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BG Lt. Col. Inge LindsaarEstonian Police and Border Guard Board
INFORMATION GATHERING, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK ANALYSIS
METHODOLOGIES (IN BORDER MANAGEMENT)
INGE LINDSAARTHEME 2
MARCH 6, 2015
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS AND THREAT ASSESSMENT IN BORDER MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITIES IN 3rd
COUNTRIES
COOPERATION ACROSS BORDERACTIVITIES
AT BORDERINLAND
ACTIVITIES
BORDER CHECKS
BORDER SURVEILLANCE
RISK ANALYSIS
3: “FOUR-TIER ACCESS CONTROL MODEL”
2: DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL (cross-border) CRIME
4: INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION
5: DEVELOPMENT OF BORDER 5: DEVELOPMENT OF BORDER RELATED POLICY ANDRELATED POLICY AND
LEGISLATIONLEGISLATION1: BORDER CONTROL
EU IBM
RISK ANALYSIS
•…IS DEFINED AS THE SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION OF THREATS, VULNERABILITYIES AND IMPACTS, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH IS RECORDED IN THE FORM OF A RISK ASSESSMENT.•CIRAM- EU BEST PACTICES IN BORDER MANAGEMENT
4
RISK ANALYSIS IN BORDER MANAGEMENT
RISK ANALYSIS SHOULD ENSURE INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE SECURITY OF BORDERS…IS THE KEY TOOL TO:• ENSURE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR BORDER CHECKS AND SURVEILLANCE;•ENSURE EFFICIENT, UNIFORM LEVEL OF CONTROL ALONG THE BORDERS;•ENSURE AGREED STANDARDS FOR INFORMATION GATHERING IN BORDER MANAGEMENT.
RISK ANALYSIS
FOR PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF-ILLEGAL MIGRATION-CROSS-BORDER ORGANISED CRIME, INCL
SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES-TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS-TERRORISTS MOVEMENTS-OTHER CROSS-BORDER CRIMINALITY
DEFINITIONS: INTELLIGENCE
IN BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INTELLIGENCE IS :ANY INFORMATION, RECEIVED OR GENERATED THAT IS RELATED TO ONE OF THE COMPONENT OF THE RISK, i.e. RELATED TO THREAT, VULNERABILITY OR IMPACT.
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INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
• COLLECTION- MUST BE PLANNED AND FOCUSED, NEEDS TO BE DIRECTED AT A TARGET (PERSON, GROUP) OR TOPIC. PLANNING TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE INFORMATION THAT IS ALREADY AVAILABLE AND EXAMINES THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL COLLECTION TO FILL GAPS IN THE INFORMATION.
EVALUATION-ASSESSING THE TRUTHFULNESS AND RELIABILITY OF SOURCE AND
INFORMATION
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
• COLLATION- SIFTING OUT OF SPURIOUS, NON-RELEVANT, AND INCORRECT INFORMATION. ORDERLY ARRANGEMENT OF THE REMAINING INFORMATION;
• USE OF COMPUTERISED SYSTEMS
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
• ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION-WITHOUT ANALYSIS, A PIECE OF INFORMATION REMAINS A PIECE OF INFORMATION!
• INTERPRETATION- KOWLEDGE+NEW INFORMATION. NB! DETERMINE THE BALANCE BETWEEN FACT AND SPECULATION! CRITICAL THINKING AND RE-APPRAISAL
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
• REPORTING- INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ARE THE CULMINATION OF ALL FUNCTIONS IN THE PROCESS. THEY STATE THE FINDINGS OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS.
• CLEAR CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FACTS AND JUDGEMENTS, AND CONCLUSIONS AND FORECASTS
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
• DISSEMINATION-DISTRIBUTION• PRIMARY ROLE-PROVIDE INFORMATION, INSIGHT,
AND LEAD TO INTERVENTION!• DISSEMINATION IS A TECHNICAL TERM USED
INTELLIGENCE TO DESCRIBE THE ACT OF DISTRIBUTING CREDIBLE AND TIMELY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO OFFICIALS AND „CONSUMERS“ INSIDE AND OUTSIDE ORGANIZATION
INTELLIGENCE PROCESSREVIEWS-1.EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT- HOW THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS’ WORK WAS DONE;2.EFFECTIVENESS- HOW THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS ASSISTED THE READER AND DECISION-MAKER. IT RELIES ON HONEST EXCHENGE AND DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF AND READERS.MAIN QUESTION-WAS IT READABLE AND TIMELY.
3. MONITORING SYSTEMS
• FRAN• MONTHLY DATA ON INDICATORS RELATED TO
IRREGULAR MIGRATION• DATA AIMED AT MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES• NOT PRIMARILY ADDRESSED AT STATISTICAL
TREATMENT: EASY TO GATHER AND ALLOW FOR COMPARISON AND TREND ANALYSIS.
2. DIFFERENT MODELS THAT ARE BEING USED (CIRAM)
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THREAT
…LOAD OF FORCE ACTING ON THE BORDERS.•IS CHARACTERISED BY ITS MAGNITUDE AND LIKELYHOOD.•THE ANALYST SHOULD DESCRIBE WHICH PROCESSES OR FACTORS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE STATE AFFECT THE MAGNITUDE AND THE LIKELYHOOD OF THE THREAT.
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IDENTIFYING OF THREATS• THREAT SHOULD BE DESCRIBED IN NEUTRAL,
SIMPLE AND SHORT WORDING STYLE;• THE DESCRIPTION OF THE THREAT TYPICALLY
INCLUDES:- THE DESCRIPTION OF MODUS OPERANDI; - THE PERPETRATOR GOALS, MOTIVES AND
CAPABILITIES (WHO, WHEN, WHERE,HOW MANY);
- THE TRENDS AND PREDICTIONS;- THE PUSH FACTORS
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TERMS
THREATRISK
PROBABILITY
INCIDENT
IMPACT/HARM
PRIMARY HARM
SECONDARY HARM
COLLATERAL HARM
HARM
THREAT ASSESSMENT
• IN CIRAM, MOST THREATS WILL BE ASSOCIATED WITH BORDER AREAS OR BORDER TYPES
• SOME THREATS CAN BE ASSOCIATED WITH PROCESSES FOR CHECKS AND SURVEILLANCE
• THREAT ASSESSMENT AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE –BY TYPES OF BORDERS.
THREAT ASSESSMENT:MAGNITUDE AND LIKELIHOOD
Among the first factors that will affect the magnitude and the likelyhood at the borders, are:
•GEOGRAPHICAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE BORDER AREAS;•THE EQUIPMENT IN PLACE (can be referred as border permeability)
MEASURING THE THREAT: EXAMPLES
• IMMIGRATION: THE NUMBER OF MIGRANTS ILLEGALLY CROSSING
THE BORDER;THE NUMBER OF REFUSED ENTRY.• DRUG CONTROL:KILOGRAMS OF DRUGS SEIZED.• COUNTERTERRORISM:PATHS THAT TERRORISTS COULD USE TO ENTER
THE COUNTRY;THE NUMBER OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.
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IMPACT - PROBABILITY
HIGH IMPACT/HARM
LOW IMPACT/HARM
LESS LIKELY VERY LIKELY
IMPACT
• BORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY• ABILITY TO MANAGE LEGITIMATE PASSENGER
FLOW AT BORDER• HUMANIATRIAN IMPACT
Identifications of threats (Optional algorithm)
1.Analytical unit collects all incidents, data and information about main threats. First of all In this process we have to take in to consideration reliability and validity of the information to the threat. Secondly we have to consider probability and magnitude of threats and notice it in the report to decision makers. Another important way of thinking is to identify real and hypothetical ; approval and potential threat.
Example: Approval threat (risk) for outside border is illegal migration. Potential threat (risk) is terrorism. Hypothetical is cross border conveying of very large scale of mass infection.
EXAMPLE OF RISK MATRIXRISK NAME THREAT VULNERABILIT
YIMPACT RISK LEVEL
RISK 1 TDA HIGH LOW LOW LOW
RISK 2 IM HIGH HIGH LOW MEDIUM
RISK 3 VA LOW MEDIUM HIGH HIGH
THREAT MATRIX FOR BORDER SECURITYIDENTIFIED THREATS FOR UPCOMING PERIOD OF X
THREAT HIGH MODERATE NORMAL LOWILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING
IRREGULAR MIGRATION
SMUGGLING (EXCISE GOODS)
SMUGGLING (DRUGS)
SMUGGLING (WEAPONS)
SMUGGLING (VEHICLES etc.)
GENERAL CROSS-BORDER CRIME
TERRORISM PROBABILITY GRADE (PG)CertainAlmost certain, very likelyPossibleUnlikely
Massive, extensive,
exceptional organised or
spontanous influx
Periodical or constant organised
and facilitated attempts by
individuals and/or groups
Single or not frequent
incidents/attemptsby persons or
groups
No incidentsRear or single
incidents
THREAT LEVEL
MAGNITUDE-EXTENT-FREQUENCY
Change from X-1
CASE STUDY BASING ON CIRAM STANDARDS
SMUGGLING OF HUMAN BEINGS: WHAT HAS TO BE IDENTIFIED,
HOW TO DISMANTLE THIS RISK?
31 31
1. MODUS OPERANDI OF TRAVEL, CROSSING, AVOIDING DETECTION, DOCUMENTS
• VNM network facilitating arrival, stay and employment in Russian Federation
• ARM OGC organising travel to RUS-EST border and finding „scout“ to take “shipment“ across the border
• Legal entry and stay in first transit country (Russian Federation)
• Recruiter for ARM OGC in Estonia – finding „taxi“ drivers nationals and residents of Estonia
• Couriers transporting „shipment“ from EST border across the Baltic countries until Poland
2. WHO, WHERE, WHEN; Month Date BGB
BorderSection
BGS Border typeSize ofgroup
December 26.12.2011 Lõuna EST-RUS Luhamaa Land 8March 15.03.2012 Lõuna EST-RUS Saatse Land 5June 14.06.2012 Lõuna EST-RUS Piusa Land 4September 4.09.2012 Lõuna EST-RUS Piusa Land 9October 26.10.2012 Lõuna EST-RUS Piusa Land 10October 29.10.2012 Lõuna EST-RUS Piusa Land 6November 1.11.2012 Lõuna EST-RUS Piusa Land 6November 18.11.2012 Lõuna EST-RUS Piusa Land 6December 19.12.2012 Lõuna EST-RUS Värska Land 6February 3.02.2013 Lõuna EST-RUS Luhamaa Land 27April 17.04.2013 Lõuna EST-RUS Piusa Land 6June 23.06.2013 Lõuna EST-RUS Saatse Land 6October 2.10.2013 Ida EST-RUS Punamäe Lake 8October 13.10.2013 Lõuna EST-RUS Piusa Land 8November 23.11.2013 Lõuna EST-RUS Värska Land 3
PROFILE OF VNM NATIONALS• Jumpers” - short stay (‘jump’ within 2 months and/or less) on tourist or
business visas and quick transit via RUS (see photo 1 and 2 below).
• “Residents” – legal entry, stay and/or work (illegally) in RUS over 3 months
• Age : 18-30 y.o (many cases claiming to be minors !)• Gender: >90% male
• Other: Change of statements during the proceedings (names, age etc.)
3.TRENDS AND PREDICTIONS • December 2011:
1st detected and identified VNM group
• December2011- November 2013Active „season“ of cross border movement
of VNM groups at EST-RUS border
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF GROUPS 30 + GROUPS (200 + persons)
(calculation with detection rate 50%)
4. PUSH FACTORS
• SOCIAL AND ECONOMICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM
• VERY FEW JOB OPPORTUNITIES WITH DECENT INCOME
• TIGHTENING OF IMMIGRATION RULES IN RUSSIA ( INTENCIFIED RAIDS BY LEA’s)
• RISE OF RACIAL HATERATE
4. PULL FACTORS
• LARGE VNM COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE (POL, DEU, FRA)
• ADVERTISEMENT OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES
• MIGRATION AMNESTIES
• AVAILABILITY OF NUMEROUS SMUGGLING NETWORKS
CASE STUDY 2: THREAT ASSESSMENT : POSSIBLE RIOTS,
TERRORISM , EXTREMISM-HOW TO ACT AT BORDERS?
THREAT ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE: VISIT OF A HEAD OF GOVERNMENT X -BRIEFING
• BASING ON 2 DOCUMENTS– THREAT ASSESSMENT (14.08.20XX)– RISK ANALYSIS FOR COMING PERIOD (WEEK)- (29.08.20XX)
• IDENTIFIED 6 THREATS:1) TERRORISM2) EXTREMISM3) RIOTS4) PROVOCATIONS5) ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION6) CROSS-BORDER CRIMINALITY
39
Kindel KÕRGE
Peaaegu kindel MÕÕDUKAS
Võimalik TAVALINE
Vähetõenäoline MADAL
OHUTASETÕENÄOSUSE ASTE
LEGEND OF THREAT MATRIX:
GENERAL ASSESSMENT: TERRORISM /
EXTREMISM/RIOTS/PROVOCATIONS
Why such assessment?•Time of the visit was announced in a very short notice •Visa requirement for 3rd country nationals who probably will plan possible activities •Unpredicatble actions by EU nationals or Schengen visa holders •Possible threat of crossing the border outside BCP-s
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THREATS IN BCP-S AND THEIR LEVEL INTERNAL BORDERS EXTERNAL BORDERS
LEVEL OF THREAT LEVEL OF PROBABILITY LEVEL OF THREAT LEVEL OF
PROBABILITYTerrorism Normal Possible Normal Possible Riots, provocations Medium Almost certain Normal Possible
GENERAL ASSESSMENT: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION / CROSS-BORDER
CRIMINALITY
41
THREATS IN BCPS-S AND THE LEVELINTERNAL BORDERS EXTERNAL BORDERS
LEVEL OF THREAT LEVEL OF PROBABLITY LEVEL OF THREAT LEVEL OF
PROBABILITYILLEGAL IMMIGRATION MEDIUM Kindel MEDIUM CERTAINILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING LOW Võimalik LOW POSSIBLESMUGGLING OF STOLEN VEHICLES - - NORMAL ALMOST CERTAINSMUGGLING OF GOODS - - NORMAL CERTAINSMUGGLING OF DRUGS - - NORMAL POSSIBLESMUGGLING OF WEAPONS - - LOW POSSIBLEOTHER CROSS-BORDER CRIMINALITY NORMAL Peaaegu kindel NORMAL ALMOST CERTAIN
WHY SUCH ASSESSMENT?•EVENTS IN 2014 AT BORDERS AND IN NEARBY COUNTRIES •ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS CROSS THE BORDERS BY CAR AND AT MAIN ROADS •INCREASE OF NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHOUT VISAS TRANSITING IN THE REGION •TRANSITING ILLEGAL MIGRATION •CROSS-BORDER CRIMINALITY IN THE REGION
3. KEY PRINCIPLES, TOOLS, ELEMENTS AND STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED
KEY PRINCIPLES• COOPERATION WITH POLICE, SECURITY
POLICE AND CUSTOMS AND OTHER BORDER SECURITY AUTHORITIES IS NEEDED
• NEED TO DEVELOP THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE BORDER CONTROL AUTHORITIES: ROLE, RESPONSIBILITIES, RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION FLOW AND DECISION-TAKING, STANDARDS, REFERENCE MODELS.
KEY PRINCIPLES :MONITORING THE SITUATION AT BORDERS
AIM- TO DETECT EMERGING THREATS OF CROSS-BORDER CRIMINALITY AT EARLY STAGE.
21. huhtikuuta 2023 45
Situation picture
TOOLS: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Own resources Criminal trends
Global general situation
National general situation
Terrain & weather
Legislation
Inter agency cooperation
Ongoing and planned activities
Operational history
Criminal history
OTHER TOOLS
• ALERTS• EARLY WARNINGS• RISK PROFILES• RISK INDICATORS• REGISTERS• STAFF/RESOURCES• EQUIPMENT
STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED: EXAMPLE
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Estonian Board of Border Guard
Police Board
Rescue Board
Security Police Board
Citizenship and Migration Board
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Local Authorities
Defence Forces
Customs Board
Correction Board
Maritime Board
Motor Vehicle Registration Centre
ELEMENTS: ACTIONS BASED ON PROPER ANALYSIS
1. Intelligence and Joint intelligence• targeted intelligence collection• joint databases• joint teams• joint targets and operations
2. Risk analysis• based on authorities’ specific task-related needs • exchange of information on the results of analysis
3. Co-operation in border management• Border Guard is the leading authority at the borders• Police , security police and customs co-operate in their area of
competence• and vice versa…• Use of each others’ databases and information• Use of INTERPOL databases
21. huhtikuuta 2023 49
OPERATIONAL ART
Strategic intelligence Strategic risk analysis Strategic planning and guidance
Operational intelligence Operational risk analysis Operational planning and guidance
Tactical intelligence Tactical risk analysisTactical guidance and field
solutions
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RISK ANALYSIS MODEL FOR BORDER CONTROL-Based on Schengen Borders Code and the Schengen Catalogue
RISK ANALYSIS MODEL FOR BORDER CONTROL-Based on Schengen Borders Code and the Schengen Catalogue
CRIME INTELLIGENCE RISK ANALYSIS BORDER CONTROL
STRATEGICSTRATEGIC
THREATS ON THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
•statistics•crime patterns•organisations
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS•geography, demography, traffic
•apprehension rate and total crime•clevel of ambition •gaps in controls?
OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT
•opplans•budgets
TACTICALTACTICAL
OPERATIONALOPERATIONAL
LOCAL INTELLIGENCE•filing data + analysis•.serving the products
PROFILING•modi operandi
•profiles, indicators,•registers
REAL TIME BORDER CONTROL
•border surveillance•border checks
THREATS AS PHENOMENA•statistics, trends
•underlying factors
LONG TERM SURVEILLANCE•risks and threats•potential change
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT•long term: shape
organisation•short term: effect on crime
21. huhtikuuta 2023 51
USING RISK ANALYSISUSING RISK ANALYSIS
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
National levelNational level
BACKGROUND
SITUATION
SINGULAR EVENTS REAL TIME ACTIONS
local levellocal level
regional levelregional level
STRATEGYSTRATEGY
OPERATIVE LEADERSHIP
LEADING IS BASED ON INFORMATION!
WHO DOES WHAT IN COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITIES?
NEW TACTICS OF ISIS: CA 1000 PERSONS PRETENDING TO BE ILLEGAL MIGRANTS CROSS ILLEGALLY STATE BORDERS. WHAT TO DO?
• WHICH AUTHORITY/ORGANISATION/BODY COLLECTS DATA/ INFORMATION?
• WHAT KIND OF DATA/INFORMATION IS COLLECTED?• WHO GIVES THE TASK FOR INFORMATION COLLECTION?• WHO CARRIES OUT ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION?• WHO IS ACTING?• HOW TO ACT?
TIME: 15 MIN