Bolivia's Radical Decentralization

8/8/2019 Bolivia's Radical Decentralization

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8 Americas Quarterly S U M M E R 2 0 1 0 A M E R I C A S Q U A R T E R L Y . O R G

M

AURO

KURY;JORGE

SILVA/REUTERS

(FLAG)

Volume 4, Number 3Table of Contents Summer 2010

3425

in ournext

issue:

Education, Inclusion and Competition: Access to quality education is the key to social mobility andeconomic growth. The Fall issue ofAmericas Quarterly examines race and educational opportunity in Brazil,

business promotion of technical education, public-private partnerships, and standards and testing, with

articles by Marcelo de Paula Paixao, Fernando Reimers and Jeffrey Puryear.

28 The New El DoradoHUGUETTE YOUNG

Climate change, oil and

geopolitics in the Arctic Circle.

34 Bolivias RadicalDecentralizationMIGUEL CENTELLAS

President Evo Morales is

transferring more authority to

departmentseven when the

results have been politically

uncomfortable.

40 Power to the ParentsDANIEL ALTSCHULER

Honduras and Guatemala

experiment with community-

run schools.

3 From the Editor

11 PanoramaFundacin Albatros

Media, Choc Quib Towns Afro-

Colombian beat, Inuit filmmak-

ers, 10 Things to Do in Panama

City, and more.

18 Hard Talk Can local govern-

ments write their own immi-

gration laws? Governors Janice

K. Brewer and Bill Richardson

square off.

22 Innovators/Innovations

Lumni, Inc. invests in LatinAmerican college students.

Yolande James empowers immi-

grant youth in Qubec. ViaEduca-

tion trains teachers. Cavi Borges

puts Brazilian cinema in the

spotlight.

104 Dispatches from the Field:

New OrleansStephanie Hepburnon post-Katrina (and now post-

BP) worker exploitation.

108 Tongue in Cheek

110 Policy Updates

Juan Blyde and Mauricio Mes-

quita Moreira on transport and

trade. Mara de la Paz Vela on

Ecuadors dollarization.

114 Fresh Look Reviews

Adam Isacson looks at Colombias

Democratic Security policy. Patri-cio Navia reviews an anthology

on Latin America's new direction.

120 Just the Numbers

The hemispheres expanding

waistlines.

DEPARTMENTS


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A M E R I C A S Q U A R T E R L Y . O R G 35Americas QuarterlyS U M M E R 2 0 1 0

IVAN

ALVARADO

/REUTERS

AL ZI T I NO

Will the creation of multiple andoverlapping regional, subregional and

local government authorities unifyor fragment Bolivia? BY MIGUEL CENTELLAS

olivia under Presi-

dent Evo Morales

is undergoing rev-

olutionary change.

Since it assumed

power in 2006 ,

much of the international attention

on the Morales government has fo-

cused on its socioeconomic policies.

But those policies may ultimately

leave less of a political imprint than

the transformation of the countrysgoverning structures. In fact, the most

profoundly radical development is Bo-

livias transition from a traditional

unitary state toward something re-

sembling a federalized onethough

the end point of this process remains

uncertain.

Political power in Bolivia, as in

much of Latin America, has been his-

torically centralized in the national

government. Subnational authorities

traditionally served as agents of the

executive. But during the wave of de-

centralization that accompanied the

regions return to democracy, Bolivia

began to move toward the federal

models of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,

and Venezuela. With this years local

and regional elections, it has become

the most decentralized of Latin Amer-

icas nonfederal states.

It is now worth asking whether the

results have advanced Bolivias dem-

ocratic development or hindered it.

The movement toward a federal-

ized structure began in the mid-1990s,

when theLey de Participacin Popular

(Popular Participation Law) created 311

popularly elected municipal govern-

ments (since expanded to 337) and con-

stitutionally guaranteed them direct

fiscal transfers. It also included mech-

anisms for grassroots citizen organi-

zations to play direct oversight and

planning roles in local government.

At the time, the neoliberal archi-tects of those reforms argued that

municipal decentralization was more

effective than granting more powers

to Bolivias nine departments, which

would merely reproduce the ineffi-

ciencies of the central government.

That was a justifiable concern, since

each of the departments was politi-

cally and economically dominated

by its capital city. The decision to cre-

ate 311 municipal governmentsmost

of which had fewer than 15,000 resi-

dentswas a conscious effort to bring

local government to marginalized in-

digenous and rural communities.

One of the most striking results of

the law was the empowerment of a

new generation of political leaders,

such as Evo Morales. But just as sig-

nificant, municipal decentralization

along with electoral reforms that in-

troduced a mixed-member electoral

system, accelerated the decline of Bo-

livias traditional party system.

B


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DAVID

MERCADO/REUTERS

36 Americas Quarterly S U M M E R 2 0 1 0 A M E R I C A S Q U A R T E R L Y . O R GA M E R I C A S Q U A R T E R L Y . O R G

HURTLING TOWARDTHE UNKNOWN

U

nder Morales, the

pace of change has

sped up, thanks to

the new nationalconstitution ap-

proved in 2009 .

While Article 1 of that constitution still

declares Bolivia a unitary state, it also

declares it (among other things) a

plurinational state with autonomies.

Essentially, the constitution now ex-

plicitly recognizes that multiple na-

tions live within the territory and

grants local self-government to differ-

ent communities. However, none of

this is defined in practical terms.The constitution introduces a new

structure for subnational autonomies

that is more comprehensive and far-

reaching than the decentralization

reforms of the 1990s. While it en-

shrines departmental autonomya

consequence of the protracted conflict

between the central state and auton-

omy movements in the eastit also

grants varying levels of political and

economic autonomy to three other

types of government: regions (subde-

partmental units self-defined by pop-ular referendum), municipalities and

indigenous communities.

This means that Bolivia is now con-

stitutionally divided between four

equal, distinct, yet overlapping lev-

els of autonomy, with many questions

still unanswered about how this po-

litical structure will work in practice.

The legislature is still working on a le-

gal framework that will regulate the

various autonomous entities. Each au-

tonomous unit must also draft its own

statute (local constitution or charter).

The reality is that no one has a clear

idea of how these units will relate to

each otheror the central govern-

mentin practice.

Even before the enactment of the

2009 constitution, departmental au-

tonomy emerged as the most visibly

federal feature of the system. Begin-

ning with the 2005 general elections,

prefects have been chosen by popu-

lar election rather than appointed by

the president. The result: in 2005, even

though Morales andMovimiento al So-

cialismo (MAS) won a comfortable na-

tionwide victory, opposition prefects

were elected in six of the country s

departments. These prefects consti-

tutionally still serve at the pleasureof the president, but Morales has

respected opposition victories and

declined to unilaterally remove mem-

bers of the opposition from office.

He maintained this hands-off ap-

proach even during the tense period

of 2008, when opposition prefects or-

ganized autonomy votes in the east-

ern lowland departments of Santa

Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando. The

Presidents response was to organize a

nationwide recall referendum for him-

self and eight prefects. Savina Cul-

lar, the Chuquisaca prefect elected in

a special election that year, was ex-

empt. Morales won, but so did most

opposition prefects.

Regional autonomy movements re-

main the greatest single challenge to

Morales presidency. In the absence of

a credible, disciplined or coordinated

national opposition political party, re-

gional movement leaders have been

the only ones capable of mounting a

sustained opposition to Morales gov-

ernment. Often, government-opposi-

tion negotiations have taken place

outside the legislature, forcing Morales

to negotiate with the prefects. Since

his election, every compromise he has

made has strengthened the autono-mists position. After resisting the in-

clusion of departmental and regional

autonomy clauses in the new constitu-

tion, Morales and the MAS delegates

finally caved in to the opposition and

included autonomy provisions.

Then, in December 2009, in what

was clearly an electoral calculation,

Morales suddenly reversed position

and supported autonomy referen-

dums: in each of the five Andean

departments (La Paz, Cochabamba,

Oruro, Potos, and Chuquisaca), in the

province of Gran Chaco (part of Tarija

department) and in 12 rural munici-

palities (where voters were given the

chance to declare themselves an in-

digenous community). Yes won in

all the referendums except for Cara-

huara. As a result, in April 2010, voters

went to the polls in a host of autono-

mous jurisdictions: nine departments,

326 municipalities, 11 indigenous com-

munities, and one region (Gran Chaco).

A political evolution: Evo Morales celebrates victory with Felipe Quispe (left),

head ofMovimiento Indgena Pachakuti, in 2005 (above). In 2008, Savina Cullar

is sworn in as Bolivias first woman governor of the Chuquisaca region (right).


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LUIS

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A M E R I C A S Q U A R T E R L Y . O R G 37Americas QuarterlyS U M M E R 2 0 1 0

They elected 2,511 officials.

Today, Bolivias autonomous de-

partments look very much like states

in a federation. Unlike municipali-

ties, whose structures are defined

by the central state, departments

(and regions) are free to draft their

own statutes. In the end, Morales

has acceptedwith little or no mod-

ificationthe kind of autonomy re-

gionalist movements had demanded.

It is too early to know whether Bo-

livias current model will continue to

evolve toward a full federal model

though even if it does, the powers and

responsibilities remain ill defined. But

its evolution from decentralization to

devolution to autonomies offers a clear

trajectory. It also suggests profound

changes are underway in the coun-

trys party system.

THE RISK OF DISPERSIONAND FIEFDOMS

The municipal decen-

tralization of the

1990s was key to

those changes. Local

elections served as

recruiting mecha-

nisms for party activists and as sound-

ing boards for societal discontent,

effectively bringing political parties

closer to the grassroots. But the resultshave been mixed. Since municipal can-

didates were still required to run un-

der the banner of nationally-registered

parties, they remained largely under

the control of central party officials

who recruited them. Once in office,

they concentrated on strengthening

their own local power bases.

Moreover, in their rush to recruit

electable local candidates, parties

sacrificed coherent platforms and

organizational discipline. They fre-

quently recruited independent out-siders with little or no political

experience in an attempt to appeal

to niche constituencies. This en-

couraged party-switching, as poten-

tial candidates held out for the best

offers from rival political parties. It

also eroded public confidence and

trust in political parties.

The picture grew even more com-

plicated after the Carlos Mesa gov-

ernment (20032005) established two

new forms of political representation:

civic groups and indigenous peo-

ples. In 1999, just 18 parties partici-

pated in municipal elections around

the country. But in the December 2004

elections, 425 political organizations

(including 344 civic groups and 65 in-

digenous communities) campaigned

across 327 municipal contests. Despite

the proliferation of groups, a number

of faces stayed the same, as incum-

bent politicians jumped ship and ran

as candidates for local organizations

or formed new political parties.

In the December 2005 elections the

landscape changed again with the

emergence of what appeared to be

separate national and regional party

systems. While just eight parties par-ticipated in the national contests for

the presidency and the legislature, 18

parties, electoral alliances and civic

organizations battled it out in the

nine prefect elections. MAS was the

only party to field candidates in all

of the prefecture votes.

The trend toward parallel party sys-

tems has continued. In the December

2009 national elections, just eight par-

ties fielded presidential and legisla-

tive candidates, but by April 2010, 191political organizations offered can-

didates in regional and municipal

elections. Of those, 46 won at least

one mayorship and 124 saw at least

one of their candidates win a mu-

nicipal council seat. At the depart-

mental level, seven won at least one

governorship and 42 secured at least

one department assembly seat (this

figure includes 26 registered indige-

nous peoples).

The four parties that won seats in

the December 2009 legislative electionall participated in the April 2010 local

and regional elections. But several

of these were themselves coalitions

whose member organizations cam-

paigned separately at the local level.

At the municipal level, MAS again

showed itself as the party with the

longest reach. It competed in all 337

mayoral elections this year and won

197 races (compared to 112 in 2004).

But Morales could hardly have con-

sidered this a broad victory for the

party: three-quarters of MASs wins

occurred in small Andean regions

and 29 were in unopposed races. The

second-largest party,Movimiento Sin

Miedo (MSM)until recently a key

MAS allywon only 19 mayoral races,

but this included the city of La Paz.

In fact, MAS candidates were elected

mayor in only two departmental capi-

tals: Cochabamba and Cobija (the capi-

tal of Pando). Six different parties won

in the other seven capitals; MSM may-


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ors were elected in Oruro and La Paz.

MAS gained significant ground at

the departmental level, however. Mo-

rales party elected six governors. The

opposition victories came with the re-

election of three prefects: Rubn Cos-

tas (Santa Cruz), Mario Cosso (Tarija)and Ernesto Surez (Beni).

What does this mean for Bolivias

emerging autonomies model? First,

the apparent entrenchment of de-

partmental autonomy suggests that

the architects of the 1990sLey de Par-

ticipacin Popularwere right to be

concerned about the dominance of

traditional elites and their civic in-

stitutions in departmental politics,

at least in the so-called media luna

(the eastern lowland departments of

Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija).

Second, increased political decentral-

ization has done little to strengthen a

national party system. Instead, each

region is developing its own party

system. In the four media luna de-

partments plus Chuquisaca, regional

politics is currently dominated by

two relatively evenly matched parties

(MAS plus a regional party).

But these regional parties do not ex-

tend beyond departmental boundar-

ies and do not work well together to

form a coherent national opposition.

Sometimes parties even fragment

within the region. In Santa Cruz, the

governorship of the department and

the mayorship of the capital city were

won by two different opposition par-ties that did not challenge each other

in their respective spaces.

Regional opposition movements

have achieved their principal goal: the

institutionalization of constitution-

ally protected regional autonomous

governments. Moreover, by acceler-

ating the process of decentralization,

Morales has created a complex sys-

tem of autonomies that is certain to

make national governance even more

difficult. Devising a legal framework

for transferring competencies (health

care, education, roads, etc.) and fiscal

transfers from the central govern-

ment to the four various subnational

units will be a significant challenge.

This will be made even more diffi-

cult by the tendency for departmen-

tal legislative caucuses (or brigades)

to cross party lines to band together

in Congress to defend regional inter-

ests. A recent example is the move by

MAS and opposition legislators from

Chuquisaca to demand that the gov-

ernment move the electoral court to

Sucre. The move, supported by the

newly elected MAS governor and the

civic organizations that backed his op-

ponent, seems likely to reignite the

conflict between Sucre and La Pazthat nearly derailed the constituent

assembly process in 2008.

As other unitary states look to Bo-

livia as a potential model, the jury is

still out on whether such radical de-

centralization is a positive force for

democracy and socioeconomic devel-

opment. The elections of 2010 have

revealed a highly fragmented politi-

cal landscape. Decentralization can

bring government closer to citizens,

which is a boon for democracy. But it

can also encourage a hyper-localism

that makes coherent policymaking at

the national level difficult. Would-be

imitators will need to decide the ex-

tent to which greater participatory

democracy can trump governability.

Miguel Centellasis Croft VisitingAssistant Professor of Political Sci-

ence at the University of Mississippi.

His research focuses on institutional

reform and electoral politics in Bolivia.

2010 ELECTION RESULTS

Department Gubernatorial Winner Capital City Mayoral Winner

Beni Primero Beni Trinidad Primero Beni

Chuquisaca MAS Sucre PAIS (Pacto de Integracin Social)

Cochabamba MAS Cochabamba MAS

La Paz MAS La Paz* MSM

Oruro MAS Oruro MAS

Pando MAS Cobija MAS

Potos MAS Potos AS (Alianza Social)

Santa Cruz Verdes Santa Cruz SPT (Santa Cruz para Todos)

Tarija CC (Camino al Cambio) Tarija UNIR (Unidos para Renovar)

*MAS won the mayorship of El Alto, a suburb of La Paz.

NUMBER OF PARTIESPARTICIPATING IN

BOLIVIAN ELECTIONS

Year National Municipal Regional

1985 11

1989 10

1993 14

1995 13

1997 10

1999 18

2002 11

2004 425

2005 8 18

2009 8

2010 191 24

Documents

Bolivia's Radical Decentralization