Black Sea Study 2008

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GREENING

THE BLACK SEA SYNERGY

JUNE 2008

© Alena Chirko / shu t ters toc

k / Odessa

© szisti / shutterstock / Bulgaria

© ukrpho to / shu t ters tock / Crimea



2 GreeninG the black sea synerGy

c

Te study has been authored by:

Nicolas avitian, Consultant, Prospect C&S, Brussels, Chapter 1 on the environmental status

Jason Anderson, Joanna Chiavari, Institute or European Environmental Policy (IEEP), Brussels,

Chapter 2 on energy and climate changeOleg Rubel, National Academy o Sciences o Ukraine, Odessa, and Nina Renshaw,

ransport and Environment, Brussels, Chapter 3 on transport

Anja Wittich, Achim Maas, Alexander Carius, Adelphi Research, Berlin, Chapter 4 on security

Claire Dupont, Milieu Environmental Law and Policy, Brussels, Chapter 5 on institutions

Coordinated by:

Paloma Agrasot, WWF European Policy Oce, Brussels

Edited by:

Paloma Agrasot, WWF European Policy Oce, Brussels

Nicolas avitian, Consultant, Prospect C&S, Brussels

Roderick Keerpütz, Heinrich Böll Foundation EU Regional Oce, Brussels

Language editing by:

Nicolas avitian, Consultant, Prospect C&S, Brussels

Lay out:

Micheline Gutman, Laurence Jacmin

Tis publication is part o the “Greening the Neighbourhood Policy” project initiated in 2005 by WWF

and the Heinrich Böll Foundation EU Regional Oce in Brussels.

Te views expressed in this publication are those o the authors alone and do not necessarily reect the views o the

Heinrich Böll Foundation or WWF.

Published June 2008 by WWF-World Wide Fund or Nature (ormerly World Wildlie Fund)

and Heinrich Böll Foundation EU Regional Oce in Brussels.

Any reproduction in ull or in part o this publication must mention the title

and credit o the above-mentioned publishers as the copyright owners.

© text 2008 WWF and Hb. All rights reserved.

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Our thanks or the useul contribution provided by:

Ahmet Kideys and Violeta Velikova, Permanent Secretariat to the Commission on the Protection o the Black Sea Against Pollution, urkey

Malkhaz Dzneladze, WWF Caucasus Programme Oce, Georgia Andreas Beckmann and Neringa Pumputyte, WWF Danube-Carpathian Programme Oce, Austria

Oleg saruk, WWF-Russia, Russian Caucasus Regional Oce

Ahmet Birsel and Sedat Kalem, WWF-urkey

Georg Rast, WWF-Germany

Michael Case, WWF-US

Aaron McLoughlin, Steania Campogianni, Florence Danthine and Jean Shearn, WWF European Policy Oce, Brussels, Belgium

Patricia Jimenez, Heinrich Böll Foundation EU Regional Oce, Brussels, Belgium

Our special thanks go to representatives o the NGOs who actively contributed to the study

during the workshop organised by Hb and WWF in Odessa, February 5-7, 2008.

We also would like to thank the Directorates General or External Relations, Environment, Energy and ransport and Maritime Aairso the European Commission or their useul inputs and the Governments o Bulgaria and Romania or their comments.



3 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Foreword

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Te Black Sea region orms a vital bridge between the Eastand West in terms o transport and energy supplies. It is aregion o enormous geo-political sensitivity.

Te latest round o enlargement o the European Unionbrings the EU right up to the shores o the Black Sea. TeEuropean Neighbourhood Policy has responded to this by developing the so-called Black Sea Synergy regional initia-tive. One particularly signifcant frst step in enhancing re-gional co-operation under the new Black Sea Synergy wasthe Ministerial Conerence in Kiev (February 2008). Tis

was viewed by participants as ‘the beginning o a long-termregional co-operation endeavor’.1

Te Heinrich Böll Foundation (Hb) and the World Wide

Fund or Nature (WWF) welcome these developments. Re-gional co-operation in areas like economic development,security, energy, transport, tourism, and many others, mustbe undertaken in the specifc context o the environmental

values, natural resources and the sustainable and securedevelopment and overall quality o lie o the people in theregions concerned.

1 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/doc/joint_statement_blacksea_en.pd

At the Kiev Conerence, the Ministers made reerence in their joint Declaration to “key priorities or regional co-operation.”Tis included ‘environmental sustainability’. Te Ministers

agreed to achieve a better co-ordination o environmentalprogrammes. Tey mentioned in their Declaration issuessuch as climate change and the sustainable use o Black Searesources as potential uture areas or co-operation.

Tis joint publication by Hb and WWF is a contribution tosuch an approach. It provides policy recommendations inthe felds o energy, transport and security set in the contexto the overwhelming importance o environmental actors.Te recommendations have been developed together withcivil society groups based in the Black Sea region.

We trust that urther opportunities or participation will bestimulated by this report and will be routinely extended tocivil society in the development o the Black Sea Synergy.

Tony Long, Director, WWF European Policy Oce

Claude Weinber , Director, EU RegionalOce in Brussels, Heinrich Böll Foundation





5 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Summary

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Te Black Sea Synergy (BSS) was initiated by the EU in2007. It is a valuable attempt to promote a coherent policy

approach towards EU’s Eastern European Neighbours andto reinorce regional cooperation involving Member States,candidate and partner countries.

Developing and implementing a sustainable BSS is a major challenge in a context o rapid development o energy and transport inrastructures where energy security andstrategic concerns turn the Black Sea Region into a “transitcorridor” while oten ignoring its outstanding cultural andnatural values and potential.

At present, nor the energy, the transport or the security ini-

tiatives take enough into consideration their environmen-tal impacts and potential sustainable alternatives. With theincreased impact o climate change and the need or miti-gation and adaptation, the strengthening o environmentalcooperation in the Black Sea Region and the stronger at-tention and increased unding or environmental protec-tion, integration and governance becomes a sine-quoi-noncondition or the ecological viability o the region.

Tis study was initiated by Hb and WWF with a view toinorming the debate on EU policies and the orms whichBlack Sea cooperation might take in the uture.



6 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Introduction

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Te EU’s 2007 enlargement brought the Union to the shoreso the Black Sea. Tis prompted it to recognise the signif-cance o the surrounding region as it launched a new initia-

tive: the Black Sea Synergy.1

Te Black Sea Region (BSR) is understood by the Europeaninstitutions2 to reach well beyond the sea’s actual shores. It in-cludes three EU Member States, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece,and one candidate state, urkey. It also includes Russia, Eu-rope’s major strategic partner to the East and a number o countries identifed as Europe’s neighbourhood: Republic o Moldova,3 Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

ogether, these countries harbour a rich natural heritage,natural areas and landscapes which in themselves are

hugely important to protect, and which are key or eco-nomic and social development. Te mountains, orests,seas, coastlines and river oodplains o the region are stillrelatively intact and provide critical environmental serv-ices or local populations and national economies.

Te BSR has become an area o particular interest to theEU not only due to the accession o Bulgaria and Romaniabut also because it is a transit area or oil and gas resourcescoming rom Russia and the Caspian Sea. Due in part toits strategic importance, the area is also subject to politi-cal conicts and tensions. Because o its location, strategic

signifcance and natural resources, massive investmentsare expected, including EU unding to promote tourism,energy and transport inrastructure which, i not properly planned, could put in jeopardy the sustainable develop-ment o the entire region.

Te region’s natural wealth is indeed under severe pressuretoday. Marine resources in the Black Sea have declined dueto over-fshing, pollution, unplanned development o coast-al zones and intense maritime trac, while unique terres-trial ecosystems, such as those in the Caucasus region, theDanube Delta and the East Carpathians are under threat.

Land or growing ood; orests or paper, pulp and con-struction; water or growing crops; rivers or navigation andcoastal resources or commercial fshing and tourism; andcontinued demands or oil and gas extraction are just someo the resources under stress. In addition to this comes thedaunting spectre o climate change impacts which will a-ect natural resource availability in unpredictable ways.

Te Black Sea Synergy (BSS) is not a policy in the conventional sense. It rather aims to ocus political attentiononto the regional level and invigorate ongoing cooperationprocesses in the Black Sea Region.

Te Ministerial conerence held on February 14, 2008 inKiev, involving the EU and Foreign Ministers rom all thecountries o the Black Sea Region, ratifed a list o policy areas which the BSS will ocus on, including in particularenergy, transport, environment, migration and security.

Te declaration urther acknowledges “the role played by existing organisations and initiatives” and heralds the “be-ginning o a long-term regional cooperation endeavour” to

work towards stability and prosperity in the region.

Te Black Sea Synergy (BSS) thus appears to initiate agradual reinorcement o the EU’s involvement in the Black Sea Region, even as it announces priorities o considerableenvironmental signifcance, including the development o energy and transport inrastructure, international security and conicts, natural resource management and environ-

mental policy as such. Te BSS, urthermore, cautiously suggests that the Black Sea Region, given the right support,may be a candidate or reinorced regional cooperation.

Tis study has been initiated with a view to inorming thedebate on EU policies and the orms in which Black Sea co-operation might take place. It aims to provide arguments tohelp make the Black Sea sustainable and to promote envi-ronmental protection as well as nature conservation in theentire region. Tis study is an integral part o the project“Greening the Black Sea Synergy”, which also included aninternational WWF - Heinrich Böll Foundation workshop,

which brought together NGOs rom all Black Sea countriesin Odessa, Ukraine, on February 5-7 2008. Te structure o this study reects the BSS’s priorities andthe concerns o environmentalists. Te frst chapter sur-

veys the region’s natural wealth and major environmentalchallenges. Chapter 2 reviews the environmental challeng-es and opportunities associated with energy production,energy security and climate change. It outlines EU policiesand initiatives o relevance in these felds and ormulatesrecommendations accordingly. Tis section also addressesthe likely impacts o climate change in the region. Chapter

3 deals with transport network developments, which areincreasingly important or transit trac between Europeand Asia, and their environmental eects in the region.Conicts and security challenges are also a major concernor this area; the oten complex linkages between them andthe environment are examined in chapter 4. Tis sectionrevisits the climate change issue as it addresses the possi-ble uture impacts o climate change on security. Finally,chapter 5, reviews the perormance o existing regionalinstitutions and multilateral initiatives in order to identiy the means to enhance the eectiveness o regional envi-ronmental cooperation in the region.

1 See Appendix A or a list o EU initiatives in the region2 COM (2007) 160 nal, ootnote 1, p 2.3 Hereater the Republic o Moldova is reerred to as Moldova.



7 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Chapter 1 / The Environmental Status of the Black Sea Region

1.1 / t b s’ x

Te Black Sea’s catchment area is very large, with a totalsurace o around 2 million km2, fve times the surace o the Black Sea itsel and a third o (non-Russian) Europe’sland mass. Some o Europe’s longest and largest riversow into the Black Sea and into the Sea o Azov, includingthe Danube, the Dnieper, the Southern Bug, the Dniesterand the Don. Te area is inhabited by a total population o around 160 million people (BSEI, 2005). Tough rather lessdensely populated than Western Europe, it includes some

o Europe’s population and industrial centres in Westernand Southern Ukraine, in Russia (Rostov on Don, Krasn-odar, Smolensk), in Istanbul and in central Europe (Austriaand Slovakia).

Te Black Sea itsel covers an area o 423 000 km2, not in-cluding the 37 860 km2 o the Azov Sea, and its immediatecoastal areas are home to about 16 million people1 (BSEI,2005). Te region is an economic hub, and a ocus or inter-national trade between the countries on its shores. History bears witness to the Black Sea’s role in trade and thereoretrac: the ancient Greeks, the Eastern Roman (Byzantine)

Empire, the Ottoman and more recently the Russian Em-pire have ruled all or most o the territory surrounding thesea. Until 1990, it was largely surrounded by Warsaw Pactcountries, with the Soviet Union to the East and North andcommunist Romania and Bulgaria to the West.

Te area is mountainous in the East and South, in theCaucasus and in Anatolia; and to the North West, with theCarpathians in the Ukraine and Romania. Most o the resto the Black Sea’s western and northern neighbourhoodis low lying.

Te region’s natural ecosystems include orests in the West,South and East, steppes to the North, and Alpine ecosys-tems at higher altitudes in the Carpathians, in Anatolia andin the Caucasus. Areas o greater natural and biologicaldiversity within the Black Sea Region include in particularthe Caucasus, Crimea, Anatolia, the Carpathian moun-tains, the estuary o the Danube and other wetlands. Boththe Caucasus and parts o Anatolia are urthermore consid-ered by the European Environmental Agency as “biodiver-sity hotspots”, because they combine a particularly rich bi-odiversity and an alarming rate o habitat loss (EEA, 2007).Economic activity remains limited compared to Western

European standards. GDP per capita is below $9 500 (ad- justed or purchasing power) in all countries concerned,and below $4 500 in Moldova, Ukraine, and the threeSouth Caucasian Republics. Ater a drop in the 1990s, GDPhas now recovered to levels comparable to pre-transitionincome in most countries, but industrial production hasnot. EEA indicators show correspondingly lower levels o energy consumption, air pollutants and waste productionor the countries o the region than in Western Europe:Ecological Footprints or these countries range rom lessthan 1 ha per person in Georgia to 3.3 in Ukraine, 4.5 in

Russia, and 5 in the EU (UNEP/EEA, 2005).2

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Te Black Sea Region’s natural heritage is o particular inter-est to Europe. Much o it is exceptionally rich and diverse,and has suered rom industrialization and urbanizationrather less than other parts o Europe. Te area’s natural environment also provides a range o products and services,most o them o direct economic value, which are vulnerableto disruption.

cp 1 / the environmental status oF the black sea reGion

Map o The Black Sea basin. (2001). In UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps andGraphics Library. Retrieved 10:39, March 4, 2008 rom http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/map_o_the_black_sea_basin.

1 In addition to the 17 million people living in Istanbul2 According to the EEA, “Ecological Footprint accounting measures the extent to which the ecological demand o human economies stays within or exceeds the capacity o the biosphere to

supply goods and services.” It is expressed in terms o the surace that would be required to sustainably provide the environmental services and resources consumed.




Te most obvious o them is the provision o reshwater: theDanube’s discharge alone amounts to more than 200 km3

yearly. Te region’s populations are dependent on con-tinued reshwater supplies or human consumption, agri-culture and industry. Many rivers also provide renewable

energy in the orm o hydroelectricity and major rivers are anessential part o the continent’s transport inrastructure. Forests provide timber; the vast orests stands o Ukraineor instance yield 1.3 billion m3 o timber yearly. Forestsalso provide uelwood, particularly in the poorer and ruralparts o the region.

Forests and a number o other habitats also provide a widerange o non-timber products, both ood (such as game ormushrooms) and non-ood products, notably medicinalplants which continue to be widely used. Around 1100 such

plants have been identifed in Ukraine alone or instance.Honey production is particularly dependent on naturalecosystems and on the diversity o wild owers (EEA, 2007).

Forests naturally play an important role in regulating thelocal climate and the water table as well as in protectingsoils. Tis is particularly important in areas exposed to anumber o simultaneous pressures on ecosystems. Te e-ects o deorestation are especially dramatic in mountainareas.

Sea and reshwater fsh are a major resource, exempli-

fed by the well-known case o the sturgeon. More gener-ally, the region’s genetic and biological diversity representsan indispensable, albeit non-commercial, resource. TeSouth Caucasus and Anatolia or example, are the naturalhome o an impressive range o ood crops, which includes

wheat, rye, oats, hazelnuts, tea and various orage legumesand ruit - 83 species in all. Te wild varieties which livein the area constitute an important gene pool or theirdomesticated cousins (EEA 2007).

Finally, the natural attractiveness o many parts o theregion, especially mountain and coastal areas, render them

attractive to tourism and recreation. ourism is already thriving on the Black Sea coast, in Romania, Bulgaria,Ukraine and Russia, and increasingly so in mountain areasrom the Carpathians to the Caucasus.

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Te main pressures on the region’s environment can besummarised as habitat disruption, degradation and rag-mentation, introduction o alien species, overexploitation,pollution and eutrophication (OECD 2007).

Forests are under threat rom excessive and oten illegallogging or harvesting or uelwood (e.g. in Russia and theCaucasus).3 Forest fres are requently the consequence o land use changes, o climate change and o the under und-ing o orest services (EEA, 2007). Te restitution o state-

owned land to private owners is considered a threat to or-est preservation in Ukraine and Romania as it is eared thatmany private owners would tend to log them or short termproft. Hunting and poaching are a widespread problemtoo, and are o particular signifcance or large mammalsand birds. In the Black Sea and spawning rivers, overfshingcontinues to be a major issue mostly driven by poverty andinternational demand or black caviar (WWF ERCP 2005).

Intensive agriculture has historically been a major causeo habitat loss, especially in the large agricultural area o Ukraine, Romania, Moldova and in coastal lowlands. Irri-

gation can damage soils and lead to salinization (EEA 07) while agricultural runo and organic pollution rom othersources is responsible or eutrophication in rivers, lakes,

wetlands and seas. Overgrazing remains widespread insuch areas as Romania and the Caucasus. In some case,such as in Ukraine, a drop in investment in the 1990s anda 50% drop in the use o chemical inputs have resulted inreduced pressure rom agriculture (OECD 2007).

River management, the construction o waterways and thedraining o wetlands are a serious problem, damaging eco-systems, disrupting the regime o rivers and altering the

water table. Tis is a major cause or concern or the largerivers such as the Danube and Dniepr.

Along the Black Sea coast, urban, industrial, transport,tourism and port inrastructure have damaged ecosys-tems and provoked erosion. Te development o tourismis going to be a threat in a number o areas, including theCarpathians and other mountain areas, while large scaleinrastructure projects such as the Baku-Ceyhan pipelineacross the Caucasus and urkey have particularly damag-ing consequences or habitats.4

Invasive species are a widespread and increasingly recog-nized problem. Te aquatic environment, the Black Sea inparticular, is especially vulnerable in this regard. In Moldo-

va, the introduction o higher yield fsh species has reducedthe stock o, or displaced, indigenous species. Overall, thenumber o “worst invasives” tends to be somewhat lowerthan in other parts o Europe (EEA 2007).

Nuclear contamination has aected vast areas, an esti-mated 3.5 million hectares in Ukraine, and large parts o Moldova.

3 For example, in Eastern Anatolia the amount o timber and uelwood taken rom orest is nine times higher than orest productivity (WWF, 2006)

4 Chapter 2 provides a more detailed account o the environmental eects o inrastructure projects.




Te eect o industrial pollution is already present, espe-cially in Ukraine, Russia and Romania. Industrial pollutionhas aected wildlie via toxic pollution, nutrient pollution,

waste dumping and industrial accidents. Generally speak-ing, industrial pollution decreased in the 1990s, and long-

range air pollution has stabilized in this region as in the resto Europe (OECD 2007).

Climate change, fnally, will add to other pressures on eco-systems in the Black Sea Region as elsewhere. Its impactis likely to be particularly severe rom the point o view o endangered and endemic species in Alpine areas such asthe Caucasus, where the size o some high altitude habitatsmay be reduced.5

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Te environmental status o the Black Sea has been thesubject o major environmental concerns since the early 1990s. Tis has led to the signing o the Black Sea Conven-tion in 1992.

While its vast catchment area spans much o Europe, theBlack Sea is linked to the world’s oceans only by the nar-

row passage o the Bosphorus. It is a deep sea, reachingdown to more than 2 000 m in places, but 87% o its volume,

below 100 to 200 m in depth, is anoxic and can thereoresupport only a very limited range o specialised lie orms.Its marine lie is made up mostly o Mediterranean species.It hosts about one third as many species as the Mediterra-nean Sea but its productivity is considerably greater.

Te sea’s main environmental problem is eutrophication,caused by the excess o nutrients owing via rivers or di-rectly rom coastal areas into the sea. Te Danube on itsown is by ar the main source o nitrogen, phosphorus andsuspended solids. Its nutrient load originates rom agricul-ture and sewage running into the river and its tributariesover a vast, developed, and relatively densely populatedcatchment area. Te nutrient discharge, which increaseddrastically ater the 1960s, has begun to decline however.

Eutrophication is widespread in the Black Sea, but its e-

ects are more pronounced on some areas, such as in theNorth West, in the vicinity o the Danube delta. Eutrophi-cation generally, and its more severe episodes in particu-lar, contribute to the degradation o natural systems and o their biodiversity (EEA, 2002, EC, 2001).

Te Black Sea’s fsh stock has declined drastically in recentdecades. Catches dropped rom a high o about 800 000tonnes yearly or all species in 1984 to a low o 250 000 t/y in 1991, causing considerable economic losses to the fsh-ing industry in the region. Catches have since recoveredsomewhat, but remain well below their earlier levels and

well below the estimated maximum sustainable yield orthe Black Sea. Te drop in fsh stock is a result o overfsh-ing, pollution, eutrophication and o habitat loss (EC, 2001;EEA, 2002, BBC, 2007).

Overfshing has also altered the presence o various fsh-es in the Black Sea. Only fve o the original 26 species o fshes which were under exploitation in the 1960s werestill commercially exploited in the 1980s, as commercialeets moved on to other species once fsheries had beenexhausted. Sturgeon fsheries have, or example, been dra-matically depleted and all sturgeon species are considered

endangered. oday, anchovy and sprat remain the maincommercial species in the Black Sea and together make upabout 80% o catches (PC, 2008).

In the relatively closed Black Sea, the increasingly requentintroduction o alien species, either intentionally or aqua-culture, or accidentally in ballast waters and on ship hulls,has also played havoc with native species and ecosystems(EEA 2002 (b)). Te most dramatic example in this regardis the jellyfsh Mnemiopsis, presumed to have been intro-duced via ballast waters: with no predator in the Black Sea,it has reproduced exponentially and, at its peak, reached

an estimated total mass o 1 million tonnes. Te mass o decaying dead individuals had become an environmental

Pollution in the Black Sea Area. (2001). In UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps andGraphics Library. Retrieved, March 4, 2008 rom http://maps.grida.no/go/ graphic/pollution_in_the_black_sea_area.

5 Chapter 3 analyzes the impacts o climate change in the region.




issue in its own right. Only the subsequent introduction o Beroye ovata, a predator o the jellyfsh, ortunately limitedits numbers.

Accidental pollution is also noted as a signifcant problemaecting the Black Sea, particularly oil spills, which causeconsiderable damage in the vicinity o ports and industri-alized areas. Waste dumping remains a problem, and dis-charges rom both residential and industrial sites result incontamination by heavy metals, oil and derivatives, persist-ent organic compounds or radionucleides (EC, EEA (b)).

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On the Black Sea’s western shores, Romania is at the con-uence o a number o biogeographical regions. 28% o

the country is still covered by orests, including some o the largest undisturbed orests in Europe. Overall, 47% o Romania is covered by natural or semi-natural areas, a highfgure by European standards, though some o them aredegraded. Its nature reserves represent 7% o the country.

Agriculture covers much o the country’s surace, and mosto the country’s low-lying areas, and little remains o thecountry’s original steppes. 60% o the Carpathian Moun-tains (Box 2) and 75% o the Danube delta (Box 1) are inRomania. Te country, and particularly its eastern part, isalso particularly important or bird migrations. It boasts3 700 vascular plants, though up to 37% are considered

either rare or endangered, as well as 364 species o birds,102 mammals and 191 fsh species.

Important threats or the environment in Romania includepollution, river damming and management, the drainageo wetlands, industrial agriculture, tourism and inrastruc-ture projects and other orms o exploitation o natural re-sources. Romania is among those countries aected by thelikely environmental impact o land restitution. As muchas 30% o the country’s orests are due to be returned to theprivate sector, and environmentalists anticipate that 20% o that might be cut down.

Bulgaria also includes a diversity o habitats rom the Bal-kan Mountains in the West and South to the Black Seacoast. Overall, 35% o the country is orested, 60% o whichare o natural origin. Te country reports upward o 3 550

vascular plant species, 383 birds and 207 fsh species (Black Sea fsh included), with a rate o endemism o 5%.

Bulgaria’s environment is exposed to a wide range o threats, including pollution, the excessive exploitation o natural resources, invasive species and land restitutionpolicies. Like other countries in the region, Bulgaria su-

ers rom inadequate awareness o the value o and threatsto biodiversity, rom an inadequate knowledge base, androm the poor enorcement o conservation laws.

[Box 1] Te Danube river and its delta

Te Danube with 2 857 km is the longest watercourse

in Europe and has the largest watershed - 817 000 km2

or one third o Europe outside Russia, home to 83 mil-lion people in its watershed. Te basin includes much o Romania, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia,Ukraine and parts o Bulgaria, Germany, the Czech Re-public, Moldova, Serbia, Italy, Switzerland, Albania andPoland.

Te river is bordered by a number o wetlands o par-ticular importance. Te Donau-Auen National Park, orexample, together with other wetlands on the lowerMorava and Dyje in Austria, the Czech Republic and

in Slovakia, orm a transboundary wetland o interna-tional importance; the Neusiedler and Ferto-Hansagtransboundary National Park is a World Heritage Site;a number o other sites o comparable value border theriver, all the way to, and including, the Danube delta.Te economic contribution o these wetlands has been

valued at 450 to 520 $/ha/year (WWF, undated).

Te upper Danube tends to be more industrialized thanthe rest o the river, and much o this stretch o river is nolonger ree owing. Te relative preservation o the riv-er’s middle and lower reaches has allowed the conserva-

tion o riches lost in most other European river systems.Over the course o the entire river, WWF nevertheless es-timates that 80% o the river’s wetlands and oodplainshave been destroyed in the course o the last century.

Te river and its vicinity are home to 330 species o birds, with 223 o them on the red list and strictly protected.60% o the White Pelican’s range and 70% o the Pygmy Cormorant’s nesting areas are in this area or instance.Te river also has 103 species o fsh, seven o them en-demic. But 5 o the 6 sturgeon species present in theDanube are either extinct or nearing extinction, includ-

ing the Beluga Sturgeon.

Te river and the many wetlands that border it havebeen modifed by water extraction or agriculture, in-dustry and human consumption, by the construction o dams or river control and by the drainage o wetlands.Te Danube’s course is thus interrupted by no less than59 dams. Since 1992 the Gabcikovo dam or instancediverts 80% o the river ow away rom the riverbed or40 km and into a side channel, thus severely aectingsurrounding wetlands.




Additionally, the Danube’s very high nutrient content re-sults rom runo rom agriculture (about hal the load),industry and households (about a quarter each). Heav-

ily urbanized and industrialized in places, the Danube isalso aected by heavy metal and bacterial pollution, as well as by industrial accidents.

Te Danube delta (a World Heritage Site and protectedarea) is the largest delta in Europe ater the Volga’s. Itis o very high conservation value and highly vulner-able. Its 5 200 km2 combine various biota including reedbeds and swamps, lakes and networks o canals, or-ests, meadows, sandy grasslands and dunes, 3 733 km2 o which are protected. It is host to 300 species o birds,3 400 insects, 1200 higher plants and is a stopover or

25 million migrating birds.

Te delta as well as the river’s lower course are today atrisk rom water management projects, including drain-age, irrigation and damming projects. 15% o the deltahas already been drained. Te proposed Bystroye Canalin the Ukrainian part o the Danube delta, represents aparticularly grave threat to the area. In the lower coursea Danube modifcation project between the towns o Ca-larasi and Braila is now envisaged, which would alter thecourse o the Danube in Romania over a stretch o ap-proximately 200 km to acilitate navigation. Tis project

and the transboundary Bulgaria-Romania project, alsoon the Danube, may have likely signifcant environ-mental impacts by aecting notably the main spawninggrounds or sturgeon (WWF6).

Tese plans and others are believed to be a threat tomany o the areas that are to be protected either underEU conservation legislation or under the Ramsar (Wet-lands) Convention.

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Most o Ukraine (96% o the country’s area) and Moldovaare inside the Black Sea’s watershed. Te region’s natu-

ral vegetation includes orests, orest steppe and steppe.Ukraine shares with Romania the Carpathian Mountains(Box 1) and the Danube delta (Box 2).

As an illustration o both countries’ biodiversity, Ukraine(600 km2) is host to an estimated 5 100 species o vas-cular plants and Moldova (34 km2) to around 2 000. Terichest parts o the region rom the point o view o biodiversity are the Carpathians, the Danube Delta andthe Crimea.

Ukrainian and Moldovan economies rely heavily on ag-

riculture. 57% o Ukraine and 75% o Moldova’s territory are armed, though substantial stretches o orests alsoremain: about 14% o Ukraine and 9% o Moldova (theEuropean average is 29%). Natural and semi-naturalareas are also estimated at around 20% o the country inMoldova and 29% in Ukraine.

Soils have suered rom agricultural exploitation causingnutrient loss, erosion and chemical pollution. Erosionaects 18% o Ukraine and oods 17%. 11 to 25% o itsirrigated lands suer rom secondary salinization.

Land restitution is an issue in Ukraine and in Romania,as comparatively well preserved state-owned areas aredue to be returned to private owners, causing ear thatmany o those new owners will put them under exploita-tion and cause environmental damage.

Inrastructure and river management projects are anissue in Ukraine as well. As a result o the dams at theDniepr cascade, water table levels have risen rom 2 to12 meters, causing ooding. Te construction in the1980s o a dam at Novodnestrovsk on the Dniester hada particularly severe eect on river regulation, causing

inter alia a dramatic drop in the river’s productivity.

Wetlands around the Black Sea and the Azov Sea

6 http://www.panda.org/about_ww/where_we_work/europe/what_we_do/danube_carpathian/our_work/reshwater/sustainable_navigation/bottlenecks/index.cm

Source: blackseaweb.net




[Box 2] Te Carpathian Mountains

Te Carpathian Mountains are a comparatively well pre-

served area o high biodiversity value, close to the centreo Europe. Tey are in the Black Sea catchment area, and90% o their waters run to the Black Sea (the rest runsNorth to the Vistula and the Baltic) (CEI, 2001).

Covering a total surace o 209 256 km2, this mountainrange is shared between seven countries, includingRomania and Ukraine to the East. With an area largerthan the Alps and roughly fve times the size o Switzer-land, it contains the largest tracts o mountain orests inEurope.

Like the Caucasus, it is at once a bridge and a barrier be-tween regions to the North and South. Its mountainousterrain has so ar largely preserved the area and its bio-diversity rom intensive exploitation. With 3 988 vascu-lar plant species, more than 10% endemic (481 species),it boasts one-third o all the vascular plant diversity o Europe. Its macro-auna is uniquely preserved, withnumerous large herbivores and carnivores, including

wolves, bears and lynx in much greater numbers than inthe Alps or other parts o Central and Western Europe.

Carpathian orests are extensive, and comprise both

deciduous and evergreen, pristine and managed or-ests. Te area covered by pristine orests, an estimated300 000 ha, is unique in Europe. Altogether, the areacovered by orests o any type is considerable, rangingrom a minimum o 30% in Hungary to as much as 60% inRomania.

Treats to Carpathian orests include timber exploita-tion and overgrazing. While pressure on orests and onopen habitats in the Carpathians has been limited dur-ing the Communist era, the restitution and privatizationo land, combined with the introduction o more inten-

sive orms o orestry, expose orests to new pressures.

Te Carpathians also include a range o natural andsemi-natural open habitats, mostly grassland, whichmake up specifc ecosystems and host much o the re-gion’s biodiversity. Tose linked to traditional liestyles,such as shepherding, are modifed or threatened. As isthe case or orests, the trend towards land ragmenta-tion, the introduction o modern agricultural methods,as well as inrastructure or industrial projects are impor-tant actors o transormation in an area which sueredrom benign neglect during the Communist era.

Crimea

Crimea is mostly lowlands, but also eatures a small

mountain range near the coastal area. Its natural biotaincludes orests, steppes and coastal ecosystems. Itsbiodiversity is high or a relatively small area, with2 775 species o vascular plants, 279 o them (about 10%)endemic, 301 species o birds (5 endemic, 50 endan-gered) and 57 mammals (15 endangered). All our o itsmarine mammals (seals and dolphins) are endangered.

Notwithstanding this biological wealth, Crimea hasbeen deeply aected by human presence. Only 2 to 3%o its habitats are unaltered, and 62% o its land is eitherunder cultivation or urbanized. Te remaining 35-36%

o the land is covered in orests or pastures. 83% o itsbiodiversity is to be ound in Crimea’s mountains and,to some extent, in coastal areas. Te Crimean steppe as abiota, while comparatively species-poor, is under a moreimmediate threat due to its accessibility. Crimea’s 137protected areas cover 5.6% o its territory (142 462 ha).

Crimea’s environmental challenges are characteristic o a low-lying, relatively densely populated area exposed tohuman exploitation. Its ecosystems are aected by hy-drological change caused by irrigation or conversely by the lowering o the water table. Tey are also aected by

reductions in habitat size, habitat ragmentation, landuse changes and encroachment by arms and urbanareas. Pesticide and ertilizer residues contaminate theaquiers and rivers. Overgrazing, illegal logging or do-mestic needs, uncontrolled medicinal plant harvestingand poaching also contribute to the overall degradation,as do orest fres.

Te area is close to Ukraine’s industrial centres and hasbeen aected by pollution rom chemical plants in Kras-noperekopsk and Armyansk since the 1960s and 1970s.(BSP, 1999). Pressures resulting rom the growth o

towns and cities, rom tourism and shipping, have alsotaken their toll. Specifcally, the current construction o an oil terminal on the aman peninsula has caused en-

vironmental concern. Once in operation, terminals may cause water and air pollution, as well as soil contamina-tion, thus creating environmental health problems andthreatening local fsheries.




t c

Te wider Caucasus ecoregion, on the Eastern edge o theBlack Sea, encompasses the lowlands to the North andSouth o the mountain ranges. It is an area o very high

biological diversity and has been classifed as a biodiver-sity hotspot on account o its conservation value and o theseriousness o the threats its habitats ace.

Te area includes the entire territories o Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also the Russian Caucasus,and parts o North Western Iran and North Eastern urkey.Te mountainous terrain, situated in a narrow isthmusbetween the Black Sea and Caspian Sea to the West andthe East, links Russia and the North-Asian landmass, to theMiddle East and Anatolia.

Tere are 6 500 species o vascular plants in the Caucasus,a quarter o them endemic: the area has the highest level o endemism in the temperate world. It also has an unusuallevel o animal diversity, including 400 species o birds,77 reptiles and 200 fsh (one third endemic). Its 153 mam-mals (20% endemic) include large herbivores and carni-

vores such as the Leopard, the Red Deer and the West andEastern Caucasus urs (WWF, 2006, EEA, 2007).

9.8% o this eco-region’s territory is ormally protected asnature reserves, parks or sanctuaries but the system o pro-tected areas in the region is patchy, underdeveloped and poorly

administered. Te distribution o protected areas is random,and they are rarely connected to allow species to migrate.

Te eco-region’s biodiversity is now being eroded at analarming rate. About hal its lands have been modifed, andless than 12% o habitats can still be considered untouched.

Te region’s population is 35 million in an area the size o France (580 000 km2). With a population density o 66 per-son/km2, widespread poverty and the industry sector stillsuering rom the economic collapse o the 1990s, anthro-pogenic threats to natural habitats originate mostly rom

illegal logging, uelwood harvesting, overgrazing, poachingand wildlie trade, overfshing, inrastructure develop-ment, habitat ragmentation and the polluting o rivers and

wetlands. Tese problems can be ascribed to socio-economic prob-lems, to the lack o administrative and enorcement ca-pacity and to a general lack o awareness. But the region isalso concerned by oil and transport inrastructure projects

which ragment habitats, cause disturbance in previously isolated environments, and occasionally create localizedpopulation booms. Tere is concern, too, about the inra-

structure required or the Sochi Winter Olympics and theplans to build the Russia-Asia canal.

Te Caucasus has already lost substantial areas o orest,but a fth o its territory nevertheless remains orested (EEA

2002b). Tese are mostly mountain, less requently lowlandorests and they harbour much o the region’s biodiversity.

Logging is a major cause o orest loss in all o the region’sorests. Illegal logging in particular has increased, while o-

fcially sanctioned logging has decreased in recent years.In Georgia experts believe that illegal logging accounts orthree times more than the ocial quotas In Armenia, 8%o orests were cut down, mostly or uelwood, during theenergy crisis between 1992 and 1995 (WWF, 2006) .

Overgrazing is also a major threat to orests and to theirregeneration, as it is to open grasslands (one-third o theregion) and to alpine ecosystems in the Caucasus.

High-mountain ecosystems cover 17% o the region andhave a high conservation value, with numerous rare and

endemic species in Alpine meadows or rock and screehabitats. Tese ragile biota are also under heavy pres-sure rom overgrazing and rom the excessive collection o plants or medicinal and other purposes. Overgrazing inalpine meadows not only contributes to denudation andsoil erosion, it also changes the species composition o the

vegetation.

Poaching is a menace in all high-mountain ecosystems, whether orested or not, and carnivorous and herbivorousmammals (bison, red dear, saiga, brown bear, bezoar goat, etc.),reptiles and other species are hunted or skins, trade, medicinal

and laboratory purposes, or or collectors and trophies.

o the North o the Caucasus range, steppes with their speci-ic vegetation and auna used to be widespread but, ollowingtheir conversion to agricultural land, only ragments remain.o the South, semi-deserts represent limited and unique habi-tats. Tey have also been largely transormed by irrigation and

winter grazing, as is the case in the South o Armenia.

Only part o the Caucasus area belongs to the Black Sea watershed; the rest ows towards the Caspian. Almost 12%o the Caucasus is covered by waterways and wetlands, the

largest among them being lake Sevan, a Ramsar Conven-tion site. Caucasian wetlands, particularly along the coast,are important stopovers or migrating birds. Numerousspecies o birds stop over during migrations or winter inthe wetlands along the Caucasus Black Sea coast.

Fishing, much o it illegal, is a major problem in lakes, riv-ers and wetlands, particularly or such a prized and slow maturing catch as the sturgeon. Chemical pollution romagriculture has declined as the use o artifcial ertilizers andpesticides declined too. Soil erosion and waste and manuredumping in or near rivers are a persistent threat and contrib-

ute to pollution and turbidity. Industrial pollution has alsobeen reduced as most o the region’s industries closed downin the 1990s, but even so, the lack o capacity, environmentalawareness or administrative oversight lead to disproportion-ate pollution rom small and medium-size businesses.




t b s a

Anatolia is another large and mountainous area borderingthe Black Sea that is remarkably rich in biological diversity.

With around 10 000 higher plants reported in urkey as a whole (3000 endemic, compare with 12 000 or the whole o

Europe), its biodiversity compares to that o the Europeancontinent.

urkey’s Black Sea Region (18% o the country’s surace)is a steep and relatively narrow strip o territory stretch-ing rom Georgia to Istanbul and the Sea o Marmara. Highmountains (with peaks at 2000 m in the West and Centreand 3000 m in the East) slope down steeply to a relatively narrow coastal strip and the area eatures a number o del-tas and wetlands. Tis northern area is both damper andmore densely orested than the rest o urkey and its tem-peratures are milder than in continental Anatolia. It thus

shares many o the characteristics o the Black Sea coasts o Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia.

More than 50% o the BS region is covered by orest, whichis substantially more than the rest o urkey, where 27% isorested. Te natural vegetation ranges rom rare temperaterainorest and deciduous mountain orest to coastal low-land orests (Colchic orests), peat bogs and coastal sanddunes. Te region is particularly rich in woody species andharbours a considerable population o large mammalssuch as the brown bear, jackal, lynx, red deer, roe deer orchamoix. It is important or migratory birds, with a number

o important areas or birds around estuaries and wetlands,a main migratory route to the East o the Black Sea, con-tinuing along the Georgian coast, and another route acrossthe Bosphorus to the West.

Unortunately, very little remains o the original Colchicorests, which have been decimated by logging and thequest or agricultural land. A number o wetlands have alsobeen drained or the purpose o extending areas availableor cultivation and most o the region’s productive lowlandsare now under cultivation. Urbanization, including theconstruction o building inrastructure, and the construc-

tion o highways, add to the pressure on the region’s eco-systems. Hunting and poaching are also threats to wildlie.

o the West o the Bosphorus, the region eatures Europe’slargest stretches o rare heathland, 95% o which have beendestroyed by a combination o urbanization and aoresta-tion, yet the remaining area nevertheless retains consider-able ecological value. Much o the region in the vicinity o Istanbul, on both sides o the Bosphorus, is under severepressure as a result o the metropolis’s expansion.

1.5 / i p

From the point o view o nature protection, Black Seacountries are concerned by a number o international as

well as specifcally European agreements and cooperationprocesses.7

Teir overarching ramework remains the Biodiversity

Convention, which all countries in the region have joinedand ratifed, and notably the Convention’s (2005) Pro-gramme o Work on Protected Areas. Te Programme o

Work’s overarching goal is the establishment o networkso protected areas on land by 2010, and at sea by 2012. TeRamsar Convention is also o particular relevance to thearea, considering the large number o wetlands o high bio-diversity value, particularly around the Black Sea and along

the Danube and other rivers.

Te Environment or Europe (EE) process has been pro-moting the cause o integrated networks o protected areastowards the establishment o a Pan-European EcologicalNetwork. In this context, the 2003 Kiev Declaration identi-fed targets or all European countries aiming both at theestablishment, by 2008, o networks o protected areas andat the designation o High Nature Value agricultural areas

which ought to be the object o measures to ensure that ag-ricultural practices are compatible with the conservation o

wildlie (EEA 2007).

While the European Union is implementing the Kiev prin-ciples via the Natura 2000 network, in non-member statesone o the main vehicles or their implementation is theEmerald Network promoted under the Bern Convention on the Conservation o European Wildlie and NaturalHabitats.

All countries in the Black Sea Region are part o the Envi-ronment or Europe process and hence ormally signed upto the Kiev principles. Tough the Bern Convention has not

yet been ratifed by Armenia, Georgia and Russia, all coun-

tries in the region are part o the Emerald Network and areactively involved in projects to set it up.

Since their accession to the EU, Romania and Bulgaria areormally covered by the Natura 2000 and the European

Union’s Biodiversity Strategy whose goal is to halt the losso biodiversity by 2010. urkey is also gradually adaptingto EU requirements or nature protection. In due course,roughly hal o the length o Black Sea coast and hal o Black Sea coastal states will thus come to be covered by EUlegislation.

7 For a more detailed analysis o regional institutions dealing with the environment, see chapter 4.




In addition to the global ramework or nature conserva-tion, several sub-regional level initiatives are o particularrelevance to the region. Te Danube Convention coverspollution reduction, prevention o accidental pollutionand habitat protection issues and has provided a strong

ramework or cooperation between countries borderingthe Danube.

Te Carpathian Convention, signed in 2003, commits itsseven state parties, including Romania and Ukraine, tonature protection and sustainable development in theCarpathian Mountains. It is notably the frst internationalagreement that explicitly calls or the establishment o eco-logical networks and or the integration o biodiversity con-servation in development planning.

Like the Danube Convention, the Black Sea Convention

(see in Chapter 5) is a relatively old international agree-ment specifc to the region. Its environmental program or-ganises conservation work in habitats that are critical orpopulations o priority species (Bonnin 2007). Te Conven-tion regulates, and the Black Sea Commission coordinates,policy on a range o issues including the management o marine resources, integrated coastal zone management,accidental pollution, pollution rom ships and rom land,hazardous substances, waste dumping and atmosphericpollution.

Te Caucasus is not covered as such by international agree-

ments or ormalized international environmental coop-eration. But its Regional Environmental Centre in bilisi,

whose board includes representatives o the three govern-ments o Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, represents aunique, though oten laborious, experience o intergovern-mental cooperation in the service o capacity-building inthe environmental sector. Te WWF’s Ecoregional Conser-

vation Plan (ECP) or the Caucasus also provides or a proc-ess o regional cooperation.8

1.6 / cg p

eg w p

Te countries in the Black Sea Region have made someprogress towards developing more eective conservationpolicies and implementing international commitments,such as the Kiev principles. Eorts to recognize and protectthe natural environment have, however, been conronted

with serious limitations.

Overall, the extent o protected areas varies, but still allssignifcantly short in comparison to Western European fg-

ures (GEO 2000), with a low o 3% o national territory in

urkey or instance. A rapid growth in protected areas isstill to be detected in countries like Azerbaijan or Bulgaria(OECD 2007, WWF 2006). It is also true that plans are pro-ceeding with the identifcation o Pan-European EcologicalNetworks (PEENs) and a network has already been identi-

fed in the Caucasus (Bonnin, 07).

Te Kiev declaration also required that all European coun-tries identiy areas o armland with high conservation

value, so called “High Nature Value” Farmlands. But mostcountries in the region have not ulflled their commit-ments rom this point o view (OECD 2007, EEA 07). Like-

wise, little action seems to have been taken in the region totackle the challenge o alien species.

Legislation concerning nature protection is consideredgenerally adequate in most countries and most concerns

ocus on the conditions o its implementation (WWF,2006). Even in the new EU members, Romania and Bul-garia, nature protection legislation is not necessarily en-orced, as illustrated by plans to build tourism or transportinrastructure on protected areas, oten in defance o EUconservation legislation.

cp g

Te wide gap between laws and stated policy on the onehand, and implementation on the other, is partly the resulto the lack o political support and resources available or

the enorcement and management o protected areas.

Funding or conservation is generally low, and capacity andresources are lacking. raining, skills, inrastructure andequipment are in short supply and salaries and employ-ment conditions are unattractive. As a consequence, the e-ectiveness o those institutions charged with implement-ing conservation policies at all levels is seriously limited. Asa result o the low availability o national unding, depend-ence on oreign sources is widespread, and the contrast be-tween those areas with access to international unding andothers can be marked (WWF 2006, OECD 2007).

e w

Te lack o awareness o the value o biodiversity, o the serv-ices it renders and o the consequences o its degradation isalso o considerable signifcance to the region. Among thegeneral public and the political class, this translates into alow prioritization o nature conservation, resulting in littleeort being invested in the enorcement o legislation or inproviding adequate unding towards conservation. Amongstakeholders, it translates into a weak social control o par-ticularly damaging behaviour, such as illegal construction

sites, poaching or logging, which make the enorcement o legislation much more dicult.

8 WWF/Williams L. (ed). An Ecoregional Conservation Plan for the Caucasus . Tbilisi, May 2006. Available online at: http://assets.panda.org/downloads/ecp__second_edition.pd




Awareness o the costs o degradation o the natural envi-ronment, by contrast, is essential to obtaining the supporto local communities or conservation projects and to pro-moting practices compatible with conservation.

G

Countries where administrative capacity is weak, und-ing scarce and policy as well as legislation poorly under-stood, are particularly vulnerable to corruption. Wherecorruption is rampant, business interests are in a positionto override legislation and undertake projects that conict

with nature protection policy. Te issue is clearly centralto eorts aimed at reinorcing the rule o law in general inmost countries o the area. Corruption can be particularly dicult to tackle, and its eects can become extremely damaging when higher levels o government authority are

aected.

1.7 / c

A considerable part o Europe’s natural heritage surroundsthe Black Sea. Much o the BSR hosts species and habi-tats that have disappeared elsewhere, or that are uniqueto these areas. But the region aces major environmentalchallenges: some o them inherited rom the past or due tothe hardship that most o the region’s countries underwent

ater the collapse o the communist regimes, but some may result, or already result, rom new developments. Tese di-erent environmental challenges call or dierent orms o international response.

Where environmental pressures aect a collective resource,such as fsheries or a shared watercourse, international co-operation should ocus on its shared management: this ap-plies to the Danube river and its watershed, or to nutrientpollution and fsheries in the Black Sea.

Conservation also requires international coordination to

the extent that it deals with natural systems that are sharedby several countries, such as the Caucasus, the Carpathi-ans or the Danube delta or instance. In spite o undeni-able achievements, regional environmental cooperation isstill in the early stages o its development in the Black SeaRegion.

But the region also remains economically under-devel-oped, and poverty, poor administrative capacity and inad-equate legislation constitute major problems as they leadto the inadequate management o resources exemplifedby poaching, illegal logging and overgrazing. Tese pres-

sures aect, frst and oremost, local resources, although

their cumulative eect may aect resources on a nationalor regional level. Improving capacity and governance lo-cally and nationally is key to tackling them. Internationalcooperation can contribute signifcantly to building ca-pacity through the exchange o best practices and through

assistance. International support is o course already beingprovided and should continue to be available in this feld.In the years to come the development o domestic capacity

will depend primarily on the determination and capability o each o the region’s governments.

In addition, the economies o all countries in the regionare growing, some o them quite ast. Industrial and urbandevelopment and inrastructure projects, stalled in the1990s, have resumed and will increasingly add to environ-mental pressures. Tis is o particular concern where thosepromoting such projects have access to vast resources and

inuence, out o proportion with those available to localadministration and conservation authorities. A strategy orsustainable development in the Black Sea Region must an-ticipate these developments too.

r

Te Black Sea Synergy and the EU- Black Sea Ministerial

Dialogue

Biodiversity and environmental protection must continueto eature as one o the BSS’ priorities.

nCooperation between Black Sea countries and the EUshould ocus in particular on monitoring and reduc-ing the environmental impact o large inrastructuredevelopments, including oil, gas, and transport inra-structure, in the spirit o the Espoo Convention9 and o its protocol on strategic environmental impact assess-ment. As many o these projects are promoted by theEU or its member states, the EU should view it as itsresponsibility to prevent damage to habitats;

nTe European Union and the European integration

process as such are usually seen as attractive values intheir own right in the Black Sea Region. Te EU shouldensure that its own approach to nature protection isperceived as a central element o its values, successesand strengths;

nTe promotion o environmental protection and con-servation policies on the basis o EU legislation shouldconstitute an integral part o the BSS process. Cooper-ation with non-EU member countries should addressconservation priorities and their achievements shouldbe monitored;

9 The ESPOO Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary context was signed in Espoo in 1991. The SEA Protocol (2003) will augment the Espoo Convention by

ensuring that individual Parties integrate environmental assessment into their plans and programmes at the earliest stages. Find more in http://www.unece.org/env/eia/




nTe BSS should support the implementation o networks o protected areas such as the Emerald Network,“support monitoring o their progress in the regionand ensure that any inrastructure projects envisagedare compatible with their viability.

International cooperation

nTere is no ormally established environmental coop-eration between Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbai-

jan and urkey, in spite o the region’s exceptionalbiodiversity value and o the severe threat it is under.

An international ramework o cooperation or natureprotection and are responsible to ensure that adequateunding is available or conservation in the Caucasusshould thereore be promoted and supported by theregion’s countries and the European Union. At present

only semi-ocial exchanges exist between urkey andGeorgia and between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijanin the context o the implementation o the CaucasusEcoregional Plan (WWF, 2006).

Awareness-raising

Te protection o biodiversity in the region will depend onpolicies, administrative capacity, scientifc capacity and onthe awareness, both among the population and among de-cisions-makers, o the cost o environmental degradationand biodiversity loss.

nIn this respect, a greater emphasis should be placed onthe practical consequences o environmental degrada-tion and on the benefts o conservation, particularly in the countryside. Environmental advocacy should beounded on local concerns and values;

nNon-governmental organizations and the media havean essential role in building public support or envi-ronmental protection and they have contributed muchover the last decade in this respect. Teir eorts mustbe supported;

nIn order to promote their independence and tostrengthen their message, non-governmental organi-zations should be assisted in fnding ways to developtheir own unding sources locally, whether rom thegeneral public, rom public institutions or rom theprivate sector. International support programmes inthis sector should aim primarily or the long-term de-

velopment o civil society organizations.

Access to resources

nNational governments should be encouraged to al-locate appropriate resources to nature protection; in-ternational unding or biodiversity projects is to be

encouraged, in particular through EC programmes(Regional unds, LIFE plus, ENPI, IPA);

n Authorities responsible or nature protection shouldexplore, with international support, alternative fnanc-ing systems to supplement public unding when it isdefcient;

n A strong scientifc research capability is essential tosustain the protection o biodiversity and this should besupported by Black Sea governments and by the EU.

Governance and enforcement

nTe EU should scrutinize the enorcement o conservation legislation in the region, and react to signifcantinringements. It should in particular include this issuein its progress reports on the implementation o ENPaction plans (see Appendix B or a detailed descriptiono the European Neighbourhood Policy) and in the en-largement progress reports or the case o urkey;

nNon-governmental organizations should be provided with assistance, support, and training in the methodo-

logical, legal and other tools available to tackle cases o corruption aecting the natural heritage;

nGovernments, with international support where re-quired, should place a greater emphasis on main-streaming conservation into development policy;

nDonors and international fnancial institutions shouldprovide support towards the implementation and en-orcement o nature protection legislation and policy.



18 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Chapter 2 / Energy and Climate Change in the Black Sea Region

2.1 / eg g b s rg: g x

Te Black Sea Region1 comprises a diverse set o countries– including ormer Soviet Republics, an ‘old’ EU memberstate, new EU member states, an aspirant to that status, ando course Russia itsel. Te diversity has a uniying eatureother than some proximity to the Black Sea : hydrocarbons.Both extraction, as in Azerbaijan and Russia, and transmis-sion – whether over land or water – give each country stra-tegic importance, even those completely deprived o oil or

gas. Other energy and climate change issues are importantin the region, but it is oil and gas that drives everything.

Te region has been the ocus o a rivalry or energy re-sources since the mid-19th century, when Baku becamethe hub o the Caucasian oil industry. International inter-ests like the British, Americans, Russians, urks and Irani-ans have bueted a region also acing ethnic and borderconicts (Chechens, Ingush, North Ossetians, Armenians,

Azeris, etc.), with energy exacerbating and ampliying theimportance o the problems (onchev, 1997).

Access to oil and gas in Europe is important to its economy,and oil and gas income is important to those countries ex-tracting and transporting it. However, oil and gas– ensuringaccess to it, and making money rom it – tends to obscuremany other energy-related issues in the region, includingaspects o both alternatives to oil and gas within the regionitsel, and the knock-on impact o securing long-term oiland gas supplies in the EU.

Energy security in the EU is taken to be nearly synonymous with supply rom as many sources as possible, and with volumes guaranteed into the uture. As a result, EU energy

cooperation with other countries ocuses on diversiyingenergy sources, their country o origin, as well as country o transit.2 But ensuring diversity means consistently planningor new capacity, which costs economic, political and envi-ronmental capital to achieve. Te result is that renewableenergy, energy eciency and other laudable aims, despitebeing addressed by ENP Action Plans and the Baku Process,still play a negligible role in the region.

While oil and gas is the central act o the energy politicso the region, there is also a legacy o nuclear energy andassociated pollution to contend with. Several Soviet-era

power plants that do not conorm to western saety stand-ards pose an ongoing threat – Ukraine’s Chernobyl cata-lyzed world anti-nuclear opinion two decades ago, butamong other examples o concern, Armenia operates anoutdated and previously damaged acility in a seismic zoneand Russia has extended the lietime o several old reactors.

Climate change plays into the dynamics o the region inthree ways: frst is how climate change will impact theregion, second is how the region’s oil and gas itsel lends toclimate change internally and externally, and third is thegenerally inecient production and use o energy,3 lead-

ing to higher emissions than necessary given the many potential improvements, which we will review.

Tis chapter contends with a given: oil and gas will likely remain o pre-eminent importance in the region’s politicsand economics. Te question is i it is possible to strike abetter balance, where the ocus on oil and gas does not de-rail options elsewhere. We will examine the policies andprograms underway (in the region itsel and within theEU), and how they might best be harnessed, and how new unds and initiatives might be brought to bear on greeningenergy supply and demand in the region.

2.2 / ip g

Environmental impacts rom energy are very much inevidence in the Black Sea Region, given the conuence o several actors – frst and oremost is the exploitation o oiland gas in the Caspian region, and its transport throughother countries to the market. Creating impacts throughleakage, waste production and emissions by processing a-cilities, the oil and gas industry leaves a very heavy ootprint

on the area. Te second actor is that the region is domi-nated by ormer Soviet countries characterized by a legacy o polluting and inecient industry, and inecient use o energy in all sectors; third is the legacy and ongoing use o nuclear energy, which has been o extreme importance insome countries, not least Ukraine, which was home to theChernobyl disaster.

Aside rom Russia, the main oil and gas producer in theregion is Azerbaijan. It has both onshore and oshoreproduction, in the Caspian Sea. Oil industry installationsare major sources o solid, liquid and gaseous waste to air,

cp 2 / enerGy and climate chanGe in the black sea reGion

1 Taking the denition to be that o the Commission’s ‘Black Sea SYNERGY’: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.2 The Communication to the European Council “External energy relations – rom principles to action”, Brussels, 12.10.2006, COM(2006) 590 nal, lists as one o the top priorities o the

EU energy policy to ensure the diversication o routes and sources o external energy supplies.3 One o the reasons or this ineciency is that ormer Soviet republics are used to receiving energy subsidies and currently domestic prices in the region hardly ever refect the ull,

long-term costs o energy.




ground and water. Tey are sources o sulphur dioxides,carbon monoxide, nitrous oxides, volatile organic com-pounds and others.4

Azerbaijan’s oil acilities contribute signifcant amounts o

pollution.5

Oil pollution levels in the Caspian Sea itsel areup to almost 12 times the maximum allowable level, whileheavy metals are also at multiples o their permissible lev-els. oxics in the ood chain are already showing their im-pacts on, amongst others, fsh population.6 As the industry gained momentum in the 90s ollowing years o decline un-der the Soviets, the proportion o Azerbaijan’s air pollutionrom oil acilities, already at around 50%, rose to over 70%.7

Te environmental impact o oil operations is not unique tothe region, but it is exacerbated by several actors – the age o some operations, as the area frst started exploiting oil and

gas in the 19th

century, and the rapid expansion o productionduring the post-Soviet rush to exploit resources in the 1990s.

Environmental impacts are not limited to production sites.Impacts caused by the transport o oil are a long-standingconcern in the region, and are nowhere more in evidencethan in the Black Sea itsel. Te Black Sea is one o the mostpolluted, anoxic and eutrophicated seas in the world, and isoten called “a disaster area”, but it has shown signs o im-provement since 1995 (Oral, 2007). Although agriculture andother diuse sources are suspected o delivering the mostpollution into the sea and into the Danube, shipping and the

shipping o oil and gas are also important contributors.

Oten overlooked, the oil released rom accidents o any type o ship can create major environmental damage. Butit is the risk o oil tanker accidents that is o particular con-cern. Te narrow and winding urkish Straits represent amajor shipping hazard – there have been some 500 acci-dents there since 1946, two o which involved oil tankers– the Independenta and the Nassia. Oil transport has beenincreasing through the straits over the last decade, up rom68 mta to 146 mta rom 1996 to 2004 (Oral, 2007); currentshipping trac in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles is about

45 000 vessels per year (one every 12 minutes), includingsome 6 000 tankers every year (EEA, 2007). Aside rom theirimportance to shipping, the urkish straits are ecologically important as a corridor or fsh and mammal migrationrom the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, and environmen-tal contamination can be especially damaging there.

Aside rom the Straits, the Black Sea has not had as many incidents with oil tankers, though many other types o shipshave been lost at sea during storms. However, the potentialor disaster has always existed given the large volume o transport – a potential that was unortunately realized on

November 11, 2007. A violent storm sank several ships, kill-ing many sailors and releasing several thousand tonnes o oil rom a tanker. However, the accident was not only an‘act o God’ – the tankers, were ill-equipped or a sea voy-age, much less in heavy weather.. According to environ-mentalist observers, the rush to proft rom high oil priceshas come at the expense o saeguards in Russia, o whichthis was just an example (Weir, 2007). According to someestimations it will take the aected areas o the Black SeaRegion’s delicate marine environment fve to ten years torecover rom the oil spill that resulted rom that accident.8

Given the hazards o oil shipping and the already precari-ous state o the environment o the Black Sea, oil and gaspipelines are increasingly under consideration. New ener-gy inrastructure currently considered in the area includesthe ollowing projects:- the reversal o the Odessa-Brody pipeline and its extension

to Poland to the West and by sea and pipeline through toKazakhstan to the East;

- the Constanta-riest,9 Burgas-Vlore and Burgas-Alex-androupolis oil pipelines, or which an implementationagreement was signed in February 2006;

- the Nabucco pipeline project, which would transport

gas rom the Caspian Sea through urkey, Bulgaria andRomania, to reach Austria and possibly other EU countries.Te construction o this €5 billion project is supposed tostart in 2009 and fnish in 2012. Negotiations concerningthe Nabucco project between the natural gas companieso fve countries - Bulgaria’s Bulgargas, Romania’s rans-gas, urkey’s Botas, Hungary’s MOL, and Austria’s OMV – were concluded in June 2006 and the Nabucco Com-pany Pipeline Study Group was ormed to undertake theconstruction o the natural gas pipeline network. RWE joinedthe Nabucco consortium in 2008. In addition, the EU hasalso been interested in building a rans-caspian pipeline,

which could fll Nabucco with urkmen gas. Recent develop-ments, however, have uelled doubts over whether Nabuccois viable, as Moscow has proposed alternative pipelines onsimilar routes Recent developments, however, have uelleddoubts over whether the project will be built, as Moscow hasproposed alternative pipelines on similar routes.10

4 ‘Environmental Movement in Azerbaijan, RUZGAR’ on http://azenviron.aznet.org/ 5 Azerbaijan’s oil acilities have been characterized by one regional expert as ‘the worst in the world’ in terms o their environmental characteristics: Alexander’s gas and oil connections,

‘Caspian Sea in danger o turning into environmental dead zone’ http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc42931.htm, 28-06-046 Alexander’s gas and oil connections, ibid.

7 RUZGAR, op cit.8 Arnold, C., 2007, “Russia: Oil Spill Highlights Tragic Environmental Legacy”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 28 November 2007, http://www.rerl.org/

eaturesarticle/2007/11/4e76545d-27ab-41cd-b1b1-9d415bd1c9a0.html

9 On 3 April 2007 the Commission gave its support to this Pan-European Oil Pipeline which will link the Black Sea directly into the continental EU pipeline system. The project would reducethe chances o a serious accident in the Bosphorus Straits, the Black, Aegean and Adriatic Seas by avoiding urther oil tanker trac (Press Release IP/07/464, European Commission,

3.04.2007). See also http://crib.mae.ro/index.php?lang=en&id=31&s=5851&archiva=true10 These include plans to extend the Blue Stream gas pipeline (which currently runs rom Russia to Turkey) through the Balkans. In March 2007 Hungary’s prime minister showed interest

in this alternative Russian-controlled project, called Blue Stream II. In November 2007, Gazprom and the Italian rm ENI signed an agreement to build this «South Stream» gas pipeline,with branches to Austria and Italy (Woehrel, 2007). In addition, in May 2007 Russia celebrated a preliminary deal with Kazakh and Turkmen to build a new pipeline rom Turkmenistan intoRussia, which would also undermine Nabucco’s commercial viability (Barysch, K., 2007).




- on the one hand there is already the established BlueStream pipeline that connects Russia with urkey. On theother, Russia is planning to construct a South Stream pipe-line that would run rom Russia to Bulgaria and throughthe Balkans. In November 2007, Gazprom and the Italian

frm ENI signed an agreement to build this South Streamgas pipeline.

Nevertheless, pipelines consume land, create visual impacts,can disrupt habitats and are potential sources o leakage.Indeed, older pipelines are major sources o pollution – inRussia alone there are thought to be 22 000 pipeline burstsa year, o which 10 are serious, such as the 3-tonne spillagerom the Europe-bound Druzhba pipeline (Weir, 2007).

In addition, pipelines are attractive targets or terrorist attack.For instance, urkey has aced several actual or attempted

terrorist attacks on oil and gas pipelines (MIP 2007).11

However, new pipelines are acknowledged to be muchmore reliable, and given the recent experience in the Black Sea, the logic o preerring pipelines over ships seems airly clear rom an environmental perspective. Te EuropeanUnion has integrated this into its call or more pipelinetransport, stating “it is o utmost importance to give a higherpriority to… the alternative o transporting oil by pipe-lines. Tis is considerably saer and more environmentally riendly” (inogate, quoted in Oral, 2007).

For instance, on 3 April 2007 the Commission gave its sup-port to the Constanta-rieste oil pipeline, which will link the Black Sea directly into the continental EU pipelinesystem. Te project would reduce the chances o a seriousaccident in the Bosphorus Straits, the Black, Aegean and

Adriatic Seas by avoiding urther oil tanker trac (PressRelease IP/07/464, European Commission, 3.04.2007). Alist o Bosphorus Bypass Oil Pipelines is provided below:

In addition, the Baku-bilisi-Ceyhan pipeline can alsobe seen as an example o an eort that will relieve somepressure (or at least the growth o pressure) rom shipping,and BP has taken pains to promote its environmental cre-dentials and has spent €30 million working with aectedcommunities. Nevertheless, serious criticism has beenleveled at the project on several ronts, casting doubt onthe rationale o pipelines. While BP extols the saety o its

technology, it is a new application and causes some con-cern about uture corrosion. Te pipeline runs throughboth pristine wilderness and seismic areas, and has morethan enough capacity or the likely supply rom Azerbaijan,leading to speculation that it will enable urther exploitationo Caspian oil felds in Kazakhstan, essentially shiting envi-ronmental problems upstream (Radio Free Europe, 2006).

11 MIPT, 2007: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Turkey. Available at: http://www.tkb.org/IncidentRegionModule.jsp?startDate=01%2F01%2F2000&endDate=12%2F17%2F2007&domInt=0&suiInt=0&lter=4&detail=21&ino=Turkey&ino1=1&imageField.x=78&imageField.y=6&imageField=lter+results&pagemode=incident&regionid=1&countryid=TU&sortby= [17December 2007)

BOSPHORUS BYPASS ROUTES- Key Information

Project Name Lenghth

(miles)

Cost estimate Investors/ Countries Added Capacity

(b/d)

Current

Capacity (b/d)

Project Status

Bourgas

Alexandropoulis

174 $800 million Gazprom, Lukoil,

Rosnet, TNK-BP

interested, RF,Bulgaria,

Greece

300,000-700,000 0 April 2005-MOU: First oil planned 2008. Initial

capacity 300.000 bbl/d.

Linked to CPC expansion

Bourgas- Vlore

(AMBO)

565 $1.2 billion Albania, Macedonia,

Bulgaria

750,000 0 Environnemental study begins in 7/05, naliza-

tion o consortium in 2005. First oil 2008,

some construction begun but still speculative.

Constanta- Trieste, SEEL

(Romanian coast to Italy)

843 $1 billion GE, CNOOC, EBRD,

IFC, Italy, Romania,Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia

480,000- 2 million Construction expected to begin during 2007.

Connection to Adria pipeline.

Samsun Ceyhan 350 $1 billion initially Turskish Gov’t 1,000,000 Financing unknown. BOT AS nished easibility

study in 2007. Completion supposedly 2009.

Trans- Thrace projects

(Kiyikoy- Saroz,

Igneada- Saroz)

120 $400-900 million Transnet (Kiyikoy),

U.S.- Turkey- Kazakh

(Igneada)

Opposed by environnemental groups due to

delicate ecosystem o Saroz bay.

Odessa- Brody

(Reversal)

414 Ukraine would

have to return

$108 million to

TNK-BP

200,000 Ukraine gov’t wants by end o 05.

Brody- Gdansk (Poland)

Extension

304 $500-600 million Ukraine, Poland,

possibly Czech,

Kazakh

0 Currently

running - Brody

to Odessa

EU easibility study began 6/05- Kazakhstan

and Poland signed MOU to invest 7/05.

Table 1: Bosphorus Bypass Oil Pipelines (U.S. DOE, 2007)




u ppg xp

Some o the most contaminating industries are uraniummining and milling. Tese activities already impact the re-gion and are expected to increase in the near uture, as ad-

ditional mining projects are initiated.

Ukraine’s annual uranium production, or instance, ac-counted or 800 metric tonnes in 2006, according to WNA(2007) estimations12 and the country has announced plansto double its production by 2010, with a fve-old increaseenvisaged by 2020. Te target is to reach an output level o 5 900 tonnes o uranium per year in 2014-2025, and 6 400per year in 2025-2030.13 According to WNA (2007), Roma-nia’s annual production accounted or 90 metric tonnes in2006.

In Bulgaria, uranium production ceased in 1992.14

However,the country has considered re-opening its uranium minesunder the recommendation o a report o the Bulgarian-Russian intergovernmental commission or economic co-operation. Indeed, both Russia and the Canadian company Cameco showed interest in mining uranium there. In par-ticular, Russia’s newly-ormed Uranium Mining Company is considering investing in Bulgaria, as this would reducethe cost o the nuclear uel it provides or the Kozlodui nu-clear plant. Russia’s investment decision was also support-ed by the act that its nuclear services exporter has recently

won a tender to build a power plant outside Sofa.15

Finally, in Armenia, the US-based Global Gold Corporationhas proposed uranium mining at Nor Getik.

n eg

Te Chernobyl disaster and its legacy are well-known, butin the Black Sea Region Armenia provides perhaps themost interesting case study o the interaction between nu-clear, ossil and (potentially) renewable energies. In 1988its nuclear acility Medzamor, which supplied 40% o thecountry’s electricity, was shut down ollowing a serious

earthquake. During that time the country received oil andelectricity mainly via Azerbaijan, which shut o suppliesdue to the Karabakh conict, leading to severe energy shortages. Te reopening o one o the two nuclear unitsat Medzamor in 1993 has been the ocus o considerable

international attention and investment (by the EU, theUS, Russia, the IAEA and others) due to concerns aboutthe saety o the acility and its location in a seismic area(INSC, 2006). Te EU has been pressing or the unit’s clo-sure, as has urkey, but the country has been reluctant todo it without alternatives in place. Te EU has suggestedthe development o hydropower acilities, including reha-bilitation o the atev Hydropower Plant, as well as otheroptions (EuropeAid, 2006).

Te dierence between leverage on EU members andnon-EU neighbours is quite in evidence in the nuclear

feld. While Armenia still operates Medzamor, Bulgariashut down our reactors at Kozloduy (Kozloduy 1 & 2 wereclosed at the end o 2002 and Kozloduy 3 & 4 at the endo 2006) with the prospect o $200 million rom the EU tobuild two new ones, under the terms o its accession to theEU (WNA, 2007).O the Soviet reactor types that do not meet Western saety standards (VVER-440/V-230s and RBMKs), only Armenia’sunit, and eight units in Russia remain – o these severalhave had upgrades and lietime extensions (WNA, 2007).

12 See http://www.wise-uranium.org/umaps.html?set=annu13 See WISE (World Inormation Service on Energy) Uranium Project, “New Uranium Mining Projects – Europe”, http://www.wise-uranium.org/upeur.html14 Bulgaria’s uranium deposit accounts or nearly 12,000 tonnes, according to the Bulgarian National Radio (see also http://www.wise-uranium.org/index.html).15 See Soa Echo, 26 May 2006 and 12 September 2006, and http://www.wise-uranium.org/upeur.html) and actsheet on Bulgaria or additional inormation

Table 2: Nuclear power plants in the region (IAEA, 2006)

Country Operational Under Construction Shut Down Suspended Cancelled

Armenia 1 1

Bulgaria 4 2 2

Romania 1 1 3

Russia 31 4 5 5 8

Ukraine 15 2 4 1 3




2.3 / c cg ip rg

In anticipating the impact o climate change on the Black Sea Region, it may be interesting to note that the region has

already experienced one o history’s most striking exam-ples o climate change impact. Some 5 200 years ago, a pe-riod o natural global warming raised sea levels to the pointthat the Mediterranean breached the Bosphorus, creatinga massive inux o water into the much lower-lying Black Sea. It ooded an immense area, driving populations (and

with them their knowledge o agriculture) West and Eastinto Europe and Asia. Tis event is believed by some to bethe origin o the story o the Biblical ood in the book o Genesis (Linden, 2006).

Such dramatic change may never return, but according

to the most recent scientifc assessments the region doesshow certain vulnerabilities. Climate change may aectstorminess, sea level rise, water availability, droughts, andooding:16

Storms: Moving eastward across the Mediterranean,storminess is anticipated to drop due to climate change,

with the exception o certain areas, which includes partso the Black Sea.

Sea level rise: Danger rom sea level rise along the Black Sea is among the highest in Europe due to the nature o

the coastline – low and subsiding in many places. Terecould be signifcant increases in damage because o thestorm surges and tsunamis acting on a higher sea level.

While parts o northwestern Europe have created shorelinemanagement plans, this is less in evidence in southern andeastern Europe. Such plans link deense, accommodationand retreat strategies into a comprehensive adaptationstrategy.

Water Stress: Water challenges resulting rom climatechange will mean ooding in some places o Europe, butdrought is more likely a consequence or Southeastern

Europe. By the 2050s, annual runo may reduce by 20 to30%, and by the 2070s, 100 year droughts may occur every 50 years or less. Water shortage orces hard decisions, otenrequiring large investment.

In addition, based on the work o the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), the Black Sea is likely to experience (i) a degradation o reshwater resources; (ii) anincrease o storm and ood disasters; (iii) a decline in oodproduction; and (iv) environmentally-induced migration.

Climate impacts vary not only by region, but also according

to terrain and ecosystem type. Te countries around theBlack Sea encompass a diverse range o types as catego-

rized in the fgure below – mountains to the East, ‘Mediter-ranean’ to the South and Southwest, Steppe to the Northand the broad expanse o central European agriculturaland orest land to the West. Each is subject to dierent cli-mate impacts (Figure 1).

While greenhouse gas emissions, largely rom energy use,are impacting the climate, the climate will in turn aect en-ergy use, oten driving a urther rise in emissions.

Heating and cooling needs will be impacted by climatechange, with strong regional variations due to the prevail-ing climatic conditions – in the North, reduction in heating

needs will be signifcant. However, in the Black Sea Regionit is most likely that there will be increases in cooling de-mands, putting a urther strain on energy systems.

Water scarcity can also impact power production negative-ly. Under moderate climate change scenarios, there couldbe a 25% reduction in availability o hydropower in South-eastern Europe (Lehner, et al., 2003). Similarly, both a lack o water and the rising temperature can impact its avail-ability as a coolant in thermal and nuclear power plants,leading to reduced capacity. Other potential impacts in-clude increased energy requirements or pumps and water

management inrastructure, as well as the signifcant en-ergy requirements or desalination, i that option is chosento meet reshwater demands in areas o acute scarcity.

Adapting to climate change and avoiding the worst o theimpacts will be as much a result o successul manage-ment and administration as o appropriate choice o tech-nologies, policies17 and techniques. Management o water-courses aecting dierent uses and regions, and integratingplanning or dierent types o land-use are two examples.

Where there is any political or administrative discord, as insome areas around the Black Sea, climate impacts may be

enhanced.

16 Reerence or this chapter is the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group II Report on climate change Impacts, Chapter 12, Europe.17 These include appropriate and sustainable use o European Community external assistance, or instance under the ENPI or IPA.

Figure 1:Likely climate impacts in Europe by type o terrain - there is much diversityaround the Black Sea (extract rom IPCC, 2007, igure 12.3, page 558)




2.4 / t eg rg w g p

Each country in the Black Sea Region is distinct in termso its energy use and potential or renewable energy, butseveral trends are clear. First is that renewables are clearly underexploited. While this is true in Western Europe as

well, the gap between use and potential is larger in the East(Ragwitz, et al., 2005). Second is that o the renewablessources, hydropower is the best known, but at large scale(and hence questionably ‘renewable’); the massive growthin wind power seen globally is beginning to make itsel known in the region.

Finally, the patterns o Soviet and post-Soviet energy re-

lations are clearly inuential – or example, the legacy o

nuclear energy defnes the starting point or many o thesecountries, as even when old capacity is retired, there is atendency toward replacing it with nuclear. Te abundanceo oil and gas in the Caspian region has let countries thereusing that resource or domestic use, as in Azerbaijan,

while many other countries continue to rely heavily onossil uels that have historically been available at cheaperthan market prices, complicating the economic argumentor alternatives.

As an appendix to this report are a series o act sheets which detail the energy characteristics o the countries inthe Black Sea Region, and a discussion o the renewableenergy used and the uture potentials (see Appendix C).Te ollowing table presents an overall characterization o the act sheet contents:

Country Oil Production Gas Production Electricity Sector RES Potential

Armenia No domestic produc-

tion

- Imports rom Russia

and Azerbaijan

No domestic production

- Imports primarily rom Russia

via Georgia and, starting rom

2008, through Iranian-Armenian

gas pipeline

- 30% supplied by 1 nuclear plant

built in the ‘80s with a design l ie

o 30 years

- low ecient thermal plants operat-

ing beyond planned lietime

- about 25% rom hydropower

- good potential or wind energy development (3MW installed

in 2005)

- despite avorable climatic conditions, solar energy potential

is little explored

- unding or exploring biogas opportunities lacking

- geothermal energy not promoted in any way

- not explored economically easible potential o hydropower

estimated between 1.8 and 2.0 kWh in 2005.

Russian control over various energy assets

Azerbaijan Signicant- 860,000 bbl/d in

2007 (EIA)

- Most o it exported

via pipelines - BTC

and Baku-Novo-

rossiysk

Signicant- 241 Bc in 2006 (EIA)

- 80% supplied by thermal plants - no installed wind energy capacity, except or small unitsused or irrigation and lightening

- several sources o residues or biomass combustion not

explored

- solar energy potential not explored

- high potential or geothermal development

- potential hydro resources relatively limited but by concen-

tration o hydro resources on the territory the potential is

signicant

Bulgaria Negligible Negligible

- Imports primarily rom Russia

- 9,4 % supplied by RES (year 2006).

Capacity expected to increase by

2009

- 40% supplied by nuclear acility

in 2004 ($688M rom the EU as

a compensation or closure o 2reactors)

- construction o 2nd nuclear plant

announced in 2005 to become

operational by 2013

- electricity rom RES increased rom

7,2% to 9,8% between 1997 and

2004

- country’s target: consumption o

electricity rom RES equivalent

to 11% o total electric energy

consumption in 2010

- technical and economic potential o hydropower already

exploited (including mini-hydro)

- good opportunities or biomass - growth rate o 17%

between 1997-2004 or biomass heat

- wind energy capacity estimated at 2.200-

3.400MWe. Accounted or 2GWh in 2004- Bulgaria’s National Programme on RES (NPRES, 2004-

2010)

- Bulgarian Energy Eciency and Renewable Energy Credit

Line (BEERECL) supported by EBRD, the Bulgarian Govern-

ment and the EU since 2004

Important transit country or oil and gas

Georgia Environmental and security concerns have infuenced

pipeline projects. Georgia is also a key transit country.

- 80% supplied by hydropower

- thermal power plants estimated toprovide 29.15% in 2007

- Annual solar energy potential estimated at 108MW. Low

use in the past. Solar heating has increased recently- Deregulation process has allowed third parties access to

small hydro power to increase share

- Good wind energy resource potential but no operative

capacity, except or small unities o about 6KW each

- Zugdidi-Tsaishi geothermal area considered exploitable

Table 3: Energy characteristics and renewable energy potential of the countries in the Black Sea Region




Country Oil Production Gas Production Electricity Sector RES Potential

Greece Small

- Imports primarily

rom Iran, Saudi

Arabia, Russia,

Libya and Egypt

Negligible

- Imports mainly rom Russia

- Pipelines projects envisaged to

decrease dependency

- 75% supplied by thermal in 2004

(mostly lignite-red and some

oil-red)

- 21% supplied by hydropower

- demand has growth o 50% overlast decade

- growing demand expected to be

met by natural gas-red plants

- increase in wind power capacity o 61% between 1997-

2004 (currently 475MW installed)

- wind arms could meet 15% o country’s electricity

demand (CRES)

- 1/3 o Greece’s energy demand could be met by solarpower (EU, 2007). There was a 27% increase between

1997 and 2004

- country’s target o 20.1% o gross electricity consumption

rom RES by 2010

Moldova Negligible No domestic production

- dependent on Russia

- domestic thermal power plants

(unprotable, large debits)

- regional imports rom Ukraine

(30%) and the Transdnistria region

o the Republic o Moldova (30%)

- good potential or wind power development (potential

capacity around 1000 MW, but no turbines operate so ar,

2007)

- no signicant application or solar energy

- biomass potential held back by ineciency o domestic

stoves and high investment costs

- potential or hydroelectric relatively low. Greater potential

in small hydro

Important transit country

Romania Signicant

- but net oil importer

primarily rom

Russia

Signicant (decreasing trend o

production)

- net gas importer rom Russia

- coal as most important uel

- biomass + hydropower account or

29% o electricity generation

- one nuclear plant with 1 working

reactor producing 10% o country’s

consumption in 2004

- 2nd reactor under construction and

expansion planned to allows export

- share o RES in energy supply is above EU average

- 2/3 o renewable energy production comes rom biomass

and most o the reminder rom hydropower

- large potential o hydropower but average growth is rather

small (5% increase between 1997-2004)

- wind arm accounted or 2GWh in 2004. Government aims

at increasing wind share

Several pipeline projects planned

Turkey Small

- net oil importer,

primarily rom Rus-

sia, Iran and Iraq

Negligible

- risk o oversupply i it cannot

use or re-export all the natural

gas it has committed to import

- Renewable Energy Law adopted in

2005 to promote electricity rom

RES (includes eed-in taris and

purchase obligations)

- nuclear energy to be included

into energy mix (nuclear reactors

expected to be operational in 2012-

2020, depending on nancial)

- vast RES unused potential

- RES ambitious objectives lacking

- energy rom hydropower can be urther developed

Important transit country or oil and gas. Inrastructure

projects have been carried out during last decades to

position itsel as an energy hub

Ukraine Domestic production meets 25%

o total demand

- relies on imports rom Russia

- ocuses on reducing imports

due to existing tension with

Russia

- 50% supplied by nuclear (govern-

ment intends to increase nuclear’s

share in the mix)

- Hydropower has 20 billion kWh/year potential but ac-

counted or 4.4 million kWh in 2005, less than 0.5% o

total primary energy demand.

- growing share o RES comes rom large hydro

- National wind programme includes subsidies and preeren-

tial taris. Installed capacity is 86MW but EBRD estimates

that wind power could supply 20-30% o total demand or

electricity

- use o biomass or heat i s relatively common in rural areas.

Agriculture sector could supply a signicant amount o

biomass and biouels could become a valuable export

commodity

- Southern and southeast regions o Ukraine have largest

potential or solar energy (e.g. Crimea was the all-USSR

test ground or solar energy), but current use is minimal

- Geothermal resources are signicant and State programme

intends to increase installed capacity o heat supply sys-

tems rom 13MWt in 2005 to 250MWt by 2010

Largest gas transit country by volume and hosts major

oil transit routes (84% o Russian gas supplies to Europe

passes through Ukraine via pipelines)

Table 3: Energy characteristics and renewable energy potential of the countries in the Black Sea Region




Total GHG per

capita

% change in GHG % change energy

industry GHG

% change

industry

processes

Energy

consumption

per capita

Energy

consumption per

GDP (toe/$m)

Renewable

energy share

Armenia 1.71 0.97 -52.19 - 0.7 123 8

Azerbaijan 4.65 16.17 -9.84 159.81 1.6 22 2

Bulgaria 8.70 5.07 7.93 2.48 2.4 222 5

Georgia 1.89 25.52 -13.95 - 0.6 154 42

Greece 12.40 4.46 4.59 2.47 2.7 109 5

Moldova 3.46 8.55 -6.85 0 0.8 381 2

Romania 7.13 17.28 4.97 12.95 1.8 198 12

Russia 14.40 4.14 3.69 15.54 4.5 364 4

Turkey 4.10 5.34 -0.81 11.63 1.1 122 13

Ukraine 8.70 4.64 2.39 10.41 3.0 381 1

Germany 12.31 -0.74 4.70 6.19 4.2 131 4

UK 11.01 -0.63 8.35 -12.97 3.9 123 2

2.5 / eu P o P

eu P

Appendix A describes the many programmes and initia-tives the EU is engaged in as leader or partner in the Black Sea Region. However, there are three overarching policieso relevance:18

1) Te enlargement process towards South-Eastern Eu-

rope and urkey;19

2) Te “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)” with Russia;

3) Te European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP – See Appendix B), with Ukraine, Moldova, and the threeSouth Caucasus countries also being active in Black Sea cooperation.

Enlargement process

A perspective o EU membership is a powerul lever, ca-pable o inducing the legal, institutional and economic

reorms needed in the Black Sea Region. A key elemento the enlargement process is that countries have to ully transpose and implement EU legislation by the time o ac-cession, which means, or instance, adopting environmen-tal standards and policies that can be (but are not always)stricter, implementing energy reorms, adopting the EU en-ergy acquis,20 and joining the Energy Community reaty.21

For instance, urkey has already taken major steps in align-ing its legal ramework with the EU energy acquis. Te EUhas a strong interest in supporting this process, which in-cludes technical interconnectivity o the urkish grid withthe EU’s grid, and the ull liberalization o urkey’s rapidly growing energy market. Te ongoing access negotiationsplay a central role in this context.

In addition, the EU provides fnancial and technical as-sistance to candidate and potential candidate countries.

Te Instrument or Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) hasreplaced the 2000-2006 pre-accession instruments22 andconcentrates on institutional building, enhancing admin-istrative and judicial capacity and encouraging some align-ment with the acquis communautaire.

In the ramework o its pre-accession assistance or urkey,the European Commission also provides direct support tothe country’s energy sector, in particular in the areas o leg-islative alignment and institutional building. Furthermore,a und or inrastructure - related projects (FEMIP – Facil-ity or Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership)

was approved by the Commission in 2005. Tis und canbe used as a tool to support large scale EIB interventions inthe energy area in urkey.23

Besides, the European Commission decided to establish,together with the Council o Europe Development Bank and in cooperation with the Kreditanstalt ür Wiederaubau

18 See Marius Vahl, “The EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Some Challenges or BSEC”, CEPS Commentary, 15 April 2005.

19 Ater the enlargement o the EU with ten new Member States in 2004 and with Romania and Bulgaria on 1 January 2007, the enlargement process currently ocus on Turkey, Croatia andthe ormer Yugoslav Republic o Macedonia. Turkey in particular has been granted a membership as early as 1963 and accession negotiations were launched in October 2005.

20 See the European Council Conclusions o 9 March 2007 based on the European Commission’s Communication “An Energy Policy or Europe”.21 The Energy Community Treaty entered into orce on 1 July 2006 and provides a structured regulatory ramework with shared trade, transmission and environmental rules. Turkey is an

observer to the Treaty.22 Ongoing projects rom the old instruments include a multi-country programme on environment and enlargement, implemented by DG Environment, which covers Romania, Bulgaria, Croa-

tia and Turkey. This programme is designed to strengthen o the countries to ensure ull compliance with the EU environmental acquis as well as developing capacity o the environmentalauthorities or implementation and enorcement; this programme will also help to reinorce the ability o other stakeholders to play their ull role (see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ enlarg/enlargement_en.htm).

23 See “EU Energy Policy and Turkey”http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pd/european_energy_policy/act_sheet_ecd_brux_comments_25_may_en.pd

Table 4: climate and energy characteristics in the region (Germany and UK for comparison) (EEA, 2007).




and the European Investment Bank, two multi-benefciary programmes to increase investment in energy eciency (“Energy Eciency Finance Facility”). Eligible countriesbenefting rom these programmes include Bulgaria, Ro-mania and urkey.

As it is clear that accession is a process likely to slow down(or even halt), it is not sure whether the perspective o EUmembership to improve environmental perormance willcontinue to be an available tool. Indeed, it is the interest infnding eective alternatives to accession that explains theemphasis being put on the ENP and other strategies.

Strategic partnership with Russia

Te EU/Russia strategic partnership goes ar beyond thescale o the ENP, which is only one pillar o the EU-Russia

relationship (hence Russia’s separate status as a “strategicpartner” in the ENP).

Te Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) withRussia expired in November 2007, but was extended au-tomatically as neither party gave notice to the contrary.Negotiations or a post-PCA agreement have still not takenplace as some EU member states have not provided the EU

with a mandate yet (Barysch, K., 2007).

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

Te most important o the major policy initiatives relevantto non-EU countries is the ENP,24 and its implementingprogramme. Details about the ENP and the ENPI are pro-

vided in appendix B.

Te ENP covers all neighbours, so that the Black Sea is justone region o cooperation. Although a ramework that cov-ers many countries, relationships with those countries arearranged bilaterally through action plans, which can vary in content and ambition. Te Commission regards the ac-tion plan with Ukraine, in particular, as relatively success-ul and its implementation has resulted in a Memorandum

o Understanding (MoU) on energy cooperation. Underthis MoU, a joint proposal rom the EU, the European In-

vestment Bank and the European Bank or Reconstructionand Development (EBRD) has provided the fnancing o hydrocarbon, and some renewable inrastructure projectsin Ukraine.Such inrastructure is not a coincidental outcome – indeed,under the ENPI eastern regional Strategy, which partially provides unding or the environment, energy is included

under the “Network” priority area, in addition to transpor-tation. Tis reveals the real emphasis o this initiative, o-cusing mainly on the region’s potential in terms o energy security and supply diversifcation or Europe.25

In order to ensure the diversifcation o routes and sourceso external energy supplies,26 EU energy cooperation withother countries tends to ocus on achieving diversity o typeo energy, o country o origin, and o country o transit. Inthis context, the Commission has stated its belie that “thedevelopment o major international pipelines to deliver oilrom the Caspian region and Central Asia to the EU is (…)

vital”.27 Hence the emphasis on upgrading the existing andconstructing new energy inrastructure in the Black Sea Re-gion (COM(2007) 160 fnal).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that renewable energy

and energy eciency are partially promoted through theENP.

Some EBRD loans have been granted to boost energy in-rastructure in the region and the European Commissionhas expressed strong support or the realization o severalpipeline projects, such as the Baku-Supsa pipeline, theBaku-bilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines, the Baku-bilisi-Erzu-rum gas pipeline, and a new trans-Caspian trans-Black Seaenergy corridor which would allow additional gas exportsrom Central Asia through the Black Sea Region to the EU.In addition, the Commission has acted as a catalyst or an

agreement between Greece and urkey towards the com-pletion o a gas pipeline linking the two countries with apossible extension to Italy.

Not all cooperation is about pipelines though. Electricity inrastructure and related improvements are also a majorocus. In November 2006 the 2nd Energy Ministerial Coner-ence was held under the Baku Initiative28 sponsored by theEuropean Commission, and a new Energy Road Map wasagreed which set a long-term plan. Te priority areas iden-tifed in the Road Map include supporting to sustainableenergy development - including energy eciency, renew-

able energy sources and demand side management - andattracting investment into energy projects o common in-terest.

“Twinning” instrument

One o the most powerul tools under the ENPI and thePre-Accession Instrument (IPA) is “twinning”, which allowsmember states to second technical experts to candidate

24 These include appropriate and sustainable use o European Community external assistance, or instance under the ENPI or IPA.25 See the Memorandum to the Commission (Annex I), Annual Action Programme covering the Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Regional Indicative Programme 2007-2013 or the

ENPI East or 2007.26 See the Communication rom the Commission to the European Council « External energy relations – rom principles to action », Brussels, 12.10.2006, COM(2006) 590 nal.27 Paper rom the Commission/SG/HR or the European Council, “An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests”, S160/06.28 The Baku initiative is a policy dialogue aimed at enhancing energy cooperation between the EU and countries o the Black Sea, the Caspian Basin and their neighbours.




countries and other neighbours concerned to share theirexperience with the implementation o EU rules or a ew

years. Such experts, paid or by the Commission, have been working in several countries in the region. For instance, inurkey, the Italian Regulatory Authority or Electricity and

Gas provided support or strengthening the administra-tive capacity o the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) under a twinning project o €1.07 million in 2002. Atwinning consortium, comprised o ADEME o France andSenter Novem o the Netherlands, also provided assistanceor the improvement o energy eciency in urkey in 2003,

with a budget o €1.25 million. Ukraine has likewise ben-efted rom “twinning” in various areas. Moldova currently has experts rom Britain, Lithuania and Poland working inits government.

Te ENPI29 represents an increase in resources compared

to the previous fnancial instruments. Nevertheless itsbudget is still relatively modest considering the ambitiousreorm agenda promoted under the ENP. Te Commissionhas urthermore set aside an amount o €700 million o theENPI budget or a Neighbourhood Investment Fund to beused to support lending rom development-fnance insti-tutions30 in ENP partner countries,31 particularly to fnancecrucial inrastructure, including in the energy sector.

Tere is a general criticism that the incentives oered by the EU are not sucient to persuade neighbouring coun-tries to carry out many o the political and economic re-

orms needed. Tis seems to be true as well in the case o the energy reorms needed, given the existing ossil uelsubsidies and domestic prices applied in the region, whichusually do not reect the price o energy in internationalmarkets. As noted above, the success o reorms achievedin preparation or accession will be dicult to reproduceor other non-acceding countries.

o p: r us p

Te EU is ar rom being the only external actor with inter-ests in the Black Sea Region. Dominated by ormer Soviet

republics, the area is still frmly in the Russian sphere o in-uence. Te United States, meanwhile, have actively pur-sued a policy in the region, particularly ater the breakup o the Soviet Union.

Russia

Russian companies have put signifcant eort into pur-chasing a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage a-cilities, and other key energy assets o the countries in the

Black Sea Region. Te control o these assets allows Russiato deliver energy supplies to western markets and to securecontrol over the domestic markets o the countries o theregion.32 Russia has also been raising the price o naturalgas charged to the countries in the region, eliminating theenergy subsidies that the ormer Soviet republics were usedto receiving.

As noted by Woehrel (2007) it is not clear whether the ac-tions o Russia’s energy frms are motivated by the coun-try’s oreign policy objectives or exclusively by businessconsiderations. At any rate, many countries in the Black

Sea Region ear that Russia may use its energy power to try to interere in their domestic aairs.

o date Russia has made it clear that it does not intend toratiy the Energy Charter reaty, which requires imple-mentation o principles o liberal international rules ortrade and investment in the oil and gas sector. Instead, asstated by Barysch (2007), Russia has promoted the concepto “reciprocity”, as the basis o EU-Russia energy relations.

United States

Te United States has strongly criticized Russian eorts touse energy supplies or political purposes.33 Members o the US Congress have also expressed concern about theimpact on European countries o their dependence onRussian energy.

In this regard, the US has supported the building o multi-ple pipelines rom Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe,adopting a so-called “pipeline diplomacy”.34 Tese projectsinclude the Baku-bilisi-Ceyhan (BC) pipeline, and theSouth Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCGP). Te US also sup-ports the Nabucco pipeline, the urkey-Greece-Italy (GI)

gas pipeline,35 the Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oilpipeline (AMBO),36 and the extension o the Odessa-Brody pipeline to Gdansk in northern Poland.37

29 European Commission, Proposal or a Regulation o the European Parliament and o the Council Laying down General Provisions Establishing a European Neighbourhood and PartnershipInstrument, Brussels 29 September 2004.

30 EIB, EBRD and the bilateral or multilateral development-nance institutions o the member States that have contributed to the Fund.

31 Communication on “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”, Brussels 4.12.2006, COM(2006) 726 nal.32 In several cases where assets were sold to non-Russian rms, Russia cut o energy supplies to the acility. Russia has also planned to build new pipelines to bypass transit areas which it

does not control.33 Secretary o State Condoleezza Rice on January 5 stated that Russia had made “politically motivated eorts to constrain energy supply to Ukraine” (Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks

at the State Department Correspondents Association’s Breakast, January 5, 2006).34 This term is adopted by Woehrel, 2007.35 The connection between Turkey and Greece was completed in November 2007 while the Greek and Italian gas transportation systems are scheduled to be connected by 2012.36 AMBO is a Bosphorus bypass project whose construction is expected to start in 2008 and be completed in 2011.37 In October 2007, representatives o Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Georgia, and Azerbaijan met with EU and U.S. ocials at an Energy Security Conerence in

Vilnius, Lithuania to discuss how to reduce the dependence o vulnerable countries on Russian energy resources and pipelines. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Poland signedan agreement to und a easibility study on the Odessa-Brody extension project.




Te success o these projects depend more on their proft-ability and on the interest o private energy frms than onUS diplomatic skill and energy (Woehrel (2007)). In addi-tion, it is not clear whether sucient oil and gas suppliesexist or the various US supported alternative routes.

In addition to diplomacy, the US has been involved in theollowing initiatives:38

- Funding easibility studies or some pipelines routes;39

- Working with Ukraine to develop an energy eciency action plan or the country;

- Providing small amounts o aid to the countries o theregion to help build their energy security.

2.6 / c - eu g pw g

Te EU Communication ‘An Energy Policy or Europe’(COM(2007)1 fnal) and the ollowing energy and climatepackage o 23 January 2008 as well as the third internal mar-ket package, have placed EU energy policy on a new ooting,

with a wide range o proposals. Importantly, it addressesenergy rom several angles – security, savings, alternativeenergies, etc– and in the context o climate change issues.

While the ‘green’ aspects o the policy are important, it isclear that a main driver has been a call or the EU to fnd a

way to overcome the independent action o member states

acting in their own interests with regard to securing oil andgas contracts, as opposed to in a coordinated way in theCommunity, and secondly to present a stronger bargainingbloc to the increasingly powerul suppliers like Russia andOPEC. Although presented under the same umbrella, very little o the external policy and the green aspects overlap.

For example, the Policy presents an Action Plan which in-cludes an ambitious program o energy eciency measuresat Community, national, local and international level. How-ever, only OECD and key developing countries (such as Chi-na, India and Brazil) are supposed to take part in a proposed

“new international agreement on energy eciency”. Te Ac-tion Plan also ocuses on increasing the share o domestically

produced renewable energy and suggests to engage thirdcountries only with regards to biouels production.

Te EU is attempting to consolidate its energy policy in-ternally to present a unifed ace externally, while at thesame time greening its energy supply, its external energy programs and policies seem neither particularly coor-dinated, nor particularly green. Although the number o policies and programs may indicate an increasing impor-

tance placed on good relations with the region (i.e. ENP,Baku Process, INOGAE, Energy Community reaty, etc.),the existence o many overlapping regional initiatives – “a

jungle o agreements, alliances, and acronyms” (assinari,2006) – has produced a dispersion o resources.

On the basis o the previous analysis, a number o recom-mendations can be drawn:

1) Adopting a common EU energy policy or the Black Sea Region. Tis would require agreeing on a com-mon approach to Russian energy, an issue still out-standing. As noted by Smith (2007), European coun-tries continue to strike bilateral deals with Russia, withlittle consideration or common EU interests, whichcalls into question the extent o EU solidarity regard-ing energy supplies. A common policy may temper

ossil uel projects by bringing them into line with thesustainable energy goals being pursued at EU level.2) Developing transparent and competitive mechanisms

to attract private investors to purchase and operate en-ergy assets. Access to fnancing mechanisms could beacilitated to potential developers and users o renew-able energy sources and to those likely to undertakeenergy eciency projects40 (based on IEA, 2006).

3) Providing technical and economic support to ensurethat the countries in the region can base their ener-gy strategies on solid energy data, economic modelsand demand projections. Tis could be achieved or

instance by improving data collection and adoptinginternational statistical methodologies. A cost-beneftanalysis o policy options could also be conducted inorder to develop realistic policies to support renew-able energy (based on IEA, 2006).

4) Helping the countries in the region to take ull advan-tage o opportunities oered by the Kyoto Protocol,

which requires establishing the institutional and legalramework, and developing a credible greenhouse in-

ventory and registry. For instance, Ukraine has majoropportunities through the Kyoto Protocol to fnanceenergy eciency and renewable energy. However,

the government has been slow to pursue these op-portunities and only approved rules or hosting JointImplementation projects in 2006 (IEA, 2006).

5) Helping ease the pain o rising energy prices and o phasing out existing subsidies or ossil uels in orderto ensure that prices cover the ull, long-term cost o energy supply 41 (IEA, 2006).

6) Ensuring that its policies do not just approach ossiluel carbon emissions as an end-o-pipe issue, butconsider the ull ootprint, placing more emphasis onconcerns o producer regions than otherwise.

38 Woehrel, 2007.39 In August 2007 the Trade and Development Administration (TDA) provided $1.7 million or easibility studies on building both an oil and gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea to link to the

BTC pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline. The Export-Import Bank has also provided unds or pipeline projects (Woehrel, 2007).40 For instance, in 1994 Ukraine set up an energy eciency policy, which could not be ully implemented due to insucient unding. Currently, Ukraine has one o the most energy-intensive

economies in the industrialized world.41 As noted by IEA (2006), greater energy eciency will be much easier to achieve i domestic prices refect the ull, long-term costs o energy.




7) Mobilizing other EU fnancial instruments avail-able in the region, such as the European InvestmentBank,42 the European Bank or Reconstruction andDevelopment43 as well as those o other internation-al fnancial institutions committed to the EU’s en-

ergy security (under the condition that the associ-ated investments are truly sustainable). In addition,the Global Energy Eciency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF)44 could help fnd additional fnan-cial resources.

8) Organising capacity building and training pro-grammes to raise awareness on how to acilitate theentry o renewable energy sources on the energy market.

9) Put even more emphasis on the implementationo the energy-related provisions o the ENP ActionPlans’

10) Promoting climate change adaptation. Although thecountries in the region may not consider the envi-ronment a top priority, the region will be conronted

42 The European Commission proposal or the new European Investment Bank external lending mandates or 2007-2013 oresees a considerable increase in the lending ceilings or theneighbouring countries. A specic memorandum o Understanding has been signed between the Commission, the EIB and the EBRD to acilitate cooperation in Russia, Eastern Europe,

Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia (Memorandum to the Commission, Annex I, Annual Action Programme covering the Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Regional IndicativeProgramme 2007-2013 or the ENPI East or 2007).

43 For instance, the European Bank or Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in cooperation with the Bulgarian Government and the EU developed in 2004 the Bulgarian Energy Eciencyand Renewable Energy Credit Line (BEERECL) – see the Bulgarian act sheet or additional inormation.

44 The GEEREF is an innovative nancing instrument proposed to the European Commission. It will be set up as a global public-private partnership which will oer risk-sharing and co-unding options or various commercial and non-commercial investors. It will engage in the creation and unding o regional sub-unds or the scaling up o similar existing initiatives.The und will include a technical assistance acility to engage local and international technical expertise. The initial unding target is set at e100 million and the ocus will be on projectsbelow e10 million. The European Commission will contribute e80 million over our years and the rst sub-unds should be established by the end o 2007. See the COM(2006) 583nal, “Mobilizing public and private nance towards global access to climate-riendly, aordable and secure energy services: The Global Energy Eciency and Renewable Energy Fund”,Brussels, 6.10.2006(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pd/key_elements.pd).

with the consequences o climate change and con-crete action should be taken with regards to adapta-tion. Tis would include sot, relatively inexpensivemeasures, such as water conservation, public plan-ning and awareness rising, developing partnerships

and also improving disaster or crisis management.In addition, adaptation will also bring new econom-ic opportunities, including new jobs and markets orinnovative products and services. At a regional levelthe development o specifc technical guidancedocuments, case studies and good practice shouldbe considered in order to defne cost-eective adap-tation measures. EU support to the Black Sea Regionis envisaged under the Green paper rom the Com-mission “Adapting to Climate Change in Europe– Options or EU Action” (COM(2007)354 fnal).Tus, concrete cooperation action, exchange o ex-

perience, best practices and projects on the groundshould be initiated through EU instruments.



30 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Chapter 3 / Transport Policy in the Black Sea Region

3.1 / i

Ater the historic EU enlargement to include 10 countrieso Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean in2004, Romania and Bulgaria joined the Union at the begin-ning o 2007. As a result o the EU’s expansion to the Black Sea coast a new geopolitical and economic situation hasbeen established in the region, which will in turn inuencethe Black Sea ecosystems. Te Black Sea plays a great roleas a transit area. rac ows use seven (or more) interna-tional transport corridors passing through the Black Sea re-gion with a total capacity o up to 1 billion tonnes o cargo

per year. Currently, reight with a value o $600 billion istransported between Europe and Asia annually. Cargo vol-umes between the two continents are expected to increaseby 30-35% until 2010.

Te European Commission Communication on “Guide-lines or transport in Europe and neighbouring regions”1

outlines an ambitious policy which aims to create an eec-tive transport market between the EU and its neighboursand to disseminate the principles o the internal market.Te Communication identifes the fve most importanttransport axes or international trade between the Union

(including the BS Region2

), its neighbouring countries andbeyond. It also sets out a package o measures to shorten

journey times along these axes including inrastructure im-provements, streamlining customs procedures and reduc-ing administrative obstacles. ransport (shipping, inlandnavigation, road transport and rail) is a key sector or coop-eration in the context o the Black Sea Synergy. Te EU hascommitted to continue actively supporting regional trans-port cooperation in the Black Sea with a view to improvingthe eciency, saety and security o transport operations.Te EU would build on the experience o all the varioustransport initiatives relevant to the Black Sea area.3 Eorts

should continue in the context o developing the transportaxes between the Union and the neighboring countries andenhancing coordination with ongoing initiatives such asRACECA. At the same time, a transport policy dialogue isencouraged to underpin regulatory approximation, whichremains a central goal or the EU. Te Commission in-tends to assist in identiying those actions that will help toachieve the uniorm and consistent application o relevantinstruments and standards. Given the growing demand oruel transport, maritime saety must also be central to the

cp 3 / transPort Policy in the black sea reGion

1 IP/07/1192 Central axis: to link the centre o the EU to Ukraine and the Black Sea and through an inland waterway connection to the Caspian Sea. A direct connection rom Ukraine to the Trans-

Siberian railway and a link rom the Don/Volga inland waterway to the Baltic Sea are also included.3 COM(2007) 160 nal4 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/ten/transport/external_dimension/index_en.htm5 Commission communication, COM(2007) 032 o January 07

agenda. Te Commission intends to support urther devel-opment o short sea shipping and inland waterway inra-structures, most notably on the Danube. Development andimplementation o EU commitments towards a sustainabletransport policy in the region will necessitate improved en-

vironmental protection standards, the development o new structures, legal procedures, as well as new saety stand-ards. Implementation o this ambitious plan requires pool-ing together all relevant fnancial sources, both public andprivate as well as national and international. In this vein,the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument(ENPI) and its “Neighbourhood Investment Facility” as well

as the EIB and the EBRD are the major sources/donors.

Te aim o this chapter is to assess the main trends o trans-port development in the Black Sea region, its potential en-

vironmental impacts, as well as the role o the EU and thegovernments o the neighbouring countries. Finally, thischapter will make recommendations or improving region-al transport policies.

3.2 / tp p

t-ep tp nw (ten-t)

Te trans-European transport network (EN-) is an ambi-tious policy initiated by the EU in the early 1990s to pro-mote linkages between national transport networks withinthe EU. Te central aim o the EN- policy is to reinorcethe competitiveness and cohesion o the enlarged Unionby improving connections within the internal market. Tenetwork has been progressively extended to the new (andpotentially new) member states. Proposals or the EN-extension to the neighbouring countries were made by theHigh Level Group in 20054 and have been taken orward

by the EC.5 Plans or new projects and routes are current-ly under discussion. oday the geographical scope o theEN- goes beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhoodand is laying the policy groundwork or links to Asia. Inthe context o such a policy, one must bear in mind thatthe Black Sea plays a vital role as a living environment andecosystem, as well as presenting great potential as a reighttransport corridor. Environmental saeguards are clearly needed i the ambitious transport inrastructure plansare to be realized without serious, irreversible damage.






Memoranda o Understanding (MoU), which oten alsoestablish a Secretariat or each corridor. Te fnancing o the Secretariats is the responsibility o one country alongthe corridor, but this has been uneven and much dependson the particular circumstances o the PEC. Te ollowing

weaknesses have been identifed: planning and prioritisa-tion o investments is in most cases undertaken in a piece-meal ashion that ollows national logic and neglects theneeds o international movements along the whole axis;the ocus is on inrastructure and insucient attention ispaid to removing non-inrastructure related bottlenecks,

which are oten the primary cause o delays, particularly at border crossings; and there are no commonly agreedmethodologies to assess the economic, social and environ-mental impacts o plans and projects that would meet thestandards o international best practice.

traceca

Te RACECA corridor has been developed since 1993 toconnect Europe with urkey, the Southern Caucasus andCentral Asia. It was conceived as an alternative to the Northrans-Siberian route and to support the political and eco-nomic independence o the Commonwealth o Independ-ent States (CIS) countries, and aterwards, also o the coun-tries to the Basic Multilateral Agreement on internationaltransport or development o the Europe-Caucasus-AsiaCorridor. It is the only corridor with a multilateral agree-ment signed by the countries concerned. Nevertheless, the

institutions established under this agreement and its pol-icy dimension need to be strengthened and modernized.Until 2015 RACECA should continue to provide an impor-tant basis or regional transport development but shouldbe progressively merged with the Baku policy process andbecome part o the set up proposed by the HLG.

ax pp hlG

Tree o the corridors proposed by the HLG are relevant orthe Black Sea region:

1) Te Central Axis should link the centre o the EU withUkraine and the Black Sea and through an inland wa-terway connection to the Caspian Sea. A direct con-nection rom Ukraine to the rans-Siberian railway and a link rom the Don/Volga inland waterway to theBaltic Sea are also included (Appendix D);

2) Te South-Eastern Axis links the EU with the Balkans,urkey, the southern Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea. Asa result o the exploratory talks, the Commission has pro-posed to split the South-Eastern Axis into two branchesboth involving urkey: one to the Caucasus, that wouldbe covered under RACECA, and another one to Egypt;

3) Te Motorways o the Sea link the Baltic, Barents, At-lantic, Mediterranean, Black and the Caspian Sea areasas well as neighbouring coastal countries. Te conceptis under construction and remains vague. It is not clearhow it will be taken orward operationally.

t b s rg hgw, bsrhW

Tis initiative is promoted by BSEC and oresees the con-struction o a high capacity highway running all alongthe Black Sea coast. Te BSRHW length would be about

7 140 km and will run as ollows: Istanbul (urkey) – Sam-sun (urkey) - rabzon (urkey) – Batumi (Georgia) – Poti(Georgia) – Novorossiisk (Russia) - Rostov-on-Don (Rus-sia) – aganrog (Russia) – Mariupol (Ukraine) – Melitopol(Ukraine) – Odessa (Ukraine) – Chisinau (Moldova) – Bu-charest (Romania) – Khaskovo (Bulgaria) – Edirne (urkey)– Istanbul (urkey) and Komotini (Greece) – Alexandrupo-lis (Greece) – Istanbul (urkey).

A Memorandum o Understanding was signed by mostmembers o the BSEC Council o Ministers o Foreign

Aairs in April 2007. More recently, in their Kiev Declara-

tion o February 2008, the Ministers have invited the EUto join the eorts in the development o interconnectionand transport inrastructures with special mention to theBSRHW.

Te BSRHW represents an enormous threat to key envi-ronmental sensitive areas in the BSR such as Danube Deltathat would be bypassed by the project. Besides, the project

will have serious diculties to be implemented in the areaso conict in the Black Sea region. For instance, there areserious doubts that the Abkhaz authorities will allow thehighway to be built rom Georgia across their land to Rus-

sia. It would be very expensive to build around Abkhazia asthe area directly to the East is ar too mountainous or a bigmotorway, and includes the highest mountain in Europe,Mount Elbrus at 5621m.

n g

Te identifcation o core networks in BS regions has gonesome way to addressing the weaknesses o the Pan-Euro-pean Corridors. Tese exercises, supported under the ac-cession ramework and the bilateral action plans o the Eu-ropean Neighbourhood Policy, aim to improve the policy

implementation and inrastructure o the regional transportsystems: urkey is in the process o identiying a core net-

work and a list o priority inrastructure projects as part o the accession negotiations. urkey is involved in both thePan-European Corridors and the RACECA corridor. ForBelarus, Moldova and Ukraine, the Pan-European Corridorsremain the reerence network. ransport is part o the nego-tiations o the new Enhanced Agreement with Ukraine. Re-garding Russia, cooperation in transport is established underthe EU-Russia dialogue that was launched in 2005. Caspianand Black Sea cooperation is established as a ollow-up tothe EU-Black Sea-Caspian Basin ransport Ministerial Con-

erence in 2004 in Baku and it brings together the RACECAcountries, Russia and Belarus as part o this “Baku process”.




3.4 / e p

m p

Expert orecasts predict that the main annual volume o transit cargo through the Black Sea to Europe will grow to500 million tonnes in the nearest 5-10 years (see Appen-dix F). Te main environmental concerns linked to marinetransport inuence in the Black Sea are: oil spills and othercontaminations, introduction o invaders in ballast waters,dredging, coastal transormation due to the developmento port inrastructure, CO

2emissions and other gases with

an impact on climate and air pollution.

Oil spill risks in the Black Sea

According to the UN Convention on the Law o the Sea o 1982 the Black sea corresponds to the status o “enclosedor hal-enclosed” sea. Te unique nature o hydrobiologi-cal indexes and recreational resources o the sea meritsspecial consideration o its ecosystem. Te planned uturecapacity o oil terminals on the Black Sea’s Eastern coastis approximately 150 million t/year (and up to 350 milliont/year in the more distant uture). Te maximum volumelimit or the transport o oil products through the Bospho-rus o 146 million tonnes per year is already met. Oil trans-port is also increasing in Russian ports, or example in theKerch channel and in uapse. “River-to-sea” vessels carry

oil deliveries rom Russian ports to Constance. Practically all Black Sea countries aim to increase the shipment vol-umes o oil. aking into account technological losses, about300 thousand tonnes o oil products can contaminate themarine environment in the Black Sea port areas each year.Port inrastructure development will clearly have a con-siderable inuence on the transormation o shore areas.Tere are more than fve major oil terminal projects in theeastern part o the BS region. erminals are also being de-

veloped on the aman peninsula. On the other side o thesea, Bulgaria and Romania also propose to construct new terminals (see Appendix G).

Air pollution and Climate Change

Maritime transport is the backbone o globalization. Bigger,aster and more ecient ships have integrated the most dis-tant regions into the world market. Maritime transport hasbecome a large and rapidly growing source o local air pol-lution and greenhouse gas emissions. Te uel consumptiono a cruise ship is equivalent to 12 000 cars. Te exhausts o diesel engines o large container vessels during entrance toand exit rom the port release air pollutants equivalent tothose produced by 300 000 cars per hour.12 A recent report

12 http:// www.earthjastis.org/background/ocean-pollution-global-shiping-and-the-cruise-indusrtry.html13 Input rom the our subgroups and individual experts to the nal report o the Inormal Cross Government/Industry Scientic Group o Experts.

International maritime organization, sub-committee on bulk liquids and gases. 28 December 2007.14 European Commission (EC). 2005. The Communication on Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution. Belgium.15 CE Delt. Greenhouse Gas Emissions or Shipping and Implementation Guidance or the Marine Fuel Sulphur Directive. December 2006.

presented by a working group o the International Mari-time Organization (IMO) estimated that worldwide uelconsumption by ocean-going vessels was in the range o 332 – 406 million tonnes o bunker uel per year (with anestimated average o 368 million tonnes). Such uel con-

sumption would represent a total o 1 121 million tonnes o CO2

emissions in 2007, with an estimated increase to 1 478million tonnes o CO

2by 2020. By comparison, total emis-

sions rom transport in the EU in 2005 were estimated to be1 247 million tonnes, which shows the importance o ship-ping as a global growing source o CO

2emissions.13 Anoth-

er problem associated with uel consumption rom ships isthe emission o air pollutants. Sea-going ships typically usetypes o uel oil with very high sulphur content, leading tomassive emissions o SOx. Moreover, the lack o stringentregulation to vessel engines also leads to signifcant NOx emissions. According to the European Commission, emis-

sions o NOx and Sox rom ships in the EU in 2020 are likely to exceed those o all land-based emission sources together.14 Particulate (PM) emissions are an associated problem,particularly in harbors. While ships tend to be a relatively environmentally riendly mode o transport, seen on a perkm basis, due to the growing volumes o maritime trans-port globally their overall contribution to climate changeand air pollution is dramatically increasing. Tis reectsthe ailure o the IMO to adopt policies and measures thateectively reduce emissions rom ships. Given this, urtherdevelopment o maritime transport in the Black Sea shouldbe accompanied by measures to ensure that incentives to

reduce emissions rom ships are in place.

Te European Commission is preparing measures to ad-dress the climatic impacts o ships. A report by CE Deltpoints to several policy options that could be implementedi the IMO continues to not address this issue. One o themost promising options seems to be the inclusion o mari-time transport in the EU Emissions rading Scheme.15

o address air pollution rom ships there are several poli-cies under discussion at the IMO and EU-level and a proac-tive approach should be taken i major impacts are to be

avoided. At IMO-level, measures to reduce the sulphurcontent o uels and to regulate NOx emissions are underdiscussion. Tis “at source” policy is likely to produce re-sults, and the Commission has confrmed that EU meas-ures are to be expected in this feld.

Regional and local measures can also be taken. For ex-ample, the North and Baltic seas are recognized SulphurEmissions Control Areas (SECA), a provision that obligesships to use uels with lower sulphur content in these ma-rine areas. It would be extremely important to ensure thatthe Black Sea also becomes a SECA since it would dramati-




cally cut SOx emissions with positive side-eects on par-ticulate emissions. Moreover, measures can also be takenat port level, or example the use o shore-side electricity toprovide power or ships when at ports.16 Harbor or airway ees dierentiated to promote the use o ecient engines

are also promising policy tools which are already readily available.17

Dangerous invaders

Foreign species transerred between regions in ballast wa-ter tanks create considerable problems or the maritimeenvironment and or the stability o ecosystems, and thusthreaten the economy and health o the population o seashore regions. Among oreign species recently brought tothe Black Sea 34% are brought or aquaculture, and 66 % weretranserred to the Black Sea as marine larvae in ballast waters

and/or as the organisms attached to the vessel’s hulls.

Damping

Damping o soil because o dredging in ports and canalscreates the additional sources o contamination with heavy metals and oil. Te number o areas o soil damping hasincreased rom 12 to 15, and will increase with the growtho shipping in the region.

i Ww tp

In January 2006 the European Commission publisheda Communication on the Promotion o Inland Water-

way ransport (IW) setting out the Action Programme“NAIADES”.18 Te Commission plans to support IW onthe Danube by granting fnancial support under the EN-and NAIADES programs. Te Commission plans to grantbudget support or these programs o approximately €20.35billion rom 2007 to 2013.19 Te EN- report20 on Priority

Axis 18 (Rhine/Meuse-Main-Danube) states: “o give ac-cess to vessels o up to 3 000 tonnes, a minimum draughto 2.5 meters is required along the entire length o the wa-terway”. Te background report21 or the NAIADES Pro-

gramme translates this tonnage capacity into 3.50 m to4.00 m draught, which implies drastic adaptation o theriver. Tis scenario would result in an ecological disasteror the Danube considering its current ecological status.22

16 For more inormation on shore-side electricity there is a Commission recommendation on the promotion o shore-side electricity or use by ships at berth in Community ports (2006/339/EC).17 Transport and Environment Review O CO

2Abatement Policies For The Transport Sector // European Conerence o Ministers o Transport Council o Ministers/ CEMT/CM(2006)4/FINAL 18

Communication From The Commission First progress report on the implementation o the NAIADES Action Programme or the promotion o inland waterway transport / COM(2007) 770nal, Brussels, 5.12.2007

18 Communication From The Commission First progress report on the implementation o the NAIADES Action Programme or the promotion o inland waterway transport / COM(2007) 770

nal, Brussels, 5.12.200719 TEN-T priority axes & projects 2005 /europa.eu.int/commrten/transport/projects/doc/2005_ten_t_en.pd20 Trans-European Transport Network; TEN-T priority axes and projects 2005, ec 200521 Study commissioned by the European Commission: Prospects o inland navigation within the enlarged Europe, Full Final Report March 2004.

http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/iw/doc/pine_report_report_ull_en pd22 Detailed analysis o the sustainability o the NAIADES Action Program, DCP WWF23 TRANS/SC.3/159. Economic commission or europe inland transport committee. Working Party on Inland Water Transport. Inventory o most important bottlenecks and missing links in the

e waterway network. Resolution No. 4924 CEE Bankwatch Network comments on the HLG report on TEN-T extension to the neighbouring countries25 Joint Statement on Development o Inland Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Danube River Basin, ICPDR26 “Inland Navigation and Emissions: Literature Review” available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/ww_iwt_emissions_lit_review.pd

Tere are plans to build the Dnieper-Daugava canal overthe course o ten years. Te canal is intended to provide atransport connection between Kherson (Ukraine) and Riga.In theory, the canal could carry up to 240 million tonneso cargo, but the building o the canal bears certain threats

or the ecosystem o the Dnieper. Te proposed waterway includes navigation through the Pripyat River. Some sec-tions o the Pripyat River will be marred by bottlenecks andare listed as being not suciently deep or navigation:23 Re-moval o bottlenecks will require intensive dredging, whichcould be problematic since these sections o the river liein territories contaminated as result o the Chernobyl acci-dent in 1986. Te dredging o sludge and bottom soils thatare heavily contaminated with radionuclides creates therisk o spreading radiation.24

In the general structure o Black Sea oil transit, Russian oil

transporting by river ships through the Don with a subse-quent raid reload on marine ships in the Kerch channel(1.7 million t/years) is substantial. Russian transport policy resulted in the damage or grounding (low-water) o morethan fve vessels during bad weather conditions on 11 No-

vember 2007. Tis re-emphasises the need or careul con-sideration o potential negative consequences o develop-ment and intensifcation o trac on Danube ecosystems(taking into account, or example, the building o the oilport in Dzhurdzhuleshty (Moldova), ISPA Project (Roma-nia), Bystroye canal (Ukraine)) (Appendix F). In this con-text, the EC should support the International Commission

or the Protection o the Danube River (ICPDR) initiative tooversee new projects and the development o navigation o the Danube.25

Inland navigation may be in general more energy-ecientthan road and air transport, but it can also create seriousecological impacts on a local scale and emissions are com-parable to those o rail transport.26 Inland waterway trans-port can only oer a sustainable alternative to road or airtransport i navigation routes are integrated into a sustain-able distribution network in the target countries, multi-modal logistics inrastructure is improved, and a balance

is ound between environmental, transport and socio-eco-nomic needs.




rw

Railways play a major role in the development o transportlinks in the Black Sea region. For example, in Russia up to75% o cargo is transported by rail. In Ukraine, the share or

rail is 23-25% o reight transport. Te main adverse envi-ronmental eects rom (non-electric) locomotives and rail wagons are emissions o air pollutants, greenhouse gasesand noise pollution. In addition, construction and opera-tion o railways requires substantial usage o land.Te main pollutants are locomotive exhaust gases, oilproducts, phenol, aerosols, and waste. Ukrainian railway transport uses approximately 170 million m3 o water per

year. Almost 50% o this water is used or operational anddrinking purposes, while unrecoverable water losses ex-ceed 40%. Annually, the railways discharge more than20 000 tonnes o pollutants into the sewage systems and

natural waters. Hal o this waste is untreated.

Air emissions

Te risk o hydrocarbon emissions is highest during stor-age and usage o oil products. Burning 1 kg o oil productsreleases emissions o 0.25 kg o hydrocarbons, and theburning o 1 kg o coal releases 0.16 kg. However, consid-erably more pollutants can be emitted during shunting ormaneuvering. In addition, rerigeration wagons are flled

with ozone depleting substances (Freon), which, i leaked,damage the global balance o ozone in the stratosphere.

Each rerigeration wagon is flled with 35 kg o Freon.

Noise

Te main source o rail noise is the contact between the wheel and the rail.27 Tis problem concerns o courseboth passenger and reight transport, but it is much moreacute or reight wagons. o reduce rail noise at its sourcethe Commission has adopted ‘technical specifcations orinteroperability’ (SI) relating to railway rolling stock, in-cluding noise limit values or newly manuactured and up-graded conventional and high-speed trains.28 New reight

wagons have to be equipped with low-noise brake blocks which reduce noise by up to 50%. However, a serious ob-stacle to reducing railway noise is the act that wagons andlocomotives have very long lietimes. Te average lietimeo rail wagons in the EU is around 40 years. In new mem-ber states, accession and neighbouring countries, the eetaverage age is likely to be even older, and thereore muchnoisier. Tis means that the new noise standards rom theSIs do not apply to a very substantial proportion o therailway eet. Tis problem unortunately cannot be solved

without investment to phase-out the traditional cast ironbraking systems o older wagons. Railways are in competi-

tion with road transport, which is perceived as being moreconvenient but has higher emissions. In addition, railway

27 Directive 2002/49/EC28 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/environment/noise_en.htm29 CEE Bankwatch Network comments on the HLG report on TEN-T extension to the neighbouring countries.

improvement projects are oten carried out later than par-allel motorway construction projects. In Central and East-ern Europe, the rail networks are oten extensive, but lack o investment and political support is contributing to theirdecline and even the closure o certain lines. Political deci-

sions are central to setting conditions or competition be-tween modes o transport. Railways in Central and EasternEurope will need political commitment and substantialinvestments i they are to increase or even maintain theirmodal share.29

r p

Road transport constitutes a very large and growing propor-tion o land transport in Europe: 44% o reight is carried by truck (61% in Ukraine) and 85% o passengers by cars, busesor coaches. Road transport incurs very high external costs, in

terms o air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions and noise,and also congestion and road trac accidents. Tese costsare generally paid by society in general (taxpayers) and notreected in the price o road transport, which in part explainsthe growth o road transport compared to other modes. Roadtransport generates about one-fth o the EU’s CO

2emis-

sions, with private cars responsible or around 12%. In Eu-rope, transport is the only sector blatantly outing the KyotoProtocol by increasing GHG emissions since 1990, and roadtransport is the biggest contributor. Te rapid increase in pri-

vate car ownership and road reight transport in Central andEastern Europe is clearly linked to serious air quality prob-

lems in cities and along major transport corridors. Whilstnew cars are becoming cleaner, the eet is on average con-siderably older in new member states, accession and neigh-bouring countries, and thereore uses more polluting andless uel-ecient technologies. Large cities o the Black Searegion (Odessa, Yalta) have very serious air pollution prob-lems. Te EU policy objectives or road transport include:promotion o ecient road reight and passenger transportservices; creation o air conditions or competition; promo-tion and harmonization o saer and more environmentally-riendly technical standards; ensuring harmonization o fscaland social conditions; and eective and non-discriminatory

application o the rules or road transport. Te main politicalconcerns are ever-increasing congestion on Europe’s roads,the climate impact and uel consumption o road transport.Te European Commission is committed to addressing ris-ing emissions rom road transport. In this context, on 7 Feb-ruary 2007, it published two communications on the uturestrategy to reduce CO

2emission rom cars and on the uture

regulatory ramework or the automotive sector. As outlinedin these communications, the Commission has decided topursue an integrated approach with a view to reaching theEU objective o 120 g/km average CO

2emissions rom new

cars by 2012. Tese new standards will, however, take a very

long time to flter into the vehicle eet in Central and EasternEurope and the Black Sea region.




Road inrastructure – Case Study

In 2002 the Lviv-Krakovets highway construction project was developed by the “ransmagistral” consortium (see

Appendix H). Te planned width o the highway is 30meters and the highway capability should be about 20000 vehicles per 24 hours. Te approved Lviv-Krakovetsproject highway will go through the territory o the villag-es o Zashkiv and Zavadiv and damage a lake with highrecreation potential. Seven homes will be demolishedbecause they are located on the construction site. Temajor problem is that the project envisages only 10 m ei-ther side o the highway to be determined as a zone witha protective regime where residential houses and agri-cultural production should not be allowed. Accordingto Ukrainian legislation the distance must be between

25 m and 100 m or roads in the state network and orthis category o highways the protective zone should be300m. Many residents’ homes are located in the 25-300m strip along the motorway and they will be signifcantly aected by the motorway construction. Resettlement o the residents rom Zashkiv and Zavadiv villages romthe protective zone is not oreseen. Tus the motorway construction violates the right to a sae and healthy en-

vironment or these people, vested by Article 50 o theConstitution o Ukraine.30

3.5 / c

Te initiative or the development o road transit corridorsthrough BS countries could seriously harm the develop-ment o sustainable transportation there. Te BS countriesshould be urged to develop and discuss a coherent trans-port policy with the public, including the development andmanagement o the local and regional transport networks.echnical support rom the EC or the proper implemen-tation o Strategic Environmental Assessments on nationaltransport policies will be required.

r

p eu

p g

n Te extension o the EN- network is potentially a posi-tive development, i managed with due consideration o social and environmental impacts and their costs. Guaran-tees are needed that together with physical inrastructure,good environmental and democratic practices are devel-oped, such as: public participation and transparency o all

30 CEE Bankwatch Network comments on the HLG report on TEN-T extension to the neighbouring countries31 CEE Bankwatch Network comments on the HLG report on TEN-T extension to the neighbouring countries

the studies related to inrastructure projects; implementa-tion o the precautionary principle or valuable biodiver-sity, air quality and residents’ health; harmonization o environmental and social standards among the donors inthe region; giving priority or the upgrading, optimization,

interoperability and modernization o the railway sectorin neighbouring countries and regions; application o theuser / polluter pays principle.31

n Ensure and promote principles o sustainable develop-ment by taking into account the economic, environmentaland social consequences and costs o inrastructure plansand projects and horizontal measures. Environmental con-servation should also be taken into account so as to avoidenvironmental degradation. In that respect, projects se-lected or fnancial support must be subject to an Environ-mental Impact Assessment (EIA). Te EU should require

the international fnancial institutions (IFIs), includingthe World Bank, to ollow the recommendations o HighLevel Groups (HLG), while fnancing the parts o EN- ex-tension projects in dierent countries. Te ideal strategicplanning o transport inrastructure would include strate-gic environmental assessments (SEA) covering transportbased on multi-modal transport corridor analysis, along

with non-transport demands on the roads, railways and waterways. Te idea that economic development will auto-matically ollow the routes o new transport inrastructureis now generally viewed as outdated in Western Europe.Te current and uture costs, benefts, and needs or trans-

port inrastructure must be assessed along with possiblealternatives or attaining the main policy objectives. Forexample, i the main objectives expected rom the inra-structure development are economic growth, employmentor regional development, authorities should consider edu-cation, training or technological programmes as potentialpolicy alternatives.

r z g

n National ransport Strategies in the Black Sea countriesshould prioritize the harmonization o their transport leg-

islation and regulations with EU standards.

n Incorporation o RACEA into EN- could give addition-al benefts: the propagation o EU environmental require-ments has the potential to reduce the negative impacts o transport (and uture developments) on the environmentin the region. Multilateral cooperation, in particular in thecontext o the implementation o the RACECA strategy until 2015 and the Baku process, as well as the plans or aMediterranean regional transport action plan complementthe bilateral action plans.




n Promote interoperability o networks between the EU andthe neighbouring countries and urther approximation o legislation and policies in the neighbouring countries to-

wards EU standards with a view to ensuring continuedeconomic and social development and environmental

sustainability. Speeding up border crossing proceduresby implementing without delay the relevant internationalconventions, as already adopted in the EU, by introducing“one-stop” oces through shared acilities, simplifcationand harmonization o trade and transport related docu-mentation in line with the EU practice.

r p w

g w

n Beginning preparations is recommended towards the sig-nature o a Protocol (or similar document) on the protec-

tion and rational use o the Black Sea between the EU andthe BS countries. Te Protocol should include sections on:ballast waters; oil contamination; marine trac regulation;technical questions o environmental saety; cooperationbetween marine transport and inland waterways; ensuringhigh quality in transport vehicles, vessels and inrastruc-ture.

n o develop the law on unifed environmental taxation orreight transport through the BS region and exclusive useo revenues raised or nature protection purposes. Ensurethat all existing and/or new ports and terminals satisy the

MARPOL convention requirement or special zones.

n EIA must be carried out or all planned transport inra-structure projects (see Appendix G). Te projects identifedor unding should undergo all assessments required by EU legislation, as well as meet the requirements o EspooConvention, MARPOL Convention, Black Sea and AarhusConventions. Te current list o projects should be consid-ered to be merely indicative. More detailed plans or thetransport axes should be developed. Tese plans should besubject to strategic, economic, environmental and socialimpact assessment in line with best international practice

and when relevant with EU legislation.32

r

n Standardization and harmonization o rules on customs,environmental, sanitary and other types o control. Intro-duce and promote resource- and energy-saving technolo-gies and minimize energy consumption in transport. Im-plement new technologies including trac managementand inormation systems in all modes (notably ERMS33

and SESAR34), including satellite navigation (Galileo).Elaborate new state construction norms or highways, rail-

32 For practical guidance on the implementation o socio-economic appraisal and on strategic environmental assessment, see the 6th Research Framework Programme projects HEATCO athttp://heatco.ier.uni-stuttgart.de/ and BEACON at http://www.transport-sea.net/results.phtml

33 ERTMS is the European Rail Trac Management System34 SESAR is the European air trac control inrastructure modernization programme35 A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy, Communication From The Commission, COM(2007) 774 nal, Brussels, 05/12/2007

way lines and navigation canals in Ukraine. Carry out hu-man health assessments, particularly o children’s health,in settlements situated near international transport corri-dors. Investigate possibilities to construct transport corri-dors away rom natural habitats / corridors and protected

areas and areas reserved or uture protection.

n For the development o environmentally sustainable seatransport the ollowing steps are necessary: reusal o usingo single-hull tankers; creation o “rescue ports” equipped

with the inrastructure to help vessels avoid incidents; en-sure availability o detergents to manage oil spills in seaports; equip local tug boats with acilities to deliver and ap-ply such detergents at oil spill sites; identiy in cooperation

with other parties to the Convention on the Black Sea placesor sae storage (or transshipment) o damaged tankers; de-

velopment o clean-up acilities in ports; develop a system

to ensure (ecologically) sae reight transport. Measures toresolve the ballast water problem might include: disposalacilities or ballast waters and replacement o aquatic bal-last at sea; on-board processing o ballast waters. o reduceair pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions rom vessels inport it is necessary to introduce programmes and require-ment or shore-side electricity provision and limits to en-gine running whilst in port.

n Te countries o the Black Sea region should strive toachieve EU technical and environmental standards, includ-ing EURO vehicle emissions standards, and other cleaner

technologies or road transport. Tis could be achieved by using alternative types o uel, electric or hybrid vehicles,and developing urban public transport. rac manage-ment measures, uel tax increases and “eco-taxes” oer apowerul tool to reduce emissions. Road charges providestrong incentives to increase transport eciency by ra-tionalizing distribution systems and logistics organisation.Reconstruction o railways assumes wider use o electriclocomotives.

r g w p

g

n Te establishment o the European Marine Registershould include the possibility to include vessels rom Black Sea countries. Other interesting measures include: inclu-sion o the Black Sea region in activities o the EuropeanMaritime Saety Agency (EMSA); improved monitoring o movements o all ships in European waters using the sys-tem o GALILEO.

n Te adoption o regional action plans or the develop-ment o sustainable transport systems in RACECA part-ner countries and their implementation.35




n Preparation o a common Black Sea ransport Develop-ment Scheme is necessary and should be based on strate-gic environmental assessments (SEA) covering transporton the basis o multi-modal transport corridor analysis,along with non-transport demands on the roads, railways

and waterways. Te scheme should identiy the most ap-propriate scenario rom an environmental and social pointo view and serve as the ramework or investment deci-sion-making.

o

nTe public consultation on the extension o the EN- intoneighbouring countries raised concerns that the urtherdevelopment o some o the transnational axes could havenegative impacts on the environment and particularly on

biodiversity. Potential conicts should be identifed early and managed pro-actively by using legal mechanisms, ar-bitration courts and special representatives.

n Tere are opportunities or the development o social

partnerships, the market or environmental inormationand technologies, transer o marine technologies, creationo marine business-clusters. Development and involve-ment o civil society groups is important in the transportsector in order to bring social and environmental perspec-tives to the attention o policy-makers and the local com-munity. A series o seminars on greening transport policy or decision-makers in the Black Sea region would be use-ul to share examples o best practices in transport (inra-structure) development.



39 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Chapter 4 / Peace, Security and the Environment in the Black Sea Region

4.1 / v c bsr

Te Black Sea Region (BSR) is home to a number o pro-tracted violent conicts which are central to security con-cerns in the area. Compared to the region as a whole, they are relatively small in scale and size and many o them areoten colloquially reerred to as ”rozen conicts”: despitephases o escalation and de-escalation and ongoing nego-tiations or many years, they are in a stalemate and unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Tese conicts are:

n

between Georgia and its two break-away regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia; nbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status

o Nagorno-Karabakh;nbetween Moldova and its break-away region

ransdnistria.

Political independence and preserving (cultural) identity are key interests o the break-away regions at stake in theseconicts. Tey have succeeded in achieving a certain degreeo political autonomy, but remain internationally unrecog-nized. Albeit rozen, the conicts remain militarized, with

numerous irregular troops, peacekeepers and armed orcespresent in the region. Additionally, Russia has voiced sup-port or Abkhazia, South Ossetia and ransdnistria, provid-ing them with a strong military and economic supporter.

In addition to these rozen conicts, two urther areas o concern exist:

nthe North Caucasus and in particular Chechnya con-tinue to suer rom violent conict despite the pro-claimed ocial ending o the war. Human rightsabuses continue while the disappearance o many people during the war remains unresolved (AI 2007;

HRW 2007). However, the number o violent incidentsis decreasing and reconstruction progresses. While

violence will probably continue at a lower intensity, amajor escalation is unlikely to happen any time soon(Swisspeace 2007, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). In addition,the idea that Chechnya could become a battlegroundor international terrorism (Mateeva 2006: 30) has yetto materialize: the number o actual or attempted ter-rorist attacks in Chechnya sharply decreased rom 31in 2006 to 4 in 2007 (MIP 2008). Te whole NorthCaucasus remains a volatile area with regular clashesbetween government orces and armed groups such as

in Dagestan (Swisspeace 2007d);

nthe conict over autonomy o Kurdish areas in urkey continues and even escalated in late 2007: Te Kurdis-tan Workers Party (PKK)1 insurgency intensifed theirattacks rom bases in Northern Iraq on targets in ur-key during the second hal o 2007. In response, urkey increased its military presence in the area. One o themost recent escalations was the bombardment o sup-posed PKK bases in Northern Iraq which strained rela-tions between the two countries (Reuters 2007, 2007a).

Besides these conicts, political tensions and internationaldisputes between dierent states in the region also abound.Tis includes, among others, tensions between Moldova,Georgia and Russia over Russia’s support to the variousbreak-away regions, the disputes between Russia andUkraine over gas prices (Götz 2006) and the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea (Socor 2007). Tese tensionsare unlikely to escalate violently in the short-term.

From outside the region, the diverging interests o globalpowers, in particular the EU, Russia and the US impact onthe BSR: the security spheres o all three o them – mani-

esting themselves mainly via the North Atlantic reaty Or-ganisation (NAO) and the Commonwealth o Independ-ent States – overlap in the BSR (Koenig 2007). At a politicallevel, this is not always without conict. Kosovo illustratesthis tellingly: the Russian President Vladimir Putin suggest-ed that i EU Member States and the US recognized Kosovoas a state and its unilateral declaration o independence,Russia would probably do the same with Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia (Parsons 2006). Irrespective o the actual

validity o this notion, raising this issue shows that ques-tions o peace and security in the BSR may also be heavily aected by wider developments.

Finally, the relevance o the BSR or other regions contin-ues to increase, in particular with regards to energy inra-structure. Te Baku-bilisi-Ceyhan (BC) pipeline stretch-ing rom the Caspian Sea to the urkish port o Ceyhan as

well as the envisaged Nabucco pipeline will be vital or thecontinued energy supply o EU Member States. Pipelinesas well as transport inrastructure in general would urther-more be endangered by any escalations and are also attrac-tive targets or terrorist attacks: in urkey alone, there were13 actual or attempted terrorist attacks on oil and gas pipe-lines between January 2000 and December 2007, many by

the PKK and associated groups (MIP 2007).2

cp 4 / Peace, security and the environment

in the black sea reGion

1 While the PKK is internationally probably the most widely known insurgent group, it is not the only one and has urthermore renamed itsel several times within the past years (see GlobalSecurity 2007). It should be clear at this point, that the PKK and similar groups such as the “Kurdistan Freedom Falcons” are considered as terrorists, not only by Turkey but also manymembers o the international community including the US, the EU and all its Member States (EU 2007).

2 For a more general discussion on energy inrastructure vulnerability to terrorist attacks, see Tänzler et al. 2007.




t r e

In acute or rozen conicts, environment and natural re-sources are no primary driving or triggering actors. Butthese conicts have impacted the environment: due to

ongoing hostilities, many areas remain essentially unus-able or activities such as agriculture and orestry. Closedborders and land degradation urther constrain already marginalized areas and local communities. In addition,environment is not a top priority or the countries and en-tities experiencing conict, as security and economic de-

velopment are more pressing concerns. Concurrently, environmental issues such as clean up (e.g. legacies rom theSoviet era) have taken a backseat, with a ollowing degra-dation o the environment. Conicts have also created in-centives or unsustainable activities such as illegal logging.Tis has on the one hand an eroding eect on state author-

ity by ostering organized crime and corruption, but is alsoa key source o income. Tus, natural resource availability lower the necessity o conict parties to come to an agree-ment as fnancial and economic pressures or conict par-ties are reduced (IA 2004: 131.). aking advantage o thelow political priority o the environment, several, primarily

western donors considered environmental cooperation asa potential entry point or confdence building measuresbetween the conict parties. Te aim o many transbound-ary environmental cooperation projects was to establishdialogue mechanisms which could acilitate negotiationsby supporting a more conducive political climate (see Car-

ius 2006; Ali 2007). Many o these projects, aiming at im-proving conditions or peace and stability, have been con-ducted in the South Caucasus. For the protracted conictover Nagorno-Karabakh, the OSCE conducted a missionto assess the environmental impact o fres in that regionupon request by Azerbaijan and Armenia. Trough coop-eration between the conict parties orest fres could bebetter prevented and managed in uture.3 However, the impact o these activities is mixed. Assess-ments and evaluations o transboundary environmentaleorts and their impact on peace processes are rarely con-ducted. Te reasons or this are many, including a lack o,

or unavailability o, assessment methodologies (e.g. lack o indicators) or simply the absence o political will to seri-ously conduct conict-sensitive programs and projects. Telack o pre-assessments also makes it dicult to identiy

whether a specifc project would have an impact on peaceand conict. In addition, projects oten lack continuousand sucient unding, are perceived as externally-drivenand thus lack ownership. In the worst case, such projectsmay even create new dividing lines, e.g. i projects clash

with the interests o local populations. Concrete eects onthe conicts themselves have not yet been demonstrated.

Te conicts in urkey’s South-East and in the RussianFederation’s North Caucasus are dierent in this regard:due to the nature o the conicts, environmental coop-eration as an instrument or dialogue between conictingparties does not exist and has not been either initiated nor

acilitated by third parties. However, the environmental de-struction which occurred as a consequence o the conict,or instance in Chechnya, remains a key challenge or im-proving livelihood security.

4.2 / F cg: edg c cg

As has been outlined in Chapter 2, the environmental situ-ation is likely to aggravate due to urther environmentaldegradation and climate change. While 2007 has seen a se-ries o studies ocusing on climate change and security (see

e.g. CNA 2007; CSIS/CNAS 2007; IA 2007; WBGU 2007),the Black Sea Region has hardly been discussed in detail.However, some conclusions can be drawn rom the work o the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU).Te WBGU has identifed our main conict constellations,

which might emerge through climate change. Tey are(WBGU 2007: Ch. 6):

(1) Degradation o reshwater resources in sucientquality and quantity, leading to increased competi-tion between dierent uses such as energy, drinking

water, agriculture and others;

(2) Increase in storm and food disasters resulting inheightened vulnerability in particular o coastal and ur-ban areas which is urther aggravated by parallel risingsea-levels due among others to thermal expansion;

(3) A decline in ood production resulting in decreasingood availability, causing ood prices to rise, reducedemployment opportunities and a drop in agriculturaloutput;

(4) Environmentally-induced migration as an indirectconsequence o climate change resulting rom theconstellations described above and rom decreas-ing livelihood security which may cause violence in

transit and target regions.

Tese constellations are not the only threats. Unsustainabledevelopment and short-sighted or ineective governancemay also contribute to environmental degradation. For in-stance, unsustainable land management and inappropriateagricultural policies led to massive amines during times o drought in late 19th century colonial India (Davis 2005). Ill-planned coastal protection signifcantly raises the threat o extreme weather events, as in the case o Hurricane Kat-rina in 2005 (Davis 2006). Te impact o climate change isthus not a novel issue, but it will severely aggravate existing

problems with regards to requency and scale.

3 In act, during a debate within the UN General Assembly, the representative o Azerbaijan considered joint operations with Armenia to combat orest res as important condence buildingmeasures (UN 2006: 26). For more details on the res, see ECC-Platorm, 2006.




None o these constellations is likely to lead directly to vio-lent conict. Historically, water scarcity or instance hasmuch more oten resulted in cooperation than in conict,even in amidst hostilities (Wol et al. 2005). Neverthelessthey certainly degrade livelihood security and have an erod-

ing eect on socio-economic activity and social resilienceby hampering development and increasing vulnerability.O key relevance in the BSR are the ollowing aspects:

nCoastal zones: the development o inrastructure andurban areas in coastal areas creates multiple risks. It in-creases the number o people concentrated in high-risk areas and makes the economies o BSR littoral statesincreasingly dependent on these areas. Tus, disastersoccurring in coastal areas may not only result in a highnumber o aected people, but may also signifcantly im-pact national economies. Tis will in turn reduce capaci-

ties or adaptation. Environmental destruction resultingrom extreme weather events may also strongly impactthe tourism sector. Climate change will impact coastalareas in three key ways: frstly through higher than glo-bal average sea-level rise; secondly through an estimatedincrease in storminess; and thirdly, through increaseddamage o potential disaster events due to sea-level rise.4

n Agriculture:between 25 and 40% o the gross domesticproduct (GDP) o Ukraine, urkey, Georgia and Moldo-

va is generated by agriculture (CIA 2007). Climatechange in the orm o increased warming (including

more requent and intense heat waves) and decreasedprecipitations will most strongly aect the southernBSR states, in particular urkey (IPCC 2007: 875), in-creasing the risks o prolonged and severe droughts. It

will also increase the risk o orest fres and desertifca-tion, thus reducing available arable land. Signifcantly decreased agricultural production is likely to triggerrural-urban migration, thus urther exacerbating theproblems o coastal areas.

Climate change may thus have strong impacts on key eco-nomic sectors o the BSR. Te inability to cope with repeat-

ing shocks may trap marginalized urban and rural areas inendemic poverty. Repeating shocks may then suce to un-ravel the social abric, resulting in the break-down o com-munities. While this would be the extreme end o the spec-trum o potential consequences, the case o Katrina hasshown that even advanced industrialized countries may experience cases o localized state ailure in the atermatho disasters. In addition, competition over scarce resourc-es may, in the absence o adequate mechanism to resolvethese issues, increase the likelihood o conicts within andbetween communities. Over the long-term, the twin threato degradation and disaster may reduce the ability o socie-

ties to resolve conicts peaceully and increase incentivesor out-o-region migration (see e.g. WBGU 2007: 125.).

Te dimension o the security-relevant consequences o cli-mate change and their negative political, societal and eco-nomic impacts will be highly dependent on the extent andeectiveness o adaptation measures. While adaptation willo course require the reallocation o resources, it is nowa-

days oten considered more cost-eective to adapt than torisk the potential negative impacts rom climate change.

Regarding the rozen conicts in the BSR, climate changeand environmental degradation will frst o all decreaselivelihood security. It is unlikely that these impacts willresult in heating up the conicts, or that environment willbecome a key driver o conict. Future impacts o climatechange may potentially increase the need or cooperationor transboundary environmental cooperation. It is notlikely that environment will become a major driver o con-ict in urkey’s Southeastern or the Russian Federation’s

North Caucasus regions either. However, in both cases de-grading livelihood security may add to the stresses resultingo (post-) conict situations and may increase the margin-alization particularly o rural communities. o what extentthis may actually transorm into renewed or uel existingconicts is dicult to estimate and needs urther scrutiny.

Beyond the regional impacts resulting most likely in low-ered social resilience and livelihood security, the BSR willalso be aected by climate change impacts in neighbouringregions. Te Middle East and Central Asia are both consid-ered potential uture hot spots, in particular with regards

to water scarcity (see WBGU 2007; Carius et al. orthcom-ing). It is likely that this may trigger migratory movementsinto adjacent regions, resulting in urther stresses in targetor transit regions. Due to the already dicult situations o host populations in a region with a background o protract-ed conicts, perceived changes in the demographic make-up o host societies could result in (violent) rejection. Inany case, the phenomenon will increase demographicpressures. Tus, climate change has the potential o creat-ing urther dividing lines within countries besides the ex-isting conicts (c. Clark 2007).

Finally, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, the BSR will be-come increasingly relevant as an energy supply and trans-port corridor, thus urther increasing its geopolitical rele-

vance. Concurrently, extra-regional pressures on Black Seapolitics are likely to become more intense; US-based think tanks CSIS and CNAS even contemplated that a deliberatecut-o o (energy) supplies could result in engagement by NAO (CSIS/CNAS 2007: 67). Additionally, it will also makethe BSR and particularly its energy inrastructure a moreinteresting target or terrorist attacks, which may result insignifcant collateral environmental damage in addition todirect conicts. Both the region’s increasing relevance or

energy security and the need to protect critical inrastruc-ture, could lead to a change o priorities, in which not only

4 The IPCC notes in this regard: “In areas o coastal subsidence or high tectonic activity, as in the low tidal range Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, climate-related sea-level rise couldsignicantly increase potential damage rom storm surges and tsunamis” (IPCC 2007a: 551, quoting Gregory et al. 2001).




the environment, but also other policy areas such as pro-motion o democracy, human rights and good governancecould take a backseat.

4.3 / e s:

i

While a set o diverse international and regional institu-tions related to environmental and security aairs operatein the BSR, the number o those working on both issues arelimited. In act, the interagency partnership Environmentand Security (ENVSEC) Initiative consisting o the OSCE,UNDP, UNEP, UNECE, NAO and REC has continuously addressed these issues over the past years. In addition,the OSCE has developed under the Spanish presidency an Environmental Security Strategy while the EU has in-creasingly addressed the inter-linkages between natural

resources and conict. Teir activities can be described asollows:

nENVSEC: Te aims o ENVSEC are to identiy linksbetween human security and the natural environ-ment and to build confdence between states to pre-

vent threats rom spilling across (national) bounda-ries, thus contributing to the management o existingconicts (Swalley 2007). Within the BSR, ENVSECis actively engaged in the South Caucasus, Ukraine,Moldova, Bulgaria and Romania. Its activities includeact-fnding missions, awareness raising and acilitat-

ing public access to inormation. Te key strength o ENVSEC is thereore to provide a platorm or com-munication and networking between actors which isbased mainly on mapping exercises. ENVSEC ocuseson localized projects and activities or on specifc prob-lems aecting countries and sub-regions. Neither theBSR as a whole nor impacts o potential uture threatsas climate change are currently covered in their as-sessments. In addition, ENVSEC has only limited re-sources available. Its demand-driven approach may urthermore lead to “late” identifcation o potentialuture hotspot areas given the act that environment is

not a top priority in many countries;

nOSCE: Te OSCE is actively involved in the resolutiono several o the conicts in the region and has been themain sponsor o ENVSEC. In the Madrid Declarationon Environment and Security o 30 November 2007 itarmed the necessity and was mandated to work onenvironment and security. Whether or not concreteactivities ollow the declaration beyond urther sup-port to activities such as ENVSEC’s remains to be seen.However, the ocus on maritime issues and inland watercourses by the Finnish OSCE presidency provides am-

ple opportunity to discuss potential threats arising romsea-level rise, potential storm surges and water scarcity.Beyond this, a key advantage o the OSCE remains itsregional scope: not only does it include all BSR states,but also all EU member states plus the US, bringing all

major regional geopolitical actors at one table. At thesame time, this is also a signifcant disadvantage, as itmakes decision-making procedures cumbersome;

nEU: Within the ramework o the ENP, the Pre-Acces-

sion process and in general EU policies towards theBSR, environment has long taken a backseat in avouro other topics such as energy and economic develop-ment. One o the recent communications o the EUCommission has highlighted the importance o ad-aptation to climate change, but its eects remains tobe seen (EC 2007). On environment and security, theENP has so ar been largely silent despite its clear o-cus on stability and security. Te EU Commission hashowever begun to step up its activities regarding envi-ronment and security in general . In particular, in par-allel and ollowing an evaluation o the Commission’s

external policy towards inter-linkages between naturalresources and conict (Carius et al. 2007), a number o institutional changes have been initiated. Tis includesthe establishment o the Instrument or Stability to f-nance measures preventing and managing crisis andtheir consequences outside the EU, which will have aspecial acility on natural resources and conict; theestablishment o the Peacebuilding Partnership whichin essence is a network o (European) experts and or-ganizations working in the feld o peace and security and which will likely create a subgroup on natural re-source management and conict; and the unding o

the Initiative or Peacebuilding (IP) which also workson natural resources and peace and conict issues. Be-

yond this, the Council Secretariat and the Commissionhave been requested by the Council in the conclusionso the German Presidency 2007 to provide a joint paperon climate change and security or discussion at theSpring Council in 2008. While all these activities only ocus on the BSR to a certain degree, the EU becomesincreasingly able to actively work on inter-linkages be-tween environmental actors and conict.

Beyond the organisations working on environment and

security, there are a number o regional organisationsand initiatives which may oster regional dialogue and ex-change, thereby reducing bilateral tensions. Tese includethe Black Sea Commission or the Organization o the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) (see Chapter 5). Oneo the key aspects o these organizations is that they allow or a more comprehensive regional approach, as they alsohave non-littoral states as members. While these organiza-tions do not have a mandate to engage in security issues,they can provide valuable support to conict preventionby working towards sustainable and resilient developmentand thus preventing environmental actors rom inducing

conicts. Subsuming this under the “security umbrella”,however, is unnecessary and is most likely to be counter-productive in these orums due to the political sensitivity o security issues.




4.4 / t b s, e s: op a.c

In summary, the environment is currently not a key driveror either violent conicts or peace processes in the Black Sea. Nor is it a key concern rom the point o view o nation-al or regional security. Instead, environmental degradationmainly results in livelihood insecurity and in hamperingeconomic development, which is urther aggravated by theenvironmental impacts ollowing conict.

Tis constellation is likely to be signifcantly aggravatedby the current parallel trends o increased environmentaldegradation and the likely impacts o climate change. I letunaddressed, it may not only urther hamper development

and poverty eradication, but also weaken societal resilienceand result in presumably mostly localized breakdowns o public order. Tus environmental degradation may in theuture become a relevant background actor or conictsand instability, albeit indirectly. In addition, urther stress-es rom outside the region will increasingly impact on theBlack Sea states, in particular due to its relevance or en-ergy security. Preventing or at least mitigating these eectsmeans primarily to ocus more strongly on sustainableand resilient development, as has been argued elsewherein this report. Tis needs to be done in a conict-sensitive

way as it will take place in conictual and ragile settings.

Maladaptation, in particular, needs to be avoided. With a view to linkages between environment, peace, security anddevelopment, there is currently still a knowledge gap withregards to uture challenges such as climate change (see

WBGU 2007: 193.).

With the OSCE also increasingly becoming an actor in thearea o environment and security, enhanced cooperationbetween the EU and OSCE becomes o utmost importanceto harness synergy eects. While o course all conictsmentioned above are unique in their own right and requiretailored action, the EU and its member states could im-

prove the oundation or such action through the ollowingactivities:

(1) Develop an analysis on the impacts o climate changeon the BSR security situation including immediately adjacent regions; security should thereby be defnedbroadly to capture threats on livelihood security;

(2) Promote climate change adaptation and mitigationmeasures with ocus on very concrete projects at alocal level aiming to improve the livelihood situation.

Additionally, the support or policy development onnational level is highly relevant as enabling condi-

tion or projects;(3) Develop and implement suitable methods and in-struments to conduct conict-sensitive adaptationmeasures;

(4) Make conict-sensitive programming (includingadequate training and stang) a prerequisite orprojects in areas suering rom either acute or rozenconicts;

(5) Draw on the expertise o the Peacebuilding Partner-ship, the IP and ENVSEC to identiy potential envi-ronmental triggers or uture political crises in theBSR;

(6) Identiy existing environment-related trans-regionalmigratory movements and how climate change andenvironment may aect them or create new ones (in-cluding adjacent regions). Tis needs to incorporatean analysis on how migrants and host communitiesare currently cooperating and competing over re-sources;

(7) Engage with dierent societal actors in conict re-gions on environmental topics to build confdenceand provide unds or civil society activities in envi-ronment and conict resolution;

(8) Conduct environmental assessments and monitor-

ing activities in rozen conict regions drawing onthe experience o civil society actors;

(9) Te EU Commission should become an Observerpartner o ENVSEC and share best practices andlessons learnt in the areas o natural resources, con-ict management and peacebuilding. In addition, itshould aim at harmonizing approaches between EN-

VSEC members including the organization o jointtrainings and assessment missions;

(10) EU member states should work towards integratingenvironment and security during the Finnish OSCEpresidency with its main ocus on maritime aairs

and inland water courses;(11) Te EU should actively use the potential o regional

organizations such as BSEC and the Black Sea com-mission to urther dialogue and deepen coopera-tion on environment and security issues.



44 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Chapter 5 / The Black Sea Institutions

5.1 / i

Te institutional structure or regional cooperation amongthe Black Sea littoral states is still quite new, dating only tothe collapse o the Soviet Union in 1991. Except or urkey,all o the other littoral states have had to build national po-litical systems and transorm their economies into modernmarket-based systems. Given these very recent and enor-mous changes, which are still under way in some countries,it is understandable that the eort to build eective region-al cooperation to protect and conserve the Black Sea andits resources is a work still very much in progress.

With the 2007 Enlargement that brought Bulgaria and Ro-mania into the European Union, the Black Sea has also be-come an “EU sea”. Tis chapter reviews the various insti-tutions in place or regional cooperation around the Black Sea, as well as the EU position vis-à-vis the Black Sea andother relevant ora or regional cooperation with respect toother sea basin areas, including the Northern Dimensionand the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It concludes

with some suggestions or measures that the EU and itsBlack Sea neighbours might consider adopting, with a view to strengthening the institutional ramework or Black Sea

cooperation and or “greening” EU policies in this strategi-cally important region.

5.2 / t eu p vis-à-vis b s

From an environmental perspective, one o the main driv-ers in the Community’s involvement in the Black Sea Re-gion today is the Tematic Strategy on the Protection andConservation o the Marine Environment, which consti-tutes the environmental pillar o the Maritime Policy. Teseinstruments have delineated the EU’s growing interest and

role in marine issues. Te EU’s aim is to achieve good envi-ronmental status o the EU’s marine waters and to protectthe resource base upon which economic and social activi-ties depend.1 Te Strategy pays special attention to coop-eration with regional structures.

One element o the Strategy is the proposed Marine Strat-egy Directive, which will designate European Marine Re-gions on the basis o geographical and environmental cri-teria. Each member state will be required to ensure that its

waters reach or remain in “good environmental status” by

2020 at the latest.2

In its current redaction, the drat Direc-tive reers to our Marine Regions including the Black Sea.3 It calls or cooperation and consultation with all interestedparties, including Regional Sea Conventions. Te Europe-an Parliament and Council reached agreement on the pro-posed Directive in December 2007 and the ormal legal text

will likely be published in mid 2008.

Te Black Sea Synergy adds a regional dimension to the Eu-ropean Neighbourhood Policy to its pre-accession policy and to its partnership with Russia by recognizing the needor an increased European Union involvement in the Black

Sea area. It involves reinorcing existing initiatives or thedevelopment o cooperation both within the region as a whole and between the region and the EU. In relation toenvironmental aspects, the Synergy makes specifc reer-ence to the Bucharest Convention4 and considers the Com-munity’s accession to the Convention a priority. It also rec-ognizes the need or better implementation o multilateralenvironmental agreements in the region and a possibleextension o the DABLAS ask Force’s approach, as well asregional-level activities to combat climate change.

Te development o a regional approach is complicated by

the act that Black Sea Basin countries have varying status vis-à-vis the EU. Greece, Romania and Bulgaria are memberstates and urkey is a pre-accession country while Moldo-

va, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are coveredby the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the EU-Russian relationship is based on a Partnership and Coop-eration Agreement, which is also the ramework or the ourCommon Spaces o cooperation and their associated Road-Maps. In addition, the Black Sea Synergy oresees the pos-sibility to extend its scope beyond these countries to neigh-bouring regions, in particular the Caspian Sea, Central Asiaand South-Eastern Europe. Tese countries all respectively

under the Central Asia Regional Strategy and the Stabiliza-tion and Association process in the Western Balkans.

In the Black Sea Synergy policy documents, the EU has pro-posed to ocus on existing cooperation structures. A review o the institutional context and associated structures cur-rently in place, along with other EU and international initi-atives in the region, and the analysis o key EU initiatives inother regions, shows signifcant potential or an increasedand eective involvement o the EU in addressing the envi-ronmental concerns o the region.

cp 5 / the black sea institutions

1 Communication rom the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Thematic Strategy on the Protection and Conservation o the Marine Environment’, SEC(2005)1290.The Strategy will be reviewed in 2010.

2 Proposal or a Directive o the European Parliament and o the Council establishing A Framework or Community Action in the Field o Marine Environmental Policy (Marine StrategyDirective), revised drat refecting the political agreement reached by the Council (Environment) on 18 December 2006.

3 Common position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption o a Directive o the European Parliament and o the Council establishing a Framework or Community Action in theeld o Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), 12/07/2007

4 The Black Sea Synergy states that ‘Community accession to the Convention on the Protection o the Black Sea against Pollution is a priority.’




5.3 / i cx

Several regional organizations and initiatives are currently active in the region, reecting the need and political will orcooperation and coordination in the area. Tese organiza-tions and initiatives dier greatly in terms o geographical

scope, extent and ocus o cooperation activities.

As described below, most o these structures are not livingup to their ambitions and their activities are oten limitedby the lack o political commitments at both regional andnational levels.

t b s c

Te main cooperation structure in the region is the Black Sea Commission created in September 2000 under the

1992 Bucharest Convention. Its Permanent Secretariat,based in Istanbul, has only two persons supported by twosupport sta.

Various international organizations and donors have sup-ported the work o the Bucharest Convention over the

years. In particular, the assistance o the Global Environ-mental Facility (GEF) has been crucial. Starting in 1993,the GEF has supported the Black Sea Environmental Pro-gramme (BSEP), ollowed by the Black Sea Ecosystem Re-covery Project (BSERP), set up under the Strategic Partner-ship or the Black Sea and Danube Basin with UNDP, the

World Bank, the EU and other partners. Under the BSEP, aseries o studies were developed leading to a ransbound-ary Diagnostic Analysis fnalized in 1996, and the Black SeaStrategic Action Plan. National Strategic Action Plans werethen developed in the period 1997-1999. Part o the insti-tutional structure set up under the BSEP (6 Activity Cent-ers distributed among the littoral states and 7 Advisory Groups) is today viewed as not having been very eectivein bringing about policy changes.

Te end o BSERP second phase in late 2007 will see a sig-nifcant disengagement o the GEF rom the Black Sea, leav-

ing the Black Sea Commission with very limited fnancial

resources. Other international partners have also scaleddown their contributions, in the hope that the Parties tothe Convention would come orward with the politicaland fnancial support needed or strong regional coopera-tion. Tis eort to make the Black Sea Commission and its

Secretariat more sel-sustaining has had only limited suc-cess. Very ew Activity Centersare unctioning, due to lack o unding, and Advisory Groupactivities are oten unocusedand do not eed into politicaldecision-making.

Te Black Sea Commissionhas recognized the need to re-

vise this institutional setting.Tere is a general agreement

on the necessity to amend theoutdated Black Sea Conven-tion in order to integrate best

practices and open the Convention to accession by re-gional organizations such as the EU. However, the Black Sea Commission has had a tendency to inertia, and lack o political will impedes ecient both decision-making andincreased regional cooperation. It would be essential to en-sure that all key partners are willing to amend the Conven-tion. Nevertheless it is not clear yet whether the next Black Sea Ministerial Conerence, to be held in Kiev in June 2008,

will adopt such amendments or will only decide on uture

preparatory activities.

All this explains the diculties encountered in develop-ing additional legal instruments under the Convention.Te Protocol on biodiversity and landscape conservation,adopted in 2002, is not yet in orce, having been ratifed by only two countries – urkey and Ukraine. Several drat pro-tocols and legal documents5 have been developed but theadoption process is constantly delayed.

Despite these problems, the Bucharest Convention re-mains a key mechanism or cooperation within the region.

As a regional sea convention, it is the only legal structureresponsible or protecting the Black Sea environment andremains the main instrument or regional cooperation inareas such as environment and fsheries. I the EU is toplay a ull role in this structure, it is essential that it should

join the Convention. A condition sine qua non or this isthe adoption o the necessary legal basis or the EU, as aregional economic integration organization, to accede tothe Convention. Amendments to the Convention shouldbe ormally adopted beore the EU can become a Party.

Structures/Initiatives Countries Involved EU Status

Black Sea Synergy Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova,

Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine

Initiator

Bucharest Convention Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine Observer

Black Sea Economic Cooperation Initiative Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,

Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine

Observer

Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova,

Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine

Partner

Organisation for Democracy and Economic

Development - GUAM

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine -

The Community of Democratic Choice Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine -

5 These are a drat Strategic Action Plan or the Biodiversity Protocol, a drat Integrated Coastal Zone Management Strategy and Action Plan, a drat legally binding Document or Fisheriesand Conservation o Living Resources o the Black Sea, and a drat Revised Protocol or the Protection o the Black Sea against Pollution rom Land-Based Sources and Activities




o rg cp s

Te Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), set up in1992, became an economic regional organization in 1999.BSEC has established dierent institutions, in particular

a Parliamentary Assembly, a Permanent Secretariat, theBlack Sea rade and Development Bank and a Project De- velopment Fund. In the feld o environment protection,the BSEC Joint Declaration and Action Plan call, amongothers, or regional cooperation and harmonization o en-

vironmental legislation taking into account the legislativeramework o the EU, but include little concrete activities.Te ocus o its activities remains the development o eco-nomic relations between its members, and ew practicalcooperation projects have emerged even in this area.

Te Black Sea Forum or Dialogue and Partnership,

launched in June 2006, has been designed as a regular con-sultative process among countries o the extended Black Sea Region and between this group o countries and in-ternational organizations. It has no permanent structure.Its viability is under question mainly due to Russia’s reluc-tance to participate.

Dormant since its establishment in 1997, the Organiza-tion or Democracy and Economic Development – linkingGeorgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova and thereoreknown as GUAM – was revitalized in 2006. It now has aormalized structure and redefned objectives ocusing on

the development o ree trade and democratic values alongthe Caspian-Caucasus-Black Sea area. Te GUAM SectoralCooperation Development Strategy,6 adopted at the Bakusummit, sets up the objectives, tasks and orms o coopera-tion in economic and trade relations, energy, transport, I,the fght against terrorism and prevention and response toemergency situations, as well as culture, science and edu-cation, along tourism.

At the 10th anniversary celebration, GUAM members statedthat they saw themselves as a natural partner o the EU andconsidered EU-GUAM, Nordic-Baltic countries – GUAM

cooperation as the most promising areas or partnership.In addition, the our member countries have recognizedthat environment should become one o the priority ar-eas o their activities. It remains to be seen i the parties tothe ODED – GUAM will succeed in their attempt to con-cretize their commitments or reinorced cooperation. Tesame remark applies to a later initiative, the Community o Democratic Choice (CDC), set up at the initiative o Geor-gia and Ukraine, with a larger membership and ocus onthe Baltic-Black Sea Region. Te CDC aims at promotingdemocracy, human rights, and cooperative eorts to endregional conicts.

5.4 / eu i i g b s

t ep ng P

a Fg7

Te European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a dierentapproach than the more traditional ramework or bilateralcooperation, which has until now characterized the EU’sdealings with the countries o the region.

Under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership In-strument (ENPI), 73% o the unds are allocated to coun-try programs. Tere is no specifc fnancing line allocatedto the Black Sea, as defned by the Communication on theBlack Sea Synergy, except or the Black Sea CBC program.

Te amount allocated to it is very limited: 17 million, com-pared with €173.6 million available or the Mediterranean.

Te ENPI also includes an Eastern dimension, the ENPI-East. 25 to 35% o available unds are to be allocated to en-

vironmental issues. However, the only action provided orin this feld in the Annual Action Program or ENPI-East or2007 relates to the improvement o Forestry Law and Gov-ernance (€6 million out o a total budget o €56 million).8

Tereore, little unds are allocated to the Black Sea Regionas such. In certain areas such as biodiversity, wetlands

protection, unding is decreasing. Te only program thatoresees direct activities on biodiversity and nature conser-

vation is the Tematic program environment and naturalresources including energy ENRP with about 7 millioneuros over a period o 7 years, and this will support activi-ties both in the East and South.

Te low return o EC unded projects is a subject o concernamong the civil society. Tis would call or external assess-ment o the eciency o EC unded projects, but also the

way civil society is involved in these.

o eu

Te EU Water Initiative (EUWI), launched at the 2002 Jo-hannesburg Summit or Sustainable Development, seeksto meet the Millennium Development Goals or drinking

water and sanitation globally. Te EUWI is a multi-stake-holder platorm that aims to strengthen coordination andidentiy additional fnancial resources and mechanisms toensure sustainable fnancing in the water sector. Te chaircurrently held by the Commission will pass on to Roma-nia in 2008. Te EUWI-EECCA component ocuses on im-proving the management o water resources through two

6 http://www.guam.org.ua/275.811.0.0.1.0.phtml7 For more detail, see Appendix B.8 It should be noted that several water related projects still nanced under TACIS remaining budget are on-going or about to start in the region.




thematic pillars: water supply and sanitation and integrat-ed water resources management (IWRM).

Te EAP ask Force9 under the Environment or Europe (EE)process and the United Nations Economic Commission or

Europe (UNECE) play a key role in the development andimplementation o the EUWI-EECCA and in particular o National Policy Dialogues on water supply and sanitation,fnancing and IWRM (NPDs).10 Te EUWI-EECCA ocuseson national level and internal waters issues rather than re-gional seas as such. Tereore, although some activities arerelevant especially in relation to the implementation o theBucharest Convention at the national level (pollution romrivers and land-based sources), the EUWI-EECCA added

value is to cover other areas and issues o concern in theregion at large, and thereore can be a complementary toolto promote environmental cooperation in relation to the

Black Sea. Te main problem is that the EUWI-EECCA su-ers rom a lack o visibility and has not been very success-ul in involving other donors and IFIs. Te Commission hasitsel recognized that the Initiative ‘has not so ar producedthe expected results’.11

Te most useul coordination structure in terms o resultsachieved (i.e., pollution reduction) has been the DABLASask Force, set up in 2001. It has enabled IFIs donors andbenefciaries to cooperate on water-related investmentprojects or both the Danube and the Black Sea Area. Onthe whole, some o the most important actors or success

o the DABLAS process have been the acts that (i) projectpreparation unds were available to encourage upgradingo projects in a phased approach12 and that (ii) there wasa clear ocus on municipal water investment as the mostbankable projects. In addition, the World Bank supportednutrient reduction projects.

Te EU is supporting Regional Environmental Centres inmost o the BS countries. Te idea o establishing regionalenvironmental centres in the countries o the ormer So-

viet Union emerged during the early Environment or Eu-rope process and was ormally endorsed in 1996 by Euro-

pean environment ministers at the Sofa Conerence. TeHungary-based REC or Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)

was the initial model or the Eastern European and Central Asian RECs, which were set up with the aim to assisting insolving environmental problems in the region through thepromotion o cooperation between various stakeholders,

assistance to environmental NGOs and increasing pub-lic participation in the decision-making process, with anemphasis on the development o democratic civil society in the EECCA countries. Te EC started to support RECsthrough fnancial unding in 2000.

In some countries, such as Russia, the RECs have played animportant role in acilitating the dialogue between the na-tional authorities and the civil society. In specifc cases, suchas in the Caucasus, the work o the REC was made particu-larly dicult due to political tensions. Generally RECs canplay a useul role during transitional periods while there is alack o consultation mechanism and policy capacity both inthe side o the civil society and the government. Nowadays,as there is increased policy capacity and awareness in theBlack Sea Region countries, regional and local NGOs haveexpressed concern about the potential overlap with their

own activities leading to competition or scarce resources.

a i i

Other international fnancial institutions and donors areactive in the region. Apart rom GEF mentioned above,international support and activities, bilateral coopera-tion is pursued by several countries e.g. Austria, UK, Ger-many. Te Black Sea basin countries are parties to variousrelevant UNECE multilateral environmental agreements(MEA)13 and the UNECE and other UN agencies and pro-grams have been involved in the region. However, certain

Black Sea countries did not ratiy some key MEA and thelevel o implementation is oten low. In particular, the Environment or Europe (EE) process hasbeen a key political orum to promote cooperation in theUNECE region. However, the Belgrade Ministerial Coner-ence has decided to reorm the EE process and thereore,beore the reorm plan is endorsed by the UNECE sessionin 2009, EE uture remains uncertain. Te EU has clearly indicated14 that its involvement will remain limited andmainly ocus on participating in the implementation o UNECE environmental conventions, contributing to UN-

ECE Environmental Perormance Reviews, acilitating andsupporting the network o EECCA Regional EnvironmentalCenters, participating in selected sub-regional initiatives,in particular in relation to Central Asia, and contributing toimprovement o the water sector in the region towards theobjectives o the EUWI.

9 The EAP Task Force was set up by the 1993 ‘Environment or Europe’ Ministerial Conerence in order to acilitate the implementation o the Environmental Action Programme or EasternEurope, Caucasus and Central Asia countries adopted by this Conerence.

10 The NPDs aim at implementing comprehensive policy packages including legislation and standards. NPDs have started in both Moldova and Armenia, while it should start in Ukraine andKyrgyzstan respectively beginning and mid-2008.

11 Commission Non-Paper ‘ENP – Thematic Dimension’, COM(2006) 726 nal12 DABLAS is ollowing a phased approach as potential investment projects are classied in a priority project pipeline under our categories rom pre-easibility stage to nearly approved or

approved nancing or investments contributing to improvements in waste water. Overtime, investment projects move up through the pipeline, rom one category to another, beore beingapproved or unding.

13 These include the Convention on the Protection and Use o Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a TransboundaryContext (Espoo, 1991) and its Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (Kiev, 2003), the Convention on Access to Inormation, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Accessto Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 1998)

14 See Communication rom the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Commission cooperation with the Environment for Europe Process after the 2007 Ministerial

Conference in Belgrade’ , COM(2007)262 nal




Finally, the Council o Europe and the Organization or Se-curity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) play a key role inmonitoring the implementation o human rights, democ-racy and the rule o law. Te Council o Europe is active inostering cooperation between regional authorities within

the ramework o the newly set Black Sea euro-region. TeEuro-Regions are mainly used as a ramework or osteringcross-border contacts and regional/local cooperation.

5.5 / t w w: a e-m Pp n d p- eu p b s rg?

Te Northern Dimension policy and the Euro-Mediter-

ranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), with its specifcinitiative on the environment (Horizon 2020), have beenconsidered potential models o coordination within re-gional sea areas. Although it is not appropriate to strive tosimply reproduce these two initiatives in a region, whichis ar less advanced in terms o regional cooperation andpresent specifc eatures, they can provide some useulbenchmarks or the development o the EU policy in theBlack Sea Region.

t n d

Te Northern Dimension policy was established in 1999, with the broad objective to provide a common ramework or the promotion o dialogue and concrete cooperation,strengthening stability, wellbeing and sustainable devel-opment in Northern Europe. Te Northern Dimensionpartners are the EU member states, the EU Commission,Norway, Iceland and Russia, together with dierent region-al cooperation structures, namely the Council o the Bal-tic Sea States, the Barents Euro-Artic Council, the NordicCouncil o Ministers and the Artic Council.

It is only in 2006 that the adoption o the Political Decla-

ration on the Northern Dimension Policy and the associ-ated Policy Framework Document15 provided a permanentoundation to this policy, involving ministerial meetingsand a steering group. Te policy is characterized as the re-gional expression in the North o the EU/Russia CommonSpaces. Tis reects one o the most striking achievementso the Northern Dimension in that it succeeds in involvingRussia in concrete cooperation projects, on a non-politicalbasis. Te main implementation instrument is the Part-nership model, inspired by the Northern Dimension Envi-ronmental Partnership (NDEP), oten considered as a key result o the Northern Dimension.16 Tis should be extend-

ed to other areas including energy and transport. Such a

structure could constitute an interesting precedent or theBlack Sea Region, in particular, the NDEP Fund which at-tracts unding not only rom the Commission but also romindividual countries, including EU member states, Norway and, more importantly, Russia. Te Fund is managed by

the European Bank or Reconstruction and Development(EBRD) and the Steering Group is composed o EBRD, theEuropean Investment Bank (EIB) and the Nordic Invest-ment Bank (NIB). It addresses nuclear saety and generalenvironmental concerns.

Te EU-Russia Environmental Dialogue between DG En- vironment and the Russian Ministry o Natural Resources,launched by the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Coun-cil (PPC) on Environment, has led to the setting up o sub-groups on particular areas o importance to the NorthernDimension such as water and the marine environment, cli-

mate change or governance and conservation. Tese couldconstitute relevant ora to discuss environmental concernsspecifc to the Black Sea Region.

Other eatures o the Northern Dimension, which could berelevant or the Black Sea Region, are:

nthe Northern Dimension Inormation System, whichprovides inormation on projects in the area, acilitat-ing exchange between stakeholders and enhancingthe visibility o the Northern Dimension policy;

nthe Commission Inter-Service Group on the Northern

Dimension and the Artic, which includes ocials romseveral DG and is chaired by DG RELEX.

It should be underlined that the Northern Dimension islinked to active cooperation structures e.g. the Baltic Coun-cil, and strongly driven by Northern States. Tere is no suchdriving political orce in the Black Sea Region at this point.Besides, the Black Sea Region is much more complex anddiversifed than the Northern area which is more homog-enous and does not suer rom the bilateral tensions exist-ing in the Black Sea area. Tereore, while the pragmaticand gradual approach undertaken under the Northern Di-

mension is exemplary, it may take more time to reach suchresults in the Black Sea Region, involving all the interestedpartners i.e. not only the Black Sea countries but also exist-ing cooperation structures, such as BSEC.

t b P hz 2020

UNEP launched its frst regional seas eort in 1975, withrespect to the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP). Te 1976Barcelona Convention and its protocols have provided acommon legal ramework or protecting the sea’s environ-ment. However, or many years the MAP ocused primarily

on monitoring and inormation sharing, whereas fnancing

15 The new Northern Dimension policy adopted on 24 November 2006 in Helsinki entered into orce on 1 January 200716 Models for the European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Economic Area and the Northern Dimension , Marius Vahl, CEPS Working Document, February 2005




mechanisms or investment in environmental inrastruc-ture were not established until very recently.Te Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and what is known asthe Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, is the main rame-

work or multilateral dialogue and cooperation between the

EU member states and Southern Mediterranean countries.In November 2006 in Cairo, the partners endorsed a timeta-ble to reduce the pollution in the Mediterranean by identiy-ing and acting on major sources by 2020, thus launching theHorizon 2020 initiative. Tis initiative includes work in ourmain areas, the frst o which is the investment or pollutionreduction projects or priority sectors (urban waste water,municipal waste and industrial emissions). Tis will involvethe development o pollution reduction projects addressingthese priority sectors defned in the Euro-Mediterraneanprocess. Te other areas are: capacity building measures, re-search and monitoring, steering, and review.

Horizon 2020 seeks to establish collaboration between theEuropean Commission, EU member states, IFIs, southernMediterranean partners, and other stakeholders includ-ing NGOs. Coordination between Horizon 2020 and theparallel Strategic Partnership or the Mediterranean LargeMarine Ecosystem17 represents also a key challenge and itremains to be seen how successul the EU will be in pro-moting collaboration between the main stakeholders inthe context o Horizon 2020.

Te Horizon 2020 ocus on hot spots is an eective approach.

In the Black Sea Region, this could be initiated throughDABLAS, rather than be established as an additional initia-tive. Coordination should be ensured with the work pursuedunder the latest ransboundary Diagnostic Analysis (DA)carried out under the BSERP project and the uture associ-ated Strategic Action Plan, which should be adopted at thenext Black Sea Ministerial Conerence in June 2008.

Other key aspects o the Barcelona process that could beused as potential models are:

nthe institutionalization o multilateral cooperation at

high-level. A Euromed Ministerial Meeting at Minis-ters o Foreign Aairs level meets every 12 to 18 mothsto assess overall implementation and to provide politi-cal guidance. In parallel, regional thematic processesensure institutional contacts and cooperation in areassuch as environment, energy or water management;

nthe ocus on stakeholders exchange at regional level:numerous ora and platorms have been set up to pro-mote communication and exchange between variousstakeholders, including NGOs, academia, civil society and regional/local authorities, in the region. A NGOPlatorm involving representatives rom the environ-

ment, human rights, gender and cultural NGOs is sup-ported by the EU;

nTe dissemination o inormation in the area o envi-ronment and reshwater via inormation systems sup-ported by EU unds. Most relevant are the Euro-Medi-terranean Water Inormation System, EMWIS, and theregional support structure set up in the context o the

Short and Medium erm Action Programme on Envi-ronment, SMAP.

Finally, the EU has been active in the Mediterranean regionor the last 15 years and Southern member states have along tradition o cooperation with some partner countries.

Whilst the Barcelona Process has partially succeeded inenhancing regional relations in specifc areas (e.g. environ-ment, energy), it has not been very successul in terms o democratization and human rights. In contrast, the EU isonly starting to get involved into the Black Sea Region. Apartrom Romania and Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent urkey,

there are not such strong historical relations between theEU Member States and the other Black Sea countries.

5.6 / W eu bs g g p ?c

In line with the principle set up in the ENP Tematic Di-mension, EU involvement in the Black Sea Region shouldbuild on existing structures rather than creating new ones.Te necessity to engage Russia, which is a key strategicplayer in the region, is also a crucial actor. Although Russiais not covered by the ENP, its integration in the Black SeaSynergy is a means to prevent that Russia and other non-ENP countries in the area, such as urkey, are not excludedrom regional activities on the environment.

r: eu b

c p w

b s c

Notwithstanding its downalls, namely a weak and partially inadequate legal and institutional ramework, a lack o po-litical commitment rom its members, scarce fnancial re-sources and a membership limited to littoral countries, theBucharest Convention remains the most suitable structureto improve cooperation on environmental issues on a re-gional basis.

Accession to the Bucharest Convention is thereore a prior-ity or the EU. Once a Party to the Black Sea Convention,

the EU will be able to play a driving role in improving thecurrent institutional structure and the Convention legal

17 The Strategic Partnership or the Mediterranean Large Marine Ecosystem links UNEP and the World Bank. It will have two main elements: a regional component and a Partnership Invest-ment Fund or the Mediterranean Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (World Bank)




ramework as well as ostering cooperation, including onenvironmental aspects linked to transport and energy e.g.integrated coastal zone management activities, marinesaety, response to emergency situations, biodiversity,etc. Te EU involvement should be reinorced through

strengthening the current European Environment Agency (EEA) collaboration with the Black Sea Permanent Secre-tariat, accompanied (when adequate) by a participationo the Black Sea countries in the EEA activities at a bilat-eral level. Te EU could be also a driving orce in involvingother Black Sea basin countries in the activities o the Black Sea Convention, in particular those countries covered by the Black Sea Synergy but not parties to the Convention.Te EU as a Party to the Convention will also be in a bet-ter position to provide signifcant support to the Black SeaCommission and its Permanent Secretariat, e.g., by sec-onding an EU expert to the Permanent Secretariat to pro-

vide ongoing support.

r: a b s

p eu m

sg d

Te Bucharest Convention has also a key role to play in theimplementation o the EU Marine Strategy and meeting theobjective o a ‘good environmental status’ o the Black Sea

waters, as recognised by the Synergy itsel, which calls orcooperation with the relevant regional sea conventions.

Te EU Marine Directive provides a “ramework or mem-ber states to take the necessary measures to achieve ormaintain good environmental status in the marine envi-ronment by 2020 at the latest” (Article 1(1)). Tis concernsnot only EU member states’ waters (Article 2(1) but also re-gional waters, in particular the Black Sea (Article 4(1)(d)).

Te inclusion o the Black Sea in the Marine Strategy Di-rective which is a component o the EU’s maritime policy is designed to combat its environmental degradation. Notonly will the EU member states need to take action but it

will require regional cooperation with third countries to

meet the targets and objectives laid down in the legislation(Article 6). Concrete action needs to be taken.

r: eu pp

gz

Accession to the Bucharest Convention should be comple-mented by a more active participation in broader initia-tives such as BSEC. Te BSEC has the distinctive advantageo a membership extending to all countries o the region.Te institutional structures in place constitute a promis-ing ramework or enhanced dialogue and cooperation.

However, at this stage, BSEC limited inuence in the regionmakes it more a orum or an enhanced dialogue than or

concrete cooperation. Such cooperation should be restrict-ed to participation in specifc projects carried out underBSEC and could be developed at inter-governmental level,but also through private sector/NGO and public sector co-operation. Tis participation into concrete projects could

lead to an evolution o the Black Sea Synergy towards a co-operation ramework similar to the Northern Dimension orthe Euromed Partnership.

Other regional initiatives oer less perspective or uturecooperation. For example, the Black Sea Forum does notseem to be viable on the long term. As the ODED-GUAMand the CDC, it does not involve Russia, which needs to bea key partner in regional cooperation. However, all theseregional cooperation structures should play a central rolein helping countries to share experience and lessons andfnding new sources o unding, as well as coordinating on-

going donors and IFIs actions. Such structures could act asa driver to build peer pressure or actions.

r: bg r

p p p p

p g

Much depends on the driving political role that Romaniaor Bulgaria could play, in their combined roles as Black Sea littoral countries and EU Member States. During itsPresidency o BSEC, Romania has sought to improve theinstitutional setting o BSEC and initiated the adoption

o a Joint Declaration and Action Plan on environmentalprotection. On the other hand, the Black Sea Forum Initia-tive was driven by Romania as an attempt to overcome thelimited scope o cooperation within BSEC.18 As explainedabove, this initiative did not bring a signifcant impetus tothe cooperation in the region.

However, both countries are to play a central role in theBlack Sea cooperation structures and initiatives. In par-ticular, Bulgaria can push orward the EU agenda, as it willhold the chairmanship o the Black Sea Commission aterUkraine. In addition, Romania will take the lead o the EU-

WI-EECCA in 2008 and will be in a position to promote theBlack Sea Region within the EU and among other interna-tional partners, although, in this latter case, it will be moreocused on national level improvements in water govern-ance. Both countries, as new member states still very muchin transition, will need strong support rom the EU in devel-oping a leading role in the regional cooperation process.

r: eu p

p g w

b s sg

Te Commission has proposed to develop in the EuropeanNeighbourhood dialogue and cooperation on thematic is-

18 The Wider Black Sea Region: An Emerging Hub in European Security , Svante Cornell, Anna Jonsson, Niklas Nilsson, Per Häggström, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road StudiesProgram, 2006.




sues, including energy, transport and the environment. It isessential that these thematic components be not addressedin isolation. Tis is equally true with regard to broader co-operation ramework such as the Baku Initiative on energy and transport, which shall also integrate environmental

aspects. Overall political guidance should be provided inthe ramework o the Black Sea Synergy to streamline envi-ronmental concerns into these other cooperation felds. Atpresent, the regional approach o the EU under the ENP isscattered among dierent strategies, programs and dimen-sions (CBC, the thematic dimension, the ENPI-East). Al-though these reect at least partially the new role o the EUin the region, they do not constitute a clear and compre-hensive EU policy. Te promotion o the Black Sea Synergy as the main ramework or EU activities in the region willgive more visibility and political value to the involvemento the EU in the Black Sea area.

r: eu ,

p

By becoming more involved in regional activities, the EUis in a unique position to oster regional integration. How-ever, strong linkages should be established as a priority

within the EU’s own institutional structures and activitiesthrough:

nInter-General Directorates coordination along the lineo the Commission Inter-Service group created under

the Northern Dimension;nCoordination between various bilateral and regional

assistance projects unded by the EU, with the involve-ment o the EU delegations;

nSupporting cooperation between dierent regionalseas structures (HELCOM, OSPAR, MAP) and acilitat-ing peer exchanges internally, but also externally.

r: eu, b s

gz g

p nGo

Developing the policy and monitoring role o NGOs is es-sential in building a strong regional identity. Te promo-tion o the involvement o NGOs and the civil society ingeneral as a partner (e.g. through NGO platorms at nation-al and regional level, inormation systems or NGO thematicorums, such as on the environment) was one o the mainrequests expressed notably by Black Sea NGOs meeting inOdessa in February 2008 (see Appendix I).

In order to oster such involvement, it is important that lo-cal NGOs participate in and receive reliable inormation onthe relevant programs, projects and activities as well as on

the existing unding opportunities. Grant application pro-cedures are oten too complex and costly or small NGOs.Tis is particularly true in relation to programs and projectsfnanced under the Black Sea CBC programme which, onthe other hand, raises expectations in relation to environ-

mental cooperation at local level and people to people co-operation. Ways o simpliying the procedures should beinvestigated, and inormation on alternative (and moreaccessible) sources o unding (e.g. oundations) shouldbe made available. More small-scale and exible support

should be provided that can be accessed by local commu-nities and NGOs, e.g. by providing the unds to intermedi-ary organizations or re-granting. At the same time, a betterorganization at local level, in particular, a more active roleo local authorities, universities and chambers o com-merce, in guiding and supporting local NGOs would alsocontribute to enhancing their involvement.

r: eu p

p g , -

p, g enPi g

dablas t F & dablas t F

p x

Te ENPI and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility willbe the main vehicles or providing EU support or Black Seacooperation. Te policy documents developed by the Com-mission in the context o the strengthening o the ENP oerseveral interesting perspectives. However, this should beconcretised through specifc and targeted regional projectslike emergency preparedness measures that would need in-stitutional structures or coordinating national-level actions.

Coordination o investments on regional and national lev-

els is a crucial aspect. Te proposal to extend the simpleand eective DABLAS ask Force coordination process toother areas (waste, non-point sources o pollution, wateruse projects, ood protection) should be pursued. With re-gard to waste, the opportunities or investment lending orthe establishment o ship waste reception/treatment acili-ties in all major ports should be assessed.

Opportunities or promoting small-scale investments inthis ramework, but also through the Neighbourhood In-

vestment Facility, should also be considered. Tis wouldinclude small grant projects, loans to smaller municipali-

ties or groups o municipalities, especially in rural areas,so-called ‘sub-projects’ e.g. electricity saving in Waste Wa-ter reatment Plants.

r: b s , eu

gz

b s g

p -g p

Inter-regional cooperation should be reinorced with otherregions. Particular interest has been raised with regard tointer-regional cooperation between the Black Sea and the

Baltic region, and between the Danube and the Black SeaRegion. Tis would also allow to involve other EU memberstates. Policy dialogue and exchanges o experiences couldalso be set up between the Black Sea Synergy and the Un-ion or the Mediterranean processes.





53 GreeninG the black sea synerGy References

Chapter 1: Te Environmental Status o the Black Sea

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Ragwitz, M., C. Huber, G. Resch, . Faber, M. Voogt, R.Coenraads, H. Cleijne, P. Bodo, ‘FORRES 2020: Analysiso the renewable energy sources’ evolution up to 2020’Report or DG Energy and ransport o the EuropeanCommission, April 2005.

RUZGAR, ‘Environmental Movement in Azerbaijan,’ onhttp://azenviron.aznet.org/

Smith, Keith, C., 2007: ‘Russia’s European Occupation’,Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/com-mentary/smith1

assinari, F., 2006, ‘Synergy or Black Sea Regional Coop-eration: Guidelines or an EU Initiative’, CEPS Policy Brie No. 105/June 2006, 17 July 2006, http://www.ceps.be/Arti-cle.php?article_id=534

omozeiu, R., S. Stean and A. Busuioc, 2007: Spatial andtemporal variability o the winter precipitation in Romaniain connection with the large-scale circulation patterns.Int. J. Climatol., (in press).

onchev, P, 1997, ‘Energy Politics and Security in the Black Sea-Caspian Region’, Center or Japanese and Asian Stud-ies, ELIAMEP, document OP97.16.

simplis, M.N., S.A. Josey, M. Rixen and E.V. Staney, 2004b:

On the orcing o sea level in the Black Sea. J. Geophys.Res., 109, C08015, doi: 10.1029/2003JC002185

U.S. DOE, 2007: ‘ Energy Cooperation and Competition inthe Black and Caspian Regions – Global Energy Security &Te Economics o Climate Change’, February 5, 2007

Vajda, A., A. Venalainen, H. uomenvirta and K. Jylha,2004: An estimate o the inuence o climate change onheating energy demand on regions o Hungary, Romaniaand Finland. Q. J. o the Hungarian Meteorological Service,108, 123-140

Vahl, M, 2005: ‘Te EU and Black Sea Regional Coopera-tion: Some Challenges or BSEC’, CEPS Commentary, 15

April 2005 Weir, Fred. ‘Black Sea Oil Spill Blamed on Russia’s Lax Standards.’ Christian Science Monitor, 15 November 2007.

WISE (World Inormation Service on Energy) UraniumProject, undated, “New Uranium Mining Projects – Eu-rope”, http://www.wise-uranium.org/upeur.html

WNA (2007), ‘Uranium Maps’, http://www.wise-uranium.org/umaps.html?set=annu

World Nuclear Association, ‘Early Soviet Reactors andEU Accession’ http://www.world-nuclear.org/ino/in44.html, April, 2007.

Woehrel, S., 2007: ‘ Russian Energy Policy towards Neigh-bouring Countries’, CRS Report or Congress – preparedor Members and Committees o Congress, Order CodeRL34261, November, 27, 2007

Chapter 3: ransport in the Black Sea Region

A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy, Communica-tion From Te Commission, COM(2007) 774 fnal, Brus-sels, 05/12/2007

Assessment and management assessment o environmen-tal noise. Directive 2002/49/EC

Building bridges: Extension o the Major rans – Euro-pean ransport Axes o Te Neighbouring Countries. //European Commission, Energy and ransport DG, B-1049Brussels, 2007 - 16 p.




C E Delt. Greenhouse Gas Emissions or Shipping andImplementation Guidance or the Marine Fuel SulphurDirective. December 2006.

CEE Bankwatch Network comments on the HLG report onEN- extension to the neighbouring countries.

Commission Decision o 23 May 2007 establishing adrat o the multi-annual work programme or grants inthe feld o trans European ransport network (EN-)or the period 2007-2013 // http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/grants/doc/2007/rte_t/2007_2013_com_2007_2158_en.pd

Commission Sta Working Document Accompanyingdocument to the Communication rom the Commissionto the European Parliament, the Council, the EuropeanEconomic and Social Committee and the Committee o the Regions an Integrated Maritime Policy or the Euro-pean Union, Brussels, 10.10.2007 SEC(2007) 1278

Commission Sta Working Document AccompanyingDocument to the Communication rom the Commissionthe EU’s reight transport agenda: Boosting the eciency,integration and sustainability o reight transport in Eu-rope Report on the Motorways o the Sea State o play andconsultation, Brussels, 18.10.2007 SEC(2007) 1367

Communication rom Te Commission First progressreport on the implementation o the NAIADES Action Pro-gramme or the promotion o inland waterway transport /COM(2007) 770 fnal, Brussels, 5.12.2007

Communication rom the Commission Te EU’s reighttransport agenda: Boosting the eciency, integrationand sustainability o reight transport in Europe, Brussels,18.10.2007 COM(2007) 606 fnal

Communication rom the commission to the Council andthe European Parliament on Strengthening the Euro-pean Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 4 December 2006COM(2006)726 fnal

Communication rom the Commission to the Council andthe European Parliament on the “Extension o the majortrans-European transport axes to the neighbouring coun-tries, Guidelines or transport in Europe and neighbouringcountries”, COM(2007) 032 fnal, Brussels 31/01/2007

Communication rom the Commission to the European

Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Com-mittee and the Committee o the Regions concerning the“Progress o exploratory talks regarding cooperation inthe feld o transport with the neighbouring countries”,COM(2008) 125 fnal, Brussels 05/03/2008

Communication rom the Commission to the Council andthe European Parliament Extension o the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countriesGuidelines or transport in Europe and neighbouringregions, Brussels, 31.1.2007 COM(2007) 32 fnal

Communication rom the Commission to the Counciland the European Parliament Results o the review o

the Community Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions rompassenger cars and light-commercial vehicles, Brussels,7.2.2007 COM(2007) 19 fnal

Communication rom the Commission to the Council and theEuropean Parliament Black Sea Synergy - a New Regional Co-operation Initiative, Brussels, 11.04.2007 COM(2007) 160 fnal

Communication rom the Commission to the EuropeanParliament, Te Council, Te European Economic andSocial Committee and the Committee o the Regions anIntegrated Maritime Policy or the European Union,Brussels, 10.10.2007, COM(2007) 575 fnal

Communication rom the Commission to the European

Parliament, the Council, the European Economic AndSocial Committee And Te Committee O Te RegionsConclusions rom the Consultation on a European Mari-time Policy, Brussels, 10.10.2007. COM(2007) 574 fnal

Communication rom the Commission to the EuropeanParliament, the Council, the European Economic AndSocial Committee and the Committee o the Regions on

An Integrated Maritime Policy or the European Union,Brussels, COM(2007) 574 fnal, SEC(2007) 1278, SEC(2007)1279, SEC(2007) 1280, SEC(2007) 1283

Detailed analysis o the sustainability o the NAIADES Action Program, DCP WWF, 2006

Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 85/337/EC

European Parliament (EP) legislative resolution o 11 De-cember 2007 on the Council common position or adopt-ing a directive o the European Parliament and o theCouncil establishing a Framework or Community Actionin the feld o Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strat-egy Framework Directive) (9388/2/2007 – C6-0261/2007– 2005/0211(COD))

For practical guidance on the implementation o socio-economic appraisal and on strategic environmentalassessment, the 6th Research Framework Programmeprojects HEACO at http://heatco.ier.uni-stuttgart.de/and BEACON at http://www.transport-sea.net/results.phtml

Green Paper rom the Commission to the Council, theEuropean Parliament, the European Economic and SocialCommittee and the Committee o the Regions Adapting toclimate change in Europe – options or EU action, Brus-sels, 29.6.2007 COM(2007) 354 fnal

Inland Waterways and Environmental Protection - Euro-pean Conerence o Ministers o ransport, 2006, - 106 p.

Input rom the our subgroups and individual experts tothe fnal report o the Inormal Cross Government/Indus-

try Scientifc Group o Experts. International MaritimeOrganization, Sub-Committee on Bulk Liquids and Gases.28 December 2007

Inventory o Most Important Bottlenecks and Missing Linksin Te Waterway Network. Economic Commission For Eu-rope Inland ransport Committee. Working Party on Inland

Water ransport. RANS/SC.3/159. Resolution No. 49

Joint Statement on Development o Inland Navigationand Environmental Protection in the Danube River Basin,ICPDR // http://www.icpdr.org

Maritime ransport policy. European Commission, Direc-torate-General or Energy and ransport, B-1049 Brussels,

European Communities, 2006 - 16 p.

Networks or Peace and Development. Extension o themajor trans-European transport axes to the neighbouringcountries and regions. Report rom the High Level Groupchaired by Loyola de Palacio, November 2005




Proposal or a Regulation o the European Parliament ando the Council Setting emission perormance standards ornew passenger cars as part o the Community’s integratedapproach to reduce CO

2emissions rom light-duty vehi-

cles, Brussels, 19.12.2007 COM(2007) 856 fnal, 2007/0297(COD)

Proposal to the European Commission For the Develop-ment o the Conceptual and Organisational Aspects o aCommunity Rail Market Monitoring Scheme, Project Nr.REN/E2/08-2000, Final Report Submitted by GIVENIS,Bankastraat 99, 2585 EJ Te Hague, Netherlands, 2001

Regulation No. 1638/2006 o the European Parliamentand o the Council o 24/10/2006 laying down generalprovisions establishing a European Neighbourhood andPartnership Instrument; Annual Action Programme cov-ering the Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and RegionalIndicative Program 2007- 2013 or the ENP1 East or 2007

Strengthening Inland Waterway ransport: Pan-European

Cooperation or Progress. - European Conerence o Min-isters o ransport, 2006, - 106 p.

Study commissioned by the European Commission: Pros-pects o inland navigation within the enlarged Europe,Full Final Report March 2004. // http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/iw/doc/pine_report_report_ull_en pd

.O. sabiyeva, S.A. Izotov, O.N. Garas. Principal ecolo-gization directions in the transport sector o economy // Works o the Odessa Polytechnic University, Issue 1,Odessa, 2002.

EN- priority axes & projects 2005 /europa.eu.int/com-mrten/transport/projects/doc/2005_ten_t_en.pd

Te Communication on Tematic Strategy on Air Pollu-tion. // European Commission (EC), Belgium, 2005.

ransport and Environment Review O CO2

AbatementPolicies For Te ransport Sector // European Conerenceo Ministers o ransport Council o Ministers/ CEM/CM(2006)4/FINAL

WWF Austria, Te Danube – a lieline or just a navigationcorridor? WWF Position Paper on inland navigation on theDanube, , Vienna, 2005, - 44 p.

Chapter 4: Environment and Security in the Black SeaRegion

Amnesty International (AI), 2007: Amnesty Interna-tional Report 2007, http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Homepage [23 January 2008].

Ali, Saleem H. (ed.), 2007: Peace Parks – Conservationand Conict Resolution, US: Massachusetts Institute o echnology.

Bitkaeva, Larissa, 2006: Te Potential Role o External Ac-tors – a Chechen Perspective. In: Rita Grünenelder andHeinz Krummenacher (eds), 2006: Searching or Peace inChechnya – Swiss Initiatives and Experiences. Swisspeace:

Berne, pp. 27-29.Carius, Alexander, 2006: Environmental Peacebuilding.Environmental Cooperation as an Instrument or CrisisPrevention and Peacebuilding: Conditions or Success andConstraints. Berlin: Adelphi Consult.

Carius, Alexander, Dennis änzler and Achim Maas (orth-coming): Klimawandel im Kontext von Sicherheitspolitik,Krisenprävention und Katastrophenvorsorge: Heraus-orderungen ür die deutsche technische Entwicklungs-zusammenarbeit, Berlin: Adelphi Consult.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2007: Te World

Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-actbook/index.html [17 December 2007].

Clark, William A.V., 2007: Environmentally Induced Migra-tion and Conict, http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2007_ex04.pd [14 December 2007].

Centre or Naval Analyses (CAN), 2007: National Security and the Treat o Climate Change, http://securityandcli-mate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Treat%20o%20Climate%20Change.pd [12 De-cember 2007].

Centre or Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Cen-tre or a New American Security (CNAS), 2007: Te Age o Consequences. Te Foreign Policy and National Security Implications o Global Climate Change, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071105_ageoconsequences.pd [12December 2007].

Davis, Mike, 2005: Die Geburt der Dritten Welt. Hunger-katastrophen und Massenvernichtung im imperialis-tischen Zeitalter. Berlin: Assoziation A.

Davis, om, 2006: A Failure o Initiative. Final Report o theSelect Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Prepara-tion or and Response to Hurricane Katrina, http://www.katrina.house.gov/index.htm [10 October 2007].

ECC-Platorm, 2006: Fires in Nagorno-Karabakh HaveInicted Signifcant Damage – OSCE Expert Group,14 October 2006, http://www.ecc-platorm.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=697&Itemid=161

European Commission (EC), 2007: Green Paper rom theCommission to the Council, the European Parliament,the European Economic and Social Committee and theCommittee o the Regions - Adapting to climate change inEurope – options or EU action, Brussels: EC.

European Union (EU), 2007: 2007/868/EC: Council Deci-sion o 20 December 2007 implementing Article 2(3)o Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specifc restrictive

measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Deci-sion 2007/445/EC, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:340:0100:0103:EN:PDF [25January 2008].

Global Security 2007: Kongra-Gel, http://www.globalsecu-rity.org/military/world/para/pkk.htm [25 January 2008].

Götz, Roland, 2006: Nach dem Gaskonikt. Wirtschatli-che Konsequenzen ür Russland, die Ukraine und die EU,http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=2716 [23 January 2008].

Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2007: Justice or Chechnya.

Te European Court o Human Rights rule against Russia,http://www.hrw.org/eca/2007/justice_or_chechnya.pd [23 January 2008].




International Alert (IA), 2007: A Climate o Conict: TeLinks Between Climate Change, Peace and War, http://

www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pd&id=322&docs=980 [12 December 2007].

International Alert (IA), 2004: From War Economies to PeaceEconomies in the South Caucasus. London: International Alert.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),2007: IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. Working Group IReport : “Te Physical Science Basis”, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg1.htm [17 December 2007].

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),2007a: IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. Working Group IIReport: “Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm [17 December 2007].

Koenig, Marietta, 2007: First Contact with Distant Rela-tives: EU Activities in the Wider Black Sea Region. KFIBS

Analysis 2/07. Cologne: KFIBS e.V.

Matveeva, Anna, 2006: International Actors and the Conictin Chechnya. In: Rita Grünenelder and Heinz Krummen-acher (eds), 2006: Searching or Peace in Chechnya – SwissInitiatives and Experiences. Swisspeace: Berne, pp. 30-35.

Memorial Institute or the Prevention o errorism(MIP), 2008: MIP errorism Knowledge Base. Chech-nya, http://www.tkb.org/IncidentRegionModule.jsp?startDate=01%2F01%2F2006&endDate=01%2F23%2F2008&domInt=0&suiInt=0&flter=0&detail=0&ino=Chechnya&in o1=4&imageField.x=73&imageField.y=10&imageField=flter+results&pagemode=incident&regionid=4&countryid=1&sortby= [23 January 2008].

Memorial Institute or the Prevention o errorism(MIP), 2007: MIP errorism Knowledge Base. urkey,http://www.tkb.org/IncidentRegionModule.jsp?startDate=01%2F01%2F2000&endDate=12%2F17%2F2007&domInt=0&suiInt=0&flter=4&detail=21&ino=urkey&ino1=1&imageField.x=78&imageField.y=6&imageField=flter+results&pagemode=incident&regionid=1&countryid=U&sortby= [17 December 2007]

Oneworld, 2005: Last chance or the orests o Armenia, http://uk.oneworld.net/article/view/113535/1/ [14 December 2007].

Parsons, Robert, 2006: Russia: Is Putting Looking oImpose Solutions o Frozen Conicts?, http://www.rerl.

org/eaturesarticle/2006/02/0827c1a-13d6-4394-aa25-5-bd758b70cd0.html [14 December 2007].

Reuters, 2007: urkey bombs Kurdish rebels in north Iraq,http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L16717769.htm [17 December 2007].

Reuters, 2007a: EU concerned at urkish attacks in north-ern Iraq, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L17609911.htm [17 December 2007].

Socor, Vladimir, 2007: Russia’s Black Sea Fleet clinging toSevastopol while it can, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372348 [23 January 2008].

Swalley, David, 2007: Te Environment and Security Ini-tiative: From analysis to action, http://www.envsec.org/docs/envsec_david_swalley.pd [5 December 2007].

Swisspeace 2007: FAS Update | Russia | Chechnya | No 1 |February to March 2007. Berne: Swisspeace.

Swisspeace 2007a: FAS Update | Russia | Chechnya | No 2| April to May 2007. Berne: Swisspeace.

Swisspeace 2007b: FAS Update | Russia | Chechnya | No 3| June to August 2007. Berne: Swisspeace.

Swisspeace 2007c: FAS Update | Russia | Chechnya | No 4| September to October 2007. Berne: Swisspeace.

Swisspeace 2007d: FAS Update | Russia | Daghestan | No 4| September to October 2007. Berne: Swisspeace.

änzler, Dennis, Hans-Jochen Luhmann, Niko Supersberg-er, Manred Fischdick, Achim Maas and Alexander Carius,2007: Die sicherheitspolitische Bedeutung erneuerbarerEnergien. Berlin: Adelphi Consult and Wuppertal Institute.

United Nations (UN), 2006: General Assembly. SixtiethSession, 98th plenary meeting, Tursday, 7 September2006, 3 p.m, New York. UN document A/60/PV.98, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/486/40/PDF/N0648640.pd?OpenElement [27 January 2008].

Wissenschatlicher Beirat Globale Umweltveränderung(WBGU), 2007: World in ransition – Climate Change asSecurity Risk, http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2007_engl.html [12 December 2007].

Wol, Aaron ., Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius andGeorey D. Dabelko, 2005: Managing Water Conict andCooperation. World Watch Institute 2005: State o the

World 2005, New York & London: Norton, pp. 80-99.

Chapter 5: Te Black Sea Institutions

Commission Non-Paper: ‘ENP – Tematic Dimension’,

COM(2006) 726 fnalCommon position adopted by the Council with a view tothe adoption o a Directive o the European Parliamentand o the Council establishing a Framework or Com-munity Action in the feld o Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), 12/07/2007

Communication rom the Commission to the Counciland the European Parliament ‘Tematic Strategy on theProtection and Conservation o the Marine Environment’,SEC(2005)1290.

Communication rom the Commission to the Council andthe European Parliament ‘Commission cooperation with

the Environment or Europe Process ater the 2007 Ministe-rial Conerence in Belgrade’ , COM(2007)262 fnal

Ocial GUAM Website at: http://www.guam.org.ua/275.811.0.0.1.0.phtml

Proposal or a Directive o the European Parliament and o the Council establishing A Framework or Community Actionin the Field o Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Directive), revised drat reecting the political agreementreached by the Council (Environment) on 18 December 2006.

Vahl, Marius, February 2005, ‘Models or the EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy: Te European Economic Area and

the Northern Dimension’, CEPS Working Document.Cornell, Svante; Jonsson, Anna; Nilsson, Niklas;Häggström, Per, 2006, Te Wider Black Sea Region: AnEmerging Hub in European Security, Central Asia-Cauca-sus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.



58 GreeninG the black sea synerGy Appendices

appx a

m eu i g

b s sg

Te Synergy is a recent regional cooperation initiative o the EU complementary to existing EU policy ramework. Itaims to develop enhance cooperation within the Black Searegion and also between the region as a whole and the EU.In the energy context, this initiative ocuses on the potentialo the region to provide energy supply security diversifca-tion to the EU by upgrading the existing and constructingnew energy inrastructure (increasing oil and gas imports).But according to the European Commission’s Communi-cation on this initiative “the EU is (…) helping the coun-

tries o the region to develop a clearer ocus on alternativeenergy sources and on energy eciency and energy sav-ing, which will release important energy resources”. It is notclear though i the renewable energy sources will replaceinternal demand or be exported.

Focus countries

Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia,Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and urkey

Focus areas

i) Democracy, respect or human rights and goodgovernance;

ii) Managing movement and improving security;iii) Te “rozen” conicts;iv) Energy;

v) ransport; vi) Environment; vii) Maritime Policy; viii) Fisheries;ix) rade;

x) Research and Education Networks; xi) Science and echnology;

xii) Employment and social aairs; xiii) Regional Development.

Sponsor

Co-fnance is applied as a general principle. Community support could be available: under the national, regionaland cross-border programmes o the ENPI, other externalassistance instruments and, or EU Member States, the Eu-ropean Regional Development Fund.

Specifc projects

Te Commission commits itsel to make use o the JointImplementation o the Clean Development Mechanism o the Kyoto Protocol in order to promote regional-level ac-tivities to combat climate change.

Reerence

Communication rom the Commission to the Council

and the European Parliament “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative”, Brussels, 11.04.2007,COM(2007) 160 fnal.

t b i

Short description

Te Baku Initiative is a policy dialogue aimed at enhancingenergy cooperation between the EU and countries o theBlack Sea, the Caspian Basin and their neighbours. Its goalis to achieve progressive integration o the Black Sea and

Caspian Sea region energy markets with the EU markets.

Te 2nd Energy Ministerial Conerence was held in Novem-ber, 2006 and agreed on a new Energy Road Map whichsets a long-term plan ocusing on the our ollowing prior-ity areas: converging o energy markets; enhancing energy security; supporting sustainable energy development, in-cluding energy eciency, renewable energy sources anddemand side management; and attracting investment to-

wards energy projects o common interest.

Time period

Te initiative began as a result o the conclusions reachedat the Energy Ministerial Conerence which took place inBaku on 13 November 2004

Focus countries

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyr-gyzstan, Moldova, ajikistan, urkey, urkmenistan, Ukraine,Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation (as an observer)

Focus areas

Energy and transport

Sponsor

European Commission

Reerence

Communication rom the Commission to the Council andthe European Parliament ‘Black Sea Synergy - A New Re-gional Cooperation Initiative’

www.inogate.org

aPPendices




inoGate

Short description

Inogate is intended to improve the security o energy supply

through multi-annual technical assistance programmes. Itis supported by the EU Black Sea and Caspian Sea Basinand its Neighbouring Countries Energy Cooperation Sec-retariat, and it was agreed at the Astana Ministerial Coner-ence on 30 November 2006. Although it originally stands or“Interstate Oil and Gas pipelines to Europe”, it has enlargedits scope since 2004 to encompass also the electricity sectorand to address energy-related environmental issues.

Time period

It has been operational since 2001.

Focus countries

Currently 21 countries have signed or acceded to the Um-brella Agreement. From these there are 13 countries wherethe agreement is in orce: Azerbaijani Republic, Republic o Belarus, Republic o Croatia, Hellenic Republic, Republico Kazakhstan, Republic o Kyrgyzstan, Republic o Latvia,Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Re-public o urkey, Ukraine, and Republic o Uzbekistan.Note the absence o Russia.

Specifc projects

Some o the main activities undertaken in 2001-2004 are:Design, Construction and Modernization o 10 Cross-bor-der Gas Metering Stations, Construction o the new EasternEurope Regional Natural Gas Metrological Centre (Ukraine,Belarus, Moldova), Upgrades to the Abovian UndergroundGas Storage Station (UGSS) in Armenia, Procurement o emergency equipment or saety and security o regional oiland gas inrastructures in Caucasus and Central Asia, Elab-oration o Reorm Options or the Gas ransit o Ukraine,Completion o Feasibility Study or Multimodal Oil rans-

port System between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia,Development o INOGAE in Romania & Support or a-cilitating the Constantsa-Omisalij Oil Pipeline, Assessmento the Iran-Armenia Gas Interconnection, Promotion andProject Facilitation or the extension o the Odessa-Brody Oil ransportation System to Poland.

Reerence

www.inogate.orgEIR Development Partners, Hill International and G&Fint,“INOGAE Developments 2001-2004… and New Perspec-

tives”, 2004

bsec (b s e cp

og)

Short description

Established in 1992 with Russia and urkey as its oundingmembers, and transormed into an international organiza-tion in 1999. Initially concentrated on economic cooperationbut its ocus has been gradually enlarged. It has proved to be“a confdence-building orum or discussion o common in-terests” but has had a poor perormance (assinari, 2006).

Focus countries

Membership includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldo- va, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, urkey, Albania and Serbia. Seven EU Member States have observer

status with BSEC (Te Czech Republic, Germany, France,Italy, Austria, Poland and Slovakia). Te Commission in-tends to seek observer status and to support EU MemberStates’ applications.

Sponsor

European Commission

oded-Guam

Short description

Tis is the revival o the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Az-erbaijan, Moldova) US-backed initiative put orward in the1990s. GUAM was restyled as the Organisation or Democ-racy and Economic Development (ODED-GUAM) in 2006to ocus on energy security across the Caspian-Caucasus-Black Sea axis, among other issues.

Focus countries

Caspian-Caucasus-Black Sea axis

Focus areas

Energy security, ree trade area among the member states,as well as democracy promotion.

t g

In October 2005, the 25 Member States, Bulgaria, Roma-nia and the countries o the Balkans signed the Energy

Community South East Europe Treaty aimed to establisha regional energy market or gas, petroleum products andelectricity, and to integrate it with the EU’s internal market.

Te Energy Community reaty entered into orce on 1 July 2006, extending the relevant EU energy acquis to the West-ern Balkan countries. It is an instrument that oers the pos-sibility o ull participation in the European internal mar-ket and ocuses on market liberalisation, reducing sulphur




content o certain uels and limiting the emissions o cer-tain pollutants. It has been granted a $1 billion loan romthe World Bank. Te Commission’s March 2006 Energy Green Paper1 suggests that the Energy Community shouldembrace urkey and Ukraine, both countries with a strate-

gic importance or the transit o energy to the EU. Ukrainehas already ormally applied to join the Energy Community reaty, though urkey has so ar rejected the idea.

o

Tere are also other relevant initiatives. For instance: pro-grammes o the UN, the OSCE, the OECD and the Councilo Europe or the Black Sea rust or Regional Cooperationo the GMF o the United States. Tese are regional coop-eration programmes supported by international organisa-tions and third countries. Other existing EU instruments,

which have long been disabled in the Black Sea Region dueto the lack o an EU common energy policy or the area, are:the Energy Commissioner’s oce, the EU’s Special Repre-sentatives or the regions, and the EU mission in energy-producing and key transit countries.2

1 A European Strategy or Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, March 2006, COM(2006) 105 nal2 See Socor (2006)




appx b

t ep ng P

Te European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched in

March 20033

is aimed at developing a “zone o prosperity and a riendly neighbourhood … with whom the EuropeanUnion enjoys close, peaceul and cooperative relations.”Te ENP gives to neighbour countries the opportunity totake a “stake in the internal market” and to participate inrelevant Community programmes. Cooperation is basedoverall on a set o shared principles such as democracy andthe rule o law.

Te ENP is an element o the EU overall security policy 4 and o the EU’s development policies, and in this contextollows EU development policy rationales.

Te ENP ocuses, among others, on the Black Sea area. Itsmain operational tools are the ENP Action Plans mutually agreed between the EU and each neighbour country. Te

Action Plans set out a broad agenda or reorms that theneighbour countries commit to undertake over a three- orfve-year period. o promote implementation o reorms,EU also commits to oer incentives in terms o trade, aid,political contacts and participation in Community pro-grammes and activities. In the Black Sea Region ENP ac-tion plans are currently in orce in Armenia, Azerbaijan,Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Te Commission is promoting a country-specifc, “dieren-tiated”, approach and ‘there are as many possible responsesas there are partner countries, according to each partner’spolitical situation, its level o ambition with regard to theEU, its reorm agenda and achievements, and its level o socio-economic development’. 5

As part o the EU’s eorts to enhance and provide more at-tractive incentives to partner countries under the ENP, aCommunication on “strengthening the European Neigh-bourhood Policy”6 was published on 4 December 2006. Inits Communication, the Commission committed towards

increased thematic (on energy, transport, but also on environment) and regional (strengthening Black Sea Dimen-sion) cooperation, increased civil society participation inthe ENP/ENPI and an additional 1 billion € unding allo-cated to a Neighbourhood Investment Facility and Gov-ernance Facility. A communication on a “Strong EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy” was then published in December2007 to take stock o the strengthening o the ENP process.

Te EU has also developed the ENP in a regional perspec-

tive, notably through the Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC)Programme and along horizontal issues through the Te-matic Dimension.

Te CBC Strategy Paper7 sets out the main issues to be

addressed under the CBC detailed programming. TeCBC Strategy oresees the development o particular pro-grammes or shared sea basins including the Black Sea.In this case, partners will primarily represent the regionaland sub-national administrative levels and local civil soci-ety organisations. Specifc objectives oreseen include thedevelopment o sea-basin wide cooperation platorms andthematic networks inter alia in the environmental feld;support or sea-basin wide planning in various areas in-cluding transport, energy, environment, maritime saety and risk prevention; support o processes and creationo multilateral contacts between NGOs and civil society

groups in the EU and partner countries.

Te Tematic Dimension,8 introduced by the EuropeanCommission in its eorts to strengthen the EuropeanNeighbourhood Policy, assesses opportunities or rein-orced regional cooperation in a range o sectors, includ-ing energy, transport and environment, across the entireENP Neighbourhood. It also ‘responds to the need to strikea multilateral/bilateral balance in the Eastern dimensiono the ENP’, an aspect only very partially considered so ar.

With regard to environment, the Tematic Dimension ore-sees some priority areas o action, namely the strengthen-

ing and/or streamlining o the implementation o existingmultilateral agreements and cooperation rameworks, in-creased peer contacts across the region and the inclusiono all stakeholders, as well as exchanges between partnerso regional seas conventions. Such exchanges are also ore-seen in relation to maritime policy with the EU providingthe initiative and support.Tis reection on the thematic dimension o the ENP isinstrumental in prioritizing environmental cross-cuttingissues, including sea basin environmental concerns. How-ever, it does not provide overall political guidance as tohow to streamline environmental considerations within

the other themes such as energy or transport. Tese shouldnot be developed in isolation. Overall guidance is key inensuring the integration o environmental considerationsand should be provided in the ramework o the Black SeaSynergy.

Fg a enP

From January 2007 the fnancial support to neighborhoodcountries is being provided under the European Neigh-

3 Communication o the Commission “Wider Europe, Neighbourhood: A New Framework or Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 nal4 See or instance “A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy”, 12 December 2003, http://ue.eu.int/cms3_o/showPage.asp?id=266&lang=en&mode=g5 Communication rom the Commission, ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’, COM(2007) 774 nal6 COM (2006) 726 nal, 4 December 20067 Cross-Border Cooperation: Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Indicative Programme 2007-20108 Commission Non-Paper ‘ENP – Thematic Dimension’, COM(2006) 726 nal9 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument




bourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).9 Comparedto the previous fnancial cooperation instruments, ENPIprovides more exibility and represents an increase in re-sources. Te EU budget settlement or the period 2007-13provides an approximate amount o €12 billion or this new

instrument to be spent on the ENP countries, both East andSouth.

Under the ENPI, 73% o the unds are allocated to country programmes. Te remaining amount is shared between theregional programmes, the CBC, the Neighbourhood Invest-ment Facility and the Governance Facility.

Te ENPI includes two regional programmes, one or theMediterranean and one or the ENPI-East as well as a cross-regional programme covering both regions. Te EasternRegional Programme covers Belarus, Moldova, Russia,

Ukraine and the three Caucasus countries and ocuses oncross-cutting regional issues. For the period 2007-2010,10 environment and orestry are within the key issues to beaddressed in this ramework, along or example energy and transport networks. Te ENPI Eastern Regional In-dicative Programme 2007-2010 oresees between 25 to 35%o available unds to be allocated to environmental issues.It defnes the priority areas or ‘environment and orestry’,including support to the regional aspects o the EU WaterInitiative and to regional seas, involving support to coop-eration on the Black Sea, ocussing on institutional supportand prioritizing o investments and leverage o IFI unding.

Other priorities in this area relate to the implementationo the Kyoto Protocol, sustainable management o orestry and environmental awareness raising. However, the only action provided or in this feld in the Annual Action Pro-gramme or ENPI-East or 2007 relates to the improvemento Forestry Law and Governance (€6 million out o a totalbudget o €56 million).11

Te CBC draws together unding rom external (ENPI) andinternal (European Regional Development Fund) sourcesin one single instrument and one single programming proc-

ess. Within the whole CBC budget, the share o the Black Sea programme is very limited. For the period 2007-2013,€17.3 million are allocated to the Black Sea Programme. Incontrast, €173.6 million is available or the Mediterraneanand the total budget or CBC is €1,118.4 million. urkey can

take part in the Black Sea basin programme drawing uponits unds rom the Instrument or Pre-Accession. Prioritiesinclude promoting economic and social development inthe border areas, addressing common challenges includ-ing networking resources and competences or environ-mental protection and valorization, and promoting peopleto people type actions.

Within the ENPI envelope €700 million will be used to sup-port a Neighbourhood Investment Fund, intended to pro-

vide grant support or lending operations by EIB, EBRDand other bilateral/international fnancial institutions.12

Also an amount o €300 million is devoted to a GovernanceFacility that rewards every year best perorming countries(in implementing the ENP).13

In addition to grant unding, neighbouring countries willbe eligible, during the period 2007-2013, or loan fnanc-ing through the EIB. In the Eastern Neighbourhood, €3.7billion or the period 2007-2013 has been allocated or Rus-sia, Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova and – subject touture Council Agreement – Belarus) as well as SouthernCaucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Tis new mandate is or “projects o signifcant interest to the EU in

transport, energy, telecommunications and environmentalinrastructure. Priority should be given to projects on ex-tended major rans European Network axes, projects withcross-border implications or one or more Member Statesand major projects avouring regional integration throughincreased connectivity.”

While the legislation establishing the ENPI14 clearly ore-sees a major role or the EIB, it also paves the way or lend-ing by other IFIs, as it provides that Community assistanceshould normally be co-fnanced by the benefciary coun-tries through public unds, contributions or other sources.

10 ENPI East Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2010, 27 March 200711 It should be noted that several water related projects still nanced under TACIS remaining budget are on-going or about to start in the region.12 These unds will be allocated to large inrastructure projects, including in the transport, energy and environmental sectors13 In 2007, Governance Facility allocations were granted to Ukraine and Morocco14 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006




appx c

c eg F s

a

Armenia has no domestic oil production or refning indus-try and relies largely on imports to meet its energy needs.Oil imports are delivered by rail, while small amounts o gasoline and diesel uel are transported by tanker truck,since Armenia lacks any pipelines or crude oil, oil prod-ucts or or domestic distribution. (Inogate, undated)

Armenia’s oil consumption in 2005 accounted or 44 thou-sand bbl/d. Te country meets its oil demand trough im-port rom Russia and Azerbaijan. Ater a sharp decreasein oil consumption ollowing Armenia’s independence in1991, the country’s consumption has been increasing slow-

ly since 1995, as described in the ollowing fgure:

Armenian oil demand is constrained, largely, due to aneconomic embargo maintained by Azerbaijan to the East,and urkey to the West. Te embargo began shortly aterthe secession o Nagorno-Karabakh (DOE, 2005)

Te largest portion o total energy consumption comes rom

natural gas. Armenia does not produce natural gas beingthus largely dependent on imports. Armenia has been con-nected to the Russian gas network (ex USSR) since 1956.

At present two gas pipelines connecting Azerbaijan with Armenia are closed and the only way to import gas into Ar-menia is rom Russia via Georgia (Inogate, undated).

Russian frms has control over various energy assets in Ar-menia and in October 2006 Armenian ocials announcedthat the Russian frm Gazprom would assume control o anIranian-Armenian gas pipeline, which will be completed in2008. Part o the gas will be used to generate electricity or

Iran and Georgia, but the remainder may meet Armenia’sconsumption needs (Woehrel, 2007).

Electricity sector

In Armenia, non-thermal domestic electricity generationaccounted or 60 per cent o total generation in 2002, with32% provided by nuclear energy and 26% by hydropower

Armenia has one nuclear power plant (Metsamor NuclearPower Plant), which was built in 1980 with a design lie o 30 years. Te nuclear power plant supplies around 30 per cento the country’s electricity (Inogate, undated). Te EU hasrequested the early closure o this nuclear power plant.

Besides the reerred nuclear plant, Armenia has three ther-mal plants with a total capacity o 1,756 MW. Tese plantsare operating beyond their planned lietime and have a

very low eciency. Since all ossil uels must be importedinto Armenia, these plants are continually low on uel andare unable to operate near capacity (EBRD, 2005).

Renewable Energy Sources Potential and Policies

Wind: Tere are 3 MW o wind energy capacity installedin Armenia. (EBRD, 2005) Armenia has a rather good po-tential or wind energy development. Te most promisingsites are (rom north to south) Pushkin-Pass, Aragaz, SevanLake, Sisian-Pass, and Karakhach Pass.

Biomass: o utilize biomass would require signifcant analy-sis o the available residues. Given the amount o orestland,agriculture, and livestock, biomass uels could prove to be a

valuable source o energy. Although biogas is not currently explored, an attempt has been made to attract oreign invest-ment or the construction o a large biogas plant. Accordingto EBRD (2005), it would be possible to build a biogas plant

within 12 to 15 years but unding is still an outstanding issue.

Solar: Te average annual solar radiation in Armenia is ap-proximately 1,720 kWh/m2, which is higher than the averageannual European solar radiation o 1,000 kWh/m2. Over aquarter o the territory o the country has solar resources withan average intensity o 1,850 kWh/m2. Despite the avorableclimatic conditions and absence o own domestic uels, solar

energy potential is little explored in Armenia (EBRD, 2005).

Geothermal: Currently thermal water is used only orswimming pools and in therapeutic baths. At present only obsolete technologies are in use: spouting (ree ow) welloperation, direct use o geothermal water. otal installedheat capacity is less than 1 MWt. Tere is no national pro-gram promoting use o geothermal energy (EBRD, 2005).Hydro electric: Hydropower provides a signifcant part o

Armenia’s electricity, accounting or 25% o electricity gen-erated in 2000. Te current hydropower capacity is concen-trated on the Hrazdan River. Te hydro potential o Arme-

nia has been evaluated to be about 21.8 billion kWh/year,including 18.6 billion kWh rom large and medium riversand 3.2 billion kWh rom small rivers. Te economically easible potential is about 3.3 to 3.5 billion kWh, with 1.5billion kWh already utilized (EBRD, 2005).

Armenian and Georgian Oil Consumption (1992-2005)Source: EIA, 2004 & 2005 are estimates

Figure 2: Armenian and Georgian Oil Consumption (1992-2005) (DOE, 2005)




Hydro electric: Hydropower provides a signifcant part o Armenia’s electricity, accounting or 25% o electricity gen-erated in 2000. Te current hydropower capacity is concen-trated on the Hrazdan River. Te hydro potential o Arme-nia has been evaluated to be about 21.8 billion kWh/year,

including 18.6 billion kWh rom large and medium riversand 3.2 billion kWh rom small rivers. Te economically easible potential is about 3.3 to 3.5 billion kWh, with 1.5billion kWh already utilized (EBRD, 2005).

az

Azerbaijan has its own oil and natural gas reserves. Ac-cording to EIA, the oil production o Azerbaijan has risento 860,000 bbl/d in 2007. Te gas production in 2006 ac-counted 241 Bc in the year 2006.

Azerbaijan is expected to export around 730,000 bbl/d o oil during 2007 (EIA). Tis oil is being exported via the Baku– bilisi –Ceyhan (BC) pipeline system. Tis pipeline runs1,040 miles rom the capital Baku via Georgia to the Medi-terranean port o Ceyhan. (See fgure below)

Tere are other export routes besides the BC line, such asthe Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline also know as the northern

route. Tis pipeline exports 40,000 bbl/d o oil via Russia tothe Black Sea. Te next pipeline, the Baku-Suspa line, alsocalled as the Western early oil pipeline, goes rom Baku toSupsa. Te Baku-Suspa line has a capacity o 155,000 bbl/d.Tis pipeline has been shut down in 2007 or an extendedrepair program (EIA). Te Baku-bilisi-Erzerum (BE) gaspipeline also runs through Azerbaijan. Tis pipeline has acapacity o 8.8 billion bcm per annum.

Electricity

Te Electric power sector has a generating capacity o 5.5

GW Azerbaijan has eight state owned thermal plants andsix state-owned hydroelectric plants. Te eight thermalplants account or 80 per cent o generating capacity.

Renewable energy policies and potential

Azerbaijan has a state policy on renewables that runs rom2005-2013.

Wind: According to EBRD, there is no installed wind ener-gy capacity in Azerbaijan. Tere are only small wind units which were used or irrigation and lighting. Te numberand current operating conditions o these units are un-known. (EBRD)

Biomass: Tere are no biomass energy projects in Azerbai- jan. However, there are several sources that could provideresidues or biomass combustion. (EBRD)

Solar: Tere are no solar energy resources in Azerbaijan.Te main reason why solar energy has not been exploited

is due to domestic oil production. (EBRD)

Geothermal: Tere is a high potential or geothermal development in Azerbaijan. Te prospective sources are rec-ommended or therapeutic baths, industrial, and energy applications.Te use o thermal waters or greenhouse heating in theLenkoran region, Kuraside zone Gandja, and Yalama-Khu-dat regions are ound to be promising. Te production ca-pacity o the Lenkoran, Massaly, and Astara regions is esti-mated to be about 25,000 m3 day. (EBRD)

Hydroelectric: Tere are three hydroelectric power plantso more than 100 MWe capacity in Azerbaijan. Te annualhydropower generation provides 1.5 billion kWh thereoreit meets 15% o power and 10% o energy demands o thepower system. According to EBRD, potential hydro re-sources o Azerbaijan are relatively limited, but by concen-tration o hydro resources on the territory the potential issignifcant as compared to other CIS countries. bg

Bulgaria does not produce signifcant quantities o oil and

gas.15 Te only signifcant domestic uel used is coal, pri-marily low-grade lignite that produces high levels o car-bon dioxide when burned. Nuclear power is a relevantsource o energy in Bulgaria and hydropower accounts ora smaller role.

However, Bulgaria is an important transit country or oiland gas, given its geographical location on the Black Sea.

As a result, several pipeline projects are planned in Bul-garia. For instance, the 570-mile Albania-Macedonia-Bul-garia (AMBO) pipeline will connect the Bulgarian Black Sea port o Burgas with the Albanian Adriatic port o Vlore.

Construction is expected to be completed by 2008-2009.In addition, in January 1997, Bulgaria, Greece, and Russiaagreed to build the $700-million Burgas - Alexandroupolis

Figure 3: The BTC pipe line (EIA)

15 According to Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) Bulgaria produced 3,000 bbl/d and consumed 180,000 bbl/d in 2005 (DOE, 2006).




oil pipeline linking the Bulgarian Black Sea port o Bur-gas with Alexandroupolis on the Mediterranean coast o Greece. Tis underground pipeline would allow Russia toexport crude oil (up to 300,000 bbl/d) via the Black Sea, by-passing the Bosphorus. Te project was stalled or several

years by a wide range o technical and economic issues.In 2006 new conditions were proposed, with Russia beinggranted a 51% stake and Bulgaria controlling a minimum24.5% o the remaining 49% o the oil pipeline project. Bul-garia’s domestic gas consumption is imported primarily rom Russia at subsidized prices, in exchange or Russia’suse o Bulgaria as a transit country. Indeed, most o theRussian natural gas piped to Bulgaria moves on to othermarkets. Recently, though, Russia has expressed interest inpaying transit ees in return or Bulgaria paying the marketprice or the imported natural gas (DOE, 2006).

In 2006 the U.S.-based AES Corp. announced that it willbegin the construction o a 670-MW coal-fred plant to re-place an existing acility (the Maritsa Istok unit-1 acility).16

Te project will be the largest single oreign investmentin Bulgaria to date. Te plant will replace lost generatingcapacity rom the closure o two nuclear reactors17 and isscheduled to be completed in 2009 (DOE, 2006).

Electricity sector

Bulgaria’s nuclear acility Kozloduy produced more than40% o Bulgaria’s electricity in 2004, and has allowed the

country to become the ourth major energy exporter in Eu-rope (DOE, 2006). However, due to EU saety concerns, Bul-garia had to close two reactors in 2006.18 Tis has producedan electricity shortage or the country and direct losseso over $2 billion, according to estimations announced in

April 2006 by the Bulgarian economy and energy minister. As a compensation or the closures, Bulgaria received $688million rom the EU (DOE, 2006).

In January 2005, Bulgaria announced the constructiono its second nuclear plant, which will be built along theDanube. It is estimated to cost between $3-5 billion and is

scheduled to become operational by 2011 (DOE, 2006).

Bulgaria has 64 hydropower plants, with 2,700 MW o in-stalled capacity, accounting or 19% o the country’s overallgeneration. Bulgaria and Austria began the construction o an 85-MW hydropower plant on the Vacha River in April2004 to be completed in 2009 (DOE, 2006).

Electricity rom renewable energy sources increased rom7.2% in 1997 to 9.28% in 2004 (EC, 2007). According to thecountry’s renewable energy target, consumption o elec-tricity rom renewable sources has to reach 11% o total

electric energy consumption in 2010.


Currently large scale hydropower is the main source o elec-tricity rom renewable energy, but its technical and eco-nomic potential is already ull exploited (EC, 2007). Good

opportunities exist or biomass. Te table below shows anannual average growth rate o 17% over the period 1997 to2004 or biomass heat.

Table 5: Production of heat and cold from renewable energy

sources (European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/

res/legislation/share_res_eu_en.htm)

Penetration

1997 (ktoe)

Penetration

2004 (ktoe)

Av. Annual

growth %

Biomass heat 3 296 3 047 -1%

Solar thermal heat 4 4 0%

Geothermal heat incl.

heat pumps 67 68 0%

Furthermore, some wind power pilot projects have beenimplemented in Bulgaria, but its contribution is minimal,as wind power accounted or 2 GWh in 2004. According toestimations a total wind energy capacity o around 2.200 –3.400 MWe could be installed in Bulgaria. In addition, it isestimated that 200 MWe could be generated rom geother-mal sources using the solar potential which exists in theEast and South o Bulgaria (EC, 2007).

Te Bulgaria’s National Programme on Renewable Energy

Sources (NPRES), which will run rom 2004 until 2010, o-cuses on increasing the share o renewable energy sourcesin the energy mix to 8% by 2010, particularly rom non-hy-droelectric renewable energy.19 Te ollowing table showsthe objectives o the NPRES or each renewable energy source:

Table 6: RES development according to the NPRES by

technological area (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/idae_site/

deploy/prj073/prj073_2.html):

Types of RES Theoretical po-

tential (toe/year)

Objectives for

2010 (toe/year)

Application areas

Biomass 3670962 380000 Heating, cooking,

industry

Geothermal 481966 95143 Greenhouses, heating,

hospitals, households

Solar 13*109 246000 (52500

in SPV and

160250 in STH)

Household,

hot sanitary water

Wind pumps 75 * 109 31476 Electricity, pumps or

irrigation

16 This acility is part o a complex consisting o our coal-red plants which are specically designed to use low-quality coal.17 Bulgaria’s nuclear acility Kozloduy.18 Ater the closure o these two units only two reactors (No. 5 and No. 6) will be operational.19 Mini-hydro is considered the only renewable energy technology well exploited at the moment. Thereore no additional plans o expansion have been made.




o achieve these goals Bulgaria adopted the ollowingmechanisms: (i) mandatory purchase o electricity orpreerential prices rom generators with a production up to10 MWh, which was replaced in 2007 by (ii) the Green cer-tifcate trading system, which requires public providers to

supply minimum mandatory quota as a percentage o thetotal annual electricity production (EC, 2007).

In order to support industrial energy eciency and smallrenewable energy projects in the private sector, the Euro-pean Bank or Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)in cooperation with the Bulgarian Government and the EUdeveloped in 2004 the Bulgarian Energy Efciency and Re-

newable Energy Credit Line (BEERECL). Under this initia-tive 20% grant are awarded or renewable energy and 15%or energy eciency. Up to September 2007, 94 projectshave been fnanced under BEERECL, receiving loans worth

more than €64.8 million, and generating annually morethan 425,000 MWh o electricity and more than 615,000MWh o heat energy (http://www.beerecl.com/index.htm)

Gg

Energy consumption in Georgia is around 8,3 billion kWh, while local production accounts or 7,8 billion kWh. Hy-dro Power provides 5,6 billion kWh, with 14 medium andlarge hydro power plants, accounting or around 80% o electricity generation. Termal power plants accounts or2,2 billion kWh and estimations reveal that thermal will

provide 29.15% o total demand in 2007. Estimations romthe Government also orecast that consumption in 2007

will account or 9919 GWH. In this context, imports in 2007are expected to reach 290 GWH, which represent 2.92% o total demand (Ministry o Energy o Georgia, 2006).

Besides its interest on developing energy transmission in-rastructure, the Georgian energy strategy ocuses on meet-ing the demand o electricity through its own energy po-tential. Te Resolution o the Parliament o Georgia #3190o 7 June o 2006 related to state policy in power sectorreports that hydro resources should be supplemented by

imports and later on by thermal generation. Currently theGovernment is also considering investing on several smalland medium hydro power plants and wind arms o vari-ous capacities (Ministry o Energy o Georgia, 2006).

Tree o the largest projects to multiply export options orCaspian energy to reach the EU (without using the Russianpipeline system) cross Georgia. Tese are Baku-bilisi-Cey-han,20 oil pipeline, South Caucasus gas pipeline, and Baku-Supsa, a.k.a the “Western Early Oil Route” (DOE, 2006).

Electricity

In Georgia hydroelectric power accounted or 81% o gen-

eration in 2001. Despite a diverse uel supply base, severaltimes throughout 2003 and 2004 non-payment disputesbetween Georgia and its natural gas and electricity suppli-ers, Russia and Armenia, have caused intermittent supply disruptions (DOE, 2006).


Solar: Due to the geographical location o Georgia, theemanation o the Sun is rather high. In most regions o thecountry there are 250-280 sunny days in a year, which isapproximately 6000-6780 hours per year. Te annual ra-diation o the sun varies depending on regions rom 1250-1800 kWh/m2, while the average sun radiation equals4.2 kwh/m2. Te total annual solar energy potential inGeorgia is estimated to be 108 MW, which is equivalent to34 thousand tonnes o uel. Despite the avorable condi-

tions, the use o solar energy has been very low. Recently though there have been some projects using solar energy or heating (EBRD, 2006).

Geothermal: According to recent hydro-geological stud-ies, the Georgian geothermal water reserves reach 250 mlnm3 per year. Currently there are more than 250 natural andartifcial water channels where the average temperature o geothermal waters ranges rom 30 to 110 C0, while the totaldebit is 160 000 m3 per day and night. Tese water channelsare grouped into 44 deposits. Within the territory o 3500km there are bore-hole wells with the water temperature o

850 C0 and more (EBRD, 2006).More than 80% o the geothermal deposits are in WesternGeorgia. In the Zugdidi -saishi geothermal area, there are9 productive, 7 reinjection and 3 observation bore-hole

wells which are considered to be exploitable. It is known,that there are two independent horizons including ther-mal water on the deposits rom which we can obtain up to30 000 m3 thermal water in case o reinjecting per day andnight. Te main port city in Georgia - Poti could be sup-plied with geothermal water through the Kvaloni and Men-

jisi water deposits (EBRD, 2006).

Hydro Power: Following deregulation process, the elec-tricity sector currently allows third parties access to smallhydro power plants. Tere are several private companiesalready established in the sector whose capacity variesrom 16 to 112 MW (Ministry o Energy o Georgia, 2006).

Wind Power: According to the “Masterplane o Wind Pow-er Development o the USSR till 2010” dated 1989, the tech-nical potential o wind power in Georgia is estimated at83 Wh a year. At 25% or greater capacity actor, this couldresult in over 2300 MW o installed capacity. Te wind en-ergy resources potential is thus good, but except or some

small unities o about 6 kW each, there is no operative windenergy capacity in Georgia (EBRD, 2005).

20 Georgian environmental and security concerns have infuenced the pipeline projects signicantly. Several non-governmental organizations rom Georgia and around the world, however,continue to express reservations about the pipeline project. Critics such as Amnesty International, Green Alternative, Friends o the Earth, and others have conducted their own studiesand act nding missions, concluding that the pipeline may still be environmentally hazardous.




G

Greece has oil reserves o just 7 million barrels accordingto the 2006 Oil and Gas Journal and produces negligibleamounts o natural gas. Greece relies thus heavily on oilimports – primarily rom Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Libya

and Egypt (DOE, 2006).

In January 1997, Bulgaria, Greece, and Russia agreed tobuild the $700-million Burgas - Alexandroupolis oil pipe-line linking the Bulgarian Black Sea port o Burgas with

Alexandroupolis on the Mediterranean coast o Greece.Tis underground pipeline would allow Russia to exportcrude oil (up to 300,000 bbl/d) via the Black Sea, bypass-ing the Bosphorus. Te project was stalled or several yearsby a wide range o technical and economic issues. In 2006new conditions were proposed, with Russia being granteda 51% stake and Bulgaria controlling a minimum 24.5% o

the remaining 49% o the oil pipeline project. It is as yet un-clear though whether Greece would accept the new con-ditions, as originally the three partners would share equal33% stakes in the pipeline (DOE, 2006).

Lately Greece has increased its reliance on natural gas, with80% o imports coming rom Russia (DOE, 2006). But Greeceis looking to lessen its dependence on Russian natural gasimports through a number o new pipeline projects.

In 2006, the Greek Parliament passed a government bill toderegulate the energy market, which will be undertaken in

stages.

Renewable energy policies and potential

Hydro power has traditionally been important in Greece,and the markets or wind energy and active solar thermalsystems have grown recently. In 2004, Greece generated55.5 billion kilowatt hours (Bkwh) o electricity, o whichapproximately 75% was thermal and 21% hydroelectric, asreported in the fgure below. Although most o the thermalenergy is lignite-fred, some is oil-fred.

Te Centre or Renewable Energy Sources (CRES) estimatesthat 15% o the country’s electricity needs can be producedby wind arms, with wind-power capacity possibly expand-ing to 2,000 MW by 2010. Onshore wind power grew at anaverage annual rate o 61% between 1997 and 2004 andcurrently wind arms are already located on the Greek Is-land o Crete, Evia, Andros, and Samos. In May 2006, Rokas,a Greek wind arm operator, announced a $3.1 billion in-

vestment to install 44 wind parks with a combined generat-ing capacity o 1,363 MW to be linked to the Chios, Lesvos,and Limnos islands in the northern Aegean. Te project isone o the biggest investments in wind energy in the world.

Greece currently has 475 MW o installed wind-power ca-

pacity, with Rokas accounting or 40% o total Greek windpower production (DOE, 2006).

Solar accounted or 1 GWh in 2004 and grew annually, onaverage, by 27% between 1997 and 2004. Since 2000, solartechnology in Greece has almost tripled, and the EU report“Photovoltaics 2010” reers that Greece could use solarpower to meet one-third o its energy demand. A 50-MW solar power plant, the frst grid -connected solar system o a considerable size, is being constructed in Crete and a 100

-kilowatt PV park is planned or the island o Gavdos. In2006, Rokas announced plans to invest between $190- $257million to set up solar power stations o between 30 MW and 40 MW capacity throughout Greece (DOE, 2006).

Despite the signifcant potential o renewable sources, themajority o plants required to meet the growing electric-ity demand21 is expected to be natural gas-fred. Recently though the Greek Parliament has reviewed the policy ramework to boost renewable sources.

Greece has a target o 20.1% o gross electricity consump-

tion rom renewables by 2010. For biouels, the ollowingnational targets have been set so ar: 0.7% by 2005, 3% by 2007, 4% by 2008, 5% by 2009, and 5.57% by 2010. m

Moldova is the poorest country in Europe according to the World Bank. It does not produce signifcant quantities o crude oil22 and has no natural gas resources, being depend-ent primarily on Russia or most o its supply. In recent

years Russia has reduced supplies o natural gas to Moldovaas a result o the country’s debt. In addition, in 2006, when

Moldova was paying its gas bill each year on schedule and

21 Electricity demand in Greece has grown nearly 50 percent over the last decade.22 Moldova’s reserves are estimated at 15 million barrels. In July 2005 the Moldovan uel trader AS-Petrol opened a $4.0 million oil renery, the rst in the country, to process domestic

crude oil extracted rom a eld in the southern region o Valeni, one o the country’s two oil elds (DOE, 2006).

Figure 4: Greece Installed Capacity by Type (EIA, 2004)

Greece’s Installed Capacity, by Type, 2004(Gigawatts)




in cash,23 Russian gas monopoly Gazprom increased gasprices, ater stopping natural gas supplies in January due toa lack o agreement over prices.24 Since the price increase,Moldova has started negotiating with Kazakh company As-com to provide more than hal o its supplies,25 but trans-

portation o the natural gas is still an outstanding issue(DOE, 2006). Furthermore, Gazprom owns a controllingstake o 50% plus one share in the MoldovaGaz company.

Moldova is an important transit country or oil and naturalgas, given its geographical location, and it provides transitservice or more than 20 billion cubic meters o Russian gasannually to Balkan countries and also to urkey.

Currently, gas pipelines investment projects include: Kaush-any-Kishinau and Drokya-Ungheny (Moldova) - Iashy (Romania) pipelines. Te main purpose o the gas pipeline

project Kaushany-Kishinau is to provide additional natu-ral gas supplies to Kishinau, Moldova’s capital, which is thelargest consumer in the country accounting or more than70% rom the total consumption. Te gas pipeline projectDrokya-Ungheny-Iashy aims at linking Moldova’s gas trans-portation system to the Romanian one in order to increasethe annual load capacity o about 4 bln m3 in Moldova.

At the moment there are no oil pipelines passing throughMoldova and ew projects have been discussed so ar.Tese include: an oil pipeline linking Giurgiuleshty oil ter-minal (still under construction) to Chisinau, the capital o Moldova, and the ramifcation to Moldova rom the exist-

ing Odessa-Brody pipeline (Inogate, undated).

Electricity sector

Moldova generates and consumes little electricity,26 relyingprimarily on domestic thermal power plants and regionalimports.27 Hydropower accounts or a small percentage o the installed electric capacity. Moldova’s electricity sectoris partially privatized but most the country’s thermoelec-tric power plants are unproftable and have large debts.28

Tere is a 750 kV line passing through Moldova to connectUkraine with Romania and Bulgaria, but this line is not

directly connected in the Moldovan power system (Oster-reichische Enerieagentur – Austrian Energy Agency, 2007).


According to EBRD estimations there is a good potentialor wind power development in Moldova, with total poten-

tial wind capacity around 1.000 MW. Areas with high windenergy potential include: in the north-east o the country,separate areas on the Podolsk Hills in the middle reacheso the Dniester River near the border with Ukraine; in thesouth-east, separate areas near the Dniester estuary; in the

west, separate areas in the Carpathians piedmonts nearthe border with Romania. ogether these areas representabout 10% o the country’s territory. Currently, though, no

wind turbines operate in Moldova (Osterreichische Ener-ieagentur – Austrian Energy Agency, 2007).

With the exception o some solar-heating plants with smallthermal power, solar energy does not fnd signifcant ap-plication in Moldova. Solar radiation is measured only inthe capital Chisinau and monthly and annual data are re-ported below:

Table 7: Monthly and annual total solar radiation incident onhorizontal surface, MJ/m2 (Osterreichische Enerieagentur –

Austrian Energy Agency, 2007)

Location I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII YearlyChisinau 126 166 303 460 607 692 685 598 440 281 117 92 4567

Table 8: Monthly and annual direct solar radiation incident

on surface normal to sunlight beams, MJ/m2 (Osterreichische

Enerieagentur – Austrian Energy Agency, 2007)

Location I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII YearlyChisinau 140 143 253 355 464 574 591 559 450 338 124 95 4086

According to EBRD (2005), besides coal and wood sun-ower stems, shelled maize cobs, maize stalks and otheragricultural wastes are currently used or heating in Molda-

via. However, biomass is used ineciently because o theineciency o domestic stoves.

Biomass potential in the country is estimated to be morethan 370 thousand toe per year, but the high investmentcosts represent an outstanding issue to invest in biogasplants (Osterreichische Enerieagentur – Austrian Energy

Agency, 2007).

Despite the large number o rivers in Moldova, the poten-tial or hydroelectric generation is relatively low and thereare only two major hydroelectric power plants. Te largesto these is the Dubasari plant on the Dniester River, withan installed capacity o 48 MW (EBRD, 2005). Te othersignifcant power plant is located in the Prut River and hasan installed capacity o 16 MW. According to EBRD, the

23 Socor (2006).

24 On 3 January 2006 the Presidents o Ukraine and Moldova joint appealed to the EU to intercede with Russia in support o the Ukrainian-Moldovan position, which specically requiredinvolvement o EU experts in the two countries’ respective negotiations with Russia and use o the EU market methodology or price ormation on Russian gas supplies to Ukraine andMoldova. The appeal also urged an all-European approach to the issue o gas supplies. The joint appeal noted that “Russia’s economic pressure is aiming to change Moldova’s policyon confict settlement in Transnistria and on our European choice”. The EU response though did not address any o the suggestion included in the joint appeal. It appealed to Russia and

Moldova on January 9 2006 to «urgently recommence negotiations and reach an equitable compromise», which ended up isolating Moldova (Socor, 2006).25 Moldova’s natural gas consumption accounted or 77 Bc in 2004 (DOE, 2006).26 In 2004 Moldova generated 4 Bkwh and consumed 7 Bkwh o electricity (DOE, 2006).27 The electricity used in Moldova is generated 30 percent in Ukraine, 30 percent in Transnitria, and 40 percent in the rest o Moldova (Osterreichische Enerieagentur – Austrian Energy

Agency, 2007). Moldova remains one o the largest consumers o the Ukrainian energy.28 The Government plans to privatize the plants to modernize these power plants. In 2004, however, Moldova cancelled plans to privatize two power distribution companies when Russia’s

energy monopoly Unied Energy Systems (UES) was the only bidder (DOE, 2006).




greater potential or hydropower development in Moldo- va is in small hydropower construction. By the year 2010,through extending established hydroelectric plants andexploring existing potential, the installed power couldachieve an additional 22 MW (EBRD, 2005).

Te EU-Moldova Action Plan, signed on 22 February 2005under the ENP ramework, sets up a series o priorities. Italso reers to updating the existing Moldovan energy strat-egy until 2020, which was adopted in 2007’.29

r

Romania has the largest oil reserves in Central and EasternEurope and is a mature oil producing country. Accordingto the 2006 Oil and Gas Journal, Romania has estimated re-serves o 956 million barrels o oil. However, Romania is a

net oil importer, depending primarily on Russia.

Romania contains proven natural gas reserves o 3.6 trillioncubic eet (c), but production has allen signifcantly inrecent years (Oil and Gas Journal, 2006). Romania is a netnatural gas importer, with supplies coming rom Russia.

A number o pipeline projects are planned in Romania toincrease natural gas transport capacity, with emphasis tothe Nabucco project. In addition, construction on the Ar-ad-Szeged pipeline, which runs rom Arad in northwest-ern Romania to Szeged in southeastern Hungary, began in

2006 and is to be completed by 2008. Te pipeline will ena-ble Romania’s system to link ully with the network in west-ern Europe, and will stretch or 40 miles in Romania and25 miles in Hungary. Another planned pipeline, the Siret-Cernauti pipeline, will connect Siret, in northern Romaniato Cernauti in southwest Ukraine. Te pipeline was origi-nally contracted in 2004 between Romanian state-ownedransgaz and the Ukranian authorities, but was delayed by the political crisis in the Ukraine and construction has yetto begin.

Te Giurgiu-Ruse pipeline would connect Romanian and

Bulgarian gas transport systems and is currently under as-sessment by ransgaz, Bulgarian Bulgargaz and the Win-tershall/Gazprom joint venture Wintershall Erdgas Han-delshaus (WIEE). In May 2006, the Romanian Economy and rade minister emphasized the need to continue withall pending projects, including the Siret- Cernauti and theGiurgiu-Ruse pipelines.

Electricity sector

Coal is the most important uel or electricity in Romania,although there is a growing contribution rom nuclear en-ergy. Romania has one nuclear plant (Cernavoda) which

maintains one sole working reactor that produces morethan 10% o Romania’s 50 Bkwh consumption o electricenergy in 2004. In July 2006, the Romanian Finance Minis-try borrowed $153 million to fnance the completion o thesecond reactor, which is expected to start working in March2007 and produce 18% o the country’s electricity. Othertwo units are scheduled to be completed by 2012. Once theour planned energy acility will be completed, excess elec-tricity could be exported to urkey. An underwater powerline under the Black Sea could connect the two countries.

EBRD has granted a $31 million loan in December 2004 to

the Romanian state power transmission company (ranse-lectrica) or the construction o a 400,000-volt power linerom Romania’s Oradea to the Romanian-Hungarian bor-der. Te project is expected to be completed by 2008 andintends to boost cross-border capacity in the Region.


In Romania, the share o renewable sources in primary energy supply, as well as in electricity generation, is aboveEU average. In 2004 the majority o electricity productionrom renewable energy sources in Romania was generated

through large-scale hydro power, accounting or 15,855GWh. Te high potential o small-scale hydro has thoughremained almost untouched, with 658 GWh in 2004. De-spite the large potential o hydro power (6 Wh smallerthan 10 MW), its average growth rate is rather small, withan average o 5 per cent increase between 1997 and 2004.Between 1997 and 2004, both the level o production, andthe growth rate o most renewable sources have been sta-ble. However, the amount o electricity rom renewablesources in Romania has decreased rom 17,520 GWh in1997 to 16,518 GWh in 2004.

Wind arm in Romania accounted or 2 GWh in 2004. Butthe Romanian Government programme aims to increasethe wind power contribution by installing a total capacity o 120 MW until 2010.

Production o heat and cold rom renewable energy sourc-es results mainly rom biomass, which accounted in 2004or 3.047 ktoe. Around two-thirds o renewable energy pro-duction in Romania is rom biomass and most o the re-mainder rom hydro power. ogether they account or 29%o electricity generation. Te ollowing table provides ad-ditional inormation on the production o heat:

29 Republic o Moldova ocial website, “European Integration”, 25.07.2007, http://www.moldova.md/en/europa/




Table 9: Heat from renewable energy sources (European

Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/res/legislation/

share_res_eu_en.htm)

Penetration

1997 (ktoe)

Penetration

2004 (ktoe)

Av. Annual

growth %

Biomass heat 3 296 3 047 -1%Solar thermal heat 4 4 0%

Geothermal heat incl.

heat pumps 67 68 0%

Romania has introduced several measures to promoteelectricity rom renewable sources:

n A quota system with tradable green certifcates orgreen electricity has been in place since 2004. GCare issued to electricity production rom wind, solar,biomass or hydro power generated in plants with less

than 10 MW capacity. Te quota increases rom 0.7%in 2005 to 8.3% in 2010.nMandatory dispatching and priority trade o electricity

produced rom renewable energy sources since 2004.

In addition, legislation on biouels was adopted in Decem-ber 2005. Until 2004 no signifcant biouels production wastaking place in Romania.

Romania has also introduced a renewable energy target.Consumption o electricity rom renewable sources has toreach 33% o total energy consumption in 2010, which rep-

resents a target o 11% o gross energy in 2010. t

urkey lacks signifcant domestic energy resources. Cur-rently, urkey produces small amounts o oil and poorquality coal, marginal amounts o natural gas and no nu-clear energy. Hydropower is a signifcant energy source

with more than 100 total plants and total installed hydro-electric generating capacity o 12.6 GW. However, energy rom hydropower can be urther developed (Shaer, 2006and Clough, 2007). As a result, 30% o the total energy de-

mand is met by domestic resources, with 70% resultingrom a diversifed portolio o imports (Ministry o Foreign

Aairs, 2006).

urkey’s economy is highly energy intensive compared tomost OECD countries. With regard to energy eciency, thepotential energy savings are estimated at 40% (EU, 2007).

urkey is a net oil importer,30 as described in the fgurebelow, particularly rom Russia, Iran and Iraq:

In addition, urkey is an important transit country or oil,given its geographical location, linking oil producer coun-tries in the Middle East and Caspian basin to the consumermarkets. Te urkish government has raised concerns thatincreased oil tanker trac through the Bosphorus increasesthe risk o oil spills (DOE, 2006). As a result, the country hasestablished or considered a number o pipeline projectsthat would avoid shipping in the Bosphorus Straits.31

urkey is a growing consumer o natural gas32

and also animportant natural gas transit country. In the last decades,urkey has undertaken several inrastructure projects inorder to position itsel as an energy hub. As noted by Sha-er (2006) these multiple state projects carry environmen-tal, social, and health implications. Diseases, spores, andalien species may travel along with oil and natural gas. As aresult, urkey should consider the long-term implicationso being an energy hub.Furthermore, there is a risk to be considered o oversup-ply. o date, urkey has signed deals or around 1.8 c per

year o natural gas imports in 2010, more than 25% above

the state-owned Botas orecast or urkish natural gas con-sumption (1.4 c) in that year.33

30 The majority o Turkey’s oil reserves are located in southeastern part o the country. International oil majors Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil are the largest oreign oil producers in

Turkey (DOE, 2006).31 These include the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline and also a number o Bosphorus bypass options (or instance the BTC Pipeline, and the Samsun-Ceyhan

bypass).32 Turkey has switched during the last two decades rom power generation by coal-red plants to those employing natural gas (Shaer, 2006).33 Shaer (2006) addresses the risk o Turkey becoming oversupplied with natural gas, as most o the imports are based on long-term take-or-pay contracts. Turkey may be required to pay

penalties in the uture to suppliers, such as Russia and Iran, i it cannot use or re-export all the natural gas that it has committed to import. Turkey must thereore negotiate its contracts ina way that accommodates major contingencies that aect energy demand. In addition, Turkey needs to extensively expand its natural gas storage acilities.

Turkey’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1986-2006*

T h o u s a n d

B a r r e l s

P e r D a

y

Figure 5: Oil Production and Consumption in Turkey, 1988-2006 (EIA,International Energy Annual International Petroleum Monthly, Short-Term

Energy Outlook)




Table 10: Status of natural Gas Pipeline Projects in Turkey

(adopted from Clough, L.D., 2007)

Project Status Length (miles) Max. Capacity

(Bcf/y)

Blue Stream In operation 750 565

Iran-Turkey

Pipeline

In operation 750 495

South Caucasus

Pipeline


Turkey-Greece

Interconnector


Nabucco Proposed 2,050 460 – 1,100

Egypt-Turkey

Pipeline

Proposed NA NA

Trans-Caspian

Pipeline

Uncertain 1,050 565


In order to meet its growing energy demand, urkey aims atully exploring its hard coal and lignite reserves, hydropowerand other renewable sources, such as wind and solar.

In 2005 urkey adopted a Renewable Energy Law in orderto promote electricity rom renewable energy sources. Sup-porting mechanisms such as eed-in taris and purchaseobligation are included in the law. Furthermore, in May 2007 an Energy Eciency Law was enacted. According to

an analysis by the EU (2007) this legal ramework needs tobe supplemented by ambitious objectives in order to exploitthe vast unused potential o renewable energy sources inurkey. At current path, energy sources are not likely to con-tribute signifcantly to urkey’s energy mix in the near term.

Furthermore, in order to decrease dependence on import-ed uels, urkey intends to include nuclear energy into thecountry’s energy mix. Te Minister o Energy announcedthat construction o a total installed capacity o 5000 MW rom nuclear power plants is expected to be completed by 202034 (Ministry o Foreign Aairs, 2006). In April 2006 the

urkish Prime Minister announced the locations where theconstruction o the nuclear power plants would take place:Sinop, Inceburun at urkey’s Black Sea Coast. However, f-nancing is still an outstanding issue (Energy Review, 2007).

u

Ukraine has one o the most energy-intensive economiesin the industrialized world.35 Although energy consump-tion has dropped since Ukraine’s independence in 1991,

it continues relaying on imports, particularly on gas romRussia.36 Domestic gas production meets about 25% o to-tal demand and the rest is imported through Russian pipes(IEA, 2006).

Ukrainian energy policy ocuses on improving energy se-curity and reducing natural gas imports, as a result o grow-ing tension between Ukraine and Russia in recent years.37 But increasing domestic production will require improvingthe investment climate.

Tere is much opportunity to increase energy eciency in

the country, although investments are limited by low do-mestic energy prices, below international level38 (IEA, 2006).Ukraine set up an energy eciency policy in 1994, whichcould not be ully implemented due to insucient unding.Ten, in 2005, a government decree closed the State Com-mittee or Energy Conservation and only recently, recog-nizing the void let, the government has established a new National Agency on Ecient Energy Use.

Energy transit through Ukraine is signifcant due to its geo-graphical location, as 84% o Russian gas supplies to Eu-rope passes through Ukraine via pipeline.39 In recent years

Russia has started developing some alternative routes toavoid passing through Ukraine (the North European gasPipeline, Yamal and Bluestream, and South Stream), whichcould aect the geopolitical importance o Ukraine’s transitbusiness (IEA, 2006). Ukraine has also recently proposeda ‘White Stream’ pipeline which would transport gas romthe Caspian to Ukraine and urther to Poland. As regardsoil, there exists the Odessa-Brody pipeline.

Electricity sector

Nuclear energy accounts or about hal o total power pro-

duction in Ukraine and the government would like to in-crease the share o nuclear energy in the energy mix. Teollowing fgure shows the Ukraine’s electricity mix rom2002 to 2004:

34 The Energy Review (issue 7, rom 19.02.2007, http://www.turkishweekly.net/energyreview/TurkishWeekly-EnergyReview7.pd) quotes the Minister o Energy, Mr. Hilmi Guler, declaringthat they would build three or ve nuclear reactors by the year 2012, meaning that it would become operational in 2012.

35 According to IEA (2006) Ukraine uses energy about three times less eciently than EU countries on average.36 Because o its geographic location, Ukraine does not have many aordable and accessible supply alternatives.37 Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monopoly, cut o supplies to Ukraine in January 2006 ater its government reused to pay a ourold increase in the subsidized prices. The crisis soon

spread to the EU, as Ukraine began to divert gas rom the pipeline that crosses its territory to meet domestic demand (Nye, J.S., 2006).38 As noted by IEA (2006), greater energy eciency will be much easier to achieve i domestic prices refect the ull, long-term costs, while today most energy prices in Ukraine only cover

operational costs. Only oil and oil product prices are at international levels while coal prices do not cover production costs.39 Ukraine is the largest gas transit country in the world by volume and also hosts major oil transit routes (IEA, 2006).





One o the main priorities o the 1996 National power En-ergy Programme was to promote the use o renewable en-ergy sources in Ukraine. In 1997 the Government launchedthe “programme o state support or the development o non-traditional and renewable energy and small hydro-and heat-power engineering as a component part o na-tional energy programme o Ukraine”, which establisheda target o 10 percent o renewable energy as part o totalenergy demand by 2010. Furthermore, in 2001 the Ukrain-ian Parliament announced a bill or the development o

renewable energy sources. But despite the several targetsand programmes adopted to increase the use o renewableenergy, implementation has been slow.

Indeed, non hydropower renewable energy sources ac-counted or less than 0.5 percent o the total primary en-ergy demand in 2005 (EBRD, 2005) while the growing shareo renewable energy in Ukraine’s energy balance comesmainly rom large hydro power plants (IEA, 2006).

Te total installed capacity o Ukrainian wind arms isaround 86 MW and the country has the only sizable na-

tional wind programme in the region. Ukraine’s nationalprogramme or the development o wind power includessubsidies or the construction o wind power plants and es-tablishes preerential taris or electricity rom wind powerplants. According to EBRD (2005) wind arm could accountor 20 to 30 percent o Ukraine’s demand or electricity power, i wind arm were built in the avorable areas or

wind power development, which cover nearly 40 percento the territory.

40 During the ormer USSR, Crimea was the all-Union test ground or solar energy. In the 1980s several projects were created in Crimea, including a solar steam-turbine power plant with a5 MW capacity, and a large experimental complex o buildings with solar hot water and a heating and air-conditioning system. In addition, Crimea - especially its southern coast - is thelargest resort zone in Ukraine, and the conservation o the unique natural environment prospects in the country is important. These two elements increase the potential o use o solarenergy or generation o electricity and heat in Crimea.

Use o biomass, mainly or heat is relatively common in ru-ral areas and many agricultural villages have been switch-ing to biomass-fred boilers or their small district heatingsystems (IEA, 2006). An assessment o Ukraine’s potentialon biomass reveals that the Ukrainian agricultural sector

could supply 500 to 800 billion kWh o primary biomass per year on medium term (i.e. 2010-2015). Tis amount wouldallow signifcant export, considering the current nationaldemand or transport uels. Improvements o agriculturaltechniques could increase this potential urther turningbiouels into a valuable export commodity or Ukraine(EBRD, 2005).

Solar radiation in Ukraine is o middling intensity. Te av-erage amount o solar energy received annually in Ukraineis about 1200 kWh/m2 (4300 MJ/m2). Te southern andsoutheast regions o Ukraine have the largest potential or

solar energy.40

However, the current use o solar energy inUkraine is minimal (EBRD, 2005).

Ukraine has considerable geothermal resources that canbe used mainly or heat supply. In 2005 the total installedcapacity o heat supply systems was 13 MWt, but accord-ing to a State programme the use o thermal water shouldincrease by 2010 up to 250 MWt (EBRD, 2005).

Te average annual hydropower production in Ukraine wasaround 10 billion kWh in 2005, with an installed capacity o 4.4 million kWh. However, according to EBRD’s estima-

tions (2005) the potential o the Ukrainian hydropower orelectricity generation would account or 20 billion kWh per

year.

Programs o small hydropower development in Ukraineinclude reconstruction and renovation o previously con-structed small hydro power plants (HPPs), adding smallHPPs to water management projects with already existing

water-retaining structures with the aim o utilizing wastereleases (EBDR, 2005).

Ukraine has major opportunities through the Kyoto Pro-

tocol to fnance energy eciency and renewable energy.However, the government has been slow to pursue theseopportunities and only in 2006 it approved rules or JointImplementation projects (IEA, 2006).

Figure 6: Ukraine Electricity Balance (1992-2004) (EBRD, 2005)




appx d

t F t tp ax

Source: Building bridges. European Commission, Energy and Transport DG




appx e

t i tp c t

Source: NAS of Ukraine




appx F

P i sppg

dp b s

Several dozens o seaports are unctioning at the Black and Azov Seas coast. Te main intermodal trans-Black Sea lineslie through the ports o Ilyichevsk, Odessa, Izmail, Nikolaev,Kherson, Mariupol, Berdyansk and Kerch (Ukraine), Con-stanta (Romania), Varna and Burgas (Bulgaria), Novoros-siysk, uapse and Kavkaz (Russia), Poti and Batumi (Geor-gia), Istanbul, Deringe, Zonguldac and Samsun (urkey).In uture it is possible that the appropriate terminals inother ports will be involved in the intermodal trac.

One o the biggest Black Sea port lying on European over-land transport crossroad is Constanta (Romania). Its

reight turnover in 2004 was 50.43 million tonnes, includ-ing 386 thousand EUs. At present the preparations aredone to restart use o erry acilities o the port to organizetransportation to urkey (Samsun) and Georgia (Batumi).

Bulgarian port Varna lies on crossroad o several activeintermodal lines, among them is the erry service Varna —Ilyichevsk — Poti/Batumi being one o the main branches o the RACECA. In the recent years Bulgarian ports have beendeveloping dynamically. In 2004 the total reight turnoverports Varna and Burgas reached 13,35 million tonnes. Teseports lie on the Pan European transport corridor No. 4.

urkish Black Sea ports together with the Marmara Seaports are developing rather quickly and playing more andmore signifcant role in the development o trade andtransport connections between Europe and the countrieso Western and Central Asia.

Georgian ports Poti and Batumi in the recent decadesbecame sea gate or Europe and other countries and con-tinents to the Caucasus and Central Asia. urnover o theport o Poti in 2004 was 6.15 million tonnes o cargoes in-cluding 70 thousand EUs. Te port had practically passed

through the main stage o commercialisation and is unc-tioning quite eciently. Plans or urther development arebeing elaborated. Near Poti very promising raid oil portSupsa was built, its turnover in 2004 reached 6.2 milliontonnes.

Russian Black Sea ports, frst o all two biggest o them,Novorossiisk and uapse, handle signifcant volume o cargoes rom ships to overland means o transport. o-tal turnover o these two ports made in 2004 89.8 milliontonnes. At the moment they are not included into any in-ternational transport corridors, but their transhipment vol-

umes place them among the most important ports o theBlack Sea Region.In 2004 seaports o Ukraine transhipped 111.43 milliontonnes o cargoes and came closely to the highest totalcargo turnover o the USSR times. In 2005 the volume o transhipment was 109 037.0 tonnes o cargo. (Te techni-cal capacity o seaports o Ukraine is 176,6 million tonnes/

year (2006). One o the biggest ports in the region isIlyichevsk port. In 2004 the total cargo turnover o Ilyichevsk port made 14.8 million tonnes, including 197 000 EUs and1.5 million tonnes o erry cargoes. At present Odessa port

occupies the third in the Black Sea place on its turnover. In

2004 it transhipped 30.5 million tonnes. Odessa port, sameas Ilyichevsk, lies in the Pan European transport corridorNo. 9. Especially quick in Odessa port is grows o containercapacity — 203.5 thousand EUs was transhipped in 2004.Increase in container turnover is 20 to 30 % annually.




appx G

m spf t rgg

i sppg d

W t

Romania: Calarasi-Braila (echnical Assistance or

the improvement o the Navigation Conditions on the

Danube – Calarasi– Braila section (ISPA2002/RO/16/P/

PA/011)

Te project concerns 200 km section o the Danube Riverbetween the cities o Calarasi and Braila in Romania. Dredg-ing works and closing lateral arms will aect the fsh popu-lation in the Danube due to the loss o the main spawninggrounds, i.e. or sturgeon. Tese are already reduced as adirect consequence o the loss o the Danube oodplain a-

ect various fsh species (incl. sturgeon) and bottom auna(incl. benthic macro-invertebrates, an important ood re-source) particularly in the vicinity o the islands. modiy the water’s natural ow regime, which aects the naturaloodplain that still exists on parts o the right bank o themost eastern arms o the Danube between Calarasi andBraila, i.e. the Danube between Calarasi-Ostrov-Harsovaand the Dunarea Veche (Macin) arm in ulcea and Con-stanta counties. Harm the natural erosion sedimentationprocesses that orm the islands and their sandy beaches.Tese areas are considered important eeding and restingareas or many important bird species, such as Dalmatian

and Great White pelican, Pigmy cormorant, and herons.41

Ukraine: Bystroye canal (Danube Delta)

Phase I o the Canal, which began in 2004, was completedand larger, sea-going ships started using the Bystroye Ca-nal. However, the canal quickly silted up its previous depth,

and thereore became ft or navigation. Dredging to reo-pen the canal began in November 2006 and was completedin April 2007. Since then, ships have been once again usingthe canal. Phase II o the project, which includes deepeningo the canal as well as construction o a dike beore arms o Danube. Te construction o the Bystroye canal is one o treats to biodiversity conservation o the Danube Delta42

and Black Sea area near Danube.

Moldova: International Free port Dzhurdzhuleshty

Port is located on the let bank o Danube on the area o 435

meters in area o Dzhurdzhuleshty between Galats (Roma-nia) and Reni (Ukraine).Danube contamination by the oil products as a result o building and operation o Dzhurdzhuleshty oil terminal ispacing the main threat to the environment in transbound-ary context. Increasing passage and manoeuvring o vesselsin proximity o Reni also increase the threat o environmen-tal catastrophes because o vessel collisions. Building andexploitation o oil terminal o Dzhurdzhuleshty presents apotential threat or: Danube Delta ecosystem and north-

western part o the Black sea; Valuable natural objects:Biosphere reserve «Danube Delta» (Romania) and Danube

Biosphere Reserve (Ukraine).

41 www.danubecampaign.org42 Ramsar sites




PROJECT NAME LOCATION COUNTRY PROJECT TYPE SHORT DESCRIPTION COMMENTS

Inland Navigation

Danube betweenBulgaria and

Romania

Bulgaria, Romania Navigation - TENs Feasibility study 2007-2008 (works planned at152 M€ or 2009-2012) Negotiations oreseen between the Romanian andBulgarian Environment and Transport Authorities in

order to mitigate the adverse impact on the ISPA

assistance or Romania (2.7 M€ ) was contracted

in May 2007 to produce a easibility study including

EIA or the section Iron Gate II (rkm 863) to Calarasi/

Silistra (rkm 375)

Danube:

Calarasi – Braila

(km 345 – 175)

Romania Navigation Feasibility study and technical project including

EIA were nalized in 2006 (1.64 M€ ISPA and

state unds). Received stakeholder comments led

to modications o the technical project Environ-

ment Permit was issued by Ministry o Environ-

ment in February 2007. Tender procedure or

the works supervision was nalized in 09/2007;

tender procedure or the works contract will be

nalized by the end o 2007.

EU Technical Assistance (ISPA) or the improvement

o navigation conditions meets the Danube Commis-

sion recommendation (2.50 m): This is part o Cor-

ridor no. VII with many bottlenecks below 1.5 m. The

project aims to realize bottom sills, bank protection,

groins, river bed calibration and stabilization.

Estimated costs (according to easibility study): 56 M€:

Phase I: 37.7 MEUR with 50% rom ISPA und

(works 35.55 M€, supervision 1.7 M€ ). Period:2008 – 2010 Phase II: 20.45 M€ rom EU cohe-

sion unds and state budget, period: 2011 – 2013

Maritime Danube

and Sulina channel

Romania Navigation Feasibility studies and works or every component

o the project in dierent stages o elaboration,

implementation

Improvement o navigation conditions o the Danube

and its maritime sector; bank protection o Sulina

channel (part o Corridor no. VII ) Total costs: 76 M€

(38 M€ state and M€ loan rom EBI). Implementa-

tion: 2004 – 2009. Project components: Banks

protection on Sulina Canal Signalization and topo-

graphical measurement system or the Romanian

Danube

Danube Free Port o

Moldova

Moldova Navigation Port opened in 2007 Bank protection on Sulina Channel (64 M€ ),

topographic and hydro-graphic survey and signaling

system on the Danube (5 M€ )

Romanian Danube

Delta

Romania Navigation Works 2006-2009 Bank protection on Sulina Channel (64 M€ ),

topographic and hydro-graphic survey and signaling

system on the Danube (5 M€ )

Ukrainian Danube

– Black Sea deep

water airway

Ukraine Navigation First phase Works on the uture revival and creation o the

protecting dike: 12 M€ in 2007, 18 M€ in 2008

appx h

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PROJECT NAME LOCATION COUNTRY PROJECT TYPE SHORT DESCRIPTION COMMENTS

Ports and terminals

Yuznyi oil terminal Ukraine Navigation Teminal is opened First phase: 8-9 mil tonnes o oil per yearSecond phase: 40 mil tonnes o oil per year

Dewelopment o

inrastructure o

Illichevsk Sea Port

Ukraine Navigation Preparation o the project The credit o the European Reconstruction and

Development Bank 25 M€

Odessa container

terminal

Ukraine Navigation Feasibility studies Transshipments o 600000 - 1 mil o containers

per year

Illyichevsk container

terminal

Ukraine Navigation Feasibility studies and works Turnover well be 1,5 mil o TEU till 2010 year.

Oil port Supsa Georgia Navigation The oil port Supsa was built in 2004 The turnover in 2004 reached 6.2 million tonnes.

Novorossiysk grain

terminal

Russia Navigation Feasibility studies and works -

Novorossiysk oil

terminal

Russia Navigation Feasibility studies and works -

Novorossiysk con-

tainer terminal

Russia Navigation Feasibility studies and works Turnover well be 250 000 o TEU till 2010 year.

Tamansky peninsula

Zhelezny Rog port

Russia Navigation Feasibility studies and works Turnover well be 12 mil tonnes till 2010 year.

Completion o the

north breakwater.

Port o Constantza

Romania Navigation The investment consists in the completion o the

north breakwater according to the initial 1985

advised investment regarding the Port o Con-

stantza breakwaters. The actual breakwater will

be extended with another 1.050 m right within

the South breakwater and -24 m bathymetric line.

Projects promoted or nancing.

Operational Transport Programme 2007-2013

(SOPT 2007-2013).

Inrastructure on

Pier III S, dedicated

to specialized ter-

minals. Port o

Constantza

Romania Navigation The completion o this inrastructure will create

great development oportunities or a specialized

terminal which will assure deep quaydepths,

allowing the accomodation o high capacity

container vessels.

The investment consists in the development o

mooring quays and the completion o the existing

one and also in reclaiming 35 ha o Pier III S territory

rom the sea using lling material and groundwork.


(SOPT 2007-2013).

Systematization and

Consolidation o ad-

jacent areas o the

Port o Constantza

between Gate 1 and

Gate 7

Romania Navigation The completion o this project is a necessity or

the protection o the port environment in ac-

cordance with the ISPS Code. Having in view the

necessity o this project or the cli area o the

city, a protocol has been signed between NC MPA

SA Constantza and the City o Constantza regard-

ing the development o a project to consolidatethe cli area between Gates 1 and 7.


(SOPT 2007-2013).

Road transport

Ring BS road Turkey, Georgia, Rus-

sia, Ukraine, Moldova,

Romania, Bulgaria

Road transport Feasibility studies During discussion

Upgrading o road

Lviv-Krakovets

Ukraine Road transport Feasibility studies and works The credit o the European Reconstruction and

Development Bank. Estimated cost rom 270 to

390 mln. Euro; 84.4 km highway – 78.40 km

new construction, 730 ha o land allocation;

shortcomings in the state EIA examination; lack o

public participation; no assessment o impact on

threatened species; orced resettlement; threat to

recreation potential.

Railway

Development o the

railway capacity in

the river-maritime

sector o Constantza

Port

Romania Navigation, Railway The investment consists in the development o a

systemized railway complex (switchyard) in the

river-maritime sector, which will assure an unitary

and optimal service or the present and uture

port operators, allowing a complex and fexible

railway operation o the area.

The project was promoted in the SOPT 2007-2013.

appx h

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appx inGo d

Te Black Sea (BS) and the Environment

(Greening the Black Sea Synergy)

Civil society position paper addressed to the

BS Ministerial Conerence in Kiev,

February 14, 2008

ODESSA, February 7, 2008

An alliance o Environmental NGOs,43 who met in Odessaon February 7, 2008, at the invitation o the Heinrich Böll

Foundation and WWF:

n Welcome the Ministerial Conerence, organised by theGovernment o Ukraine with the participation o theEU, as an important step towards long term regionalcooperation in the BS region.44

n Wish to stress the importance o the EU Black Sea Syn-ergy, as a critical instrument to promote sustainabledevelopment, environmental protection, integrationand governance, and an opportunity or “stimulating aregional dialogue with civil society” in the BS region.

nCall or greater involvement o the EU in the Black Searegional cooperation by promoting political dialogueand sustainable development.

nNote the considerable environmental values o theBlack Sea Region, the many services its natural envi-ronment provides to human society and economiesand the presence in the region o particularly sensitiveareas; and point out that regional environmental co-operation, can also contribute to reinorcing coopera-tion in the region more generally.

nHighlight that climate change is leading the region to ascarcity within the natural resource base, in particularresh water and may lead to irreversible environmentaldegradation, increased poverty and migration ows i immediate, coordinated and cooperative action is not

taken.

nStrongly believe that national and internationalsupport or concrete environmental projects, withinvolvement o all stakeholders, will strengthenconfdence, stability and cooperation in the so-calledrozen conicts.

nRecognise that a severe and additional pressure on theBS environment stems rom recent illegal, uncontrolledand unsustainable tourism developments within exist-ing protected areas and urthermore the privatisation

o state lands will make the establishment o protectedareas increasingly dicult.

nStress that ossil and nuclear power are not solutions toclimate change as ossil uel based energy leads to ur-ther greenhouse emissions and nuclear energy posesa severe risk rom its hazardous waste. Tese sourceso energy must be phased out as a necessity or sus-tainable lie on our planet. Oil and gas extraction romthe BS shel is a major threat to marine protected areasand wetlands.

n Are concerned by rapidly increasing environmentalimpact o transportation, especially shipping o oil by sea as between BS countries as well through the Bos-phorus Strait. Neglecting o modern saety standardsand regulations increases probability o accidents un-ortunately exemplifed by the recent one in November2007 (Kerch accident).

nRequest attention to the construction o Winter Olym-pic 2014 acilities within protected areas o the SochiNational Park and the buer zone o the CaucasianState Reserve.

43 List o NGO attending the meeting is enclosed. Representatives signed in their personal capacity.44 Black Sea Synergy countries include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Greece




NGOs request the countries o the Black Sea Region and

the EU to:

1. Implement the Aarhus Convention to ensure civilsociety organizations have access to environmental

inormation, participation and access to justice andare involved in the development, implementationand evaluation o regional sustainable developmentpolicies as well as in the reorm process in every BScountry.

2. Ensure that civil society is able to participate eec-tively in the development and implementation o theBlack Sea Synergy.

3. reat environmental NGOs as important peace build-ing actors in conicting areas and to establish a spe-

cial EC grants program dealing with activities relatedto conict resolution.

4. Promote biodiversity conservation, notably throughthe establishment or strengthening o existing pro-tected areas networks, in particular transboundary protected areas in conict zones.

5. Promote implementation o the SEA45 and EIA46 legis-lation (UNECE and EU) and ensure careul and properassessment o uture development plans with particu-lar attention to protected areas.

6. Support undamental research or sound decisionmaking. Encourage joint studies and monitoring o the state o the environment and natural resourcescoordinated at the level o the BS countries.

7. Promote technology transer o the best availableenergy conversion and end-use technologies together

with decarbonisation o economies. Obsolete tech-nologies and the waste materials produced in onecountry should not be exported to countries with lowerstandards.

8. Te energy end-use eciency and renewable energy integration should be given a priority in the regionalcooperation.

9. Phase out existing subsidies or ossil uels and nu-clear energy.

10. Promote international saety rules and standardsand properly coordinate the construction o oil inra-structure by BS states. Avoid duplication o terminalsdue to political reasons and competition.

NGO participants

Association or Sustainable Human Development, Armenia

European Integration, Armenia

Institute or Peace and Democracy, Azerbaijan

Environmental Law Center “Ecolex”, Azerbaijan

Bulgarian Black Sea NGO Network, Bulgaria

Georgian Energy Eciency Center, Georgia

Green Alternative, Georgia

CEE Bankwatch Network, Georgia

Ecotiras - International Environmental Associationo Rivers Keepers, Moldova

NGO “Ecospectrum-Bender”, Moldova

Mare Nostrum, Romania

“Save aman’!”, Russia

Environmental Watch on North Caucasus, Russia

Russian Geographical Society, Russia

Black sea NGO Network, urkey

EUROSOLAR (urkish Branch o EUROSOLAR European Association or Renewable Energies), urkey

KADOS Kadikoyu Friends o Science Culture and Art Association, urkey

ÜRÇEP Environmental NGOs Platorm o urkey

BAKÇEP Western Black Sea NGOs Platorm, urkey

MARÇEP Marmara Region Environmental NGOs Network

o urkey Ecoclub Ukraine, Ukraine

Centre or Black Sea Studies, Ukraine

Centre or Regional Studies, Ukraine

Econad, Ukraine

Resource & Analysis Center “Society and Environment”,Ukraine

National Ecological Centre o Ukraine

ECOPRAVO Lviv, Ukraine

NGO Black Sea Women’s Club, Ukraine

Youth Ecological Center, Ukraine Wetlands International, Ukraine

WWF European Policy Oce, Belgium

WWF- Danube-CarpathianProgramme Oce, Austria

WWF Caucasus Programme Oce, Georgia

WWF- Danube-CarpathianProgramme Oce, Ukraine

45 Strategic Environmental Assessment46 Environmental Impact Assessment





Te Heinrich Böll Foundation sees itsel as an agency or Greenideas and projects, as well as a orum or the exchange o ideasboth nationally and internationally. Working together withmore than 100 project partners in over 60 countries, it supportsthe development o democratic civil societies worldwide. TeHeinrich Böll Foundation maintains oces in 24 countries. Aparticular ocus o the Foundation’s work is the promotion o sustainable development.

For more inormation about the project:Roderick Keerpütz

Heinrich Böll Foundation EU Regional Oce Brusselsel: +32 2 743 41 [email protected]

www.boell.be

WWF is one o the world’s largest and most experienced in-dependent conservation organisations, with almost 5 millionsupporters and a global network active in over 100 countries.

WWF’s mission is to stop the degradation o the planet’s natu-ral environment and to build a uture in which humans livein harmony with nature, by conserving the world’s biological

diversity, ensuring that the use o renewable natural resourcesis sustainable and promoting the reduction o pollution and

wasteul consumption.

For more inormation about the project:Paloma Agrasot

WWF European Policy Oceel: +32 2 743 88 [email protected]

www.panda.org/eu

the Project Partners

Documents

Black Sea Study 2008