BODY, MIND AND SOUL

WHAT THE EXAMINERS SAYWE NEED TO STUDY

(a) Distinctions between body and soul in the thinking of Plato, John Hick and Richard Dawkins.(b) Different views of life after

death.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

In practice these thinkers have probably been chosen because they are representative of some mainstream views. Plato is a dualist. Hick believes that life needs to be talked about using a sophisticated interplay of both mind and body talk. Dawkins is a materialist. Between them, they do not represent all of the points of view that exist.We will look at others.

THREE FOUR LETTER WORDS

BODYBODY MIND MIND SOULSOUL Beware: until we are clear about what

a particular thinker means by these three terms, it will not be clear what their relationship to one another is.

SOME PRELIMINARYD.I.Y. DEFINITIONS

BODY seems straightforward enough.Any suggestions?

MIND is less easy.Any suggestions?

SOUL is positively tricky!Any suggestions?

Perhaps the best strategy is not to attempt definitions at all, but to ask how these terms have been used by various thinkers.

The MIND-BODY Problem

The context for much of the discussion had historically been the so-called mind-body problem.

How does the mind operate on matter and matter on mind?

Answers to this have been as much the province of theology as philosophy.

MONISM AND DUALISM

MONISM The doctrine that there

is only one ultimate reality.

Major candidates include:

GOD MIND MATTER

DUALISM The doctrine that there

are two ultimate realities.

The major candidate is

MIND & MATTER

Two species of monism

If you reckon that everything that is MIND can be reduced without remainder to MATTER, or to put it another way, explained (away) in terms of Matter, this makes you a MATERIALIST.

If you reckon that everything that is MATTER can be reduced without remainder to MIND, or to put it another way, explained (away) in terms of Mind, this makes you an IDEALIST.

MATERIALISM (1)

If you believe that everything is ultimately explicable in terms of matter, you are a materialist.

This is HOBBES. In the 17th century he proposed a strictly materialist account of mind.

MATERIALISM (2)

There is a tendency for those who celebrate the advances that science has made to assume that this is in some way a vindication of the materialist viewpoint.

This is a mistake. Science and its methods may or may not be consistent with the philosophical outlook of materialism. The view that science can offer a complete view of the world is sometimes termed scientism.

MATERIALISM (3)

An outspoken contemporary materialist is the biologist who currently is the Professor of the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford.

This is RICHARD DAWKINS

IDEALISM according to SPINOZA SPINOZA took the view

that in the final analysis, everything was God.

All mental and physical substances are in fact aspects of the same ultimate reality.

This is a form of PANTHEISM.

CARTESIAN DUALISM (1)

DESCARTES was in no doubt that the thinking self was indubitable. This is the essence of his famous Cogito ergo sum

(Latin) Donc je suis

(French)

CARTESIAN DUALISM (2) Descartes was also convinced that Matter

as well as Mind was an ultimately real substance but radically different from it.

But these two substances were seen as fundamentally different. In the metaphysics of the day, the word substance referred to basic irreducible stuff.

This leads to the question: “How do they interact?”

CARTESIAN DUALISM (3)

Descartes solution to the problem of how these two dissimilar substances interact, was to claim that mind engaged with body (matter) via the pineal gland in the brain.

DUALISM ACCORDING TO MALEBRANCHE In the 17th cc he popularised the

view that mind and matter do not interact at all!

God intervenes to make the (apparently) mentally caused physical events coincide with them.

This curious doctrine is called OCCASIONALISM.

LEIBNIZ’ PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM Minds and bodies may

seem to be coordinated, with one causing the other.

But in reality this is not so. They are wholly separate.

God establishes a harmony between the two at creation, then leaves them alone.

EPIPHENOMENALISM

Another form of dualism which says that any interaction is entirely one way.

Physical events cause mental events. But mental events do not cause physical events. Mind is a convenient and possible comforting

epiphenomenon. I may think I am free, but I am not. I may think I cause parts of my body to move, but I don’t.

MATERIALISTIC SCIENCE

Remember we noted the common assumption made by those holding a secular humanist or naturalistic worldview, that science is somehow inherently materialistic. That is to say, because there is no place for ‘mind talk’ or for that matter ‘God talk’ in the working methodology of science, there is no ontological place for either mind or God either. This is a non sequitur.

EVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE

Similarly, belief in the evolutionary process and the relatedness of all living things has led some to the view that because our origins are material, that is all that we are in the final analysis.

Where could non-physical minds have come from?

Does the evolutionary account necessarily eliminate mind as an irreducible category?

However…

Minds remain irritatingly resistant to the kind of investigation that is only concerned about physical entities and forces.

Whilst there is a profound, complex and interesting relationship between mind and brain, we know very little about what this is. We know even less about the way that mental events cause physical ones – assuming that they do, which we cannot help but assume in daily living.

BEHAVIOURISM

Behaviourists effectively denied that there is a mind.

Mind talk translates into talk about public dispositions and tendencies.

To quote Ryle, “There is no ghost in the machine”

Problems with Behaviourism

If it is true, then all we have are the observable behaviours.

There is no difference between being happy and pretending to be happy.

It ignores qualia, the inner feeling of being in a particular state of mind.

PHYSICALISM

Sometimes called Mind/Brain Identity theorists.

Although the language we use to talk about minds and brains is different, the truth is: MINDS = BRAINS

PROBLEMS

Claims that ‘in principle’ we can explain minds by say, neurophysiological means, is a matter of faith.

In fact, mental stuff seems unlike brain stuff, even though brains may be needed to support minds.

Subjective (mind) and objective (brain) may be necessary but complementary accounts.

The relationship between the two remains mysterious and in some ways quite unfathomable.

FUNCTIONALISM

Uses a familiar computer analogy.

Brains are like hardware; minds are like software.

Thoughts exist but not in the same sense as brains. To confuse them would be a category mistake. Mental states are functional states.

Conclusion..?

The mind body problem remains one of the most challenging in philosophy and related disciplines.

To be honest, we are nowhere near bottoming this conundrum!