Boehner-A Recent Presentation of Ockham's Philosophy

8/10/2019 Boehner-A Recent Presentation of Ockham's Philosophy

1/15

Franciscan Institute Publications

St. Bonaventure University Franciscan Institute Publications

A RECENT PRESENTATION OF OCKHAM'S PHILOSOPHYAuthor(s): PHILOTHEUS BOEHNERSource: Franciscan Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1949), pp. 443-456Published by: Franciscan Institute PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41974395.

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2/15

COMMENTARY

A RECENT

PRESENTATION

OF OCKHAM'S HILOSOPHY

We

Wulf's

Histoire

de la

Philosophie

Mdivale

belongs

o the

standard

Il ti histories

f

medieval

hilosophy.

More

ersonal

han

Geyer'

work,

ie

Patri

ti

che und Scholastische Zeit

it

runs the risk

of

being

more

subjective

s

well.

Whilst

eyer

arefully

ollects the results

of the atest

studies

in the

particular

ields,

De

Wulf

pparently

ims

at a more ounded

picture

f the

philosophers

nder onsideration.

n

such

a

synthesis,

ow-

ever,

there

s a

greater

anger

f

being

ed

by preconceived

deas

or the

consistency

f

an

imaginaryystem

nd

in

consequence

rriving

t

a

sub-

jective

interpretation.

e

still

believe

that

history

hould

first scertain

facts, and it shouldattempto reconstruct "system", f there s any,

only

after

thorough

cquaintance

with he sources. We also

believe that

history

hould

be

absolutely

mpartial.

We

do not

deny

hat

history

as also

the task

of

judging;

but its

judgment

must

be

guided

by something

more

important

nd

more

bjective

han

he

personal

onvictions

f thehistorian.

And

bove

all,

the historian

hould

withdue

regard

o human

railty

lways

be

ready

o understand

he

thought

f a

philosopher

n the

better

nd

more

intelligible

ense,

whenever

is statements

ermit

t.

Scotus

promulgated

this

golden

ule

of

nterpretating

exts nd

udging

bout

hemwhenhe said:

Ex

dictis

eorum

volo

rationabiliorem

ntellectum

ccipere

quem

possum

(Ox,

I,

d.

8,

q.

5,

n.

8).

We

are

convinced

nd intend

o

prove

hat

uch

soundrules of historicalresearch have not been observed n De Wulf's

treatment

f the

philosophy

f Ockham.

We

werereluctant

t

first

o make

n

issue

of

this,

especially

since

the

man

whose

work

we were

to

criticize,

s

justly

regarded

pioneer

n the

field

of

the

history

f medieval

philosophy.

We

were

even

morehesitant

of

censuring

is work n

learning

f the death

of

this

great

historian.

But

can

we

strictly

dhere o the rule

of

charity,

e mortuis

il

nisi

bene if

a

dead

man's

work till lives and

perpetuates

what

are

clearly

errors nd

misunderstandings

anifest

o

those who went

through

he tedious abor

of

checking

his

work

gainst

the historical facts?

We

believe,

we

can

adhere

to the

rule,

if we

separate

the

person

from

is

work,

nd

avoid

setting

ne

personal

onviction

gainst

the other.With

his

understanding,we shall in spite of ouroriginalhesitationundertake,t therequest f

several

friends,

n

objective

criticism

f

De

Wulf's

presentation

f

Ock-

ham's

philosophy.

nd

while

we shall

have

to

point

out almost

ncredible

errors,

till

it

is

only

these

errorswe

wish

to

expose,

not the

man,

whom

we

admire

nd

to whom

we are

indebted. or

thatreason

we

shall notrefer

to De

Wulf

n

the

following ages,

but

only

to the Histoire

Our

criterion

will

be the

evidence

f the

texts.

Ockham's

philosophy

s treated

n

pp.

27-51

of the

third

olume

fthe

Histoire

de

la

Philosophie

Mdivale

published

n

1947.

We

hall

read

one

paragraph

fter

nother,

ndicating

ach

by

ts number

n

the Histoire

nd

then

hall

offer

ur

comment.

Nr. 377 deals with he life ofOckham nd his works.This part, s is

acknowledged,

was

rewritten

artly

by making

se

of our

ownresearch.

There

s

one

sentence,

however,

hich

n the face

of the sources

is

hardly

admissable.

443

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3/15

444

COMMENTARY

Quand

ouis de

Bavire

oulut

gitimer

e

marriage

dultrine son

fils,

on-

trairementux

lois de

l'Eglise,

Guillaume

fendit

'omnipotence

e

l'Etat

en

matire

olitique

p.

29).

It will be

very

difficult r

rather

mpossible

to

prove

this

sweeping

statement

n the

basis

of

Ockham's text itself in the

work

hat he

has

written bout this

matrimonialause.

We

shall

refer o it in the

edition

of H.S.

Offler

Guillelmi

de

Ockham

Opera

Politica

Manchester

940).

Ockham discusses this

individual

case under

the

assumption

hat the

marriage

nder

uestion

s not

valid

(cfr.

p.

281,

24-27)

-

an

assumption

which

was later

confirmed

y

the

Church

n

1349.

He

further

aintains

that

the

emperor

as

no

jurisdiction

s

to

the

purely piritual

nd

sacra-

mental haracterfa marriagease.

In

specie

autem

e sacramento

atrimonii....

icitur

uod

ad

imperatorem

n-

quantum

olummodo

mperator,

o

quod luries

xistit

nfidelis,

ausa

matrimonialis

quantum

d ilia

quae specialiter

ltra

egem

aturae

t

us

gentium

t

leges

civiles

sunt

n

scripturis

acris

prohibita

el

praecepta,

inime

pectantp.

282-283,

. 30-

2);

cfr.

lmosthe

ame

words little

urther,

.

283,

-13).

Matrimonialases

amongst

nfidels

have to be

decided

by

the

Emperor

s

successor

of

the old

Roman

mperors.

or the

rest,

Ockham

eems to

admit

that

the

Emperor

as

the

right

o

interfere,

hough

Ockham

s not

fully

decided

n

his

answers,

ince he is

constantly

iving

lternatives.

n

any

case,

Ockham

eclares

that

he

marriage

nder

uestion

an

be

declared o

be annulled ytheemperor,ince it is proven hatno truemarriagexists.

The

emperor

an

do this

either ecause

he

has this

power

s successor of

the

Roman

mperors,

r

because he has the

right

o use

epikeia

p.

282, 1),

owing

to

urgent

ecessity

and the

impossibility

f

recourseto

the

Pope.

This

is

all

that emains

f

the

alleged omnipotence

f

the

state

according

to Ockham.

In

the

same

number n

p.

30

we

read:

"Dans

la

seconde

partie

de

sa

carriere,

Guillaume

mie

e

campagne

ontre e

Pape,

dont l

conteste es

droits

temporels

t la

suprmatie

olitique.*

t is

true that

Ockham

as

denied the

political supremacy

f

the

Pope,

which,

after

ll,

is

correct

teaching.

However,

Ockhamhas

neverdenied the

temporal ights

of the

Pope, on the contrary,e believes that a Pope, by the fact that he s

instituted

he

Supreme

ontiff,

s

free

and

subject

to

no

secular

uris-

diction

cfr.

Dialogus pars

III,

tract.

,

lib.

1,

c.

17;

and

Octo

quaestio

nes

..,

q.

3,

c.

3;

ed.

Sikes,

p.

105).

Nr.

378. We

read:

"Duns Scot

est

son

principale

dversaire..."

p.

30).

The

statement hat Scotus

was the

main

adversary

or

Ockham an be

correctly

r

incorrectly

onstrued. t

is

truethat none of the

great

scho-

lastics

has

been more riticized

by

Ockham

han

Scotus.

One

has

butto

read the Venerable

nceptor'

writings

n order o find

overwhelming

vi-

dence

for

t,

so

much,

ndeed,

that a

fruitful

tudy

of

Ockham

equires

constant

se

of

Scotus's

works s well.

However,

f the

statement eans

thatOckhams alwaysinoppositiono Scotus, t is definitelyxaggerated.

Ockham dmires cotus

and he

has

learnedmuch rom

im,

nspite

ofhis

differences.We

could

say

thatOckham

has

developed

his own

philosophy

and

theology

n constant ritical discussion

with

cotus.

He

has

performed

a true

"crisis9,

a

discrimination,

iscardingmany

cotistic

doctrines,

ut



4/15

.

COMMENTARY 445

also

retaining

n

equal

if

not

greater

umber

f

them.

In

this connection

e would ike to

expose

the

peculiar

manner

n

which

the

Histoire

distorts

uotations

rom

ckham's

works.

We

read

on

p.

32:

Ralisme

utr..,

alisme

modere...

t

surtoutormalisme

es

scotistes....

ont

tour tour

clars

bsurdes,

emplis

e

contradictions,

mpensables:

alsaf

b-

surda

irrationalis

Logica

I,

c.

16).

Here we have

an

express

reference o

the

sixteenth

hapter

f the

first

art

of Ockham's umma

ogicae

In this

chapter

ckham

nly

ejects

the

formal

distinction

f

Scotus

in

regard

o

the

problem

f universais.

The

only

ext

which

substantiates

ne

third

f the

alleged quotation

s this: Sed

haec

opiniovidetur sse irratinabils.wWesuspectthat he rest was takenfrom

Ockham's

criticism

n the

Ordinatio,

ut,

to be

sure,

not

of

Scotus,

but

of

the

others,

or n d.

2,

q.

6

whereOckham riticizesScotus

by naming

im

neither

he term

absurd*,

nor

irrational* ccurs.

n

fact,

t

does not

even

occur

n the

chapter

f the

Summa

ogicae

quoted

by

the

Histoire

for

he

fides

codicum

estifies that

nstead of

irrationalis

r

rather

rr-ationabilis

Ockham

wrote: mnino

mprobabilis

In Nr.

379.

On

pp.

31-32

we

are

informedboutthe terrible

ndividualism

and

pluralism

f

the

Venerable

nceptor.

We

read:

Individualismet

pluralisme

enforcs:

elle est- a

thse

fondamentalet

elle

est

nonce

satit.

Tout tre st

individuel

ar

tout

e

qu'il

est. Etant

'une

pice,farouchementsol,etrellementistincte tout utre,l ne contientien

qui

soit semblable u

commun

ntre

ui et

quelque

utre

ndividu.'universel

n'existe

onc

aucun

itre ans a

nature.

The

last sentence s

unquestionably

rue

for

Ockham,

nd

that s about

ll.

However,

t is

definitely

ot true

hat,

ccording

o

Ockham,

n

individual

does not

contain

nything

hat s

similar

r

common ith

nother

ndividual.

Unfortunately

he

wording

f the

Histoire s

equivocal.

We

can

hardly

elieve

that common"

means

here

something

hich

s

identically

he same in

two

individuals.For

such

a

universality

as been

denied

by

everyone

f

the

classical

scholastics.

"Common"

an

also

hardly

mean,

something

hich

is not ndividual

n

a concrete

xisting

eing;

for t

is

just

this

commonness

which s resentedbyThomists n thesolutionofScotus formal istinctionbetween he common ature nd the individual ifference. he

Thomists,

too,

defend

he

thesis

that

everything

n

an

individual s

individual,

ven

if

they

prefer

o

say,

individualized. ut that

which

s

individualizeds

individual.

Hence

"common* an

mean

only

"similar*.

Therefore,

he

assertion

of the

Histoire will

only

apply

to

Ockham,

f

and

only

if,

he

denied

similarity

etween

he

individuals.

Only

then

could we

speak

of

an

isolationism.

Unfortunately

he

facts,

that

s

the

texts of

Ockham,

learly

affirm hat

he

Histoire enies.

How

else,

could

Ockhamwrite

Reportatio

III,

q.

9, Q):

...uno modo

ccipitur

univocum]

ro

conceptu

ommuni

liquibus

abentibus

perfectam

imilitudinemn

omnibusssentialibus

ine

omni

issimilitudine,

ta

quodhoc sit verum am n substantialibusuamn accidentalibus,ic quodn

forma

ccidentali on

st

reperire

uod

st

dissimile

uilibet

ormaen

alia forma

accidentali.

...

Et sic

accipiendo

nivocum,

onceptus

olus

speciei

pecialissimae

est

univocus,

uia

in

individuisiusdem

peciei

non

st

reperire

liquid

lterius

rationisn uno t

alio.-



5/15

446 COMMENTARY

It

is

true,

s

the

Histoire

maintains,

hat n Ockham'

system

here

s

no

place

for n Aristotelian

r

Thomistic

bstraction;

he

reason,

however,

is not this

isolationism,

ut the denial

of

any

principle

f individuation

which

s

according

o Ockham

vide de

sens*,

as

the

Histoire

orrectly

states.

Passing

over few

ines

of

equally

dubitable

orrectness,

e

read:

Il n'est

de distinction

ossible

ue

la distinction

eelle,

ar la

distinctione

raison

virtuelle)

t la distinctionormelle

ontdes vains

artifices

'ayant

as

plus

de

valeur

ue

e ralisme

homisteu

scotiste ont lles

sont

onction.

We

wonder

why

Ockham an

say just

the

opposite

Quodl.

I,

q.

3):

...

quia

omnisdistinctiovel est formalis el realis vel rationis Andfurthermore,

if

this statementf the

Histoire

were

correct,

t is

hard

o

understand,

hy

Ockham,

ven

in

one

of his

latest

works,

an

speak

of

a

formal

istinction

and

explain

t

in

the sense of

Scotus' formal

on-identity?

n

the

Summa

Logicae

part

I,

c.

2,

Ockham

ays:

Non

est aliud

dicere,

uod

essentia

t tres

Personae

distinguuntur

ormaliter

secundum

num

ntellectum,

isi

quod

ssentia

st tres

personae

t

persona

on

est tres

ersonae...

In

fact,

Ockham

as

always

admitted

he formal

istinctionn its

negative

wording

and

probably

more

cotistic

meaning),

ut

only

in

God,

not

n

creatures.

After few ines offairly orrect tatements e are stopped hortbya

?[uite

.

33):

inaccurate

xposition

f

Ockham's

octrine

n the

categories.

We

read

p.

33):

...les

accidentsabsoluts*

e sont

as

distincts

e

la

substance,

t

se

reduisent

a des

concepts

pondant

des

aspects

e cette

ubstance.

In

other

words another

onfirming

ext

will

be

given

little

ater accor-

ding

to the

Histoire Ockham

maintains hat

the

only things

res)

in

this

world re

substances

or the

parts

of

substances,

viz. matter

nd

form;

ll

accidents

re reduced

o

concepts.

We have

notthe

slightest

dea,

on which

text

in

Ockham's

collected works

his statement

s,

or

possibly

could

be,

based.

It is

true

that,

according

o Ockham's

clearly

favored nd

often

defendedheory,uantitys not n entity istinct romubstance rquality;

quantity

s

only

mode

of

being

of

material

ubstances

or

corporeal

uali-

ties,

for t is

their

modeof

having

parts

outside

parts.

However,

nd this

was

apparently

verlooked

y

the Histoire a material

ubstance

can exist

without

he

modeof

having

arts

outside

parts,

s

the

body

of Christ oes

in

the

Holy

Eucharist;

hence to

say:

*Des

lors,

comme

or

Descartes,

l'tendue

se

confond vec

l'essence

du

corps,"

is incorrect.

or

actual

extension

has

nothing

o do

with the

"essence*

of

a

body

or material

substance,

since

it can

be

absent,

as

in the case

of the

body

of

Christ

existing

in

non-quantitative

anner

n

the

Holv

Eucharist.

But

still

for

another

eason

the

identification

t extension

with

the essence

of bodies

is incorrect,ince corporeal ualities are quantitativen thesame manner

that

bodies

are.

But

what

about

quality?

According

o the

sweeping

tatement

entioned

before,

he absolute

ccidents,

hencealso

the

qualities,

are

not

real

entities

distinct

rom

heir

ubstance.

This

the Histoire

even

expressly

maintains:



6/15

COMMENTARY

447

"A

leur

tour

les

qualits

corporelles

e

confondent

vec la substance*

(p.

33).

In

other

words,

according

o the Histoire Ockham

eaches

that

corporeal ualities

are

the

same

as substance and

they

re

only

different

aspects

of

substance

n the same manner

s

quantity

s.

This

is

expressly

stated as

regards

all

the four

pecies

of

qualities

distinguished y

the

scholastics:

"Aucun

des

quatre

types

de

qualits

reconnues

par

les

sco-

lasticques

(a

la suite

d'Aristote)

ne trouve

grace

devant e franciscain*

(p.

33).

If

only

Ockham's

most

explicit

words,

ime and

again

reiterated,

wouldhave

found

race

before he Histoire

However,

n this

case,

we can

even

quote

the Histoire

gainst

tself.

A

few ines furtherhe

Summa

ogi-

cae

is

quoted

to the

effectthat relation

s not a distinct

entity

rom

substance and quality- which s correct;but we are surprised o read

here:

Praeter

res absolutas

scilicet

substantias

et

qualitates

nulla res

est

imaginabilis

Sum.

totius

og.,

Ia

p.,

c.

49)

(p.

34).

Thus

the Histoire

quotes

a text

against

its

own statement. here

is

no text to be found n

Ockham's

works

where he

has

ever denied

that

certain

qualities,

though

not

all,

are

distinct

ntities

res)

and are

not identical n

any

way

with

substance.

For

further

vidence

we shall

quote

the

following

ext from he

same

work

uoted

by

the

Histoire

c. 49).

Sunt

utem

uaedam

n

genere ualitatis,

uae important

es distinctas sub-

stantia,

ta

quod

lia res non

st

substantia,

icut unt lbedo

t

nigredo,

olor,

scientia,

uxet huiusmodi.

uaedam

utem

unt,

uae

alias res a

praedictis

uali-

tatibus t substantia onimportant,uiusmodiuntfigura,urvitas, ectitudo,

densitas,

aritas

t

huiusmodi.

This

text lso

proves

he

futility

f the restriction

uoted, trangely

nough

-

from

non uthentic ork.

Ont

seules une

ralit

propre

utre

ue

la substancees

qualits

ui

sont

f-

franchies

e liensavec

l'tendue,

savoir es

actes

conscients:

isio, ntellectio,

dilectio

et omnes ctus

anime

ognitivi

t

appetitivi

unt

qualitates

eales n

anima.

Tractatus

e

principiis

heologiae

p.

120.

What

s most

mazing

s,

that

t

the

bottom f the same

page

this

exclusive

statement

f

the

Histoire s falsified

ven

by

the

Tractatus

For

therewe

read:

Ideo

gravitas

levitas color

sapor

et huiusmodi...

sunt

res

inher-

entes (p. 120s);

Nr.

380

deals

with

Ockham's

Psychology.

his

part again,

is a

strange

mixture

f

truthnd fiction.We

noticed

with

atisfaction

hat

he

explanation

of Ockham's

doctrine n

intuitive nd abstractive

ognition

pp.

34

s)

is

fairly

orrect.

Certain

erious

misunderstandings

f

the

intuitive

ognition

of non-existents

o not

reappear

n the Histoire. The

^nly

critical

obser-

vationwe wish

to make

here s thatwe have

not

found

ny

evidence

n the

texts

of Ockham

o show that

he limits bstractive

ognition

o intellective

cognition

lone.

On the

contrary

n Ordinatio

prol.

q.

1,

TT)

Ockham

quates

phantasia

with

notitia

bstratiya.

Likewise the short

ccount

of

Ockham's

heory

f

signification

s

fairly

correct,xceptfor woprobablyminormisunderstandings.irst,theHistoire

maintains

hat Ockham's term

or

the function

f

signification

s

notare;

we

have

no evidence

for hat. On the same

page

(36)

connotare

nd

"con*

signifier0

eem

to be

brought

nto

a

similar elation.

n

Ockham's

anguage

it would be more

ppropriate

o

call

the

significative

unction

f

the

yn-



7/15

448

COMMENTARY

categoremata

ike

"Every*,

and*

etc.

co-signification,

ecause such terms

signify

only

in connection

with

categorematic

erms.

The

categorematic

terms

are

to

be

subdistinguished

nto

absolute

and

connotative erms.

Connotative

erms

have

signification

nd

no

co-signification

ince

they

signify

n

object

or

usually

ndividuals. White*

s

for

nstance

connota-

tive

term,

ince

it

directly

ignifies

an

individual hat

has

whiteness.

"Whiteness*,

owever,

s an

absolute

term nd

not a connotative

erm,

nd

so

is

"intellection*

ccording

o

Ockham,which,

however

he Histoire

unfortunately

ses

as

an

example

of connotative

erm.We

hope

that

t

is

only misprint,

ince

it should

be "intellectus*.

n

fact,

according

o

Ock-

ham

"intellectus*

s a

connotative

ermwhich

ignifies

directly

he soul

andindirectlyn intellection.

If

after

these

misunderstandings

e

continue

o read the Histoire we

find

urselves

n a

swamp

f

confusion

nd

ignorance

f

Ockham's echnical

language.

We

read

p.

36):

Or,

tandis

ue

les

termes

u

language

t de l'criture

nt vec le rel

ignifi

un

rapport

e

signification

onventionelle

suppositio

materialis),

e terme

ui

dsigne

n ndividu

suppositio

ersonalis)

t le terme

bstrait

suppositioimplex)

sont

is

de

faon

aturelle

ux

objects

enss.

Let

us

try

omehow

o

disentangle

his

confusion

f

suppositio

impositio

and

intentio,

We

have

given

a

complete

xplanation

f these

terms nd

connectedheories n the Franciscan tudies VI, 1946,143ss, 261 ss)

and

hence

will

only

explain

whatthetermsmean.A termhas

personal

uppo-

sition

when

t

is used

in a

proposition

this

applies

to

simple

nd material

supposition

s

well

-

and

signifies

ts

object;

it does

not

matter,

hether

the

term

s

a

concept

r an

intention

f the

mind,

r a

spoken

or a written

word.

When

e use

the

term

word* s

predicate

n a

proposition

t

signifies

every

word

nd

has

personal

upposition.

he

spoken

or written

ord

man*

was

instituted

t

will

(ad

placitum)

o

signify

ndividual

men;

when

t

is

used

in

this

significative

unction,

t has

personal

upposition.

urthermore,

the

term

man*

s

instituted

y

human

eings

n

order

o

signify

eal

objects

which

re

not

words

or

concepts,

n a

word,

which re

not

signs;

for

that

reason

the

word

man*

s called

a name

of first

mposition.

n the

other

hand,the term word* s institutedo signifywords, ike "man*, noun*

etc.,

hence

t

signifies

bjects

which

re

signs

instituted

t

will. The

term

"word*

s a

sign

of

a

sign,

and

for

his

reason

is

a

word

f second

mpo-

sition.

Ockham

lso

distinguished

irst nd

second

intention,

nly

making

now

the

distinction

etween

ntentions

f

the

mind nd

intentions

f

the

mind

which

signify

ntentions

which

n turn

ignify

bjects

outside

the

mind.

Every

concept

nd

every

poken

and

written

ord,

when

used

in its

original

ignification,

hich

s

natural

n

the case

of

concepts

nd

arbitrary

in

the

case

of

words,

has

personal

upposition.

When

otused

in its

signifi-

cative

function

t

may

epresent

ither

he

ntention

s

such

or thematerial

word,

be

it

spoken

or written.

n the

first

ase

the term

as

simple

uppo-

sition

regardless

of

whether

t

is a

first

r

second

intention

hat

s

repre-

sented.Whenhetermepresentshematerialpoken r written ordwhether

it

be

of

first

r second

imposition,

t

has

material

upposition.

t is

some-

what

ironical

to

find

the

Histoire

attributing

o

Ockham

he

very

dea

of

simple

supposition

hat

he

so

often

ejected

namely

hat

n

simple

uppo-

sition

the

term

upposits

for ts

abstract

ignified

bject,

for nstance

hat



8/15

COMMENTARY

449

"man*

upposits

for

humanity*

r"white"for whiteness".Ockhamwrites:

Ex

quo

sequitur

uod

falsum

st

quod

liqui gnorantes

icunt,

uod

oncretum

parte

praedicati

upponit

ro

forma,

idelicet

uod

n ilia:

Sortes

st

albus,

y

"albus*

upponit

ro

lbedine.

umma

ogicae,

.

I,

c.

63.

A

similar

confusion

f

various

theories

s

found

n the

following ages

(p.

37-39).

They

deal

with

the

nature

nd

the

value

of universais.

The

Histoire

sks:

"Les

signes

sont-ils

n

rapport

vec les tres

qu'ils

signifi-

ent

t

quel

est

ce

rapport?"

distinction

s

required,

we

are

told.

The acts

of

sensation

or

of intellective

ntuitive

ognition

ring

s

in

direct

contact

with

he

real,

with

he

experienced.

Abstractive

ognition,

n

the

contrary,

is but a fiction nd applies only

to

thought bjects. However,

he

most

explicit

textsof Ockhammilitate

gainst

such a distinction. or instance:

Idem

otaliter

t sub

eadem

atione

parte

biecti

st

obiectum

ntuitivaet

abstractivae

otitiae..

Ordinatio

prol.

.

1,

CC.

It

is

not difficult

o

indicate

the

cause

of this

misunderstanding.

he

Histoire

fails

to do what

Hochstetter as

masterly

one,

namely

o dis-

tinguish

etween

wo

heories

f

Ockham

n

regard

o the

nature

f

concepts.

According

o

the first

heory

which

was

later

completely

bandoned,

he

concept

r

universal

s a

fictum,

hat

s

a

mental

icture

which

xists

only

as

thought

bject

or has an

"esse

objectivum",

ince it

is

not a

reality

r

a

thing,

ut

only

a

thought,

r

more

xactly,

he

object

of

a

thought.

he

term

ideal"

being

would

probably pply

to this "esse

objectivum",

ince

it is constituted

y

an act of

thinking.

nfortunately

heHistoire inattentive

to Ockham's

terminology,

alls

this

fictum

figmentum

Ockham,

when

dealing

with his

theory,

as never alled

the

concept,

for nstance

of

man

or

of

cause,

a

figmentum

but

always

a

fictum

F"or

figmentum

as Ockham

explains

in the

same

context,

s

something

hich s

an

impossibility

s

"chimaera",

hircocervus

stag-goat)

etc. A

figmentum

is

of

course

the

result

of

a

fictio

and

thus

can

be

called

a

fictum;

ut

not

every

ictum

s

a

figmentum

Since

a

fictum

s the

product

f mental

picturing

f

something

that

is

real

or can

be

real,

it

has

not the

connotation

f

"unreal"

as the

modern

ord

fiction"

has.

Figmentum9

owever,

as

this connotation. or

that

reason,

Ockham an

maintain,

hat

fictum

nd

fictio

(as

the act

of

producing fictum)re related oreality, hat s, that fictums a concept

which

s

similar

o

things

n their

ubjective,

hat

s,

their

eal,

being.

Now

let

Ockham

peak

for

himself.

....universale

on

est

aliquid

eale

habens sse

subjectivum

ec

in anima

ec

extra

nimam,

ed

tantum

abet

sse obiectivum

n

anima,

t est

quoddam

ictum

habens

sse

tale

in

esse

obiectivo,

uale

habet

es extra n

esse

subiectivo.t

hoc

per

stum

modum,

uod

ntellectus

idens

liquam

em xtra nimam

ingit

on-

similem

em n

mente,

ta

quod

i haberet

irtutem

roductivam,

icut

habet

irtutem

fictivam,

alem

em

n esse subiectivo

umero

istinctam

priori roduceret

xtra....

Illud

fictum

n mente

x visione

licuius

ei extra

sset unum

xemplar.

ta

enim,

sicut

domus

icta,

i

fingens

aberet

irtutem

roductivam

ealem,

st

exemplar

ipsi

artifici,

ta llud

fictum

sset

exemplar

espectu

ic

fingentis...

rdinatio

.

2,

q. 8, E.

This

certainly

xposes

as untenable

he

following

ines

(p.

37)

of

the

Histoire

..il

(l'universel)

'est

q'une

fiction

orge

ans

'mede

toutes

ices:

abstractio

quae

non

st

nisi

fictio

uaedam.

ures

tiquettes

entales

ui

servent

cataloguer



9/15

450

COMMENTARY

les individus

elsdans es cadres

nriques

t

spcifiques,

es

notions

bstraits

n'attaignentas

ces

individus

ue

par

a surface

t le

dehors,

t non

ar

e

dedans.

All

this is

being

said

on the

basis

of

that

theory

which

Ockham

eld

when he

lectured

n the

Sentences

but

which

was

gradually

bandoned

when

he worked

n his Ordinatio When

e

wrote

his

Summa

ogicae

and

the

Quodlibeta

e

definitelyejected

t as false.

However,

f

this

mportant

development

n Ockham*

teaching,

he

Histoire

makes

no

mention.

he

second

and

truly

ckhamistic

heory

bout

the

nature

f

concepts,

namely

that

a

concept

or

universal

s

the act

of

knowing

tself,

and therefore

quality

of

the

mind nd

a real

entity

n

the

soul,

because as

such it is

more imilar o theobjectknown,s onlymentionedythe Histoire t the

end

of this treatment ithout

ttaching

much

mportance

o it. Hence the

exposition

f

Ockham's

heory

s

deficient

n two

respects:

First,

too much

emphasis

s

put

on

the

theory

whichOckham

bandoned t

an

early tage

of his

career,

nd

secondly,

his

theory

tself

s

misrepresented.

This

misrepresentation

s revealed

n the

following assage.

Toutes

ttaches

vec

l'extramental

tant

rises,

es universaux

eviennent

n

materiel

ogique

ue

les sciences onbinent.

out

e

passe

commei

les vues

de

l'esprit

'adaptaient

ux ndividus

els,

mais lles

ne es

atteignent

as....

There

s no

text n

Ockham*

works

which ubstantiates

hese

lines,

and,

of

course,

no

quotations

re

given.

However,

we would

ike

to

ask,

what

does "atteindrereallymean?As faras we are able to makeout, it can

only

mean

that

our

concepts,

according

o

Ockham,

o not

"reach"

the

individuals,

because

they

do

not

represent

hem.

f this is

meant,

t is

contradicted

y

Ockham

verywhere

here

he deals

with

this

topic.

For,

as

we have

seen

before,

e

insists

in the character

f

similarity

etween

concepts

nd

individual

atures.

or

that

reason,

we believe

that

Ockham's

"Nominalism"

r

rather

onceptualism

s

closer,

if

not

much

he

same,

as

the

theory

f

Abaelard,

which

he Histoire

denies,

and

precisely

for his

reason

very

far

from he

conceptualism

f

Kant

with whom he

Histoire

associates

Ockham.The

interested eader

may get

more

nformations

nd

also

textual

evidences

from

ur article

"The

realistic

conceptualism

f

Ockham,"

n

Traditio

Vol.

IV

(1946).

Setting

side

all

the

other

partially

rue

and

partially

alse

statements

oftheHistoire

let us

select

only

he

following

ncorrecttatement:

La notion

bstraite

'etre

perd

on charactere

nivoque

Scot)

ou

analogique

(Thomas)

p.

38).

No reference

o

any

work f Ockham

s

given.

n

fact,

no

reference

ould

be

given,

ecause

Ockham efends

he

univocity

f

the

term

being",following

Scotus

and

dissenting

n

an

extrmely

ild

manner

rom

t.

Thomas,

forhe

admits

univocity

nd

also

analogy

n

a

certain

ense.

Let the texts

peak

for

hemselves.

Prounivocatione

entis]

nescio

nisitantum

nam

ationem,

ncuius

virtute

mnes

aliaerationesenent,t est sta:Omnesonceduntuod liquam otitiamncomplex-

am habemus

e Deo

pro

tatu

sto,

et etiam

e

substantia

reatamaterialit m-

materiali

Igitur portet

ecessario

nere,

uod

ntelligendo

eum

ro

tatu

isto

ognoscam

um

n

conceptu

ommuni

ibi

et

aliis...

In virtute

ationis

raedictae

enet

atio

rima

oannis

id

est

Scoti ]

de

conceptu

dubio t

certo,

liter on...

Report.

II,

q.

9.



10/15

COMMENTARY

451

In the

same

question

Ockham

lso

explains

in which

ense

one

can

speak

of

analogy.

The

scanty

remarks

xpressing

onvictionsmore

han

ccuratefacts

and

the few lines

of

Ockham's

speculative

psychology

hall be

passed

over

here.

Nr.

381. The

presentation

f

the

Theodicee

of

Ockham

uffers nder ll

the

shortcomings

ointed

ut

in

our

previous

discussions.

Only

here

they

have the cumulative

ffect f

making

ckham's

erious

and

important

he-

odicy simply

caricature.

We have

written detailed critical

review

of

this

part

which

will

appear early

next

year

in

Franziskanische

tudien

(Munster). ence we shall singleoutonly fewoftheextremelyurprising

statements

f theHistoire

We

should

not be

surprised,

f

course,

to

read on

p.

41

thatour

notions

in

regard

o

God

and

especially

the

notion

f

causality

re

of no

help.

...la

notion e cause est un

figmentum

e

l'esprit.

e

principe

e

causalit e

peut

tablir

vec

rigeur

'existence e

Dieu,

ar

l est

difficile,

inon

mpossible

e

dmontrer

ue

les causes ne

peuvent

'enchaner

l'infini,

t sans

point

'arrt.

Quia

difficilest

vel

mpossibilerobare

ontra

hilosophosuod

on st

processus

in

nfinitum

n

causis eiusdem

ationis

/

Sent.,

.

II,

q.

5).

We

charitably uppose

that the

author f the

Histoire

has never een

the

context

of his

quotation.

First,

because the

quotation

s

wrong,

t

is

to

be foundn I, d. 2, q. 10, Q. Secondly,because it has quite theopposit

meaning

n

its context.For we read:

Dico

ergo uantum

d

primm

rticulum,

uod

atio

robans

rimitatem

fficientis

est

sufficiens,

t est

ratio mnium

hilosophorum.

idetur

amen,

uod

videntius

posset probari rimitas

fficientis

er

conservationemei a

sua causa

quam

er

productionem,

ecundum

uod

dicitrem

ccipere

sse

immediate

ost

non

sse.

[And

now

follows he ext

uoted y

theHistoire

.

Cuius

ratio

st,

quia

difficile

est vel

impossibilerobare

ontra

hilosophos

uod

non st

processus

n

nfinitum

in

causis eiusdem

ationis.

As

the reader

an

ascertain

for

himself,

ckham

xpressly

tates

that he

primacy

f

a first fficient

ause

can

be

proved

nd even

demonstrated

the

latter s clearlymaintainedyOckhamn one ofhis latestworks, he

Quaestiones

uper

ibros

Physicorum

However,

heworst fall is this:the

words

uoted

by

the

Histoiredo not

even

prove

he

point

which t

intends o

make.

n

fact,

n

extraordinary

lunder

as

been

committed.

hich

cholastic

has evermaintained

hat

process

ad

infinitum

s

impossible

n

the

order f

causae

eiusdemrationis

Eiusdem rationis

s

dropped

n the

French

ext.

St. Bonaventurend

a few

others,

yes;

but

not

St. Thomas

nor

Duns

Scotus

nor

most f the other cholastics. How

else

could

St. Thomasmaintain

hat

in the

case of

the

generation

f

one

manfrom

nother

process

ad

infinitum

is

possible?

For

he

says:

Unde

on

st

mpossibile

uod

homo

eneretur

b

hominen

nfinitum.

sset

autem

impossibile,

i

generatio

uius

ominis

ependeret

b

hoc

homine,

t a

corpore

le-

mentari,ta sole,etsic in nfinitum.ummaheoL , 47, 2, ad7um.

Unfortunately

he

immediately

ollowing

ines of

the

Histoire

re

of

the

same

type:

Que

si,

pour

viter ne

regression

l'infini

ans a

srie

des

causes,

on s'ar-



11/15

452

COMMENTARY

rte un

premier

fficient,

elui-ci

rime

ans doute ous es autres

tres;

mais

pourquoi

erait-il e

plus parfait ossible?

Conclusion:

'existence e

Dieu

est

objet

de foi et nonde

dmonstration.

on

potest

ciri evidenter

uod

Deus

est

(

Quodl

1,

1).

Here

again,

we

are

forced

o

show

that

the text of

Ockham

was not

undei>

stood and that

maimed

ext s used to

prove omething

hatOckham as

denied.The

Histoire ses the

expression primen*

hich

means

to

urpass"

and

"to be the

first".

There would

be no

harm

n

using

this

expression

n

the

latter

ense,

viz.

to

be

the

first,

f

the Histoire

had abstained

from

adding

hat

t is

the first

n

regard

o

all

other

hings.By

this addition he

Histoire

makes a

supposition

which

Ockham

enies;

for,

f

this first f-

ficient ause surpasses all otherbeings, t follows ccording oOckham,

that

t can

be but one and

is

also

the most

perfect

eing

that

s

possible.

But

it

is

exactly

this notionof

God,

viz. that God

surpasses

all

other

beings,

which

ccording

o Ockham annot

e theresultof

any

demonstration

possible

to us.

In order

o

give

the reader clear

picture

f

the

really

dis-

torted

presentation

f Ockham's

teaching

n the Histoire we

have

to

go

into loser discussion

of

thetext

uoted

fromhe

Quodlibetcu

In

Quodlibetum

,

1 the

question

s

asked: Whether

t

can

be

proved

y

natural easonthat

here s

but

one

God.

In

answering

his

question

Ockham

gives

two definitions

f the

term

God".

One

meaning

s: Deus

est

aliquid

nobilius et meliusomni

lio

a

se.

It is

obvious

and

also later

mphasized

by Ockham, hat thatwhich s morenoble and betterthan nythinglse,

surpasses

all

other

beings.

A

second

meaning

f

the term

God"

is

this:

Deus

est

illud

quo

nihil

est

melius et

perfectius

This definition

xpresses

that

God

is first

nly

n

the sense that

He

is

not

surpassed

by anything

else,

but

not in the

sense that

He

surpasses

everything

lse.

After his

Ockham

gives

an

answer to the

question

according

o

the two

different

descriptions

f

God.

First,

he answers

ccording

o

the first

escription

f

God.

In

order o

enable

the reader o

judge

for

himself

ow

nadequate

he

quotation

n

theHistoire s we

shall

quote

the

entire

nswer f

Ockham nd

italicize

the

text

elected

by

theHistoire

we

also add

in

parenthesis

few

wordswhich

re

in

most

of

the

manuscripts

ut not in

the editionused

by

theHistoire:

Dico

quod

ccipiendo

eum

ecundum

rimam

escriptionem

on

otest

emonstra-

tive

probari,

uod

antum

st unus

Deus.

Cuius

atio st

quia

non

otest

videnter

sciri

quod

Deus

est

sic

accipiendo

eum);

rgo

non

potest

videnter

ciri,

uod

est

tantum

nus

eus,

ic

accipiendo

eum.

It is

or

rather

hould

be obvious

that

Ockham's

denial

of

a

demonstrative

proof

f

God's

existence

refers

nly

to

the first

description

f

God.

Ock-

ham's

indication

hat

he is

speaking

of

God

in

the first

meaning

ccurs

twice

n the

edition

used

by

the

Histoire

nd

even three imes

n the

origi-

nal

form

f the

Quodlibeta

and thus

t

shows,

how

nxious

Ockhamwas

not

to

be

misunderstood.

Unfortunately,

t did not

help

him. Nor did his

express

and

absolutely

unequivocal

ffirmationhatGod's existencecan be demonstrated,f"God"

is taken

n

the

meaning

f the second

description.

And,

strangely nough

(from

he

viewpoint

f the

Histoire)

the

reason

Ockham

ives

is

that

other-

wise

there

would

be a

process

ad

infinitum

Let

the text

peak

forhimself:



12/15

COMMENTARY

453

Sciendum

arnen,

uod

potest

emonstran

eum

sse

accipiendo.

eum

ecundo

modo

rius

icto,

uia

aliter

sset

processus

n nfinitumisi

esset

aliquid

n

nti-

bus,

uo

non

st

aliquid

rius

t

perfectius

We

abstain

from

ommenting

n

the rest

of this

Number,

ince

it would

lead

us

too far and

would

mostly

e a matter

f

favorable

r unfavorable

interpretation.

Nr.

382.

Here the

Histoiredeals

withOckham's

Ethics and

Logic.

Ock-

ham's

Ethics

is still

little

explored

nd

probably

ess understood. his

is

reflected

n the

scanty

remarks

f the

Histoire

which

re

at least

exagger-

ated.

However,

et us

discuss a

few f them.

On

p.

42

we

read:

Il n'ya ni biennimalensoi, la diffrencentre'unet l'autre eposanturun

dcret e Dieu

qui

et

pu

renverser'ordrexistant.

Dieu

est un

utocrate

ui pourrait,

ans tenir

ompte

e ce

qu'il y

a

de

rationnel

ou non

ans

es

volonts,

rovoquer

hez 'homme

es actes d'amourussi bien

ue

des

actesde haine

II

Sent

q.

19).

According

o Ockham t least

one act is

bad

in

itself,

o that

t can never

be

good,

viz.

to

disobey

God;

and

there s one act

that

s

absolutely ood,

so

that

t can never

be

bad,

viz.

to

obey

or to love

Gocl.For

the

atter

art

of

our tatement

e

quote

the

following

ext.

Nam ste actus

quo

Deus

diligitur

uper

mnia t

propter

e]

est sic

virtuosus,

quod

non

otest

sse

viciosus,

ec

potest

ste actus ausari volntate

reata

isi

sit virtuosus:um uia quilibet ro ocoet temporebligaturd diligendumeum

super

mnia,

t

per onsequens,

ste

actus

non

otest

sse

viciosus;

um

uia

ste

actus

st

primus

mniumctuum

onorum.

uodl,

II,

13.

In other

words,

Ockham dmits one absolute

norm f

Ethics,

viz. the

obligation

o

obey

God,

Ockham

as

nevermaintainedhat

nyone,

not

even

God,

can

dispense

fromhis

obligation.

However,

o

obey

God

means

o love

God.

But

here,

a

difficulty

rises. Does Ockhamnot

maintain hat

it is

possible

that

God

can commandhat creature ates

Him?

According

o

the

evidence

of the

texts,

t cannot e

doubted hatOckham dmittedhis.

How-

ever,

in order

o understandhis

correctly

e mustnot

overlook hat

po-

test"

in

Ockham's

anguage

has two

meanings.

n one

meaning

t

has the

sense ofconsistencyrratherackofcontradiction;his s subdistinguished

into

possibility

ased

on the

ack

of

logical

contradiction

r

contradiction

with

necessary

ruth,

nd a

possibility

ased

on the

ack of contradiction

with

ontingent

acts. From

his

logical

possibility

we

have

to

distinguish

psychological

possibility

or

capability.

WhenOckhammaintains hatGod

can

command

atred f

Him t is

only

n the first

ense;

never

n the

econd.

By

this he means that

such a

commands

not

selfcontradictory

n

logical

grounds.

How does

he

prove

hat?

t is

based

on the

theological

ruth hat

God

is

the

primary

ause

of

every

ffect.

Now,

a

creature

an

command

o

hate

God,

this

act

of

commanding

he

hatred

f

God

is

caused

by

God as

first ause and

by

the

creature

s second

cause. Hence

it cannot

nclude

contradiction

on

purely ogical grounds

that

God

can command atred f

Himself.

Up

to

now,

we

have dealt

with he

ogical possibility

s such.

Let us now

assume

that God

would

command

hat

a created

will

hates

Him.

There,

c-

cording

o

Ockham,

would be

a

genuineperplexity

r

ethical

antinomy.

n

such a

case,

the created

will

simply

ould not

act. For

if it

obeys,

and



13/15

454

COMMENTARY

consequently

ates

God,

it would

ove

God.

Let us

listen to Ockham

im-

self,

who

presents

his

case

in

a

slightly

milder orm.

Si

dicatur,

uod

Deus

potest raecipere,

uodpro

liquo tempore

on

diligatur

Ipse,

quia potest

raecipere

uod

ntellectusit intentus

irca tudium

t

voluntas

similiter,

t

nihil

ossit

lio

tempore

e

Deo

cogitare....

Respondeo:

i Deus

posset

hoc

praecipere,

icut

videtur

uod

otest

ine

contra-

dictione,

ico

tunc,

uod

voluntas

on

potest ro

unc

alem

ctum

licere,

uia

ex

hoc

pso

quod

alem

ctum

liceret,

eum

iligeret

uper

mnia,

t

per

onsequens

impleret

raeceptum

ivinum,

uia

hoc st

diligere

eum

uper

mnia,

iligere uid-

quid

Deus

vult

diligi.

Et

ex

hoc

ipso quod

ic

diligeret,

.on aceret

raeceptum

divinum

er asum,

t

per onsequens

ic

diligendo

eum

iligeret

t non

iligeret.Quodl. ll, 13.

To

qualify

ckham's

osition

s ethical

positivism

s

perhaps

more matter

of words.

For

the

Venerabilis

nceptor

nows

ne

invariable

orm

f

Ethics,

viz.

the

obligation

o

obey

the

will of

God

or to love

God.

For

the

rest,

ethical

norms re

commanded

y

the will

of

God

and have

to be

obeyed

n

virtue

f the

general

nd

absoluteethical

norm.

hus

Ockham

oes not

base

his

ethics

on some

anonymous

nd

impersonal

aw

pervading

ature,

r on

something

o whichGod

Himself

s

subject,

for nstance n "ethicalvalues*

of

which

the

Histoire

speaks.

Ockhambases

his ethics

on one Personal

principle,

n

God

who

s most

powerful,

ost

good

and

most

wise

and

most

just.

Hence

t

is

absolutely

ncorrect

o

say

that

thical

aws

depend

n

the

subjectiveviewpoint f thosewho consider nd udgethem, s we read n

the

Histoire:

Puisque

es valeurs

morales

e

sont

pas

des

absolus,

lles varient

uivant

e

point

e vue

ubjectif

e

qui

es considre

t es

uges.

No text

reference s

given,

since

there s

no text in

Ockham

which ub-

stantiates

his statement.

The

following

hort

emarks

n

the

Logic

of Ockham re rather

ague.

The

Histoire

does

not

explain

what

Ockham,

nd

almost

all the

scholastics

meant

by

'demonstration*,

amely

omething

hat

modern cholastics

no

longer

trive

for.

To

some

extent,

we

think

hey

re

right.

n

Aristotelean

Axiomatics

demonstration

s a

necessary

onclusion

btained

y

a

syllo-

gistic process

from

ecessary

ndevident

remisses.

t was notOckham'

fault hat

such

high

nd almost

mpossible equirements

ere

demanded

f

a

demonstration,

ince

it was Aristotle

who,

under

he

influence

f

Mathe-

matics,

wrote

he Posterior

Analytics

But

Ockham

was

not

such a

foolto

believe,

that:

Tout

ce

qui

n'est

pas

dmontrable

st

relgu

ans a

sphre

es

conclusions

probables

p.

42).

For,

Ockham

not

only

knew

of

propositiones

er

se notae

and

immediate

formal

onsequences,

but lso

of

absolutely

vident

ontingent

ropositions

based

on

experience.

n

all

these

cases

absolute

certitude

s

given

nd

no

fear

of

deception.

But

even a

"probable* yllogism

r

a

dialectical

proof

which ften s a persasio,as the Histoirerightlymentions,maygivethe

highest

degree

of certitude.

Ockham

ays

concerning

he

"probabile*

n

the

Summa

ogicae

part

II,

I,

c.

1:

Sequitur

tiam

liud,

quod

non

mnis

yllogismus

opicus

acit

emper raecise

dubitationem

t

formidinem,

ed

etiam

requenter

acit

rimam

idem

ine omni ubi-

tatone,

uia

ta

aliquando

dhaeremus

robabilibus

icut videnter

otis.



14/15

COMMENTARY 455

What

s

said about cience

on

page

forty-three

s of

such a nature hat

we

hardly

elieve

that

Ockhamwould

ecognize

his as his owndoctrine:

Tout e ramne

une

technique

comme

ans a

logique

mathmatique

oderne)

et

celle-cine

peut

onduire un nrichissementu

savoir,

ar e

sujet

t le

prdi-

cat des

propositionsnalytiques

ont

dentiques.

It

is

definitely

ot the case

that

analyticalpropositions

nter

science

-

at

least

as

long

s

it is

not

ogic.

The

famous

azorof

Ockham

must,

f

course,

lso

appear

n

the

Histoire

There

s

nothing rong

bout

this,

for

he

principle

was

known

o

Aristotle

and

every

philosopher

s

bound o

use it. For

philosophy

s

a

science,

and

a science has toprovewhat t affirms. owever,t is notquitehistorical o

impute

he

wording:

luralitas non est

ponenda

ine necessitate

ponendi

to

Ockham.

hese

exact

words

re found n

the non-authentic

ractatus e

principiisTheologiae

ed.

Baudry .

125).

Ockham as

several forms or

t.

The

mostcommon ne is:

Pluralitas non est

ponenda

ine

necessitate

We

also

find he

form:

rustra

itper plura9 uod

potestfieri

per pauciora

The

most

explicit

forms this: Nihil

debet

poni

sine

ratione

ssigna

a

nisi sit

per

se

no um

el

per

experientiam

citum el

per

auctoritatem

cripturae ro

batum

(

Ordin d.

30,

q.

IE).

In

Nr.

383

the

Histoiredeals with

Ockham's

physics.

Here we

find he

expression:

La

qualit

tant

rduite

la

quantit.

."Before

we read that

qualitywas reduced o substance.As ourtextshave shownboth tatements

are

in

disagreement

ith

Ockham'smost

xpress

words.

Only

certain

uali-

ties are not distinctfrom

ubstance whilst

quantity

s not

distinct rom

substance r

quality.

Nr.

384

deals with the

relationbetween

Philosophy

nd

Theology.

We

certainly

an

abstain

from

detaileddiscussion of

this

part,

ince

a

master-

ly

Dissertation

has

been

published

bout this

by

Guelluy.

Let us

simply

confrontwo

quotations.

The

Histoire

eads

(p.

45):

D'une

part

a

sphre

es

vrits

hrtiennesst

inaccessibles la

raison

t

rserve la

foi;

d'autre

art,

a

thologie

oit

enoncer

tablir es

affirmations

par a voieduraisonnement.rticuli idei on unt rincipiaemonstrationis,ec

sunt

robabiles,

uia

omnibusel

pluribus

el

sapientibus

pparent

alsi

Summa

.

log.

III,

1

-

to be more

orrect:

II, I,

1).

C'est

la

condemnatione

la

thologie

spculative

t

toute

ollaboration

vec

a

philosophie

st

mpossible.

After

nly

mentioning

ere

that

to

render

demonstrationist

ith

"du

rai-

sonnement"

nlyemphasizes

the

fact

thatthe

meaning

f

demonstrations

unknowno the

Histoire we

quote

now

Guelluy's

Philosophie

t

Thologie

chez

Guillaume 'Ockham

Louvain

1947,

p.

364).

Notons,

'autre

art, u'Ockham

efuse

e

sparer

e

domaine

e la

thologie

e

celuide

la

mtaphysique.

.

Le Venerabilis

nceptor

e

semble,

ans

ucun es

textes

ue

nous

vons

tudier,

se donnerour utd'opposera foiet la raison u de soustrairee domainee la

rvlation

toute

nvestigation

ntellectuelle...

To this

statement f

a

scholar who

has

studied

this

problem

x

professo

in the

text

of

Ockham

himself,

we

add a

passage

from

ne of

the

atest

works

f

Ockham:



15/15

456

COMMENTARY

Contra:

Nisi

eademVeritas

osset

probari

n

scientianaturali t

Theologia,

Philosophia

on uvaret

d

Theologiam. uodL

V,

1.

The

following

eflexions

re

therefore ithout

ny

foundation

n

the

texts

of

Ockham.

Much

riticism

ould

be

applied

to

the

following

umber

n the

political

doctrines

f Ockham.

Most

f t is fiction

s

can

be

gathered

rom

he

article

of

Morrall

n this

number

f the Franciscan

tudies

We

have

led

the

patient

eader

through

veritable

forest

f

misunder-

standings

wildly

grown

p,

not so

much

because

of the fault

of

one

man,

but

because

of careless and

sloppy

reatment

f

a

scholastic who

per

fas

et

nefas mustserve as the explanation f the decadence ofscholasticism.

All

this

only

proves

that

we need

serious

studies

on

the

Theology

nd

Philosophy

f Ockham

n order o

find ut

whathe

reallythought

nd

wrote.

Only

fter

hat

we have

the

right

o

udge,

to

condemn

r

to

praise.

PHILOTHEUS

OEHNER,

.F.M.

The

Franciscan

nstitute

St,Bonaventure

NewYork

Documents

Boehner-A Recent Presentation of Ockham's Philosophy