Dis cus sion

The Bewaji, Van Binsbergen and Ramose debate onUbuntu

J.A.I. Be waji1 and M.B. Ramose

De part ment of Po liti cal Sci ences and Phi loso phyDis ci pline of Phi loso phy

Uni ver sity of South Af ricaPO Box 392

UNISA0003

E- mail: <ra mosmb@unisa.ac.za>

Ab stract

What fol lows is a dis cus sion, in three parts, of the Af ri can con cept of ubuntu

and re lated is sues. In the first part of the dis cus sion J.A.I. Bewaji as sesses an

es say by W.M.J. van Binsbergen on Ubuntu and the Globalisation of South -

ern Af ri can Thought and So ci ety (2001). In the sec ond part Bewaji re views

M.B. Ramose’s Af rican Phi los o phy through Ubuntu (2002). And in the third

part Ramose re sponds to both Bewaji and Van Binsbergen. Al though Ramose

dis agrees with some of Bewaji’s com ments and in ter pre ta tions – es pe cially

with re gard to the the sis on which ubuntu is, ac cord ing to the for mer,

founded (i.e. “that on tol ogy proper is a rhe ol ogy”) – both Bewaji and

Ramose agree that Van Binsbergen’s cri tique of ubuntu phi los o phy, and spe -

cif i cally of Ramose’s ex pli ca tion thereof, is un ten a ble.

PART I

“If my peo ple must go, they will have to find their way by them selves”.Criti cal com ments on Wim van Bins ber gen's Ubuntu and the Globali sa tionof South ern Af ri can Thought and So ci ety

2

(J.A.I. Be waji)

It was Al bert Luthuli who made the clar ion call, “Let my peo ple go”, at his No belPrize for Peace ac cep tance speech in 1962. But what we wit ness in hu man his tory, isnot a sit u a tion where any op pressed per son, any en slaved or shack led peo ple, anygroup, any so ci ety, has ever at tained free dom, great ness, and suc cess with out hav ingto sweat, suf fer great pains, and in deed, die for the lofty am bi tions that makes forgreat ness of hu man spirit. This is the jus ti fi ca tion for the lead ti tle of this dis cus siones say on Wim van Binsbergen's (2001) con tri bu tion to a spe cial is sue of Quest de -voted to the Af ri can Re nais sance and Ubuntu Phi los o phy (cf. Boele van Hensbroek,2001).

1 Ad dress for cor re spon dence: De part ment of Lan guage, Lin guis tics and Phi los o phy, Uni ver sity of theWest In dies, Mona Cam pus, Kingston, Ja maica, The West In dies. E-mail: <tundebewaji@ya hoo.com>.

2 Cf. Van Binsbergen (2001).

Com ing to read the very long piece by Pro fes sor Van Bins ber gen, I was very dis ap -pointed about some of the tenu ous con clu sions reached by him, es pe cially with re la -tion to Ubuntu's his toric ity and its authen tic ity. I read the piece with trepi da tion. It ishard to en gage in a critical dis cus sion with some one who has claimed so much in ter est in Af ri can phi loso phy, with out seem ing to be nega tive. But mat ters have to be putstraight re gard less. Ini tially I thought that the author was proba bly try ing to ei ther gen -er ate se ri ous de bate by his in cli na tion to over stress the value of ubuntu as a ral ly ingcon cep tual idea, or that Van Bins ber gen was seek ing to at tain un nec es sar ily cheappopu lar ity on the back of Ra mose's (2002) very com mit ted dis course. Af ter read ingthe es say for the first time, I went back to read Ra mose. This was proba bly a bless ingin dis guise, be cause it made my read ing of Ra mose more criti cal. What ever the casemay be, I have to con fess that I am not flu ent in any of the lan guages of as so cia tion ofbotho, ubuntu or their cog nate ren di tions in Bantu lan guages. Nev er the less, I find itnec es sary to make a few clari fi ca tions in view of the Yo ruba con cep tion of omo lu abi,as dis cussed by Gbade ge sin (1991), Aki wowo (1999), Mak inde (1988), Abim bola(1971), and oth ers. This is the idea of a hu man, nay, hu mane per son that is of ten rep li -cated in many in dige nous and tra di tional so cie ties in Af rica and else where.

The cen tral ten ets of Van Binsbergen's dis course re volves around (a) the con tem po -ra ne ous na ture of the ubuntu con cept and con struct or what he calls an “etic re con -struc tion, in an alien for mat”; (b) the intellectualistic na ture of ubuntu, mak ing it a cu -ri os ity de vised by mem bers of an ex tra ne ous ac a deme and their po lit i cal po ten tateswith di verse agen das “of ex ces sive pur suit of in di vid ual gain”; (c) the “uto pian andpro phetic” ide al ism and dream-like surreality of the con cept in the class of such ide ol -o gies as Af ri can So cial ism, Af ri can Communalism, Consciencism, etc., and (d) thecon cept as a prod uct of North ern At lan tic glob al ism or re sponses thereto (VanBinsbergen 2001:57).

To ar gue his point that ubuntu is ideo logi cal, uto pian and pro phetic, Van Bins ber -gen, in the hope that it will make up for the ana lyti cal rig our lack ing in his dis course,en gages in pro lix ety mo logi cal ex cur sus on the con cept and con cludes that there is anaf fin ity be tween ubuntu and its prede ces sors, which the North At lan tic civi li za tionkilled in their in fancy, in the nec es sary bid that Af rica re mained for ever de pend ent,viz:

It is easy to see that Zam bian hu man ism and ubuntu are not in the first placefac tual de scrip tions. They pri mar ily ex press the speaker's dreams about normsand prac tices that al leg edly once pre vailed in what are now to be con sid eredpe riph eral places (no ta bly within the in ti macy of al leg edly closely-knit vil -lages, ur ban wards, and kin groups), while the speaker her self or him self is sit -u ated at or near the na tional or global cen ter. Such dreams about the past andthe pe riph ery are ar tic u lated, not be cause the speaker pro poses to re tire thereper son ally or wishes to ex hort other peo ple to take up ef fec tive res i dence there,but be cause of their in spir ing mod el ing power with re gard to cen tral na tionaland even global is sues – in other words be cause of these dreams' al leged per -sua sive/perlocutionary na ture out side the pe riph eral do main in which they areclaimed to orig i nate and to which they re fer back (Van Binsbergen, 2001:60-61).

To sup port this al leged uto pi an ism and proph ecy of ubuntu phi los o phy by Af ri can phi -los o phers, Van Binsbergen al ludes to the many spaces the ad vo cates of ubuntu ne go ti -ate in daily ex is tence – at one time they are mem bers of kin ship re la tions, at an other

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 379

they are pub lic ser vants in ur ban cen ters; at one time they un der take all the rit u als oftra di tional life, at an other they are Chris tians con duct ing or tak ing part in mass; at onetime they are ad vo cates of Af ri can cul tures, at an other they are prod ucts of West ernphilo soph i cal tra di tions they can not ne gate; at one time agents of re volt against apart -heid and at an other, prod ucts of globalizations and the North At lan tic in tel lec tual cen -ters (2001:61-62). Be cause of this, the ques tion that Van Binsbergen now asks, is:Why are these guys con coct ing var i ous ideas and retrojecting them to non ex is tent pe ri -ods of com mu nal con scious ness? And his an swer is: Ramose (2002) and other dis il lu -sioned Af ri can ac a dem ics er ro ne ously think they can ex hume some value sys tem, ide -al ist metaphysic, or epistemic con struct from a pris tine Af ri can his tor i cal pre-co lo nial,pre-apart heid and pre-Chris tian civ i liz ing past. But ubuntu is,

a con tem po rary aca demic con struct, called forth by the same forces of op pres -sion, eco nomic ex ploi ta tion, and cul tural al iena tion that have shaped South ernAf ri can so ci ety over the past two cen tu ries (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:62 – ital icsmine).

The il lu sion of these Af ri can aca dem ics, so Van Bins ber gen seems to claim, is a formof de men tia they suf fer from in the search of Af ri can schol ars for lost At lan tis, a han -ker ing over a non- existent past, an in spir ing nos tal gia with an er rant fic tional and il lu -sion ary foun da tion. Bef ore the white colo nists there were ob vi ously no Af ri can vil lage life, nor city life in the spaces to which ubuntu is now be ing as so ci ated, and there fore,no ideas or ide als of be ing a good per son, the good life, a sense of com mu nity or com -mon des tiny! Even if there were sem blances of these dif fer ent from the shanty townsand Ban tus tan set tle ments on the out skirts of white cit ies, there is no rea son to be lievethat con tem po rary South ern Af ri can vil lag ers have any rea son to claim de scent fromsuch in cho ate and un sta ble set tle ments. Says Van Bins ber gen (and I quote here ex ten -sively so as to show the dis dain with which he holds Af ri can his tory and phi loso phy),

Both as an an thro polo gist and as a diviner- priest I have fa mil iar ized my selfsome what with these for mats. In these con texts, the vil lage and fam ily world- view is pre sented by the peo ple as time- honoured, an ces tral, un chang ing. Butthis may be de cep tive, af ter the now all- too- familiar model of the 'i nve ntion oftra di tion'.... Also as eth nogra phers and ana lysts we are of ten brought to proj ectthe world- view we en coun ter dur ing our re search, back into the past, at least by a few cen tu ries, per haps the time of the emer gence of the Bantu lan guage fam -ily, or even a few fur ther to the in ven tion of ag ri cul ture and ani mal hus bandry – the pro duc tive ba sis of the Af ri can vil lage. It is es pe cially tempt ing to see in to -day's vil lage life an un al tered con tinua tion of the nor ma tive pat terns gov ern ing nineteenth- century vil lages as peo pled by the di rect an ces tors of present- dayvil lages. But we could only be rea sona bly sure of such con ti nu ity on the ba sisof ex ten sive his tori cal re search, which ... is se verely handi capped by the pau -city of ver nacu lar nineteenth- century sources and by the fact that the nine -teenth cen tury is sink ing be low the ho ri zon of liv ing mem ory and re li able oraltra di tion. What is more, on theo reti cal, epis te mo logi cal and com para tivegrounds we are to sus pect that the South ern Af ri can vil lage and the so cial andnor ma tive pat terns that gov erned it, in stead of con tinu ing a per en nial lived re al -ity, have to some ex tent been a crea tion of co lo nial ad mini stra tion, mis sion aryac tivi ties, in dus trial re la tions based on la bour mi gra tion, and so cial an thro po -

380 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

logi cal ag gre gate de scrip tion (2001:67- 68 – ital ics mine to show authors loose -ness with his tory, logic, ar chae ology and sci en tific evi dence).

Now, if this were the case, what could be the foun da tion of an ubuntu phi loso phy thatis Af ri can or authen ti cally in dige nous? Maybe one should con clude this for Van Bins -ber gen: Jack Goody (1977) was right! A peo ple who never set tled or added value toland wan dered by them have no le gal rights to such land, and it is not an in jus tice, ei -ther in South ern Af rica, the Ameri cas, Aus tra lia, New Zea land or even in to day's Pal -es tine for more greedy, mor ally and cul tur ally bank rupt mi grants to dis pos sess such in -dige nous “primi tives” and oc cupy, to the greater glory of their equally mor ally bank -rupt De ity, such lands. If the likes of aca dem ics such as Ra mose think they can doany thing about it through con cep tual res ur rec tions, they need to watch how brotherMugabe will be dealt with just like Ny erere, Nkru mah and Lu mumba were dealt withbef ore him. How can a peo ple with out a his tory be yond the 19th cen tury (which is his -tory of Euro pean oc cu pa tion any way) claim any no tion of a good per son or good so ci -ety? This ubuntu phi loso phy thing is cer tainly good ther apy for the soul of the con -quered, the op pressed wretched of the earth, a way of com ing to terms with de feat andex pro pria tion, to show that rec on cilia tion is a genu ine act of mag na nim ity rather that acon se quence of non- availability of any op tion!

When you con sid er the fact that even the lead er ship and of fi ci at ing cus to di ans in the con tem po rary vil lag ers hardly have re course to such con cep tual ob fus ca tions ex cepton visi ta tions by such towns peo ple as Ra mose, then you be gin to re al ize the limi ta -tions of ubuntu ide al ism in the global South ern Af ri can en vi ron ment. Or what else will ex plain the fact that, ac cord ing to Van Bins ber gen, in all his years of in ter ac tion withthese (lowly, poor, maybe sav age) peo ple he has never wit nessed the regu lar use of the term ubuntu? He says,

I have never wit nessed the tech ni cal terms ubuntu (or lo cal mor pho log i calequiv a lents) or Zam bian hu man ism to be used as a mat ter of course, of ac -cepted par lance, in these con crete sit u a tions of the vil lage and the fam ily. Atbest they were used in quasi-quo ta tion, in tro duc ing into ver nac u lar [they do not speak a lan guage, re mem ber! – J.A.I.B.] world of the vil lage and the fam ily astilted (and of ten some what iron i cal) ref er ence to the out side world of lit er acy,pol i tics and ide ol ogy. These terms do not be long to the for mat of ex pres sionproper to those sit u a tions....There fore, to de scribe the vil lages, be liefs and im -ages at op er a tion at the vil lage and fam ily level as 'the South ern Af ri can in dig e -nous phi los o phy of ubuntu' amounts to a ren der ing (in dis cur sive ac a demic,spe cif i cally philo soph i cal, terms which ex em plify glob ally cir cu lat ing con cep -tual us age) of ideas that are cer tainly im plied in South ern Af ri can vil lage prac -tices and ideas but that ex ist there un der dif fer ent, much more dif fuse andsituationally vary ing, lin guis tic for mats. Ubuntu in the sense of the con cep tualcom plex which mod ern ex po nents of ubuntu phi los o phy claim to ex ist aroundthat term, is at best a transformative ren der ing, in glob ally me di ated, an a lyt i callan guage, of ver nac u lar prac tices and con cepts which are very far from hav inga one-to-one lin guis tic cor re spon dence with the phrase ol ogy of ubuntu phi los o -phy (Van Binsbergen, 2001:69).

This is amaz ing! Holla Amigo, here en ters Tem pels! Where did phi loso phers likeLocke, Hob bes and Rous seau get their ideas of so cial con tract? Was it la tent in theviews of their so cie ties or a dis til la tion of con cepts pres ent in nebu lous form in their

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cul tures – or did they de rive it from the poli ties which the so- called ad ven tur ers, dis -cov er ers and civi liz ers of the primi tive worlds en coun tered on their for eign trav els?

Us ing the ar cane ideas of emic and etic as thematized by Pike, Van Binsbergenseeks to in val i date the au then tic ity and indigeneity of the philo soph i cal con cept ofubuntu. Ac cord ing to him,

The sys tema ti za tion of ubuntu as an al leged in dige nous phi loso phy is an eticprac tice that re motely, ana lyti cally and trans form ingly rep re sents emic i.e. ver -nacu lar prac tices that take place in pe riph eral con texts in present- day South ernAf rica, and that in mean ing, but not in strict for mat, may more or less cor re -spond with the ex plicit, re la tional, dis cur sive state ments as pub lished....Theself- proclaimed ex perts on ubuntu form a globally- informed, South ern Af ri canin tel lec tual elite who, re mote in place and so cial prac tice from the emic ex pres -sion at the vil lage level which they seek to cap ture, have of fi cially coined thecon cept of ubuntu as a cor ner stone of South ern Af ri can self- reflective ethno -graphy (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:69- 70).

Clearly, in the view of Van Binsbergen, the de cep tion in the ef forts of these self-styled apos tles of in dig e nous in tel lec tual cre ativ ity of Af ri cans is easy to sense. They are try -ing to for mu late a phi los o phy that is at best only la tent. Some thing that never re allyrises to the sur face in the con scious ness of the av er age South ern Af ri can in di vid ual or, for that mat ter, even South ern Af ri can sage. Their ef fort is no better than that ofPlacides Tempels (1959) in a new cen tury, and this is la men ta ble. In this re gard VanBinsbergen clev erly uses the weak ness of the ear lier phi los o phy of Negritude as a foilfor the new Ubuntu phi los o phy, ap peal ing to Mudimbe's (1994) cre ative ex po sure ofsuch gen er al iza tions as no more than mar ginal in ven tive retrodictional lin guis tic fab ri -ca tions of an Af ri can es sence through the misty prisms of North ern At lan tic in tel lec -tual con scious ness (Van Binsbergen, 2001:70).

The fact that Neg ri tude as an Af ri can phi loso phy was easy to un der stand be cause ofits con cep tual de pend ence on the in tel lect of its crea tor, while ubuntu is an in cho ate,nu anced, tex tured and con tex tu ally de pend ent con cept cap tur ing a fam ily of fluid andin de lim it able se ries of quali ties, at trib utes, and char ac ter is tics of per son hood in of fi cial and pri vate do mains of ex is tence, does not make the mat ter any less simi lar in VanBins ber gen's view. For him there is no need to en gage in a Quinean in de ter mi nacysearch, nor in re pro graphic exe ge sis. The mat ter is very sim ple, be cause, as he glee -fully ex claims, “all rep re sen ta tion is dis tor tion” (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:62). The ef -forts of this genre of Af ri can schol ar ship is worse than that of Tem pels (1959) andHor ton (1993), as one could eas ily un der stand the mo ti va tion of these gen tle men andtheir search for the ra tion al ity of the primi tive minds. The case of this new cate gory ofAf ri can schol ars, on the other hand, is very para doxi cal, as they claim and cling to allthe ap pur te nances of North At lan tic in tel lec tual bene fac tions, yet fab ri cate a nos tal gicAf ri can iden tity from the cozy co coon of their air- conditioned of fices and lec ture thea -tres. He says,

In these, in ma jor ity Fran cophone, at tempts to re con struct, re- appropriate, andas sert a philo sophi cal per spec tive that is West ern in for mat yet is pro claimed to be pre- colonial Af ri can in con tent, his toric Af ri can thought is de picted as re -volv ing on a human- centered on tol ogy, which Af ri can authors and sym pa theticEuro pean ob serv ers al ready have a cen tury ago ha bitu ally cast in terms of the

382 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

same Bantu- language root –untu that was later, to emerge as the cor ner stoneof ubuntu phi loso phy (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:70 – ital ics mine).

In fact, given the gen er os ity of North At lan tic world to the rest of the hu man ity andthe uni verse, one may well won der, with Van Bins ber gen, why it is sim ply im pos si blefor these self- styled Af ri can in tel lec tu als and those like them in other colo nized anden slaved climes to just for get they ever had any tra di tion? This ques tion is es pe ciallyper ti nent if we re call that all the so- called schol ar ship pro duced by these schol ars arein ex tri ca bly in ter woven with the edu ca tional heri tage that gave them con scious ness,lin guis tic ex pres sion and cog ni tive rep re sen ta tion. For Van Bins ber gen the be lated pa -thetic rant ing of ubuntu phi loso phers is an ex hu ma tion of a dis graced form of ethno- philosophical cul- de- sac. It amounts to a di ver sion from the se ri ous is sues of socio- political and eco nomic re con struc tion and de vel op ment to which all se ri ous peo ples of col our should in vest their me nial and men tal en er gies, if they have any of the lat ter!What we all want Af ri can schol ars (and all colo nized and un colo nized peo ples of theworld with which the West has had the good for tune of in flu enc ing) to do, is sim ply to for get the past and get on with the busi ness of be com ing Euro pe ans or as close toEuro pe ans as pos si ble (i.e. civi lized, demo cratic and ad vanced). But if ubuntu is rec -og nized as a need ful di ver sion, it may help in the pro cess of trans for ma tion that it iscalled to serve, oth er wise it may be a waste of time and re sources. Thus, claims VanBins ber gen,

Ubuntu is a tool for trans for ma tion in a con text of globalisation. As an etic ren -der ing in a glob ally me di ated for mat, it has emerged, and takes its form andcon tents, in the re al i ties of post-apart heid South Af rica to day ... There fore,look ing for the 'true' pre-co lo nial or nine teenth-cen tury mean ing of ubuntuthrough et y mo log i cal, ethnographic and his tor i cal pro ce dures would be basedon a mis un der stand ing of what ubuntu is, and is meant for. None the less, likemost ide ol o gies, ubuntu is le git i mated by the claim ... that this con cept sums upthe an ces tral ori en ta tion of the South ern Af ri can globalised ur ban pop u la tionto day (2001:71).

The ex pert eth no log i cal, ethnographic and an thro po log i cal psy chi a trist, psy chol o gistand sci en tist that Van Binsbergen is, he is able to di vine the men tal in cu bat ing or i ginsof ubuntu phi los o phy in the Oedipus com plex of the er rant Af ri can stargazers in thecloak of phi los o phers. These phi los o phers and their par a sitic bed-fel lows are for evertry ing to foist on the un for tu nate Af ri can vil lag ers ideas of which they have the leastin kling. What mo ti vates these schol ars is not merely “(a) ... re con struc tion of Af ri cansys tems of thought” in the nor mal type known as eth no-phi los o phy, rather it is the glo -ri fi ca tion and perlocutionary in ven tion of one con cept which is then “(b) ... ar ti fi ciallyraised to star sta tus” and glo ri fied with the vaunted ti tle of a phi los o phy. Thus,

The cur rent ubuntu in dus try, how ever, has largely re sorted to (b) (star gaz ing, if you will – J.A.I.B.). Dis tantly, and with out re course to ex plicit and sys tem aticmeth odo logi cal and em piri cal pro ce dures, but in stead driven by aca demicphi loso phers' and man age ment con sult ants' in tui tive lin guis tic analy ses andchild hood remi nis cences (sic). If ubuntu is to be Af rica's great gift to theglobal world (sic) of thought, it is pri mar ily not the Af ri can vil lag ers' gift, butthat of the aca demic and mana ge rial codi fi ers who al lowed them selves to bedis tantly and se lec tively in spired by vil lage life; ig nor ing the ubiq ui tous con -flicts and con tra dic tions, the op pres sive im ma nence of the world- view, the

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 383

witch craft be liefs and ac cu sa tions, the con straint os cil la tion be tween trust anddis trust, and merely ap pro pri at ing and rep re sent ing the bright side (Van Bins -ber gen, 2001:72 – ital ics and bold mine).

This won der ful anal y sis is quite an ex traor di nary prod uct of the ge nius of theneo-Hortonian scholar who knows ev ery thing about tra di tional Af ri can life, their value sys tems, cul tural ethos and even the fu ture tra jec to ries that Af ri can thought sys temscan and must take and what con sti tutes its proper and cor rect modes of pre sen ta tion,rep re sen ta tion and de vel op ment. Those Af ri can phi los o phers and in ter dis ci plin aryschol ars who ar ro gate to them selves the ex per tise of mid-wiv ing new and cre ative mo -dal i ties for the tran scen dence of the im posed episteme of the global slave-mas ter mustbe si lenced and made to pur sue more wor thy ex ploits, like re in ter pre ta tions of Marx,Hobbes, Locke and Rous seau, and prob a bly the proper im plan ta tion of the Amer i canver sion of de moc racy on the con ti nent of Af rica to the greater glory of the Span ishCo lum bus' God or even the de mented and Xe no pho bic Yahweh of the Old Tes ta mentre li gion. Where in the con quered, ap pro pri ated, ex pro pri ated, sub verted, dec i mated,de nuded and sub ju gated Af ri can con scious ness can any one dis cover such highly hu -man, hu mane, hu man is tic and greatly ad vanced ideas of Ubuntu, ex cept with the as sis -tance of North At lan tic in tel lec tual crossbreeding, spoon-fed and blended with a gooddos age of ge net i cally mod i fied grains and tu bers?

Ad mi ra bly Van Bins ber gen won ders how we would show the va lid ity of Ubuntu inthe new world of the fu ture even if Af ri can so cie ties were to whole- heartedly em bracethe phi loso phy (2001:72). This has al ways been a rele vant is sue for all ideas lo callygen er ated and de vel oped by in tel lec tu als of vari ous ages, whether re gard ing Plato'sRe pub lic and his failed ex peri ment with Al ex an der, Ar is totle's Poli tics, Augustine'sCity of God, Locke's Con trac tari an ism, Marx's Capi tal, or Rawls' A the ory of jus tice!But these are only is sues, in Van Bins ber gen's view, rele vant to tra di tional, in dige -nous, cul tur ally origi nated and com mu nity based Af ri can philo sophi cal ideas, since the lat ter lack the ca pac ity to nuke out any in tel lec tual dis sent from North At lan tic in tel -lec tual he gemons or pre vent the pub li ca tion of such anti-dem ocratic in sub or di na tions.

In this re gard it is clear that the ap par ently in noc u ous ques tion whether ubuntu can“bring about the pos i tive change ad vo cated in its name”, and prob lems of em pir i calver i fi ca tion, are not in no cent is sues. These are clearly is sues that ra tio nal per sonswould have wanted to raise with re gard to the cel e brated ideas men tioned in the lastpara graph. But we never think it nec es sary to do this. In stead we are co-opted intothese West ern dishes by sim ple pat ri mony of slav ery and co lo nial ism. Van Binsbergen makes it seem as if the ad vo cacy of ubuntu is sim ply one of au then tic ity and orig i nal -ity and ex clu siv ity of the idea to South ern Af rica. Thus, he says,

State ments of ubuntu phi loso phy sug gest that, now that the mists of North At -lan tic he gemonic sub ju ga tion and the en su ing self- censorship have been liftedfrom the minds of Af ri can think ers, the true Af ri can thought can come out inun adul ter ated form that, since the ur ban, mod ern con sum ers of such a re statedphi loso phy can largely iden tify as Af ri cans, will in spire their ac tions inmajority- rule South Af rica and Zim babwe for the bet ter. We have to take con -sid er able dis tance from this sug ges tion, with out to tally dis miss ing it (Van Bins -ber gen, 2001:72 – ital ics mine).

The rea sons why we must put this dis tance be tween us and this idea of any thing origi -nal ever com ing out of Af rica are many. As we have said, Van Bins ber gen does not

384 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

be lieve any crea tive idea can be origi nal to Af rica, nor does he be lieve that any suchidea can be dis tilled from Af ri can in tel lec tual heri tage (if there ever was any suchthing!) us ing the lin guis tic tools of West ern con cep tual frame works. More im por -tantly, Van Bins ber gen would ask, how can any ex- seminarian or bene fi ci ary of West -ern schol ar ship rec og nize authen tic or sig nifi cant ideas from a tra di tional mi lieu af terhav ing been sub jected to West ern edu ca tion for so long and par tak ing in the foun tainof knowl edge that only the West can pro vide? This is why ubuntu phi loso phy, in hiswords, is the pro duc tion of,

A re gional in tel lec tual elite, largely or to tally weaned away from the vil lageand kin con texts to which ubuntu phi loso phy ex plic itly re fers, em ploys a glob -ally cir cu lat ing and in ori gin pri mar ily North At lan tic for mat of in tel lec tual pro -duc tion in or der to ar ticu late, from a con sid er able dis tance, Af ri can con tents re -con structed by lin guis tic, eth no graphic and other means which are largely un -sys tem atic and in tui tive (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:72).

As a stu dent of an thro pol ogy, (one would ex pect of) so ci ol ogy and by dis tant as so cia -tion through proba bly pre tended com pe tence, Af ri can phi loso phy (as every West ernscholar or 'thinker' is an ex pert in Af ri can phi loso phy), it is very clear that Van Bins -ber gen is very se ri ous about his views, es pe cially as he is able to ac com mo date dis cor -dant state ments when ever con ven ient with out not ing clear in con grui ties. He does notfind it nec es sary to ex plain why Af ri cans ne go ti ate dif fer ent spaces with out feel ingcon tra dic tion, in the one sense ur ban, and in an other ru ral. While it is very in ter est ingand ex otic that he was able to cling to his eupho ria of nos tal gia by co hab it ing with theZam bi ans in city- life and vil lage life, get ting the best of both worlds, he does not seethe im prints the cul ture leaves on the in di vid ual, mak ing space tran si tions natu ral tothe Af ri can. Con sid er, for in stance, his state ment that,

Through out the 1970s and 1980s I have learned Zam bian hu man ism andubuntu, not so much as a value sys tem spelled out ex plic itly (al though therewas that el e ment, too: dur ing court ses sions, wed dings, ini ti a tion rites, fu ner -als), but es pe cially more im plic itly; as a dif fuse value ori en ta tion in form ing thelives of oth ers more lo cal than I was then my self. I shared their lives as, al ter -nately, they now ap plied and af firmed, then trans gressed and re jected, theseval ues, within the dy nam ics of con flict ing pres sures brought about by per sonalas pi ra tions; by the so cia bil ity ex pected in a vil lage and kin con text; by the mul -ti plic ity and mu tual in com pat i bil ity of their var i ous roles and so cial ties; and by ur ban and mod ern goals, in cen tives and bound ary con di tions (Van Binsbergen,2001:61).

And place this in the con text of the fol low ing, as ubuntu is of no his toric ity or lin guis -tic prove nance,

Be ing pro phetic, ubuntu phi los o phy seeks to ad dress fun da men tal ills in themake-up of ur ban, globalised South ern Af rica: the so cial life world of its ac a -demic au thors. Be ing uto pian, the im ages of con crete so cial life fea tur ing instate ments of ubuntu do not have to cor re spond to any lived re al ity any where –they are al lowed to re fer to 'No-Place', and to merely de pict, through so cial im -ag ery, de sired changes to be brought about by an ap pli ca tion of the pre ceptscon tained in ubuntu....How then could ubuntu, con jur ing up im ages of a vi a bleand in tact vil lage so ci ety, be ex pected to make a dif fer ence in the ut terlyglobalised con text of ur ban South ern Af rica and its con flict-rid den so cial, in -

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 385

dus trial, eth nic, and po lit i cal scene? Would not the ru ral ref er ence, be cause ofits ob vi ous ir rel e vance in the ur ban globalised con text, an nul any ad van tagesthat may be de rived from the glob al ized for mat of ubuntu phi los o phy? (VanBinsbergen, 2001:73).

Van Bins ber gen nev er the less sees three rea sons why ubuntu might still “make a dif fer -ence”: (i) it could serve a pur pose simi lar to the fe male ini tia tion pro cess, which hasre fused to die in spite of ur bani za tion and globali za tion (he rec og nizes cu ri ously thatthis is a tra di tional, in dige nous, authen tic Af ri can thing in Zam bia, not North At lan ticim pelled or for mat ted); (ii) it could serve as a new sym bol around which the new ethic of in de pend ence from North At lan tic he gemonism can be woven (re gard less of itssource as a new myth, it will be use ful, even if for eign in ori gin); and (iii) it con sti tutes a new per spec tive en shrined with 'b ogus' sac ral authen tic ity whose prove nance can notbe con tested out of fear and ig no rance (2001:73- 74). Clearly, for Van Bins ber gen,ubuntu has no re la tion ship to any his tori cal re al ity or con tem po rary ex is tence. It ismerely a new myth gen er ated as a ral ly ing point in the mind of the under- employed in -tel li gent sia and the novo- riches of the South ern Af ri can rim. But it is not use less, be -cause it re in tro duces new dy nam ics into the fluid contradiction- ridden so ci ety of apost- apartheid world.

How ever, Van Binsbergen also en joins us to see the fu til ity of the ubuntu ex er cise.Clearly and cor rectly, for him Af ri cans have al ways been the fools of the world, talk -ing of rec on cil i a tion where there is no ba sis for one, be ing hos pi ta ble to your worst foe when the right ap proach is to tal ne ga tion and de struc tion of the 'other', and cre at ing ause less phi los o phy called ubuntu when the cor rect one is in sis tence on rep a ra tions,land re turn, equal ity, jus tice, and fair ness! Where, and I agree with him on this point,do South ern Af ri cans find this re sil ience, un til Mugabe, that is (whose ac tions may berep li cated re gion-wide if this new ubuntu folly is not heeded), to con tinue to live withthe tyr anny of mi nor ity su per struc ture of dom i na tion and con trol?

Van Bins ber gen is very cor rect in re flect ing on the na ture of the Truth and Rec on -cilia tion Com mis sion's treat ment of the per pe tra tors of apart heid and the re sil ient con -tinu ing class di vi sions un der ma jor ity rule in the Re pub lic of South Af rica. He sees,and I agree, the dan ger of in jus tice be ing swept un der the car pet to fes ter and re sur face in a more dan ger ous for mat in fu ture if not ad dressed prop erly and he sees ubuntu be -com ing a tool in the hand of the new Af ri can elite in con cre tiz ing their op pres sion offel low Af ri cans (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:75- 77). That this moral les son must not be lost on any one of us, and that aca demic in ter est must not be placed on the su per fi cial tothe det ri ment of the real ex is ten tial con di tions of ru ral and ur ban peo ples, is the moralof the in ter view with the vil lage elder re counted by him (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:78).Clearly one can grant that the se ri ous ness of the em pa thy of Van Bins ber gen is not inques tion, and he need not worry about ex pul sion from his diviner- priest status (whichhe seems to prize so much). What we need to do, is to show how Van Bins ber gen mayhave been mis led by his right emo tions of em pa thy and aware ness of real life situa -tions of suf fer ing of South Af ri cans to mis take lin guis tic af fini ties for logi cal ahis -torici ties and ge nea logi cal ir rele vances.

Van Bins ber gen's views are in con sis tent and self- contradictory. He ar gues thatubuntu has no lo cal, vil lage, in dige nous, cul tural his toric ity; as Af ri can vil lage sagesdo not es pouse it (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:64, 78). It is rather a new con struct by a newin tel lec tual elite group search ing for a uto pia and proph ecy. Yet he sug gests that tra di -tional ubuntu con tro versy reso lu tions would in clude fines, sac ri fices, and in dire situa -

386 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

tions, capi tal pun ish ment, con trary to the Tutu- led Truth and Rec on cilia tion Com mis -sion blan ket par don to apart heid agents (Van Bins ber gen, 2001:75- 77) – or,

... ubuntu con tains an ef fec tive pre cept for the man age ment of such in ter ests:the se cret of the vil lage head man's skill who, while lack ing all for mal sanc tions, yet through the imag i na tive power of rec on cil i a tion man ages to safe guard thecon flict ing in ter ests of the mem bers of his lit tle com mu nity, with out de stroy ingany of them (Van Binsbergen, 2001:81).

Clearly, Van Bins ber gen fails to re al ize that the rea son the lo cal vil lag ers still trust thevil lage head's judg ment in set tling mat ters is be cause they be lief in ubuntu, the trans -par ency of the mo tive of the head man, his re la tions to his an ces tors and his loy alty tothe com mu nity (and not his bank ac count or credit card!). Now, the teeth has been re -moved from the vil lage jus tice sys tem, as me dia tion of mat ters have been usurped bythe le gal struc tures of the North At lan tic sys tem in which jus tice is for the high est bid -der, and plea bar gains are nor mal ways of set tling is sues. This may have led to the am -biva lence of Van Bins ber gen in rec og niz ing the in dige nous na ture of the jus tice sys -tems of the ru ral com mu ni ties, and that in vil lages there is less vio lence over dis putesof vari ous kinds – small and big!

Read ers need to re visit Ra mose's book dis cussed by Van Bins ber gen to judgewhether it was the same book that Van Bins ber gen was dis cuss ing. I found it strangethat Van Bins ber gen's un con cealed agenda was not really to in ter ro gate Ra mose, butrather to give his own pre- conceived cri tique of ubuntu phi loso phy or group of ideaswhich South ern Af ri can think ers are try ing to use as a spring board for em pow er mentof them selves and their so ci ety in their quest for mean ing in a post- apartheid world. Aworld that is now at the feet of a greater apart heid by the name of globali za tion and the WTO- IMF- World Bank, aided and abet ted by the om ni bus CIA. It be lieves thatthrough com mu ni ca tions tech nol ogy, which en ables the only power in the new mil len -nium to eaves drop into the bed rooms of eve ry one, we must be cowed into sub mis sionand for get about our sor rows.

Why did Van Bins ber gen fo cus on only ubuntu phi loso phy from the very crea tivebook by Ra mose and not on all the many strands woven beau ti fully to gether in it?Could it be that he (Van Bins ber gen) is con cerned that con ced ing origi nal thought tothe South ern Af ri can may ne gate what the poli tics of globali za tion is all about? Couldthis be an other ver sion of the strug gle that Ramose (2002) men tioned in his book – the strug gle for ra tion al ity of all homo sa pi ens, Af ri cans, Asians, Euro pe ans, Women –which was the ini tial ba sis of the early parts of Ra mose's book? Well, given the self- orchestrated bio- history of Van Bins ber gen, it would be dif fi cult to make this in sinua -tion, but the es say un der con sid era tion pain fully leaves no room for any other con clu -sion.

One gets the dis tinct im pres sion that Van Bins ber gen de lib er ately con structed forhim self a straw per son in his sug ges tion that us ing ubuntu to re solve con flicts is mereeva sion of re al ity and the exi gen cies of daily ex is tence by em ploy ing pu er ile and ri -dicu lous gloss over situa tional events of life and death. His cari ca ture of ubuntu failsto at tend to the fact that ubuntu pro vided a real start ing point to solv ing real life prob -lems of peace, unity and de vel op ment in post- apartheid South Af rica; an op por tu nitythat may be grasped or missed! It is clear that this may not be the in tent of the author,bear ing in mind his em pa thy with the weak, the poor and dis pos sessed South Af ri cans. But there can be no doubt that the im pli ca tion of his ar gu ments has this nox ious ef fect.

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 387

PART II

Be yond eth no-philo soph i cal my o pia. Crit i cal com ments on Mogobe B.Ramose's Af ri can Phi los o phy Through Ubuntu

3

(J.A.I. Be waji)

In this re view es say I wish to give a pre limi nary in ter ro ga tion of what I con sid er to bethe most im por tant is sues raised by Pro fes sor Mo gobe B. Ra mose, in his book, Af ri can Phi loso phy Through Ubuntu (2002). I must say that I find the book very in ter est ing,well re searched, po lemi cally pu gi lis tic, pro voca tively deep and in sight fully com bat ive, as it took the de vel op ment of Af ri can phi loso phy, as an in tel lec tual and dis ci pli naryef fort, be yond the con fines of ethno- philosophical myo pia. This tran scen dence of thelimi ta tions of on to logi cal nega tiv ism, meta physi cal mim icry, epis temic lazi ness andax iologi cal dif fi dence, de mar cates the book from other less cer tain or sure- footedworks. It also de mar cates it from works that pa rade in vari ous bor rowed gar ments inthe Af ri can philo sophi cal home stead while danc ing to the ap proval tunes of West ernpub lish ers (cf. Karp and Ma solo, 2000; Bell, 2002).4 My ef fort, then, is a way of tak -ing se ri ously Ra mose's call for a criti cal and philo sophi cal in ter ro ga tion, es pe cially byAf ri cans, of is sues re lat ing to Af rica, when he says,

The ma jor part of our in ten tion is to open up dis cus sion by sug gest ing ar eas ofre search. In this sense, the var i ous chap ters may be seen as re search pro pos alson Af ri can phi los o phy based on ubuntu (2002:vii).

The tone of the book is set in the “In tro duc tion”, where the writer clearly af firms thepo si tion that all hu mans re serve to them selves the right to seek self- defence in what -ever way (I be lieve this means also “by all means pos si ble and nec es sary”) they de ter -mine in the face of the threat of ex tinc tion (which I un der stand to mean in the face ofat tack, not pre- emptive 'self -defense', to kill sus pected or imag ined op po nents), in clud -ing at the ex pense of other fel low hu man be ings (Ra mose, 2002:v). The mu tual ra tion -al ity of all homo sa pi ens (which need not be granted gra tui tously by any in tel lec tualgeo- political group of hu mans as a mark of con de scen sion), in clu sive of women, Af ri -cans, Amer in di ans, and the Aus tra la si ans (Ra mose, 2002:1), is also pos ited with quitete na cious logic. Also clearly for mu lated is the po si tion that there can be no logic ofpri or ity of any one sys tem of po liti cal or gani za tion, re lig ious rep re sen ta tion, eco nomic on tol ogy and philo sophi cal ap pre hen sion of re al ity over any other, as such pri or itylacks ei ther his toric ity or meth odo logi cal ra tion al ity, even when so- called voy ages be -came euphe misms for theft, graft and co lo ni al ism. These lat ter is sues are taken up inthe rest of the book in very crea tive and com pel ling ways. But let us start by tak ingeach chap ter at a time and see the po si tions can vassed by Ra mose, es pe cially to seewhy some schol ars, who proba bly fail to un der stand the in tri cate ar gu men ta tion of Ra -mose, could feel so irate about the views de fended, to war rant such un jus ti fied op pro -brium and dec la ma tion (cf., for ex am ple, Van Bins ber gen, 2001).

388 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

3 Cf. Ramose (2002).

4 Com pare, on the one hand, the am biv a lence and se lec tive at ten tion to lit er a ture in the lat est col lec tioned ited by Ivan Karp and D. A. Masolo (2000), and the pat ent con tra dic tions in the pre sup po si tions un -der scor ing the ef fort of Rich ard H. Bell (2002), with, on the other hand, the col lec tion of es says ed itedby Olusegun Oladipo (2002).

In chap ter 1, “The Strug gle for Rea son in Af rica”, Ra mose in ter ro gates, in novelways, the idea of ra tion al ity as the ex clu sive pur view of a seg ment of hu man ity, basedon a (their) skewed in ter pre ta tion of the ac ci dent of con quest and hap pen stance of co -lo ni al ism which meta mor phosed and ma tured to be come a dis repu ta ble ide ol ogy of ra -cism. The new ana lyti cal and criti cal in sights that he brings to bear on is sues re lat ingto the ex is tence of Af ri can phi loso phy and other dis ci pli nary ques tion marks are re -fresh ing, in gen ious and com mend able. These in clude the de con struc tion of Plato'sThe ory of Forms, Ar is totle's homo ra tio nis, the co lo ni al ist in ten tions of Christ's in -junc tion to “go ye and teach all na tions”, Co lum bus' so- called dis cov ery of places thatwere al ready peo pled by civi li za tions, and the ra cism of the fa thers of mod ern Euro -pean lega cies such as Locke, Hume, Kant and He gel and their con tem po rary sur ro -gates such as Levy Bruhl, Robin Hor ton, Jack Goody and the lat ter day an thro polo gist“phi loso pher”, Van Bins ber gen (2001). The skep ti cism that has at tended the meremen tion of “Af ri can Phi loso phy”, both as a con cept and as an in tel lec tual dis ci pline,which has no ba sis in rea son (logic) nor in ex pe ri ence (sci ence), not only arises fromthe ig no rance of the West ern rac ist per spec tive, but also from a mo tive to de ceive andthe will to un justly domi nate and con tinue to plun der the re sources of the con ti nent ofAf rica. Says Ra mose:

Of course, this imagi nary right, sup ported by ma te rial power de signed to de -fend and sus tain the su per sti tion that Af rica is in ca pa ble of pro duc ing know -ledge, has got far- reaching prac ti cal con se quences for the con struc tion ofknowl edge in Af rica. The self- appointed heirs to the right to rea son have thuses tab lished them selves as the pro duc ers of all knowl edge and the only hold ersof truth. In these cir cum stances, the right to knowl edge in re la tion to the Af ri -can is meas ured and de ter mined by pas sive as well as un criti cal as simi la tioncou pled with faith ful im ple men ta tion of knowl edge de fined and pro duced fromout side Af rica (2002:2).

The over all im pli ca tion of the above is the de nial of the right to life, to sub sis tence and sur vival of the Af ri can on an equal foot ing with other peo ples of the world, lead ing toan in tol er able im passe, which de grades and de hu man izes the Af ri can. The to ken is ticcon ces sions from the forces of ret ro gres sion, which force Af ri can so cie ties into de -pend ency situa tions by way of grants, loans and bo gus trade pacts only ag gra vate thisstate of af fairs (e.g. the trade and as sis tance pack age be tween Amer ica and some Af ri -can coun tries on the UN Se cu rity Coun cil, hinged on the non- objection of these coun -tries to Ameri can for eign poli cies and eco nomic in ter ests no mat ter what these are andhow they af fect Af ri can life). Ra mose is very frank in say ing that these are rep re hen si -ble and should be con demned:

The ma te rial and prac ti cal res to ra tion of the Af ri can's right to life (sub sis tence)con tin ues to be hin dered by the sub tle and deadly re fusal to re view the statusand va lid ity of the rights ac quired by pos ter ity on the ba sis of ques tion ableright of con quest. For this rea son even de colo ni sa tion has failed to re store fullsov er eignty to the Af ri can (2002:3).

What we are wit ness ing is a ma ca bre dance be tween the colo niz ers and the colo nized,a de pend ency syn drome which has no way of be ing dis rupted, as the um bili cal chordof de pend ency tran scends into the meta physi cal and epis te mo logi cal de part ments ofthe in tel lect of an in ept Af ri can po liti cal and in tel lec tual lead er ship. This is what, ac -cord ing to Ra mose, ex plains the so- called struc tural ad just ment poli cies im posed on

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 389

Af ri can so cie ties, which forces Af ri can states to pri vat ize pub li c prop er ties to for eigncom pa nies, lib er al ize their econo mies to the point of non- viability of pro duc tive ca -paci ties, and re trench the most vul ner able of their popu la tions in the name of cost- saving de vices. This while Euro- American gov ern ments con tinue to sub si dize edu ca -tion, ag ri cul ture, and in dus try – even with the WTO ap proval of dou ble stan dards –and main tain mil lions of their citi zens on wel fare, Medi care and Medi caid. It is for this rea son that the West preaches only one ver sion of de moc racy – the ad ver sar ial typethat can be ma nipu lated by ex ter nal agen cies and through in ter na tional or gani za tionssuch as the IMF and World Bank – a type that does not even func tion in their owncoun tries. This is also why the West preaches only one ver sion of truth and rea son,when they are well aware that there are many paths to truth and many ver sions oftruth. Hence, Ra mose says,

De moc racy has be come the po liti cal black hole within and be yond which noth -ing more can ever be known about poli tics. Within the dog mati cally pre scribedand, there fore, pre cari ous lim its of po liti cal knowl edge, the per fect demo cratholds that the re al ity of struc tural hun ger, pov erty and pre vent able death is themini mum price pay able for the smooth func tion ing of de moc racy. Un em ploy -ment as a struc tural ne ces sity within the pre vail ing demo cratic dis pen sa tionsim ply lu bri cates the sys tem of the death of the many for the sur vival of thefew. Wait ing for death is the un change able dogma of the demo cratic su per fi -ciency (2002:5).

This analy sis of the plight of Af rica and Af ri cans is most in sight ful, but it does not, tomy way of read ing the ba rome ter of op pres sion and des ti tu tion of the Af ri can in tel lect, reach far enough. It claims that the rea son why Af rica and Af ri cans re main poor is acon se quence of “the strug gle for rea son”. That is, the un de clared but fun da men tal pre -sup po si tion of the in fe ri or ity of the Af ri can hu man ity, which makes it pos si ble for Af -rica to em brace the re jects of other so cie ties, while re ject ing the best in their own in tel -lect and sci ence and tech nol ogy. This is an ac cu rate di ag no sis, but I see that he proba -bly has not rec og nized the greater weak ness in the Af ri can in ter ac tion with other peo -ples of the world. Ra mose must also rec og nize the fact that the strug gle for rea son isonly car ried out by a cer tain seg ment of the Af ri can acad emy. The ma jor ity of Af ri canin tel li gent sia are cowed into ac cep tance of their own in fe ri or ity or even in fe ri or ity oftheir ra tion al ity on the one hand, and on the other, hardly has any Af ri can po liti callead er ship en gaged the strug gle for rea son. Thus, while Ra mose is right in in di cat ingthe ef fect of the strug gle for rea son as the ba sis of the in su per abil ity of the mul ti tudeof prob lems fac ing Af rica and Af ri cans, he has not blended into the equa tion the factthat the strug gle is not a uni ver sal one. That is, there has not been a uni ver sal rec og ni -tion of a strug gle that must be en gaged and prose cuted by all means nec es sary by those in the Af ri can lead er ship po si tions (in edu ca tion, re lig ion, busi ness, poli tics, arts andthe sci ences) who would de ter mine the suc cess or fail ure of the ef fort to lib er ate Af -rica from ex ter nal op pres sion and he gem ony. The con tin ued cul tural en slave ment ofthe men tal ity of Af ri can so cie ties dero gates from the strug gle for rea son. This con clu -sion be comes even more ap par ent in view of the fact that, in spite of the Pa pal Bull,which de clares that all hu mans are “ra tional ani mals” (Ra mose, 2002:6), most lead ersof the in dige nous re lig ions of the Ara bian des ert (Chris ti an ity and Is lam), who plytheir prose ly ti za tion wares for bread and butter in Af rica, still ref er to in dige nous re lig -ions as “tra di tional cults” (Amanze, 2001; 2002). They also ref er to peo ples who arenei ther Chris tians, nor Mus lims as hea thens, pa gans or bar bari ans for whom spe cial

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pray ers must be of fered to save them and their souls from eter nal per di tion (since force and in timi da tion be came un law ful as a con se quence of 'civ il iz ation' af ter the most hor -ren dous Cru sades and Ji hads in hu man his tory!).

While it as tutely char ac ter izes sci en tific ra cism (Ar is totle), philo sophi cal ra cism(Locke, Kant, Hume, He gel and care fully con cealed in Ber trand Rus sell), spiri tual ra -cism (La Peyr ere), and his tori cal ra cism (He gel), chap ter 1 must be read in con junc tion with chap ter 2, “Af ri can Phi loso phy and the Quest for Authen tic Lib era tion of Af -rica”, where some an thro po logi cal and ar cheo logi cal is sues are con sid ered in thesearch for authen tic lib era tion of Af rica. The ex is tence of a hu man be ing pre datesspeech, which pre dates all other forms of docu men ta tion. The fact that all hu manshave this ca pac ity, it is ar gued, shows thought, which can be ver bal ized or scripted orpainted, or sung or what ever. This was the theme of chap ter 2 that com ple mented thefirst chap ter of Ra mose's book.

One point stands out clearly from the dis cus sion in these two chap ters. This is thefact that con quest and colo ni za tion are not mere facts of his tory. They are part of anover all de sign to sub ju gate and ho moge nize, for ex ploi ta tion, the so cie ties brought un -der tu te lage, ei ther by force or by sub ter fuge; just as the al le ga tion of the pos ses sion of weap ons of mass de struc tion by Iraq was an or ches trated plan hatched over the fiveyears lead ing up to 2003 to re con fig ure the map of the Mid dle East for the over allbene fit of the new im pe ri al ist power, United States of Amer ica, and the dis gracedformer co lo nial mas ter of Iraq, the United King dom. Given the po lari ties in the re lig -ions that un der lie con quest, ex pro pria tion, ap pro pria tion and ex ploi ta tion for thegreater glory of the ubiq ui tous West ern de ity, the de vel op ment of epis te mo logi cal,meta physi cal, physio logi cal, eco nomic, ideo logi cal and psy cho logi cal para digms tosup port the pro cess was only par for the course. The Pope has gone to Asia to apolo -gise for the er rors of Chris ten dom re gard ing the in qui si tions meted to ob serv ers ofother meth ods of re lat ing to the su preme be ing. Yet, strangely, simi lar rec og ni tion ofper fidy has not hap pened with re gard to Af rica. In stead, many Af ri cans are be ingtaught that colo ni za tion has ac tu ally been bene fi cial to Af rica, as it has lib er ated herfrom back ward ness and bar ba rism. When Ra mose dis cusses the idea of globali za tionin the last chap ter of the book we see the rea son why the logic of slav ery, colo ni za tion, and land ex pro pria tion all works to gether for the same over all ob jec tive of en sur ingho mog eni za tion for the sole pur pose of con trol and profit maxi mi za tion by the ex- colonial mas ters and plan ta tion slave own ers (what is popu larly dubbed “sla vocracy”in South ern Af ri can in tel lec tual cir cles). And the re al ity of this can not be bet ter per -ceived un less we un der stand the fact that the se lec tion of friends and ene mies in thecon tem po rary war on ter ror is based only on eco nomic in ter est, not on any ar caneprin ci ples called de moc racy, equal ity of hu man ity or any such high sound ing butmean ing less dic tion. This is why Ra mose sees in the con tem po rary world the re al ity of money as the only de ity to ward which all ends must tend, and this is why there is theim pera tive that all peo ples of the world must wake up and face the re al ity of their pos -si ble ex tinc tion in the face of the sole de nomi na tor that mar ginal izes all other val ues.Val ues that fail to play the game of the bottom- line (Ra mose, 2002:149- 150).

It is per ti nent to men tion one mi nor dis ap point ment I have af ter read ing the book. Iex pected a sec tion on pov erty, not just a dis cus sion of rea son, re lig ions, his tory, slav -ery, co lo ni al ism, wealth, eco nom ics, prop erty and com merce. But I guess my dis ap -point ment must have arisen from the fact that there is so much to learn from the bookthat one ex pects it to pro vide ideas on vir tu ally all as pects of Af ri can re al ity. What I

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am al lud ing to is the fact that ideas of wealth and pov erty seem to be couched in percap ita terms now, and these are meas ured in the al mighty dol lar terms, so that if youfall above a cer tain level, you are do ing well, while be low a cer tain level, you are be -low pov erty level and must be pit ied. This fact stares us in the face eve ry day in re ports of the in ter na tional me dia and their cro nies. But given the community- based na ture oflife in Af ri can and other hu mane so cie ties out side of the West, what is wealth andwhat is pov erty may re quire care ful analy sis. This is even more rele vant to Ra mose'sdis cus sion of the ideas of la bour and em ploy ment; of how these have changed thewhole pro cess of life in many colo nized so cie ties; and of the forci ble in te gra tion ofsuch so cie ties into the so- called global econ omy. How ever, this dis ap point ment is well com pen sated for by the lu cid ity of the analy sis of other is sues in the area of de vel op -ment and po liti cal lib era tion.

In chap ter 3, “The phi los o phy of ubuntu and ubuntu as a phi los o phy”, which hap -pens to be the cen ter piece of the book, Ramose an a lyzes ubuntu phi los o phy most care -fully. This chap ter poses the great est chal lenge to read ers. Some schol ars may find that there are is sues that need clar i fi ca tion in this chap ter. One would also have ex pected itto be the bone of con ten tion for Van Binsbergen (2001).

Let us spend some time on this chap ter be cause of the cen tral ity of the ideas that aredis cussed in it to Af ri can phi loso phy ex pos tu lated by Ra mose. His dis cus sion im -proves vastly on the cur sory way in which many schol ars have con tem plated BantuPhi loso phy, based on the su per fi ci al ity and in ter pre tive nar row ness of Tem pels' dis -cus sion of the na ture of force or power and spir its in Bantu on tol ogy. Ra mose de partsradi cally from these dis cus sions by not bas ing the onus on the philo sophi cal dis courseof force, but rather on be-ing (ubu-), that is on the on tol ogy of ex is tence. Us ing thecon cept of be ing and the si mul ta ne ity and pri macy of homo- loquens and homo sa pi -ens, Ra mose makes us see a com bi na tion of the uni ver sal ity of be ing and the par ticu -lar ity of modes of be ing, mak ing the hu man be ing the ra tional self, from whom ra tion -al ity can not be dero gated with out the de trac tion from the be ing. Thus, for Ra mose,ubu may mani fest in vari ous ways, ei ther as sin gu lar or as plu ral – umuntu and ubuntu(2002:41) – the lat ter mani fes ta tion giv ing rise to the idea of “Bantu” peo ple. But thesense of be com ing that at taches to untu is both on to logi cal, le gal, so cial, and moral. Itis the be ing of the ubu or umu in par ticu lar states and in re la tion to other un tus. Thereis con ti nu ity in the be com ing of untu, which is not cir cum scribed ex cept within thecon text of ex is tence with/of other be ings. Clearly, the idea of “ex is tence” is not anade quate rep re sen ta tion of the be-in gness of untu that is re ferred to here by Ra mose.There is a way in which other modes of ex is tence have ubu, but the pe cu li ar ity of theubu of untu sepa rates it from that of other en ti ties quali ta tively in the sense of not justbe ing hu man, but of be com ing hu man (2002:43).

An other im por tant pre sup po si tion of the phi loso phy of ubuntu is the dia lec ti cal re la -tion ship be tween the forces in na ture. This pre cludes the ab so lu ti za tion of po lari tieslike good and evil, or right and wrong – be cause there is no way in which or der cancome out of chaos, nor be fixed for all time (Ra mose, 2002:47). Such fixa tion will ne -gate the con ti nu ity of flow in a rheo modic mul ti di rec tional har mony that is na ture andbe ing – a flow which ab hors frag men tary con cep tu ali za tions of re al ity and ex is tence.This ex plains why in all things one must look at the global pic ture – in the set tle mentof dis putes, in em bark ing on a ven ture, in ne go ti at ing con tracts, in de cid ing mari tal at -tach ments, in po liti cal com pe ti tion, and in all as pects of life. In this re gard, Ra mosecriti cizes West ern theo ries of truth for their overly lim it ing for mat and ap pli ca bil ity.

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Hence, in ubuntu phi loso phy, just as in Akan phi loso phy, as ar gued by Wiredu (1999)(who had enun ci ated the ve rac ity and veridi cal ity con cep tions of truth as opin ion),

... truth may be de fined as the con tem po ra ne ous con ver gence of per cep tion andac tion. Hu man be ings are not made by the truth. They are the mak ers of thetruth....Even per cep tion is not wholly neu tral. In this sense it is more ap pro pri -ate for hu mans to live the truth than liv ing in and by the truth. The former cap -tures the ba sic tenet of Af ri can phi loso phy whereas the lat ter speaks to the pre -vail ing fea ture of West ern phi loso phy (Ra mose, 2002:49).

While con fess ing the lin guis tic limi ta tion of this writer, be cause I only have a cur soryas so cia tion with the lan guages from which both Ubuntu and Botho de rive as a con se -quence of my liv ing in Bot swana and trav el ing in South Af rica, I find an af fin ity be -tween the con cept of Ubuntu and Botho and Omo lu abi as dis cussed by Gbade ge sin(1991) in his con sid era tion of Yo ruba phi loso phy of per son hood and per sonal iden tity. In the lat ter con cept the ba sic ele men tal form from which the other com po nents are de -rived is “iwa”, which may mean “to be”, “be ing”, “char ac ter of be ing”, “how of be -ing”, “way of be ing”, or “being- ness”. Given the fact that this is a dis cus sion of thewhole book and not just chap ter 3, I will move on to other as pects of the book, but notwith out mak ing rele vant ref er ences to this con cept in an in ter ro ga tion of Ra mose forthe pur pose of clari fy ing is sues re lat ing to Af ri can thought. While I find par al lels inthe dis cus sion of Yo ruba and Akan phi loso phies by Gbade ge sin, Wiredu and Gyekye,I find the dis cus sion of Van Bins ber gen with re spect to the ubuntu con cept rather su -per fi cial and fail ing to dem on strate any knowl edge of the lan guage from which thecon cept de rives. There is no doubt that Ra mose's dis cus sion is more en light en ing andclear enough, which adds to my sur prise con cern ing the tan gen tial at ten tion Van Bins -ber gen gave to the text of Ra mose in his dis cus sion. On the other hand, I do not wantto de bate the ap par ent mys ti cism of the rheo modic form of lan guage and its mu si calcon cep tion of the uni verse now, given the ten dency it seems to have to ward a sys tembuild ing genre of phi loso phy. But the point is well taken that many Af ri can philo -sophi cal sys tems are holo nis tic (ho lis tic), not frag men ta tive. What is prob lem atic is the so- called tri adic con cep tion that fol lows from that, es pe cially with re gard to the idea of the living- dead (a con cept which “jars at my drink ing lobes”, a- la- Soyinka, every timeI ac cost it), since only a cate gory of hu mans be come this privi leged set of be ings andnot all (Ra mose, 2002:50).

Why do I find the onto- triadic ac count of be ing (be- ing), based on the idea of theliving- dead, the liv ing, and the yet- to- be- born, prob lem atic? The idea of living- deadgained cur rency in the work of Mbiti (1969). I was rather be mused by his choice ofwords to de scribe the world of an ces tors and the an ces tors. For one, it does not fol lowthat every dead rela tive can be come a living- dead, nor that all dead rela tives are ven er -ated or de serve at tach ment! Con se quently, it be comes dif fi cult to see the point oftrans lat ing a phe nome non that is of purely utili tar ian value into a re lig ious linch pin for the con struc tion of a the ory of ex is tence. Thus, the ba sis of re al ity and con ti nu ity ofex is tence that Ra mose pro pounds can sur vive with out the prob lem atic and ap par entlyself- contradictory ter mi nol ogy of “living- dead”, re gard less of the dia criti cal use towhich Mbiti may have put the ter mi nol ogy.

Hav ing said that, one must rec og nize the fact that all other as pects of the book re -volve around the ana lyti cal points of the chap ter un der dis cus sion. The con cept of be -ing (be-ing) in ubuntu rep re sents what phi loso phy is about in Af rica and, more im por -tantly, what is phi loso phized. With out be-ing there would be no lan guage, no cul ture,

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no re lig ion, no phi loso phy, no medi cine, no law, no poli tics – only a vac uum. This iswhy the chap ter is cen tral to the book and must pro vide the ana lyti cal foun da tion forun der stand ing the vari ous themes ad dressed in the book.

Chap ter 4 dis cusses “Re li gion through ubuntu”. Here Ramose uses the na ture of re li -gion and spir i tu al ity in all so ci et ies to un der score the sim i lar i ties be tween the ways inwhich hu man be ings, spir i tual be ings and the meta phys ics of di vin ity, have been rep -re sented down the ages. By look ing at the pre sup po si tions of prayer, be lief in af ter life or im mor tal ity, be liefs in su per nat u ral en ti ties (God, An gels, liv ing dead, an ces tors,Devil, etc.), he ex am ines the ideas of Plato, Ar is totle, Ockham, and Gilson on these is -sues and he seems to be sym pa thetic to the po si tion of Gilson that the pos tu la tion ofsuch en ti ties can be jus ti fied as a meta phys i cal con struct with no other form of proofre quire ment than that it is a ra tio nal doxa. How ever, those who main tain the be liefs inques tion do not merely de rive meta phys i cal con se quences from the be liefs – they alsosup pose that causal con se quences, moral im pli ca tions, and fac tual de ci sions fol lowfrom their pos tu la tions. This is where I find it dif fi cult to ac com pany Ramose in hissug ges tion that the soul is “a meta phys i cal ne ces sity”. This does not fol low log i cally,ex cept as a post facto jus ti fi ca tion of our ini tial ir ra tio nal (pre-ra tio nal), long held tra -di tional, per va sive con jec ture of the ex is tence of such en ti ties (Ramose, 2002:61-62).If we as sume that any be lief that has no foun da tion, but which has been long held bymany per sons from all so ci et ies we are fa mil iar with, must be ra tio nal, then we mustsay that the be lief in a meta phys i cal en tity like the soul is ra tio nal. And we must thenalso say it of any sim i lar be lief, no mat ter how out land ish and in de fen si ble it may be.We must con cede ret ro ac tive ra tio nal ity to such be liefs! It is not par tic u larly clearwhat Ramose means by nat u ral or Chris tian the ol ogy (2002:62) as proof here, be causeI se ri ously sus pect we shall still be in volved in a ques tion beg ging prob lem, as weshall be us ing what is in need of proof as proof.

Ra mose looks at the Af ri can con cept of a per son within the con text of the com plex -ity of hu man ex is tence, (ubu, be- ing) which largely con sti tutes the mean ing grant inglo cus of be ing and ex is tence in most, if not all so cie ties. His view is that the Af ri cancon cep tion of a per son works within the con text of com mu nity, or within the con textof the to tal ity of the hu man and natu ral en vi ron ment in which the com plete ness of hu -man ity is a pro cess which one does not just at tain over night. This pro cess of ac qui si -tion takes place in stages – from in fancy to adult hood and in trans for ma tive stages. Hecites the words of Gyekye and Men kiti to but tress this po si tion. But I think that Ra -mose, Gyekye, Men kiti and oth ers who may think along these lines may have ex -tended the meta phor of the ac qui si tion of hu man ity rather too much – that is, they may have been de ceived by the am bi gu ity of the con cept person- hood and may have seenthe pro cesses of at tain ment of adult hood and ma tur ity in so ci ety as syn ony mous toper son hood.

Let me ex plain what I mean here and use the Yo ruba ideas con cern ing per son hoodto il lus trate my point. Those who have at tempted an analy sis of the Yo ruba con cep tion of a per son would be aware of the com plex ity of the ideas that it sug gests (Gbade ge -sin, Mak inde, Abim bola, Be waji). It is clear that there is a sense in which there is a du -al ity of meta physic in the Yo ruba con cep tion of a per son. On the one hand, there is the idea of the physi cal self, the body or ara with all the vari ous bod ily or gans, parts andfunc tions with out which the in di vid ual can not have ex is tence. Ele ments of hy per bolesub sist in the con sid era tion of the im por tance of some parts of this physi cal self, as inthe case, for ex am ple, of ori (head), ese (legs), inu (stom ach), opolo, (rain), etc. But

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the fact that no part is more im por tant than an other within the over all sur vival of theself as an or gan ism is in sisted on in many Ifa verses. But the Yo ruba also sup pose thatthere is an im ma te rial com po nent to the hu man be ing, emi (soul), which is de rivedfrom God, and which is en dowed with an ipin (des tiny or fate) through the ap por tion -ment of des tiny to the self bef ore birth. I have ex plained that this myth may be a wayof man ag ing the fact that we do not know what each one will be come or how each will end their lives, but it still is the po si tion of the Yo ruba that we have a com po nent thatwe de rive from Olo du mare, the Su preme Be ing in Yo ruba lan guage. What this means,is that each per son, young or old, male or fe male, well- formed or de formed, in tel li gent or im be cile, is en dowed with all three com po nents and to be lack ing in any one ofthese is in con ceiv able in Yo ruba thought. This is why in Yo ruba cul ture the cele bra -tion of femi nism or po liti cally cor rect lan guages of sub sti tut ing “physi cally chal -lenged” for “handi capped” does not arise, as women are highly re spected and treatedas moth ers just as men are treated as fa thers, and those with in ca pa bili ties are highlyre spected as spe cial peo ple with spe cial tal ents or re la tion ships to the an ces tors or di -vini ties.

If we come to the other side of the equa tion now, and dis cuss the con cept of per sonor in di vidu al ity, the am bi gu ity that led Ra mose and oth ers astray be come ap par ent. For one, it is true that in di vidu al ity is not mean ing ful ex cept within the lived re al ity of per -sons, that is, it is mean ing less out side or with out the mi lieu of hu man com mu nity. Thepres ence of oth ers, the re la tion ships that make us ac ti vate choices, and the nur tur ingand de vel op ment of bio- historical re ali ties, are the ba sic in gre di ents for self- understanding and ac tu ali za tion. But it is clear that one can be come a per son with outbe com ing “hu man”. Ex pressed dif fer ently, a hu man be ing really is a per son bef ore be -com ing hu man ized, in the sense of be com ing hu mane, be com ing an omo luwabi, thatis, a real per son with all the re spect and ap pre cia tion of the val ues and mo res thatmake for proper co ex is tence with other hu man (hu mane) be ings in the world of theliv ing. There is no pe ti tio prin cipii here at all, as what we af firm here is the sim ple fact that in vir tue of be ing a homo sa piens, one is auto mati cally a per son, one is physio -logi cally hu man. But to be come a proper mem ber of a com mu nity of per sons is a pro -ces sual, evo lu tion ary, de vel op men tal, in tel lec tual matu ra tion kind of thing which doesnot hap pen over night. This is the point of say ing that “though all ani mals are equal,some are more equal than oth ers”. This point could also be de rived from the dis cus -sion un der taken by Ra mose in chap ter 3.

We may stretch this some what with an in ci den tal an ec dote – the visi bil ity of one'shu man ity con fers per son hood de facto, but the con scious ness, aware ness, moral ca -paci ties, vo li tions, pro fes sional ac com plish ments, age, physi og nomi cal con tours andother spe cial real or imagi nary at trib utes de ter mine the le gal, so cial, cul tural, re lig iousand ethi cal as crip tions of per son hood. This ex plains why there is a very thin gen derline in Yo ruba cul ture for ex am ple, as such gen der dis tinc tions are non- existent in gen -eral terms, as Afro- feminists have in sisted. In the analy sis of Ra mose, it is pos si ble todis pose of hu mans who have not be come per sons or who have lost per son hood with -out feel ing that we have done any in frac tions to our hu man ity or to that of the “thing”or “it” of our novel crea tion. For ac cord ing to him, quot ing Men kiti,

With out in cor po ra tion into this or that com mu nity, in di vidu als are con sid eredto be mere dan glers to whom the de scrip tion 'pe rson' does not fully ap ply. Forper son hood is some thing which has to be achieved, and is not given sim ply be -cause one is born of hu man seed... Thus, it is not enough to have bef ore us the

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bio logi cal or gan ism, ... We must also con ceive of this or gan ism as go ingthrough a long pro cess of so cial and rit ual trans for ma tion un til it at tains the full com ple ment of ex cel len cies seen as truly de fini tive of man... (Ra mose, 2002:66).

It is most likely that this is not the in ten tion of Ra mose or Men kiti; but the pos si bil ityof a re duc tio ad ab sur dum of their views and the coun ter in tui tive ness of the con se -quences these views gen er ate make them sus pect. For ex am ple, it is clear that in noAf ri can so ci ety (nor in any sane so ci ety, one would ex pect) would it be true thatstrang ers can just be killed or dis pos sessed in vir tue of not hav ing been ini ti ated intolo cal cul tural lore. They surely may not be able to hold po si tions of of fice in manycases, or get prop erly in te grated as would be the case in any com mu nity, not only ofhu mans but also of ani mals. Hav ing com mit ted some of fence is also in dica tive of aloss of re spect and po si tion in the com mune of hu mans. But this is no way of say ingthat such per sons are non- persons and could be killed or dis pos sessed with out due pro -cess.

With res er va tions al luded to ear lier I do en dorse the holo nis tic con cep tion of the in -di vid ual, her world, com mu nity, re al ity and uni verse. How ever, there are se ri ous is -sues that must be raised and ad dressed to make this form of holonism ac cept able anduse ful as a tool for analy sis of per son hood and im mor tal ity of the soul. In the firstplace, it is rare to see any so ci ety in which in fants ever make the tran si tion into tran -scen den tal ity, or the so- called living- dead or an ces tor world. Any so ci ety which en -dows in fants with ansces tor ship could only be one in which HIV/AIDS, some plague,or natu ral dis as ter has deci mated the adult popu la tion to the ex tent that life ex pec tancy has been re duced dras ti cally and all sense of worth de nuded. An other prob lem thatneeds to be con sid ered is the fact that we may overly stretch the con cept of com mu nal -ity of the Af ri can con cept of per son hood and the after- life to the point where wewould have to raise the ques tion as to what kind of com mu nity the in di vid ual wouldtran scend at death. Would it be an Af ri can world with eth nic and cul tural dif fer ences,or a global one of the West In dian rain bow so ci ety, or what?

Why, af ter all, do hu man so cie ties need an ces tors? Could it be be cause our hu manmem ory or con scious ness as a means of self- understanding and re ali za tion is in ade -quate and need a foil for our foi bles and iras ci bil ity? Could we not ex trapo late fromthis sort of in ade quacy to even the fact that the gods we have con structed have been as in ade quate as the hu mans that have cre ated them? Is it not pos si ble that the po lari tiesof the uni verse that we have built, namely good and evil, right and wrong, peace andwar, rich and poor, happy and sad, etc., are con se quences of the same lim ited un der -stand ing of re al ity? And now we have to find ways of fit ting eve ry thing into this po -lar ized re al ity, as those who are not for us must be against us – a ter ri ble fal lacy of bi -fur ca tion – such that we all must bear the ar mour and join the sal va tion army to fightthe en emy, the great Lu ci fer, the ter ror ist, or what ever the imagi nary evil one ourminds deign it fit to iden tify. Sim i larly, is it not pos si ble that this so- called task oflook ing for phi loso phy or non- philosophy is a prod uct of the either- or that we havebeen suck ered into ac cept ing from the West ern philo sophi cal in tel lec tual myo pia?Such that the de sign of re flec tiv ity and ra tion al ity must now be con ducted along thepaths con structed by the same in credi bly un re al is tic in tel lec tual de sid er ata, the ques -tion ing of which be comes a ne ces sity, even if it means tak ing se ri ously the ini tiallywrong as sump tions on the ba sis of which criti cism and analy sis must prog ress. Themore I try to re flect about the is sues raised here the more it seems to me that we are

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bark ing up a wrong tree, es pe cially in the dis course on im mor tal ity, per son al ity andiden tity is sues. For the tran sience of im mor tal ity in the So tho cul tures par al lel simi larviews in Ibo, Yo ruba and Akan so cie ties, mak ing im mor tal ity or the sur vival of the“living- dead” de pend ent, to some ex tent, on the memo ries of the liv ing!

This, on the other hand, does not ren der the con cept of im mor tal ity mean ing less orob so lete. On the con trary, some peo ple do not only live in the com mu nal mem ory ofcom mu ni ties like any regu lar per son would. Rather, they are very much part of theover all heri tage of so cie ties to the ex tent that they are founder- heroes/hero ines, super- ancestors, leg ends and sym bols of sur vival and the con tin ued mean ing ful ness ofselves. These are “im mor tal” peo ple. In Yo ruba so ci ety there are such in di vidu als.They tran scend mere lev els of the ap par ently self- contradictory and mean ing less dic -tion of “living- dead”5 as Oduduwa, Orun mila, Ogun, Sango, Oya, Mo remi, Oranyan,etc.; sources, not lim ited by gen der, of so cie tal ori gins and found ers. If one were look -ing for par al lels to the Jew ish an ces tors such as Adam, Eve, Abra ham, Ja cob, Jo seph,Je sus, Pe ter, John, etc., clearly these would pass for such per son ages. How ever, thefact re mains: that some per sons pass into such an end less pool of ancestor- ship andoth ers do not is nei ther here nor there. Nor is it any less im por tant that in most so cie -ties of the world, in fants and ado les cents are never al lowed to be an ces tors – un lessthere be a so ci ety in which life span be so short that it be less than a score. When welook at con tem po rary West ern treat ment of peo ple who die in all forms of ca lami ties,and the way in which peo ple bury the dead in Bot swana so ci ety, it be comes evenclearer that an ces tor ideas are not cast in stone. Clearly, keep ing the memo ries ofloved ones, mourn ing the man ner of their death, and in some in stances, cele brat ing the lives they lived and their con tri bu tions to so ci ety, calls for some level of ex trava gancein flower trib utes or kill ing of cows and feast ing of neigh bours. But in most cases thisis where the mat ter ends.

Thus, nei ther Pla tonic, Ar is to te lian, Sar trean, Sengho rian or Boh mian, nor theOnwuanibean- cum- Ramosean ex tem po ra ne ous con cep tions of per son hood would help us un der stand the com plex is sues of in di vid ual self hood, per son hood or iden tity, asthey are all vi ti ated by the fact that they con sti tute at tempts to de scribe com plex phe -nom ena in sim ple, uni vo cal, uni di rec tional terms. The vari ous so cial sci ences that have fol lowed their lead in the search for the homo ra tio nis, homo oeconomi cus, homo gre -gari onis, etc., like wise failed in their at tempts to de scribe the hu man be ing in terms ofbe hav ioural speci fic ity, even when viewed in terms of a stretched Ubun tuan philo -sophi cal dic tion (cf. Ra mose, 2002:70- 75). In fact, the Boh mian holo graphic ap proach, while use ful for the un der stand ing of such is sues as ge netic, he red ity, cul tural af fini -ties, near death ex pe ri ences, out of body ex pe ri ences and pos si bili ties of trans bod ilystate ex pe ri ences, would not yield much fruit ful in sights into mat ters of per sonal iden -tity. This is be cause the limi ta tions of men tal mag ni tude and con scious ness in hu manmem ory, whether at the micro- cellular or macro- cellular lev els, are not ex haus tive inand for the un der stand ing of selves. Selves are not only ge neti cally con structed holo -graphi cally, they are in di vidu ally se lected, so cio logi cally pro grammed, re lig iously in -doc tri nated, eco nomi cally ori en tated, fili ally sour ced and amo rously in gra ti ated,among other things, thereby re duc ing to con jec tures all ef forts at to tal com pre hen sion,us ing lim ited per spec tives that suit in di vid ual ana lysts or even phi loso phers.

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5 How phi los o phers could join Mbiti and oth ers into talk ing of Af ri can an ces tors in such ter mi nol ogy is amys tery to me.

I pre fer to con tinue to use the term “tra di tional” in stead of os cil lat ing be tween “tra -di tional” and “in dig e nous”, un less it is ab so lutely nec es sary, as these terms are not co -ter mi nous. This is a nec es sary divertissement in the light of Ramose's chap ter 5 wherehe dis cusses “Med i cine through Ubuntu”, as it is clear that he at tempts, as many haveun crit i cally done be fore him, to make much of the Af ri can pro cesses, stages and mark -ers of in di vid ual de vel op ment and growth, as if these are any dif fer ent from what ob -tains in other cul tures where var i ous rit u als and for mal stan dards are set for ad mis sioninto var i ous cat e go ries and stages in so ci ety. I am re fer ring to mat ters such as ini ti a tion cer e mo nies, sac ri fices, age-grades, cir cum ci sion, ti tle con fer ment, etc., as dif fer enttypes of mark ers sim i lar to grades in the West ern ed u ca tional sys tem. Com pare in thisre gard also the award ing of di plo mas, pro fes sional cer tif i cates, bap tism, in duc tion into cad res of the mil i tary, pro fes sional guilds, etc. Thus, to sug gest that hu man be ings be -come per sons only af ter at tain ing any one or all of these stages is most in cred i ble. It isvery clear that at tain ing these do not make one an omoluabi in Yoruba land, nor Bothoin Bot swana – which is why Ramose says, par a dox i cally, that, “This means that spe -cific rites and com mu nal struc tures mean very lit tle if they are de void of botho, mu tual re spect and com pas sion for one an other” (2002:77). It may be in sight ful to show thatthere are such lim i ta tions as Ramose could not ig nore here, for in Yoruba meta phys icsthe ini ti ated knows that when an an ces tor is called or con sulted, it is the liv ing that an -swers, and they never rel e gate the hu man ity or knowl edge of the young, be cause, ac -cord ing to their wis dom, omode gbon, agba gbon, l'a fi da ile Ife, that is, “the young is wise, the old is wise, (this) is the foun da tion on which the an ces tral city of Ife is built”; and, as a con se quence, while the young are not an ces tors and never be come an ces torsif they die young, their hu man ity and the po tency of their con tri bu tion to group andcom mu nal sur vival is never un der es ti mated. If they are not omoluabi from youth, theycan hardly be come one in old age, hence an ef fort is made to en sure that the young are prop erly ed u cated in the ethos, lores and norms of the cul ture and so ci ety. This en sures that their iden ti ties and per son al i ties are never in doubt – see ing them selves throughthe eyes of their so ci ety and see ing their so ci et ies through their own com mu nal eyes.

Ramose's short dis cus sion of “Med i cine through ubuntu” is per cep tive but lim ited. It does not ex plain why tra di tional med i cine treats ill ness the way it does, nor does it ex -am ine crit i cally the eti o log i cal pre sup po si tions of med i cal prac tices in tra di tional Af ri -can com mu ni ties. To say that men tal cases are re lated to com mu nal ex is tence and an -ces tral me di a tion with out ex am in ing these is sues and the at ten dant socio-cul tural mi -lieu of bal ance and healthy liv ing is in ad e quate. While the ideas broached re in force the need for in te gra tion of tra di tional med i cal prac tices into con tem po rary Af ri can med i cal prac tices, the fi nan cial re ward sys tem in tra di tional med i cal prac tice is shown to be nodif fer ent from what ob tains in other ar eas of life, as there is a large in vest ment in com -mu nal trust and the be lieve in the in trin sic good ness of hu man be ings in so ci ety. It isnot sim ply the fact that the healer uses ex ter nally de rived pow ers to cure that pro hibitupfront pay ment or ex tor tion. Rather, it is a deeper mat ter in which all are pro vided for in so ci ety and in which all ex per tise are com mu nally de rived and owned (Ramose,2002:79-80).

Speak ing in broad terms about the “So cial Con tract The ory” of Hob bes, Locke andRous seau (cf. Be waji, 1998), it is per ti nent to sug gest that the ba sis of in ter ac tion be -tween per sons in West ern so cie ties is one of mu tual an tago nism, a con stant strug glefor pos ses sion and de limi ta tion of space, which West ern le gal sys tems en shrine intorights of per sons pre domi nantly, and com mu nity rights by mere ex ten sion. Since Ra -

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mose comes to a simi lar con clu sion us ing the Boh mian ex peri men tal holo nis tic ap -proach, it seems that our views may not be in com pati ble, ex cept that it is a bit dif fi cultto see the im port of the “rheo mode lan guage” as an ana lytic de vice in the face of theer rant West ern in fan tile ro mance with in di vidu al ity (Ra mose, 2002:81- 85). Put dif fer -ently, the ques tion that I raise here is: To what ex tent can an eter nally de rived in di -vidu al is tic and in di vidu at ing lin guis tic equip ment yield mean ing to a so cially ac com -mo dat ing con cep tual analy sis of re al ity? Would the West ern ten dency to ward frag -men ta tion and ato mism of self and so cial re la tions not balk at an Ubun tuic ex plana tory model, no mat ter how strained the ef flu ent of Boh mian rheo modic lin guis tic sug ges -tions may jar at the edges of West ern con scious ness? Dis il lu sion ment with West erncog ni tive re- interpretation of the uni verse is not mis placed when one bears in mind the colo ni za tions of the last cen tu ries and the un fold ing he gemonism of Amer ica andEurope in the in fancy of the new cen tury. One may say that these have no di rect ef -fects on the philo sophic en ter prise of Af ri can in tel lec tual un der stand ing of self and so -ci ety, but such san guine com pla cency will only add to the suf fer ing of Af ri cans ingen era tions to come, as there is no in di ca tion that such apolo gists of colo ni za tion andWest er ni za tion as Van Bins ber gen (2001) will not find new am mu ni tion in the 'in ef -fec t ual' rheo modic dic tion to af front the so- called holo nis tic in ter pre ta tion of re al ity,true as the lat ter may prove to be, whether in lin guis tic or in le gal terms. The ba sic the -sis that is ad vanced by Ra mose is that thought ne ces si tates hu man ex is tence and sincehu mans ex ist, ex pe ri ences ex ist, thus lan guage ex ist to con cre tize thought and rep re -sent it. How ever, we frag ment re al ity by treat ing a part as if it were the whole. There is there fore a need to be care ful in how we de scribe re al ity, so that we do not get car riedaway by the limi ta tions of our in di vid ual per cep tual equip ment into think ing that, be -cause I only know a part, there fore, only parts ex ist. The phenomenological- cum- metaphysical mys ti cism that the Boh mian lan guage of rep re sen ta tion ne ces si tates canthen be dis pensed with, while sav ing the bet ter part of the ideas dis closed to in formour un der stand ing of hu man so ci ety and the le gal struc tures therein.

I can not see why we are try ing to ab ro gate one lin guis tic con struc tion of re al ity,which is clearly de fec tive be cause of the nega tiv iz ing im pli ca tions it has for re al ity,law, or der and hu man wel fare, for an other whose on to logi cal and epis temic pre sup po -si tions are un clear to us. The West ern le gal sys tem is prob lem atic to many so cie tieswith dif fer ent un der stand ings of re ali ties, but it seems that the rheo modic ap proach tole gal is sues will not be os ten si bly bet ter than the in di vidu al is tic and con spira to rial le -gal struc tures of the West. For one, if flux is the un der lin ing foun da tion of be ing andex is tence, what would or der be in the rheo modic sys tem? Would it be per pet ualchaos? Or would it be be-ing be com ing, an end less se ries of un cer tain ties, whererights and wrongs are in de ter mi nate and in de ter min able? It is clear that part of theprob lem that has de stroyed the Af ri can moral fab ric is the pre sump tion of in no cencetill proven guilty, de riv ing from the idea of a long suf fer ing de ity of Chris ten dom andthe ele va tion of in di vid ual rights to the det ri ment of so cial and com mu nal rights topeace ful ex is tence! If, as Ra mose says, “... the uni verse has got no cen ter at all”(2002:89), then where does the idea of our cen ter de rive from – our re al ity, our truth,our jus tice and our be ing?

In Ramose’s dis cus sion of law, there is the contraposition of in dig e nous law, whichac cord ing to him is group ori ented, and West ern law, which is in di vid u al ist in ori en ta -tion. It is wrong to con clude that there is no proper con cept of “law” in Af rica sim plybe cause Af ri can law is aimed at group equi lib rium and not, like West ern law, at pro -

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 399

tect ing the in di vid ual rights against group in frac tions. It is cor rect, as Ramose notes,that we need not over play the role of the group. But the point which re ver ber ates in al -most all Af ri can le gal sys tems that I have be come fa mil iar with, ei ther first hand orthrough read ing, is the con sen sual na ture and con tra-an tag o nis tic per spec tive of con -flict res o lu tion and jus tice dis pen sa tion. It would not be fair to the sys tem of jus ticethat is en shrined in the le gal prac tice of the Af ri can to sug gest that it mu tate and be -come Eu ro pean. In fact it is the un war ranted trans plan ta tion of West ern ju ris tic sys -tems into Af ri can soils that have been the down fall of many sys tems of law and or derin many African societies.

Ramose ar rives through an in di rect route at the con clu sion that contractarianism is aprod uct of the as sump tion of an in di vid u al ist solipsistic a-so cial hu man be ing who hasa right to life as an in alien able prop erty in vir tue of be ing hu man. This as sump tionwould fal ter if it is not backed up by a quar tet of rights to make it mean ing ful – life,free dom, work and prop erty. I as sume that for Ramose these rights are in trin sic to be -ing hu man. How ever, he seems to can vass no se ri ous ar gu ment in sup port of this be -lief. On the other hand, it would make sense to see a hu man be ing as s/he is, namely aper son who de rives rights in vir tue of be ing born into a fam ily, so ci ety, cul ture andcom mu nity of hu man ity (Ramose, 2002:140-153). Out side of this kind of sce nario,there ex ist no such thing as in alien able rights. All ef forts to couch such rights in philo -soph i cally ab stract and con vo luted lan guage can only ob fus cate rather than elu ci datethe mat ter.

It is in ter est ing and un der stand able that Ramose places hu man rights cen trally, butthis cen tral ity is not jus ti fi able out side of the fam ily. What I have in mind here is notany spe cific fam ily, as he agrees, be cause of the com plex ity of fil ial or ga ni za tionsaround the world. What I am sug gest ing is that, as such, hu man ex is tence can not bede fended ex cept as pro tected by par ent age – this is mainly a con se quence of the fra gil -ity of in fant life com pared to other lives at the mo ment of en try into worldly ex is tence. This fra gil ity en sures de pend ence for a very long pe riod be fore vi a bil ity of self hood. Thus it lit tle avails to de bate hu man rights with out con sid er ing the life cir cum stancesof the so-called hu man per son.

I spe cif i cally en dorse Ramose’s po si tion re gard ing em ploy ment and la bour(2002:149-152). I would go fur ther by sug gest ing that the ap pro pri a tion of hu man la -bour and der o ga tion of the right to per sonal sus te nance has been the hall-mark ofWest ern lib er tar i an ism - a sys tem that per pet u ally cre ates masses of poor peo ple anden riches only the few who must have clem ency on the masses and grant them crumbsfor sur vival so as to pre vent a re volt. This is es pe cially done through cre at ing for themthe il lu sion of a here af ter where all things will be equally shared by a de ity. A de itywho has de vi ously se lected one tiny frag ment of the world for a her i tage in the land ofmilk and honey!

It is in ter est ing to see the de vel op ment of Ramose’s po si tion to the ul ti matethematization of the po lit i cal ori en ta tion of ubuntu. But there are avoid able lapseshere and there. For ex am ple, the rep e ti tion of the same quo ta tion on pp.93, 114, 121and 126 is un nec es sary. Sec ondly, chap ter 8 dan gles some how and does not syn the -size into the whole book as one would wish, and chap ter 9 can do with a bit of ex traex po si tion to clar ify how liv ing an ubuntu life con duces to an ecosophically sus tain -able world. Fi nally, a clear anal y sis, within the con text of his dis cus sion of the mech a -nisms of the mar ket in the so-called global sys tem, of the re la tion ship be tween hu man -ity, land and hu man sur vival would have been in ter est ing. This also ap plies to the way

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in which the so-called set tle ment on the eve of ab o li tion of apart heid in South Af ricafailed to ad dress the crit i cal is sue of own er ship of land – this em a nates from only abrief di a logue that Ramose con ducts. We see that peo ple can only bar gain if they areon a level play ing field. But a vic tim of an un just expropriative sys tem can never bar -gain at all un less the in jus tice is re dressed and em pow er ment un der taken. It is un der -stand able that Ramose may not wish to be seen as ad vo cat ing vi o lence or revolution.However, it requires no great imagination to see the conclusions that this materialimpels.

While urg ing that we move away from the dog matic cen ter stip u lated by West ernsys tems of thought, ed u ca tion, tech nol ogy, cul ture, eco nom ics, so ci ol ogy, etc.,Ramose was able to ex hypothesi uti lize the Eu ro cen tric view point to un der score thebogey of “globalisation”. It is in this sense that he hu mors the Eu ro cen tric VanBinsbergen by say ing Chris tian ity’s im pact has been more pro nounced than other re li -gions on globalisation (Ramose, 2002:132). It is not quite clear why Ramose con tin -ues to use the re dun dant phrase “sub-Sa ha ran Af rica”, es pe cially in his dis cus sion ofmar i tal norms and pref er ences, as North ern Af rica re mains a part of Af rica in its Is -lamic re li gi os ity, a re li gi os ity found in all parts of Af rica. This also ap plies to the po -lyg a mous marriage preference that he considers (Ramose, 2002:139).

It is hoped that Ramose's book will be cir cu lated widely and that it would re ceive amore thor ough dis cus sion than the dis cus sion Van Binsbergen pro vided. One can onlywon der whether it is the same book that Van Binsbergen read, as at the end, one is leftto spec u late why Van Binsbergen pur sued his agenda of Afrophilophobia,6, vil i fy ingRamose un justly, with lit tle at ten tion to what Ramose says in this book or the chal -lenges that he poses for further re search and dis cus sion.

Ramose de serves our praise for pro vid ing a clear ex am ple of the kind of philo soph i -cal en gage ment that Af ri can phi los o phers should un der take in or der to in ter ro gate Af -ri can ideas, con cepts and phi los o phies. One may be tempted to see his ef fort in a nar -row way, sim i lar to what Van Binsbergen has done, with out see ing the pro ject as acon tin u ing ef fort, call ing for all to en gage with the foun da tions of Af ri can ontologies,epistemologies, sci ence and the Af ri can in tel lect gen er ally. Ramose’s pro ject is awork in prog ress. It is im por tant that those who do not be long to the Bantu geo-cul -tural prog eny seek com par a tive ideas in their own in dig e nous sys tems, so as to helpthe acad emy to rid it self from a de pend ency syn drome that does not al low for the uti li -za tion of in dig e nous con cepts and ideas.

As a con tri bu tion to the de bate on Af ri can eman ci pa tion, re nais sance, de vel op ment,pol i tics, phi los o phy, re li gion and in deed, in tel lec tual un der stand ing of Af ri can re al i -ties, I rec om mend this book to pol icy mak ers, pol i ti cians, as pir ing lead ers, heads ofstates in Af rica (those of them who can read and write), mem bers of teach ing fac ul ties, un der grad u ate and grad u ate stu dents in ter ested in Af ri can phi los o phy, cul ture, eco -nom ics, law, etc. They will find a great deal to interrogate in this book.

Two sug ges tions are ap po site here, in or der to im prove the ac ces si bil ity of sourcesand nav i ga tion of the con tent of the book, though their ab sence does not de tract fromthe in tel lec tual qual ity of the book as it pres ently stands. Pro fes sor Ramose will haveto (a) me tic u lously pro vide an in dex at the end of the book and (b) there should be abib li og ra phy for those in ter ested in fur ther re search. Fi nally, the typo er rors in thissem i nal work should be elim i nated in a third edi tion, though they do not in any wayde tract from the flu ency of pre sen ta tion or the co gency of the points ar gued.

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6 I.e. ha tred for Af ri can phi los o phy, in con trast to Afrophobia, which is ha tred of Af rica and/or Af ri cans.

PART III

Re ply to Bewaji and Van Binsbergen

(M.B. Ramose)

Introduction

The crit i cal com ments of Bewaji fo cus upon the ar ti cle of Van Binsbergen pub lishedin Quest vol.XV no.1-2 (2001), which is a spe cial is sue on the “Af ri can Re nais sanceand Ubuntu Phi los o phy”. In part the ar ti cle of Van Binsbergen brings un der the prismof crit i cism what it pur ports to be the po si tion of Ramose with re gard to the philo soph -i cal mean ing and the prac ti cal sig nif i cance of ubuntu as ex pli cated in the book un derthe ti tle Af ri can Phi los o phy through Ubuntu. It is ap par ent then that Bewaji’s crit i calcom ments per tain to two sep a rate but in ter re lated is sues. One is the ques tion whetheror not Van Binsbergen’s crit i cism of Ramose is sci en tif i cally and philo soph i cally ten a -ble. An other is the cri tique of Ramose’s Af ri can Phi los o phy through Ubuntu.

I pro pose to com ment briefly on the sa lient points of Bewaji’s crit i cism of VanBinsbergen. The ma jor part of this es say will there fore be a re ply to Bewaji’s cri tiqueof my philo soph i cal ex po si tion of ubuntu and its im pli ca tions for ev ery day life.

Van Binsbergen on Ubuntu

Bewaji starts off his crit i cal as sess ment of Van Binsbergen’s claims con cern ingRamose’s ex po si tion of ubuntu phi los o phy by won der ing whether “...Van Binsbergenwas seek ing to at tain un nec es sar ily cheap pop u lar ity on the back of Ramose’s verycom mit ted dis course”. As his ex plo ra tion of this won der un folds, Bewaji reaches thepoint at which he is able to pro vide us with both the im age of Van Binsbergen and hiscen tral crit i cism of Van Binsbergen. With ap po site and bit ing sar casm Bewaji de pictsVan Binsbergen as the self-ap pointed di viner and sole de finer of the mean ing of ex pe -ri ence, knowl edge and truth for the Af ri can. This con sti tutes the ker nel of Bewaji’scrit i cism of Van Binsbergen. Ac cord ing to this de pic tion, Af ri cans will for ever neednon-Af ri cans to de fine on their be half their iden tity and to de ter mine their des tiny.This pu ta tive right of the non-Af ri cans is based upon their philo sophic myth that Af ri -cans must be ex cluded from mem ber ship of “ra tio nal an i mals” be cause of a de fect intheir on tol ogy. Bewaji suc ceeds in dem on strat ing that Van Binsbergen is a child ofthis West ern myth and ap pears to be se ri ously com mit ted to it. For this rea son it is per -ti nent that on spe cific is sues such as the Truth and Rec on cil i a tion Com mis sion, Bewaji ex presses agree ment with Van Binsbergen, but he is also care ful to coun ter bal ancethat with his char ac ter is tic bit ing sar casm. Thus he writes:

Van Binsbergen is very cor rect in re flect ing on the na ture of the Truth and Re -conciliation Com mis sion’s treat ment of the per pe tra tors of apart heid and the re -sil ient con tin u ing class di vi sions un der ma jor ity rule South Af rica. He sees, and I agree, the dan ger of in jus tice be ing swept un der the car pet to fes ter and re sur -face in a more dan ger ous for mat in fu ture if not ad dressed prop erly and he seesubuntu be com ing a tool in the hand of the new Af ri can elite in concretizingtheir op pres sion of fel low Af ri cans. ...Clearly the se ri ous ness of the em pa thy of Van Binsbergen is not in ques tion, and he need not worry about ex pul sion from his di viner-priest sta tus ... What we need to do, is to show how Binsbergen may have been mis led by his right emo tions of em pa thy and aware ness of real life

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suf fer ing of South Af ri cans to mis take lin guis tic af fin i ties for log i cal ahis to -ricities and ge ne a log i cal irrelevances.

The prob lem with Bewaji’s use of coun ter bal anc ing sar casm is that it takes “the se ri -ous ness of the em pa thy of Binsbergen” at face value. We find this ten dency againwhen Bewaji writes: “Now, one gets the dis tinct im pres sion that Van Binsbergen de -lib er ately con structed for him self a straw per son ...It is clear this may not be the in tentof the au thor, bear ing in mind his em pa thy with the weak...” (ital ics mine). The point is that be neath the ve neer of “em pa thy with the weak” lies the West ern philo sophic myth that the Af ri can does not, can not and would not be long to the “ra tio nal an i mal” group.This is, as al ready sug gested, the ba sis for the dis ci ples of this myth to claim the soleand ex clu sive right to de fine the mean ing of ex pe ri ence, knowl edge and truth for theAf ri can. Bewaji has dem on strated that Van Binsbergen ap pears to take the West ernphilo sophic myth se ri ously. It is there fore some what odd to rec og nize VanBinsbergen’s “em pa thy for the weak” as un re lated to the pa ter nal ism de manded of thead her ents to the West ern philo sophic myth. Fur ther more, Bewaji has omit ted to men -tion that Van Binsbergen’s de mand for “sys tem atic meth od olog i cal and em pir i cal pro -ce dures” is un der mined by the fol low ing. First, de spite his many years of liv ing among the vil lag ers in Zam bia, Van Binsbergen’s di viner-priest sta tus is not matched by athor ough knowl edge of the lan guage of the vil lag ers among whom he lived. Sec ond,one won ders - in the name of “meth od ol ogy” - why Van Binsbergen takes it forgranted that the reader will iden tify and know the meth od ol ogy he is us ing in his dis -cus sion of ubuntu. Third, it is rather cu ri ous, this time in the name of “em pir i cal pro ce -dures”, that Van Binsbergen pre fers only a vague ref er ence to “ac a demic phi los o phersand man age ment con sul tants” in stead of spe cific iden ti fi ca tion and quan ti fi ca tion. Per -haps Van Binsbergen’s will to ig nore his own cri te ria is yet an other re af fir ma tion ofhis ap par ent com mit ment to the myth that the Af ri can can not be a mem ber of the “ra -tio nal an i mal” group.

Hav ing thus adopted the above po si tion, Bewaji pro ceeds thence forward to iden tifyspe cific points that Van Binsbergen claims to ex tract from Ramose’s book. The pur -pose of Bewaji’s iden ti fi ca tion of such points is to es tab lish (i) if in deed they are to befound in the book and, (ii) if they are cor rectly un der stood and in ter preted by VanBinsbergen. I leave the reader to make an in de pend ent judge ment on whether or notBewaji achieves these two aims. The im por tant point to note is that Bewaji in vites thereader to

....re visit Ramose’s book dis cussed by Van Binsbergen to judge whether it wasthe same book that Van Binsbergen was dis cuss ing. I found it strange that VanBinsbergen’s un con cealed agenda was not re ally to in ter ro gate Ramose, butrather to give his own pre-con ceived cri tique of ubuntu phi los o phy or group ofideas which South ern Af ri can think ers are try ing to use as a spring board forem pow er ment of them selves and their so ci ety in their quest for mean ing in apost-apart heid world. A world that is now at the feet of a greater apart heid bythe name of glob al iza tion and the WTO-IMF-World Bank, aided and abet ted by the om ni bus CIA. It be lieves that through com mu ni ca tions tech nol ogy, whichen ables the only power in the new mil len nium to eaves drop into the bed roomsof ev ery one, we must be cowed into sub mis sion and for get about our sor rows.

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 403

Thus Bewaji has found an an swer to the won der with which he be gan, namely,“whether Van Binsbergen was seek ing to at tain un nec es sar ily cheap pop u lar ity on theback of Ramose’s very com mit ted dis course”.

I was part of the Intercultural Phi los o phy re search group at Eras mus Uni ver sity towhich Van Binsbergen be longed. I know him as an an thro pol o gist and cer tainly not asa phi los o pher. I re mem ber his spon ta ne ous re ac tions - in the name of “meth od ol ogy” – es pe cially to the draft ver sion of the chap ter, The phi los o phy of ubuntu and ubuntu asa phi los o phy. I re call in par tic u lar his dif fi culty in un der stand ing that di verse, dis sim i -lar or dif fer ent ex pe ri ences oc cur ring at dif fer ent places and aris ing at dif fer ent pointsin time may none the less lead to iden tity of in sight. For him the rheomodic char ac ter of ubuntu was not only re duc ible to Heraclitus’ the sis that ev ery thing flows but it wasalso a di rect bor row ing from Greek phi los o phy. Thus Af rica could not, can not andwould not be ca pa ble at all to de rive any in sight from her own ex pe ri ence. I am there -fore not sur prised with the ker nel of Bewaji’s crit i cism that Van Binsbergen is a childof the West ern myth that the Af ri can can not be a mem ber of the “ra tio nal an i mal”group. The con se quence flow ing from this, namely, that Van Binsbergen ap pears totake this myth se ri ously and is there fore com mit ted to teach ing and pre scrib ing to theAf ri can is also no mat ter of sur prise for me. Bewaji cor rectly ob serves VanBinsbergen’s aver sion to di a logue - the prin ci ple of phi los o phy proper – with Af ri cans in these terms: “I found it strange that Van Binsbergen’s un con cealed agenda was notre ally to in ter ro gate Ramose, but rather to give his own pre-con ceived cri tique ofubuntu phi los o phy...”. Van Binsbergen’s aver sion to di a logue places him out side theproper ter rain of phi los o phy. It is there fore im pos si ble for me to re spond to VanBinsbergen’s flight of imag i na tion. I re main ready to re ply once he de cides “to in ter ro -gate Ramose” in the ter rain of phi los o phy, the only proper home of the book Af ri canphi los o phy through Ubuntu.

Bewaji on African philosophy through Ubuntu

It is per ti nent to note that both Bewaji and my self re fer to the sec ond edi tion of mybook pub lished in 2002. Bewaji starts off cor rectly by mak ing per ti nent ob ser va tionswith re gard to spe cific points con tained in the “In tro duc tion”. More over, he ex presslyac knowl edges one other per ti nent and cru cial point con tained in the “In tro duc tion”,namely, the state ment of the pur pose of the book. It reads as fol lows: “The ma jor partof our in ten tion is to open up dis cus sion by sug gest ing ar eas of re search. In this sense,the var i ous chap ters may be seen as re search pro pos als on Af ri can phi los o phy basedon ubuntu” (Ramose, 2002:vii). I pro pose to show in some of the para graphs that fol -low that Bewaji has paid in suf fi cient at ten tion to the con se quences of this state ment.For ex am ple, he does not thor oughly ap pre ci ate that it is con sis tent with the state mentof this pur pose to have some rather short chap ters which strictly speak ing are un de -serv ing of the ti tle. Nor does he ap pre ci ate that the “pro voc a tive” el e ment just like theap par ent su per fi ci al ity, is in tended pre cisely to in vite opin ion and de bate on the spe -cific is sues raised. If that were not so then it would be oti ose to claim that the pur poseof the book is “to open up dis cus sion by sug gest ing ar eas of re search (mak ing the var i -ous chap ters) re search pro pos als”. That Bewaji has ex pressly noted the pur pose of thebook gives rise to the fol low ing points. First. The crit i cal com ments of Bewaji arisefrom the text. Pre cisely be cause they arise from the text they must be seen as a spe cific and con struc tive con tri bu tion to wards the chap ters un der stood as “re search pro pos als”. From this point of view, the crit i cal com ments of Bewaji de serve se ri ous con sid er -

404 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

ation. Sec ond. Some of his crit i cal com ments are so far re moved from the pur pose ofthe book that they war rant a new and sep a rate dis cus sion on their own. They may becon strued as in ad ver tent im po si tions sup plant ing the ex pressly stated pur pose of thebook. These will be spe cif i cally noted but not dis cussed. Third. The breadth and depthof some of the crit i cal com ments is that they de mand some com ment how ever brief.This may be in ter preted as the con tra dic tion of the sec ond point. How ever, it is notcon tra dic tory at all. It is the rec og ni tion that what Bewaji de scribes as the “pro voc a tive and in sight ful” char ac ter of the text may give rise to other re search ques tions that Ihave not orig i nally en vis aged.

It is note wor thy that in his iden ti fi ca tion of per ti nent points con tained in the “In tro -duc tion” Bewaji has omit ted one other crit i cal point. It is the point that all ex pe ri enceis space and time bound. From dif fer ent ex pe ri ences with par tic u lar ref er ence to spaceand time might arise sim i lar in sights. The fact that sim i lar in sights are ar rived at bydif fer ent routes and also at dif fer ent times calls for the dis tinc tion be tween ar gu mentand in sight. Upon this dis tinc tion one may well un der stand why and how dif fer entand, even at times ap par ently con tra dic tory ar gu ments may none the less be ad vanced to sup port a sim i lar in sight. What is ob jec tion able then is the claim that since the in sights are sim i lar all other ar gu ments, ex cept one, must be ban ished. In stead, dif fer ent ar gu -ments per tain ing to a sim i lar in sight must be en ter tained pre cisely be cause they formthe ba sis for di a logue which is the ba sic prin ci ple of phi los o phy. This is the ex pla na -tion of the fol low ing con tained in the “In tro duc tion”:

In read ing what fol lows both the cu ri ous and the ad her ents to the view that only one seg ment of hu man ity has a prior and ex clu sive claim to rea son might feelurged to raise a num ber of ques tions and even ob jec tions. One of the ques tionsmight be that what is pre sented as Af ri can phi los o phy on the ba sis of ubuntu isso fa mil iar to West ern thought that one still won ders what ex actly is Af ri can af -ter all. First of all, this ques tion is a strange way of pre fer ring to ig nore the factthat ubuntu/botho is by any stretch of the imag i na tion lin guis ti cally and philo -soph i cally dis tinct from what ever might be termed West ern lan guage orthought. Sec ond, one of the un stated pre sup po si tions of this ques tion is thatubuntu phi los o phy is not only an ex pres sion of the al ready fa mil iar in West ernphi los o phy but that it also re lies upon it for its ex is tence. To dis cover fa mil iar -ity be tween West ern and ubuntu phi los o phy is not the same thing as to af firmiden tity be tween them. The two phi los o phies are not and can not be iden ti calsince to be iden ti cal they must dis solve into one phi los o phy only. But such dis -so lu tion might be pos si ble only if (a) two sep a rate con di tions may be found tobe ex actly the same in all re spects at one and the same time; (b) if hu man free -dom and, there fore the in her ent un pre dict abil ity of hu man ac tion, were to becom pletely re moved from the hu man ex pe ri ence. For as long as re quire ments(a) and (b) can not be ful filled at the same time in spe cific cir cum stances re lat -ing to a par tic u lar hu man ex pe ri ence, the point that fa mil iar ity is not iden tity re -mains in tact. Fur ther more, the fact that hu man ex pe ri ence is time and spacebound al lows for the pos si bil ity of sim i lar in sights aris ing out of dis sim i lar ex -pe ri ences. This means that al though in sights might be sim i lar, they are al waysin eluc ta bly clothed and col oured by dif fer ent ex pe ri ences. Tinc tured in sightsare the pos si bil ity con di tion for di a logue and com mu ni ca tion. But they are notthe rea son for the as sim i la tion, in te gra tion or even dis so lu tion of one ex pe ri -ence into an other. (Ramose, 2002: vii-viii)

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 405

The omis sion of this state ment is some what cu ri ous. This is be cause a close read ing of Bewaji’s crit i cism ei ther of Van Binsbergen or Ramose does take this state ment as itstacit point of de par ture. This means that there is agree ment be tween Bewaji and my self with re gard to the fun da men tals. The point of dif fer ence arises at the level of ex pres -sion of this fun da men tal agree ment. The dif fer ence for me lies in the fact that Bewaji,as will be shown sub se quently, at times de parts from this fun da men tal agree ment.

Ow ing to the stric tures of space it shall not be pos si ble to pro vided de tailed and ex -tended re sponses to all the is sues raised by Bewaji. I will there fore fo cus on some ofthe is sues and pro vide a re ply that ad dresses the es sen tials. No doubt re fined andnuanced ar gu men ta tion will have to be sac ri ficed. My hope is that the re sponses willshow why and how we agree or dis agree on spe cific points.

Bewaji cor rectly brings to light the con nec tion be tween chap ters one and two. Healso adds new in for ma tion that il lu mi nates the point that “the strug gle for rea son inAf rica” is alive even in our time. The ad di tional in for ma tion per tains to thecontinuators of the leg acy of rac ism in West ern phi los o phy. He men tions spe cif i callyLevy Bruhl, Robin Hor ton and Jack Goody. The cru cial point to un der stand here isthat these continuators share one thing in com mon with their pre de ces sors, namely, the def i ni tion of the hu man be ing as “a ra tio nal an i mal” must ex clude the Af ri can. Ofcourse, each phi los o pher has ad vanced his pe cu liar ar gu ment to sup port the self samethe sis.

Bewaji then fo cuses some what briefly on my cri tique of West ern style de moc racy.Ide ally he should have linked this to the ar gu ments and in sights con tained in chap tersseven and eight re spec tively. In the for mer chap ter I raise the fol low ing ques tion: “Isthe multi-party po lit i cal sys tem as an in te gral el e ment of the west ern dem o cratic cul -ture a nec es sary and suf fi cient con di tion for the po lit i cal eman ci pa tion of Af rica?” Tothis ques tion I an swer as fol lows: “My ar gu ment is that the necessitarian po si tion thatthe West ern-style de moc racy is the an swer to the ques tion of po lit i cal or ga ni za tion incon tem po rary Af rica is fun da men tally flawed” (Ramose, 2002:108). A cor ol lary to my ar gu ment is that the West ern style of de moc racy is

..an inauthentic ex pres sion of Af ri can po lit i cal cul ture pre cisely be cause it is an im po si tion which con tin ues to re sist di a logue with tra di tional Af ri can po lit i calcul ture .... In the par tic u lar sphere of po lit i cal re la tions, the prin ci ple of rec i -proc ity will crys tal lize into the prin ci ple of sol i dar ity. This lat ter is man i festedby the al most in fi nite quest for con sen sus in tra di tional Af ri can po lit i cal cul -ture. (Ramose, 2002:109, 112)

In chap ter eight the same rea son ing is ex pressed thus:

The tra di tional Af ri can dem o cratic tra di tion was by no means based upon thead versarial prin ci ple as this op er ates in the con text of West ern dem o cratic pol i -tics. On the con trary, it was pred i cated upon the prem ise that each par tic i pant in the kgotla was ca pa ble of weigh ing both the neg a tive and the pos i tive sides ofany mat ter un der dis pute. This ca pa bil ity would cul mi nate in the de liv ery of anob jec tive, vir tu ally im par tial judge ment. Such a judge ment would, in the na ture of things, be ei ther an af fir ma tion or a ref u ta tion of other judge ments de liv eredon the same mat ter. The at tempt to rec on cile con tend ing judge ments would re -sult in con sen sus with which most par tic i pants in the kgotla would iden tify.This then is the es sence of con sen sual de moc racy ac cord ing to tra di tional Af ri -can po lit i cal phi los o phy. It is dis tinctly dif fer ent from and even con trary to the

406 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

ad versarial prin ci ple of West ern dem o cratic pol i tics. ...It is in deed doubt fulwhether or not there can be a bridge or rec on cil i a tion be tween the two po lit i calphi los o phies (Ramose, 2002:121- 122).

The point of my cri tique of the West ern style of de moc racy in and for Af rica is two -fold. First. It is to ar gue that in view of the in jus tice of col o ni za tion, it re mains an eth i -cal and po lit i cal im per a tive to strive to wards the de colo ni sa tion of Af ri can thought.Sec ond. It is to ar gue in fa vour of the res to ra tion and mod i fi ca tion of con sen sus pol i -tics in the light of pres ent day re al i ties. As Wiredu aptly put it:

Af ter years of sub jec tion to un told severities of one-party dic ta tor ships in Af -rica, there is now vis i ble en thu si asm among many Af ri can in tel lec tu als and pol -i ti cians for multi-party de moc racy. In deed, to many, de moc racy seems to besyn on y mous with the multi-party sys tem. This en thu si asm is plainly not un con -nected with for eign pres sures; but there is lit tle in di ca tion, in Af ri can in tel lec -tual cir cles, of a crit i cal eval u a tion of the par tic u lar doc trine of de moc racy in -volved in the multi-party ap proach to gov ern ment. Yet that po lit i cal doc trineseems clearly an ti thet i cal to the phi los o phy of gov ern ment un der ly ing tra di -tional state craft. ...What, then can we learn from the tra di tional phi los o phy ofgov ern ment that might be of rel e vance to the con tem po rary quest for de moc -racy? Tra di tional Af ri can gov ern ments dis played an in ter est ing va ri ety offorms. But amidst this va ri ety, ..., there was a cer tain unity of ap proach, ...Andthat unity con sisted in the in sis tence on con sen sus as the ba sis of po lit i cal de ci -sion-mak ing (2003).

On this ba sis, I un der stand Bewaji’s in sight ful in put that the “strug gle for rea son inAf rica” must be com ple mented by the rec og ni tion that the “ma jor ity of Af ri can in tel li -gen tsia are cowed into ac cep tance of their own in fe ri or ity or even in fe ri or ity of theirra tio nal ity on the one hand, and on the other, hardly has any Af ri can po lit i cal lead er -ship en gaged the strug gle for rea son.” This lat ter part per tain ing to the “po lit i cal lead -er ship” is stated more in hy per bolic than in mea sured terms.

One other as pect which un der mines West ern-style de moc racy in Af rica is the role of Af ri can tra di tional re li gion. The meta phys ics of West ern con sti tu tional de moc racy isdeeply em bed ded in re li gion and the ol ogy. The con sti tu tion is a transsocial and tran -scen dent sym bol with which ev ery in di vid ual in so ci ety iden ti fies. The sym bolic char -ac ter of the con sti tu tion means that in a de moc racy gov ern men tal of fice or power is an empty space (Lefort, 1988: 230-233). This empty space may there fore be oc cu pied byany one pro vided that such oc cu pa tion shall be ac cord ing to the rules (Lefort,1986:303-304). The transsocial and tran scen dent char ac ter of the con sti tu tion meansthat the con sti tu tion is higher and above ev ery in di vid ual. In this sense the con sti tu tion is the god of the po lit i cal do main. For this rea son ev ery one must re spect and obey thecon sti tu tion as there can not be any one stand ing above the god of the po lit i cal do main.The god of the po lit i cal do main is the only one and is avail able to ev ery one. It is sub -mit ted that these ba sic meta phys i cal ten ets are fun da men tally at odds with those un der -ly ing the po lit i cal phi los o phy of the in dig e nous Af ri can peo ples. It is this con trast andten sion be tween po lit i cal phi los o phies which also ex plains why West ern lib eral dem o -cratic constitutionalism con tin ues to be a prob lem in Af rica. We now turn to ex plainthis.

The po lit i cal phi los o phy of the in dig e nous Af ri can peo ples is un der pinned by re li -gion. This re li gion rec og nizes the pres ence and the in flu ence of the liv ing-dead (“an -

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 407

ces tors”) in the lives of the liv ing. This per va sive pres ence of the liv ing-dead meansthere fore that they are pres ent also in in dig e nous Af ri can law (M’Bay, 1974:141) andpol i tics. The fol low ing im pli ca tions flow from the rec og ni tion or be lief in the liv -ing-dead. (i)The liv ing-dead be long to a dif fer ent sphere of be ing, namely, the do mainof the on tol ogy of in vis i ble be ings. They are, how ever, rec og nized as real and not asphan toms of the imag i na tion. Ac cord ingly, their be long ing to a dif fer ent sphere of be -ing does not pre clude real con tact and in ter ac tion be tween them and the liv ing. Thisren ders them “this worldly” in the sense that they are part of the one ness mak ing theirre la tion ship with the liv ing pos si ble. (ii) The liv ing-dead re late and in ter act only withthe mem bers of their ex tended fam ily. They are nei ther avail able nor ac ces si ble to thewhole com mu nity at large. Un like in the West ern po lit i cal the ol ogy, here there is noone sin gle god with which the en tire com mu nity iden ti fies. There is no uni ver sal,transsocial and tran scen dent god of the po lit i cal do main as a whole. On this ba sis, thecon sti tu tion - writ ten or un writ ten – can not be the god of the po lit i cal do main. The liv -ing-dead are rec og nized as sim ply “higher”, “better” or “greater” but not as “all-high”, or omni- in the sense of be ing in fi nitely su per la tive in ev ery re spect. In this sense thecon sti tu tion does not have, in the po lit i cal phi los o phy of Af rica, a meta phys i cal char -ac ter. The will and the wish of the liv ing-dead are de ci sive in the prac tice of Af ri canpol i tics. In stead of seek ing guid ance and pro tec tion from the West ern lib eral dem o -cratic constitutionalism many Af ri can pol i ti cians and elite re sort to their liv ing-dead.Once these lat ter have spo ken their word must be obeyed and re spected. Con se quently, even if, for ex am ple, an in dig e nous Af ri can pol i ti cian has acted con trary to the con -ven tions of the West ern po lit i cal model he/she would not take the hon our able courseof res ig na tion from of fice. To do so would be dis obe di ence and dis re spect to the wordof the liv ing-dead. No doubt the pol i ti cian would ap pear to be un duly stub born andeven fool ish in the eyes of those who fail to re cog nise that the pri vacy of the of thesphere of the on tol ogy of in vis i ble be ings makes it un nec es sary for him/her to de clarethat he/she is act ing in obe di ence and re spect to his/her own gods; the liv ing-dead. It is pre cisely the con fi dence that one is duly pro tected and must obey which im pels one todis re gard even the “rule of law”. This prac tice is prev a lent and in tense through outmany parts of Af rica. It speaks to the ur gent need to adapt con tem po rary Af ri can pol i -tics to Af ri can tra di tional re li gion.

Bewaji makes a rather quick jump, some thing I do not do, to con jure up a re la tion -ship be tween pov erty – “Af ri cans re main poor” - and the “strug gle for rea son”. Sincehe re verts to the ques tion of pov erty later and much more per ti nently when he writes:“...one mi nor dis ap point ment I have af ter read ing the book (is that) I ex pected a sec -tion on pov erty, not just a dis cus sion of rea son, re li gions, ...” I share Bewaji’s “dis ap -point ment” that there is no spe cific dis cus sion of the liv ing and wide spread re al ity ofAf rica and, in deed of the rest of the for merly col o nized world, namely, “pov erty”.This is one ob ser va tion which I re gard as a spe cific con tri bu tion to wards the re searchpro posal. The pro posal arises, as Bewaji cor rectly ob serves, from my dis cus sion of the dif fer ence be tween la bour and em ploy ment. It is in the con text of this dis cus sion that I posit the the sis that “money is the mea sure of all things, of life that there is that it maybe and, of life that is not that it may never be.” This is ob vi ously a play on words rem i -nis cent of the the sis of eth i cal rel a tiv ism de clared in the his tory of West ern phi los o -phy. But it is more than that. It is also the rec og ni tion that money has be come the ab -so lute eth i cal value of our time. It is not only the means to an end but it is si mul ta -neously an end in it self: the mea sure of all ends that hu man be ings may con tem plate

408 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

and strive af ter. Ac cord ingly, it de ter mines whether or not ex ist ing life may be al lowed to con tinue its ex is tence for ex am ple, by wag ing un jus ti fied and ir ra tio nal wars. It also de ter mines whether or not life as we know it may con tinue by putt ing hu man ity andthe en tire eco sys tem un der the real threat of nu clear omnicide. But the threat of nu -clear omnicide is sus tained by other man i fes ta tions of money as the ab so lute eth i calvalue. In the name of money the eco sys tem, for ex am ple the con tin ual dam age to theozone layer, is re lent lessly dis turbed re gard less of the im per a tives of bioethics or en vi -ron men tal eth ics. In the name of money, part ners must de cide if abor tion is the bestcourse in view of the eco nomic de mands on par ent hood. Thus life that is yet to be may never be at all. In the name of money the em ployed shall be re trenched and be re turned to the hordes of la bour ers con demned to sur vive on their wits. Un der the guise of“com pe ti tion” (The Group of Lis bon, 1995:90-91), be ing the un bri dled pur suit ofmoney, hu man be ings are lured to be come sub scrib ers to a meta phys ics (Arnsperger,1996:11-13) which per mits the un jus ti fied kill ing of an other hu man be ing for one’sown sur vival. Thus money has suc ceeded to erect the ed i fice of struc tural pov erty al -low ing for the ac tual but pre vent able deaths of the many for the ben e fit of the few.Bewaji is cor rect then in dis cern ing the con nec tion be tween the dis cus sion of the dif -fer ence be tween la bour and em ploy ment on the one hand, and the the sis in the lastchap ter that con tem po rary eco nomic globali sation is pred i cated on the meta phys ics ofthe un jus ti fied kill ing of an other hu man be ing. This is an ethic with which other seg -ments of hu man ity dis agree. It is pre cisely this dis agree ment on eth i cal grounds whichjus ti fies the need for a sep a rate and ex tended dis cus sion on pov erty. By way of con tri -bu tion to such a dis cus sion, I sug gest that our un der stand ing and in ter pre ta tion of pov -erty must in clude the fol low ing el e ments. One. Pov erty is by no means nat u ral. No one is born poor by na ture. By na ture ev ery one has the right to ac cess and use the ma te rialre sources pro vided by na ture for one’s own sur vival. This point is ex pressed in Re rumNovarum thus: “since the do mes tic house hold is an te rior both in idea and in fact to thegath er ing of men into a com mon wealth, the for mer must nec es sar ily have rights anddu ties which are prior to those of the lat ter, and which rest more im me di ately on na -ture. If the cit i zens of a State - that is to say, fam i lies - on en ter ing into as so ci a tion and fel low ship, ex pe ri enced at the hands of the State hin drance in stead of help, and foundtheir rights at tacked in stead of be ing pro tected, such as so ci a tions were rather to be re -pu di ated than sought af ter”. On this rea son ing, pov erty is not nat u ral. Two. Pov erty ishis tor i cal. It is the re sult of hu man in ter ac tion and power re la tions in a given con text.Three. Pov erty is struc tural. It is the re flec tion of power re la tions in sti tu tion al ized in astruc ture that gives it the char ac ter of nor mal ity. Yet, the point is that pov erty is notnor mal. Four. Pov erty is sys temic. The in sti tu tion al ised char ac ter of pov erty and itsfalse ap pear ance of nor mal ity al lows for its con tin ual re struc tur ing and re cy cling. Five. Pov erty is con ven tional. That pov erty is a con ven tion is best il lus trated by the va ga ries of the cur rency mar ket where the game played can make one rich to day and poor to -mor row. This must be strange for those who have known cat tle to be the re al ity andsym bol of wealth. Whereas it is nat u ral for a cow to give birth to a fully-fledged vi a ble calf af ter a spe cific pe riod, it can be said that this too is the case with money as in ter est on it ac crues on a daily ba sis, but within a spec i fied pe riod of time. But this sim i lar itydis ap pears if one con sid ers that money, as an ar ti fi cial cow, is sup posed - in prin ci ple - to give birth to a fully-fledged calf ev ery day. Surely, a cow which gives birth to afully-fledged calf ev ery day is any thing but nat u ral. The con trast and the ten sion be -

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 409

tween money as a nat u ral and an ar ti fi cial cow may well serve as the ba sis to un der -stand the at ti tude of the in dig e nous con quered Af ri can peo ples to wards money.

I have al ready sug gested that not ev ery one ac cepts the the sis that money is the ab so -lute eth i cal value. Ubuntu philopraxis is to be counted among those who re ject thisthe sis. To un der stand the bases of this re jec tion one must turn to chap ter three of thebook. It is in tended spe cif i cally as the foun da tion for ubuntu philopraxis. It is there fore vi tal to un der stand chap ter three in or der to com pre hend and ap pre ci ate the sub se quent chap ters. In deed, the first two chap ters in part one must be un der stood as pav ing theway for chap ter three and all the sub se quent chap ters (Kimmerle, 2000:196). Chap terone an swers the ques tion why and how Af ri can phi los o phy was de nied and sup pressed over the cen tu ries un til our time. Chap ter two ar gues that our knowl edge of the rea -sons and the meth ods by which Af ri can phi los o phy was de nied and sup pressed mustlead to the Af ri can’s de ter mi na tion to as sert the right to be Af ri can with out apol ogy toany one. Now, chap ter three rec og nizes this and thus deals with the mean ing of ubuntuas a phi los o phy and its prac ti cal im pli ca tions. In this sense it is an ex po si tion of theubuntu philopraxis. The main prob lem for me is that af ter rec og niz ing “the cen tral ityof the ideas that are dis cussed” in chap ter three Bewaji de votes rel a tively much less at -ten tion and time to this piv otal chap ter. For me a thor ough and clear grasp of the chap -ter is cru cial to un der stand what fol lows. I do ac knowl edge, how ever, that Bewaji ex -pressly con fesses his “lin guis tic lim i ta tion ...be cause I only have a cur sory as so ci a tionwith the lan guages from which both Ubuntu and Botho de rive ....” It would there forebe un fair of me to de mand that Bewaji should com mand com pe tence where he has ex -pressly de clared his “lim i ta tion”. What I do ex pect from this dec la ra tion, how ever, isthat he will re frain from ap pro ba tion. But we note that in the same para graph Bewajihas none the less ven tured to approbate by his ref er ence to “the ap par ent mys ti cism ofthe rheomodic form of lan guage and its mu si cal con cep tion of the uni verse.” Bewajiyields to the temp ta tion to “approbate” once again in the para graph re fer ring to his dis -cus sion of the “So cial Con tract The ory”. In this para graph he writes: “... ex cept that itis a bit dif fi cult to see the im port of the ‘rheomodic lan guage’ as an an a lytic de vice inthe face of the er rant West ern in fan tile ro mance with in di vid u al ity. ...such apol o gistsof col o ni za tion and Westernization as Van Binsbergen will not find new am mu ni tionin the in ef fec tual rheomodic dic tion to af front the so-called holonistic in ter pre ta tion ofre al ity, ..., The phenomenological-cum-meta phys i cal mys ti cism that the Bohmian lan -guage of rep re sen ta tion ne ces si tates can then be dis pensed with, ...”. Bewaji’s in ter pre -ta tive re course to “mys ti cism” casts doubt on his un der stand ing of ubu- as ex plainedin chap ter three. This ap plies equally to his some what dis miss ive at ti tude to wards the“rheomodic” lan guage. He clearly needs to come to terms with the rea sons and the ar -gu ment in the text show ing why there is a dif fer ence be tween “be-ing” and “be ing”.His at tempt to do so in the para graph, “Let us spend some time ...but of be com ing hu -man” re af firms this ob ser va tion. The dif fer ence be tween be-ing and be ing clar i fies,among oth ers, the cop u la tion be tween ubu- and ntu. Once this is un der stood, then hemight have to re think his ref er ence to the “so-called holonistic” in ter pre ta tion of re al -ity. As one crit i cal com men ta tor ob served:

In or der to un der stand the sense in which a new ap proach to Af ri can phi los o -phy is pre sented in this book, it is nec es sary to pay at ten tion to the care ful andin no va tive use of lan guage which leads to a fresh un der stand ing of quite anum ber of words. We have al ready seen that ubu-ntu is ap proached ‘as an hy -phen ated word’ and that a spe cific in ter pre ta tion flows from this way of writ -

410 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

ing. The same is true for the con cepts of ‘be-ing’, ‘whole-ness’ and ‘one-ness’.Ubuntu has to be thought of, and forms the ba sis of Af rica phi los o phy, as awhole or as one in a very spe cific sense: ‘just as the environing soil, the root,stem, branches and leaves to gether ... give mean ing to our un der stand ing of atree’. It is re mark able that ac cord ing to Ramose ubu-ntu is to be un der stood asa noun and a verb at the same time, like the ger und in Latin gram mar. That isex pressed in the on to log i cal and epistemological as pects of it. But ‘it is also agerundive ... since it may crys tal lize into a par tic u lar form of so cial or gani sa -tion’, and of meta phys i cal, eth i cal or po lit i cal thought, as is shown by the say -ings quoted above. In the lat ter more nar row sense, ubuntu could be ren deredby hu man-ness. At any rate it is im por tant not to make an -ism of it as in theword hu man ism (Kim merle, 2000:191).

My ba sic crit i cism of Bewaji’s rather brief and some what un clear ex po si tion of ubuntuis that he fails to grasp and ap pre ci ate the fun da men tal the sis of chap ter three. Thismay be ex em pli fied by the im pre ci sion and the lack of clar ity in his claim that

The ba sic the sis that is ad vanced by Ramose is that thought ne ces si tates hu manex is tence and since hu mans ex ist, ex pe ri ences ex ist, thus lan guage ex ist toconcretize thought and rep re sent it. How ever, we frag ment re al ity by treat ing apart as if it were the whole. There is there fore a need to be care ful in how wede scribe re al ity, so that we do not get car ried away by the lim i ta tions of our in -di vid ual per cep tual equip ment into think ing that, be cause I only know a part,there fore, only parts ex ist.

The fun da men tal the sis of this chap ter is that the phi los o phy of ubuntu is founded onthe the sis that on tol ogy proper is a rhe ol ogy. Ac cord ingly, it is an in vi ta tion to de partcon sciously from fragmentative lan guage, thought and ac tion and to de velop as well as adopt rheomodic lan guage, thought and ac tion. The de vel op ment and adop tion of thelat ter is the best way for be ing to be in tune - to use the mu si cal met a phor - with be-ing as rhe ol ogy. The prob lem is that the thrust of Bewaji’s en tire crit i cism is placed along -side rather than in di rect con ver sa tion with this main the sis. This may be ex em pli fiedby the fol low ing. “If, as Ramose says, ‘...the uni verse has got no cen ter at all’, thenwhere does the idea of our cen ter de rive from – ?” Apart from the ar gu ments and in -sights from as tro phys ics re ferred to in the text that the uni verse has got no cen ter, thesim ple an swer is that ubu- (be-ing) can not have a cen ter. In view of this an swer, I amnot sure if I un der stand es pe cially the “holonism” re ferred to in the sen tence, “...How -ever, there are se ri ous is sues which must be raised and ad dressed to make this form ofholonism ac cept able and use ful as a tool for anal y sis of personhood and im mor tal ity of the soul”. I can not un der stand the as crip tion of any -ism to me be cause I state ex -pressly in the book that “ubuntu is al ways a -ness and not an -ism” (Ramose, 2002:42). Though I ac knowl edge Bewaji’s self con fessed “lin guis tic lim i ta tion” with re gard toubuntu, I am cer tain that he can fol low the in ter nal logic, co her ence and sig nif i canceof the con cept of ubuntu only if he de votes a lot more at ten tion to it than he has done.To my mind, Bewaji moves on too quickly “to other as pects of the book but not with -out mak ing rel e vant ref er ences to the con cept in the fol low ing in ter ro ga tion of Ramose for the pur pose of clar i fy ing is sues re lat ing to Af ri can thought”. But there is rea son todoubt that he keeps his prom ise to make “rel e vant ref er ences to the con cept”. When -ever “rel e vant ref er ences to the con cept” are made I re main won der ing whether thedis tinc tion be tween be-ing and be ing is thor oughly ap pre ci ated. Ac cord ingly, his crit i -

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 411

cism is, strictly speak ing, un re lated to the book to the ex tent that I show in the sub se -quent chap ters how ubuntu is con sis tent with the the sis that on tol ogy proper is a rhe ol -ogy. In the light of this, it is sub mit ted that Bewaji’s as crip tion of “mys ti cism” to thephi los o phy of ubuntu as well as his some what dis miss ive at ti tude to wards the“rheomode” lan guage and holon-ness speak to the need to ap ply his mind to chap terthree. With out this his in ter pre ta tion of the sub se quent chap ters will be based upon ase ri ous mis read ing of the text.

An other fea ture of Bewaji’s crit i cism is that his mul ti ple ref er ences the “Bohmian”,be it the “ho lo graphic ap proach”, the “ex per i men tal holonistic ap proach” or the “lin -guis tic sug ges tions”, seem to sug gest that ubuntu phi los o phy bor rows a lot from thephi los o phy of Da vid Bohm and, by ex ten sion from West ern phi los o phy. This is an ex -am ple that Bewaji does at times de part from what I have re ferred to above as the fun -da men tal agree ment be tween us. This means that he fails to take se ri ously the pointmade in the “In tro duc tion” namely that “To dis cover fa mil iar ity be tween West ern andubuntu phi los o phy is not the same thing as to af firm iden tity be tween them.” At thesame time the sug ges tion that there is a bor row ing from the phi los o phy of Da vidBohm clearly does not take se ri ous is sue of yet an other point made in the “In tro duc -tion” namely that “Tinc tured in sights are the pos si bil ity con di tion for di a logue andcom mu ni ca tion”. Hav ing rec og nized di a logue as the prin ci ple of phi los o phy I de lib er -ately re sorted to the phi los o phy of Da vid Bohm in or der to make ubuntu phi los o phyac ces si ble to those who might have lin guis tic and cul tural lim i ta tions to ac cess it. Inthis way I ac knowl edged the need for di a logue be tween Af ri can and West ern phi los o -phies.

In his dis cus sion of chap ter four, “Re li gion through ubuntu”, Bewaji as serts care -fully that the au thor, “seems to be sym pa thetic to the po si tion of Gilson that the pos tu -la tion of such en ti ties can be jus ti fied as a meta phys i cal con struct with no other formof proof re quire ment than that it is a ra tio nal doxa”. First, I do not “seem” to think theway Bewaji pres ents me. On the con trary, my point is that Gilson’s the sis that “God isnot a sci en tific prob a bil ity but a meta phys i cal ne ces sity” means the fol low ing. (i) Thecon cept of proof as known and ap plied in the nat u ral and so cial sci ences is in ap pli ca -ble with re gard to the con cept of “god”. (ii) Rea son pos its “god” as a ne ces sity. Inother words, hu mans tend to rec og nize the ne ces sity to posit or in vent “god”. Whatform and mean ing “god” takes de pends upon those who posit it. How ever, what iscom mon to all this in ven tion or pos it ing of “god” is that “god” is held to be the rea sonfor and the end or pur pose of hu man ex is tence. Con se quently, hu mans will, in prac ti -cal daily life, strive to liv ing ac cord ing to the pu ta tive rea son and pur pose of their ex is -tence, that is, ac cord ing to the imag ined “will of god”. This clar i fi ca tion, is con sis tentwith my ar gu ment that Bewaji mis un der stood me.

An other mis un der stand ing emerges with re gard to the fol low ing:

Ramose looks at the Af ri can con cept of a per son within the con text of the com -plex ity of hu man ex is tence, ...which largely con sti tutes the mean ing grant inglo cus of be ing and ex is tence in most, if not all so ci et ies. ...But I think thatRamose, Gyekye, Menkiti and oth ers who may think along these lines mayhave ex tended the met a phor of the ac qui si tion of hu man ity rather too much -that is, they may have been de ceived by the am bi gu ity of the concept per -son-hood and may have seen the pro cesses of at tain ment of adult hood and ma -tu rity in so ci ety as syn on y mous to personhood.

412 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4)

The sec ond part of the first sen tence quoted is not par tic u larly clear. The same is truewith re gard to the sec ond part of the sec ond sen tence. Fur ther more, Bewaji re fers to“hu man ex is tence”. But he does not seem to con sider se ri ously, let alone at all, thepoint that the dis course on the ac qui si tion of personhood, or, the con cept of a per sonin Af ri can thought takes the fact of be ing a hu man be ing for granted. It is as sumed that one can not dis cuss the con cept of personhood with out in the first place ad mit ting the“hu man ex is tence” of the hu man be ing upon whom personhood is to be con ferred. Atstake there fore is the ac qui si tion of personhood but cer tainly not the “ac qui si tion ofhu man ity”. Whereas be ing a hu man be ing is an ex is ten tial da tum, personhood is a ti tle con ferred upon this da tum. Bewaji’s fail ure to take this dis tinc tion se ri ously is ap par -ent in the sen tences quoted above es pe cially the words ital i cized by the pres ent au thor. It fol lows that Bewaji’s ex tended dis cus sion of this point is clearly off the mark. How -ever, the in sights de rived from the lengthy dis cus sion are note wor thy in their ownright. One would wish to have them borne in mind with re gard to re search on the Af ri -can con cept of a per son.

It is in ter est ing that his ex pla na tion of “the Yoruba con cep tion of per son” takes himto the heights of Olodumare and fem i nism. From Olodumare, the “Su preme Be ing”each and ev ery per son de rives emi, the soul. “This is why in Yoruba cul ture the cel e -bra tion of fem i nism or po lit i cally cor rect lan guages of sub sti tut ing ‘phys i cally chal -lenged’ for ‘hand i capped’ does not arise, as women are highly re spected and treated as moth ers just as men are treated as fa thers...”. This then also ex plains why there seemsto be a very thin gen der line in Yoruba cul ture, as such gen der dis tinc tions seems to be non-ex is tent in gen eral terms. Pro fes sor Ronke Oyewumi does in deed ar gue that

The chal lenge that the Yoruba con cep tion pres ents is a so cial world based onso cial re la tions, not the body. It shows that it is pos si ble to ac knowl edge thedis tinct re pro duc tive roles for obinrin and okunrin with out us ing them to cre ateso cial rank ing. ...The es sen tial bi o log i cal fact in Yoruba so ci ety is that theobinrin bears the baby. It does not lead to an essentializing of obinrin be causethey re main eniyan (hu man be ings), just as okunrin are hu man too, in anungendered sense. ...I have called this a dis tinc tion with out so cial dif fer ence(1997:36).

I can fol low the logic of the Yoruba words to the ex tent that the un der ly ing rea son ingis for me the same as that found, in this par tic u lar case, in the con cepts mo-nna andmo-sadi. Suf fice it to state that the pre fix mo- may be con strued as the el lip sis ofmotho, a hu man be ing re gard less of sex ual iden tity. On this ba sis I can un der stand thesig nif i cance Oyewumi at ta ches to eniyan. How ever, I re main with a puz zle with re -gard to her claim that obinrin and okunrin may be used with out cre at ing “so cial rank -ing”. First Oyewumi does not clar ify “so cial rank ing” and this leaves the reader withthe lib erty to un der stand this as an ar range ment or or ga ni za tion in ver ti cal terms, thatis, ac cord ing to a hi er ar chy. It seems to me that Oyewumi sub scribes to this un der -stand ing al beit tac itly be cause she writes: “Se nior ity is the pri mary so cial cat e go ri za -tion that is im me di ately ap par ent in Yoruba lan guage. Se nior ity is the so cial rank ing of per sons based on their chro no log i cal ages” (1997:40). If ju nior is the ap pro pri ate op -po site of se nior then it is dif fi cult to avoid the in ter pre ta tion that Oyewumi’s “so cialrank ing” is ver ti cal. A ju nior in age though an eniyan like the se nior can not be, at least in some re spects, equal to the se nior in time with out mak ing non-sense of “chro no log i -cal ages”. It would seem that hi er ar chy or verticality as the ba sis of “so cial rank ing”does not by def i ni tion ex clude the pos si bil ity of op pres sive re la tions even in the case

S. Afr. J, Philos. 2003, 22(4) 413

of women. Writ ing from within Yoruba cul ture, Bolaji Olukemi Olayinka ar gues that“...the in flu ence of prov erbs on the fem i nine cause is the fo cus of his ar ti cle. It aims tobring to light as pects of the sup pres sion of women by men as ex pressed in Yorubaprov erbs. ...Among the Yorubas, a woman’s sex u al ity be longs ex clu sively to the pre -cincts of her hus band.” (1997:215,218). She ta bles a few prov erbs to il lus trate thispoint. Among them is the fol low ing. “Obo ko j’oba Illu k’o daru Níjo obo ba j’oba Niilu yio daru - (When) the va gina is not on the throne the town is peace ful, it is on theday the va gina as cends the throne, that the town will be in tur moil” (1997:219).7 Inview of this I won der whether Oyewumi may be con strued as the ba sis for di a logueand de bate on the ques tion whether or not gen der dis tinc tions are non-ex is tent in gen -eral terms in Yoruba thought. The Ifa cor pus as ex plained by Ambibola and Oluwole(1996:1-20) among oth ers is an im por tant source for the de bate on this ques tion.

Conclusion

I pur posely con clude at this point, aware that I have not dealt with Bewaji’s crit i calcom ments on other chap ters such as “Med i cine through ubuntu”. One rea son for this is the stric ture on space. An other is that I am hop ing that Bewaji and my self have in tro -duced a de bate which other col leagues might wish to join. No doubt I will con tinue the dis cus sion with Bewaji on the other is sues he has raised.

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