Brazil and UN Peacekeeping: The Case of East Timor and Haiti.

DJuan Bracey

Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service

Brazil’s role in peacekeeping operations deserves greater attention due to its rise as the strongest regional power in Latin America. Because Brazil lacks serious threats along its borders, its rapidly expanding security agenda will likely focus on interventions sponsored by the United Nations in the years to come.1 In the last decade, this trend has become visible with its engagement in five peace operations in East Timor since 1999 and its leadership over the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since 2004.2

Why does Brazil participate in peacekeeping missions? What factors shape the scope and nature of its participation? Two international relations scholars, John T. Fishel and Andrés Sáenz, argue that prestige is a primary motivation.3 Brasília believes that peacekeeping will increase its voice in world affairs by enhancing its international reputation and attracting global attention. Prestige is further linked to its goal to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, a position which would grant it more regional clout in Latin America and a forceful presence in international military and economic affairs.4 Fishel and Sáenz list a sense of international obligation, hemispheric solidarity, and the opportunity to enhance defense capabilities as further incentives.5

The nature and scope of Brazil’s contributions to peacekeeping are based on the principles of its foreign policy. Brasília strongly adheres to multilateralism and views its participation in international organizations as a mechanism to address the imbalances in the international system, which it sees as favoring wealthier nations.6 The basic elements of Brazil’s foreign policy thus embrace many of the principles of the UN Charter: the peaceful mediation of conflicts, the self-determination of nations, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and respect for

1

international law.7 For reasons of economic and political pragmatism, Brazil contributes most frequently to peacekeeping in countries it considers to be strategically important, including Latin American nations, other Portuguese-speaking countries and the developing world.

This paper addresses the factors which account for Brazil’s contributions to peacekeeping by examining the evolution of Brazil’s foreign policy and relationship with the UN in the first section. The next section describes UN actions in East Timor and Brazil’s motivations for participating in efforts there. The last section outlines Brazil’s leadership over MINUSTAH and the future implications for Brazil’s role in the UN.

UN Peacekeeping and Brazilian Foreign Policy: An Overview.

The UN states that peacekeeping is “a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace.”8 Because the UN Charter fails to mention the term explicitly, it evades clear definitions. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, referred to peacekeeping as coming under “Chapter Six and a Half” of the UN Charter, falling in the grey zone between Chapter VI, which requires member states to resolve disputes through mediation, negotiation and arbitration, and Chapter VII, which empowers the Security Council with the ability to maintain international peace and security through forcible intervention (i.e. peace-enforcement missions).9

Brazil holds strong reservations against participating in Chapter VII-based interventions, preferring instead to contribute to those based on Chapter VI, which require the consent of parties involved in conflict.10 Brazil also insists that peace-enforcement missions should be set up multilaterally and address what it views to be the sources of conflict: poverty, underdevelopment and social and economic inequality.11 Even with this in view, Brazil is still concerned that forcible intervention may be employed improperly or used for unilateral policies by the major powers, particularly the United States.12

The systemic paralysis of the Security Council caused by the frequent use of the veto power by the United States and the Soviet Union severely limited the UN’s peace and security agenda during the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1988, the UN approved only thirteen missions with the permission of host governments. The end of East-West tensions has since led to greater cooperation among the Council members and an increased number of enforcement actions based on Chapter VII.13

This fact explains an apparent paradox: Although Brazil participated in 26 of the 54 UN peacekeeping missions by 2002, it only participated in 11 out of 37

2

since 1989.  In other words, Brazil participated in nearly half of UN peacekeeping missions since its first in 1956, when it deployed troops to intervene in the Suez Crisis.  However, it participated in less than a third of all peacekeeping missions in the period between 1989 and 2002, when it demands for a permanent seat on the Security Council were the most vocalized. This is a significant drop from the period between 1956 and 1989, when Brazilians participated in 15 out of 17, or nearly 90 percent of UN missions.14

Brazil’s participation in East Timor and Haiti marks a critical departure from its non-interventionist principles. In the case of the former, Brazil has engaged in two peace operations with mandates based on Chapter VII.15 The first was the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)16 in 1999, a taskforce established by Resolution 1264 in response to the declining humanitarian and security situation during East Timor’s transition to independence from Indonesia.17 The second was the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) in 2002,18 a peacekeeping mission established by Resolution 1410 to provide assistance to East Timor until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to East Timor‘s government two years later.19 Brasília reconciled with the enforcement mandates by justifying its role based on the cultural and linguistic ties shared between the two states and the fact that consent was given by the hostile parties.20

A thorough observation of Brazil’s decision to participate in MINUSTAH reveals similar justifications and interpretive subtleties. On February 29, 2004, Brazil voted in favor of Resolution 1529 which established the Multinational Interim Force to provide relief aid and assistance to the Haitian police and Coast Guard, but did not participate in the force. 21 Brasília argued that the Resolution was a peace-enforcement mission because it acted under Chapter VII, and that Brazil would agree only to participate at a “subsequent moment” in a Chapter VI-based peacekeeping mission. That moment came with the approval of Resolution 1542 on April 30, 2004 which authorized MINUSTAH. An inconsistency emerges because this Resolution also acts under Chapter VII, yet Brasília denies this argument because the reference to Chapter VII was made in the preamble of Resolution 1529, but in the seventh paragraph of Resolution 1542. Brazil thus argues that only this paragraph falls under Chapter VII rather than the whole Resolution.22

Brazil’s recent willingness to participate in Chapter VII-based missions should be understood as a consequence of the redevelopment of its foreign policy. During the period of military dictatorship which lasted from 1964 to 1985, Brazil’s leaders spurned international organizations, viewing them as bit-players in the rivalry between the superpowers, and thus contributors to the imbalance of global power.23 This posture shifted during the return of democracy as a result of greater awareness of globalization after the end of the Cold War. Civilian leaders have

3

since adopted a policy of “autonomy through integration,”24 which calls for active participation in multilateral organizations in order to improve Brazil’s economic competitiveness and access to global markets. One of the first signs of this policy shift was Brazil’s return to the Security Council as a non-permanent member after a twenty year absence in 1988. Since that time, Brazil has served for four more two-year terms in 1993-1994, 1998-1999, 2004-2005,25 and is now serving in the 2010-2011 term. To date, Brazil has been a nonpermanent member of the Council for 18 years, a time period matched only by Japan.26

Regional solidarity in Latin America and trade preferences with the Global South are fundamental factors in this redefined policy. In accordance with its 1988 Constitution, Brazil seeks “economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America, aiming at the formation of a Latin American community of nations.”27 The new civilian leaders prioritized free trade to offset competition from the United States, whose lucrative markets threatened to reduce Brazil’s trade negotiation capabilities with neighboring countries. This competition and the failures of dictatorship’s protectionist economic model led to the creation of the Southern Common Cone Market (MERCOSUR) with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991 for new markets and trade opportunities.28 Brazil’s post-authoritarian foreign policy has also prioritized strong ties with the developing world in order to extend its economic interests beyond its traditional sphere of influence.29

These areas of strategic and economic importance are strong factors in the location and scope of Brazil’s presence in peacekeeping operations. Although Brazil has participated in peacekeeping on every continent, its largest and most frequent interventions reflect its regional projection. Between 1989 and 1999, Brazil deployed troops to El Salvador, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Macedonia, Liberia, Guatemala, Angola, Cyprus, and East Timor.30 The largest of these contributions by far was made in the UN Verification Mission in Angola III (UNAVEM III) to which Brazil sent a total of 4,174 troops and 48 police officers between 1995 and 1996.31 The second largest contribution was made to the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to which it sent 218 troops and sixteen police officers between 1992 and 1994.32 In comparison, Brazil sent less than one hundred personnel to its other missions. Brazil’s heavy involvement in Angola and Mozambique was based primarily on economic incentives, particularly in developing Angola’s petroleum industry, 33 and its pursuit of stronger relations with other Portuguese-speaking countries.34

Political and economic pragmatism should be considered the most critical determinant in Brazil’s decision to lend troops to peacekeeping operations.The foreign minister, Celso Amorim, has articulated this strategy, stating, “Our attitude is pragmatic and defends Brazilian interests.”35 The second term of

4

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1996-2002) and the current administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 – present)36 have been responsible for a rapid expansion of Brazil’s foreign policy and greater willingness to participate in Chapter VII-based missions. Brazilian diplomats have since understood that active participation in the UN is an essential mechanism for greater political autonomy and visibility on the world stage.

Brazil in East Timor

Brazil’s more ambitious foreign policy agenda was a critical factor in its initial decision to deploy troops to East Timor. During the late 1990s, the Cardoso administration pursued stronger political and economic ties outside of European and American circles. Southeast Asia became an attractive region due to the emergence of newly industrialized economies in the region, including the “Four Asian Tigers.”37 Brazil also pursued greater political autonomy at the time, departing from the pro-U.S. stance it had maintained since the Cold War and adopting an internationalist foreign policy in its place. East Timor thus presented Brasília with a unique opportunity: its status as former Portuguese colony in a highly visible struggle for independence allowed Brazil to actively demonstrate its independent foreign policy, its commitment to self-determination, and its expansion of economic ties with the Global South.38

East Timor drew the attention of the international community in the 1990s, when its struggle to end 25 years of Indonesian occupation grew more violent.39 With the consent of the Indonesian and Portuguese governments, the Security Council authorized Resolution 1246, which established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 1999.40 The purpose of this mission was to conduct a referendum to determine if the East Timorese population supported the creation of a special autonomous region or full independence from Indonesia. After the referendum revealed a clear support for sovereignty, the UN deployed 900 troops to serve in INTERFET under Australian leadership after pro-Jakarta militants clashed with the East Timorese.41

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), notably led by the Brazilian diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,42 followed UNAMET and INTERFET in 1999 and lasted until East Timor’s independence was achieved in 2002. The goal of UNTAET was to provide an interim government to provide humanitarian assistance, assist in development, support capacity-building and provide security and maintain law and order.43 UNIMITSET followed UNTAET once independence was achieved to aid the new government, provide interim law enforcement and maintain East security. The United Nations Integrated Mission in

5

East Timor (UNMIT) is an ongoing mission established in 2006 by Resolution 1704 in order to consolidate stability, enhance a culture of democratic governance and facilitate political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders.44

Of these missions, Brazil has participated in UNAMET, INTERFET, UNTAET, UNMITSET, and UNMIT. Brasília’s most critical role in these missions has been that of a mediator, a position it has upheld by cautiously preserving its neutrality in order to maintain friendly relations with the Timorese and Indonesian governments.45 Brazil’s troop presence has been comparatively limited; the Cardoso government deployed only 57 troops to INTERFET and 91 to UNTAET.46 Brazil has opted for its role as an arbitrator due to its economic interests with Indonesia, whose economy offers promising investment opportunities.47 Along with its peacekeeping commitments, Brazil continues to play a strong role in development and education in East Timor in order to secure its presence in the region.48

Of the motivations outlined by Sáenz and Fishel, Brazil’s renewed sense of international obligation played the most critical role in its decision to participate in East Timor.49 The Cardoso government prioritized human rights and democratization in order to symbolize its transition from authoritarian rule to the world at large.50 The Brazil’s willingness to take part in a peace-enforcement mission also reflected the changing nature of UN peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War. The UN’s activities in countries have become more multi-dimensional, and have prioritized post-conflict resolution to develop the necessary conditions to prevent future outbreaks of violence. These new characteristics of UN action have allowed Brazil to publicize the humanitarian aspects of its foreign policy and its willingness to commit to long term state-building in East Timor.

The Cardoso administration also sought prestige through its contributions. The Brazilian government formally announced its pursuit for a permanent seat on the Security Council in 199451. According to Brazil’s leaders, the country possessed the credentials to serve as the regional representative of Latin America, due to its large population, comparatively stronger military and soft-power resources.52 East Timor allowed Brazil to further legitimize its desired status, especially after its argument for reform could have been weakened due to its previous opposition to Chapter VII-based missions.

East Timor marks a critical shift in Brazil’s relationship with the United Nations. By departing from Brazil’s traditional non-interventionist principles, Cardoso set the precedent for the country’s willingness to engage in peace-enforcement.

6

Brazil in Haiti

Brazil’s decision to lead MINUSTAH in February 2004 marks another critical juncture in its foreign policy.  Since the rise of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003, the traditional elements of Brazil’s diplomacy have been asserted with renewed vigor.53  Like the Cardoso government, the current administration emphasizes South-South cooperation, the subordination of Brazil’s diplomacy to economic considerations, the centrality of trade to reduce external vulnerabilities, an active engagement in regional and global partnerships and a preference for multilateralism.  Yet Lula moves beyond these traditional pillars of Brazil’s diplomacy by actively promoting its aspiration for a ‘first among equals’ status in South America.54  In order to secure this status, Lula has played an important role in regional stability by intervening in the political crises in neighboring states, most notably in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. Lula has also pursued stronger ties outside of Brazil’s traditional region of interest, including India, South Africa, China and several other nations in the emergent South.55 Brazil’s participation in Haiti allows Brasília to legitimize its role as the regional hegemon in South America and attain greater visibility worldwide.

The UN Security Council authorized MINUSTAH in response to the institutional collapse in Haiti that followed the resignation of Jean-Bertrand Aristide on February 29, 2004. Aristide’s resignation came with pressure from the French and American governments after tensions between the leader’s opponents and supporters resulted in civil conflict and state failure. This conflict stemmed from the controversial results of the 2000 election that brought Aristide to power for a second time in a climate of intense dispute. Resolution 1529 states that the purpose of the mission is to monitor and restructure the Haitian national police; assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed militias; the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law and the protection of UN personnel and local civilians.56 The military force of 9,524 is currently the sixth largest peacekeeping force in the world.57 Alongside leading the mission, Brazil provides one of the largest contingents of forces, which numbers 1,200 troops.58

Prestige is the perhaps most visible factor accounting for Brazil’s leadership in Haiti, especially regarding its aspiration to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council. Although diplomatic officials do not publicly associate Brazil’s leadership over MINUSTAH with this goal, certain members of the Brazilian Congress, military leaders and ministers from the Defense Ministry connect the two issues.  Luiz Carlos Da Silva, the government’s leader in Congress, for example, claims that “it is a singular opportunity for Brazil to continue bidding for

7

a permanent seat in the United Nations that led our country not only to send troops to Haiti, but to command them as well.”59  Lula has made a permanent seat a goal since the beginning of his presidency, remarking at his inaugural speech that he would work for “a reformed Security Council, representing modern-day reality, with developed and developing countries of all regions of the world among its permanent members.” 60

Brazil’s leadership over MINUSTAH may have legitimized its desire to serve as a permanent Latin American representative on the Council. Argentina’s acceptance of Brazil’s leadership role is significant because the two countries have historically been continental rivals and competitors for a permanent membership on the Council.61 By accepting Brazil’s leadership, Argentina may be indicating a policy shift towards Brazil’s position. Mexico, another nation aspiring for a permanent seat, is notably absent from the mission, thereby foregoing an opportunity to attain international visibilty.

Brazil’s aspiration for regional solidarity is related to pursuit of prestige. MINUSTAH is notable as the first peacekeeping mission comprised of a majority of Latin American nations, with Argentina and Chile being among the top contributors.62 These nations were motivated, according to the statement of the Argentine defense minister, “to show Latin America has put on long pants.”63 Argentina, Chile and Brazil have closely aligned their political and economic interests in intragovernmental organizations, including the newly formed Community of South American Nations. The mission is beneficial because it publicizes the region’s presence as an emerging power base and an alternative economic bloc to the Global North. Furthermore, participation in Haiti has allowed for closer political and economic coordination among the South American nations. Brazil looks at it leadership role as crucial for the reopening of free trade negotiations in South America, including currently stalled discussions in MERCOSUR.64

The decision to lead MINUSTAH is also connected to Brazil’s expanding military agenda. The mission serves as an opportunity for the military to deepen its ties with the Foreign Ministry in order to expose Brazil’s more active role in international security and future commitments to stabilization and efforts against new threats and conflicts.65 Brazil’s police action in Haiti provides invaluable experience in training its armed forces for internal security missions such as crime control in Brazil’s larger cities.66 These considerations are reflected in Brazil’s 2008 National Defense Strategy, which states, “Brazil shall expand its participation in peacekeeping operations, under the aegis of the UN or of a regional multilateral organization, according to the national interests stated in international commitments.”67

8

Brazil’s leadership over MINUSTAH may hold important implications in the future direction of Brazil’s relationship with the UN. Although Brazil continues to face precarious security problems in Haiti, the possibility of a successful completion of the mandate could leverage Brazil’s mediation role in South America and the development-oriented principles of its foreign policy. As Brazil’s foreign policy agenda continues to expand, the country will likely seek a leadership role in other UN actions in areas of its regional interest.

Conclusion

According to one proverb, Brazil is “the country of the future…and will always be.” Since the early twentieth century, Brazil has aspired for great-power status, relying mostly on its soft-power attributes, including its relatively large economy. Since the restoration of democratic rule in 1985, Brazil’s civilian leaders have worked closely with multilateral organizations, including the UN, to further its economic and political goals. Peacekeeping has become a critical mechanism for Brazil to further project its influence in regions of national interests, especially Latin America, other Portuguese-speaking states and the developing world.

Brazil’s participation in East Timor marked the first time it participated in a Chapter VII-based mission. The Cardoso administration departed from the country’s traditional non-interventionist principles in order to pursue stronger economic ties with Southeast Asian nations and publicize Brazil’s commitment to the international norms of human rights and democracy. Like the Cardoso government, the Lula administration participated in peace-enforcement missions to legitimize Brazil’s pursuit of a permanent seat on the Security Council. The current Brazilian leadership over MINUSTAH is linked to its aspiration for greater regional clout in its area of interest. Argentina’s acceptance of Brazil’s position is significant as it indicates an acceptance of Brazil’s desired leadership role in South American integration. MINUSTAH also gives Brazil an opportunity to enhance its defense capabilities.

Brazil’s future contributions to UN peacekeeping missions will continue to reflect the pragmatic norms of its foreign policy. Brasília will aspire for greater prestige to expose its emergence as an economic and political power through UN action.

9

1Endnotes Alfredo Montero. Brazilian Politics: Reforming a Democratic State in a Changing World. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 47.2 These are not the only missions in which Brazil participates. Rather, Alfred Montero, an associate professor of political science at Carleton College argues that these are the most notable, most likely because Brazil’s leadership in Haiti is the first time it has ever headed a UN Mission.3 John T. Fishel and Andrés Sáenz. Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping.. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), p. 199.4 Ibid, p. 199.5 Ibid, p. 199.6 Alfredo Montero. Brazilian Politics: Reforming a Democratic State in a Changing World. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 129.7 Ibid, p. 129.8 This definition is found at the UN’s Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information’s web page at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/9 Ibid.10 Eugenio Diniz. “Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Foreign Policy.” Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), p. 95.11 Ibid, p. 95.12 Ibid, p. 95.13 Ibid, p. 9514 Ibid, p. 9515 Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto. “Participação sul-americana em operações de paz: um estudo de caso da participação dos países do Cone Sul na MINUSTAH.” Rio de Janeiro: Revista Eletrônica Boletim do Tempo, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2009),p. 6.16Ibid, 6.17 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1264. S/RES/126418 Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto. “Participação sul-americana em operações de paz: um estudo de caso da participação dos países do Cone Sul na MINUSTAH.” Rio de Janeiro: Revista Eletrônica Boletim do Tempo, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2009), 6.19 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1410. S/RES/141020 Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto. “Participação sul-americana em operações de paz: um estudo de caso da participação dos países do Cone Sul na MINUSTAH.” Rio de Janeiro: Revista Eletrônica Boletim do Tempo, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2009), 6.21 Amélie Gauthier and Sarah John de Sousa. “Brazil in Haiti: Debate over the Peacekeeping Mission.” Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior. April 2006, p. 1.22 Ibid, p. 1.23 Eugenio Diniz. “Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Foreign Policy.” Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), 94.24 Ibid, 95.25 Ibid, 95.26 Susanne Gratius. “Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peace Broker?” Working Paper no, 35, April 2007, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y del Dialogo Exterior, p. 1.27 Article IV of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil: A República Federativa do Brasil buscará a integração econômica, política, social e cultural dos povos da América Latina, visando à formação de uma comunidade latino-americana de nações28 Eugenio Diniz. “Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Foreign Policy.” Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. Edited by John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), 97.

29 Ibid, 99.30 Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse Fontoura. O Brasil e as Operações de Paz. (Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco, 2005) 224. 31 Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse Fontoura. O Brasil e as Operações de Paz. (Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco, 2005) 216.32 Ibid, 216.33Wendy Hunter. “State and Soldier in Latin America: Redifining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Chile and Brazil.” Peaceworks no. 10, p. 24. 34 Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse Fontoura. O Brasil e as Operações de Paz. (Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco, 2005) 226.35 Expedito Filho. "Nossa Atitude É Pragmática E Não Há Antiamericanismo." O Estado de São Paulo, February 11 200736 Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst. “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities.” International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006) p. 30.37 Leandro Leone Pepe and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “O envolvimento do Brasil na questão timorense.” Lusotopie, Vol, 13, No. 2, (2006), p. 52.38 Ibid, p. 50.39 Ibid, p. 50.40 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1246. S/RES/124641 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1246. S/RES/124642 Leandro Leone Pepe and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “O envolvimento do Brasil na questão timorense.” Lusotopie, Vol, 13, No. 2, (2006), p. 55.43 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1410. S/RES/141044 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1704. S/RES/170445 Leandro Leone Pepe and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “O envolvimento do Brasil na questão timorense.” Lusotopie, Vol, 13, No. 2, (2006), p. 55.46 Leandro Leone Pepe and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “Operaciones de paz de las Naciones Unidas: la perspectiva brasileña.” Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad •Vol. 19 ,No. 1 ( 2005), p. 6247 Leandro Leone Pepe and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “O envolvimento do Brasil na questão timorense.” Lusotopie, Vol, 13, No. 2, (2006), p. 51.48 Leandro Leone Pepe and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “Operaciones de paz de las Naciones Unidas: la perspectiva brasileña.” Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad •Vol. 19 ,No. 1 ( 2005), p. 6249 Leandro Leone Pepe and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “O envolvimento do Brasil na questão timorense.” Lusotopie, Vol, 13, No. 2, (2006), p. 57.50 Ibid, 56.51 Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst. “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities.” International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006) p. 29.52 Leandro Leone Pepe and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “O envolvimento do Brasil na questão timorense.” Lusotopie, Vol, 13, No. 2, (2006), p. 57.53 Eugenio Diniz. “Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Foreign Policy.” Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. Edited by John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), 98.54 Ibid, p. 99.55 Ibid, p. 99.56 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1529. S/RES/1529. 57 The Economist. "Call the Blue Helmets: Can the UN cope with increasing demands for its soldiers? "..58 Walter E Kretchik. “Haiti’s Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview.” Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), 8.59 Amélie Gauthier and Sarah John de Sousa. “Brazil in Haiti: Debate over the Peacekeeping Mission.” Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior. April 2006, p. 1.

60 Eugenio Diniz. “Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Foreign Policy.” Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. Edited by John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), 100.61 Ibid, 60.62 John T. Fishel and Andrés Sáenz. Lessons Learned from Haiti: Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping.. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), 198.63 Ibid, 200.64 Eugenio Diniz. “Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Foreign Policy.” Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. Edited by John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007), 100.65 Mônica Hirst. “South American Intervention in Haiti.” Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior p. 10.66 Ibid, p. 9.67 Ministerio Brasileiro de Defesa. Estratégia Nacional de Defesa. 2008

BibliographyDiniz, Eugenio. “Peacekeeping and the Evolution of Foreign Policy.” Capacity-

Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. Edited by John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007.

The Economist. "Call the Blue Helmets." January 6, 2007, 23-24.Filho, Expedito. "Nossa Atitude É Pragmática E Não Há Antiamericanismo." O

Estado de São Paulo, February 11 2007Fishel, John T. and Andrés Sáenz. Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping: the

Case of Haiti. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007.

Fontoura, Paulo Roberto Campos Tarrisse. O Brasil e as Operações de Paz. Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco, 2005.

Gauthier, Amélie and Sarah John de Sousa. “Brazil in Haiti: Debate over the Peacekeeping Mission.” April 2006, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y del Dialogo Exterior, Madrid,Spain

Gratius, Susanne. “Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peace Broker?” Working Paper no.35. April 2007, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y del Dialogo Exterior, Madrid,Spain

Hirst, Mônica. “South American Intervention in Haiti.” April 2007, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y del Dialogo Exterior, Madrid,Spain

---. “Strategic Posture Review: Brazil.” World Politics Review. (2009)Hunter, Wendy. “State and Soldier in Latin America: Redifining the Military’s Role

in Argentina, Chile and Brazil.” Peaceworks no. 10. October 1996., United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

Kretchik, Walter E. “Haiti’s Quest for Democracy: Historical Overview.” Capacity-

Building for Peacekeeping: the Case of Haiti. Edited by John T. Fishel and Andrés Saenz. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University Press, 2007.

Ministerio Brasileiro de Defesa. Estratégia Nacional de Defesa. 2008Montero, Alfredo. Brazilian Politics: Reforming a Democratic State in a Changing

World. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.Pepe, Leandro Leone and Suzeley Kalil Mathias. “O envolvimento do Brasil na

questão timorense.” Lusotopie, Vol, 13, No. 2, (2006), pp. 49-58(10)---. “Operaciones de paz de las Naciones Unidas: la perspectiva brasileña.”

Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad •Vol. 19 ,No. 1 ( 2005), pp. 57-71Soares de Lima, Maria Regina and Mônica Hirst. “Brazil as an Intermediate

State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities.” International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2006) pp. 21-40.

Souza Neto, Danilo Marcondes de. “Participação sul-americana em operações de paz: um estudo de caso da participação dos países do Cone Sul na MINUSTAH.” Rio de Janeiro: Revista Eletrônica Boletim do Tempo, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2009)

Vaz, Alcides Costa. "Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula: Change orContinuity " Dialogue on Globalization. Briefing Papers, (2004)