t h i r t y- n i n t h

a nd

f o rt y -f o u rt h , w i th o u t s u b s t a n t i a l

c o m p e t e n t

evidence to s up po rt th e

f indings.

T hu s,

th e

question arises a s to w h e th e r

th e

a d m i n is t ra t i o n , i n t e n t i on a l l y,

m a d e this proces s m i s l e a d i n g b y fai lure to followCity C o u n c i l s d i r e c t i v e s o r

w h e t h e r

it

w a s ,

s i m p l y ,

n e g l i g e n t

in

p e r f o r m a n c e

of

its m a n d a to ry

duties.

T h e r e is

n o s ub s ta n tia l c om p e te n t e v id e n ce

to support

th e

f i n d i n g s of

th e

t r ia l court

h o l d i n g

t h a t th e P r o p er ty O w n e r s re c e iv e d p ro pe r n otic e w h e n in f a c t

t h e y

r e c e i v e d

2 2


29/51

conflicting notices.

The.denial

of

th e Property Owners r ights ofdue process

was

before th e tr ial

court

at

two d iffe r ent

t imes. First,

th e

court stated

it

wou ld consider a ll

arguments

raised

in

legal

memorandums

s o

long

a s

they were d irected

to th e

evidence in

the

c a s e 8 Property

Owner

Scott Morr is s memorandum

in

opposit ion

to

th e

complaint

fo r validation

raised

th e m at ter before

th e

trial cou rt. (APP 0952 -1017 .)

The

matter was also raised in the Appel lants

Motion fo r Rehearing.

(APP 0746-0786.)

Property Owners

contend

that

even

this

Cour t

wou ld

decide

that

the

matter

was not properly raised in th e

trial

court,

that

th e

matter

is one of

fundamental error

and can be add re ssed

by th is Cou rt fo r th e f irst

t ime,

on

appeal because

it goes to

the very foundation ofthe City Council s c a u s e

ofaction.

In order fo r the bond

validation process to be a success, City Counci l mus t prove

it

complied with

a ll

th e

constitutional

requirements

ofdue process. Proper adherence

to

due process

requirements is

a fundamental

requirement

fo r the City

Cou ncil s to be

successful

in the cau se o

action. Universa l Insurance

Company

of

North Amer ica

v

Warfel ,

8 2 S o

3d

47

(Fla.

2012);

Sanford

v

Rubin,

237 S o 2d 1 3 4

(Fla.

1970).

8 T h e trial cour t ind icated it wou ld consider a ll arguments based on ev idence

in the record. (APP 0484-0485.)

23


30/51

A R G U M E N T

I S S U E

III. T H E T R I A L C O U R T

C O M M I T T E D REV ERSI B LE

ER R O R

BY

IT S D E N I A L

O F T H E P R O P E R T Y

O W N E R S

O RE TENUS

M O T I O N F O R C ON TIN U A N C E.

S T A N D A R D O F R E V I E W I S S U E III

T h e

g ra n tin g o r

d e n i a l

of

a

m o t i o n fo r continuance is c l e a r l y

a m a tte r th a t is

w i t h i n

th e

discretion

of

th e t r ia l

j u d g e a nd

should

n o t

b e overturned

unless

a n

a b u s e

of

discretion ca n b e establ ished b y tlie c o m p la i nin g p a rty .

S t r a n d

v

Es cam b i a

County, F l o r i d a , 9 9 2

S o 2 d

1 5 0

F l a.

2 0 0 8 ) .

O n

th e

m o r n i n g

ofO c t o b e r 8 2 0 1 3 , P ro p e rty O w n e r S c o t t M o rris

m a d e

a n

ore

tenus m o t i o n

fo r

continuance

w h i c h

w a s

j o i n e d in b y th e ot h e r P r o p er t y

O w n e r s . T h e purpose

of

th e m o t i o n w a s to obt a i n

a

continuance s o t h a t d i s c ov e ry

could

b e

o b t a i n e d , w h i c h h a d n o t occurred

becau se

of th e v e r y short tim e p e rio d

be t w e e n

t h e

O rd er to S h ow

C a u s e

a n d

th e a c tua l h e a rin g .

A P P .

0 0 9 2 -0 10 6 . )

A s

e v i d e n c e d b y

th e O r d e r

to

S h o w

Cause, th e h e a r i n g h a d o n l y

b e e n

scheduled fo r

period

of

o n e hour.

A P P

0 9 0 1 -0 9 0 4 .) F urth e rm o re ,

there i s no

representat ion in a n y of th e p a p e r w o r k file d in th e r e c o r d , t h a t

th e

date a nd

t i m e

of

th e

h e a r i n g w a s c o o r d i n a t e d

with

a n y

of

th e P r o p e r t y O w n e r s

w h o

h a d

e n t e r e d a n

appearance in th e c a s e

At th e c o m m e n c e m e n t of

th e

h e a r i n g

th e

t r i a l co u r t

stated

G i v e n

th e

n u m b e r of d e f e n d a n t s ,

there

will

b e

a th r ee- m i n u te t im e

l im i ta t io n .

Pleas e

d o

n o t

2 4


31/51

simply repeat wha t others have al ready said

y ou w is h

to speak. Absolu te ly no

direction was given by

th e

t r ia l court a s to whe th e r o r no t

evidence wou ld

be

admit ted, witnesses could be presented oi. cross examinat ion wou ld be

a l lowed.

The

only parameters

th e

t r ia l court establ ished e a rly o n was that th e

Property Owners could

only

speak fo r

three

minutes each. (APP 0006.)

The bond val idat ion hear ing was a f irst fo r

th e

Property Owners

a nd a ls o

appeared

to

be

a

f irst

fo r

th e t r ia l court

a s

there

seemed to

be confus ion

regarding

th e

exact procedure to util ize. Property Owners tried to

make

the a rgument to

th e

tr ial

cour t tha t

they

had been denied

the

ability

to

e n g a g e

in

discovery,

the

ability

to

obtain

any

subs tant ia l competent ev idence

ofthe i r ow n to

present

to

th e

court to

show

c a u s e

w hy

th e

City Cou nci l s complaint should no t be granted.

Counsel fo r

City

Counci l stated the fo l lowing

concerning the

request fo r a

cont inuance:

In this

c a s e th e

parties

received a notice ofbond

val idation a s

required by

Flor ida l aw, which

is more

notice than the 20-day

publ ished

notice

required

by

Section

75.06. S o

general ly

speaking,

in

a

bond val idat ion c a s e You r

Honor ,

we do anticipate

that th e

discovery will be taken

in

an expedi ted

fashion.

General ly , th e circuit

judges with

whom

have

been

deal ing in bond val idat ion c a s e s keep

th e t r ia l date fo r

th e bond

val idat ion

th e

same and

have a c a s e

management

order

order ing th e

d iscove ry to ta ke p la ce pr io r to tr ial .

(Emphasis

25


32/51

added.)

(APP

0096-0097. )

The

tr ia l court

den ied the mot i on

fo r

cont inuance, apparen t l y n o t

because it

was unt imely, but on l y

upon

th e

t r ia l

court s , in t e rp re ta t ion tha t th e b on d val idat ion

statute does

n o t contempla te

a discovery

p rocess , even though

City

Co unc i l s

at to rney admi tted

that

it

was

par t

of

th e no rma l

process. Af t e r

its den ia l of

th e

mot ion fo r con tinuance , the Cour t apparen t l y ignored

its

three minute t ime l imit.

The trial court a b u s e d i ts discret ion in not g ran t ing the mot ion fo r

cont inuance.

There

was

n o a rgumen t presented

that

grant ing

the

mot ion

wou ld

be

pre jud ic ia l to City

Counc i l .

There

was

substant ia l

argument

presented

that

the Property

Owners would

be grea t ly pre jud iced

by

denia l

ofthe mot ion .

Property

Owners

asked

the

C ourt to

consider the f o l l ow ing

a s

examples ofthe

severity of

the

pre jud ice to they wou ld suffer

the t r ia l

court denied their mot ion

fo r

cont inuance:

The published no tice fo r the hea r ing

indicated

it

wou ld be

fo r one

hou r bu t even tua lly cont inued fo r

f ou r

days,

fo rc ing th e

Proper ty Owners

to

scramble,

a s best

they

could,

for , those f ou r days ofhear ings;

2 . Property Owners

were given

no

oppo r tun i t y

to depose

a n y persons

i nvo lved

with

th e

fire assessment inc luding M r.

Burton, th e City

Manager ,

th e

City

Attorney,

the Bus iness

Manager ,

th e

Finance

Director, th e

City Clerk , th e Fire

Chie f , members

ofCity

Counc i l o r

ind iv iduals with

th e

Lee County

Proper ty

26


33/51

App ra is e r s o ffic e .

3. Prope r t y Owne r s

were

given no chance to co n d u ct d o cume n t

d is co ve ry . T he

State

A t t o r n e y

ind icated

tha t

he

r e ce iv e d th e documen t s , howev e r

no

documen t s we re prov ided

to

an y

of

th e Prope r t y Owne r s , pr io r to th e h e arin g.

Prope r t y

Owne r s had no chance to e xam in e a n y exhib i ts

be fore

o r dur ing t r ial.

4 Proper ty Owne r s were given no

opportuni ty

to

retain a n

expert

witness

fo r examinat ion

of th e

Bur ton Associa tes repor t and

th e repor t s

conclusions of spec ia l bene f i t

to th e

bu r dened p rope rt ie s .

5 No c a s e man ageme n t co n fe re n ce w a s he ld to

assure

t ha t there was a

level

playing f ield fo r

a ll

part ies.

6 Insuf f ic ient t ime to r e ta in

legal

representat ion.

Ci ty Counc i l wou l d n o t have been pre jud iced b y gran t ing th e mot i on

fo r

cont inuance a n d

sett ing

th e

hear ing

wi th in

sixty

days,

then

al lowing

t ime

fo r discovery.

Grea t in just ice

and pre jud ice

was

created

against

th e Proper ty

Owne r s b y th e t r ia l cou r t s den ia l of

the

mot i on fo r

cont inuance.

T he t r ia l cou rt s . den i a l of a mot i on

fo r

cont inuance was b r ough t before th e

Appe lla te Cou r t in

a

dissolut ion ofmarr iage

act ion

in F l em i ng v Fleming, 710

S o

The

r epresen ta t ive

fo r th e Sta te

ofFlo r ida

d id n o t a sk on e s ing le que s t io n

dur ing f ou r days ofhear ings,

ye t

is bel ieve(1

to

have r epr e sen te d th e in terests of th e

S t a t e

ofFlorida. (APP 0001-0707.)

27


34/51

2 d

6 0 1 , 6 0 3 F l a .

4 * D CA

1 9 9 8 ) ,

w h e r e i n

in

rev ers i ng

th e

t r i a l c our t ,

th e

Ap p e l la te

C o u r t st at e d th e f o l l o w i n g :

m o t i o n fo r

c o n tin u a n c e is

a d d r e s s e d to

th e s ou nd j u d i c i a l

d i s c r e t i o n

of

th e

t r i a l

c o u r t

a n d a b s e n t

a b u s e

of

t h a t d i s c re t io n

th e

c o u r t s d e c i s i o n

will

n o t b e r e v e r s e d o n

a p p e a l .

F a c t o r s

to

b e

c o n s i d e r e d in d e t e rm in in g w h e t h e r th e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d

it s d i s c r e t i o n

in

d e n y i n g

th e

m o t i o n

fo r

c o n t i n u a n c e i n c l u d e

w h e t h e r

th e

d e n i a l of

t he c o n tin u a n c e

creates

a n i n j u s t i c e fo r

th e

m o v a n t ; w h e t h e r th e c a u s e of

th e

r e q u e s t fo r c o n t i n u a n c e

w a s

unforeseeable b y th e m o v a n t a nd n o t th e res u l t

ofd i l a t o r y

pract ices;

a nd w h e t h e r

th e o p p o sin g p a r t y w o u l d

suffer

a n y

p re ju d ic e o r i n c o n v e n i e n c e a s a r e s ul t of

a

c o n t i n u a n c e .

T h e

t r i a l

c o u r t s d e n i a l ofa

m o t i o n

fo r

c o n t i n u a n c e w a s

b e f o r e

th e A p p e l l a t e

C o u r t in a

t erm i nat i o n

ofp a r e n t a l

r i ght s

a c t i on in th e c a s e of

In th e In t e r e s t o fD . S .

B . R .

R . R . a n d

C . R .

Chi l d ren,

M . R .

m o t her v . D e p a r t m e n t

of

C h ild r en a n d

F a m i l y

S e r v i c e s 8 4 9

S o . 2 d

41 1 , 41 4 F l a . 2 d D C A 2 0 0 3 ) , w herei n th e A p p el la t e C o u r t in

r e v e r s i n g

th e

t r i a l c o u r t stated

th e

f o l l o w i n g :

w h e n d e n i a l ofc o n t i n u a n c e creates

i n j us t i c e ,

th e

a p p e l l a t e

c o u r t s

o b l i g a t i o n

to re c t i fy th e

injust ice

o u t w e i g h s th e

p o l i c y

of

n o t d is tu r b in g t r i a l

c o u r t s

r u lin g , p a r tic u l a r l y w h e n th e

o p p o s i n g p a r t y

w o u l d

s u f f e r n o i n j u r y

o r

g r e a t i n c o n v e n i e n c e .

T he re is n o t h i n g

w i t h i n

th e b o n d v a l i d a t i o n statutes w h i c h d i s a l l o w s

d i s c o v e r y .

D i s c o v e r y

p r o c e d u r e s a re a v a i l a b l e in a ll

ivil

c a s e s

a n d

t h e r e is

n o t

a

v a l i d

r e a s o n w h y

th e

p r o c e d u r e s a re n o t

a v a i l a b l e

in b o n d v a l i d a t i o n c a s e s .

2 8


35/51

A R G U M E N T ISSUE

V

IV . THERE

IS

N O

S U B S T A N T I A L C O M P E T E N T E V I D E N C E

TO SUPPORT TH E F I N D I N G B Y C I T Y C O U N C I L A N D

TH E

T R I A L

C OU R T

T H A T

TIE R

O F

TH E

FIRE

ASSESSMENT

CO MPLI E S

W I T H

THE

REQUIREMENTS

O F

F L O R I D A

STATUTE 17 0 . 2 0 1.

S T A N D A R D O F R E V I E W ISSUE

V

T h is C ou rt re vie w s

th e trial court s f inding

of fact

fo r

substantial

competent

evidence

an d its conclusions of law, d e n o v o . Strand

v

E s ca m b i a

County,

Fl ori da,

9 9 2

S o 2 d 1 5 0

Fla.

2 0 0 8 ) . Th e findings will be erroneous n o t b a s e d on

substantial

evidence

H olland

v

Gross, 8 9 S o 2 d 2 5 5

Fla.

1 9 5 6 ) .

Florida Statu te 1 7 0.2 0 1 a) an d

b )

authorizes municipalit ies

t o a p p or tio n

th e

costs

of special

assessments

in tw o

different w a y s a s

fo l lo w s:

a) Th e f ront o r

square

footage

ofeach

parcel of land; o r

b )

A n alternative method ology, s o

long

a s th e amount ofth e

a s s e s s m e n t

fo r

each

parcel

of

land

is

n o t

in

excess

of

th e

proportional

benefits a s

compared to o t h e r

assessments

o n o t h e r p ar c e ls of land.

Some

explanation of th e

m et h od ology

fo r

th e Tier

of

th e

fire assessment

is

necessary to

th e understanding

w h y

it

is

arbitrary an d

w i t h o u t evidence to

support

it.

A c c ord in g to th e B u r t on Associates Fire A s s e s s m e n t Study F inal Re p o r t

Revised,

A u g u s t 2 2 ,

2 0 1 3 , Tier

is called R e s po n s e R e ad in e s s .

t is

described

in

th e s t u d y a s fo l lo w s:

Th e City maintains th e facilities, e q u i p m e n t an d p e r s o n n e l

2 9


36/51

necessary to provide fire protection

services

on

a

24 hou r

a day, seven

days

a

week,

year-round

basis

to

all parcels

in th e

City.

This state of response readiness is

provided

by

th e f ixed costs of th e system

tha t are

not discretionary and

t hat are not deployed in the ac tual response

to

calls.

(APP 0915-0916 .)

According

to

th e legislation

passed by

City Counci l

wh ich employs

th e

methodology

crafted by

Burton

Associates, all unimproved parcels of land will

be

a s s e s s e d th e same

dollar amount , regardless of

size,

regardless

of location and

regardless ofwhether theyare residential o r commercial. Th e

Tier

assessment is

b a s e d on

a

fixed dollar

amoun t per parcel

identification

number

assigned

by

th e

Lee County Property

Appraiser.

At th e evidentiary hearing

in

October, 2013 , t he

Chie fof

th e Fire

Department

was asked

it would

take

more resources to f igh t a

fire on

a 1 0 0 acre

parce l than it would

on

an 80 x 1 2 5 lot. His answer

was,

unequivocally yes. (APP

0118-0119. ) Property Owners

contend the

assessment fo r a sm all parce l

is

in

e x c e s s of th e

proportional

benefi t it

receives a s compared

to

other a s s e s s m e n t s on

larger

parcels. In reality,

th e smal l parcel

owner is subsidizing th e

cost of th e Tier

assessment fo r th e la rge r parce l owner.

How

can th is be a fair

appor t ionment

based on th e requirements of th e

law?

Bur ton

Associates report

relied

on b y City

Counci l

does

not contain

subs tant ia l

competen t

evidence

to

suppor t th e conclus ions

t ha t a ll

parcels

benef i t

30


37/51

equal ly ,

regardless

of

the i r

size a nd m a k eup . S in ce th e repor t

fai ls

to be

suppor ted

by subs tan t ia l comp e ten t ev idence ,

it means th e

f ind ings

by

th e

City

Counc i l

a re

l i kewise

n o t suppor ted by subs tan t i a l compe ten t evidence. P a n am a City Beach

Redeve lopment

Agency v .

State

ofFlorida, 831 So. 2d

66 2 (Fla . 2002 ).

The

t ranscr ip t of th e

proceed ings

from City

Counc i l

on

Augus t

26 ,

2013, establ ishes a

l ack

of subs tan t ia l comp e ten t ev idence

fo r th e

leg i s la t ive fi nd ings .

(APP

1056 -

1 2 0 4 .

Cape Coral

is

unique in tha t there are m a n y undeve loped a r e a s

which have

parcels tha t

range from

40

x

1 2 5

lo ts to

hundreds of a c r e s . A couple ofexamples

will

ma k e th e poin t . Assume

a

lo t exists tha t measure s 40 x 1 2 5 feet fo r a to ta l of

5,000

square

feet. Compa re

this

aga ins t

a

parce l which conta ins 223.89 a c r e s

or

9,752,648 s q u a r e feet b a s e d on 43,

5 60 s q u a r e

feet per a c r e .

Accord ing

to

th e

fire

protect ion

assessment

which

h a s

been adopted

by

City

Counc i l

the

in i t ia l a s s e s s m e n t fo r a vacan t p a r ce l wi th

one

parce l

ident i f icat ion

n umbe r

is

62.02.

How

can this be

an a p p o r t i o nmen t t h a t

fo l lows th e mand a te

in

170.201 (b)? Is it

fair ,

j us t a nd equi tab le

to

a s s e s s each

40 x

125 foo t

lo t

th e same

amoun t

a s th e 223.89

acre

parcel? The 223.8 9 acre pa rce l conta ins

9,752 ,648

square

feet wh i ch is 1,9 50 t imes l a rger than th e 40 x 125 lot. The

assessment

fo r

th e 40 x 1 2 5 lo t is c lear ly

in excess

of

th e

p r opo r tio na l bene f it received by the 40 x

1 2 5 foot lo t when compared

to

the 223.89

acre p a rc el. T he e n tire scheme smel ls

of

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38/51

discrimination

against

sma ll land owne rs . T hu s,

th e apport ionment

methodology

is

arbitrary.

Blacks Law

Dictionary,

Fifth

Edition,

1979,

defines arbitrary in

part a s

follows:

Wi thou t

adequate determining

principle;

not founded

in

th e

nature of things;

nonrat ional; not

done

or

acting

accord ing to

reason

or j udgment .

Fisher

v

Board of

County

Commissioners of

Dade County,

84 So. 2d 572

(Fla.

1956), h a s

not

been overturned by

the

this Court. It is

an

important c a s e to

examine

a s it relates to the substantia l competent ev idence which

Bur ton

Associates mus t have

to

support their conclusions.

The Florida

Supreme Court stated

in

part th e following at

pages

575,

576,

and 577 of its opinion.

Al though

th e

County

Engineer

submits

th e

opinion

that special a s s e s s m e n t s on a ll real property within

the

district,

including

homesteads, should be in

proportion to

assessed valuation

of

such real property

because

in h is

opinion this

is

in

proport ion to th e

bene fit to be

received , nevertheless,

in

Section

6-02

of th e report

it is readi ly admi tted tha t n o exact valuat ion ofbenefits

has

been made

In fact,

except fo r th e

bald conclusions

submit ted

there

is

nothing

in

this record

to

s how any

actual

attempt

to

evaluate

th e benefits

to

be received

by

th e

var ious properties

abutt ing th e

streets to

be

improved.

The

unsupported

conclusion of th e County Engineer

under the c ircumstances revea led in this record

regardless

ofhis

abil ity

and integrity cannot be accepted

a s

32


39/51

dete rmina t ive

of th e

cons t i tu t iona l quest ion i nvo lved.

A

spec ia l

benef i t assessment mus t be levied according

to th e par t icu lar benef it s rece ived by

th e rea l

p roper ty

in

quest ion

a nd

in

order to susta in

th e assessment ,

there

mus t be som e p r oo f of th e

benefi ts

other

than

th e

dic tum

of

th e

govern i ng

agency.

The.actua l

cost

of

th e

i m p r o vemen t

mus t

be

direct ly related to th e spec ia l benef i t a l leged to

be

received by th e p roper ty

imp roved .

The

Bur ton Assoc ia tes repor t

rel ied

upon by City

Counc i l

a s

the i r

subs tan t ia l compe ten t

evidence fo r th e two tie r approach,

conta ins

th e fo l lowing

s ta temen t to justify th e benef i t fo r

a

vacan t pa rce l

based

on readiness to

serve:

A

given parce l is benefit ted

ove r t ime

by

t ha t

ava i lab i l i ty

a lone, even

when th a t

parce l d o e s n o t generate

a

ca l l

fo r service, through

increased

value and marketab i l i ty ,

heightened u s e

and enjoyment ofth e proper ty and

reduced insurance premiums . (APP 0918.)

N o subs tan t ia l comp e ten t ev idence

wa s

received by

City

Counc i l

o r to

the t r ia l

cour t

to

prove

increased value and marketab i l i ty , heightened u s e

and

en joymen t of

th e p roper ty

and

r educed insu rance

p rem ium s . (APP 1056-1204. )

(APP

0001-0489.)

It

is

hard

to

believe

that

someone m ay purchase fire insurance

fo r

a

vacan t

parce l

of la nd. E ach c a s e mus t turn o n its ow n set

of

fa c ts a n d e vid en ce. The City

Counc i l

rece ived no

tes t imony

from

a n y r e a l

estate

p ro fe ss iona l t ha t v a lida t ed

th e c la im

tha t th e assessment

i ncreased

va lue and marketab i l i ty . N o

t e s t imony

was

prov ided by any in su rance

p ro fe ss iona l tha t

th e

fire assessmen t prov ides th e

33


40/51

benef i t of

reduc ing

fire i nsu rance

costs fo r

parcels ofproper ty , par t i cu lar ly vacan t

parce ls.

(APP

1056-1204. )

There

mu s t

be

a t le a st

a

scint i l la ofevidence to

suppo r t

th e f ind ings . No n e was prov ided in th e c a s e a t bar .

Savage

v .

State

of

Flo r ida , sup ra

and F ishe r

Documents

Briefs filed by Scott Morris against Cape Corl's fire services assessment