Questions for Week 4

Question on Making It Explicit1. Brandom suggests that in order to understand what it is for a sentence or a state to

represent something we must understand what it is to grasp a sentence or state as representing (p.75). In this way we are to use a focus on the attitude of “taking, treating, or using a representing as a representing” (ibid) in order to understand what it is for some sentence or state to be a representing. And this means we are to look for a kind of know-how that a thing must exhibit for its behavior to count as conceptual rather than a merely responsive classification. At p. 89 Brandom introduces the Sellarsian criterion of being able to give reasons for one’s classifications as the practical know-how needed for those classifications to count as conceptual. He writes “To grasp or understand a concept is, according to Sellars, to have practical mastery over the inferences it is involved in—to know, in the practical sense of being able to distinguish, what follows from the applicability of the concept, and what it follows from” (p.89).

This makes it seem like the practical capacity that a thing must exhibit to count as conceptually classifying the world, representing it as being some determinate way, is a linguistic capacity. But in his later papers Sellars tried to distance himself from this reading of his work. At the opening of the 1981 paper “Mental Events” Sellars writes “I find that I am often construed as holding that mental events in the sense of thoughts, as contrasted with aches and pains, are linguistic events. This is a misunderstanding. What I have held is that the members of a certain class of linguistic events are thoughts” (In the Space of Reasons p.282). He goes on in that paper to assert that “The concept of innate abilities to be aware of something as something, and hence of pre-linguistic awareness, is perfectly intelligible” (ibid p.292). It would seem then that Sellars, or at least the later Sellars, is perfectly content to allow that the game of giving and asking for reasons, as a socio-linguistic game, is not a necessary condition on conceptually classificatory, and hence representational, capacity.

Now at times it seems like Brandom would be amenable to this sort of approach. On page 91, for instance, he studiously mentions both linguistic and apparently non-linguistic conceptual activity, writing about an “autonomous language game (or set of practices of applying concepts)” and “languages or conceptual schemes.” Do these disjunctive discussions of “languages or conceptual schemes” signal an allowance that a state might represent in the absence of being situated in a language game?

Questions on Between Saying and Doing2. As a follow up to the question above: Sellars thinks that any innate non-linguistic

classificatory abilities count as conceptual only if they are situated in the context of “other representational states and actions,” where “[p]rimitive inferences would also be

involved.” These will include, for Sellars, prelinguistic analogues to language-entry transitions or perceptual takings (lo, smoke!), language-language transitions or inferrings (where there is smoke, there is fire), and language exit transitions or volitions (I shall get out of here now). And so it seems that what is needed is that a thing’s behavior be situated in a system of what Brandom calls reliable differential responsive dispositions (RDRD’s). I find Brandom’s discussion of RDRD’s in Making it Explicit difficult to pin down. In chapter 1 he argues against a reduction of language-use to reliable differential response, but in chapter 2 he remarks that the know-how involved in language-use will involve RDRD’s (p.88), and that indeed these RDRD’s will contribute to the content of linguistic episodes (p.119).

RDRD’s appear also in Between Saying and Doing, and here they are characterized in normative terminology (p.34). Given that the problem with the regularist’s appeal to RDRD’s as a reduction of language-use (in MiE) was that such an appeal elided the distinction between proper and improper response, might this normative construal of RDRD’s afford a bridge from non-linguistic conceptual activity to its linguistic variety? At any rate, this prospect is not followed up on, as section 3 of chapter 2 shifts discussion to autonomous discursive practices, and section 4 reintroduces RDRD’s in the context of explicitly linguistic practices.

But perhaps non-linguistic RDRD’s, situated in the kind of perception/inference/action context that Sellars and Brandom both think are necessary for explicitly conceptual activity, stand to language-entry/language-language/language-exit transitions as non-indexical vocabulary stands to indexical vocabulary (as argued in the appendix to BSD chapter 2). That is, just as anything capable of using non-indexical vocabulary is already doing enough to count as being capable of using indexical vocabulary, without this sufficiency relation counting as a reduction of the latter to the former, perhaps anything capable of properly situated RDRD’s is already doing enough to count as being capable of using a language. (This would be an in-principle capability in the sense discussed on p.38—it is not that a dog, say, whose RDRD’s count it as classifying some things as bobcats and other things as housecats can actually be made to speak a language, but that the abilities necessary for this differential classification are themselves analogues to language-transitions.)

My suspicion is that evolved purposive dispositions, selected for and reinforced over evolutionary and educational processes, are just such RDRD’s that are PV necessary for employing any vocabulary.

Preston Stovall

MIE Ch2

The identification of conceptual content with inferential relations seems satisfythe theoretical role Brandom attributes to content (as determining the significanceof a claim in a context or what we are committed to and to what we are entitled).However, is this the only role we ask of content? Intuitively it seems as thoughcontent should tell us what a claim is about. Brandom's account of content appearsto face two important obstacles in satisfying this criterion. First, it seems to beunable to distinguish between coextensive terms. The sentence "Hesperus is visible"has the same content as "Phosphorous is visible" on Brandom's model since the twosentences include the same inferential relations. Second, it is unclear as to howcontent, in this sense, relates to the physical world. Conceptual contents functionas a consistent and internally coherent set of beliefs but how are these beliefsabout the world? How does Brandom escape McDowell's charge of "frictionless spinningin a void"?

BSD Ch2

Brandom argues that it is only in virtue of conditionals that we are able to saysomething, as opposed to only doing something. This claim seems to rely on his modelof propositional content as material inferential relations. However, I am unclear asto how to understand the former claim while also accepting the latter claim.Conditionals, it seems, must be primitive since our grasping a proposition not onlyrequires but consists in (according to 2) that we are committed to certain otherpropositions which follow from the original proposition as well as propositions fromwhich it follows. Given this model it seems as though grasping the proposition "thechair is red" consists in the conditionals, "if the chair is red, then the chair iscolored" and "if the chair is red, then the chair is not blue". Although theseconditionals are true and contribute to the meaning of "the chair is red", it seemsas though we must have an independent understanding of "the chair is red" to get theproject off the ground.

Laura Davis

*MIE *Ch. 2

Many of the examples of material inference in this chapter seem to becapable of being understood in purely formal terms, such as “Pittsburgh isto the West of Philadelphia” licensing the inference to “Philadelphia is tothe East of Pittsburgh.” Examples like this exhibit a*monotonic*character, which makes it possible to understand them informal terms.There is at least a plausible reading of the early Wittgenstein on colorexclusion on which he seems to take this sort of route, due to hisaffirmation of the independence of atomic sentences It seems like you haveinferences that would be very difficult to understand in this way in mind,like one from “This is a zebra” to “This has stripes” – inferences that canbe defeated upon addition of further premises, such as “This is albino.” Isthis correct? How does this change things?

William Eck

MIE 2 --

On page 94 you say that the "still-dominant tradition ... readsinferential correctnesses off from representational correctnesses, whichare assumed to be antecedently intelligible." You characterize theinferentialist approach as one "start[ing] with a notion of content as amatter of what is a reason for what and understand truth andrepresentation as features of ideas that are not only manifested in, butconferred by their role in reasoning." Could asking the question 'How onemakes a representation' make for an alternative approach? In representingsomething, it seems to me implicit that in selecting something 'as to berepresented' is to necessarily presuppose a counter-concept that it is nototherwise. For example, one cannot utter the word 'red' to represent/that/ color unless one has inferred that there is something else to be'not red'. This would support the referred to need of not having oneconcept but many concepts, in that how a concept is even formed requires'two' (to single out one from otherwise). How does the 'still-dominanttradition' defend itself on that mark? Does it?

BSD 2 --

In relation to the above, on page 47 you say "that just as everyautonomous discursive practice must involve distinguishing some inferencesas materially good, so it must involve distinguishing some claims asmaterially /incompatible/ with others. That a monochromatic patch is redrules out its being blue. Only algorithmic elaboration is required toturn distinguish material incompatibility of claims into the ability todeploy logical /negation/. And once that bit of logical vocabulary isdeployed, it (together with the conditional) lets one /say that/ twoclaimables are materially incompatible: 'If a monochromatic patch is red,then it is not blue.'" Would you agree that this distinguishing materialincompatibility is necessary before one can say anything at all -- even tojust say 'red'?Jacquet Kehm

I had the following short question about Articulating Reasons Chapter One.Around page fifty-five you say that we can think of form in terms of aprivileged vocabulary constant across substitutions of nonprivilegedvocabulary. Accordingly, there might not only be logical form, but say,theological or aesthetic form, if we were to privelege those vocabularies.What would a theologically or aesthetically valid argument form look like?(I think it would be useful to see a couple of examples.)

Sam Gavin

1.

According to Brandom, in order for us to understand Sam’s utterance “Thisapple is red” as meaning this apple is red, we must attribute appropriate

commitments and entitlements to Sam. If we merely attribute to Sam thecommitment that the sky is blue and the entitlement that the sky iscolored, we would not have understood Sam. Therefore which commitments andentitlements are appropriate to attribute must, for Brandom, be determinedby an inferential semantics (how else is one to know which commitments andentitlements are appropriate?). This might be one important way in whichBrandom’s semantics shed light on his pragmatics. However, suppose we meetMrs. Malaprop armed with our inferentially backed attributions. Sheproduces only those utterances for which our inferential semanticsdetermine inappropriate commitments and entitlements, but despite this weunderstand her utterances perfectly well. She says “You’re taking me forgranite”, the commitments and entitlements we would have ascribed wouldconcern granite, but we know better. We know she means you’re taking mefor granted. Brandom’s theory, assuming it describes how we interpretothers, gives the wrong answers in cases of deviant speech. The pointabout interpreting deviant speech suggests, I think, that even in cases ofinterpreting *non-deviant* speech Brandom’s theory does not suffice, andperhaps might not even be necessary. The only bits of ‘theory’ left toground interpretation would then be ones already made explicit by hearersthemselves, e.g., “we have been friends for quiet some time now, so I knowwhat you mean”.

2.The problem of the unity of the proposition consists in giving an accountof how semantic primitives can be put together in such a way as to instancethe unity of something that can be true or false. By claiming thatpropositional contents are primitive, however, Brandom seems to dismiss theproblem of the unity of the proposition as a pseudo-problem, along with theframework of thinking about language that made it seem like a problem. But,in dismissing the problem of the unity of the proposition Brandom seems tointroduce another problem into his fold. In particular, Brandom may not beable to account for how a subject can know the meaning of a potentiallyinfinite number of sentences on the basis of finite means. Since it seemsthat the account of compositionality would, in many respects, mirror anaccount of the unity of the proposition, Brandom may also rejectcompositionality as a pseudo-problem. However, unlike the problem of theunity of the proposition, it seems that compositionality *does* present aproblem. What is your attitude toward compositionality in the context of aninferential semantics?

Shivam Patel

Concerning chapter 2 of Making it Explicit, I want to address an issue related to the Dummettian notions of appropriate circumstances and consequences of the application of concepts introduced in section V (MiE, pp. 116 ff.). My question arises in the context of the elaborations about this Dummettian model in connection with the twin-earth thought experiment (cf. MiE, pp. 119/120); and maybe the difficulties I am having are only due to a misunderstanding about the specifics of this thought-experiment. Anyway, in the case of this twin-earth model, we can see that the application of the concept

water to the substance XYZ is inappropriate from the perspective of the interpreter who considers the linguistic practices of the practitioners from outside their practices. Within the language-game of the earthlings (and the twin-earthlings), however, the concept application might be considered as appropriate. After all, it is possible that the earthlings do not and cannot possibly know that there is a difference between water and twater in terms of their chemical composition. Now, should we regard their concept application as inappropriate if judged by their internal standards of appropriateness, that is, if judged by what they know and could possibly know as appropriate circumstances of the application of some concept? Apparently, this question concerns the relevant perspective and the context of any assessment of the appropriateness of a concept application: we may admit that the practitioners in the twin-earth model are not „omniscient about the inferential commitments implicit in their own concepts“ (MiE, p. 119) –– this is, more or less, a consequence from the ideal set-up of the thought experiment. And I am inclined to say here: they are not omniscient about all their inferential commitments. But they surely know some of the inferential commitments implicit in their concepts; and isn‘t that knowledge enough to account for the appropriateness of their concept application? Who is to decide which circumstances should enter the determination of the appropriateness of a concept application, that is, what inferential commitments have to be (made) explicit in order to decide whether a concept application is appropriate? In other words: in what sense is omniscience required here to decide whether a concept application is appropriate? And in what sense could we say that the interpreter (in the twin-earth model) is omniscient? Since we cannot rely on such an ideal interpreter if we try to examine the appropriate circumstances of our own concept applications in real life, I was wondering whether we should understand the appropriateness of a concept application as involving all possible circumstances that could render a concept application as appropriate or inappropriate? Does it involve all possible circumstances which an imagined, ideal interpreter could be acquainted with and be omniscient about in order to assess whether our concept applications are appropriate?

Florian Rieger

My question is, in effect, what the reasons are for making anythingexplicit and, hence, for developing and using logical (normative,semantic, intentional...) vocabulary at all. Of course, at one level,there is a straightforward enough answer: we want implicitly relied-onmaterial inferences (as well as patterns of language-entry and exit) tobecome the subject matter of explicit discussion. However, when thinkingabout the purpose of _that_, I can think of two good answers, and I havea feeling that (at least) MIE takes only one of them seriously.

The first one, which appears on numerous pages in MIE, is that once aninferential or non-inferential pattern is made explicit, we can assessour entitlement to it, individually or in an open exchange of multiplespeakers. Here is a clear formulation: »In Reason's fight against

thought debased by prejudice and propaganda, the first rule is thatmaterial inferential commitments that are potentially controversialshould be made explicit as claims, exposing them both as vulnerable toreasoned challenge and as in need of reasoned defense« (126). A fewpages later, there is also explicit mention of »discovering andrepairing discordant concepts« (130, my emphasis).

The second one is this. We make the internal relations (inferential andnon-inferential links) which constitute our individual idiolectsexplicit by way of logical (normative, semantic,...) vocabulary in orderto help other speakers translate our idiolects into theirs. This, ofcourse, is a prerequisite for any judgments about whether a particularcommunicative problem between individual speakers amounts to adisagreement or merely an instance of (complex, formerly undetected)talking past one another. It is also a prerequisite for the possibiltyof _adopting_ another speaker's idiolect. This way of looking at logical(normative, semantic,...) vocabulary suggests that its use is one of the_calibration_ of different speakers' linguistic dispositions against oneanother.

Both sets of reasons are compatible with the slogan that »logic is theorgan of semantic self-consciousness« (9). I wonder if there is anysystematic reason for the emphasis on the first, or rather the silenceon the latter set of reasons. May not the second set of reasons even bethe more fundamental one?Matthias Kiesselbach

*BSD,* Ch. 2

Last week, in your response to my question (concerning how one is betteroff with regard to the gerrymandering problem if one employs deonticmodality rather than alethic modality), you described part the aim ofmaking practices explicit, in deontic rules, in the act of interpretationas saying *what you have to take *someone to be doing in order to take themto be engaging in certain practices, or employing certain vocabularies. Iwonder what this means for our understanding of PP-Necessity: Granted thateverything in *MIE *is true, is to say that Practice A is PP-Necessary forPractice B just to say that *in order to take someone as engagingin*Practice B,*we must take them to be also engaging in *Practice B? If so – how limitedis the domain of “we” – the set of discursive beings, the set of humanbeings, the set of members of a given culture? In *BSD *PP-Necessity soundslike a much stronger relationship, and I wonder if this is simply becausethe *BSD *framework is meant to be applicable to a broad range of theories,or because there is in fact a stronger relationship than the one I amcurrently attributing to you.

William Eck

*BS2**, Ch. 2*:

On p.43, you claim that *inferential *practices are “PV-necessary for thefor the deployment of every vocabulary whatsoever” because they “arePP-necessary components of every autonomous discursive practice.” In thisquestion, I’m interested in how to justify or motivate the latterclaim—i.e., that any ADP presupposes inferential practices. It seems to methat you take this claim for granted as a starting point for your analysis,and suggest that a reader could look to *MIE* for arguments for it. But areader who wants to read *BSD *in isolation from *MIE* might find thattaking this as a starting point begs the question concerning your laterargument for “semantic logicism”. I’ll try to motivate her worry.

In 2:5, you explain that semantic logicism, which gives logical vocabularya “special role” in “the process of elaborating one vocabulary intoanother” (49), got something right. You then argue for this by showingthat both horns of the logicist dilemma can be avoided by appealing to thefact that logical vocabulary can be both *elaborated* from and*explicative*of any ADP (“LX” relation), as any ADP presupposesinferential practices.

That’s what seems to beg the question: Ultimately the “LX”-relation thatjustifies the special role of logic in semantic analysis rests on theassumption that inferential practices are PP-necessary for any ADP.

Let’s quickly run through why this, though restricting ourselves toconditionals for simplicity: It is because inferential practices are takento be PP-necessary for deploying any ADP that one can begin with “theability to respond differentially to moves relating one setof…sentence-tokenings to another as *inferences* [a] system [that candeploy any vocabulary] is disposed to *endorse*” as primitive ability thatcan be algorithmically elaborated into further abilities (44). Thisability to distinguish good and bad inferences is then shown to be to be“(PP-)*sufficient* for the ability to deploy conditionals involving[non-logical] sentences” (45). Conditional vocabulary is then shown tohave a “distinctive expressive role” of “mak[ing] *explicit* something thatotherwise was *implicit* in the practical sorting of non-logical inferencesinto good and bad.” That is, after the algorithmic introduction ofconditional vocabulary “one can endorse or reject [an] inference by*saying*something” (46).

But, other starting points seem possible (though I’m not sure how one arguefor most of them). Let’s look at example. Perhaps someone’s semantictheory starts with the idea that all ADPs presuppose treating each other asmeaning things by saying things, so intentional vocabulary (like the word‘means’ in “He *means* *p* by saying *p*”) can be algorithmicallyelaborated from any ADP, and bear an “LX”-relation to the originalpractices-and-abilities. [I take it that this suggestion is somewhat likeShivam Patel’s from last week]. In that case, intentional vocabulary mightbe thought to play the “special role” that you, agreeing with the bulk of 20th century analytic philosophy, give to logic alone.

I wonder if we might then reverse the order of motivations, so to speak, sothat *BSD* can be taken to give a theoretical argument for why we shouldtake inferential practices to be PP-necessary for any ADP. The idea hereis to begin with the assumption that logic really does have the specialrole that “semantic logicism” says it does. Then, we could say thatlogical vocabulary—in order to unlock the logicist’s dilemma with apragmatic key—must bear an “LX”-relation to the practices-or-abilitiesPP-necessary for deploying an ADP. This then shows that inferentialpractices must be PP-necessary for any ADP. It’s true that this startingpoint might also be thought of as question begging (consider: the laterWittgenstein’s work or Derrida’s “logocentrism” complaint), but it seems tome that this strategy gives an interesting motivation to your projects ingeneral.

What do you think of this suggestion?

*MIE**, Ch.2*:

I’m not sure if this a small question or a large one, so I figure it’sparticularly worth asking, if for nothing else, for the sake ofclarification.

In 2:I:3, you discuss representational purport, and explain that an accountof representational content requires an account of representationalpurport, that makes room for purport to be “veridical or spurious” (73). Youthen go on to say that this requires us to give an account of the “uptake,grasp, of understanding of such purport” (74), since, as Dennett says,representation is always “to or for someone”. I’m still a little unclearabout how the move from whether the purport can be veridical or not to

needing an account of understanding purport, though it feels more-or-lessright to me. I suppose someone could say that what it means for a purportto be veridical is for it to be objective, *viz*., stand in somerelationship to objects that holds independently of how anyone understandthe purport. Is there something incoherent about this response? Seeingthat there is might be helpful in understanding why to go for aninferntialist as opposed to a representational semantics.Chuck Goldhaber