Between Exit and Loyalty: The Dealignment and Realignment in the

Turkish Party System

Thesis Defense by Emre Erdoğan

Major Aims of the Dissertation I

• To understand the nature of the change in the Turkish party system

• To explain the change by referring similarities between political parties

• To show the significance of government programs as symbols of positions of different governments

Major Aims of the Dissertation II

• To discover the relationship between government programs and governing parties’ electoral manifestoes

• To present usefulness of the Exit, Voice and Loyalty Framework to understand the change in the party system

• To show validity of spatial voting models to understand the voting behavior of Turkish voters

Evidence for the Change

• Fragmentation of the party system:– Effective Number of Political Parties

Elections Parliament

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

0,0

1,0

2,0

3,0

4,0

5,0

1961

1965

1969

1973

1977

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

Evidence for the Change

• Fragmentation of the party system:– Power Fragmentation Index

0,0

1,0

2,0

3,0

4,0

5,0

6,0

7,0

8,0

1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

PFI Maximum Number

Evidence for the Change

• Volatility of the party system

Pedersen’s Volatility Score

Laakso and Taagepera’s Index of Electoral Volatility

0,00

0,05

0,10

0,15

0,20

0,25

0,30

0,35

0,40

1965

1969

1973

1977

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

0,00

0,05

0,10

0,15

0,20

0,25

0,30

0,35

0,40

1961

1965

1969

1973

1977

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

ELECTORAL FLUCTUATION PARLIAMENTARY FLUCTUATION

Reasons of the Change

• Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Hirschman, 1970)– Exit: the withdrawal from a relationship with a person

or organization

– Voice: consumers prefer to communicate their dissatisfaction stemmed of quality decline, rather than Exit

– Loyalty: Consumer prefers to being loyal to his/her previous choice, despite the quality decline, without communicating his/her satisfaction

Reasons of Exit: Schematized Framework

Reasons of Exit: Turkish Case

Similarity in Promises: Government Programs

Consensus on Declaration

•Technology and infrastructure

•Economic goals

•Distributional Policies

•Military

•Government Efficiency

Consensus on Ignorance

•Social services expansion negative

•Education expansion negative

•Military negative

•National unity negative

•Minority Rights

•Decentralization negative

Determinants of the Government Agenda

1980s •Economic Orthodoxy

•Free Enterprise

•Democracy

•Freedom and domestic human rights

•Non economic demographic groups

•Environmental protection

•European community (+)

•Economic Planning

•Regulation of capitalism

•Social services expansion (+)

•Protectionism (+)

•Labor groups (+)

•Social justice

•Technology and infrastructure

•Constitutionalism (+)

•Government effectiveness (+)

•Military (+)

•National effort

•National way of life (+)

•Traditional morality(+)

Determinants of the Government Agenda

Interim Governments

•Government efficiency

•Government effectiveness and authority

•Law and order

•Constitutionalism (+)

•Military (+)

•Foreign relationships

•Nationalization

•Controlled economy

•Agriculture and farmers

•Social services expansion (+)

•Labor groups (+)

•National effort, social harmpny (+)

•Traditional morality (+)

•Defense of national way of life (+)

Determinants of the Government Agenda

Electoral Government

• Labor groups (+)

• Free enterprise

•Agriculture and farmers

•Foreign relationships

•European Community (+)

•Technology and infrastructure

•Government efficiency

Coalition

Governments

•* European Community (+)

•Government corruption

•Democracy

•Economic goals

Determinants of the Government Agenda

Left in government

•National effort, social harmony

•Democracy

•Labor groups

•Law and order

•Economic goals

•Technology and infrastructure

•Productivity

•Social services expansion (-)

Grouping Turkish Governments

Grouping Turkish Governments

1960-1980 1980-2000

GRAPH 4.20. POSITIONING OF TURKISH GOVERNMENTS

8 İNONÜ9 İNÖNÜ

10 İNÖNÜ

ÜRGÜPLÜ

DEMİREL 1DEMİREL 2

DEMİREL 3

ERİM 1

ERİM 2:MELEN

TALU

:ECEVİT 1

:IRMAK

:DEMİREL 4

:ECEVİT 2

:DEMİREL 5:ECEVİT 3

DEMİREL 6

ÖZAL 1

:ÖZAL 2:AKBULUT:YILMAZ

DEMİREL 7

ÇİLLER 1

ÇİLLER 2

:ÇİLLER 3

YILMAZ 2

ERBAKAN

YILMAZ 3

ECEVİT 4

ECEVİT 5

-1,5

-1

-0,5

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

2,5

3

-3 -2,5 -2 -1,5 -1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5 2

X

Y

Plotting Turkish Governments

Plotting Turkish Governments

GRAPH 4.20. POSITIONING OF TURKISH GOVERNMENTS: PRE-80 GOVERNMENTS

:DEMİREL 6

:ECEVİT 3:DEMİREL 5

:ECEVİT 2

:DEMİREL 4

:IRMAK

:ECEVİT 1

:TALU

:MELENERİM 2

ERİM 1DEMİREL 3

DEMİREL 2DEMİREL 1

ÜRGÜPLÜ10 İNÖNÜ

9 İNÖNÜ

8 İNONÜ

-1

-0,5

0

0,5

1

1,5

2

-1 -0,8 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1

X

Y

Plotting Turkish Governments

GRAPH 4.22. POSITIONING OF TURKISH GOVERNMENTS: POST-80 GOVERNMENTS

:ECEVİT 5

:ECEVİT 4

:YILMAZ 3

:ERBAKAN

:YILMAZ 2

:ÇİLLER 3

:ÇİLLER 2

:ÇİLLER 1

:DEMİREL 7

:YILMAZ:AKBULUT

:ÖZAL 2

:ÖZAL 1

-2,5

-2

-1,5

-1

-0,5

0

0,5

1

1,5

-1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5

X

Y

Relationship Between Government Programs and Party Manifestoes

• Determinants of the government agenda:– Party Effect: If the government program is

totally determined by the governing parties’s programs

– Issue Effect: If each issue in the government program has reserved spaces

– The Basic Equation:

G=f (P,I)

Additional Variables

• Majority Effect: If the party is the major party or single party in the government

• Post-1980 Effect: If the government is set up after 1980

• Coalition Effect: If the government is a coalition government

Findings

• Issue effect dominates all other external variables. (R2=0.72) (Model 2)

• There is no majority/single party effect• 1980s:

– Spaces reserved for issues changed– The effective power of Party declined

• Being a coalition partner reduces the power of the Party Effect

• Distributional policies are among first compromises given by the coalition partners

Perceptions of the Voter

• Respondents are asked to position themselves and major parties in a seven item issue set

• When perceptions (P) are compared with average positions of the voters (AV)– The WP and the NAP have no image gap– All other parties are moderate than perceptions

Findings

• Left-Right and Religiosity are important components of the voter preferences

• Some issues are ‘cross-cutting’:– Parties attract voters despite distances– Nationalism for the NAP, Local values for the TPP

• When vote changers are considered:– Left-Right and Religiosity confirm our expectations– Other issues don’t confirm– Explanatory power remains limited

Findings

• When utilities are considered:– The .NAP, the VP and the TPP don’t borrow

voters– All other parties borrow voters from other

parties

Why the Voice is not a valid option?

• Voice: Dependent to the openness of communication channels

• Party organization is the most important communication channel

• History of organization of political parties, is the evolution of communication channels

Different Party Types

The Old Cadre Party •Organized in the parliament

•Connection of ruling elites

•Personalistic network

The Mass Party •Organized to mobilize the electorate

•Strong Organization

•Intra-party democracy

•Financed by members’ fees

•Uses the party newspaper

•Electoral campaigns: labor intensive

The Catch-all Party •Transformation of the traditional parties

•Financed by contributions

•Uses independent channels of communication

•Electoral campaigns: labor and capital intensive

•Party mechanism is not important

The Cartel Party

• Aim: keeping in touch with resources of the state• Financed by state subventions• Electoral campaigns: professionalized and capital

intensive• Has access to state regulated channels of

information• Membership is not significant• The least sensitive type to the Voice

The Voice in the Turkish Case

• Transition to democracy was mobilization of clientelist networks

• Transformation to mass parties prevented by frequent military interventions

• Post-1980 parties failed to takeover party mechanisms of old regime– Competition for old clientelist networks– Emergence of new patronage mechanisms

• The WP, the NAP and the DLP – Emphasized on establishing party organizations– Strong intraparty discipline

Turkish Political Parties are Cartel Type Parties

• Elections don’t serve to transform the power from one party to others. All political parties have continuous access to the state funds

• Major source of finance is the state subventions• Electoral competition became clashing

advertising campaigns• Major political parties dominate the use of the

national media

Turkish Voter Don’t Use Party Organizations as Communication Channels

• Political parties are among least trusted institutions

• There is no intraparty democracy

• Members don’t care about intraparty democracy and don’t participate

Future Research

• Increased similarities between political parties– Similarity in reputations– Similarity in promises– Perceptions of voters

• Effect of institutions• Party members and organizations• Development of the Cartel party