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Buddhist Studies 220.

Friday 10am-12pm.

288 Dwinelle.

Professor Evan Thompson: evantimothythompson@gmail.com

http://evanthompson.me

Buddhist Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Cognitive Science: Assessing

the Dialogue.

This seminar will be devoted to recent work in cross-cultural philosophy that links

Buddhist philosophy with cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and

phenomenology. Our guiding question will be whether Buddhist philosophical

psychology can be understood as a kind of phenomenology. The conviction that

it can be so understood is often used as a way to argue for the relevance of

Buddhist accounts of the mind, as well as Buddhist meditative practices, to

cognitive science, especially to recent neuroscience attempts to explain

consciousness. Yet this approach to the Buddhism-cognitive science dialogue

has provoked criticism. Buddhist scholars have argued that Buddhist accounts of

the mind are theoretical constructs, not phenomenological descriptions, and they

have emphasized that these accounts are embedded in metaphysical and

epistemological frameworks that are incompatible with “neurophysicalism,” the

view that consciousness is a state of the brain. At the same time, philosophers

and cognitive scientists have voiced scepticism about the validity of

phenomenology for a scientific understanding of the mind. Examining these

criticisms in light of our guiding question will require us to think about what

exactly phenomenology is and what it could be in a modern cross-cultural context.

At stake is nothing less than the fundamental issue of what it means for the

human mind to examine itself and the place that Buddhist philosophy can have in

this endeavor for us today. Our readings will include chapters from my

forthcoming book, Waking, Dreaming, Being: New Light on the Self and

Consciousness from Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy, chapters from

Jay Garfield’s forthcoming book, Engaging Buddhism: Why Buddhism Matters to

Philosophy, as well as a wide variety sources from Buddhist studies, Buddhist

philosophy, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and phenomenology.

Class Format:

Given the wide range of readings and the diverse backgrounds of the seminar

participants, I will take the first half-hour or so to introduce and critically present

the readings; the rest of our time will be devoted to discussion.

Texts:

The book manuscripts by Jay Garfield and Evan Thompson will be made

available electronically. Other primary readings are available electronically, either

through the University library or as indicated on the class schedule below. For the

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background and supplementary materials, which are not required reading, I have

given links to electronic versions, where available.

Requirements

• Midterm paper (can be a detailed proposal for the final paper): 3000-4000

words.

• Final paper: 7000-8000 words.

Schedule

Readings in bold typeface are the required seminar readings and should be

completed before each class meeting. Do these readings in the order listed. The

other readings are background and supplementary materials; they are not

required. I will draw from them in my presentations and you can make use of

them in writing your papers. (Note: I do not expect you to have read the required

readings prior to the first class meeting on Jan. 24.)

I. Introduction.

Jan 24. The Buddhism-Cognitive Science Dialogue: Where Are We Now and

Where Might We Go?

Thupten Jinpa, “Buddhism and Science: How Far Can the Dialogue

Proceed?” Zygon 45 (2010): 871-882.

Donald S. Lopez, Jr., “The Future of the Buddhist Past: A Response to the

Readers,” Zygon 45 (2010): 883-896.

Jay Garfield, “Ask Not What Buddhism Can Do for Cognitive Science; Ask

What Cognitive Science Can Do for Buddhism,” Bulletin of Tibetology

47 (2012): 15-30.

http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/docs/garfield_ask_not.pdf

Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being, Prologue.

Dan Arnold, “Reaching Bedrock: Buddhism and Cognitive Science,” Berfois.com

(April 2012). http://www.berfrois.com/2012/04/dan-arnold-buddhism-

cognitive-science/

Bernard Faure, “Buddhist Meditation and Neuroscience,”

http://files.meetup.com/1502376/FaureB2012.pdf

Asaf Federman, “What Buddhism Taught Cognitive Science about Self, Mind,

and Brain,” Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia 47 (2011): 39-62.

http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/enrahonar/0211402Xn47/0211402Xn47p39.pdf

Peter Harrison, “A Scientific Buddhism?” Zygon 45 (2010): 861-869.

Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne, and Richard J. Davidson, “Meditation and the

Neuroscience of Consciousness: An Introduction,” in Philip David Zelazo,

Morris Moscovitch, and Evan Thompson, eds., The Cambridge Handbook

of Consciousness (New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,

2007).

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http://www.sheermind.com/uploads/9/3/7/0/9370422/meditation_and_the_n

euroscience_of_consciousness.pdf

Antoine Lutz, Heleen A. Slagter, John D. Dunne, and Richard J. Davidson,

“Attention Regulation and Monitoring in Meditation,” Trends in Cognitive

Sciences 12 (2008): 163-169.

http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/Lutz_attention_regulation_monit

oring_meditation_tics_2008.pdf

Jan 31. No Class

I have to be away at the annual “Zen Brain” conference at the Upaya Institute

and Zen Center: http://www.upaya.org/programs/event.php?id=1099

II. How Contemporary Buddhist Philosophy of Mind

Leads to an Encounter with Phenomenology

Feb 7. Buddhist Philosophy Basics.

Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapters 1-3.

Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, chapters 1-2.

Feb 14. The Self.

Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapter 4.

Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being, Introduction and chapter 10.

Amber Carpenter, “Persons Keeping Their Karma Together: The Reasons for the

Pudgalavāda in Early Buddhism,” unpublished. Email me if you want a copy.

Jonardon Ganeri, “Buddhist Individuals and Inward Empathy,” World View and

Theory in Indian Philosophy. Warsaw Indological Studies 5 (2012): 247-260.

https://www.academia.edu/2146304/Buddhist_Individuals_and_Inward_Em

pathy_2012_

Jonardon Ganeri, “Emergentisms, Ancient and Modern,” Mind 120 (2011): 671-

703.

Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, chapters 3 and 6.

Feb 21. Varieties of Consciousness.

Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapter 5.

Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being, Introduction, chapters 1-2.

Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson, “From the Five Aggregates to Phenomenal

Consciousness: Towards a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science,” in Steven

Emmaneul, ed., A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy (John Wiley & Sons,

2014).

http://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/emmanuel_8772

_c38_main.pdf

Jonardon Ganeri, The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person

Stance, chapter 7.

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Feb 28. Buddhist Dualism, Neurophysicalism, and the Hard Problem of

Consciousness.

Dan Arnold, “Dharmakīrti’s Dualism: Critical Reflections on a Buddhist

Proof of Rebirth,” Philosophy Compass 3 (2008): 1079-1096.

https://www.academia.edu/284734/Dharmakirtis_Dualism_Critical_Reflectio

ns_on_a_Buddhist_Proof_of_Rebirth

Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being, chapters 3 and 9.

Dan Arnold, Buddhas, Brains, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in

Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind, chapter 1.

Michel Bitbol, “Is Consciousness Primary?” NeuroQuantology 6 (2008): 53-72.

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4007/1/ConsciousnessPrimaryArt2.pdf

The Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom, chapter 6.

Owen Flanagan, The Bodhisattva’s Brain, chapter 3.

Piet Hut and Roger Shepard, “Turning the Hard Problem Upside Down and

Sideways,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1996): 313-329.

http://www.ids.ias.edu/~piet/publ/turning/tuc2.ps

Galen Strawson, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.”

Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (2006): 3-31.

March 7. Phenomenology.

Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapter 6, pp. 201-212.

Francisco J. Varela, “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for

the Hard Problem,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1996): 330-349.

https://unstable.nl/andreas/ai/langcog/part3/varela_npmrhp.pdf

Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela, and Pierre Vermersch, “The Gesture of

Awareness: An Account of Its Structural Dynamics,” in Max Velmans,

ed., Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and

Maps (Amsterdam and New York: John Benjamins Publishing, 2000).

http://www.autopoiesis.com/documents/Depraz%20Varela%202000.pdf

The Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom, chapters 7-8.

Piet Hut, “The Role of Husserl’s Epoché for Science: A View from a Physicist,”

paper presented at the 31st Husserl Circle Conference, 2001.

http://www.ids.ias.edu/~piet/publ/other/husserlcircle.html

III. Can Phenomenology Be Buddhist?

Can Buddhist Philosophy Be Phenomenology?

The Problematic Status of Phenomenology

in Buddhist Philosophy of Mind

March 14. Husserl and Indian Thought.

Edmund Husserl, “Pure Phenomenology, Its Method and Its Field of

Investigation.”

http://www.lightforcenetwork.com/sites/default/files/Husserl%20-

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%20Pure%20Phenomenology,%20Its%20Method%20and%20Its%20Field

%20of%20Investigation.pdf

Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man.”

http://www.users.cloud9.net/~bradmcc/husserl_philcris.html

Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Indian Thought,” in D.P. Chattopadhyaya,

Lester Embree, and Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and

Indian Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992).

Steven Crowell, “Is There a Phenomenological Research Program?”, Synthese

131 (2002): 419-444.

Steven Crowell, “Jan Patočka and the Phenomenological Research Program.”

http://www.o-p-o.net/essays/CrowellArticle.pdf

Fred J. Hanna, “Husserl on the Teachings of the Buddha,” The Humanistic

Psychologist 23 (1995): 365-372.

Jonardon Ganeri, “Well-Ordered Science and Indian Epistemic Cultures: Toward

a Polycentered History of Science,” Isis 104 (2013): 348-359.

https://www.academia.edu/4105450/Well-

Ordered_Science_and_Indian_Epistemic_Cultures_Towards_a_Polycentre

d_History_of_Science_2013_

Edmund Husserl, “Sokrates-Buddha: An Unpublished Manuscript from the

Archives,” Husserl Studies 26 (2010): 1-17.

Richard King, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought,

chapters 1 and 2.

Lau Kwok-Ying, “Husserl, Buddhism and the Problematic of the Crisis of

European Sciences.”

http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/rih/phs/events/200405_PEACE/papers/LAUKwokYi

ng.PDF

J.N. Mohanty, “Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy: The Concept of

Rationality,” in D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree, and Jitendranath

Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY

Press, 1992). http://www.sunypress.edu/pdf/52314.pdf

March 21. Is Yogācāra Philosophy a Kind of Phenomenology?

Jay Garfield, “Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the Three Natures: A Translation

and Commentary,” in Jay Garfield, Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy

and Cross-Cultural Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, chapter 6, pp. 212-241.

March 28: Spring break

April 4. Is Yogācāra Philosophy a Kind of Phenomenology?

Dignāga, Pramänasamuccaya, Section 1: Exposition of the Theory of Peception.

In Masaaki Hatori, Dignāga on Perception (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1968), pp. 28-31.

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Birgit Kellner, “Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Dignāga’s

Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti: A Close Reading,” Journal of Indian

Philosophy 38 (2010): 203-231.

April 11. Is the Svasaṃvitti Doctrine Necessarily Internalist?

Dan Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive Scientific-Philosophy of Mind,

chapter 5.

Christian Coseru, “Taking the Intentionality of Perception Seriously: Why

Phenomenology is Inescapable,” Philosophy East and West, in press.

http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~ckeng/doc/Coseru1_svasamvitti_paper_PEW.pdf

John Dunne, Resources for the Study of Svasaṃvitti in Ultimate Contexts,”

paper presented at the American Academy of Religion 2012.

Dan Arnold, “Is Svasaṃvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction

Following Śāntarakṣita,” Asian Philosophy 15 (2005): 77-111.

Dan Arnold, “Self-Awareness (svasaṃvitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists

Following Dignāga: Philosophical Characterizations of Some of the Main

Issues,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (2010): 323-378.

Georges Dreyfus, “Is Perception Intentional? A Preliminary Exploration of

Intentionality in Dharmakīrti,” in B. Kelner, H. Krasser, H. Larsic, M.T. Much,

and H. Tauscher (eds.) Pramāṇakirtiḥ: Papers Dedicated to Ernst

Steinkellner On the Occasion of His 70th Birthday, Wien: Arbeitskries für

Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 95-113.

Jonardon Ganeri, “Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity.” Journal of

Indian Philosophy 27: 469–83.

Jay Garfield, “The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What’s At Stake

in a Tibetan Debate?” Philosophy East and West 56 (2006): 201-228.

Birgit Kellner, “Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Dignāga’s

Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti: A Close Reading,” Journal of Indian

Philosophy 38 (2010): 203-231.

Brigit Kellner, “Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: a

Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,” Journal of Indian

Philosophy 39 (2011): 411-426.

Evan Thompson, “Self-No-Self: Memory and Reflexive Awareness,” in Mark

Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, eds., Self, No Self?

Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

http://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/self-no-self.pdf

April 18. Is Yogācāra Philosophy a Kind of Phenomenology?

Iso Kern, “The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang,”

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19 (1988).

Iso Kern, “Object, Objective Phenomenon, and Objectivating Act

According to the ‘Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi’ of Xuanzang (600-644),” in D.P.

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Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree, and Jitendranath Mohanty, eds.,

Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992).

Robert Sharf, “Is Yogācāra Phenomenology? Some Evidence from the

Chéng wéishì lùn,” unpublished.

Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of

Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun (London:

RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2002. A useful synopsis of this book is William

Waldron’s review at

http://www.middlebury.edu/media/view/440170/original/review-

lusthaus_buddhist_phenomenology_h-buddhism.pdf

IV. Mindfulness: A Meeting Ground for Cognitive Science,

Phenomenology, and Buddhist Philosophy of Mind?

April 25. Can There Be a Cognitive Science of Mindfulness?

Antoine Lutz, Amishi P. Jha, John D. Dunne, and Clifford D. Saron,

“Investigating the Phenomenal and Neurocognitive Matrix of

Mindfulness-Related Practices,” American Journal of Psychology, in

press.

Thomas Metzinger, “The Myth of Cognitive Agency: Subpersonal Thinking

as a Cyclically Recurring Loss of Mental Autonomy,” Frontiers in

Psychology 4:931. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931

http://www.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931/abstract

Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson, “Developing Attention and Decreasing

Affective Bias: Toward a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science of

Mindfulness,” in K.W. Brown, J.D. Creswell, and R.M. Ryan, eds.,

Handbook of Mindfulness (New York: Guilford Press), in press.

http://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/davis-thompson-

chap-08-final1.pdf

Georges Dreyfus, “Is Mindfulness Present-Centered and Non-Judgmental? A

Discussion of the Cognitive Dimensions of Mindfulness,” Contemporary

Buddhism 12 (2011): 41-54.

John Dunne, “Toward an Understanding of Non-Dual Mindfulness,”

Contemporary Buddhism 12 (2011): 71-88.

Paul Grossman and Nicholas T. Van Dam, “Mindfulness, By Any Other Name…

Trials and Tribulations of Sati in Western Psychology and Science,”

Contemporary Buddhism 12 (2011): 219-239.

Anne Harrington and John Dunne, “Mindfulness Meditation: Frames and

Choices,” American Psychologist, in press.

http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10718406/46521719.pdf?seque

nce=1

Robert Sharf, “Mindfulness and Mindlessness in Early Chan,” unpublished.

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The “Buddhism, Mind, and Cognitive Science” Conference at UC Berkeley

begins the afternoon of Friday, April 25, with afternoon lectures by me and

Clifford Saron. http://buddhiststudies.berkeley.edu/events/

May 2. Phenomenology, Cognitive Science, Meditation, and the Rhetoric of

Experience.

Georges Dreyfus, “But Aren’t We Conscious? A Phenomenological

Approach to Buddhist Philosophy of Mind,” unpublished draft.

Georges Dreyfus, “Taking Meditation Seriously But Not Too Much,”

unpublished draft.

Robert Sharf, “Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience,”

Numen 42 (1995): 228-283.

http://buddhiststudies.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/sharf/documents/Sharf19

95,%20Buddhist%20Modernism.pdf

Robert Sharf, “The Rhetoric of Experience and the Study of Religion,” Journal of

Consciousness Studies 7 (2000): 267-287.

http://buddhiststudies.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/sharf/documents/Sharf19

98,%20Religious%20Experience.pdf

Mark Siderits, “Buddhas as Zombies: A Buddhist Reduction of Subjectivity,” in

Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, eds., Self, No Self?

Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

May 9

Classes end May 2, but I am happy to schedule an extra class to make up for the

missed class on Jan 31 if there is interest.