Between a Rock and a Hard Place- Somali Refugees in Kenya

8/11/2019 Between a Rock and a Hard Place- Somali Refugees in Kenya

1/30

Royal United Services Instute

OCCASIONAL PAPER

Hugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers

RELOCATION, RELOCATION, RELOCATION

Could the UKs Nuclear Force be Moved after Scottish Independence?


2/30

Relocaon, Relocaon, RelocaonCould the UKs Nuclear Force be Moved aer Scosh

Independence?

Hugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers

Occasional Paper, August 2014

www.rusi.org


3/30

The views expressed in this paper are the authors own, and do notnecessarily reect those of RUSI or any other instuons with which theauthors are associated.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to:

Hugh Chalmers, Research Analyst, Nuclear Analysis, Royal United ServicesInstute, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET, United Kingdom, or via email [email protected]

Published in 2014 by the Royal United Services Instute for Defence andSecurity Studies. Reproducon without the express permission of RUSI isprohibited.

About RUSI Publicaons

Director of Publicaons: Adrian JohnsonProducon Editor: Ashlee GodwinEditorial Assistant: Derek Kang

Paper or electronic copies of this and other reports are available bycontacng [email protected].


4/30

Execuve Summary

A Scosh vote for independence would present a signicant challenge tothe rest of the UKs (rUKs) nuclear forces, which currently rely upon Scoshbases for operaonal support. While it is technically feasible that the rUKcould connue to base its forces in Scotland aer its independence, in thelong term this opon may not be polically feasible. The rUK would onlyseriously consider doing so if the costs of connued Scosh basing wereclearly smaller than those of relocang forces to the rUK.

An inial analysis of previous nuclear submarine infrastructure projectssuggests that the gross costs of relocang the rUKs nuclear forces to two

separate sites in England could amount to between 3 billion and 4 billion(at 2012/13 prices), excluding any costs associated with land purchase andclearance. The net increase in infrastructure costs (excluding land purchaseand clearance) created by relocaon could be reduced to between 2.5 and3.5 billion (at 2012/2013 prices) by the cancellaon of planned investmentto prepare Scotland for a successor submarine.

A vote for independence could be followed by a jointly commissioned studyfor relocaon opons, with a view to establishing an agreed baseline forsubsequent decisions. Such a study is highly unlikely to suggest that relocaoncould be carried out safely by the 2020 target suggested by the Scoshgovernment. An agreement to link relocaon to the entry into service of anew generaon of nuclear-armed submarines, currently ancipated to beginin 2028, could provide a more natural meframe for relocaon.

A pledge not to prepare Scosh bases for a successor submarine couldreassure an independent Scotland that the Vanguard will be the last nuclearsubmarine based in Scotland. The rUK, for its part, could be condent thatunforeseen delays in the construcon programme would not leave it withouta secure operang base.

The technical and polical challenges of creang demonstrably safe nuclearfacilies would be signicant, and would likely generate signicant localopposion. While past experience suggests that the Ministry of Defencepossesses considerable levers that it can use where local opposion threatensto block important defence-related infrastructural projects, it could nd ithard to use these levers without broader polical support for relocaon.

The various challenges of relocaon would probably trigger a wider naonaldiscussion in the rUK on whether or not the strategic benets of retainingnuclear weapons exceeded the costs involved. This paper argues that while

the technical and nancial challenges presented by Scosh independence

would inuence this discussion, they would not be severe enough to dictate it.


5/30

Could the UKs Nuclear Force be Moved

aer Scosh Independence?

Current polls suggest that Scotland will not vote for independence on18 September. Whilst support for independence has surged from me

to me (most recently following the cross-party rejecon of a currency unionwith an independent Scotland),1 those against have remained in the lead.Nevertheless, the referendum itself has revealed that a central pillar of UKdefence and security may rest upon an unstable foundaon.

The HM Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde outside Glasgow has hosted the UKs eet

of nuclear-armed ballisc-missile submarines (SSBNs) for more than fortyyears. During this me, these submarines have played a signicant role inthe UKs defence and foreign policy, oering it a disnct role within NATO,a unique connecon to the US, and what is seen as an ulmate assuranceof naonal security.2With these roles in mind, both the current coaliongovernment and its Labour predecessor have laid the groundwork to replacethe current Vanguard-class SSBN with a successor once it begins rerementin 2026.

While successive governments have supported the maintenance of the UKsnuclear forces (known colloquially as Trident), nuclear weapons have alwaysbeen a controversial topic in the UK. This is parcularly the case in Scotland.Recent opinion polls indicate stronger support for nuclear disarmament inScotland than in the rest of the UK (rUK),3and some even indicate that themajority of Scots wish to see Trident abandoned.4

1. BBC News, Scosh Referendum Poll Tracker, , accessed 1 August 2014.

2. HM Government, The Future of the United Kingdoms Nuclear Deterrent, Cm 6994(London: The Staonery Oce, December 2006), p. 5.

3. The YouGov 2013 Public Administraon Select Commiee found that when asked

whether the government should renew its nuclear forces if no cheaper alternave wereavailable, 41 per cent of Scots disagreed compared to a naonal average of 29 per cent.See House of Commons, Engaging the Public in Naonal Strategy, Fourth Report ofSession 201314, HC435, 28 June 2013, , accessed 1 August 2014.

A 2010 Chatham House/YouGov Survey suggested that 29 per cent of Scots would wishto abandon nuclear weapons enrely even if a cheaper opon were available, comparedto the naonal average of 20 per cent. See Chatham House-YouGov, Brish Atudestowards the UKs Internaonal Priories, July 2010, ,accessed 1 August 2014.

4. A ComRes poll conducted in collaboraon with the Independentsuggested that 66 per

cent of Scots polled agreed with the statement that Given the state of the countrysnances, the Government should scrap the Trident nuclear missile system. ComRes


6/30

Relocation, Relocation, Relocation3

To date, this regional dynamic has had lile eect on the UKs ability to

operate Trident (and its predecessor Polaris) out of the Clyde. Since the Actof Union in 1707, the Parliament in Westminster has had sole legislaveauthority over maers of defence and foreign policy, leaving few mechanismsto translate any Scosh opposion to nuclear weapons into a change in UKpolicy.5

Following the devoluon of many aspects of domesc policy to a newScosh Parliament in 1999, pressure has been growing for dissenng voicesto be heard. This pressure has manifested itself most clearly in the 2011victory in the Scosh elecons for the Scosh Naonal Party (SNP), thepartys subsequent arrangement of a referendum on Scosh independence,

and its pledge to remove nuclear weapons from Scotland if the country wereto become independent.

Scotlands Future the SNPs 670-page blueprint for an independentScotland states that in the event of a vote for independence, the Scoshgovernment would work quickly to expel nuclear weapons from Scotland.Aer a vote for independence in September, the Scosh government plansto establish a metable for negoaons with the rUK over the division ofassets and liabilies and the transfer of power such that it can formallydeclare independence on 24 March 2016.

These negoaons to be carried out by a representave selecon of theScosh polity (but which would likely be dominated by the SNP) willmake early agreement on the speediest safe removal of nuclear weapons apriority.6Furthermore, these negoaons would proceed with a view to theremoval of Trident within the rst term of the Scosh Parliament followingindependence implying a removal date of no later than April 2020. Duringthis negoaon period and prior to independence, the Scosh governmentalso intends to express its interest in joining NATO and the Nuclear Non-Proliferaon Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. Having secured anarrangement for the removal of Trident from HMNB Clyde, Scotland would

Poll, Published Vong Intenon Figures, , accessed 1 August 2014.

A YouGov/University of York poll suggested 64 per cent of Scots would choose toabandon nuclear weapons immediately or at the next replacement decision. YouGovArchive, YouGov/University of York Survey Results, , accessed 1 August 2014.

5. It should be noted that the connued operaon of HMNB Clyde does depend uponco-operaon between the UK government and Scosh emergency services andregulators, leaving Scotland some (hazardous) opportunity to aect the operaon ofthe UKs nuclear forces.

6. Scosh Government, Scotlands Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland,(Edinburgh: Scosh Government, November 2013), p. 14.


7/30


then set about transforming the nuclear submarine base into a convenonal

naval base whilst Trident is removed.7

In contrast to the Scosh government, the UK government has beenextremely reluctant to outline how it might approach these issues in the

event of a vote for independence. With lile polical incenve to be clearer,the UK has only gone so far to say that relocang Trident would costbillions of pounds and take many years.8Despite encouragement from theElectoral Commission to establish and communicate joint posions on anindependent Scotland,9the UK has stated that relocaon opons will not bediscussed prior to the referendum.10Indeed, the government has been quickto distance itself from any speculaon regarding its plans for Trident in the

event of a vote for independence.11

Breaking Up is Hard

Due to the sensive nature of their work, the two primary facilies at HMNBClyde the Faslane naval base and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD)at Coulport require highly specic and expensive capabilies developed tovery stringent safety standards. Previous experiences in updang elementsof nuclear submarine infrastructure suggest that redeveloping thesecapabilies elsewhere could be very challenging.12

7. Ibid.,p. 246.8. House of Commons Scosh Aairs Commiee, The Referendum on Separaon

for Scotland: Terminang Trident Days or Decades? Government Response to theCommiees Fourth Report of the Session 2012-13, 1st Special Report of Session 20122013, HC861, January 2013, , accessed 1 August 2014.

9. Electoral Commission, Referendum on Independence for Scotland, Advice of theElectoral Commission on the proposed referendum queson, January 2013, p. 36,,accessed 1 August 2014.

10. Ibid.

11. Lindsay McIntosh, No 10 Denies Plot to Keep Faslane in UK aer Independence, TheTimes, 12 July 2013.

12. For reports from the Naonal Audit Oce on the development of nuclear submarinefacilies at HMNB Clyde and HMNB Devonport, see Naonal Audit Oce, Ministry ofDefence: Management of the Trident Works Programme, Report by the Comptroller and

Auditor General(London: The Staonery Oce, July 1994) and Naonal Audit Oce,Ministry of Defence: The Construcon of Nuclear Submarine Facilies at Devonport,

Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (London: The Staonery Oce,December 2002), , accessed 1 August 2014.


8/30


Faslane

The Faslane naval base provides a safe home for the UKs eet of nuclearsubmarines, with a number of cered berths equipped with backed-up,high-voltage power supplies to maintain and monitor submarine systems.Furthermore, its covered ship li a necessary part of its operang capability

can remove fully-armed submarines from the water for basic repairs andmaintenance, whilst keeping them supplied with power and reactor coolantand protected against risks such as earthquakes, dal surges, high winds,high temperatures, explosions and dropped loads. Faslane also hosts mine-clearing vessels, Royal Marine Commandos and specialist divers, as well asa series of engineering-support, material-processing, accommodaon andtraining facilies to support the safe and secure operaon of submarines.

Map 1: HMNB Clyde

N

Floang explosives

handling jeyFaslane ship li SSBN berths

RNAD CoulportTrident munions

facility

Unused Polaris

munions facility

Fasla

neNavalB

ase

The most obvious replacement for the Faslane submarine base is HMNBDevonport in Plymouth. Here the exisng infrastructure used to baseconvenonally armed nuclear submarines, and to refuel and overhaul theenre nuclear submarine eet, provides many of the services currentlyused to support SSBNs. Other elements could be provided through furtherinvestment.


9/30


Map 2:HMNB Devonport

N

Licensed nuclear

submarine berths

Potenal SSBN repair

dry dock (No. 10 dry dock)

SSBN refuel and

overhaul dry dock

(No. 9 dry dock)

SSN refuel and

repair docks

Basin No. 5

(nuclear licensed)

Relocang SSBNs to Devonport would not be trivial. While there are at leastseven licensed and operaonal nuclear berths at Devonport,13more mighthave to be created to accommodate the increase from four Trafalgar-classconvenonal submarines today to the maximum of eleven nuclear- andconvenonally armed submarines (four SSBNs and seven SSNs) that it wouldhave to host following the relocaon of the nuclear-armed submarines.14Relocang the submarines and their surface support vessels, and providingany addional training and support facilies may strain the current capacityat Devonport. It might force out some of Devonports exisng convenonalsurface eet (and support infrastructure), presumably to HMNB Portsmouth.15Access routes to new berths may have to be dredged to allow larger nuclear-armed submarines to dock. Furthermore, a spare dry dock would have tobe redeveloped to provide the minor maintenance and repair capability

currently provided by the Faslane ship li.16

Finally, addional personnel

13. Babcock Engineering, Decommissioning/Disposal Strategy: Submarine Dismantling Facility Gap Analysis, 000025472, 2011, p. 16, , accessed 1 August 2014.

14. Whilst patrolling paerns make it unlikely that all of these submarines would be in portat once, an emergency capability to host the enre eet would sll be desirable.

15. This includes three amphibious assault ships (HMS Ocean,Albionand Bulwark), sevenType-23 frigates (HMS Argyll, Monmouth, Montrose, Northumberland, Portland,Somersetand Sutherland), and four surveying vessels (HMS Echo, Enterprise, GleanerandSco).

16. The no. 10 dry dock, adjacent to the no. 9 dry dock used for the refuelling and overhaulof current SSBNs, is large enough to house the current Vanguard-class submarine


10/30


would need to be brought in to bring any new facilies up to operaonal

capacity whilst its predecessor remained operaonal.

Safety concerns will also complicate maers. Introducing nuclear-armedSSBNs to Devonport will unavoidably introduce a new risk that an accidentalignion of one or all of a submarines Trident D5 missiles could spreadradioacve material over some of Plymouths 260,000 inhabitants.17

The layers of protecon that have been created to guard against such acatastrophe are such that its probability is negligible. Indeed, John Ainslieof the Scosh Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has cited Ministry ofDefence (MoD) sources that suggest that the probability of such an accident

while an armed submarine undergoes maintenance in Faslane may be as lowas once every 1,300,000 years.18

While the loading and unloading of Trident missiles is handled elsewhere,there is lile reason to think that moving SSBNs to Devonport wouldincrease this risk.19 However, because of the large populaon nearby, theconsequences of such an event would be far more severe in Devonportthan in Faslane. This would parcularly be the case if minor repairs ofmissile-armed submarines were being carried out in a dry dock adjacentto other submarines undergoing major refuel and overhaul. Accounng forand addressing the compound risk of an accidental missile ignion in theformer having serious knock-on eects for submarines in the laer will be animportant new challenge for site safety and regulaon.

and was previously used for nuclear work. See Malcolm Smith, The D154 Project:Redevelopment of the Submarine Support Facilies at Devonport Royal Dockyard,Ingenia (No. 13, August 2002), p. 28.

17. The three stages of a Trident D5 missile are fuelled with an extremely potent solidpropellant which, despite being more robust than less potent propellants, is sensive toextreme shocks or heat. See John R Harvey and Stefan Michalowski, Nuclear Weapons

Safety: The Case of Trident, Science and Global Security(Vol. 4, 1994), p. 271.18. However, the author has been unable to conrm this gure within the documents

cited, which have all relevant probability gures redacted in the versions thatare now publicly available through the Freedom of Informaon Act. See JohnAinslie, Risk from Trident Missiles in Devonport, Scosh Campaign for NuclearDisarmament, 4 January 2013, , accessed 1 August 2014 and Ministry ofDefence, Annex A, in Accident Probability Assessment of Faslane Shipli for VanguardClass Submarines with Strategic Weapon System Embarked, ES352/98/58, Ministryof Defence, August 2000, , accessed 7 August 2014.

19. It is more likely that the simplicity and robustness of a dry dock would reduce the

probability of an accidental ignion of missiles when compared to the complex (yetsophiscated) mechanisms within a ship li.


11/30


If this locaon were chosen, previous work undertaken to prepare Devonport

and Faslane for Vanguard-class submarines suggests that, once a decision todo so had been made, the addion of licensed berths and the developmentof a repair dry dock could probably be carried out within a decade. Oncecontracts were placed for the refurbishment of berths numbers 14 at Faslanein 1989, all of the work relang to electrical supply and safety developmentwas complete within four years.20Once contracts were awarded to developthe power supplies for the enrety of Faslane in 1987, construcon wascomplete ve years later in 1992.21 Furthermore, having chosen to refuelVanguard-class submarines at Devonport in 1993, contracts were placed todevelop the required infrastructure in 1997 and Devonport accepted its rstsubmarine for refuelling in 2002.22

Coulport

The nuclear and convenonal munions (such as torpedoes) for SSBNs arestored and handled at a separate facility: RNAD Coulport, approximately 2.5miles from Faslane by land and 15 naucal miles by sea. Here, segregatedmagazines provide capacity to store and carry out limited maintenance onnuclear warheads, their re-entry bodies, and the US-supplied Trident D5missiles that carry them.23

Warheads are mated to their re-entry vehicles in the magazine area andare then transported one-by-one to a oang explosives-handling jeyanchored to the banks of Loch Long. As with the ship li at Faslane, this

jey is designed to resist earthquakes, impacts, explosions and other similarhazards.24 Dedicated cranes within the jey can load and unload nuclearwarheads, as well as Trident missiles, if there is any reason to doubt theirsafety or reliability. As with the Faslane submarine base, Coulport also hostsa number of support facilies for operaonal headquarters, power supplies,alarm systems and maintenance.25

20. Naonal Audit Oce, Ministry of Defence: Management of the Trident WorksProgramme, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, p. 38.

21. Ibid., p. 40.

22. Smith, The D154 Project,p. 28.23. Due to the nature of a submarines lifecycle, these stores provide only limited capacity

for warheads (the vast majority of which spend most of their lifecycle onboard thesubmarines themselves) and only one full submarine-loading of missiles (which areloaded onto submarines in the US and only removed at Coulport if emergency storageor maintenance is required).

24. J R Warmington et al., The Floang Explosives Handling Jey, Trident Facilies (London:Thomas Telford Services, April 1994), p. 153. Published on behalf of the Instuon ofCivil Engineers.



12/30


However, there are no facilies similar to those of Coulport in the UK. The

non-nuclear munions for SSNs are far less sensive than Trident missiles,and can be loaded alongside a regular berth. A replacement for Coulportwould have to be developed from scratch if Trident were to be relocatedfrom Scotland. This would of necessity require some form of loading andunloading plaorm,26and safe and secure storage for at least one boat-loadof nuclear warheads and Trident D5 missiles, along with all relevant supportfacilies. Logiscal links to and from the Atomic Weapons Establishment(AWE) at Aldermaston would also be required to allow for the longer-termrepair and monitoring of nuclear warheads.

From an operaonal perspecve, it would be advantageous to co-locate

nuclear submarines with their munions at Devonport, thereby reducingthe me consumed loading and unloading munions. However, from theperspecve of safety, this opon, and indeed most other opons, looks lessdesirable. Whilst the worst-case scenario for a potenal accident namely,the simultaneous ignion of a boat-load of missiles is the same as thatconsidered for a submarine base, the loading and unloading of nuclearwarheads and missiles makes such a scenario somewhat more likely (albeitsll highly improbable) at a munions facility.

The most desirable locaon for a replacement munions facility wouldtherefore be in a locaon where the consequences of such an accident couldbe migated by isolang it from vulnerable populaons, and segregangstored missiles, warheads and loading plaorms at safe distances fromeach other.27The opon given most credence to date involves developing amunions facility on the Fal estuary to the North of Falmouth, 28which oersgood shelter and a comparavely isolated locaon.

This opon would certainly not be without its problems. Devonport andFalmouth are almost 50 naucal miles apart over three mes the distancebetween Faslane and Coulport. Travelling between the two to load andunload nuclear warheads would consume upwards of six hours that could

otherwise be spent on patrol. Furthermore, displacing local services,houses and amenies in an area with a strong tourism industry will be very

26. This need not be a oang jey. The prole of the coastline at Falmouth may be moresuited to a simpler, xed jey built into the seabed.

27. These requirements essenally rule out a munions facility near Devonport, which hasneither the space nor the isolaon to make it desirable.

28. See Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, Uncharted Waters: The UK, NuclearWeapons, and the Scosh Queson (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 2001), p. 113 andHouse of Commons Defence Commiee, The Future of the UKs Strategic Nuclear

Deterrent: the White Paper, Ninth Report of Session 200607, Vol.II, Oral and WrienEvidence, HC 225-II, March 2007, p. 121.


13/30


unpopular.29 However, it may be the best available opon within the rUK

should Scotland become independent.

Map 3: Falmouth

N

Falmouth

Flushing

Mylor

Locaon for potenal

nuclear munions

facility

Other opons for the home of the UKs nuclear submarines were consideredin the 1960s, but today all seem more challenging than Devonport andFalmouth. Twenty-ve per cent of the UKs liqueed natural gas now passesthrough terminals in Milford Haven, ruling it out as a potenal alternave onsafety grounds. Similarly, whilst the UKs SSBN construcon yard at Barrow-in-Furness can host nuclear submarines, there are no suitable locaons foran equivalent to Coulport nearby. Portland in Dorset the nal non-Scoshopon considered in the 1960s has similar problems.

It is dicult to assess how long it would take to construct a replacement forCoulport. While it inially only took about four years to build,30construconstandards and processes are far more rigorous and safety-conscious today.The programme of work to develop new facilies at Coulport to accept thecurrent Vanguard-class SSBN during the 1980s demonstrates this well: ittook the government almost ve years to translate dra briefs of work intoa signed contract, and a further six to complete construcon. It is prudent to

29. The damage caused to a vibrant local tourism industry would be parcularly unpopular,and prompted the UK to overlook Falmouth as a potenal base in the late 1960s. SeeChalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, p. 20.

30. House of Commons Scosh Aairs Commiee, The Referendum on Separaon forScotland, p. 17.


14/30


assume that, even aer the rUK had secured a new site, developing it into a

replacement for Coulport would take a similar amount of me.31

Home Sweet Home?

We esmate that the exisng facilies at Devonport could, in principle, beupgraded and adjusted to host the rUKs SSBNs on a day-to-day basis withina decade at most. If land for a munions facility near Falmouth could beacquired and cleared, construcng an alternave to Coulport would takesomewhat longer: perhaps between ten to een years aer the inial siteidencaon. However, carrying out such a plan in pracce would involveovercoming signicant polical and nancial barriers.

CostsThe government of the rUK would have to consider whether it was willing tomeet the costs of replacing HMNB Clyde with facilies outside of Scotland.32

Concerns have already been raised about the 18-billion capital costs (at2012/13 prices) associated with developing a new eet of SSBNs, andsubstanally adding to these costs would heighten such concerns.

There may well be a certain nancial threshold above which the benets ofretaining nuclear weapons in the event of Scosh independence are felt tobe outweighed by their growing costs. However, there is no a priorimeans

of determining where that threshold might lie. On the one hand, Scoshindependence is expected to decrease the taxaon revenues available tonance overall defence spending by the rUK by around 8 per cent.33 Anysignicant increases in spending on the successor programme within such anancially constrained environment may be unpopular. On the other hand,the perceived strategic and polical value of nuclear weapons within the

31. Most of the work at Coulport involved developing essenally greeneld sites. K Parngton,Coulport and Faslane General Management, Trident Facilies, p. 59.

This programme of work was delayed by at least een months, primarily due to thepremature placement of contracts before the design of the submarine was sucientlyadvanced. With a design maturity of at least 70 per cent expected for successor

submarines at Main Gate, these delays might be avoidable. See Naonal Audit Oce,Ministry of Defence: Management of the Trident Works Programme, Report by the

Comptroller and Auditor General, p. 2.

32. It is assumed here that the vast majority of the costs associated with relocang nuclearforces from an independent Scotland would be shouldered by the rUK. In the event ofScosh independence, there may be some scope for cost trade-os between the twopares on this issue and others. Importantly, sharing nancial burdens typically involvesalso sharing some level of control as well. The rUK may be reluctant to accept any costtrade-o on relocaon that would give uncomfortable levels of control or oversight toan independent Scotland.

33. House of Lords Select Commiee on Economic Aairs, The Economic Implicaons for theUnited Kingdom of Scosh Independence, Oral and Wrien Evidence, Second Report

of Session 2012-13, HL Paper 152, April 2013, pp. 7881, , accessed 1 August 2014.


15/30


rUK might increase aer the breakdown of the Union.34This could make any

addional expenditure required for their upkeep seem like a high priority.

It is dicult to give an accurate assessment of the costs associated withrelocang nuclear weapons from an independent Scotland, and prediconsof this cost have ranged from the low billions up to 50 billion.35The TridentWorks Programme, carried out within the late 1980s and early 1990s toupgrade infrastructure at HMNB Clyde, may give some indicaon as to possiblecosts. This package of work involved developing an enrely new ship li atFaslane, as well as ulity supply buildings, licensed berths, support areasand earthworks. The Trident Works Programme also had to redevelop mostof Coulport from scratch, with the construcon of a new explosives handling

jey, munions storage and management areas, support facilies and accessroads to accommodate the increase in size between the Vanguard- and theirpredecessor Resoluon-class boats, as well as the new Trident D5 missile.36

(For a detailed breakdown of the twenty most expensive projects within theTrident Works Programme, see Annex 1.)

The Trident Works Programme therefore involved most of the tasks thatwould be associated with a move from Faslane to Devonport and developinga new munions facility at Falmouth.37In total, the cost of this programmecame to approximately 1.9 billion in 1993/94 prices which equates toaround 2.8 billion at 2012/13 prices.38 It might be reasonable to assumethat the cost of generang a two-site replacement to HMNB Clyde would costaround the same, perhaps between 2.5 and 3.5 billion at 2012/13 prices.Some allowance should be made for construcon cost inaon (over andabove general inaon), which could take the total cost up to 34 billion.Importantly, a signicant sum would also have to be added to allow for theaddional costs of acquiring and clearing the land for a new munions-handling facility.

The UK has already budgeted between 2.3 and 3.4 billion (at 2012/13prices) to upgrade exisng infrastructure at HMNB Clyde and Devonport for a

34. In parcular, whilst the rUK seeks to maintain the posion in world polics enjoyed bythe UK, it may feel parcularly aached to weapons which symbolise its special posionin relaon to the US and NATO.

35. House of Commons Scosh Aairs Commiee, The Referendum on Separaon forScotland: Terminang Trident Days or Decades?, p. 16.


37. However, the Trident Works Programme did not have to acquire as much land as wouldbe needed for a replacement of Coulport.

38. It is worth nong that this gure represents a 72 per cent increase on the ancipatedcosts when the Works Programme began. Naonal Audit Oce, Ministry of Defence:

Management of the Trident Works Programme, Report by the Comptroller and AuditorGeneral.


16/30


eet of successor submarines, as well as to make adjustments to the current

command-and-control infrastructure.39

The poron of this gure reservedfor upgrades at HMNB Clyde would no longer be needed if a successoreet were to be based at Devonport. Assuming that only approximately500 million of this gure relates to work at HMNB Clyde,40 the net costof relocaon, if conducted in parallel with the introducon of successorsubmarines, could therefore be between 2.5 and 3.5 billion, not includingthe addional costs involved in land acquision and clearance. If the naldesign of a successor submarine would require more drasc alteraon of theexisng infrastructure at HMNB Clyde (to accommodate a larger submarinefor instance), then the net increase generated by relocaon may be furtherreduced.

In addion to relocaon expenses, there will also be costs involved in cleaningup HMNB Clyde once the Royal Navy leaves. The extent of these costs may beaected by whether an independent Scotland decides to maintain Faslane asa convenonal naval base. It is unlikely that an alternave military use wouldbe available for Coulport. So some provision would have to be made for cleanup (and/or ongoing security) at this site, as well as an arrangement over howthese costs will be shared by the rUK and an independent Scotland.41

Safety Regulaons and Local Polics

As discussed above, introducing nuclear-armed submarines and weapon-handling facilies near signicant populaon centres would raise veryserious quesons of safety. Military regulators would have to work veryclosely with civilian regulators to answer these quesons sasfactorily. Therelaonships between these regulators are complex, and demonstrangeecve co-ordinaon to a concerned public may not be easy.

As military assets under the control of the Crown, nuclear submarines areexempt from some aspects of health, safety and environmental proteconlegislaon, but remain subject to others.42 The MoD must convince theOce for Nuclear Regulaon that it has properly prepared and briefed the

public for a radiological emergency as required by the Radiaon (Emergency

39. HM Government, The Future of the United Kingdoms Nuclear Deterrent, p. 38.40. Suggestions have emerged that the infrastructure costs at HMNB Clyde relating

to a successor submarine could be lower than initially anticipated. See MalcolmChalmers, Towards the UKs Nuclear Century, RUSI Journal (Vol. 158, No. 6,December 2013), p. 21.

41. Current arrangements have all radioacve wastes at these sites (either low-level orvery low-level) shipped to the UKs repository or discharged into the atmosphere. Assuch, lile radioacve contaminaon should be le on-site in the event of Scoshindependence.

42. Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, DNSR Annual Report 2012/2013, Ministry of Defence,p. 3.


17/30


18/30


Given this exibility, and the potenal consequences of an accident (no

maer how remote), the MoD and the government of the rUK would haveto develop a sophiscated strategy to reassure regulators and the generalpublic that new submarine and munions base facilies do not place thepopulace at intolerable risk.

The longstanding presence of nuclear-powered vessels at Devonport,in addion to the prospect of up to 8,000 jobs being transferred fromScotland,48 may make the Plymouth public less averse to hosng Trident-armed submarines. However, the same cannot be said for a replacementfor Coulport. Few members of the public have had the same experiencewith nuclear vessels as Devonport, and locaons such as Falmouth are likely

to be more concerned with the adverse impact that a nuclear-munionsfacility would be bound to have on the areas substanal tourism and sailingindustry, rather than with the jobs such a facility might bring. The prospectof large numbers of new workers, both military and civilian, moving into thearea may be a source of further concern amongst local residents.

Local opposion to new nuclear facilies could therefore be signicant, andthe rUK would have to demonstrate not only that such facilies would besafe and secure, but also that they would make a worthwhile contribuon tothe rUK as a whole. There are many opportunies for local opposion to beexpressed in planning, legal and regulatory bodies, and such opposion couldseriously disrupt the relocaon of nuclear forces to the rUK. However, despitelosing its general exempon to local planning processes in June 2006, theCrown (and therefore the MoD) is sll aorded some leeway to avoid theseprocesses. The secretary of state has the power to restrict the examinaonof plans to only those with suitable clearance in a case that may involvethe interests of naonal security.49Furthermore, if a planning applicaonis likely to be refused, any urgent development of naonal importance canbe submied directly to the secretary of state for communies and localgovernment for planning approval.

While the secretary of state would sll have to consult local authoriesand allow a public hearing in this case, he or she would ulmately be ableto make a nal and unilateral decision.50 The power of polical will toovercome local opposion and procedural blockades is well demonstrated

48.HM Government, Scotland Analysis: Defence, Cm 8714 (London: The Staonery Oce,October 2013), para 1.30.

49. In this instance, those excluded from the planning process would be representedby a special advocate appointed by the aorney general. This decision could onlybe overturned by judicial review. See Department for Communies and LocalGovernment, Crown Applicaon of the Planning Acts, DCLG Circular, 02/2006,June 2006, pp. 36, , accessed 1 August 2014.50. Ibid.,pp. 79.


19/30


20/30


possible locaons in the rUK.53 Such an arrangement, at least in the short

term, seems inevitable. The Scosh government currently aims to declareformal independence in 2016, but only hopes to see nuclear weaponsremoved from its soil by 2020. It will therefore be necessary to developarrangements that would allow the rUK to supply, manage and deploy itsnuclear forces from an independent Scotland within this transion period.

However, the obstacles to extending such an arrangement indenitely couldbe considerable. Whilst a recent survey suggests that the majority of Scotswould be prepared to see Trident remain in an independent Scotland,54 thesame survey suggested more Scots reject the UKs nuclear weapons as awhole than support them.55Moreover, such an arrangement would require

Scotland to permanently cede some elements of its newly found sovereigntyto guarantee the rUKs access and control over HMNB Clyde, whilst alsosacricing what lile inuence its polical representaves had over nuclear-weapons policy when it was part of the Union. Sustaining polical supportwithin an independent Scotland for such an arrangement could becomeincreasingly challenging over me. There might also be a risk that futureaccidents (or near-accidents) could suddenly undermine Scosh policalsupport for rUK basing on its territory, forcing the rUK to abandon HMNBClyde before an alternave could be made available.56

The rUK would be similarly sensive to any sign that it could not rely uponan independent Scotland to facilitate the robust and eecve operaon ofits nuclear forces out of the Clyde. The UK already relies upon the US for aconnued supply of Trident D5 missiles, and exacerbang the UKs nuclearreliance on other states might be seen as jeopardising the operaonal

53. The Firth of Clyde was originally chosen on the basis of this proximity to deep water,along with the opportunies to evade adversary submarines around the Isle of Arranand Mull of Kintyre. Whilst the intensity of adversarial an-submarine operaons othe coast of the UK may have subsided aer the Cold War, they could become more

important and challenging in future. Advances in an-submarine technology alsosuggest that these operaonal factors will sll be important in any relocaon decision.See Chalmers and Walker, Uncharted Waters, p. 20.

54. Katrine Bussey, Scots Keener than English to Keep Trident on Clyde, Scotsman, 17 June2014.

55. Scosh Naonal Party Media Centre, Majority Remain Opposed to Nuclear Weapons,press release, 17 June 2014, , accessed 1 August 2014.

56. Indicaons have already emerged that co-ordinaon between the UK and Scotlandon these roles is far from perfect. See Rob Edwards, Nuclear Convoy Disaster ExerciseReveals Weakness in Emergency Response, Guardian, 12 June 2013. See The ScoshGovernment, MoD Radiaon Exempon to be Removed, press release, 11 March 2014.

See Rob Edwards, Salmond Accuses UK Defence Secretary of Decepon over DounreayRadioacve Leak, Herald Scotland, 9 March 2014.


21/30


independence of the UKs nuclear forces; a capability deemed essenal for

its credibility as a deterrent.57

The key to modelling such a scenario, from a rUK point of view, would beto ask how long it would take to create an alternave to Scosh basing if,at some future date, Scotland decided that it no longer wanted to host theforce. It might be possible, at relavely short noce, to use Devonport as anemergency operang base. But, for the reasons explained above, it wouldtake much longer to recreate the loading capabilies that are essenal formaintaining an operaonal force. Even if Scotland and the rUK were to signa long-term basing agreement, the rUK would have to factor in the risk that,in mes of internaonal tension or crisis, Scotland might decide it was in its

security interest to ask for the nuclear forces to be removed. Without such acapability at home or abroad, the rUK could nd itself in the dicult posionof operang unreliable nuclear forces without any straighorward means ofdisarming them.

With this in mind, some in the rUK may be tempted to place their trust inthe US, which has been faithfully allowing UK submarines to enter and exitits Kings Bay Naval Base in Georgia to load and unload unarmed TridentD5 missiles for more than twenty years. However, basing in the US is not acredible long-term opon. One of the primary purposes of the UK nuclearforce is to provide some insurance against a scenario where, for whateverreason, the US is not willing to come to the UKs defence against a nuclearthreat. A decision to rely on a US operang base would clearly underminethe credibility of the UK nuclear force in this scenario.

Furthermore, both pares membership of the NPT would complicate theshared use of a nuclear base. The NPT bans nuclear-armed states fromdirectly or indirectly transferring control of nuclear weapons to any recipient.As such, any capacity to load and unload UK nuclear warheads in the USwould have to convincingly isolate those warheads from US control in orderto avoid raising serious quesons in relaon to the NPT compliance of both

states.58

This would exacerbate the already signicant logiscal challenges toconstrucng a secure, naonal chain of custody that allows for the transportof UK-based warheads, equipment and personnel across the Atlanc.

57. HM Government, The Future of the United Kingdoms Nuclear Deterrent, p. 22.

58. Isolang the rUKs nuclear forces from US control may not by itself require thedevelopment of signicant new facilies in the US. If there is sucient capacity tosimultaneously operate both US and rUK forces out of US bases, the rUK could developsecurity and logiscal arrangements such that its nuclear weapons are never willingly

subjected to US control. Similar arrangements currently isolate US non-strategic nuclearweapons in Europe from their host naons during peaceme.


22/30


While a similar arrangement with France might be somewhat easier

logiscally (because of the shorter distances involved), it would encounterother dicules in addion to those discussed above. The UK would haveto demonstrate the segregaon of its nuclear forces from French accessor control to worried members of the NPT. It would also have to reassurethe US that it was not inadvertently transferring sensive (or proprietary)informaon regarding US missiles or US nuclear-warhead components to itshosts.59This would place even greater emphasis on the segregaon of Frenchand UK nuclear acvies something that may not be easy to accomplishwithin the extremely ght connes of Frances only nuclear naval base at leLongue.60

Negoang with ScotlandIn the immediate aermath of a Yes vote, it would be in the broader policalinterests of both sides to come to a mutually acceptable agreement on thefuture of nuclear basing in Scotland. Given technical uncertaines aboutthe feasibility and likely cost of relocaon opons, a jointly commissionedstudy of possible relocaon opons within the rUK which could start withinmonths of a Yes vote, and produce interim ndings relavely quickly couldprovide an important component in such an agreement.61

In order to reach such an agreement, the Scosh government would haveto make clear that it had no intenon of forcibly denuclearising the rUK. As aresult, it would need to be willing in principle to give the rUK the opportunityand me that it needed to relocate its nuclear force to alternave operangbases. The rUK, for its part, would probably have to accept in principle thatit had a strong incenve to relocate its nuclear forces to its own territory,even if it could not commit to doing so unl it could be assured that this wasfeasible and aordable.

As discussed above, UK historical experience appears to suggest that the netnancial costs of relocaon might amount to 2.5 to 3.5 billion, spread overa decade or so. Given previous experience with major works and procurement

programmes, this could end up being signicantly higher in pracce. In thecontext of a total nuclear deterrent programme worth around 80 billion

59. The UKs longstanding arrangements for warhead collaboraon and missile transfer withthe US contain provisions forbidding the onward transfer of such informaon withoutprior permission from the US. For a more detailed discussion of these arrangements, seeHugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers, The Future of the UKs Co-operave NuclearRelaonships, RUSI Occasional Paper, June 2013.

60. House of Commons Scosh Aairs Commiee, The Referendum on Separaon forScotland, p. 20.

61. Malcolm Chalmers, Dissoluon and Defence: Scotlands Armed Forces aer a Yes Vote,

RUSI Journal(Vol. 159, No. 2, April 2014), p. 33.


23/30


over twenty-ve years, however, it is hard to see the costs of relocaon (in

themselves) being a primary factor in shaping the decision.

Public discussion of relocaon opons as part of consultaons conductedwithin a feasibility study should also help to establish whether there is apolical appete in the rUK for the construcon of new nuclear facilies onits territory. Such cauon could not, in itself, be an obstacle to relocaon.An independent Scotland could not be expected to be a permanent host ifthe main argument against relocaon was English domesc polics. But itwould help to establish whether the rUK government had the support, bothat naonal and local level, necessary for the construcon of new nuclearweapons facilies.

A feasibility study might also help the two governments reach agreementon the likely mescale for relocaon. The Scosh government has alreadyaccepted that there will be a period of up to four years during which theTrident force would have to operate out of an independent Scotland.A feasibility study should be able to provide some pointers as to how farbeyond this period it would be necessary for Trident to remain.

In principle, both the rUK and Scotland would wish this period to be asshort as possible. However, seng a concrete date for the relocaon ofnuclear forces would be problemac. Many of the problems that plaguedthe development of HMNB Clyde in preparaon for the Vanguard-classsubmarine stemmed from forcing complicated design and development workinto a ght metable with a hard deadline.62Repeang this mistake wouldlikely hinder, not help, the relocaon of forces. Furthermore, Scotland couldnot easily enforce such a deadline: whilst it could exert polical pressureupon the rUK if metables slipped, suspending its co-operaon with the rUKat HMNB Clyde could endanger the safety or security of nuclear forces on itsown territory.

Yet an independent Scotland could be reassured that it would be dicult for

the rUK to use the absence of a clear deadline as an excuse for permanentTrident basing. Once a decision had been made on alternave locaons, andplans had begun to develop them for this purpose, it would be dicult tostop the momentum towards relocaon. The connuing development ofsuccessor submarines would provide addional assurance in this regard. Itwould be very complicated, and perhaps dangerous, to operate a successor

submarine out of HMNB Clyde without the infrastructure upgrades thatare currently being planned. The deployment of the rst successor to theVanguard-class submarine currently due in 2028 would therefore providea natural target date for relocaon.

62. Naonal Audit Oce, Ministry of Defence: Management of the Trident WorksProgramme, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General.


24/30


If the rUK were both willing and able to relocate its nuclear forces to its own

territory, a commitment not to prepare HMNB Clyde for a successor wouldsend Scotland a clear signal in this regard. The infrastructure required tosupport a successor submarine could also be built to support the Vanguard

class, allowing the rUK to relocate its force from Scotland once suchinfrastructure is complete.63

While the current metable suggests the rst successor submarine should bebrought into service in 2028, this deadline and therefore the deadline forsupporng infrastructure to be available could slip. Unl a credible basingsoluon has been agreed, both the MoD and the rUK Parliament would beuncomfortable approving the Main Gate decision to begin the construcon

of a successor submarine. Furthermore, the planned refuelling of the oldestVanguard-class submarine (and the ancipated refuelling of its fellow boats)may give the rUK more condence in its longevity than it has had to date.The Main Gate decision might therefore slip somewhat, in turn delaying thein-service date for a successor submarine.

Yet a signicant further extension in the lifespan of the Vanguard-classsubmarine could be risky. Any indicaon that the rUK was operangpotenally unreliable and unsafe submarines out of an independent Scotlandcould derail the Scosh consent that would be necessary to make connuingoperaon from the Clyde possible.64

A joint study over relocaon opons would not be without its problems.As some technical aspects of relocaon might reveal sensive or classiedaspects of the rUKs nuclear-armed submarines, some informaon wouldhave to be held back from Scosh interlocutors. At the same me, anyaccusaons of bias or lack of transparency could undermine polical supportin an independent Scotland for the connued hosng of the rUKs nuclearforces. It would be parcularly important to avoid this in the event that thestudy paints a pessimisc picture of relocaon prospects.

63. As discussed above, it is likely that the rUK would be able to develop a replacement for

Faslane faster than they could for Coulport. With this in mind, it has been suggested thatScotland could be oered a phased relocaon plan, in which Faslane is vacated beforeCoulport. While this would allow Scotland to at least celebrate the end to submarinebasing on its territory, these would likely be muted by the connued presence ofnuclear weapons at Coulport and thus need for warhead convoys and other protecvemeasures. Furthermore, the rUK may be uncomfortable basing its submarines so farfrom an emergency capability to remove nuclear warheads or missiles if they showedany signs of being unsafe. Nevertheless, such an opon could be considered if policalcircumstances require and technical realies oblige. See Malcolm Chalmers and WilliamWalker, Will Scotland Sink the United Kingdoms Nuclear Deterrent?, WashingtonQuarterly(Vol. 36, No. 3, Summer 2013), p. 114.

64. While the ancipated refuel of Vanguard-class submarines will reduce the risk of a

reactor fuel rod failure, refuelling will not address any other age defects that mightemerge in other elements of the nuclear propulsion reactor.


25/30


Despite the provisional conclusions of this paper, detailed study could nd

that relocaon would be so dicult that many in the rUK would want togive serious credence to the opon of permanent basing in Scotland, orperhaps even the US. This would not be an easy decision to make; relyingupon another state be they nuclear-armed themselves or otherwise for the operaon of nuclear forces would draw uncomfortable quesonsabout the rUKs nuclear independence, and therefore its credibility. Thesequesons would have to be answered if the rUK wished to base its nuclearforces abroad.

Given its importance and sensivity, a joint relocaon study would be animportant inial test of condence between the two negoang teams.

If completed within the rst few months aer a Yes vote, it could have aposive impact on the two sides ability to agree a mutually agreeablesoluon to the future of HMNB Clyde. This in turn could have a posiveimpact on the broader negoaons about the post-separaon selement.If such a soluon was not possible, by contrast, the prospects for a smoothtransion to independence ... are likely to be much reduced.65

Conclusions

If Scotland votes for independence in September, its relaonship with therUK (and subsequently NATO, and to an extent the rest of the world) will beshaped by its approach to nuclear weapons. The Scosh governments ocialposion on this maer seems anthecal to that which the rUK would belikely to adopt. However, this contradicon, heightened by the polics of thereferendum campaign, may understate the potenal for a more co-operavepost-separaon relaonship, given the stakes that both sides would have inavoiding deterioraon in their wider security relaonship.

Despite its opposion to nuclear weapons in Scotland, agencies of theScosh government already work eecvely with the UK to co-ordinate anumber of services vital to the connued operaon of nuclear forces fromthe Clyde.

This tradion of co-operaon would be likely to connue if Scotland wereto transion to independence. The Scosh government acknowledges thatnuclear forces are likely to remain in an independent Scotland for at leastfour years, and possibly (if not probably) longer. During this me, neitherScotland nor the rUK would want to see these forces become unsafe orinsecure.

65. Chalmers, Dissoluon and Defence, p. 33.


26/30


27/30


greeneld site for the new munions-loading facility. With lile familiarity

and economic reliance to date upon the rUKs nuclear weapons, the publicaround greeneld sites (such as those north of Falmouth) are much morelikely to resist the societal and economic changes that a large, new nuclearfacility would bring.

Past experience (including at Faslane and Coulport) suggests that localpolical opposion, by itself, is not enough to prevent such projects fromgoing ahead. The MoD possesses considerable levers that it can use wherelocal opposion threatens to introduce unacceptable delays into importantdefence-related infrastructural projects. However, overruling local opposionwould be very unpopular if it were not backed up by naonal support.

Even if a relocaon programme along the lines described above weretechnically feasible, it would not go ahead if it were not also policallyfeasible. The UK publics current ambivalence to its own nuclear forces wouldbe tested if it had to confront the nancial and polical hurdles requiredfor their retenon. If support for the UKs current nuclear policy remainedaer Scosh independence, the need to overcome local opposion anddemonstrate compliance with safety regulaons would be likely only to delayrather than prevent the relocaon of the rUKs nuclear forces to its territory.

If this were found to be the case, it is therefore likely that both Scotland andthe rUK would be able to idenfy a mutually agreeable relocaon plan, andwith it a smooth pathway to an amicable relaonship. If not, the rUK may befeel compelled to pursue alternave and untradional basing soluons (inthe US or at sea, for instance), which might seem incredible to the states itwished to deter.

The relocaon programme outlined above would confront the currentScosh government with two interesng ironies. First, despite its currentopposion to nuclear forces, the government of an independent Scotlandwould play a signicant and vital role in supporng the rUKs nuclear forces

for at least a decade aer independence. No nuclear-weapon state has everplaced such reliance on another state for the maintenance of its nuclearcapability. Second, if relocaon were ed to the compleon of a successorto the Vanguardsubmarine, an independent Scotland would have a strongincenve to support, or even accelerate, the acquision of a new generaonof nuclear submarines which it had previously opposed.

Hugh Chalmers is a Research Analyst within RUSIs Nuclear Analysis

Programme. Hugh has previously worked at the Vericaon Research,

Training and Informaon Centre (VERTIC), IHS Janes, and the Kings College

London Centre for Science and Security Studies. His recent publicaons on

UK nuclear policy include, The Bang Behind the Buck: Replacing the UKs


28/30


Nuclear Warheads, RUSI Occasional Paper, March 2014; A Disturbance in

the Force: Debang Connuous At-Sea Deterrence, RUSI Occasional Paper,January 2014; The Future of the UKs Co-operave Nuclear Relaonships,

RUSI Occasional Paper, June 2013.

Professor Malcolm Chalmers is Research Director at RUSI, and leads its

work on nuclear policy issues. His recent, relevant publicaons on this issue

include Dissoluon and Defence: Scotlands Armed Forces Aer A Yes Vote,

RUSI Journal (Vol. 159, No. 2, April/May 2014); Towards the UKs NuclearCentury, RUSI Journal (Vol. 158, No. 6, December 2013); Will Scotland Sinkthe United Kingdoms Nuclear Deterrent?, Washington Quarterly (Vol. 36,No. 3, Summer 2013) (with William Walker). He has given evidence on the

defence implicaons of Scotlands independence to the House of CommonsDefence, Foreign Aairs and Scosh Aairs Commiees.


29/30

Annex 1: Top Twenty Packages/Projects of the

Trident Works Programme, by Value

This table shows the top twenty Trident Works projects by value banding,locaon and main funcon. The total cost of these twenty projects, at 1994prices, was 1.371 billion. The remaining 503 million, making up the fullcost of the programme, consisted of smaller, non-complex projects under10 million in value and consultants costs. The total expected cost in 1994was 1.9 billion, the equivalent of around 2.8 billion at 2012/13 prices.

Table 1: Faslane.

Project Price(1994/95,m)

Funcon

Faslane Shipli >200 To li Vanguardand other classes of submarineclear of the water for maintenance

Northern UliesBuilding

100200 Generaon and distribuon of water, fuel andother ulies at the depot

Finger Jey 50100 Provides berthing for servicing of Vanguardand other classes of submarine

Asbestos

DecontaminaonPhase II

2050 A major decontaminaon project to preparethe Northern Development Area Site

General Service andStrategic WeaponSupport Buildings

2050 Oces and facilies for Trident crews; storageand weapon support

Naval TechnicalDepartment

2050 To provide engineering support to Vanguardand other submarine classes

Berths 14Refurbishment

Phase 1

2050 Modernisaon of berths

Trident Training

Facility1020 New building now part of the Royal Navy

Strategic System School

North EntranceWorks

1020 Roads, security and infrastructure for newentrance to the base

Berths 56 and Inll 1020 Modernisaon and inll of lagoons

Senior Rates Messand Single SleepingQuarters

1020 New buildings and accommodate increasednumbers


30/30


Table 2:Coulport.

Project Price(1994/95,

m)

Funcon

Explosives

Handling Jey

>200 A covered oang jey for berthing Vanguard-

class submarines and transferring warheads

and missiles

Jey Access Road

and Support Area

100200 Roads and infrastructure in support of the

Explosives Handling Jey and Explosives Area

Main Works

Explosives AreaMain Works

100200 A facility for the storage and handling ofmissiles and their warheads

Power Staon

and Distribuon

System

50100 Generaon of power and distribuon of water,

fuel and other ulies at the depot

Advance Works

I & II

2050 Inial works on roads, drainage, sewerage,

fencing and excavaon for the Jey Access

Road and Explosive Main Area Works

Non-Explosives

Area Phases I & II

2050 New technical, maintenance and control

facilies

Table 3:External.

Project Price

(1994/95,

m)

Funcon

Northern Access

Road

1020 To improve access to RNAD Coulport and

reduce congeson on local roads

Grid Supply

Point and PowerDistribuon System

1020 Interface with naonal grid providing power

for both Coulport and Faslane

Garelochhead

Bypass

1020 To improve access between RNAD Coulport and

Faslane and reduce congeson on local roads

Source: Naonal Audit Oce, Ministry of Defence: Management of theTrident Works Programme, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General(London: The Staonery Oce, July 1994).

Documents

Between a Rock and a Hard Place- Somali Refugees in Kenya