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May 8, 2007 Between Saying and Doing:

Towards an Analytic Pragmatism Lecture One

Extending the Project of Analysis1

My aim in these lectures is to present a new way of thinking about language, specifically

about the relations between meaning and use, or between what is said and the activity of saying

it. To that end, I will introduce a new metatheoretic conceptual apparatus, and develop it

through applications to a number of sorts of locution that have, properly, been the focus of

intense philosophical interest: logical and semantic vocabulary, indexical vocabulary, modal,

normative, and intentional vocabularies. The concerns that animate this enterprise arise from a

way of thinking about the nature of the general project pursued by analytic philosophy over the

past century or so, and about its epic confrontation with Wittgensteinean pragmatism. Justifying

that rendering of the tradition would take me far afield, but it will be well to begin with at least a

sketch of that motivating picture.

Section 1: The Classical Project of Analysis

I think of analytic philosophy as having at its center a concern with semantic relations

between what I will call ‘vocabularies’. Its characteristic form of question is whether and in

what way one can make sense of the meanings expressed by one kind of locution in terms of the

meanings expressed by another kind of locution. So, for instance, two early paradigmatic

1 The work reported here was conducted with the support of the A.W. Mellon Foundation, through their Distinguished Achievement in the Humanities Award, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University (where I was also supported by the Mellon Foundation).

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projects were to show that everything expressible in the vocabulary of number-theory, and again,

everything expressible using definite descriptions, is expressible already in the vocabulary of

first-order quantificational logic with identity.

The nature of the key kind of semantic relation between vocabularies has been variously

characterized during the history of analytic philosophy: as analysis, definition, paraphrase,

translation, reduction of different sorts, truth-making, and various kinds of supervenience—to

name just a few contenders. In each case, however, it is characteristic of classical analytic

philosophy that logical vocabulary is accorded a privileged role in specifying these semantic

relations. It has always been taken at least to be licit to appeal to logical vocabulary in

elaborating the relation between analysandum and analysans—target vocabulary and base

vocabulary. I will refer to this aspect of the analytic project as its commitment to ‘semantic

logicism’.2

If we ask which were the vocabulary-kinds whose semantic relations it was thought to be

important to investigate during this period, at least two core programs of classical analytic

philosophy show up: empiricism and naturalism. These venerable modern philosophical

traditions in epistemology and ontology respectively were transformed in the twentieth century,

first by being transposed into a semantic key, and second by the application of the newly

available logical vocabulary to the self-consciously semantic programs they then became.

As base vocabularies, different species of empiricism appealed to phenomenal

vocabulary, expressing how things appear, or to secondary-quality vocabulary, or, less

2 In this usage, the logicism about mathematics characteristic of Frege’s Grundgesetze and Russell and Whitehead’s Principia is semantic logicism about the relations between mathematical and logical vocabularies.

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demandingly, to observational vocabulary. Typical target vocabularies include objective

vocabulary formulating claims about how things actually are (as opposed to how they merely

appear), primary-quality vocabulary, theoretical vocabulary, and modal, normative, semantic,

and intentional vocabularies. The generic challenge is to show how what is expressed by the use

of such target vocabularies can be reconstructed from what is expressed by the base vocabulary,

when it is elaborated by the use of logical vocabulary.

As base vocabularies, different species of naturalism appealed to the vocabulary of

fundamental physics, or to the vocabulary of the natural sciences (including the special sciences)

more generally, or just to objective descriptive vocabulary, even when not regimented by

incorporation into explicit scientific theories. Typical targets include normative, semantic, and

intentional vocabularies.

Section 2: The Pragmatist Challenge

What I want to call the “classical project of analysis”, then, aims to exhibit the meanings

expressed by various target vocabularies as intelligible by means of the logical elaboration of the

meanings expressed by base vocabularies thought to be privileged in some important respects—

epistemological, ontological, or semantic—relative to those others. This enterprise is visible in

its purest form in what I have called the “core programs” of empiricism and naturalism, in their

various forms. In my view the most significant conceptual development in this tradition—the

biggest thing that ever happened to it3—is the pragmatist challenge to it that was mounted

during the middle years of the twentieth century. Generically, this movement of thought

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amounts to a displacement from the center of philosophical attention of the notion of meaning in

favor of that of use: in suitably broad senses of those terms, replacing concern with semantics by

concern with pragmatics. The towering figure behind this conceptual sea-change is of course,

Wittgenstein. In characterizing it, however, it will be useful to approach his radical and

comprehensive critique by means of some more local, semantically corrosive argumentative

appeals to the practices of deploying various vocabularies rather than the meanings they express.

Wilfrid Sellars (one of my particular heroes) criticizes the empiricist core program of the

classical project of analysis on the basis of what one must do in order to use various

vocabularies, and so to count as saying or thinking various kinds of things. He argues that none

of the various candidates for empiricist base vocabularies are practically autonomous, that is,

could be deployed in a language-game one played though one played no other. For instance, no

discursive practice can consist entirely of making non-inferential observation reports. For such

reliably differentially elicited responses qualify as conceptually contentful or cognitively

significant only insofar as they can serve as premises from which it is appropriate to draw

conclusions, that is, as reasons for other judgments. Drawing such conclusions is applying

concepts inferentially—that is, precisely not making non-inferential observational use of them.4

Quine offers an even broader pragmatist objection, not only to the empiricist program,

but to essential aspects of the whole analytic semantic project. For he attacks the very notion of

4 This argument occupies roughly the first half of his classic “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” [reprinted by Harvard University Press, 1997]. His critique of the phenomenalist version of empiricism can be found in “Phenomenalism”, in his collection Science, Perception, and Reality [Routledge Kegan Paul 1963].

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meaning it presupposes. Quine is what I have elsewhere called a “methodological” pragmatist.5

That is, he takes it that the whole point of a theory of meaning is to explain, codify, or illuminate

features of the use of linguistic expressions. He, like Dummett, endorses the analogy: meaning is

to use as theory is to observation. And he argues that postulating meanings associated with bits

of vocabulary yields a bad theory of discursive practice.

If there were such things as meanings that determine how it would be correct to use our

expressions, then those meanings would at least have to determine the inferential roles of those

expressions: what follows from applying them, what applying them rules out, what is good

evidence for or against doing so. But what follows from what depends on what else is true—on

laws of nature and obscure contingent facts—that is, on what claims can serve as auxiliary

hypotheses or collateral premises in those inferences. If we look at what practical abilities are

required to deploy various bits of vocabulary—at what one has to be able to do in order to count

as saying something with them—we do not find any special set of these whose practical

significance can be understood as pragmatically distinctive of semantically necessary or

sufficient conditions.6

Quine thought one could save at least the naturalist program by retreating semantically to the level of

reference and truth-conditions. James and Dewey appeal to the same sort of methodological

pragmatism in support of more sweeping sorts of semantic revisionism—pursuing programs that

Rorty, for instance, argues should be understood as more rejectionist than properly revisionist. And under the

5 “Pragmatics and Pragmatisms” in James Conant and Urszula M. Zeglen (eds.) Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism [Routledge 2002], translated as "Pragmatik und Pragmatismus", pp. 29-58 in Sandbothe, M (ed.) Die Renaissance des Pragmatismus [Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2000]. 6 Ibid.

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banner “Don’t look to the meaning, look to the use,” Wittgenstein further radicalizes the

pragmatist critique of semantics. Pointing out to begin with that one cannot assume that uses of

singular terms have the job of picking out objects, nor that declarative sentences are in the

business of stating facts, he goes on to deny, in effect, that such uses even form a privileged

center, on the basis of which one can understand more peripheral ones. (“Language,” he says,

“has no downtown.”)

I take it that Wittgenstein also understands the home language-game of the concept of

meaning to be explanation of how expressions are correctly used. And he is profoundly skeptical

about the utility or applicability of the model of postulation, explanation, and theoretical

systematization in the case of discursive practices—about the possibility of systematically

deriving aspects of correct use from assigned meanings. Seen from this perspective, the idea of the

classical project of analysis is to codify, using logical vocabulary, the meanings expressed by one vocabulary—from

which we are to derive proprieties of its use—from the meanings expressed by some other vocabulary—from which

we can derive proprieties of its use. One idea, I think is that this enterprise makes sense only if we

think of the uses as species of a genus—of them all being the same general kind of use, say

stating facts, or representing states of affairs. This may seem plausible if we focus on a very

restricted set of uses—just as, in the case of tools, we might be impressed to notice that nails and

hammer, screws and screwdriver, glue and brush all have the function of attaching more-or-less

flat things to one another. So we can think of declarative sentences as stating empirical,

physical, normative, modal, and intentional facts, making claims about such states of affairs

(even if we then find ourselves metaphysically puzzled about the nature of the fact-kinds to

which we have thereby committed ourselves). But if we think of the uses as very different, if we

think also about the carpenter’s level, pencil, and tool-belt, if we think of linguistic practice as a

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motley, of uses as not coming in a simple, or systematic, or even determinate variety, then the

very idea that there is such a thing as meanings that permit the codification of proprieties of quite

disparate kinds of use—even with liberal use of logical elaboration of the meanings—becomes

contentious and in need of justification both in general and in each particular case.

More specifically, Wittgenstein uses the image of “family resemblances” to urge that the

kinds into which linguistic practices and the vocabularies caught up in them are functionally

sorted—what belong together in boxes labeled ‘game’, ‘name’, ‘assertion’, ‘observation’ and so

on—do not typically admit of specification in terms of underlying principles specifiable in other

vocabularies, whether by genus and differentia(e) or any other kind of explicit rule or definition.

It is easy to understand this line of thought as entailing a straightforward denial of the possibility

of semantic analysis in the classical sense.

I think that one thought underlying these observations about the unsystematic,

unsurveyable variety of kinds of uses of expressions and about the uncodifiable character of

those kinds concerns the essentially dynamic character of linguistic practice. I think

Wittgenstein thinks that an absolutely fundamental discursive phenomenon is the way in which

the abilities required to deploy one vocabulary can be practically extended, elaborated, or

developed so as to constitute the ability to deploy some further vocabulary, or to deploy the old

vocabulary in quite different ways. Many of his thought-experiments concern this sort of

process of pragmatic projection of one practice into another. We are asked to imagine a

community that uses proper names only for people, but then extends the practice to include

rivers. There is no guarantee that interlocutors can master the extended practice, building on

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what they can already do. But if they can, then they will have changed the only sessences proper-

name usage could be taken to have had.7 In the old practice it always made sense to ask for the

identity of the mother and father of the named item; in the new practice, that question is often

senseless. Again, we are asked to imagine a community that talked about having gold or silver

in one’s teeth, and extends that practice to talk about having pain in one’s teeth. If as a matter of

contingent fact the practitioners can learn to use the expression ‘in’ in the new way, building on

but adapting the old, they will have fundamentally changed the smeanings of ‘in’. In the old

practice it made sense to ask where the gold was before it was in one’s tooth; in the new practice

asking where the pain was before it was in the tooth can lead only to a distinctively philosophical

kind of puzzlement.8

At every stage, what practical extensions of a given practice are possible for the practitioners can turn on

features of their embodiment, lives, environment, and history that are contingent and wholly particular to them. And

which of those developments actually took place, and in what order can turn on any obscure fact. The reason

vocabulary-kinds resist specification by rules, principles, definitions, or meanings expressed in

other vocabularies is that they are the current time-slices of processes of development of

practices that have this dynamic character—and that is why the collection of uses that is the

current cumulative and collective result of such developments-by-practical-projection is a

motley. 9 If that is right, then any codification or theoretical systematization of the uses of those

vocabulary-kinds by associating with them meanings that determine which uses are correct will,

7 Cf. Quine’s remark (in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”): “Meaning is what essence becomes when it is detached from the thing and attached to the word.” 8 I am indebted for this way of thinking of Wittgenstein’s point to Hans Julius Schneider’s penetrating discussion in his Phantasie und Kalkul [Suhrkamp, xxxx]. 9 A patient and detailed investigation of the mechanisms of this phenomenon in basic descriptive and scientific concepts, and an extended argument for its ubiquity can be found in Mark Wilson’s exciting and original Wandering Significance [Harvard University Press, 2006].

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if at all successful, be successful only contingently, locally, and temporarily. Semantics on this

view is an inherently Procrustean enterprise, which can proceed only by theoretically privileging

some aspects of the use of a vocabulary that are not at all practically privileged, and spawning

philosophical puzzlement about the intelligibility of the rest.10 On this conception, the classical

project of analysis is a disease that rests on a fundamental, if perennial, misunderstanding—one

that can be removed or ameliorated only by heeding the advice to replace concern with meaning

by concern with use. The recommended philosophical attitude to discursive practice is

accordingly descriptive particularism, theoretical quietism, and semantic pessimism.

Section 3: Extending the Project of Analysis: Pragmatically Mediated Semantic Relations

On this account Wittgenstein is putting in place a picture of discursive meaningfulness or

significance that is very different from that on which the classical project of analysis is

predicated. In place of semantics, we are encouraged to do pragmatics—not in the sense of Kaplan

and Stalnaker, which is really the semantics of token-reflexive expressions, nor again in the sense of Grice, which

addresses conversational heuristics in terms that presuppose a prior, independent, classical semantics—but

‘pragmatics’ in the sense of the study of the use of expressions in virtue of which they are

meaningful at all. To the formal, mathematically inspired tradition of Frege, Russell, Carnap,

and Tarski, culminating in model-theoretic semantics, is opposed an anthropological, natural-

historical, social-practical inquiry aimed both at demystifying our discursive doings, and at

deflating philosophers’ systematic and theoretical ambitions regarding them. I think that

10 I would be happy if those who dance with his texts find affinities here with Hegel’s insistence that the metaconceptual categories of Verstand must be replaced by those of Vernunft. It is characteristic of his philosophical ambition that draws the opposite of Wittgenstein’s conclusions from an appreciation of the dynamics of conceptual development and its sensitivity to arbitrary contingent features of the practitioners, devoting himself to elaborating what he insists is the logic of such processes and the conceptual contents they shape.

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contemporary philosophers of language have tended to draw this opposition in the starkest

possible terms, treating these approaches as mutually exclusive, hence as requiring that a choice

be made between them, thereby marking out a substantial sociological faultline in the discipline.

Those who are moved by the pragmatist picture generally accept the particularist, quietist

conclusions Wittgenstein seems to have drawn from it. And those committed to some version of

the project of semantic analysis have felt obliged to deny the significance of pragmatics in this

sense, or at the least to dismiss it as irrelevant to properly semantic concerns. In the most

extreme cases, the attitudes of anti-pragmatist philosophers of language to Wittgenstein’s picture

verges on that of the Victorian lady to Darwin’s theory: One hopes that it is not true, and that if it

is true, at least that it not become generally known.

But I do not think we are obliged to choose between these approaches. They should be

seen as complementing rather than competing with one another. Semantics and pragmatics,

concern with meaning and concern with use, ought to be understood as aspects of one, more

comprehensive, picture of the discursive. Pragmatist considerations do not oblige us to focus on

pragmatics to the exclusion of semantics; we can deepen our semantics by the addition of

pragmatics. If we extract consequences from the pragmatists’ observations somewhat more

modestly and construe the analytic project somewhat more broadly, the two will be seen not only

as compatible, but as mutually illuminating. If we approach the pragmatists’ observations in an

analytic spirit, we can understand pragmatics as providing special resources for extending and

expanding the analytic semantic project, from exclusive concern with relations among meanings

to encompass also relations between meaning and use. In its most ambitious form, such an

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enterprise would aspire to articulate something like a logic of the relations between meaning and

use.

If we leave open the possibility that the use of some vocabulary may be illuminated by

taking it to express some sort of meaning or content—that is, if we do not from the beginning

embrace theoretical semantic nihilism—then the most important positive pragmatist insight will

be one complementary to the methodological pragmatism I have already identified. The thought

underlying the pragmatist line of thought is that what makes some bit of vocabulary mean what it

does is how it is used. What we could call semantic pragmatism is the view that the only

explanation there could be for how a given meaning gets associated with a vocabulary is to be

found in the use of that vocabulary: the practices by which that meaning is conferred or the

abilities whose exercise constitutes deploying a vocabulary with that meaning. To broaden the

classical project of analysis in the light of the pragmatists’ insistence on the centrality of

pragmatics, we can focus on this fundamental relation between use and meaning, between

practices or practical abilities and vocabularies. We must look at what it is to use locutions as

expressing meanings—that is, at what one must do in order to count as saying what the

vocabulary lets practitioners express. I am going to call this kind of relation “practice-

vocabulary sufficiency”—or usually, “PV-sufficiency,” for short. It obtains when engaging in a

specified set of practices or exercising a specified set of abilities11 is sufficient for someone to

count as deploying a specified vocabulary.

11 For the purposes of the present project, I will maintain a studied neutrality between these options. The apparatus I am introducing can be noncommittal as to whether we understand content-conferring uses of expressions in terms of social practices or individual abilities.

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Of course it matters a lot how we think about these content-conferring, vocabulary-

deploying practices or abilities. The semantic pragmatist’s claim that use confers meaning (so

talk of practices or the exercise of abilities as deploying vocabularies) reverts to triviality if we are allowed

to talk about “using the tilde to express negation,” “the ability to mean red by the word ‘red’,” or

“the capacity to refer to electrons by the word ‘electron’,” (or, I think, even intentions so to refer). And

that is to say that the interest of the PV-sufficiency of some set of practices or abilities for the

deploying of a vocabulary is quite sensitive to the vocabulary in which we specify those

practices-or-abilities. Talk of practices-or-abilities has a definite sense only insofar as it is

relativized to the vocabulary in which those practices-or-abilities are specified. And that means

that besides PV-sufficiency, we should consider a second basic meaning-use relation:

“vocabulary-practice sufficiency,” or just “VP-sufficiency,” is the relation that holds between a

vocabulary and a set of practices-or-abilities when that vocabulary is sufficient to specify those

practices-or-abilities. VP-sufficient vocabularies that specify PV-sufficient practices let one say

what it is one must do to count as engaging in those practices or exercising those abilities, and so

to deploy a vocabulary to say something.

PV-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency are two basic meaning-use relations (MURs). In

terms of those basic relations, we can define a more complex relation: the relation that holds

between vocabulary V′ and vocabulary V when V′ is VP-sufficient to specify practices-or-

abilities P that are PV-sufficient to deploy vocabulary V. This VV-relation is the composition of

the two basic MURs. When it obtains I will say that V′ is a pragmatic metavocabulary for V. It

allows one to say what one must do in order to count as saying the things expressed by

vocabulary V. We can present this relation graphically in a meaning-use diagram (MUD):

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V

V' P

1: PV-suff

2: VP-suff

Res1:VV-1,2

Meaning-Use Diagram #1:Pragmatic

Metavocabulary

The conventions of this diagram are:

• Vocabularies are shown as ovals, practices-or-abilities as (rounded) rectangles.

• Basic meaning-use relations are indicated by solid arrows, numbered and labeled as to

kind of relation.

• Resultant meaning-use relations are indicated by dotted arrows, numbered, and labeled as

to kind and the basic MURs from which they result.

The idea is that a resultant MUR is the relation that obtains when all of the basic MURs listed on

its label obtain.

Being a pragmatic metavocabulary is the simplest species of the genus I want to

introduce here. It is a pragmatically mediated semantic relation between vocabularies. It is

pragmatically mediated by the practices-or-abilities that are specified by one of the vocabularies

(which say what counts as doing that) and that deploy or are the use of the other vocabulary

(what one says by doing that). The semantic relation that is established thereby between the two

vocabularies is of a distinctive sort, quite different from, for instance, definability, translatability,

reducibility, and supervenience. My basic suggestion for extending the classical project of

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analysis so as to incorporate as essential positive elements the insights that animate the

pragmatist critique of that project is that, alongside the classical semantic relations between

vocabularies that project has traditionally appealed to, we consider also pragmatically

mediated ones—of which the relation of being a pragmatic metavocabulary is a paradigm. I

will introduce an apparatus that recursively generates an infinite set of such pragmatically mediated semantic

relations. In fact I will eventually argue that unless we take steps along these lines, we cannot understand the

expressive roles played by some of the kinds of vocabulary with which the analytic tradition has been most centrally

concerned: logical, modal, normative, and intentional vocabularies.

Under what circumstances would this simplest pragmatically mediated semantic relation

be philosophically interesting, when considered in connection with the sorts of vocabularies that

have been of most interest to classical analysis? At least one sort of result that could be of

considerable potential significance, I think, is if it turned out that in some cases pragmatic

metavocabularies exist that differ significantly in their expressive power from the vocabularies

for the deployment of which they specify sufficient practices-or-abilities. I will call that

phenomenon “pragmatic expressive bootstrapping.” If one vocabulary is strictly weaker in expressive

power than the other, I will call that strict expressive bootstrapping. We are familiar with this sort of phenomenon

in ordinary semantics, where sometimes a semantic metalanguage differs substantially in expressive power from its

object language—for instance, where we can produce an extensional metalanguage for intensional languages, as in

the case of possible worlds semantics for modality. One example of a claim of this shape in the case of

pragmatically mediated semantic relations—though of course it is not expressed in terms of the

machinery I have been introducing—is Huw Price’s pragmatic normative naturalism.12 He

argues, in effect, that although normative vocabulary is not reducible to naturalistic vocabulary,

12 See his “Naturalism without Representationalism” in Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (eds.) Naturalism in Question [Harvard University Press, 2004], pp. 71-90.

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it might still be possible to say in wholly naturalistic vocabulary what one must do in order to be

using normative vocabulary. If such a claim about the existence of an expressively

bootstrapping naturalistic pragmatic metavocabulary for normative vocabulary could be made

out, it would evidently be an important chapter in the development of the naturalist core program

of the classical project of philosophical analysis. It would be a paradigm of the sort of payoff we

could expect from extending that analytic project by including pragmatically mediated semantic

relations.

The meaning-use diagram of the pragmatically mediated semantic relation of being a

pragmatic metavocabulary illustrates a distinctive kind of analysis of that relation. It exhibits

that relation as the resultant, by composition, of the two basic meaning-use relations of PV-

sufficiency and VP-sufficiency. A complex MUR is analyzed as the product of operations

applied to basic MURs. This is meaning-use analysis. The same analytic apparatus applies also

to more complex pragmatically mediated semantic relations. Consider one of the pragmatist

criticisms that Sellars addresses to the empiricist core program of the classical analytic project.

It turns on the assertion of the pragmatic dependence of one set of vocabulary-deploying

practices-or-abilities on another.

Because he thinks part of what one is doing in saying how things merely appear is

withholding a commitment to their actually being that way, and because one cannot be

understood as withholding a commitment that one cannot undertake, Sellars concludes that one

cannot have the ability to say or think how things seem or appear unless one also has the ability

to make claims about how things actually are. In effect, this Sellarsian pragmatist critique of the

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phenomenalist form of empiricism consists in the claim that the practices that are PV-sufficient

for ‘is’-φ talk are PP-necessary for the practices that are PV-sufficient for ‘looks’-φ talk.13 That

pragmatic dependence of practices-or-abilities then induces a resultant pragmatically mediated

semantic relation between the vocabularies. The meaning-use diagram for this claim is:

Vis-φ

Pis-φ

1: PV-suff

Vlooks-φ

Plooks-φ

3: PV-suff

2: PP-nec

Res1: VV 1,2,3

Meaning-Use Diagram #2:Pragmatically MediatedSemantic Presupposition

The resultant MUR here is a kind of complex, pragmatically mediated, VV-necessity, or

semantic presupposition.

In fact, although Sellars’s argument for the crucial PP-necessity relation of pragmatic

dependence of one set of vocabulary-deploying practices-or-abilities on another is different, his

argument against the observational version of empiricism—the claim that purely non-inferential,

observational uses do not form an autonomous discursive practice, but presuppose inferential

uses—has exactly the same form:

13 I discuss this argument in greater detail in the final chapter of Tales of the Mighty Dead [Harvard University Press 2004.]

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Vinferential

Pinferential

1: PV-suff

Pobservational

3: PV-suff

2: PP-nec

Res1: VV 1,2,3

Meaning-Use Diagram #3:Pragmatically MediatedSemantic Presupposition

Vobservational

For these cases, we can say something further about the nature of the pragmatically mediated semantic relation that

is analyzed as the resultant MUR in these diagrams. For instead of jumping directly to this VV resultant MUR, we

could have put in the composition of the PP-necessity and second PV-sufficiency relation, yielding a kind of

complex pragmatic presupposition:

Vis-φ

Pis-φ

1: PV-suff

Vlooks-φ

Plooks-φ

3: PV-suff

2: PP-nec

Meaning-Use Diagram #4:Composition

Res2: PV 2,3

If this diagram were completed by an arrow from Vis-φ to Vlooks-φ such that the same diagonal resultant arrow could

represent both the composition of relations 2 and 3 and the composition of relation 1 and the newly supplied one,

then category theorists would say that the diagram commutes. And the arrow that needs to be supplied to make the

diagram commute they call the retraction of relation 1 through the composition Res2:

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Vis-φ

Pis-φ

1: PV-suff

Vlooks-φ

Plooks-φ

3: PV-suff

2: PP-nec

Meaning-Use Diagram #5:Composition and

Retraction

Res2: PV 2,3

Retraction of 1through Res2

After composition, then, the next most complex form of resultant MUR is retraction. Analyzing the structure of

Sellars’s pragmatist arguments against empiricism requires recognizing the pragmatically mediated semantic

relation he claims holds between phenomenal and objective vocabulary as the retraction of a constellation of more

basic meaning-use relations.

Section 4: Automata: Syntactic PV-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency

Now this is all extremely abstract. To make it more definite, we need to fill in (at least) the

notions of vocabulary, practice-or-ability, PV-sufficiency, and VP-sufficiency14, which are the

fundamental elements that articulate what I am calling the “meaning-use analysis” of resultant

meaning-use relations—in particular, the pragmatically mediated semantic relations between

vocabularies that I am claiming we must acknowledge in order to pursue the classical project of

philosophical analysis in the light of what is right about the pragmatist critique of it. We can

begin to do that by looking at a special case in which it is possible to be unusually clear and

precise about the things and relations that play these metatheoretic roles. This is the case where

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‘vocabulary’ takes a purely syntactic sense. Of course, the cases we eventually care about —and

will be discussing in the remaining lectures—involve vocabularies understood in a sense that

includes their semantic significance. But besides the advantages of clarity and simplicity, we

will find that some important lessons carry over from the syntactic to the semantic case.

The restriction to vocabularies understood in a spare syntactic sense leads to

correspondingly restricted notions of what it is to deploy such a vocabulary, and what it is to

specify practices-or-abilities sufficient to deploy one. Suppose we are given an alphabet, which

is a finite set of primitive sign types—for instance, the letters of the English alphabet. The

universe generated by that alphabet then consists of all the finite strings that can be formed by

concatenating elements drawn from the alphabet. A vocabulary over such an alphabet—in the

syntactic sense I am now after—is then any subset of the universe of strings that alphabet

generates. If the generating alphabet is the English alphabet, then the vocabulary might consist

of all English sentences, all possible English texts, or all and only the sentences of Making It

Explicit.15

What can we say about the abilities that count as deploying a vocabulary in this spare

syntactic sense?16 The abilities in question are the capacity to read and write the vocabulary. In

this purely syntactic sense, ‘reading’ it means being able practically to distinguish within the

universe generated by the vocabulary, strings that do, from those that do not, belong to the

15 Computational linguists, who worry about vocabularies in this sense, have developed metalanguages for specifying important classes of such vocabularies: the syntactic analogues of semantic metalanguages in the cases we will eventually address. So, for instance, for the alphabet {a,b}, ‘anbn’ characterizes the vocabulary that comprises all strings of some finite number of ‘a’s followed by the same number of ‘b’s. ‘a(ba)*b’ characterizes the vocabulary that comprises all strings beginning with an ‘a’, ending with a ‘b’, and having any number of repetitions of the sub-string ‘ba’ in between. 16 Here we can safely just talk about abilities, without danger of restricting the generality of the analysis.

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specified vocabulary. And ‘writing’ it means practically being able to produce all and only the

strings in the alphabetic universe that do belong to the vocabulary.

We assume as primitive abilities the capacities to read and write, in this sense, the

alphabet from whose universe the vocabulary is drawn—that is, the capacity to respond

differentially to alphabetic tokens according to their type, and to produce tokens of antecedently

specified alphabetic types. Then the abilities that are PV-sufficient to deploy some vocabularies

can be specified in a particularly simple form. They are finite-state automata (FSAs). As an

example, suppose we begin with the alphabet {a, h, o, !}. Then we can consider the laughing

Santa vocabulary, which consists of strings such as ‘hahaha!’, ‘hohoho!’, ‘hahahoho!’ ‘hohoha!’,

and so on.17 Here is a graphical representation of a laughing Santa finite-state automaton,

which can read and write the laughing Santa vocabulary:

3 4h

a

o

h

!1 2

The Laughing SantaAutomaton

The numbered nodes represent the states of the automaton, and the alphabetically labeled arcs

represent state-transitions. By convention, the starting state is represented by a square (State 1),

and the final state by a circle with a thick border (State 4).

17 In the syntactic metalanguage for specifying vocabularies that I mentioned in the note above, this is the vocabulary (ha/ho)*!

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As a reader of the laughing Santa vocabulary, the task of this automaton is to process a

finite string, and determine whether or not it is a licit string of the vocabulary. It processes the

string one alphabetic character at a time, beginning in State 1. It recognizes the string if and only

if (when and only when) it arrives at its final state, State 4. If the first character of the string is

not an ‘h’, it remains stuck in State 1, and rejects the string. If the first character is an ‘h’, it

moves to State 2, and processes the next character. If that character is not an ‘a’ or an ‘o’, it

remains stuck in State 2, and rejects the string. If the character is an ‘a’ or an ‘o’, it moves to

State 3. If the next character is an exclamation point, it moves to State 4, and recognizes the

string ‘ha!’ or ‘ho!’—the shortest ones in the laughing Santa vocabulary. If instead the next

character is an ‘h’, it goes back to State 2, and repeats itself in loops of ‘ha’s and ‘ho’s any

number of times until an exclamation point is finally reached, or it is fed a discordant character.

As a writer of the laughing Santa vocabulary, the task of the automaton is to produce

only licit strings of that vocabulary, by a process that can produce any and all such strings. It

begins in its initial state, State 1, and emits an ‘h’ (its only available move), changing to State 2.

In this state, it can produce either an ‘a’ or an ‘o’—it selects one at random18—and goes into

State 3. In this state, it can either tack on an exclamation point, and move into its final state,

State 4, finishing the process, or emit another ‘h’ and return to State 2 to repeat the process. In

any case, whenever it reaches State 4 and halts, the string it has constructed will be a member of

the laughing Santa vocabulary.

18 As a matter of fact, it can be shown that every vocabulary readable/writeable by a non-deterministic finite-state automaton—such as the laughing Santa automaton—is also readable/writeable by a deterministic one. [ref.]

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I hope this brief rehearsal makes it clear how the constellation of nodes and arrows that

makes up this directed graph represents the abilities to read and write (recognize and produce

arbitrary strings of) the laughing Santa vocabulary.19 What it represents is abilities that are PV-

sufficient to deploy that vocabulary—that is, read and write it, in the attenuated sense appropriate

to this purely syntactic case. And the digraph representation is itself a vocabulary that is VP-

sufficient to specify those vocabulary-deploying abilities. That is, the digraph representation of

this finite-state automaton is a pragmatic metavocabulary for the laughing Santa vocabulary.

The relation between the digraph vocabulary and the laughing Santa vocabulary is, then, a

pragmatically mediated—not now semantic, but syntactic—relation between vocabularies.

It may seem that I am stretching things by calling the digraph form of representation a

‘vocabulary’. It will be useful, as a way of introducing my final point in the vicinity, to consider 19 For practice, or to test one’s grip on the digraph specification of FSAs, consider what vocabulary over the same alphabet that produces the laughing Santa is recognized/produced by this automaton:

3

5

o

1

2

The "I'll Have What She'sHaving" Automaton

4!

o h

h

a

a

o

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a different form of pragmatic metavocabulary for the laughing Santa vocabulary. Besides the

digraph representation of a finite-state automaton, we can also use a state-table representation.

For the laughing Santa automaton this is:

State 1 State 2 State 3 a Halt 3 Halt h 2 Halt 2 o Halt 3 Halt ! Halt Halt 4

In read mode, the automaton starts in State 1. To see what it will do if fed a particular character, we look at the row

labeled with that character. The LSA will Halt if the input string starts with anything other than an ‘h’, in which

case it will change to State 2. In that state, the automaton specified by the table will halt unless the next character is

an ‘a’ or an ‘o’, in which case it changes to State 3, and so on. (There is no column for State 4, since it is the final

state, and accepts/produces no further characters.) Clearly there is a tabular representation corresponding

to any digraph representation of an FSA, and vice versa. Notice further that we need not use a

two-dimensional table to convey this information. We could put the rows one after another, in

the form:

aHalt3Halth2Halt2oHalt3Halt!HaltHalt4.

This is just a string, drawn from a universe generated by the alphabet of the LSA, together with

‘Halt’ and the designations of the states of that automaton. The strings that specify finite-state

automata that deploy vocabularies defined over the same basic alphabet as the LSA then form a

vocabulary in the technical syntactic sense we have been considering. And that means we can

ask about the automata that can read and write those state-table encoding vocabularies. The

meaning-use diagram for this situation is then:

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VLaughingSanta

PLaughing SantaAutomaton

1: PV-suff

VLSA State-Table

2: VP-suff

Res1: VV 1,2

PLSA State-TableAutomaton

3: PV-suff

Meaning-Use Diagram #6:Specifying the Automatonthat Deploys the Laughing

Santa Vocabulary

Section 5: The Chomsky Hierarchy and a Syntactic Example of Pragmatic Expressive

Bootstrapping

Restricting ourselves to a purely syntactic notion of a vocabulary yields a clear sense of

‘pragmatic metavocabulary’: both the digraph and the state-table vocabularies are VP-sufficient

to specify practical abilities articulated as a finite-state automaton that is PV-sufficient to

deploy—in the sense of recognizing and producing—the laughing Santa vocabulary, as well as

many others. (Of course, it does that only against the background of a set of abilities PV-sufficient to deploy

those vocabularies.) Perhaps surprisingly, it also offers a prime example of strict pragmatic

expressive bootstrapping. For in this setting we can prove that one vocabulary that is

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expressively weaker than another can nonetheless serve as an adequate pragmatic

metavocabulary for that stronger vocabulary. That is, even though one cannot say in the weaker

vocabulary everything that can be said in the stronger one, one can still say in the weaker one

everything that one needs to be able to do in order to deploy the stronger one.

Here the relevant notion of the relative expressive power of vocabularies is also a purely

syntactic one. Already in the 1950’s, Chomsky offered mathematical characterizations of the

different sets of strings of characters that could be generated by different classes of grammars

(that is, in my terms, characterized by different kinds of syntactic metavocabularies) and

computed by different kinds of automata. The kinds of vocabulary, grammar, and automata line

up with one another, and can be arranged in a strict expressive hierarchy: the Chomsky

hierarchy. It is summarized in the following table:

Vocabulary Grammar Automaton Regular AaB

Aa Finite State Automaton

Context-Free A<anything> Push-Down Automaton

Context-Sensitive c1Ac2c1<anything>c2 Linear Bounded Automaton

Recursively Enumerable No Restrictions on Rules Turing Machine (= 2 Stack PDA)

The point I want to make fortunately does not require us to delve very deeply into the

information summarized in this table. A few basic points will suffice. The first thing to realize

is that not all vocabularies in the syntactic sense we have been pursuing can be read and written

by finite-state automata. For instance, it can be shown that no finite-state automaton is PV-

sufficient to deploy the vocabulary anbn, defined over the alphabet {a,b}, which consists of all

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strings of any arbitrary number of ‘a’s followed by the same number of ‘b’s. The idea behind the

proof is that in order to tell whether the right number of ‘b’s follow the ‘a’s (when reading) or to

produce the right number of ‘b’s (when writing), the automaton must somehow keep track of

how many ‘a’s have been processed (read or written). The only way an FSA can store

information is by being in one state rather than another. So, it could be in one state—or in one of

a class of states—if one ‘a’ has been processed, another if two have, and so on. But by

definition, a finite-state automaton only has a finite number of states, and that number is fixed in

advance of receiving its input or producing its output. Whatever that number of states is, and

whatever system it uses to code numbers into states (it need not be one-to-one—it could use a decimal

coding, for instance), there will be some number of ‘a’s that is so large that the automaton runs out

of states before it finishes counting. But the vocabulary in question consists of arbitrarily long

strings of ‘a’s and ‘b’s. In fact, it is possible to say exactly which vocabularies finite-state

automata (specifiable by digraphs and state-tables of the sort illustrated above) are capable of

deploying. These are called the ‘regular’ vocabularies (or languages).

The next point is that slightly more complex automata are capable of deploying

vocabularies, such as anbn, that are not regular, and hence cannot be read or written by finite-state

automata. As our brief discussion indicated, intuitively the problem FSAs have with languages

like anbn is that they lack memory. If we give them a memory, we get a new class of machines:

(non-deterministic20) push-down automata (PDAs). In addition to being able to respond

differentially to and produce tokenings of the alphabetic types, and being able to change state,

PDAs can push alphabetic values to the top of a memory-stack, and pull such values from the top

20 By contrast to FSA’s, there need not in general be for every vocabulary computable by a non-deterministic PDA, some deterministic PDA that reads and writes the same vocabulary.

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of that stack. PDAs can do everything that finite-state automata can do, but they can also read

and write many vocabularies, such as anbn, that are not regular, and so cannot be read and written

by FSAs. The vocabularies they can deploy are called “context-free”. All regular vocabularies

are context-free, but not vice versa. This proper containment of classes of vocabularies provides

a clear sense, suitable to this purely syntactic setting, in which one vocabulary can be thought of

as “expressively more powerful” than another: the different kinds of grammar can specify, and

the different kinds of automata can compute, ever larger classes of vocabularies. Context-free

vocabularies that are not regular require more powerful grammars to specify them, as well as

more powerful automata to deploy them. FSAs are special kinds of PDAs, and all the automata

are special kinds of Turing Machines. Recursively enumerable vocabularies are not in general

syntactically reducible to context-sensitive, context-free, or regular ones. And the less capable

automata cannot read and write all the vocabularies that can be read and written by Turing

Machines.

Nonetheless, if we look at pragmatically mediated relations between these syntactically

characterized vocabularies, we find that they make possible a kind of strict expressive

bootstrapping that permits us in a certain sense to evade the restrictions on expressive power

enforced for purely syntactic relations between vocabularies. The hierarchy dictates that only the

abilities codified in Turing Machines—two-stack push-down automata—are PV-sufficient to

deploy recursively enumerable vocabularies in general. But now we can ask: what class of

languages is VP-sufficient to specify Turing Machines, and hence to serve as sufficient pragmatic

metavocabularies for recursively enumerable vocabularies in general? The surprising fact is that

the abilities codified in Turing Machines—the abilities to recognize and produce arbitrary

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recursively enumerable vocabularies—can quite generally be specified in context-free

vocabularies. It is demonstrable that context-free languages are strictly weaker in syntactic

expressive resources than recursively enumerable languages. The push-down automata that can

read and write only context-free languages cannot read and write recursively enumerable

languages in general. But it is possible to say in a context-free language what one needs to be

able to do in order to deploy recursively enumerable languages in general.

The proof of this claim is tedious, but not difficult, and the claim itself is not at all controversial—though

computational linguists make nothing of it, having theoretical concerns very different from those that lead me to

underline this fact. (My introductory textbook leaves the proof as an exercise to the reader.21) General-purpose

computer languages such as Pascal and C++ can specify the algorithms a Turing Machine, or any other universal

computer, uses to compute any recursively enumerable function, hence to recognize or produce any recursively

enumerable vocabulary. And they are invariably context-free languages22—in no small part just because the

simplicity of this type of grammar makes it easy to write parsers for them. Yet they suffice to specify the state-table,

contents of the tape (or of the dual stacks), and primitive operations of any and every Turing Machine. Here is the

MUD characterizing this pragmatically mediated relation between syntactically characterized

vocabularies:

21 Thomas A. Sudkamp Languages and Machines 2nd edition [Addison Wesley Longman 1998], Chapter 10. 22 In principle. There are subtleties that arise when we look at the details of actual implementations of particular computer languages, which can remove them from qualifying as strictly context-free.

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VRecursivelyEnumerable

PTuring Machine

1: PV-suff

VContext-Free

2: VP-suff

Res1: VV 1,2

PPush-DownAutomaton

3: PV-suff

Meaning-Use Diagram #7:

Syntactic PragmaticExpressive Bootstrapping

I called the fact that context-free vocabularies can be adequate pragmatic metavocabularies for recursively

enumerable vocabularies in general ‘surprising’, because of the provable syntactic irreducibility of the one class of

vocabularies to the other. But if we step back from the context provided by the Chomsky hierarchy, we can see why

the possibility of such pragmatic expressive bootstrapping should not, in the end, be surprising. For all the result

really means is that context-free vocabularies let one say what it is one must do in order to say things they cannot

themselves say, because the ability to deploy those context-free vocabularies does not include the abilities those

vocabularies let one specify. Thus, for instance, there is no reason that an FSA could not read and write a

vocabulary that included commands such as “Push an ‘a’ onto the stack,”—and thus specify the program of a

PDA—even though it itself has no stack, and could not do what the vocabulary it is deploying specifies. A coach

might be able to tell an athlete exactly what to do, and even how to do it, even though the coach cannot himself do

what he is telling the athlete to do, does not have the abilities he is specifying. We ought not to boggle at the

possibility of an expressively weaker pragmatic metavocabulary having the capacity to say what one must do in

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order to deploy an expressively stronger one. We should just look to see where this seems in fact to be possible for

vocabularies we care about, and what we can learn from such relations when they do obtain.

Section 6: Looking Ahead

Let us recall what motivated this rehearsal of some elements of automaton theory and

introductory computational linguistics. I suggested that a way to extend the classical project of

semantic analysis so as to take account of the insights of its pragmatist critics is to look

analytically at relations between meaning and use. More specifically, I suggested focusing to

begin with on two in some sense complementary relations: the one that holds when some set of

practices-or-abilities is PV-sufficient to deploy a given vocabulary, and the one that holds when

some vocabulary is VP-sufficient to specify a given set of practices-or-abilities. The composition

of these is the simplest pragmatically mediated semantic relation between vocabularies: the

relation that holds when one vocabulary is a sufficient pragmatic metavocabulary for another. It

is a paradigm of the infinite, recursively generable class of complex, pragmatically mediated

semantic relations that I propose to lay alongside the other semantic relations between

vocabularies that have been investigated by analytic philosophers (for instance those who

address the core programs of empiricism and naturalism): relations such as analyzability,

definition, translation, reduction, truth-making, and supervenience. I suggested further that

pragmatic metavocabularies might be of particular interest in case they exhibited what I called

“expressive bootstrapping”—cases, that is, in which the expressive power of the pragmatic

metavocabulary differs markedly from that of the target vocabulary, most strikingly, when the

metavocabulary is substantially expressively weaker—a phenomenon Tarski has led us not to

expect for semantic metavocabularies.

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We have now seen that all of these notions can be illustrated with particular clarity for the

special case of purely syntactically characterized vocabularies. The abilities that are PV-

sufficient to deploy those vocabularies, in the sense of the capacity to recognize and produce

them, can be thought of as various sorts of automata. There are several well-established,

different-but-equivalent vocabularies that are known to be VP-sufficient to specify those

automata. In this special syntactic case we can accordingly investigate the properties of

pragmatic metavocabularies, and when we do, we find a striking instance of strict expressive

bootstrapping in a pragmatically mediated syntactic relation between vocabularies.

Of course, the cases we really care about involve semantically significant vocabularies.

Are there any interesting instances of these phenomena in such cases? I have indicated briefly

how some of Sellars’s pragmatist criticisms of various ways of pursuing the empiricist program

can be understood to turn on pragmatically mediated semantic relations. And I mentioned Huw

Price’s idea that although normative vocabulary is not semantically reducible to naturalistic

vocabulary, naturalistic vocabulary might suffice to specify what one must do—the practices-or-

abilities one must engage in or exercise—in order to deploy normative vocabulary. Here is

another example that I want to point to, though I cannot develop the claim here. For roughly the

first three-quarters of the twentieth century, philosophers who thought about indexical

vocabulary took for granted some version of the doctrine that a tokening n of an expression of

the type ‘now’ was synonymous with, definable or semantically analyzable as, ‘the time of

utterance of n,’ and similarly for ‘here’ and ‘the place of utterance of h,’ and so on. During the

1970’s philosophers such as John Perry, David Lewis, and G. E. M. Anscombe, by focusing on

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the use of indexicals in modal and epistemic contexts, showed decisively that this cannot be

right: what is expressed by indexical vocabulary cannot be expressed equivalently by non-

indexical vocabulary. This fact seems so obvious to us now that we might be led to wonder what

philosophers such as Russell, Carnap, and Reichenbach could have been thinking for all those

years. I want to suggest that the genuine phenomenon in the vicinity is a pragmatically mediated

semantic relation between these vocabularies. Specifically, in spite of the semantic

irreducibility of indexical to nonindexical vocabulary, it is possible to say, entirely in non-

indexical terms, what one must do in order to be deploying indexical vocabulary correctly: to be

saying essentially and irreducibly indexical things. For we can formulate practical rules such as:

• If, at time t and place <x,y,z>, speaker s wants to assert that some property P holds of

<x,y,z,t,s>, it is correct to say “P holds of me, here and now.”

And

• If a speaker s at time t and place <x,y,z> asserts “P holds of me, here and now,” the

speaker is committed to the property P holding of <x,y,z,t,s>.

Further (as I show in an appendix to the next lecture, where the necessary concepts have been introduced), those

responses can be algorithmically elaborated so as to play the role distinctive of essential

indexicals. Non-indexical vocabulary can serve as an adequate pragmatic metavocabulary for

indexical vocabulary. The fact that one nonetheless cannot say in non-indexical terms

everything that one can say with indexical vocabulary just shows that these vocabularies have

different expressive powers, so that the pragmatically mediated semantic relation between them

is a case of strict pragmatic expressive bootstrapping.

In the lectures to come, I will be doing three things:

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• further developing the conceptual apparatus of meaning-use analysis, by introducing both

new basic meaning-use relations and new combinations of them;

• applying that apparatus to vocabularies of ongoing philosophical interest (logical, modal,

normative, intentional); and

• seeing what new pragmatically mediated semantic relations become visible in that way.

Each subsequent lecture will report some unexpected, suggestive results, which fit together

cumulatively to constitute a distinctive, novel picture of what we would previously have thought

was familiar terrain.

Besides pragmatically mediated semantic relations between vocabularies, there is another

sort of pragmatic analysis, which relates one constellation of practices-or-abilities to another. It

corresponds to another basic meaning-use relation: the kind of PP-sufficiency that holds when

having acquired one set of abilities means one can already do everything one needs to do, in

principle, to be able to do something else. One concrete way of filling in a definite sense of “in

principle” is by algorithmic elaboration, where exercising the target ability just is exercising the

right basic abilities in the right order and under the right circumstances. As an example, the

ability to do long division just consists in exercising the abilities to do multiplication and

subtraction and write down the results of those calculations, according to a particular conditional

branched-schedule algorithm. The practical abilities that implement such an algorithmic PP-

sufficiency relation are just those exercised by a finite-state automaton. Indeed, automata are

defined by a definite set of meta-abilities: abilities to elaborate a set of primitive abilities into a

set of more complex ones, which can accordingly be pragmatically analyzed in terms of or

decomposed into the other.

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To get a usefully general concept of the PP-sufficiency of a set of basic abilities for a set

of more complex ones, we need to move beyond the purely syntactic automata I have described

so far. One way to do that is to replace their specialized capacities to read and write symbols—

in the minimal sense of classifying tokens as to types and producing tokens of specified types—

by more general recognitional and productive capacities. These are abilities to respond

differentially to various non-symbolic stimuli (for instance, the visible presence of red things),

corresponding to reading, and to respond by producing performances of various non-symbolic

kinds (for instance, walking north for a mile), corresponding to writing. What practically

implements the algorithmic elaboration of such a set of basic differential responsive abilities is a

finite state transducing automaton.

In my third lecture, I will argue that the notion of the algorithmic decomposability of

some practices-or-abilities into others that results suggests in turn a pragmatic generalization of

the classical program of artificial intelligence functionalism—which, though a latecomer in the

twentieth century, deserves, I think, to count as a third core program of classical semantic

analysis. AI functionalism traditionally held itself hostage to a commitment to the purely

symbolic character of intelligence in the sense of sapience. But broadening our concern from

automata as purely syntactic engines to the realm of transducing automata puts us in a position to

see AI functionalism as properly concerned with the algorithmic decomposability of discursive

(that is, vocabulary-deploying) practices-and-abilities. What I will call the ‘pragmatic’ thesis of

artificial intelligence is the claim that the ability to engage in some autonomous discursive

practice—a language game one could play though one played no other—can be algorithmically

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decomposed into non-discursive abilities. The arguments for and against this pragmatic version

of AI-functionalism look quite different from those arrayed on the opposing sides of the debate

about the prospects of symbolic AI.

The notion of PP-sufficiency brings into view a slightly more complicated pragmatically

mediated semantic relation between vocabularies: that which obtains when practices PV-

sufficient for V1 are PP-sufficient (in the sense that they can be algorithmically elaborated into)

practices PV-sufficient for V2. Another basic meaning-use relation of the kind we have been

considering is PV-neccessity, the converse of PV-sufficiency. It obtains when one cannot deploy

a certain vocabulary without engaging in the specified practice, or exercising the specified

ability. For example, I have argued elsewhere that nothing could count as engaging in an

autonomous discursive practice (hence using a vocabulary one could use though one used no

other) that did not include asserting and inferring. Considering that basic MUR permits the

formulation of a complex resultant MUR that is a variant on the prior one: a relation that obtains

where practices PV-necessary for V1 are PP-sufficient for practices-or-abilities PV-sufficient for

V2.

It can happen, I will argue, that such a V2 is also VP-sufficient to specify the practices-or-

abilities that are PV-sufficient to deploy V1. A MUD for this is:

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5: VP-suff1: PV-suff

Res1:VV 2-5V1V2

PAlgEl 3: PP-suffP2

2: PV-nec4: PV-suff

PSuff

PNec

LX: V2 is Elaborated fromand Explicative of Practices

PV-Necessary for V1

In my next lecture, I will introduce a version of this complex resultant pragmatically mediated

semantic relation (what I call for short being “universally LX”), and argue that it constitutes the

genus of which logical vocabulary is a species. More specifically, I will argue that logical

vocabulary both can be algorithmically elaborated from and is explicative of practices that are

PV-necessary for the autonomous deployment of any vocabulary at all. And I will argue that the

most illuminating way to explain and justify the distinctive privileged role accorded to logical

vocabulary by the classical project of philosophical analysis—what I have here called “semantic

logicism”—is by appeal to this whole constellation of basic meaning-use relations, and the

complex pragmatically mediated semantic relation that results from it.

My last three lectures will address modal vocabulary, normative vocabulary, and the

pragmatically mediated semantic relations they stand in to ordinary objective, empirical, and

naturalistic vocabularies, and to each other. The modal revolution in the last third of the 20th

century breathed new life into semantic logicism, providing powerful new expressive tools,

which have been of great use to those pursuing naturalistic programs, for instance. But this

successor version raises the same question of vindication that I consider for semantic logicism in

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my second lecture: what justifies according modal concepts this special, privileged role in our

semantic analytic enterprise? This question is particularly urgent since the empiricist program

had always been—traditionally with Hume, and in the 20th century logical form, with Quine,

particularly and specifically hostile to and critical of this vocabulary.

I will begin my treatment of modality, in my fourth lecture, with a consideration of this

question, and with a vindication of the role of modal vocabulary that parallels the one I will

already have offered for ordinary logical vocabulary: modal vocabulary, too, can be elaborated

from and is explicative of, features integral to every autonomous discursive practice—features

intimately related to, but distinct from, those made explicit by ordinary logical vocabulary. I will

then enter into an extended treatment of the relation between alethic and deontic (modal and

normative) vocabularies. When we look at those vocabularies through the lens of meaning-use

analysis, a sequence of startling relations between them emerges.

For a start, I argue that deontic normative vocabulary is also universally LX (that it is

VP-sufficient to specify practices-or-abilities that are both PV-necessary for deploying any

autonomous vocabulary, and PP-sufficient for practices-or-abilities PV-sufficient for deploying

the deontic normative vocabulary that explicates them). Although in this regard it belongs in a

box with alethic modal vocabulary, the features of autonomous vocabulary use that it explicates

are quite different from those explicated by modal vocabulary. I then argue that what lies behind

Sellars’s dark and pregnant claim that “The language of modality is a transposed language of

norms” is the fact that deontic normative vocabulary can serve as a pragmatic metavocabulary

for alethic modal vocabulary. In my fifth lecture, I will show how exploiting that relation makes

possible a new kind of directly modal formal semantics that makes no appeal to truth:

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incompatibility semantics. It in turn gives us a new semantic perspective both on traditional

logical vocabulary, and on modal vocabulary. The final lecture will then weave all these strands

into a meaning-use analysis of intentionality itself (what is expressed by intentional vocabulary)

as a pragmatically mediated semantic relation essentially involving both what is expressed by

modal and what is expressed by normative vocabulary.

The substantive cumulative result of this sequence of revelations about modal and

normative vocabulary is to put new flesh on the bones of ideas that originate with Kant, and are

developed by his tradition up through the traditional American pragmatists, and are reinterpreted

by Sellars in the middle years of the 20th century. And the methodological result of this

development and application of meaning-use analysis is a new synthesis of pragmatism and

analytic philosophy—one that shows how concerns and considerations at the heart of the

pragmatist critique of semantic analysis can be seen to have been implicitly at work within the

analytic tradition all along.

The title of this lecture series, “Between Saying and Doing,” evidently refers to my

aspiration to present a new way of thinking about the relations between meaning and use that

arises when we think systematically about saying what we are doing when we are saying

something. But the phrase itself is taken from an Italian proverb: “Between saying and doing,

many a pair of shoes is worn out.” Following the argumentative and constructive path I am

proposing for exploring the intricate and revealing ways in which semantics and pragmatics

interdigitate will require wearing out a few.

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