Bazan Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties of Arts 2005

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Radical Arist6telianismhe Faculties of Arts.

The case of Siger of Brabant

B . Carlos Baz ā n, F.R. S. C., Ottawa

k:.I. Sense of the Expression

L,

edievalists are currently in excellent position to assess the different forms of' to telianism in the thi r teenth and four teenth c entur ies. Many texts have

;been cri t ically edited, ' and the historians of philosophy hav e produc ed sur-ē ys, m onographs and general in terpretat ions that g ive com prehensive and

tensive coverage to the phenom enon. 2 I t is not the purpose of this pape r tosynthesize the results of this enormous a mount of scholarly work. My way of

aying homa ge to the work of m y colleagues will be to rely on their findings.1 hope, however, to contribute to the scholarly dialogue by raising some

Jõns concerning bas ic issues tha t have int r igued m e every t ime tha t I have

needed to exam ine the subject. For practical reasons I will focus the attentionō n issues pertaining only to philosophical anthropology.

First of all , there is the quest ion concerning the m eaning of the exp ressionrad ica l Aristotelianism «, to w hich is a t tached a cer ta in connota t ion of ex-

4 emism, heterodoxy and (perceived) cultural danger ^ Nei ther the m ere ad-rence to Aristotelian principles and the exclusion of theological interferenceen doing na tural philosophy, nor the m ere effort to present faithfully thethentic m eaning of Aristotelian texts while they are object of teac hing can

ccount for that connotat ion.Iibliography at the end of the article.-

! ,•

l imited Bibliographical noteited to some of the most important monographs that havedealt with »radical« Aristotelianism in the last fifty years, the reader will find in theworks listed a more complete bibliographical information: VANS^rrsERGHEN 1977(the most complete study on the Brabantine master); GAVrHt 1951; Dusr 1954; DA

PALMA1955; NARni 1960, part. 119-161; KuxsEwicz 1968 (the most comprehensive•:tudy on the different representatives of »Averroism«); HissF=1977; K R F : T Z M A N N

HEGPm i oR G 1982art. the articles Garr1982, LoR1982 and W LE Aivn

1982; WIPPFL 1987; B i A N C H i 1990; DE LmsaA 1994; PUTALLAZ/IMBACH 1997; PrcH1999. Although not monographs, the following studies by R.-A. G A U T H I E R should be

mentioned: GAurHsR 1946-1947; G A U T H I E R 1983; GAurmER 1984. On the four-teenth and fifteenth centuries, the classic monographs remain NAizni 1945; NAR D i

'

1958; they should be completed by the studies of MAHoNEY 1968; MAHoNEY 1976b;M A H o N E Y 1976a; MAHoNEY 1983; M A H O N E Y 1986, MAHoNEY 1 9 9 1 ; BER NET 2003. II i iIII!

II



586. Carlos Bazdn

As far as A ris to te l ian pr inc ip les a re concerned , they w ere pro I t could be argtcepted, with different levels of understanding and syncretism, by rnrs...ecause

t he y w e rarts whose orthodoxy is beyond any doubt. 3 Faithfulness to the Aristot 'ē ading of Aris to

t e x t w a s a m a i n c omp one n t o f t he b a s ic intenttio of the m asters of ar ts and ' "~ resent a more Fonly h indered by the i r im perfec t unders tand ing of Aris to te l i an d o ctrines ange the mainam ples of remarka b le courses on Aris to t le ' s De anima are not rare in the ' f ir fh{u11y. My poihal f of the th i r teenth century. ¢ This kind of exegetical wo rk was an ins ti tu ophica l grouncna l duty o f the mas ters o f a r ts . And th is norm, a s has been em phas ized man - , gain, i t couldt imes by h i s to r ians , found in Alber t the Grea t — an au thor whose or thodo y rdical insofar asbeyond do ubt — the s trongest support: »nihil ad m e de Dei miraculis cum egos. ^ w required by his 1de na tura l ibus di sse ram «5 S holar« or a » hi:

value of texts); heJohnl r eady a t the ve r y beg inn ing of the th i r t een th cen tu r y ,hn Blund , who s tud ied ' the expressions

and taught both in Paris and Oxford, adopted Aristotle's definit ion of the soul as " tji ' ar 'e beyon d the iperfection of the body – although within the general framework of anthro olo { 'p ^ 1.'ouldccepted ,dua l i sm pe r vas ive in the La t in Wes t – and dem anded tha t theo log ians do no t gē t ' applied to theolcinvolved in the s tudy of the na ture of the soul (c f . IoANNEs BLONDUS, Tractatus de's'' osophy as »true<c . II n. 21-22 , edd. Cal lus /H unt , 7) . A l i t t le bi t l a te r , Pe ter of Spain ( the future po 1

John XXI, who reques ted the enquirythat led to the Condemnation of 1277 t ē ā c h ' =d pure ly p h i le

ing probably in Toulouse around 1240, used l iberal ly Aris to te l ian and Arabic `' }-a t

eir corporativelosophical sources , com bined them in a sy ncre t ic anthropological dual ism, anded , ve r y m u ch in the s am e ve in as J ohn Blund , tha t the s tudy of the na tu r e of thesoul as a substance belongs to the m etaphysic ian , the s tudy of the na ture of the sóål c ^ ,s st s DE AQUINO,

the perfect ion of the body to the natural phi losopher , and o nly the study of the rew a raS DE BRABANTIA,tl':of the separated so ul according to i ts merits to the theologian (cf. PETRus Hssrntvus, i Iostu as DE J^De anima, ed. Alonso, esp. 76 and 78). These epistem ological principles presideet f. 25'. On A lbePeter's personal work: his Scientia de anima (writ ten probably between 1 250 and 126 Eclecticism w asstays on the level of purely philosophical discourse even wh en he has to deal with ' 1 quired a privi lcj ects as the or ig in , incorrupt ibi l i ty and imm orta l i ty of the soul (cf . PETxus Hssr remained per

Scientia de anima, ed. Alonso). Except for a reference to rew ards granted to the separate rirculation of;s 1 sou(ch. VIII , 333), no other theological subject is found in this treat ise. There are n r .:been well estal:

quotat ions of theological »autho ri t ies«. Peter 's philosophy is, of course, highly ed ec _' ,the thirteenthcal, with strong influence from neo platonic sources, part icularly Avicenna . But theF tonisant« (cf.

F ficulties to accept his Scientia de anima as a truly philosophical t reat ise are not grease more recent lythan the diff icult ies that could be found in wri t ings of arabic authors. bisme« of thirt

4 The anonym ous C omm e nta ry o f Oxfo rd , MS B odle i an La t . mi s c . C 70 , i s no t on l . in te l lectual cr isthe o ldes t comple te expositio on Book III df that t reat ise , but a l so a t rue piece of L spect of the

I totelian scholarship and pure philosophical exegesis (cf . ANot wMus, Sententia super 11 4 Picii 1999, 21III De anima, ed. Baz ā n) . The s ame can be s a id o f the anonym ous C omm e nta ry ō To write arist<

Rome, MS N az. V. E. 828, except for some reserva t ions tha t i ts author mad e to safe- z ' : dut ies. Why e.. ' guard the area of com petence of theo logians out o f personal concern more than ep ' andefforttot

temo logical or ins t itut ional confl ic t (cf . ANONYMUs, Lec tura in Librum De anima, ePet'

: . l ion that a waiiDominica:heauthier , see 18*-19* of the Introduct ion) , and of the comm entary of the Ps . r: .¢+r appointedf Spain (Cf. Ps: PEnus H is p u. us, Expositio libri De anima, ed. Alonso). m e n

i5LSEtrrus MAGNus, De ge n. et corr. I, 1, c. 22 (Ed. Colon. 5/1), 129, v. 15sq.; cf. Tt,o iussing studies



4 ;adical A ristotelianism in the Faculties o f Arts87

7 were progressively:lcretism, by ma ster 'sHess to the Aris totelm as ters o f a r t s andistotelian doctrines. 1are not rare in the two rk w as an ins t it j

p e e n e m phas i ze d m zhor w hose o r thodoxDei m i racul is cum

John Blund, who studi,lefini t ion of the soul as `daework of anthropologic,at theologians do notBLONDUS, Tractatus de ¢thlof Spain (the future Po

:emnation of 1277), tē a c

istotelian and Arabic p]ological dualism, and .study of the nature ōfof the nature of the soulsly the study of the rewai

3n (cf. PETRUS HlsPANps,ical principles preside. between 1250 and 12f

=n he has to deal with 0s a

sou l (c f . PETRUS H ls p .,

ds granted to the separā t

this treatise. There are',

s, of course, highly ecdearly Avicenna. But the ' '_cal treatise are not grē ā

authors.

at. misc. C 70, is not or

italso a true piece of AroNYMUS, Sententia super 11Ionymous Commentary'

at its author made tō saal concern more than t!'a in Librum De anima,

mmentary of the Ps.-Pe3. Alonso) .'1), 129, v. 15 sq.; cf. Tf

I t could be a rgued tha t m ost of these mas te rs were ab le to avo id radica l ism:because they were in fact eclectic Neoplatonists who incorporated in theirreading of Aristotle many non-aristotelian principles that allowed them to

presen t a more palatable Aristotle to Christian minds. 6 But that does not' change the m ain in tention of the mas te rs , which w as to unders tand A ris to t l e;fai thful ly. My p oint is that the wil l ingness to ex plain Aristot le on strict ly phi-losophica l grounds is not what could define radical aris totel ianism.

Again, it could be argued that even if a master should not be considered

iadical insofar as he remains at the level of philosophical analysis of texts as

required by his professional duties (he would then be just an »Aristotelian

scholar « or a »historian« of philosophy who need not decide about the truthva lue of t ex ts ) ; he would becom e a radical i f he em braces Aris to te li an thoughtas the express ion of a t rue ph i losophy tha t en l igh tens f i e lds o f k nowledge tha tare beyond the institutional borders of the faculties of arts. This criterion, if

accepted, could have some curious consequences. By extension it could be

appl ied to theologians who , l ike Thom as and Alber t , va lued Aris to te l ian phi -losophy as » t rue« ph i losophy , devoted m uch of the i r t ime to w r i ting ex tens iveā nd.purely philosophical commentaries on Aristotle's works, went beyond

(he i r corpora t ive dut ie s in doing so , 7 and used Aristotelian principles as the

MASDE AQUINo, Sum ma theologiae, I Pars, q. 76, a. 5 ad lm (Ed. Leon. 5), 228; SIGERUSD E B R A B A N T m A , De anima intellectiva c. III, ed. Bazā n, 84, v. 47-48. They are echoed by

'N' . IO NNES DE JANDUNo, Quaestiones in X II libros M etaphysicae, I q. 4 (Ed. Venice 1553),`. f.25. On Albert, cf. VAN SmEENBERGEEN 1966, 290-291; BtANclu 1990, 110-111.

Eclecticism was favoured by the fact that Avicenna was first to enter the scene, ac-squired a privileged position among the auctoritates and exercised an influence whichremained pervasive throughout the Middle Ages. Eclecticism was reinforced by the

circulation of pseudo aristotelian writings of neoplatonic inspiration. The point has=<. been well established by Van Steenberghen, for whom philosophy in the first half of

the thirteenth century should be considered as an »aristotē lisme eclectique nē opla -' • :: . tonisant« (c f. VAN STEEVBERGHEN 1966, 181-185). The same point has been shown

; •' .more recently by DE LmERA 1993, 363. De Libera has also emphasized the »ara-bismee of thirteenth century Latin masters and shown the geopolitical context of the

. . in te llectual cr is is which affected medieval univers i t ies (cf . DE LLBERA 1991, 117) . This. aspect of the crisis had already been underlined by D'Aivmu'w 1949, 247. Cf. also

i:. .PICHi 1999, 248 n. 1..7 . To write aristotelian commentaries was not required of a theologian as one of his

duties. Why eminent theologians, like Albert and Thomas, devoted so much timeand effort to this task while being regent masters in theology remains an open ques-tion that awaits a comprehensive study. Though the need expressed by the Order atthe Dominican general chapter meeting at Valenciennes (1259), where they wereappointed members of a special commission entrusted with the responsibility of dis-cussing studies in the Order, should not be neglected as a possible explanation, nei-



588Carlos Bazdn

Radi

foundation of their theological doctrines. They were suspects in their o' , , ' respect . His long Comm ,time, but contemporary historiography has exonerated them from »radi e best exeget ical intrurism«, considering them rather as representatives of »Christian aristote1ian t e e n th c e n t u ry : t ho roug 'i sm« , t h ink e r s w ho d i d »o e uvre de s a g e s se « r a the r t ha n »sc ho l a r l y« a na i y peripatet ic t radi t ion, ancw ho soug h t » c onc o rd i sm« ra t he r t ha n show i ng i n d ra ma t i c t erms t he oppō siY

text. No p e da g og i c a l to ,t ion between the authent ic Aris totelian thought and the Chris t ian w orld-vis ion t ha t t he ma s t e r s r e c og n iAc k no w l e dg m e n t o f t he t ru t h va l ue o f Ar i s t o te l ia n i sm (a nd o f t he Peripatetic' y troversia l doctrines ( l iketradition)) did notrevent Christian thinkers to perceive the oppositionsPPe; ' using this extraordinarytween their world-vis ion and the »pagan« world-vis ion.

a nce of the »valde notaAnother e l em ent could be added to the search for th i s de f in i tion . I t is we i i

1a c c e p t i t, a nd w e n t on u

known that the writings of Aristotle were not the only ones that »inva ded< r Is i t possible that therF.m edieva l unive rs it ie s . They w ere accom panied by an impress ive ensem ble of ? ' of phi losophy in i ts ow nAra b i c c om m e n t a r ie s a nd pa ra ph ra se s t ha t in som e c a se s p re c e de d t he t e x t s ' the me re ana lys i s o f tex tof A ris to t l e , were vehic les of A ris to te l ian a s w e l l as of Neo pla tonic ideas ancft ' n the l ight of na tura l recarried with them different models of how to face the cultural crisis arisin"., c a se , a g re a t num b e r o ff rom t he e nc oun t e r o f a m ono t he i s ti c r e li g ion a nd »pa g a n« t houg h t , how t o ` te r of Spa in , A lber t the»harmonize« faith and reason as well as Plato and Aristotle (»conc o r d i s m < Z : L whom I have already qagain!). In the thirteenth cen tury, the Lat in We st was in cultura l , religious and because they s t rong ly as

geopo l it i ca l conf l ic t wi th the Is l amic w orld . I t i s then q ui te poss ib le tha t a l l ' analysis. Alternatively, tcthese fo rms of »a rabi sme < w ere perce ived as a »c lea r and presen t danger <oft

ident i f ied - had d e fendeaccul turat ion, not only by re l igious, but also by pol i t ical authori t ies. The fact 1r w ou l d no t on l y b e f a l s ere ma i ns t ha t ve ry c onse rva t ive L a t i n t h i nk e rs , w hose o r t hodoxy w a s b e yond : gnif icant representatives

• doubt in the i r t imes , incorpora ted in the i r ec lec tic sys tems m any o f the ideas " a u t onomous e xe rc ic e o f9

found in Arabic writings, adapting them to their Latin background. Wcan; Aristotelianism « and, coa c c use a l l o f t he m o f »e c l e c t ic i sm« , »sync re t i sm « , »m ē t issage culturel«, bu - not i ts defining cha ractece r ta in ly not of »radica l i sm«. The case of A verroes i s qui te revea l ing in th i s ` . There is s t i l l a f inal fe

totel ianism, but i t is witht

ther should be neglected the personal intellectual and cultural project of both ma s - ; "' it has been disqualifiecters. Cf. WEISHEIPL 1974, 138, 195, 281-285.

»doub le t ruth«. »Comrr

8Thomas Aquinas recognized those oppositions and used to excuse them by invokingq

'

P

^'` ō u > h ē tē rodoxe< pour d^

weaknesses in the limited premises on which Aristotle built his system. Siger of Bra .:r • . ask ourselves fol lowingbant struggled to show that some conclusions of Aristotle's philosophy that opposed,.

bu t;e' :,s norhe m aste rs of a r t s arevealed truth were not in fact necessary conclusions of natural reason,o n l y :

probable, and did not hesitate to say that Aristotle i>humanus erat et errare potuit«;r t ow a rds t her, .:. .elat ionshi lMy oint is that this critical acceptance of the truth value of Aristotle'sphilosophy,_______Y Px ' ....

? ^ ^nd t he y d i d no t a dop tIoes not define a radical Aristote lian .' ing . De Libera has po in t

' 9hat was the case of those authors who fall under the label of »augustinisme avi--

^' cennisant«, who simply adapted Avicenna's doctrine of the separate agent intellect toAugustine's doctrine of God as source of illumination, but who also adopted m a n y ' 10 Cf. BAzAv 2000, where

! . ! other Avicennian theses. That was also the case of many masters of arts, who, m readers of Averroes, rec• . their efforts to understand Aristotle's texts and make them intelligible to their stu; using his Commentary

dents, used Avicenna and Averroes as interpretive tools. H1 DELrsat&1991, 124.



Radical A ristotelianism in the Faculties o f Arts89

°y were suspects in their

:one ra t ed t he m f rom » ra d i i [y es of »Christian aristote °x

. ther than »scholar ly« analysì n d ra ma t ic t e rms t he oppos :

and the Christ ian world-vision;: l ianism (a nd of the Peripateo pe rce ive the oppos i t ions bk..i-vision. 8:-ch for this definition. It is wē ll

the only ones that »invadedI by an im press ive ensem ble .som e c a se s p re c e de d t he text.

: l l as of Neopla tonic ideasface the cul tural crisis arisi i i .Z :

and »paga n« thought , ho .w ' (oo and Aris to tl e (»concordisms t was in c ultural , re ligious az` '

is then quite possible that å1l»c lear and present danger«` ōf

y p ol i t ical au thorit ies. The fac_wh o s e o r t h o do x y wa s beyo n d

:c t ic sys tems m any of the ideas

° i r La t in backgrou nd. 9 W e c3m«, »m ē tissage culturel«,' .b I. rroes is qui te revealing in this:

and cultural project of both m a s

I used to excuse them by invokiri.totle built his system. Siger of Bra-Aristotle's philosophy that oppose,

isions of natural reason, but on!.e »humanus erat et errare potuitiuth value of Aristotle's philosophy

ier the label of »augustinisme.:aie of the separate agent intellect; tition, but who also adopted many]of many masters of arts, who, iÍ

nake them intelligible to their slimtools .

.respec t . H is long Comm entary on De anima was, I have no doubts about that,

ē best exegetical intrument that a master of arts could use in the mid-thir-

' S a e ē nth century: thorough, detailed, enlightening with respect to the wholeIe r ipa te t ic t radi t ion , and inspi red by the des i re of be ing fa i thful to A ris to t le ' s

,text: No pedagogical tool could surpass Averroes' commentaries. The factat the masters recognized in the Long Commentary the existence of con-

." ' oversial doctrines (l ike the unici ty of the inte l lect) did not deter them fromg th i s ex traord ina ry pedagog ica l too l . They s imp ly acknow leged the p res -

sēnce of the »valde notabilis« doctrine (as Adam Bocfeld put it), refused to

accept i t , and w ent on us ing Averroes ' com m entary. ' °

= ' , Is i t possible that the s ign of »radicalism« is the assert ion of the auton om yofhi losophy in i t s own f ie ld? And for > >ph i losophy < I unders tand he re notPthe mere a na lys i s of t exts , but the examina t ion of a prob lem for i t s own sake

I : . in the l ight of na tura l reason. That w ould n ot be suff ic ient . If tha t were thecase , a grea t number of th inkers whose »m odera t ion« i s we l l known , l ike Pe-' te r o f S pa i n , A l b e r t t he Gre a t a nd T hom a s Aqu i na s – t o me n t i on on l y t hosewhom I have already quoted in this paper – would fall into this category,because they s t rongly asse r ted the spec i f ic i ty and autonom y of phi losophica l

analys is . Alternatively , to think that only the > >ra dicals<( –wh o s ti ll need to beidentified – had defended the ideal of an autonomous philosophical activity

;would not only be false, but would also deprive us of some of the most si-gnificant representatives of this autonomy. My point is that the ideal of anautono m ous exerc ice of phi losophica l thought i s not the pr ivi l ege of »radica lAris to te l ianism« and, consequent ly , tha t th i s epis temo logica l cons ide ra t ion i snot i ts defining charac teris t ic .

There is still a final feature that might be used to characterize radical Aris-to tehanism, but i t i s wi th hes i ta t ion tha t I inc lude i t in to m y an a lys i s , so m uchit has been disqualified by historians. It is the so-called doctrine of the;idouble truth«. »Comment en est-on venu ā par le r d '>ar i s to t ē l isme radical<ōu h ē t ē rodoxe < pour d ē finir une doctrine qui n'a jamais existē ? ' < we c o u ldask ourselves following Alain de Libera." It is known that neither Averroes

not the m asters of arts adopted this il logical thesis (for different their a t t i tude stowards the relationship between religion and theology might have been).And they did not ado pt i t because , prec i se ly , of the i r Aris to te l ian log ica l t ra in-in g . De Libera has pointed out correc t ly tha t the doc t r ine wa s an »invent ion«

K •.

10 C£ Bnzārr 2000, where I hope to have proved that masters of arts were not »naive«readers of Averroes, recognized his doctrine of the unicity of the intellect, and keptusing his Commentary as the best exegetical tool available to them.

': '11: DE LmExA 1991, 124.



590CarlosBazn

of Et ienne Tem pier , a » t rap« in to w hich h i s to r i ans fe l l a t the beg inn ing of our j';

L "}

.materia l forms. Stabl ,century for l ack of know ledge of the sophis t i ca ted epis temologica l pr inc ip les ' l y t he re ne ve r ha s b ^that inspired the work of radical ar i s to te li ans such as Bo e thius Dacus . U n d e r F _ r.' sinse images. The inthose circumstances, historians believed Tempier rather than Boethius. For;' hum a n b e i ng s pa r t ic ithe conse rva t ive b i shop - and the theologians who h e lped h im w i th the draf t ' . ; . ship fits perfectly wit]ing of the Condem nat ion of 1277 - the mere idea o f the re l a tiv i ty of po ints o - .view concerning a single truth could not be understood otherwise thans . ' : •tpure and s imple re la t iv ism. The non-ex i s ten t doc t r ine o f »double t ru th« could ' ,not be used then to define radical aris totel ianism.

H aving fa i l ed so fa r to f ind a t the l eve l of genera l doc t r ines the ke y to de

o ug hthe unicity

f ine th is h i s tor ica l phenom enon, i t would on ly seem a ppropria te to search for '' most all the repressi ts essent ia l characteris t ics a t the level of part icular doctrines of som e m asters , ; Avicenna be ing the iFour su c h do c t r ine s a ppe a r t o o f fe r t he b e s t c ha nc e s o f f i nd ing t he de f i n i ng `

West), the unicity offea tures o f radical Aris totel ianism: unicity of the intel lect , e ternity of the world ,

:posed i t as the correcintellectual determinism, and the idea of happiness attained through phil ō t

,; .his c onc e p t i on o f t hesophy as the m os t per fec t s ta t e o f hum an l i fe . I wi ll l im i t mysel f to p resen t ing

' that it could not be »the thesis of the unici ty of the intellect , its sources , i ts con di t ions of possibi l i ty totle s general definiti

• '` and i t s most inf luent ia l representa t ive in the th i r teenth century , nam ely SiweiThough being a sub.

of Bra b a n t , w hose d oc t r ina l e vo l u t ion a f fe c t e d t he fu t u re de ve l opm e n t o f ra- ''t ā liquid (tā d e tO O . This e :€ : . dical Aris totel ianism. matter in their comlaliquid confirms the t

I I . Unic i ty of the In te l l ec t, t . . ances that are a hoc aib e m ul t ip l e in num b ,

1 verroes develope; , : . . unicity of the intellet,::.

The receptive (materialis, possibilis) intellect, the lowest of the separate subst -3knowledge. The key

.antes, is unique for al l human beings. Its ontological lower status t ranslates;-` I . 2 AvERRoES, InDe an

in to a divided in te l lec tua l a t tent ion , turned both tow ards the supe r ior rea lm r •I I , 5 (404, v. 514-51of separa te subs tances and toward s the infe r ior rea lm of the m ate r ia l wo rld:„ L 1 3bid. II, 32 (178, v. 2

With respect to the latter, the receptive intellect has a double operational. 14 Ibid. II, 7 (138, V. 11

F

de pe nde nc y : it mus t acquire know ledge of the ma ter i a l wor ld us ing sense ima ; ;...15 In Michael Scotus' tv. 23-25); ITI, 3 (38

es provided by hu m an be ings , and i t requi res tha t a super ior agent in te l lec t ' snatura non est aliqui,

a l so separa te and unique , proceed to abstract the forms of m ater ial beings f rom y tunc reciperet forma

those ima ges w here they a re in te l lig ib le in potency, ma king them in te ll ig ib le ' i existentes in ipsa ess

in ac t . Wi th respec t to the super ior rea lm, no suc h process t akes p lace , g iven: est ex demonstratioi•:: i . the fac t tha t sp i r i tua l subs tances a re in te l lin te l lig ib le in ac t by themse lves . Um on:P! neque virtus in corp.

16 Ibid. III, 5 (402, v. 4be twee n the separa te in te ll ec t and hum ans i s then opera t iona l , but in t im ate ; numeratus per num

^ 'necessary and stable. Intimate and necessary, because without sense images aut corpus aut virtu

rovided by hum ans the in te l lec t canno t pe rform i t s ac t of in te l lec t ion of therovidedYpotentia<; cf. ibid. (2

r r

s t`



Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties of A rts91

a l forms. S tab le , because the hum an spec ies i s e te rna l and consequen t -

e never has been, nor will ever be, a lack of individual providers of

imag e s . The intimacy of the union explains why and how individuali 'beings participate in " the act of intellection. The stability of the relation-

s perfect ly with the e terni ty of the inte l lect .

2. T he source

:

l the unicity of the agent intellect is a thesis that can be found inill the representatives of the Greek and Arabic Peripatetic tradition

nā be ing the m ain vehic le of t ransmiss ion of th i s doc t r ine to the Lat intiie unicity of the receptive intellect is typical of Averroes, who pro-

i t ` ās the co rrec t in te rpre ta t ion of A ris to t l e 's De anima. 1 2 Consistent withiception of the intellect as a separate substance, Averroes also stated

c ou l d no t b e »a n im a ne que pa r s a n i me o , 1 3 and consequent ly tha t Aris -gē neral defini t ion of the soul appl ies only equivocal ly to this inte l lect ."h being a substance, its spiritual nature prevents it from being a hoc

Itō de ti). This express ion , indeed, a ppl ie s only to subs tances tha t inc ludein the i r com posi t ion . 1 5 The refusal to consider the intellect as a hoc

confirms the thesis of the unicity of the intellect, because only subst-

hat a re a hoc aliqu id possess the mate r ia l com ponent tha t a l lows them to[tiplē innum ber w i th in a spec ies .16ioē s developed a sophisticated theory to explain how, in spite of theof the intellect, human beings participate in the act of intellectual

:dge. The ke y of his proposa l is the specia l kind of intent ionali ty that is

iiROES, In De anima In, 1, ed. Crawford, 380, v. 44-45; III, 5 (401, v. 424-425);5 (404, v. 514-517 ); I I I , 5 (406, v. 576) .. II, 32 (178, v. 33-35)..II, 7 (138, v. 18-19); cf. II, 21 (160, v. 9).

3 fichael Scotus' translation, the expression reads »aliquid hoc«. Cf. Ibid. I, 34 (45,'3-25); III, 3 (382, v. 21-23); III, 5 (388, v. 38-42): »Et ex hoc apparet quod istaira'non est aliquid hoc, neque corpus neque virtus m corpore; quomam, si ita esset,reciperet formal secundum quod sunt diversa et ista, et si ita esset, tunc forme

tentes in ipsa essent intellecte in potentia«; (393, v. 191-193): »Et iam declaratum

ex demonstration Aristotelis predicta quod non est aliquid hoc, neque corpusLie vir tus in corpore.«

III; 5 (402, v. 432-434): »Si enim posuerimus quod iste intellectus materialis est

ieratus per numerationem individuorum hominum, continget ut sit aliquid hoc,corpus aut virtus in corpore. Et cum fuerit aliquid hoc, exit intentio intellecta inint ia<c cf. ibid . (392, v . 169-171).

II



59 2

. Carlos Baz ā n

i i

proper to the lowest of intellectual substances: because of its »proportio«

material forms that are carried by images, the receptive intellect must com

into contact with individual human beings. This rapport results in establis]ing an operational union, an operative composite, whose fruit is actual unde

standing (intelligere in actu). There are three principles of this c o mp osi te : threceptive and agent intellects, and the images that carry the forms. The higj

est sensitive faculty of the individual, i. e. the imaginative — or the cogitative

faculty participates thus in the act of intellection as provider of images. Its ro]

is so important that it deserves to be called »intellect« in the broadest sense c

the word. That is why it receives the name of intellectus passibilis (o r parsiuus l

James of Venise's translation), which is corruptible, as Aristotle stated i430a25. Through this, their highest faculty, human beings are united with t

intellect and participate in the act of intellection. Being the highest facult

the intellectus passibilis defines the sensitive soul proper to humans and assure

to them their specific difference with respect to other animals."

In order to understand how this union between the separate intellect anindividuals by the intermediary of the imagination — this copulatio per ph ant'

siam — is possible, it is necessary to note that the object known has, accordiii

to Averroes, a double support or subiectum: the image and the receptivevtellect. From the first comes its truth content, from the second its beinknown." In the act of intellection, the form provided by images plays the rill

of formal cause specifying the act; the intellect plays the role of matter recer.

ing the form. Individuals do not participate in the exercise of thought by th

intellect, which is separate from them, but by the objects of knowledge pr

vided by images, which are proper to them.i9

This unique and, so far, clear noetic doctrine was however not withdiambiguities. One of them is the relationship between the separate agent

material intellects. This relationship pertains to a kind of intentionality in whic"

humans do not participate. As a separate substance, the receptive intellect

17 Ibid. III, 20 (454, v. 315-316): »Et per istum intellectum differt homo ab aliismal ibus .o

18 Ibid. III, 5 (412, v. 725-727): »subiectum secundum quod est vera, scilicet forymaginationis, et [...] subiectum per quod est intellectus ens (et est materialis)o.

19 Ibid. III, 5 (404-405, v. 501-520): »Dicamus igitur quod manifestum est quod he

non est intelligens in actu nisi propter continuationem intellecti cum eo in actualimpossibile est ut intellectum copuletur cum unoquoque hominum et numeretur.numerationem eorum per partem que est de eo quasi materia, sc. intellectum_terialem; remanet ut continuatio intellectorum cum nobis hominibus sit per Contitionem intentions intellecte cum nobis (et sunt intentiones ymaginate), sc. partis que e

nobis de eis aliquo modo quasi forma.« For more on this subject, cf. Bnz āN 1981.1,



Radical A ristotelianism in the Faculties of Arts93 4

s

»propowards the superior realm and knows the agent intellect without

:ellect F"es.In this act of intellection the knower and the object known

sUl ncal,as Aristot le had stated (430a4). In referring to this intentio-'t Ave r roe s use d e xp re s s ions t ha t w ou l d c a use p rob l e ms o f i n t e r -

is cōm not on ly fo r m edieva l m as ters, bu t a lso fo r con temp ora ry h i s to ri ans ,

forms ōse expressions could give the appearance that for Averroes the

)r the , . ateria l intellect were facult ies of one substance —the intellect ive

of irnag hiriwhich they are related as matter and form, when in fact their

bro ād Ót a subs tant ia l one , but one tha t ob ta ins be tween know er and ob-

bilis ( ō,hich leaves intact the conception of the two intellects as two

a r i s tō ubstances.2° The other ambiguity concerns the rather lax way in:rre unit rroes wrote about the intellect, referring to it as a »form«. The

ê h 'h e-òf thinking is an imm ediate datum of our consciousne ss. Even i f the

mans : receptive principles of intellection are separate substances,, we

als.1 atewe think when we want, as if those substances were under our

sate ē ason for that, according to Averroes, is that intellection takes

opula s a c c o rd i ng t o t he i ma g e s o f ou r phantasia, which are really in our

mlis;activate. But because we are part of the operational unity that

thē.r t e l lec t ion , and nothing pe rform s

an ope ra t ion e xc e p t b y i ts fo rm , E.se c ō n a id tha t both in te l lec t s can be ca l led ou r »form s«. 21Obviously, by

Lges p a t f »form« Averroes understands a principle of operation ratherof na c ip le ofbeing. As we will see, this particular conception, and its

oft o - ` : biguities, found propitious grounds to develop in the mid-thir-

>f kno fury. ' I,ever t; j•';per ,`,,. I

,

itioriepti o f s - : in De animaIII, 5 ed Cawod 406 v 556565 Sge o Baban

pe though intialytha bohinelecswetwfacutieso asngese-

1?sance bu lae onrecognzedthemaswsubsances Thedocrne

t ho gtowchtheagen andmeia inelec aefacutieso thehumnsou

ònamngmseso atsduingthefirs haf o thethrteenhcenuy

very";- esu cetanyno anauhenicAerosicdocrine shoudno becaledIj...

s m- vrism bu ms beconsdeedinseadasoneo thems oigna con I';

o the--Lainmsestotheinepeaiono Aisolespsychoogy C 'l

11un' 000 4345

n:ē:r

"

Ēs,-InDanima in, 18, ed. Crawford, 439-440. – The operational union be I 'sc.' e separate intellects and individual human beings continues throughout our

Pus jt is at the end, when all the forms of our imagination have been actualized

I ..

stag nt and received by the receptive intellect, that it reaches its perfection and II I

.!

:f .' .. : eels achieve their role of forms. (cf. ibid. III 36, ed. Crawford, 499-500).

I



594. Carlos Baz ā n

'"

3. T he c onditions of possibilitythe speculative facult

,..'' texts is a lready re aso

What made itossible for this doctrine to be adopted by Latin masters inhe they a re p la tthirteenth and fourteenth centuries? It is, indeed, a strange doctrine,n, ana general doc trine of t fI wond er i f any of us wou ld subscr ibe to i t . 2 2 So, how can w e exp la in tha t the , ` said is that these res t]doc t r i ne o f t he un i c it y o f t he i n te l le c t w a s a c c e p t e d b y pe op l e w ho m a de i ts instrum ent , the e^the exerc i se of in te ll igence the suprem e reason of the i r profess iona l pr ide?;: : L intel lect (o no ū s), it se

is not subject to cornkai to theorein) decline

a) T he A ristotelian aporiae;^; ^' intellect is impassible

` , . mind, but ra ther ofThere w ere, f i rs t of a l l , theoret ical reasons w hose origin is to be foun d in Aris " does so . Mem ory an ,toile himself, the »auctoritas« that the masters of arts were supposed to ex ' the mind, but of theplain faithfully. The ontological status of the intellect is far from being clearly;:: th e mind is somethirdefined in the Treatise On the Soul, and the difficulty of the task was ac=;? , ; son am ong a l l theseknow ledged by Aris totle himself (403a3-5). Every time that Aris totle mak es a ? :` ; . source of the » noeti<s tep forward in the c la r i f ica t ion of h i s hy lomorphic theory , he w ould a lso add . : _ ' commenta tors whoa res t r i c t ion c oncern ing the in te l lec t . Afte r s ta t ing tha t the sub jec t of ope ra ; ,tions is man, he adds »but mind seems to be an independent substance en_

t f ' ° gendered in us, and to be imperishable« (408b18-19). 2 3 After cr it iciz ing -the ' b) Aaerroes's »deconstrutheory con cerning the par t s of the soul , he adds : » i f the soul as a whole holds. .

together the whole body, it is natural that each of the parts should hold to, By the t ime when Agether some pa r t o f the body. But th i s seems im poss ib le ; fo r i t is ha rd eve n to : : in te rpre ta tion had e

st imagine w hat par t the m ind w i ll hold toge the r , or how i t wi ll do i t« (411bI5= ' intellect. He unders±

10). After s t a ting , a s a consequence of hy lom orphism, tha t the soul cannot be , " ; »deconstructing < th{ separated from the body, he adds: »there is nothing to prevent some parts; w ha t he c ons i de red

being separated, because they are not actualities of any bod <<413a7-8 . , `with controversial FAfte r expla in ing tha t the so ul i s the pr inc ip le of a l l the func t ions of the l iv ing . resolving the aporiabeing through its faculties, he asks whether each of these faculties is soul,: ciples of Aristoteliana nd he ob se rve s t ha t fo r som e o f t he m t he so lu t i on i s ea sy , a dd i ng how e ve r the priority of the f

; . : . tha t » in the case of the m ind and the th ink ing facul ty no thing i s ye t c l ear ; it corol la ry , the impo ^seem s to be a di s t inc t k ind of sou l , and i t a lone ad m i ts of be ing separa ted , as ; of understanding,26the imm orta l f rom the pe r i shab le« (413b13-16) . F ina l ly , a f te r having es tab= gnoseological level ,lished that the general definition of the soul is equivocal or at the mostand=logical l ike the d efini t ion of a rect i l inear f igure, he a dds: »the co nsiderat ion of; : _ 24 The ma terialism c

a ism (mainly Avicei22 Even if we go t used to Absolute Spirits leading history,ollective Unconscious'Yespecially the theo:; . .

influencing our perception of reality, or horizons of understandig (social, economic,. ,: 25 AvERRoEs, In De a

cultural or linguistic) conditioning the way we think, we always presuppose that .we ma jor role in Th<^ { ' • , ' ; : . have an intellectual principle of our own. anima, q. 8 (Ed. L e

23 We use as translation: HE Z-r 1957. ) 6 AvERxoES, In De a

h^ I I



•


at in masters innge do ctrine,!,

we e xp la in tha teople who madeofessionai nridl ,

speculat ive facu lty is another quest ion < (415a11 -12). If every one of theser : t s is a l ready reason for concern , the i r loca t ion in the t rea t ise i s even mo re ,

3 cause they a re p l aced in such a w ay tha t they seem to l imi t the scope of theera l doc t r ine o f the soul tha t Ar i s to tle has dev eloped. The leas t tha t can be

^•°. is'd ^ that these restrict ions seem to create a dist inct ion between the inte l lect ,

instrume nt , the exerc i se of though t , and the sub jec t of th i s opera t ion . The

n t ē llect (o no ū s), i t seems, exis ts in us as possessing a su bstant ia l exis tence a nd, , • . .s no t subjec t to corrup t ion . The exerc i se o f thought and kn owledge (to noein dé

iii to thieorein) dec l ines when som e in te r ior organ i s des t royed , but in it se l f the

ritellec t i s impass ib le . »Thinking , loving and ha t ing , a re a ffec t ions not of the

hind, but rather of the individual which possesses the mind, in so far as itfoes so. Mem ory and love fa i l when th i s pe r i shes ; for they were never pa r t of

he m i nd , b u t o f t he w ho l e e n t it y (t o ū koinoū ) which has pe r i shed. Presumably

he m ind is som ething more d ivine, and is unaffec ted« (408b 1 9-3Q). The ten-ion amo ng a l l these e l ements c rea ted by such pa radoxica l s ta tem ents a re theõurce of the »noe t ic prob lem« an d of the conf l ic t of in te rpre ta t ions be tweenom m enta tors who s t ruggled to so lve the apor iae of Aris to t le ' s De anima.

A verroes's »dleconstructive« project

By the t ime when Averroes wro te h i s Commentarium magnum, l aye r a f te r l aye r ofin te rpre ta t ion had en r iched and o bscured A ris to t le ' s doc t r ine of the soul andntellect. He undertook, with considerable scholarship, the difficult task of

de c ons t ruc t ing << t he h i s to ry o f Pe r ipa t e t ic i sm w i th a v i e w o f r e c upe ra t i ngat he considered to be the authentic Aristotelian doctrine. 2 4 Confronted

with cont rovers ia l passages ofDe anima, he adopted a method consisting in

resolving the apor iae by p lac ing them under the l ight of we l l -es tab l ished p r in-' c iples of Aris totelian phi losophy. Aga inst Alexander 's ma teria lism h e oppose dthe priority of the formal and final cause (m ateria est propter formam) 2 5 with i tscoro l la ry , the im poss ib il i ty tha t the e lem ents could genera te a facu l ty capableof understanding, 2 6 and he argued that the intellect, though in potency at the

gnoseological level, should be conceived as a substance at the ontological

24 The materialism of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the different forms of Neoplaton-

ism (mainly Avicenna's) had deformed, in his opinion, not only hylomorphism, butespecially the theory of the intellect.25 A v E x x o E S , In De anima II, 36, ed. Crawford, 185, v. 26. This principle would play a

major role in Thomas's psychology; cf. THOMAS D E A Q u u v o, Quaestiones dispu tatae deanima, q. 8 (Ed. Leon. 24/1), 66 adn. 177-178.

26 AvExxoE S, In De anima III, 5, ed Crawford, 398, v. 319-320.

o b e found i n • 1rre supposed to_:from being clearf the task w ast A ris totle makeshe would a l so a

e subject of op^rent substance ë:fter criticizing Ì:Ii l as a whole h ō li

r ts should hold : tr i t i s ha rd eveni l l do i t« (411bl

the soul cannot 1revent some pi,body« (413a7--

ct ions of the liviifacu l t ies is a Si

y , adding how ē vhing is yet clear;eing separated , ''

af te r having es tār at the most an

e consideration

l le c t ive Unconsc io īsi g ( soc i a l , e conomic

s p re suppose tha t w<






to cr i t icize mater ialiseDh i lo sophe rs seem ed . 1

, v. 142-151).

an important role in; a l hy lomorph i sm.has a corollary, namel• 141, v.63; 142, v.80homas Aquinas.

conception of the soul as a spiritual substance

'prevalent conception of the soul during the first half of the thirteenth

rit i ē P

{î ry; am ong both theologians and m aste rs of a r t s , is tha t the soul i s a sp i -1 substance that also plays the role of »perfection« of the body. 3 2 The: a most commonly used to express the substantial nature of the intel-

C ivē sou l was to s ay tha t i t was a hoc aliqu id, wh ich t rans la tes the greek tō de ti,

ēdby Aristotle to refer to primary substances, i. e. to substances in the

op r sense of the word (not to parts or components of a substance). The

fiori of the intellect ive soul as a spiri tual substance is found v ery early in the

itingsof t he m a s t e r s o f a r ts . 3 3 The substantial nature of the soul was alson i non ' doc t r ine a m ong t he o l og i a ns : spiritualem verissime substantiam earn esse,

riliam of Auvergne used to say, and he was echoed by Philip the Chancel-

`, Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle and Bonaventure. Among ther,pm inicans , Alber t the Grea t , who hes i ta ted for a mo men t incall ing the soul

hoc aliquid – probab ly und er the pressure of Averroes ' a rgum ent l imi t ing tha;...pression to material substances - ended up embracing the doctrine, and

ē n Thomas Aquinas did so at the beginning of his career.' A spiritualistic

;On this subject, see my article: BAzAi 1997. This doctrine, and the anthropological;dualism that is its necessary consequence, resulted from the influence of patristicsources (Nemesius, Augustine, among others) and Arabic sources (mainly Avicenna),

s !where the Latin thinkers learned to consider the nature of the soul as that of a spi-ritual substance, and from an insufficient understanding of Aristotle's hylomorphismthat led them to conceive that being a form was simply a role or a function perfor-

^n ed by this substance.

tIt is present already in the treatise De anima et poteneiis eius, written around 1225 by ani. anonymous master. Peter of Spain, who knew Averroes' Commentary, expressed the:=idea in clear terms around 1240: »anima secundum omnem sui differentiam est sub-_stantia que est hoc aliquid.o Pan us HispANus, In De anima, ed. Alonso, 518. Conse-

- quently the name »anima« does not express this substantial characteristic, but only a

function, or anofficium: » Dicit dyonisius et avicenna quod anima non est nomen sub-Io'stancie set officii et ita anima intellectiva non debet dici intellectus nisi ab operatione

ē t :aposteriori.« (Ibid., 381) Peter repeated the same doctrine in his Scientia de anima:: • (cf . PE Rus HispANus , Scientia de anima, ed. Alonso, 17, v. 18-31). The same idea iso foiind again in the Ps.- Peter of Spain (cf. Ps. Pxntus His p ANus, Ex positio libri De ani-

ma, ed. Alonso, 325; cf 327-328), in Roger Bacon, and in anonymous commentarieson De anima written by masters of arts between 1246 and 1260, many of which have

T already been published or are about to be edited (cf. BAzkN 1997, 107-109). Thefact that the masters of arts during the first half of the thirteenth century – and bey-ond – considered the intellectual soul as a hoc aliquid is yet another argument againstlabelling them »first averroists«. Nothing, indeed, more opposite to Averroes' viewsthan considering the intellect to be a hoc aliquid; cf. supra, nt. 15 and 16.BAZAN 1997, 110-112.

)ns that reserved forsnphasized the fact-4

cept ive in te ll ec t jJ:n and unicity thattellect. 2 8 A combin 4e theoretical difcwr ightly pointed out1t ter is required onlyt ransmuta t ion , but

i the unicity o f the ' ; ;

in the intellect hellse ma tter is principleakes of the inte l lectGod) , because a l l ftddi ty and subs tance

m ode l o f i n t e rp re tpropo s i t ions of a '

a of w hich tha t texbe rigorous in l q

– a charac teris t icaared the reve.ren.che thirteenth centt

Aristotle's writingso ve rc o me t h e

• t icu la r ly appea linc lus ions tha t

u l^

` C '



598. Carlos Baz ā n Radical A ril,

conception of the intellective soul presided over the eclectic dualistic , hest operat ion of the compthropology – a com bina t ion of Aris to te li anism and N eopla tonism – tha t

4fis not surpris ing that Lat in t I

firmly entrenched in medieval circles since the very beginning of the ''' e. def init ion of the soul giverteenth century.11ective soul only analogical)

Ec l e c t ic i sm re qu i re s a c c om oda t i on o f som e t im e s m ut ua l ly e xc l us ivein 11 e he b re e d i ng g rounds c

c ip les . Inevi tab ly , tha t i s don e a t the pr ice of w eaken ing som e of the rr i . V1

exam ple , if the soul is cons ide red to be a sp i r i tua l subs tance , i t becom escessary to in t rodu ce in i t a sor t of com posi t ion in orde r to di s t inguish i t "ō n _ " ,.0 ognitiae extrinsecism

tologically from the absolute s implic i ty of the Firs t Cause. Lat in thinkerstwo models of composition that could ensure this distinction; one was ` tZ ;; y , »cognit ive extrinsecismo I

»Boethian« composi t ion be tween quod est and esse; the other, the A ristote ' '",knowledge that states – in a r

composition of matter and form. Without much concern for the spec f#c depends on the as s istance of am eaning of these compos i t ions , some m as ters appea led to bo th of them a t d i " effic iency of the inmediate cai

sa me t i me . 3 5 The result of this accomodation is that a substance, itself co ''- the representatives of » augusti

posed of m at te r and form , pe rforms a l so the ro le of »form« or pe rfec t ion • `' persona l principle of intellect i

the body . The pr ice pa id for th i s syncre t ic so lut ion i s the weak ening ,of . t l' . sic cause, creat ing ft^ ^n g thus

Aristotelian not ion of form 3 6 and of the uni ty of the composi te soul-body. .Dî ` g g round fo r radical Aris totelto the preva lence of these doc t r ines , the Lat in m inds were t ra ined to th ink ; ``fjthe intellect ive soul as a spiri tual substance enjoying an existence and an or

ē) Resolution of the internal tensionra t ion of i ts ow n; of i t s ro le of form as an ojicium quite far from the n ot ion 'of i rst ac t ; of the union be tween sou l and body n ot as the im m edia te union ; r.

obtainsequi resb e t w e e n m a t t er a nd fo rm , b u t a s one t ha t r e que s i n t e rm e d i a r ie s ; ' asters^ ;f a r t s were h igh ly t ra

.:

the soul as giving only an esse completivum in view of the performance of ;Ehon the texts tha t were par t of tWort to reach their authentic

ne r . S ome o f t he se ma s t e r s , c35 That was the case of Peter of Spain, who stated that the soul is composita ex quo psi

qu od est sicut q uelibet su bstancialis vel ex materia et forma spirituali (Pans Hisp tsms, In ec tur ing on De anima, unsatisianima, ed. Alonso, 518, v. 15-17; cf. also 510, v.9-22). It must be underlined th theirroach adopted by the rede

'matter« that enters into the composition of the soul is only a »spiritual« matte»hoc aliquid dicitur duobus modis: uno modo dicitur hoc aliquid quod est .comp) 7 Cf. PErRus H1sPANus, In De an

turn, et hoc modo rei que est hoc aliquid competit dare vitam [...] alio modo dic!• pletivum corpori et est principi

hoc aliquid illud quod est compositurn ex materia et forma et tali hoc aliquid ;r 38 , % The existence of such theories

competit dare vitam.« The weakening of the notion of form is clear, regardless of : futation of extrinsecism contai

distinction, because it is still stated that a complete substance can play the role q. 11, a. 1 (Ed. Leon. 22/2), 3

»form«. The anonymous author of the Qu estions super librum D e anima of MS Sie trinsecism was not only an ex

Bibl. Corn. L III.21 introduced the composition of matter and form in the soul .: r gustine, and with the support

the anonymous author of the questions on De anima edited by Vennebusch introduc . ! accept that the exercice of thoi

a composition between »quo est« and »quod est« asthe potential and actual'cō in intelligence and that the role o

ponents of the spiritual substance. The same can be said of many other masters ,.; Spain put it: »intellectus agen

arts and theologians (cf. B zAie 2000, 48-51). +.-. inpressiones suscipit a supremorm '36 Peter of Spain exemplified best this point when he asserted that »duplex est f

`

: !ormas receptas possibili inpri

quedam est que est forma tantum; quedam que est forma et substantia« PE is •377, v. 33-36. Cf. 385, v. 25

OF SPAN, In De anima, ed. Alonso, 83, v. 13-14; 84, v. 31-33; 88, v.28-29; 77 ;: :entia (separata), in qua in of

v. 17-20. t a rum.«

1'




highes t operation of the composite. 3 7 Under these theoretical circumstances,

i t i s not surpr i s ing tha t La t in th inkers w ere a l so t ra ined to ac cept the idea tha t

the de f in i t ion of the sou l g iven by A ris to t le in h i s De anima applies to the in-t e l lec t ive soul only ana logica l ly , i f not equivoca l ly . These c i rcumstanc es a reone o f t he b re e d i ng g rounds o f radical Aris totel ianism.

d) Cognitive extrinsecism

By »cogn i t ive ext r insec ism« ' I unders tand the chara c te r i s ti c of any theory ofknowledge that states – in a number of ways – that the exercise of thoughtdepen ds on the assis tance of a separa te source of intellect ion, limit ing thus the

E f f i c iency o f the inm edia te causes to a prepara tory ro le . 3 8 Although none of

the representa t ives of »augu s t in ism e avicennisant< d enied the exis tence of apersonal principle of intellection, they subordinathd it nonetheless to an ext r ins ic cause , c rea t ing thus a f rame of m ind tha t I cons ide r the second b reed-i ng g round fo r radical Aris totel ianism.

e) Resolution of the internal tensions of syncretism

Ma sters of arts were highly t ra ined in logic as well as in the art of »lecturing <on the texts tha t were par t of the curr iculum in a r t s , wich im pl ied for them aneffort to reach their authentic meaning and to present it in a coherent man-ner. Some of these masters, confronted with the Aristotelian aporiae when

lecturing on De anima, unsa t i s f ied wi th the incons is tenc ies of the ec lec t ic ap-proach ad opted by the i r predecessors , having reached a be t te r unders tanding

37 Cf. PErxus HisPAxus , In De anima, ed. Alonso, 231, v. 30-32: »anima dat esse com-pletivum corpori et est principium operationis in illo.«

38 The existence of such theories in the thirteenth century is attested by the strong re-futation of extrinsecism contained in Thomas Aquinas' Qu aestio disputata De v eritate,q. 11, a. 1 (Ed. Leon. 22/2), 347sqq. Although its main exponent was Avicenna, ex-trinsecism was not only an expressions of »arabisme«. Under the influence of Au-gustine, and with the support of some scriptural passages, Latin thinkers learned toaccept that the exercice of thought is made possible by the intervention of a superiorintelligence and that the role of secondary causes was a preparatory one. As Peter ofSpain put it: » intellectus agens ad rerum superiorum contemplationem elevatus est,inpressiones suscipit a supremis causis rerum consistentias percipiens, omnes veroformas receptas possibili inprimit.« PETxus HcsPANus , Scientia de anima, ed. Alonso,

• . 377, v. 33-36. Cf. 385, v. 25-27: » Causa igitur dandi ei has formas est hec intelli-gentia (separata), in qua in effectu sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstrac-

tarum.«

c t ic dua l i s ti c an-onism – tha t was

ring of the thin_

ly exclusive pr in_me of them. For .e, i t becom es ne- . •dist inguish i t ona t in th inkers had.on ; one w a s t he

the Aristote l ian . 'for the spec i f ic,th of them at the -

tance, itself Corn -

orr perfection of '.weakening of th ee soul-body. Due-a i red to th ink ofence and an opeom t he no t ion o fedia te union tha tntermedia r i es 1 of

r fo rmance of the

somposita ex quo est ettus Htsp ANus, In Deunderlined that the»spiritual« matter:

d quod est comple-.] alio modo diciturali hoc aliquid nonir, regardless of this

an play the role ofanima of MS Siena,n in the soul, whileinebusch introduces

al and actual corn-y other masters of

»duplex est forma:substantia« PETER

88, v.28-29; 177,

i s i I.F f

I I : .! Ii iI " : I I I



600. Car1osBaánir.aof the Aristotelian system as a whole, and being acquainted with Averroes ' nothing prevents one frmethod of searching the meaning of a controversial text by appealing to th e õr unique, is the »perfe

logical consistency of the system, dared to draw the conclusions that allow us,;;;;;_

are equally strong in bto define radical Aristotelianism.sion: the general defini

To begin with, they knew that the property of being a hoc aliqu id goes ha n d , - Soul. But one - the posiin hand with the property of being »separate<, as Aristotle has taught in of its dramatic consequtaphysics V, 8 1017b24-26 and VII, 3 1029a28-30. Hoc aliqu id, for Ar is tot le , is reassuring confusion ofequivalent with individuality. »Separate« (k'zoristÓn) refers mainly to the pro- This is the line of thperty by which substances have independent existence and consequently do. representative theses, nnot need a subject of inherence; derivately it also means that they are not priate to call it an »Ari

received in matter. This connection of ideas was already acknowleged by Pe. __________ insisted, the main pureter of Spain: »substancie que sunt hoc aliquid distant per essentiam a mater ia totle's authentic thoughet per se fixe sunt.« 3 9 But if the soul is a hoc aliqu id, as was widely accepted in of Aristotle's De anima.the Latin West, the inevitable consequence that follows from the aforemen proponents advanced ittioned principles is that the soul is a purely immaterial substance. 4 0 On the rigorous inference consother hand, as matter was considered to be the principle of numerical mul- -Cause they did so beintiplication within a species, it was logical to conclude also that a< Q from it. It could also bsubstance could only be unique in its species. •flicts with principles of

The unicity of the intellective soul seems then to be a logical development ënces: first, it would beof the doctrine according to which the soul is a spiritual substance. The an when we speak of »Chrthropological dualism proper to most Latin thinkers at the beginning of the sonal beliefs of particulithirteenth century evolved into another, more metaphysical dualism. 4 ' f the One of them dealt withseparation of the Agent intellect was acceptable, why not accept also the se rodox« thesis a necessarparation of the receptive intellect and make of the whole intellective soul a______ a l so be ca l l ed »Ave i - r o jsseparate substance? That would require intermediaries, bien entendu, but source both of the thesitermediaries were also required to unite the spiritual soul with its body, asmost of the theologians themselves have stated. No true hylomorphic unity

42 In the hypothesis of unwould be established between man and the separate intellectual substance, tional, and the hylomoibut that was also the case in the previous, anthropological dualism. In a mi-, be safeguarded; while ilieu where the notion of substantial form has lost its Aristotelian meanin pression that the union

the human being is »pe.separate substance, whi

39 PmusHIsPMus, In De anima, ed. Alonso, 330, v. 17-20. whole perfection of ma40 This conclusion, i. e. that the intellective soul is an individual and separate substance - humbly it might be

fits perfectly with the passages of De anima where Aristotle states that the intellect 5 This position is no mor»separateo (429b5; 430a17; 430a22). rality of forms, than the

41 If the dualism of the first kind is somehow a return to the Platonic tension between____________

principle of operation thbody and soul, each considered to be a substance, the second one is a return to all what is meant by »fomthe tensions proper to the Aristotelian noetic problem, which arises when an hylor according to which themorphic and consequently corruptible composite - the human being - is said to bt ing the separate intellerelated with a »separate« and consequently incorruptible intellect, in whose activit) notion of form thanhuman beings participate. But Latin thinkers were used to deal with extrinsecism. J1110 :entally (as an ojicium) a




with A v erroes ' noth ing preven t s one f rom saying tha t an in te l lec tua l subs tance , be i t m ul t ip leppealing to the 'ior unique , is the »perfe ct ion« of the sensi t ive body. The theoret ical difficult ies

s t ha t a l low us ' a re equa l ly s t rong in both cases . 4 2 Both positions arrive at the same conclu-s ion: the genera l de f in i t ion of the sou l appl ie s equivoca l ly to the in te l lec t ive

i quid goes hand . : soul. But one – the posi t ion assert ing its unici ty – is awa re of the problem ands t aught in Me- . . s °f i ts dram atic conseque nces; the other is not , working as i t does in the fa lselyfor Aristotle, is . . reassuring confusion of syncret ism.i n lo theo-ro , :his is the l ine of thought that defines radical Aristote l ianism by one of i tsIonsequent ly do representa t ive theses , nam ely the unic i ty of the in te l lec t ive soul . I t is appro - ^ J

x•,

a t they a re no t :" . pr ia te to ca l l it an »Aris to te li anism« beca use , as F . Van S teenberghen a lw ays

lowleged by Pe_ ins i s ted , the m ain purpo se of the propon ents of th i s thes i s was to reach A ris -t iam a ma te r ia to i le ' s authent ic though t : the thes i s wa s adv anced as a fa i thful in te rpre ta t ion k 1 . 1

ely accep ted in . , ^ . of Aristotle's De anima. It is appropriate to call this thesis radical because i tst he a fo re me n propone n t s a dva n c e d i t a s a r e so l u t ion o f A r i st o t el ia n a po r i a e b y m e a ns o f a

ance . 4 0 On the ;: +. r igorous infe rence cons is tent wi th the Aris to te l ian sys tem as a w hole , and be -n u m e r i c a l mill- ' cause they did so being aware of the grave theoretical problems that derive

a t a »separa te« . . ' from it. It could also be called »heterodox« Aristotelianism, because it con- ;!

flicts with principles of Christian faith, but this would have two inconveni-

a l deve lopment '.

3 . ences : f i rs t, i t would be som ehow an ext r ins ic qua l i fi ca t ion , l ike the one usedstance. The .an= : wh en we speak of »Chris ti an« phi losophy; second , it would pre judge the pe r-eginning of the " ' sona l be l ie fs of par t icula r authors and ov ers impl i fy the prob lem of how ea chual ism . ' ' If t l ' . one of them dea l t wi th the con f l ic t a t the epis temologica l l eve l ( i s the »he te -ept a lso the ' s ē - F :rodox<< thes is a necessary or jus t a probab le con c lus ion?). And f ina lly i t could

te l lective sou l a l so be ca l l ed »Averroism«, bu t in a re s t r ic ted sense . Averroes , indeed, i s theentendu, but`source both of the thesis and of the method that led to it; the unicity of the

i th i ts body, as :omo rphic uni t}

42In the hypothesis of unicity it will be known, at least, that the union is only opera-

Ctual substan ` tional, and the hylomorphic unity of the human being as a sensitive composite will';alism. In a be safeguarded; while in the hypothesis of multiplicity we would have the false im-

t e l i an meanie pression that the union between two substances is a truly hylomorphic one. Again, ifthe human being is »perfected« both by its sensitive soul, which is its form, and by a

separate substance which operates in it and depends on it it can be said that thewhole perfection of man includes that separate substance, because by contributing

substahat the intellect

(umbly it might be said, but necessarily - to its operation, we participate in it.r 'his position is no more inconsistent with hylomorphism than the theory of the plu-

rality of forms, than the notion of anima composita or than the loose notion of form as ( ::i: ;; .

s tension between principle of operation that grantsan esse compleduum. And if it is argued that this is not

is a return to?: what is meant by »form< in the Aristotelian system, one could reply that the thesises when an :hyl according to which the continuatio intellectus nobiscum is sufficient ground for consider

ins said to— r:

g eparate intellect as our »perfection« is no more inconsistent with a strict :^ L ,.

i n wh ose ' a c t i ve notion of form than the idea that the soul is essentially a substance and only acci-extrinsecism. dentally (as an of fcium) a form.



Radical A

rnonopsych ism is the eclectictinkers . For an ec lec t ic

hags even w o r s e , bec a us e 1 -ristotelianis m f rom Ne op l athe truth value of Aristotlet houg h t , pa ve t he w a y fo r n

III. Th

8iger was not the only auth

t r ine of the unici ty of the intthesis was never extraordinam as ters a re found who kep tc e n t u ry . T he pa r t i c u l a r do<

dzi s law Kuksew icz in a besive .study of Latin Av erroisn

Siger of Brabant , by the c l a' .to the theoret ical ch allenge:r e e xa mi na t ion o f h i s ow n droists«, from Giles of Orlea

. ,t e l lec tua l dram a of radical 4unde rstanding the fa te of Ai

The unicity of the intelle

'. ,pical ly A verroist ic doctr ine

they kept us ing Averroes ' cc? ^ This is the situation till arotma s t er o f a r t s w ho e mb ra c ,Qu aestiones in IIIm De anima,

45 In this respect L. Bianchi'sof why John of Vercelli reca

46 KutcsEwicz 1968.

47 Cf. BAznN 2000.48 When I edited this text sor

Gauthier raised serious objicf . GAUrH IER 1983 , e sp . 20the Nov a translation of De a

:.: that Thomas Aquinas's Q u c

• 1269. My own research ha


material intellect is one of his most original contributions to the history .J

Peripateticism. However, for the masters who adopted that thesis ar ound .

1265 Averroes was the »commentator«, not the »auctor« whose authenticthought they were trying to determine. Nonetheless, given the originality;th is in terpre ta t ion — Averroes w as the f i r s t to p ropose i t — , the t e rm »Aver= 'ro i s t« can be used a dequ a te ly in the res tr i c t ive sense of »pa r t isan of the Vic :i ty of the inte l lect ive sou l«.

The effort to recover Aristotle's authentic thought proper to these ridic¢(Aristotelians has much in common with Thomas Aquinas' project. Thomas

also wanted to recover the authentic sense of Aristotelian hylomorphism

w h i c h he c ons i de re d to b e e nda ng e re d b y t he N e op l a t on ic f r a me w ork whe r7 ,it has been placed, and where it played a subsidiary role destined to seciir ē '_

some sort of unity in the human composite in spite of the inconsistency ofus ing hylomorphism to un i t e two subs tances . Instead of accep t ing the p rem isetha t the soul i s a hoc aliqu id, he s trongly em phasized tha t the soul is essential ly , ,a subs tant ia l form and, through a care ful ana lys i s of what i s requi red to behoc aliqu id ( i . e . subs is t ence and com ple te essence), he conc luded tha t the sow " ,is not properly speaking a hoc aliquid, and cannot be properly called a subst

ance, because it is only a part of the human essence. It could be called hoc:

aliquid only per reductionem, in the same sense tha t the com ponents of a subs t - ànce a re ca l l ed subs tances . 4 3 Both the radicals and Thomas shared the same'

respec t for the »separa t ion« of the in te ll ec t and the imm ate r ia l i ty o f in te l lec=Lion, but , in a similar effort to be consistent with Aristote l ian principles, they:draw di f fe rent conc lus ions .

In a remarkable article published in 1984, Luca Bianchi called the atten''t ion to the intervent ion of William of Baglione, holder of the Franciscan chairof theology a t the Univers i ty of Par i s , who, in h i s ques t ions di sputed be tween

1266 a nd 1267 , de nounc e d t hose w ho re fuse t o a c c e p t t ha t t he sou l »e x . .ntura sua s i t hoc a l iquid , e t cum ho c s i t ve ra pe rfec t io corpor i s fac iens cum eb ,unum esseo of being responsible for the pernicious error of monopsychisml

and of endangering the immortality of the soul. In unequivocal terms hstates that these thinkers who maintain »quod [...] anima rationalis non esthoc aliquid, et quod non est prima perfectio humani corporis, et sic non est

prima p e rfec t io hominis (unfa i r c r i ti c i sm, i f adressed to Thom as) , favent i J1 ipe rnic ios i ss imo e rror i Com m enta tor i s de uni ta te in te l lec tus ,« becau se both ' "

theses »sun t fundam entum i ll ius er ror is« ." The on ly vacc ine aga ins t the f lu 6f43 The key t ex t i s THOMA S DE AQ uiNo, Qaaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 1 (Ed . Leon . 24 /1) ,

3-12, and the para lle l texts indicated in th is cr i t ical edi t ion. Cf. also BAZA N 199 7.44 BieNcsn 1984 , pa r t . 507. Cf . a lso VAN STEE NBERG H EN 1 977, 33-34 and the wr i t ings

of Fr. I. Brady quoted by him.

1

f





604. Carlos Baz ā n Radical

cease to evo lve towards a m ore modera te v iew and ended up aban d o n j r i g Fad a s stating a necessity»m onopsych ism«. Al though i t i s widely recognized tha t Thom as Aqde se est corruptibilis« d

argum ents p layed an im portant ro le in Siger ' s evolut ion , i t must be a d d e d states that this incorruptibithat Siger followed his own way and that his own noetic w as in state of crisis but.from the causality of itbefore Thom as' intervention, as I will show further do wn. The presentat ion` second thesis: the eternityof Siger 's radical Aristotelianism w ill follow, then, the v arious stages of h 'philosophical conclusion: »evolution. s a r . i U m « ( q . 5, p. 6, v . 64-6

The Qu aestiones in Illm De anima are the expression of Siger's most radic ' on the w ill of the First Caposit ion. The doc trinal content of this text has bee n the subject of m agisteri ' fold scrutinize such a transexposes by Van Steenberghen and other scholars. 4 9 Consequently I need cal. f . the theologian, who se ccto present the ma in points related to the subject at study. First of all, the unic

. - t's he is to explore with rati oi ty of the intellect is fi rmly stated: »unu s est intellectus diversorum , una erg` , ā anifested by Revelat ionest substantia intellectus, et similiter una potestas« (q. 9, p. 28, v. 60-61). O n " That is why Siger acknowlethe basis of the Aristotelian principle according to w hich every direct effect of 'on the basis of an analys isthe Firs t Cause is e ternal , S iger conc ludes that for A ris to tle the in te l lect ,departure, and consequentshould also be eternal precisely because, given i ts nature as a separate subst , sicut ostensum est , ipsa taianc e, i t can only be a direct effect of the First Cause (q. 2, p. 5-6, v . 44-52a- v. 81-83). I have a lways fotFor ho weve r corrupt ib le the rela t ionship betw een the unique intel lec t a r i" ':humility when dealing Wittparticular individuals may be, the intellect in itself and absolutely considered The un ique and sepa ra tis eternal, as has been established by Aver-roes: »intellectus speculativus in hoc;; wceptive intellects: »grout e:hom ine es t corrupt ibil is, es t tamen secundum se et simpliciter aeternus, ut dicif 'sibilem et agentem« (q. 13,Averroes« (q . 9 , p . 29, v . 10-12) . But th is s ta tement m ust be und ers todI not Averroes' position, foragain, in the light of Siger 's creationism . From this creationism a nd them intellects were tw o separattaphysica l t ranscendence o f the Firs t Cause tha t i t im pl ies der ive tw o f co mm o n amo n g th e mas t edam ental theses. First of all , and this t ime borrowing the Av icennian notio cause they are one in subsof contingency, S iger states that although the intellect has no contrary in i ts the agent intellect, but wenature that wo uld m ake i t necessari ly corruptible, it does not have ei ther ā n cf. q. 15, p. 54, v. 26). Witf

principle in its nature that wo uld m ake i t not necessari ly corruptible. In fac decep tive intellect is in pot(»intellectus de se est corruptibilis; unde sicu t eductus est de nihilo, sic per naturaii sculty which c arries thoseom reductibilis est in nihilumolum a Prim a Causa habet , sci licet o lr pri

• ..]

q makes them (agit) intelligik

sit perpetuus« (q. 5, p. 17, v. 8-16). This is a fund am ental clarification of th '(reapit) them. This requireformula »est secund um se et simplici ter aeternus« of the previous quotat ion:, hat exists between the se]There, »secundum se« is relative to »in respectu individui«, and should not be them p art ic ipate u

and 1267 in Italy (Cf. Tuoat.s AQuiNAs, Quaestiones disputatae De anima, Ed. Leon . . -,50 »Qui ergo voluerit scire u24/1, Preface, 25*) rguments I proposed to jusac iniger ' s quest ions in:uustify pq oportet eum investigare f<1269-1270 having been proved to be without foundation, nothing prevents now' '.' :it?« (q. 2, p. 7, v. 72-75).from accepting the date of 1265. to base his conclusions on

'49 Cf. VAN SzEENBERGHEN 1977, esp. 339-347; cf. also MAHoNEY 1974. I have dealt ' ' ` ° material substance can revwith the noetics of Siger's Q in tertium De anima in my previous works: BAZārr 1974ā .:: of absolute necessity, suspeand BAzAN 1975. 51:Cf BAZAN 2000.




ed up abandon jrad as s ta t ing a necess i ty of na ture . In the second qu ota t ion , the express ionThomas Aquj5$ »de se est corruptibilis« does not deny the eternity of the intellect; it only

it must be added that this incorruptibility does not derive from a property of its naturestatesas in state ofcrjsj- but f rom the cau sa l i ty of i t s c rea tor : i t i s an e te rni ty ab alio. This leads to the

. The presentat io thes i s : the e te rni ty of the in te l l ec t cann ot be adva nced a s a necessaryecondr ious s tages of h phi losophica l conclusion: »licet hoc sit probabile, non tamen hoc est neces-

arium « (q. 5, p. 6, v. 64-65). Indeed, if the eternity of the intellect dependsiger 's most radical on the will of the First Cause, there are no means by which a philosopherbject of magisterial could scrut inize such a t ranscendent will . 5° But th i s appl ie s as w e l l to the w ork 1

uent ly I need only the theologian, whose conclusions are also affected by probability, limited

' irst of all, the UfliL- _______ as he i s to explore w i th ra t iona l ins t ruments the inf in i te depth of Go d' s l ife asenimn •____ m anifested by Revelation through the finite means of the human language.. 28, v. 60-61). On That is w hy S i g e r a c k now l e dg e d t ha t t he hypo t he s is a dva nc e d b y ph i l o sophy

very direct effect ofi , - on the basis of an analysis of nature has at least a more verifiable point ofstot le the inte l lect departure, and consequently that »licet non sit necessaria positio Aristotelis,

as a separate subst- sicut ostensum est, ipsa tamen est probabilior quam pos i t io August in i« ( ib id . ,, p. 5-6, v.44-52).4-52)..i I have a lw ays foun d hea l thy and re freshing th is ca l l for re spec t and

nique in te l l ec t anð hum i li ty when dea l ing wi th the wi l l of God .solute ly considered -. The unique and separate intellect has two »parts«, the agent and the re-

speculativus in ceptive intellects: »prout est substantia separata in se habet intellectum pos-ter aeternus, ut dic i t s ibi lem et ag entem « (q. 13, p. 44, v. 31-32; cf . q . 15, p. 58, v. 42-43). This wasst be understood, - . .not Averroes ' pos i t ion , for who m the agent and the recept ive (or »m ate r ia l«)onism and the m4 intellects were two separate substances, but Siger followed here a doctrinee s de r i ve tw o fu n - common among the masters of arts in the first half of the ITh century. 5 ' Be-Avicennian not ion - -ause they are one in substance, the receptive intellect has clear intuition ofs no con t ra ry in i t s. the agent intellect, but we do not share in this act (q. 13, p . 45-46, v. 61-64;ot hav e e i the r a i iÿi cf. q. 15, p . 54, v. 26). With respect to material forms, on the other hand, the

corruptible . In facti , recept ive in te ll ec t is in potency and d epends on the co rporea l imagina t ive fa -ihio, sic per naturam culty which carries those forms (q. 14, p . 51, v. 52-55). The agent intellect

nbet, scilicet, quod makes them (agit) intelligible in act so that the possible intellect can receiveclarification of t}w (reczpit) them. This requirement is the foundation of the operational union

previous qu ota t ion .. . ______ . that exists between the separate intellect and individual human beings and, and should no t be makes them participate in the act of thinking as providers of images (sub

De anima, Ed. Leon.— 50 »Qui ergo voluerit scire utrum intellectus factus sit de novo vel factus sit aeternus,g Siger's questions i4'.. oportet eum investigare formam voluntatis Primi. Sed quis erit qui earn investiga-othing prevents now bit?< (q. 2, P. 7, v. 72-75). Under those circumstances, the philosopher is constrained

to base his conclusions on what the analysis of the nature of the intellect as an un-xy 1974. I have dealt material substance can reveal, knowing that his conclusions will not reach the degrees works: BAZAN 19744 of absolute necessity, suspended as they are from an inscrutable will.

:51 Cf. BA ZA I. 000.




ratione imaginatorum) (q. 14, p. 52-53), wh ich a re the »raw« m ater ia ls o f the ac t . adap t ing i t to a typi ,Of course, this union co ulatiol thoug h a c c om pl ishe d w i th r e spe c t t o ' # ` fa te of the deba te o

vidua ls , i s fo remos t and essen t ia l ly re la ted to the hum an spec ies . But a l though r . ;cultural identity ancthere is no substantial union between man and the intellect, the o p erational . : .r ' ' The first adaptati.

union » mtellectus perficit corpus non per suam substantiam sedper su'pas to consider the

otent iam«

,

3 v. 38-39; cf. 8,

5 v. 16-17)ustif ies cal l ing.PJthe in=`: = . : . : .intellect iventel lective »soul«. E

tel lect the » perfect io« of m an and , derivately, »sou l«, insofar as the sou l is a : . :.logy, had developpeprinciple of operation in the body (»operans in corpore«, q. 8, p. 25 , v. 19) principles of intel lecThe intellect, indeed, is for Siger the principle of movement and of intellec= ; ; as hoc aliquid and font ion. As a m over, the intellect is » in qualibet parte corporis«; as a principle of : express ion hoc aliqui

inte l lect ion, it re lates only to the ima ginat ion (ibid. , v. 20-28). H u m an b e ings himself f rom his pre ,have then a »com osite« soul anima com ositaade o f the sensi t ive soll l ` ;, a r . : point tha t the two uw hich i s uni ted subs tant ia l ly wi th the bod y as i t s s ing le subs tant ia l form arid' soul is not a substan

fromthehich is extracted by natural agentsmpotency of matter, and e - thropological dualistpara te in te l lec t , which do es not have any k ind of subs tant ia l union w i th h ū - k Y ' : ;: ; d u a l i s m and i t s equtm an be ings or w i th the sens it ive sou l , but only an op era t iona l one (q . 1 , p . 3 , '. doctr ine is marked 1v. 58-61), and which is, as stated, a direct creation of the First Cause.F There is also a s

H ow o r i g ina l w a s S i g e r? Fa t he r Ga u t h i e r g a ve a ve ry ne g a t i ve a nsw e r : td ' : . : , based on a sem ant icthis quest ion. According to him, »on chercherai t en vain chez lui (Siger) i i r i ^l ā, , ; : , o rde r tour. .xplainid ē e or ig ina le« , but he recognized tha t once S ige r had borrowed an idea f ro ii :the union between t

som eone e l se , » i l exce l le ā en dē velopper jusqu'au bout les cons ē quences.«5?;.Maybe Siger deserves more credit. It is true that the discovery of the real • - t = 'i lesne has to,• found at ion of Averroes ' noet ics , nam ely the unici ty of the »materia l« intellect ; ^ : ; : .

_commentary , but w

had been de tec ted by Alber t , Thom as , Bonaventure and some m as ters o f a r t s ':i•`

':,::¢.;: roes' principles. Gaa few ye a rs before Siger wro te h i s Q. in Elm De anima, but Siger wa s def inite ly" =:.:: wh ich the theolo 'z.:the f i rs t to em brace A verroes ' doc t r ine as the correc t in te rpre ta t ion of Ari l= was no c lear aff i rm

•otle's De anima and tha t i s prec i se ly h i s or ig ina l i ty .ali3 He did so not withoutPY para te substance. S i

s h ip (Hym an , Ivry»borrowed«, which

52 GAUTHIER 1983, 232.53 Other ma s ters of Arts , though recognizing the »notabi l is« doctr ine of the unici ty o

That, in fact , increa54 1 have tried to prow

the in te l lect in Averroes ' com m entary, did not ado pt i t. This should be seen as ;a . in te rpre ta t ion of A iclear indication that they did not subsc ribe to i t as a val id interpretation of Anstodes. s idered a facul ty oftext and that they d id not cons ider the exis tence of th is radical doctr ine as a reason of Averroes in supp

LIo deprive them selves from the bes t in te rpre t ive tool avai lable a t the ir t ime a nd t of context ; and thatce as e be ne f i ti ng f rom m any o the r in t e rp re t a t ions p ropos e d by the A rab com me - I , new in terpreta t ion ita tor . In the case of the theologians l ike Albert , Thomas an d Bonav enture , -they. ex[ ;:L.' ' ' undoubtedly, was upl ici t ly denounc ed the doc tr ine as contrary to Ar is tot le 'sught , so i t wou ld behought £r^.: leagues theideath

st range tha t S iger had borrowed f rom them th is par ticular » readin « of Averroes i,. ` same substance. Butha t shou ld be t akeo infer af te rward s the oppos i te conclus ion ( i . e . that Averroes g ives the correct I l l ; r

terpretat ion of Aristot le 's text) . In order to say, like G authier did, that Siger professes pretation of AristotlI I.;n »averro isme de second e m ain« , which i s no t an »averro isme de ph i lo logue« ( i e . dual and multiple hi

basedogicsed on texts ) but an »averroisme deile«soi . e . based on the tof.prn.l l • : ;a unique spiri tual so

I I I '^`ô



Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties of Arts07

.aterials of the act.'',dapting i t to a typical Latin context and not without taking into accou nt theth respect to indi_ `;s tate of the debate on the subject. I prefer to consider both features as signs of

cies. But although':ultural identity and of collegial responsibility.t , the operationalhe first adaptation that he 'imposed to the authentic doctrine of Averroesam sed per suarn 'was to c onsider the recept ive an d agent in te l lects as »par ts« of the uniquefies calling the in,ntellective »soul«. As stated, many Latin ma sters, both in arts and in theo-ā r as the soul is a'ogy, had developped this new reading of Aristotle's De anima, attributing bothq. 8, p. 25, v. 19)-principles of intellection to the individual hum an soul – considered by themn t and o f int e l l e c - ; 4 Yrasoc aliquid and form. 5 4 By asserting the unicity of intellects and not using the

as a principle of_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ e x p r e s s i o n hoc aliquid to speak of the intellective substance, Siger distanced

8). H uman beings

!himself from his predecessors and got closer to Averroes – though m issing thethe sensit ive soul,.point that the two intellects are two substanc es. By assert ing that the hum an)stantial form and :'oul is not a substance but a sensit ive substantial form he surm onted the an-'atter, and the se'_luopological dualism of his colleagues – though falling into a metaphy sical.a l union with hn-'dualism and its equally formidable problems. Though tipically Latin, Siger'snal one (q. 1, p. 3 j"octrine is marked by original features.rirst Cause.. There is also a second adaptation of Averroes' doctrine, an adaptationegative answer .t ōased on a sem antic mod ification that w ill leave Siger 's noetics in disarray. In

zee lui (Sige r) iii;rder to explain our participation in the act of understan ding (intelligere) and

)wed an idea froth

he union between the in te l lect and the individuals by m eans of the images

consequences. «521

:overy of the .material« intelme m asters ofiger was aenmrpretat ion o flid so not wi

-ine of the unicity:should be seen as

re tat ion of Aris tot ledoctrine as a re,at their time andthe Arab comme

;onaventure, they e

fight, so it would .1ing« of Averroes j ū

gives the correct i1, that Siger profess

de philologue« (i.

on the logic of pri

ciples), one has to assume that the unicity of the intellect is not found in Averroes'commentary, but was only an inference made by the theologians from some of Aver-roes ' principles. Gauthier, indeed, embraced S. Gomez Nogales thesis according towhich the theologians had unduly hardened Averroes' thought, when in fact therewas no clear affirmation in Averroes' commentary that the intellect is a unique se-parate substance. Such is not the case, as has been proven by contemporary scholar-ship (Hyman, Ivry, Taylor). Consequently it cannot be said that Siger's position was»borrowed«, which does not exclude that he also knew the theologians' warnings.

•t _ That, in fact, increases his originality and his exegetical courage.

54.. I have tried to prove elsewhere that this is the first original Latin contribution to thefi nterpretation of Aristotle's noetics (never before had the agent intellect been con-

sidered a faculty of the human soul); that some of those masters invoked the authorityof Averroes in support of their interpretation for dialectical reasons, quoting him outof context; and that this is insufficient to speak of a »First Averroism« because theirnew interpretation is foreign to Averroes' authentic thought (cf. BAZAN 2000). Siger,undoubtedly, was influenced by this new interpretation and accepted from his col-

leagues the idea that the agent and receptive intellects are faculties inherent in thesame substance. But there is between him and his colleagues a profound differencethat should be taken into account when assessing his originality. In Siger's inter-

' pretation of Aristotle, the agent and receptive intellects were not faculties of indivi-dual and multiple human souls, each one of which is a hoc aliquid, but two faculties ofaunique spiritual substance common to all human beings.

^ 'h .




(cop ulatio per phantasmata), Averroes had proposed the theory of the double sub=' q_,- ; Y not s tud ied by Gauject or suppo rt of the intelligible object (intellectum speculatiaum). Siger had grea,; Thomas Aquinas.difficult ies in accepting or understanding this theory, as is shown by the fact ' The first case concthat he felt the need to ana lyze Averroes's explanation of the union between proved that Siger owthe in te l lect and the individuals in three of h is Q de anima (q . 8, q. 14 and +authority« attributeq. 15). If we exam ine the way he presented the data of the problem, we real bet suum quod es t eze that the roots of h is d iff icul t ies are to be found in the fact that he ha d ' =unquestionable. Butshifted the Av erroistic doctrine from the level of the object to the level of thel rasp and underlineknowing subjet (intellectus speculativus), i. e. , the subject understand ing in act. At i . What Siger is em phthis level, Averroes' doctrine is completely incapable of explaining the union , c rea t ionism: o nly th

becau se the act of und erstanding, although hav ing i ts point of departure in ° ' : ' ; creatures must hav eimages that are in us, does not reach co mpletion un til the intelligible form has : censors, he refused tobeen separated by abst ract ion f rom the images that are in us. Thus the act of r ement . He s t at ed yeunderstanding is accomplished by a subject that is separated from u s (the in- ; separate substances axtellect), when i t is actualized by a form that is also separated from us by the : composition between

i.' operation required to make it intelligible in act. The images, being intelligible' In potency) and anotlin potency, cann ot explain our par t ic ipat ion in the intellectus speculativu s an d com posit ion that heconsequently i t would seem that » intelligere nunquam est nobis«. Siger was ; the specific forms (ibisincapable of solving the objection he himself had raised. Curiously , he retur.=

totelianism than anyned to Av erroes ' doctrine, wh ich he tried to justify by saying that we share iri shows Siger's original; ,, the know ledge of intelligible forms not beca use the images a re united to i ts, This impression is

but becau se the intel lect is united to us. This was a circular justification: his:; A close relationship bpoint of departure ha d been tha t the intellect is united to us because the in- ences. Examining thetelligible object is united to us. That Siger him self , well before Thom as' in-; 'tlie body, Thomas e latervention, had raised insoluble objections to Averroes' noetics is of great his-_____ one: »potentiae animatorical significance and should be credited to Siger's cri t ical m ind. ss_sse simplicius princi

Father Gauthier has also shown that Siger had considerable knowledge of nuiiius co ris actustheological wri tings, part icularly of Thom as' Comm entary on the Sentences, animae raponalis . «s6

and that he ha d borrowed f requent ly f rom them, especial ly wi th respect to ; uch an argum ent. Si;• the sources that he quo tes. Siger's acquaintanc e with theological writings is an ".it a centerpiece of hi

I in teres ting charac ter ist ic of h is in te llectual personal i ty , and m aybe one of the; 1V

simplicior sua substarreasons w hy he indulged in subjects that w ere »not qui te phi losophical ' corpus, eius operatiosuch as the question non multum ph ilosophica regarding the suffering of the soul :cessario utetur corpoi

` .; in he l l . I do not see in th is character is t ic any m otive to m inimize Siger s plicior sua substantia<.; place in the h istory of thought. But I would like to seize this opportunity to ; turned into a foundat

' I reexam ine one case , a l ready s tudied by Gau thier , in order to show afun- was not convinced bdam ental character is t ic of Siger ' s philosophy, and to exa mine a nother one56 V TxoMas AQuuvas, In

V55 I have examined in detail this aspect of Siger's noetics in my article: BA zā rr V

xASuaestiones dispu t

1 :

part. 439-445.23 -26.

•



k 'adical A ristotelianism in the Faculties of A rts09

'; I

ot studied by Gauthier, in order to show Siger's independence vis-avi siThomAuna

The f i r s t case concerns the com pos i tion of every f in it e be ing . Gauth ier hasIproved tha t S ige r owes to Thomas the informat ion concerning a we l l known

L), authority « a t tr ib u t e d t o Boe t h ius , na m e l y »omne quod e s t c it r a Pr imu m ha -bet suum quod est et suum quo est« (q. 6, p. 19, v. 39-40). This finding isunques t ionab le . But I would l ike to pu t the quota t ion in to context in orde r tograsp an d un der l ine the bas ic or ienta t ion and o r ig ina l ity of S ige r ' s pos i t ion .W ha t S i g e r i s e mpha s i z i ng i s a p r i nc i p le t ha t de r i ve s f rom h i s me t a phy s i c a l

`.'creationism: only the First Cause enjoys perfect ontological simplicity; all' creatures must have some sort of composition. Against many of his prede-c e s so r s , he r e fuse d t o e mb ra c e un i ve r s a l hy l omorph i sm t o s a t is fy t h i s r e qu i-rement. He stated very strongly the spiritual nature of the intellect and ofsepara te subs tances and f in ished by ac cep t ing in them a kind of pure ly fo rm a lcom posi t ion be tw een a p r inc ip le tha t i s s imi l a r to ma t te r ( in the sense tha t i sin potency) and another that is similar to form (in the sense that is in act), a

composition that he compared to the relationship between the generic andthe specif ic form s ( ibid., p. 19-2 1) . All this is by far m ore con sis tent with Aris-

to te li an i sm than any of the p revious so lu t ions o f fered by ec lec t ic th inkers andashows Siger 's o r ig ina li ty and c r i ti ca l independence .^

; ;. This impression is confirmed by the second case, where we can also detectaclose relationship between Siger and Thomas' Commentary on the Sent-ences.. { xamining the question whether the rational soul can be united with

'tl c body , Thom as e labora ted a ser i es o f objec t ions among w hich we read th isonc : »po t e n t i a e a n i ma e f l uun t a b e s se n t ia e j us . S e d p r i nc ip i a t um non p o t e s tcs r simplicius principio a quo fluit. Cum ergo quaedam potentia animae

udthus corp or i s ac tus s i t , u t in te l lec tus e t volun tas , v ide tur quod nec essent iaimae ra t ionalis .« 5 6 To our knowledge, Thomas was the first to elaborateū ch an argument. Siger picked it up from Thomas' Commentary and made

t a centerpiece of his doctrine: »potentia a qua egreditur operatio non est< <

pl ic ior sua subs tant ia ; s i ig i tur in te ll ec tus pe r suam subs tant iam perf ic ia tt ^r-pus , e ius opera t io non potes t e sse n i s i m corpore ; qua re in operando ne-

ario utetur corpore, cum potentia a qua egreditur operatio non sit sim-P1i- for sua sub stant ia« (q. 7 , p . 23 v. 18-22). The fac t that Thom as ' object ion

turned in to a foun dat iona l pr inc ip le of S ige r 's doc t r ine show s tha t the l a t te r

'

1 1 1111

'I I'Inot convinced by the theory of the »emergence« of forms by which

6 `Txos A Q u n v a s , In II Sent. d. 1, q. 2a.4, arg. 4. Cf. parallel texts inTxohfAAQr.ns, Quaestiones disputatae de anima q. 2, 13 (Ed. Leon. 24/1), 20, app fontium, adn.1 2326.

I ^ ^ 4iiI I I I I

)ry of the double sub

i vum) . Siger had g rea t .i s shown by the fac taf the union betweensnima (q . 8 , q . 14 andhe p rob l em , w e re a pthe fact that he hadect to the lev el of the' ' `lers tanding in act . A,expla in ing the uni ,Jo in t of d epar ture i ii ''

intell ig ible form haa us. Thus the act ofa ted f rom us ( the i rir a t e d f rom us b y t he.ges, being intelligible-llectus speculativu s an des t nobi s« . Siger wäš

• Curiously, he ret t i rying tha t we shareLges are united to ús:ular jus tif ication:to us because the •

I before Thomas' in

ioet ics is of great hist ical mind .55

le rable knowledgery on the Sentence; i a l ly w i th respec t t) logical writings isn d m a y b e o n e o f thIuite philosophicalsuffer ing of the so, ,to minimize Siger'

th i s opportuni ty to

)rder to show a f<amine another on

ny article: BrzAv 1

;t.




Thomas tried to refute his own argument. He was not convinced even after'

T hom a s g a ve m ore r e f ine d a nsw e rs in h i s De unitate intellectus, as is proven b y

/Ithe fact that the argument reappears in Siger's De anima intellectiva: »Non cor it ing it subs tant iam a l iquam esse uni tam m ate r iae e t potent iam i ll ius subs tan_ '

UU Ui ae esse sepa ra tam a m a ter ia« (c . I I I , p . 82, v . 101-102) . This case show s tha teven i f S ige r borrow ed from Thom as , he did so wi th a c r i t ica l , indepe ndent `m ind and ref ined , in the l igh t o f Ar i s to te l ian hy lomorphism , a p r inc ip le tha t i s 'one o f t he s t rong e s t a rg ume n t s a g a i ns t T hom a s ' noe t ic s .

Finally, the thesis of the unicity that Siger was the first to embrace as t 6

correc t in te rpre ta t ion o f Aris to t l e 's De anima should be put in the context of

Siger's basic professional project. My comments – and questions – are in=.sp i re d b y a b ook pub l ishe d b y my f r ie nds F . - X . Pu ta l la z a nd R . Imb a c h un= :der the sug gestive t i t le: Profess ion: Philosoph e. Siger de Braban t (Paris , 1997).How did Siger himself conceive his »profession«? Nothing explic i t appears in"his Q in III De anima, but he made it clear in his De anima intellectiva: »nostra'in tent io pr inc ipa l is non es t inqui re re qu a l i te r se habea t ve r i t as de anim a , se dquae fueri t opinio Phi losophi de e a« (c . VI, p . 99, v. 81-83). One ca n take this . ,a f f i rm a t ion a s a m e re d i a l e c ti c a l g im m i c k t o a vo i d t roub l e s w i t h t he a u t ho r 'ities, but I prefer to take it as the expression of what a master of arts was:

suppo sed to do and of wh at ma s te rs of a r ts had been d oing in the f i rs t ha l f ō f

the th i r teenth century. I t has becom e cus tom ary to oppo se th i s pro jec t to the• one expressed by Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary onDe caelo (I, 22

n. 228): »studium phi losophiae non est ad hoc quo d scia tur quid hom ines sen`rse r in t , sed qua l i te r se habea t ve r i t as re rum .« The di f fe rence be twee n these"two equally valid , in te l lec tua l pro jec t s could n ot be mo re s igni f icant , even`m ore so whe n w e lea rn tha t Siger a lso knew tha t the f ina l goa l o f ph ilosop} i^ 'i s to reach the t ruth of be ing: »ph i losophu s in tendi t f ina l it e r cogni t ionem vel

ritatis« (Q m orales, 4, p. 102 v. 13-14). But wh ich one o f the two f its the profil ēof a p h i lo sophe r? I ha ve no doub t t ha t T hom a s ' p ro je c t de f i ne s muc h b e t t e rthe kind of search that is proper to philosophers, i . e . the search for the trut i ;-of be ing . S ige r ' s pe rsona l pro jec t (nostra in tentio) , howev er , points to a d i f ferent kind of truth, i. e. the truth of texts. What he has defined is the kind o

search prop er to a his torian of phi losophy.- That is why w e like him, his toriansf philosophy as we are. If we take Siger's statement at its face value ainccept that his project was to present Aristotle's psychology as faithfully

possible, we should grant him the benefit of the doubt. I am not thinking int e rms of the benef i t tha t a mem ber of the Inquis it ion cou ld have granted h im'had h e accep ted Siger ' s s ta t emen t a s a v a l id jus ti f ica t ion for the he terodoxy"his doctrine. I am thinking in terms of the benefit that we, as historiai _.should grant him w ith respect to his method . We are used to the sophist icated' '

tool s of re search tha nd i c a ppe d . Und

Ave r roe s' c omm e rpenetrate the meaone an o ther : h i s refor consis tency. Sit

•principle, had givethe not ion of evol tlayers o f » r ē dac t iot reat ises were wri t i

w a s a n »a ve r ro i smgue«, as Gauthierō requirement of con• other thinkers had

su he showed tha t ta phi lological one.

The problem retoppos i t ions be tweerrhentic Aristote lianreconci le them? An(:

•: . subject , again, w e fiell as an undenial•t iophy as a great sc' rporat ing into the

t ru t h doe s no t c on f l^•lue of theology de

•us . H e was a l so aw

stian teachings and titelian philosophy oIt>ed by som e theolo1;ions he applied a 3

-'n the one hand, its t '- ' it philosop hical p i1-^lerns raised by som eL, expla ined, f i rs t ofÎ

trminations of Ari;

5 7 Both Averroes and• • ristotle's texts, whit

written.

w



4

I.i.

C I

II I I ^ ' ^ ^ II I ^ ^ ^ ! ;

Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties o f Arts11

onvinced even a V ls of research that are avai lable to us: In comparison, Siger was seriously

ectus, as is proven Under those circumstances it is not surprising that he privileged

intellectiva: »Non cō yerroes ' comm entary as an interpret ive tool . He a lso had another tool toentiam illius subs' ē

netrate the m eaning of obscure texts w hich somet imes seem to contradictThis case shows tJ ,n ē

'another: his reason. The search for the historical truth become the searchcrit ical, indepen ē ō "r consistency. Siger, as m ost med ieval thinkers, assumed that Aristotle , inm, a principle that j rinciple, had given a consistent system. 5 7 H e h ad n o t l e a rn ed f ro m J ae g er. "ē not ion of evolu t ion, he had not learned f rom Gauthier the exis tence ofst to embrac e as th yers of »redact ion«, he did not k now that the order in w hich Aris to t le ' sut in the 1eatiseseas w ere wr i t ten did not fo l low necessar i ly a logical order . May be his

ques t ions – are ` . {as an »ave rroisme de phi losophe« ra ther tha t an »averroIsme de phi lolo-and R. Imbac h `.' : e«, as G authier put i t , but a t leas t h is effor ts brought in to fu l l l ight therabant (Paris, 199.E ^ :quiremen t of consistency and the theoretical diff icult ies of a doctr ine thatg explicit appears ther thinkers had been solving too easily by eclectic conco rdism. By doing

ma intellectiva:»nos .hehowed that the history of philosophy is a philosophical discipline, noteritas de anima, s philological one.3). One can tak e iJ

=The problem rem ains that in h is search for consistency S iger discoveredbles with the autl o pposi t ions between his unders tanding of w hat he con s idered to be the au-a m aster of a r ts entic Aristotelian do ctrine and so me o f his Christian beliefs. Is it possible toing in the first half' . econcile them? And how important is it to find such a reconciliation? On thisse this project to ` 0th ū bject , again, we f ind significant differences between S iger and Thom as asry on De caelo (I,} e11 as an undeniable common ground. Thomas considered Aristotle 's phi-ur quid homines š l as a great scientific achievemen t of human reason that wa s worth in-rence between th ō rporating into the body of Christian culture, he was convinced that rationalore significant, . ei 4ith does not con f l ic t wi th revealed t ru th , and he a lwa ys thought tha t theal goal of ph ilosog ue of theology dep ends on the qual i ty of the ra t ional ins trum ent tha t i taliter cognitioncin s. He was also aw are that some Aristotelian theses did not agree with Chri-

the two fits the pro fin teachings and that some theological doctrines were in opposition to Aris-t defines mu ch be telian philosophy only because of the poor quality of the philosophical toole search for the std by som e theologians. In order to build a bridge betwee n the two w orldver , points to a •ions he applied a m odel that includes a double and simultaneous cr i tique.defined is the kin +..n the one hand , i t wa s necessary to clean W estern theology of i ts inconsi-

e like him , histoiJ nt philosophical principles, on the other, i t wa s necessary to solve the pro-at its face value`` 'ems raised by some of Aristot le 's doctrines. Some A ristotelian theses cou ldology as faithfully e ex plained , f irst of al l , as a result of a limited perspective . Second, some in-

I am no t thinking eterminations of Aristotelian philosophy could be clarified by internal criticism,ld have granted ^`for the heterodoxy: 7 Both Averroes and Thomas had to their credit the perception of inconsistencies in

hat we , as histon.: Aristotle's texts, which they attributed to the different moments when they were

ed to the sophistic written.



612. Carlos Baz ā nadical A ristotelianism ij

searching, in Aristotle's texts themselves, the principles that may solve thf

apor iae in a w ay c onsistent both w i th the Ar isto te l ian system and w i th phi

losophical truth »tout cou rt«. Finally, some A ristotelian theses require a phi

losopical development o f the system, provided that is done in a m anner consistedwith its logical requirements. Siger of Brabant did not have an epistemoldgical mode l so well ar t iculated w hen he w rote his Q in IIIm De anima, but hi

developed one under the pressure of Thomas ' a rguments and the Cond ē i n

nat ion of 1270. Those c ircumstances made h im becom e aware of t h e n e e d } ^

explain and justify his personal thought and his professional wo rk. There is nireason to doubt h is honesty w hen he claimed that in case of conflict betwedl

fa i th and reason, t ru th is on the s ideof faith, as there is no rea son either tc

^ristotelis cela nda, licet si t co ntraria.88), because philosophical propo sition

Lecessary conclusions of natural reason.arding Aristotle was that his authenticof oppose revealed truth and, consequehropology was a formidable and readilzcorporated without major inconvenier,hat is why he saw in radical Aristoteli,ardizing his intellectual project. Finallyisophical developm ent of the system, ,fell as fundamental differences betwee

think that he ever suscribed to the »double truth«. He simply insisted onti '_that Siger had denounced in some of A rau to n o my of phi losophy in i t s own f ie ld and worked a qui te consistent exoubt that could only be overcome by aplana t ion of the ant inomies betw een ph i losophy an d revealed t ru th. .This `;this effor t he chose to rem ain a t tachecexplanation can b e resum ed in these terms: philosophical proposit ions tha+ .'nlains the diff icult ies experienced thrcoppose fa i th are not necessary conclus ions of scientif ic rea soning, but only

probable inferences; in ma ny occa sions the opposition arises from the li iniled prem ises and perspect ive adopted by phi losophers , which , in turn , l imithe scope of validity of the philosophical conclusion, makes it superfluous ti

deny i t and deflates the conflict with faith; when ke pt in i ts epistemologic ā

field of validity, natural reason d oes not c ontradict fai th; Aristotle is not t l ,only au thority in philosophy; a ll philosophers, including Aristotle, were h im an and sub ject to error; human reaso n is particularly wea k in dealing wit]

the rea lm of separa te subs tances and the t ranscendence of the First Causfand p hi losophy r isks fal l ing m ore easi ly in er ror in those dom ains; in mancases comm on m en do not have the ins t rum ents to refu te probable conchsions that oppose revealed truth and in such cases it is legitimate to adh ere t^

faith, because the authority of philosophers is not absolute. 5 8 This puts Sigevery c lose to Thom as' f irst approach to rec oncile faith and reaso n, i . e. , threcognition of their respective dom ains of validity and of the relativity of tt

prem ises used by philosophers. There is also some com m on ground w ith rfspect to the second approac h, i . e. , the need to use internal cr i t icism to 1 14the solution of controversial texts by appealing to clear principles of the Arttotelian system , except that they did not cease to be at odd s with each oth ē

as to which pr inc iples take precedenc e in the solu t ion of the apor iae. Th

dif ferent resul ts at w hich they ar r ived explains also som e other di f ferenceSiger thought that the historical t ruth should not be hidden: »non est intents

58 I have explained in detail all these epistemological principles in my article: BAZP

1980.

of the no t ion of subsistent suhim as to »qu id v i a r a t ions nm«, and w hy he ended up revristic of eclectic Aristotelianism

2. Siger of Brabant: Evolution

.In the case of Siger, there were tw o mairrefine and adjust his posit ion: Thoma sand Peripatetic doctrine on the intellect,

i. atter served as a rem inder of orthodox Ioadhere as a Christ ian. The former 1,

'di tion the debate for yea rs to com e. Th`deed, set the whole debate conc erningvery spec if ic grounds: the doctr ine exF

o patetic texts had been corrupted by Ave ;F; ly, i t was necessary to recupera te i ts ai

would show that the doctrine expressedwith Christian teachings. In brief, Thomof Aristotelian texts w ould also yield the

truth would be shown to coincide w ith ticonc eived his task as being init ially an

59 :The final stage of this evolution, reached ia complete return to the pre-thomistic con



Radical A ristotelianism in the Faculties o f Arts1 3

Aristotelis celanda, licet sit contraria veritati« (Q in Metaph. III, 15, 132,•^ . 88) , because phi losophica l propos i t ions tha t oppose revea led t ruth a re n otnecessary conclusions of natural reason. For Thomas, the historical truth re-garding A ris to t l e was tha t h i s ' authent ic doc t r ine con cerning the in te l lec t d idnot oppose rev ea led t ruth and, con sequent ly , tha t Aris to t le ' s phi losophica l an-

'`'' thropology was a formidable and readily available instrument that could be

•icorpora ted w i thout major inconv enience in to a Chris ti an cul tura l synthes i s .That is why he saw in radical Aristotelianism a great danger capable of jeo-

:Pardizing h is inte l lectua l project . Final ly, for the third appro ach , i . e . , the phi-

losophical development of the system, we can also find common ground as

well as fundamental differences between the two masters. The weaknessestha t S ige r had d enounced in some of Aris to t le ' s doc t r ines l e f t h im in a s ta te ofdoub t tha t could on ly be overcom e by a pe rsona l phi losophica l e ffor t . But inthis effort he chose to remain attached to Aristotelian premises, which ex-plains the difficulties experienced throughout his doctrinal evolution, hisrejection of the notion of subsistent substantial form, the doubts that kepthauting him as to »quid via rationis naturalis in praedicto problemate sittenendum«, and why he ended up reverting to a very traditional doctrinecharacteris t ic of eclect ic Aris totelianism. 59

2. Siger of Brabant: Ev olution of his radical A ristotelianism

In ' the case o f Siger , there were two m ain c i rcum stances tha t p rom pted h im torefine and adjust his position: Thomas Aquinas' analysis of the Aristotelian

and Per ipa te t ic doc t r ine on the in te l lec t , and the Cond em nat ion of 1270. Thela t te r se rved as a rem inder of or thodox po s i tions to which S ige r never ceased

to adhere as a Christian. The former launched a challenge that would con-d i t ion t he de b a t e fo r ye a r s t o c om e . T homa s A qui na s ' De u nitate intellectus, in -deed, set the whole debate concerning the nature of the intellective soul on

very specific grounds: the doctrine expressed by the Aristotelian and Peri-pate t ic texts had been co rrupted by A verroes ' in te rpre ta t ion and , consequent -ly, it was necessary to recuperate its authentic meaning. A proper exegesiswo uld show tha t the doc t r ine expressed in those texts was in pe rfec t harmonywi th Chris t ian teach ings . In b r ie f, Thom as a rgued tha t the t rue in te rpre ta t ionof Aristotelian texts would a lso yield the t ruth of the m at te r , tha t the h i s tor ica l

t ruth would be sho wn to coinc ide wi th the phi losophica l tru th . That is why heconceived his task as being initially an exegetical one: »ostendemus primo

59 The final stage of this evolution, reached in his Quaestiones super librum De causis, marks

a complete return to the pre-thomistic conception of the soul; cf. infra, nt. 76.

:ha t ma y so l ve t hes tem and w i th ph i_

yeses require amanner consistP.,f.a ve a n e p i s t emo l

ō

r m De anima, but

and the Condem-'

;vare of the need to . 'I work. There i s n oof confl ict between

no reason e i the r toiply insis ted o n theluite consistent ex -:vealed truth. This

L propo s i t ions thabut on ly~

ises from the l im it=hich, in turn, limit'

:es i t superf luous tō

. . .its epistemological?.Aristot le is not theAris to t l e , w ere hueak in dealing with-of the First Cause,

d o m a i ns ; in m a n y ':e p robable conc lu ; .t imate to adhere toe . s a This puts Sigē r '

ad rea son , i . e . , thethe rela t ivi ty of thy'on ground with re-

ia l cri t icism to findinciples of the Aris-ids wi th each o the rf the aporiae. The

e o the r d i f fe rences .n: »non e st intent io

in my article:



61 4. Carlos Bazdn

pos i ti one m p re d i c t a m ( i . e . , the one a d va nc e d b y A ve r roe s a nd r a d i c a l Artotelians) eius verbis et sentent ie ( i . e . Aris tot le 's) repugnare om nino. «60 p t

end of h i s t rea t ise , Thoma s wa s proud to d ec la re tha t h i s ana lys i s o f t ex t s had"shown that none of the philosophers has stated the unicity of the intellect(cap . V , 314 , v . 386-389) and tha t h i s re futa t ion of th i s pe rnic iou s e rror hL`been achieved »non per documenta fidei, sed per ipsorum philosophortitnrationes et dicta« (ibid. v. 431-433).

Siger o f Brabant accep ted the cha l lenge in i t s very t e rms , name ly as a ch ā l:l enge con cerning the h i s tor ica l m eaning of Aris to t le ' s t exts . Al though ` i t .. .. .poss ib le tha t S ige r 's f i rs t answer to Thom as w as h i s los t t rea t ise D e i n t e ll e c t u ,b „ :

the imprec ise informa t ion tha t we h ave abo ut th i s t ext make s i t adv isab le toconcen t ra te our ana lys i s on the surviving w ri t ings . S ige r 's De anima intellectiv e,w ri t te n a f t e r t he Conde m na t i on o f 1270 b u t b e fo re t he d e a t h o f T hom a s , .. ishis mos t com ple te answer . When Siger sa id tha t in h i s t rea ti se he wo uld t ry tdetermine »quid circa praedicta sentiendum sit secundum documenta philosopii.rum probatorum , non a l iquid ex nob is asse rentes « 6 2 he w as no t h id ing beh ind;a m ethodologica l excuse ; he was in fac t accept ing the te rms tha t Thom as ha , .established for this important hermeneutical debate. But accepting the chili

l enge did not mean tha t he should w eaken his com m itment to h i stor ica l t ru th ,even if his exegetical work might not yield the same harmonious results as

60 Txott s AQuuvns, De u nitate intellectus, cap. 1 (Ed. Leon. 43), 291, 37-38; cf. 2 9 3 ,v. 218-222; 294, v. 303-306; 296, v. 462-466; 297, v. 500-503 et v. 576-579; 298;;

V. 620-621; 301, v. 845-849 and cap. 4, 308, v. 128-129. Concerning the Peripatetradition cf. cap. 2 (301, v. 1-2; 302, v. 145-151).

61 According to Agostino Nifo, who transmitted passages of this treatise together withhis own interpretation of them, Siger first reaction to Thomas' criticism seem§'have been the reduction of the human intellective soul to the receptive intellec

(keeping however its .unicity) and the affirmation that God is the agent intellect . fhuman kind; cf. A. Nipsus, De intellectu, I, tr. 4, c. 10, quoted by NARDI 1945, 18..

ibid., 46-47 and KuxsEWIaz 1968, 44. For important adjustments to Nardi's int,

pretation, cf. MP.xoNEY 1974, 538-539.

62 S I G E R U S D E BR.ssarrrin, De anima intellectiva, Prologus, ed. Bazā n, 70, v. 13-15;`,

cap. 3 (83, v. 44-48; 88, v. 50-53); cap. 6 (99, 81-83); cap. 7 (101, v. 7-9) Cf.S IGE R U S D E BRASarr r in , De aeternitate mundi, cap. 4, ed. Bazā n, 132, v. 85-86. As,.tallaz and Irnbach put it: »Siger vise en premier lieu une correcte interpretation de

lettre d'Aristote ā Pencontre de 1'attaque de Thomas qui lui reprochait justement

interpretation fallacieuse du texte d'Aristote.« (Pi-r u1 .z / IMBAcu 1997, 52). SQ .

of these texts and others that go in different direction have been analysed by % ō

Wippel, who concludes that Siger, in fact, has distinguished »between the way.natural reason, on the one hand, and determining the mind of Aristotle, on the`±her«, which suggests that Siger »allows for two distinct but complementary fun6iifor a philosopher at the University of Paris in the 1270s.« Cf. WWEI. 1998

ach ieved by Thom as . T»solum in tent ionem ph

iophus sen seri t a l iter q ,nem de an ima Sin t t rad(p. 83, V. 44-48).

With these methodc

mi ne , t h roug h a c a re fuAristote lian psyc hologysense can the in te l l ec t

± ( ” :Aristotle's general defii

. ; l ion as the s ingle subsontological correlative.intermediar ies , con sti ttkellective soul withoutā ny oth er soul , or is i tAlber t and Thomas , w

essendo« and i ts vwith Aristotle 's intenti

l ive with respect to th ,

In fac t , for Ari.hough being »uni t a uonly »in opere«, and

< ecto« (a thesis that TIIltellection can be at

p, bō dy ( a s shou l d b e c cause the images a re i

intellective soul is o p e n

compos i t e ex intrinsecot ē l lec tion should be a 'S i g e r ha s a b a ndone d,with an anthropologif ive soul cannot be upnly by ex tens ion : »fdicatur« (ch. III). Sig(soul is not compo si te

the incorruptibil i ty ofrequires , according tcthe !past . But Siger u

- ,63 - SIGERUS DE BRABANI

x^ .



Radical A ristotelianism in the Faculties of Arts15

and rad ica l Arisachieved by Tho m as . That is why S iger s ta ted tha t he would t ry to de te rmineo mn i n o . «60At the..;: »solum in tent ionem ph i losoph orum e t praec ipue Aris to te l i s , e t s i for te Phi lo-

aalysis of texts had ,;, sophus senserit aliter quam veritas se habeat et sapientia, quae per revelatio-ity of the intellect ''' nem de anim a s in t t radi ta , quae pe r ra t iones na tura les conc ludi non possunt«:rn ic ious e rror has (p. 83, v. 44-48).im phi losophorum ,' } With these methodological principles in mind, Siger proceeded to deter-

m i ne , th roug h a c a re fu l a na l ys is o f t e x t s , w ha t he t houg h t w a s t he a u t he n t i c; , namely as a chal- _ Aris to te l ian psych ology. The mo st important prob lem i s to de te rmine in w hatxts. Although it .Is sense can the intellective soul be separated from the body.

63According toeatise De intellectu, 6 1 .". Aris to t l e 's genera l de f in i t ion , the soul i s the pr inc ip le of be ing an d of o pera-

akes it advisable to „"lion as the single substantial form of the hylomorphic living composite; its

De anima intellectiva, t ontologica l corre la t ive pr inc ip le i s m at te r , to w hich the sou l i s uni ted wi thoutLeath of Thomas , Is ntermediaries, const i tut ing unum ens (ch. 1 and 2). Can this be said of the in-

, t ise he w ould try to ':. s ; te l lective soul without qu alif ications? Is i t united to the body » in essgndo«, l ikedocumenta ph ilosopho-' any othe r soul , or i s i t uni ted to i t only »in operando «? The in te rpre ta t ions ofs not hiding behind : : Alber t and Thom as , who wan ted the in te ll ec t ive soul to be uni ted to the bodyIs t ha t T homa s ha d w in essendo« an d i t s in te l l ec tua l facul ty to be separa ted i s ne i the r cons is tentaccep t ing the chal . , w ith Aris to t le ' s in tent ion (»def ic iunt ab in tent ione Phi losophi«) , nor co nc lu-

it to historical truthruth4 s ive wi th respec t to the point they in tended to prove (»no n conc lud unt in ten-

xrnonious resul t s a i tu m«. In fact, for Aristotle the intellective soul is »separata in essendo«, al-though be ing »uni ta in operando «. The in te ll ec t ive soul is one w i th the bod y

29 17 - 38 ; cf. 293,only » in opere«, and depends on it »non sicut ex subiecto, sed sicut ex ob- { ,I

,03 et v. 576-579• 2

i ec to« (a thes is tha t Thom as had app l ied to the in te l lec t ive facu l ty) . The ac t o f

cerning the Penpat ē d intellection can be attributed to men neither because it takes place in thebody (as should be concluded from Albert's and Thomas' position), nor be-

s treatise together with ' " cause the im ages a re in the body (as Averroes had proposed) , bu t because then asr i ti c i sm seems ,.intellective soul is operans intrinsecu m ad corpu s per naturam. Man i s consequent ly a

the recept ive ^nte lle - the agent int ellect,o compos i te ex zntrznseco operanti et eo ad quod intrinsece operatur and the act of in-by NARDI 1945,18 ; t e l lec t ion should be a t t r ibuted to th i s w hole com posi te , not to any o f i t s parts.tments to Nardi s In ;tiger has abandoned the original Averroistic interpretation only to replace it +rl

with an anthropological dualism which forced him to state that the intellec-az ā n, 70, V . 13-15; f ive soul cannot be united to the body utf igura cerae and can be called form ; I '

701, v. 7-9 . Cf.85 – 8632 , v .A s. Only by extens ion: »forma extens ive acc ip i tur u t in t rinsecum operans form a

ecte interpretat ion de " c3 catur« (c h. III) . Siger s ta tes a lso that according to A ris tot le -the intellect iveep rocha i t jus t emenf ul is not composite of matter and form, and infers from this immateriality

BACH 1997, 52). S the inco rruptibil ityof the soul in the future. He also states that this conclusionbeen analysed by Jo requires, according to Aristote l ian principles, that the soul be incorruptible in

d > > b e t w e e n th e w a y .of Aristotle, on th,

he Su tast.iger insists that this thesis does not imply that the soul is not- t

!

itpy

ioom lementu n t

WIPPEL 1998. A3 SIGERUS DE BRABANTIA, De anima intellectiva, Prologus, ed. Bazan, 70, v. 7-9.

i1li,i^l k

jl II

ii l_I



61 6. Carlos Baz ā nadical A ristoteli

caused ; on the contrary, as proven by Aristot le himself in Metaphysics V, . t -soul i s »semper ens , ab a l io t amen< (ch . IV and V ) , a thes is tha t was a l rea .

present in Siger's Q in tertium De anima.S o , how i s the sou l separabilis f rom the bod y? In chapte r VII of h i s Dē anjnintellectiva Siger recognizes that it is difficult to find a straight answer i

of Aristotle. On the one hand, the Philosopher seems to imply tl

the soul i s not separab le , becau se he c l ear ly s ta ted tha t the re i s no so ul wi t jout a body, that the soul cannot be defined without the body, that it cannc

exercise its own operation without bodily images, and because there is nevide nce co ncerning the sep arate s ta te of the soul. If it i s argued that Aris tots ta ted a l so tha t the soul »separa tur ab a l i i s s icut pe rpe tuu m a corrup t ib il i« , ;could be said, »secundum Commentatorem et forte intentionem Philosophi«, th ī

the soul separates from this particular body, but not from a body »simpli(

t e r« . Bes ides , acc ording to A ris to t le the soul i s e te rna l , but the bod y has bgun to exis t ; consequent ly i f it were separab le f rom the body, the soul w ou.have ex i s ted separa ted f rom a bod y du r ing an in f in i t e t im e, w hich i s i r ra t io r ito say. Again , as an inf in ite num ber of m en have pre -existed , i f each one h ia pe r sona l sou l w h i c h re m a i ns s e pa ra te f rom t he b ody a f t e r t he de a t h o f t icomposite, there would be an infinite number of separate souls, which

against the Aristotelian principle that there is no infinite in act. Finally,~.Aristotle had thought that the soul was separable from the body, he woqhave written a treatise on separate souls and their state, but that is not.qcase , which indica tes consequent ly tha t »nec animam s ic separar i ve rum esopinari videtur« . This is the conclusion that Siger prop osed as an A ristoteli^scholar w hose respons ib i li ty i s to present as fa i thful ly as poss ib le the co ne lof the texts . But he i s a l so a phi losopher and a Chris ti an . As a ph i losopherknow s tha t by the i r very na ture cer t a in subjec t s a re beyond the u nders tandi r

c a pa b i l it ie s o f hu m a n re a son . T ha t i s w hy he a l so c onc l ude s : »E t i de o , l icphilosophi non experti operum apparentium de animabus totaliter separ ā 'i

eas sic separatas non ponant, qui tamen experti sunt praedictam animae.'i

para t ionem noveru nt e t a li i reve laverun t .« Under those epis tem ologica l coditions, nothing in nature prevents some prophetic men to reach a superi,

k i nd o f k now l e dg e w h i c h i s b e yond t he s c ope o f hum a n re a son , a nd no t h i tprevents common men to accede to those truths »credendo testimonio prphetaeo. We arrive thus tc the same conclusion proposed by J. J. Duin wi

respec t to S ige r 's doc t r ine in the Com m entary on the M etaphys ics .64As for the numerical mul t ipl icat ion of inte l lect ive soul , Siger 's point of c

parture is twofold: a) acco rding to truth, which ca nnot l ie , the souls are multip'

64 Duur 1954, 422-429; cf . a lso Bnz ā rr 1974b, 32.

but h i s t ask i s to de te rm ine he r(r i tas« . The pro b lem i s tha t phi l ,

aý the m ul t ip l ic ity on the bas i sid he adds, in a clear rejection:ent subs tant ia l form, tha t no nl ividua ta cou ld be m ul t ip le , asia ra te forms) , on the bas i s tha ti mat te r can be m ul t ip le , and cier phi losophers , l ike Av icennais of the m ultipl ication of intel l ,aced in favor o f m ul t ip l i ca tion ,i l ity of ex plaining the m ultipl icz- hypothesis of the unicity of theêtics was a lready in crisis in hisDe anima intellectiva the crisis e•

ep evo lut ion of his thought: a) Ie i n t e ll e c t w i th m e n b y me a ns. te in the ac t of in te l l ec t ion a nce intel lect as intrinsecus operans, at

m s of the recept ive or possiblem the agent intellect is a sepa'

6 5

-_. .Ano ther aspect of Siger 's evolt(Lisbonne) . This text is contem pslightly earlier. 66 Basica l ly , the dconfi rms tha t S ige r cons ide rs theby the recept ive intellect , which,

had presented it in his Q in tertiuth i s t ext, i s not a lway s und ers tanthis affirmation is that the receptb e c a use b y na t u re suc h sub s ta nca c t ; ou r c omm on e xpe r i enc e , onund ers tanding in ac t (q . 3 , 109,agent intellect , defined by A rist<

65 That i s the conc lu s ion tha t can t

tel lect found in chapter V (93, V. Ecould perform the abs tract ion: » imatibus, agente intel lectu, et tandindication that the theory reporte(

x:66 Cf. Bnzā ty 1974b, 33-39.




4etaphysics V, thes that was already`. '

VII of his De anima`ght answer in theem s to im ply tha t •re i s no soul w i th- ')dy, tha t i t canno t:cause the re i s no•geed that A ris totle

i a c orruptibil i« , it :.rn Philosophi« , thata body »simp lici-:

t the body ha s be - .:y , the soul wouldwh ich is i rra t ionald , i f e a c h one ha d:r the dea th of thy '. t e soul s , which i s 'in act. Finally, if'

. e b ody , he w ou l d)ut that is not the:parar i ve rum esse '

as an A ristoteliann)ssible the contents a phi losopher hthe unders tanding

les: »Et ideo, lic 1

• totaliter separa.tild i c t a m a n i ma e s) is temological con

reach a superiō i

ason , and no th ingdo tes t imonio pry ;by J . J . Duin w i t t

taphysics.Siger 's point of desouls are mu ltiple;

b) but h i s task i s to de te rm ine he re the »in tent io phi losopho rum m agis quamveri tas« . The prob lem i s tha t phi losophers a re divided o n th i s sub jec t . Som e

deny the m ul t ip l ic ity on the bas i s of the im m ate r ia l i ty o f the in te l lec t ive soul(and he adds, in a clear rejection of Thomas' doctrine of the soul as a sub-s i s tent subs tant ia l form, tha t no na tu re wh ich i s pe r se subs is tens and pe r seindividua ta could be m ul t ip le , as Aris to t le has show n w i th respec t to Pla to 's

`.. separa te fo rms ) , on t he b a s i s t ha t on l y m a t e r ia l fo rms o r c om pos i te s o f fo rmand m at te r can be m ul t ip le , and on the im poss ib i li ty of an inf in ite in ac t . But

-. other philosophers, like Avicenna, Algazel and Themistius are strong parti-

. sans of the m ul t ip l ica t ion of in te ll ec t ive sou l s . Other reasons , can a l so be ad-

vanced in favor of multiplication, the most important one being the impos-sibi li ty of explaining the m ult iplicat ion of the a cts of intellect ion i f one acc eptsthe hyp othesis of the un ici ty of the intellect . With respect to this point , Siger 'snoet ics w as a lready in cris is in his Q in tert ium De anima, a s w e ha ve show n . Inhis De anima intellectiva the c r i s is evolved in to two dev e lopments tha t indica te a

• deep ev olut ion of h i s thought : a ) he s ta ted expl ic i tly (ch . IV) tha t the union ofthe intellect with men by means of images cannot explain how men partici

pate in the act of intellection and replaced this theory by his own theory ofthe intel lect as intrinsecus operans, and b) he spoke of the intellect ive soul only interm s of the recept ive or possible intellect , g iving the c lear impression that forhim the agent intellect is a separate substance necessary for the abstractive

operation.65Ano ther aspec t of S ige r ' s evolut ion i s ma ni fes ted by h is Qu aestiones naturales

;: (Lisbonne). This text is contemporary with De anima intellectiva or might beslightly earlier. 6 6 Basically, the doctrine presented in question 3 of this textc onf i rms t ha t S i g e r c ons i de r s t he hum a n i n t e ll e c ti ve sou l t o b e de f i ne d on l y

: by the recep t ive in te llec t , which , con t ra ry to the op in ion of Av erroes a s Siger

`had pre sented i t in h i s Q. in tertium De anima and a s he synthe t izes i t aga in in- t h is t e x t , is no t a l w a y s unde r s t a nd i ng i n a c t . T he i mm e di a t e c onse que nc e o fth i s a ff i rm at ion i s tha t the recept ive in te ll ec t cannot be a separa te subs tance ,because by nature such substances are intellectual and always intelligent in

a c t ; ou r c om m on e xpe r i e nc e , on t he c on t ra ry , a t te s t s tha t w e a re no t a l w a ysunderstanding in act (q. 3, 109, v. 43-46): The next consequence is that the

agent intellect, defined by Aristotle as »sciens in actu«, must be a separate

65 That is the conclusion that can be inferred from the rare mention of the agent in-tellect found in chapter V (93, v. 62-65), where Siger also seems to indicate that Godcould perform the abstraction: »intelligere animae intellectivae causatur ex phantas-matibus, agente intellectu, et tandem ab omnium Primo Principio.« This could be anindication that the theory reported by A. Nifo is authentic; c£ supra, nt. 61.

66 Cf. BAZnrr 1974b, 33-39.

p h i , -1 t, +;



61 8. Carlos Bazdn

'.,:. substance, distinct from the receptive intellect (ibid., V52-53). Both subst- own natu re sT. antes the agent and the rece tive intellects, are defined bif ferent opecept iveyra un i t e d to m a

tions, which are still characterized by the Averroistic terms »agere in telligi were comple tbi l ia« and »rec ipe re in te ll ig ib i liw< and they a re n ot re l a ted to each o the r , as ' ' that are uniqmatter and form (ibid., v. 45-46 and 110, v. 56-5 7). Curiously, Siger adds as other matethat the experienc e of und erstanding at tests a lso that both principles of Intel- - t im e t he pe r fl ec t ion m ust be long to our soul , because both opera t ions requi red for in tellec- :: , blem »qua l i tytion are » in voluntate nostra« (109, v. 47-49). This is a significant r einter- . m ent . That i spre ta t ion of Averroes ' thought , who a lso asser ted tha t the agen t and rece p t ive De c ausis. Theintellects are part of our »soul« for the same reason, and in almost identical ": to which theterms , but in a ve ry d i f feren t on to log ica l f ramew ork.67 (a thesis that ,

' We reach thu s the l as t s tage of S ige r 's evolut ion: h i s Quaestiones super Librum' accepted): if tDe Causis. 6 8 T he i mpor t a nc e o f t h is w ork ha s b e e n una n i mou s ly e m pha s i zed opera t ion carby a l l h i s tor ians , wh o agree on the or thodoxy of S ige r ' s pos it ion , concerning , : ' o t he r me a ns 1

the na ture of the in te l lec t ive soul , h i s dependency on Thom as ' doc t r ine , the _ ' ; of the body, 1deep reinterpreta t ion that Siger mad e of Aris tot le 's texts , and his reject ion of ; `: Aristotle 's alEAverroes ' exeges is on ph i losophica l g rounds . The text , then , dese rves a ca re - ' : be at tributedful analys is . ed as if the ac

The fi rs t thing that is not iceab le is that Siger speaks o f the intellect ive soul `; ' an objective c

as being d efined by the recep t ive intellect (q. 22, v. 75-78; q. 26, v. 8 and 10; '3 modo quo inthe whole q. 27; q. 39). The question of the agent intellect is not examined , f a n t um s i c u t

i s directly. The second thing worth noticing is that Siger strongly rejects um sensibilia ad sversal hylomorphism. Neither the separate intelligences nor the human m- to roan, but not e l lec t ive soul a re com posi te of ma t te r and form . The i r fin i tude i s expressed anim a, intel l ifb y a c o m pos i ti on o f a c t a nd po t e nc y , w h i c h S i g e r de f ine d i n t e rms c l o se t o . , naturaliter unthose used by Thom as: »Inte ll igent ia enim cum non s i t pr imo ens , s ic e s t ens h : : intelligit sinquod esse habet et quod natura in te ll igen t i ae com para tor ad esse e ius s i cu t po • original , as Pt

tentia ad actum « (q . 22 , v . 64-66) . The th i rd th ing to n ote i s S ige r ' s s t rong a l - already in Sigf i rmat ion tha t the in te l lec t ive soul i s the form or pe rfec t ion of the body. This ` ; š- himself. 7 ° Butfund am enta l thes i s i s presented as the t rue mea ning of Aris to t l e 's unive rsa l < the sensit ive adef in i t ion of the soul and as the resul t of a phi losophica l a rgum ent which re ? _ the vegetative; ..qui res tha t the pr inc ip le of opera t ion tha t de f ines hum an be ings spec i f ica l ly ; the intellectivebe the i r subs tan t ia l form (q . 26, v . 47-64) . _

However, Siger is extremely careful in explaining the scope of this affir 69Rrn rsz/m at ion and i t s impl ica t ions both for the na ture of the in te ll ec t ive sou l and of 70 Cf. SIGERUS

T H O M A Sthe intellectual operation (intelligere). He knows that forms that are by their '` D

tamen<<; Q u eIn De anima

67AvERROES, In De anima III, 18, ed. Crawford, 439, v. 71-75.

68 SrcExus DE BxnsaN'r'in, Les Q uaestiones super L ibrum De Causis de Siger de B rabant, e d . ? °

(Ed. Leonthesetexts

Marlasca. f ive« , bu t nc

^1 F e

I } • i l l ^ y



Radical Aristotelianism in the Facultie s of A rts19

. 52-53). Both subst-:.

d by different opera_'

erms »agere intelligi-'ted to each other, asā uriously, Siger adds

,th principles of Intel-

required for intellec=

a significant reinter-'

e agent and receptive

id in almost identical

)uaest iones super Librun

aimously emphasize(

s position concerning

'homas' doctrine, th,and his rejection o

then, deserves a car('

)f the in te l lect ive "so7 8; q. 26, v. 8 and 1

llect is not examini

strongly rejects Ii i

:s nor the human i• finitude is express

ned in terms close;primo ens, sic est ē

ad esse eius sicut

:e is Siger's strong:ion of the body. .T

f Aristotle's univer

d argument which

an beings specific

own nature separate from matter are specifically different from forms that are

• united to matter by their own nature (q. 18, v. 14-15). If the intellective soul

were completely separated from matter, it would be one of the separate forms• that are unique in their species; if it were the form of matter in the same way

• asother material forms, it would be impossible for the soul to be at the same

. time the perfection of the body and incorruptible (q. 18, v. 37-42). The pro-

blem »qualiter intellectus materiam perficiat« requires then a special treat-ment. That is precisely the purpose of question 26 of Siger's commentary on

De causis. The question begins with a rejection of Thomas' doctrine according

to which the soul is united to the body but its intellectual faculty is separated

(a thesis that, as we saw when commenting De anima intellectiva,

Siger neveraccepted): if the soul is the form of the body, sicut rei veritas est, its faculty and -operation cannot be separated (ibid., v. 72-74). Siger undertakes to prove by

:.Other means the truth of the matter, i. e., that the intellective soul is the form

of the body, by analysing the intellectual operation. His point of departure is

-Aristotle's affirmation (in book I of De anima) that the act of intellection should

be attributed to the composite of body and soul. This should not be interpret-

ed as if the act of intellection had in the body its ontological subject, but only

'an objective dependence: »non arguit ipsum intelligere esse commune ex hoc

nodo quo intelligere egeat corpore sicut subiecto in quo sit intelligere, sedtantum sicut obiecto, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum sicutsensibilia ad sensum« (ibid., v. 89-93). The act of intellection can be attributed

Oman, but not for the same reasons as the act of sensation: »dicitur homo, non

intelligere eo quod in ipso intelligere corpore egeat sicut obiecto cuitūraliter unitur, cum commune sit intelligere ex modo quo intellectus nihil

lelligit sine phantasmata« (q. 52, 182, v. 145-152). This terminology is not

ginal, as Putallaz and Imbach have affirmed; 6 9 on the contrary, it is found

ē ady in Siger's De anima intellectiva and its origin must be traced to Thomaself. 7 ° But for Siger the intellective act is not common to body and soul as

sensitive act, and the soul must not be considered the form of the body as

vegetative and sensitive soul (ibid., 106, v. 106-116). From the fact thate intellective soul operates without using the body as the subject of operation

he scope of this .a- / Ii&aAca 1997, 155

atellective soul and.0 . Cf. SIeExus DE Ba.. s rx. , De anima intellectiva, c. III, ed. Bazā n, 85, v. 69-72. Cf.

rms that are byiJ

HOMAS DE AQtmvo, Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 81 (Ed. Leon 13), 506: »Sciendum

tameno; Qu aestiones disputatae. de anima q. 1 ad urn (Ed. Leon. 24/1), 12, v.423-428;. , In De anima 1,2 (Ed. Leon. 45/1), 9, v. 48-69; Sum ma theologiae, IPars, q. 75 a. 6 ad 3. ' (Ed. Leon. 15), 204; De unitate intellectus, c. 1(Ed. Leon. 43), 299, v. 676-680: in all

isde Sigerde Brabant,; hese texts Thomas shows that the act of intellection depends on the body »obiec-tive«, but not »subiective«, i. e. does not use a corporeal organ or instrument.

I. ;

620. Carlos Bazā n



I Siger infers - as Thomas had done - that the intellective soul does not s ubsist objects becausein the body, but in itself and, subsequently, that the soul cannot be ge ner a ted . species; but exp

. ' . ' from the potency of matter, but must be created from without (ibid., V. 116 gtiently, if their118 and 162-165: »forma quae per se subsistit, sicut in suo esse non dependē t . ' many objects, wex materia, sic per transmutationem et dispositionem materiae ad actum non , the intellect mteducitur, sed ab extrinseco est intellectus«). Siger also states that, according to';' . though in itsel

•ristotle, this ontological independence does not prevent the intellective soul V matter for its befrom being the form of the body (107, v. 131-132 et v. 147-148), and Con- indeed, a spirits:

r . versely that this role of perfection of the body does not make of the soul a.''''; lectus sit ens sinmaterial form »a materia totaliter conclusa et materiae obligata« (ibid.;

; .

,': nem formae, etv. 155-157). The terminological similarities with Thomas' notion of »forma ; -

114, v. 202-204)per se subsistens« are misleading and one must consider other aspects of Si unicity, its »ratioger's explanation before jumping into conclusions. cation (ibid., v.

In question 27 of his commentary, Siger examines the problem of the mul multiplication leitiplicity of the intellect. The nature of the soul as a subsistent form, indepen given that for Asdent from matter in its being, seems to indicate its unicity, because the nu perpetual seriemerical multiplication is caused only by matter. Such is the conclusion drawn" ' the impossibilityby Averroes on the basis of principles quite similar to those that define the thought, and honature of the soul according to Si er." But, Siger insists, Averroes' conclusion'" tion of the intelle

is not only heretical but also irrational (q. 27, 112, v. 147). To prove the last and consequent)point he offers two arguments, one based on Aristotle, the other on Algazel. ' multiple (v. 250-The first runs like this: forms that are united to matter in such a way that if 'y Averroes' doctrinthey keep their unicity it would be impossible for them to fulfill the union Aristotle's noetic:must be multiplied following the multiplicity of matter; the intellective soul is In order to reunited to bodies in such a way that if it were uni ue it would not be able tonique the nature of thefulfill this union; therefore it must be multiplied following the multiplication ' questions that artof human bodies (ibid., 152-162). The second argument is, in fact, presented troversy. This an<

as proof of the minor premise of the previous one, and although Siger invokes z similarities, Siger'the authority of Algazel, its origin can be traced back to Aristotle and to Tho ' z object of which is

mas.7 2 Si ger's originality was to use this argument to refute mono s chismin ty

umy essence, Siger stat

and its historical importance is reflected in the fact that later Averroists, like intelligences (infim

! ;. Thomas Wilton, John of Jandun and Matthew Gubbio had to deal with it potency and conseThe argument runs like this: an intellect cannot think simultaneously many '_, ing actualized by

also q. 49, 173, v.

be, this capability71 The ressemblance between Si ger's definition of the soul and the principles on which. ' ; ;gp

intellective soul isi Averroes' position is based has been underlined by Pvzar raz / Iaex 1997, 156. notion of »forma72 Cf. AtusTOTELES, Top., 114b34, quoted by THoMns DE AQusro, Summ a theologuu,

substance (ibid., 17I Pars, q. 85, a. 4 (Ed. Leon. 15), 339.73 Cf. KuxsEwIcz 1968, 191-192 (Thomas Wilton), 226 (John of Jandun), 349 (Mat

V depending operatic

thew Gubbio).level of objects of k

Radical A ristotelianism in the Faculties of A rts 21J I



soul does not s ubsist objec ts because i t cannot be s imul taneo us ly ac tua l ized by m any in te l l ig ib leannot be genera' spec ies ; but exper ience a t te s t s tha t hum an be ings th ink man y ob jec t s ; conse -

thout (ibid., v 1164 qū

ent ly, i f their intellect is one, this intellect would be thinking simu ltaneouslyo esse non d epend. objec t s , which con t rad ic t s the m a jor p rem ise . Siger in fers f rom th i s tha ter iae ad ac tumhee intellect must be multiplied following the multiplication of bodies, al-s that , according tb 'hough in itself it is »per se subsistens«, not a material form dependent onthe intel lective soul: Iatter for its being (ibid., 113, v. 184-187). For Siger, the intellective soul is,14 7- 14 8) , a nd c on ? }ndeed, a spiritual substance which is at the same time a form: » licet intel-m ake of the soul a '" :' lectus sit ens sine corpore quantum ad eius substantiam, tamen habet ratio-iae obl igatao (ibid ;' nem formae, et ideo bene dicitur quod anima non est sine corpore« (ibid.,s' notion of »forniā 'i ''14, v. 202-204). If i ts nature of spiri tual substance w ould see m to su ggest i tsother aspec ts of Si-fi unic i ty , i ts »ra t io formae « requi res the union w i th the bod y and i t s m ul t ip li -

;. cation (ibid., v. 216-218 and 115, v. 228-230). And if it is argued that thisp ro b lem o f t h e mu l m ul t ip l ica t ion l eads to the conc lus ion tha t the re i s an infinite num ber of souls ,s t en t fo rm, indep ēn

becausegiven that for A ris tot le aninfinite number of men has already existed in the

ity,he n ū"' perpetual series of generations, one can reply that Aristotle seems to limite conc lus ion drawn . the impossibility of an infinite in act to material entities. Whatever he

hose tha t de f ine the 1hought, and however uncertain his words are concerning the multiphca-verroes ' conclus ion t ion of the in te l l ec t , one m ust rem em ber tha t Aris to t le homo fait et errare potuit,

) . To prove the last and consequently one must stick strongly to the truth -that the intellect ishe other on Algazel: multiple (v. 250-252). This statement implies the philosophical rejection ofn such a way that if Ave r roe s ' doc t r ine , b u t l e a ve s ope n t he que s t i on o f t he h i s t o r ic a l m e a n i ng o fto fulfill the union , Aris totle ' s noetics .

e intellect ive soul is In o rde r t o r e a c h a c om pl e te und e r s ta nd i ng o f S i g e r 's pos i t ion c onc e rn i ngould no t be ab le to the na ture of the in te l lec t ive soul a f ina l ana lys i s must be m ade o f a se r ie s of

ig the mult ipl icat ion ques t ions tha t a re l e ss re la ted to the polem ic context of the Averrois t i c con-is , in fact , presented t roversy. This ana lys i s wi l l a llow m e to show tha t , in sp i te of t e rminologica l

hough Siger invoke =" similarities, Siger's doctrine is quite different from Thomas's. In q. 39, theristotle and to Th6 objec t o f which i s to de term ine whether sepa ra te in te l ligences know thei r ownfute monopsychi sm ā , essence , S ige r s ta te s tha t the hum an in te l l ec t ive sou l , be ing the l as t of theselater Averroists, like` intel l igences ( infima in ordine intel lectualis naturae) is defined by an intel lect inad to d ea l wi th i t 'd ; potency and consequent ly i t can reach know ledge of i ts e ssence only a f te r be -

imul taneous ly many ' . mg actualized by the knowledge of material things (q. 39, 149, v. 35-45; cf

a lso q . 49 , 173, v . 19-20) . H owever imperfec t th is k ind of se l f=knowledge m aybe, this capability to return completely to its own essence confirms that the

the principles on wh^cl

IMBwca 1997, 156.'' intellective soul is by nature a subsistent form (q. 52, 181, v. 137-139). The

Qusro , Summ a theologwe' notion , of »forma subsistens« is clarified as being a synonym for spiritualsubs tance ( ib id ., 179, v . 69-72) . Nothing prevents such a sp i r i tua l na ture f rom

of Jandun), 349 ,(Mat " . ..depending opera t iona l ly on the body as long as th i s depend ence i s kept a t thelevel of objects of know ledge (ibid. , 182, v. 156-158). And Siger conc ludes the

^ÎI

ACC

622. Carlos Bazān



• presenta t ion of h i s anthropologica l v iews w i th a synthes i s tha t represents 116

.

a n a g re e m e n t w i t h T hom a s , a s some t i me s ha s b e e n t houg h t , b u t a s tun r i it t w h

return to the traditional dualism characteristic of the first half of the1277, bec

t eenth century:»intellectus cum hoc quod est per se subsistens et hoc al'Y4 u i d ;in

th e4

est etiam actus corporis e t forma« (ibid., 182, v. 165-166).i l l iam of Ba glion ē .

What 1cue the

c ou l d no t ha ve a sk e d fo r a ny t h ing m ore ! dig

anirony:

IV. Conclus ion: the Legacy of S ige r ` • : ' 'the exege:

' : say to theegesis), by

The in te l lec tua l evo lut ion of the m ost impo rtant radica l Aris to te l ian of the - ' yo u r o wnthirteenth century followed thus a curious path that started with Av erroes' l ian philom etaphy s ica l dua l i sm as be ing the prope r in te rpre ta t ion of Aris to t l e 's De ant-' , the re i s nma, m oved to , an am biguous anthropologica l dua l i sm w hich cons ide rs the re ? nas ' cultwcept ive in te l lec t to be the pe rfec t ion of hum an be ings as intrinsecu s op erans bu t s ' Aristotle 'sl eaves in doub t the que s t ion whe the r A ris to t le a ff i rmed i t s m ul t ip l ic i ty , and:` , sound fouended up with the traditional anthropological dualism – criticised by Tho s tut ional mmas – that was characteristic of the immense majority of Christian theolo ` approachg ians and ph i losophers . Siger adopted th i s dua l i sm as a doc t r ine which w as prudent aaccorda nce both wi th t ruth and wi th Aris to tl e< hylom orphism ap pl ied to hu ; , ship)76 ancman beings (though the uncertainty concerning Aristotle's position on the pressed d imultiplicity of the intellect was never fully overcome). It must be said that nnderstandur ing th i s long i t inera ry Siger never unders tood correc t ly Averroes ' pos i t ion Duns Scotw hen he co ns ide red bo th the agent and the recept ive in te l l ec t s as separa te ; ' '. : analysis off rom hu m a n b e i ng s , he m a de o f t he m t w o fa c u l t ie s o f t he s a me se pa ra t e sp t -ritual substance; when he considered them as two substances (as Avexrod .. 75 This rep

did) , he put them in di f fe rent onto logica l l eve l s . I t mu st be added tha t S ige r 's after thfyes

I ; correc t unders tand ing of hylomorp hism in a l l o the r re spec ts was never ful ly ' .

gP. a

ditionllapplied to the human com posi te cons ide red as a c orporea l in te ll ec tua l subst ed that

ance: in his first stage he stated that the only substantial form of human asserted

be ings was the su per ior sens i tive soul and tha t the in te l lec t wa s a subs tance" ' •quently

separated from them; from that stage he moved to a weaker notion of sub-by whai

i'! stant ia l form that a l lowed him to apply i t »extensive« to an intellectual subst ' . form of

ance »intrinsecus operans«; at the end, when he clearly stated that the foundati

(receptive) intellect belongs in the human composite, he fell back into the , not mul

infra -metaphys ica l concept ion of hylomorphism according to wh ich i t i s pos- ; 'willing t

! I

.:., sible for a spiritual substance to playalso the role of form. Finally,I would in order

ken 25'

l ike to rem ark tha t , parad oxica l ly , the radica l in te rpre ta t ion of Aris to t le ' s Dē this text.76 Cf. BIAI

II . '''4 For Thomas' criticism of this dualism, cf. Box 1997. and the

11i1I',3-

Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties of A rtr 23



at represen ts not ' i' I :anima, w h i c h ma d e o f S i g e r one o f the m a i n t a rg et s o f the Conde m na t i on o fi.t, but a stunning 1277, becam e the . s tandard in te rpre ta t ion even amo ng those who pa r t ic ipa ted'I

half of the thin_ ; in the draft ing of the disciplinary measure.75tens et hoc aliqu id, ` W ha t b e g a n a s a n he t e rodox i n t e rp re t a ti on , de se rv ing c ond e m na t ion , b e -ham of Ba liong came the standard accepted understanding of Aristotle in theological circles

du ring the las t quar te r of the th i r teenth centu ry. More than a p arado x th i s isan irony: the radical Aris to te l ians prov ided the conse rva t ive theologians w i ththe exeges is they need ed to d i sc redi t Aristo t l e . In shor t , the theologian cou ldsay to the »radicals«: you are right (from the point of view of historical ex-

eges is ), but you a re wrong (f rom the point of v iew of the Chris ti an t ruth) and'ristotelian of the` c your own interpretation confirms your error and the limitations of Aristote-d w ith Averroes ' . ;: lian philosophy. If the »radicals« have proposed the correct interpretation,

Aristot le 's De ani there is no truth value in Aristotle's De anima. Conse que n t l y , T hom a s Aqui -considers the re ; ; nas ' cul tura l pro jec t , which was ba sed on the ac ceptance of the t ruth Value of

insecus operans but i g Aristotle's philosophy, should be set aside: Aristotle indeed cannot provide

mu ltiplicity, arid ;. sound foundations to Christian wisdom. It is not surprising then that insti-

ri t icised by Tho- t u t iona l me a sure s w e re t a k e n t o »c o r re c t « T homa s , t ha t ma ny w h o sha re d h i sChrist ian theolo r y e ; p roach — like Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines — adopted moreP. ine which was in

prudent attitudes when expressing their views (if not self-imposed censor-

m a pplied to his- ship)76 and tha t grea t th inkers a t the beginning of the four teenth century ex-position on the dis trus tressed di sus t v i s -à-vis the cont r ibut ion of the »phi losophers« to the co rrec t

g ust be said that j unde rs t a nd i ng o f t he na t u re o f m a n a nd t he un i ve r se ( a s i t is t he c a se o f J ohnverroes' position:: ` Duns S cotus) , or concent ra ted the i r e ffort s on the sa fe r dom aine of Logic andElects as separate ; analys is of language.s ine separate spi ; rices (as Averroes " ' 75 This remarkable text, written by none other than Henry of Ghent, only eight years

dried that S iger 'safter the Condemnation proves the point: »Everything that Aristotle said in his trea-tiles of natural philosophy with respect to the soul as form of the body was said con-

s was neve r ful ly ditionally and hypothetically, in such a way that it cannot be inferred that he assert-intellectual subst- ' ; ed that the soul was the form of the body; however from other principles that he

form of hum an ' ! :: asserted absolutely it follows that the soul is not the act of the body, and conse-

was a subs tance quently that it does not multiply following the multiplication of bodies, as it is shown

er notion of sub-rby what has been said previously. Therefore it must be stated absolutely that Aris-

! •intellectual subst

toile did not say nor did he determine anythingcertain about the intellect being thegform of the body and about its multiplication, that he refused to follow-the principalstated that the ='- . foundations of his doctrine, i. e. that the intellect is not the form of the body and doesē 11 back in to the not multiply. However, he did not believe in those foundations to the point of being

o w hich i t is pos- ."willing to assert explicitly what follows from them; but he left the question in doubt

. ,

Fina l ly , I wo uldin order to avoid easy criticism.« HENRICUs n GANDAvo, Quodlibet IX , q. 14, ed. Mak

; I i' .:' .

Aristotle's Defken, 255,42-256,54. I am thankful to Kent Emery for having called my attention to

da lthis text, which he analyses in his recent paper, c£ EMEStY 2000, part. 95-98.76 C£ BUUVcxi 1990, 27-32. This work is essential to understand the impact, the scope

.. andthe final goal of the Condemnationof 1277

I

624 . Carlos Baz ā n



'. As for the masters of Arts, they kept doinghe ke t doin what was required of them, i . e wh a t h a they kept explaining Aristotle's text. Not without feeling oppresed, thou Aristotleand censored, as L. Bianchi has underlined." And perhaps not without 6 : , 5 domains ) ti

` ;ee l ing pe rplexed, may we ad d, because i f the re was so mu ch e rror in Aris ta ! '; thor deseryt i e 's t exts , wh y should they be kept in the curr iculum? Are they supposed to . : r=n g the opFbe taught only as a m eans to provide t ra in ing in reasoning sk i l ls? Some m as_ f those whot e r o f Ar t s , however , da red to re i te ra te the pa th fo l lowed by Siger and to keep ; "for the syn.searching for the exact meaning of Aristotle's De anima guided by Av erroes' and T hom <in terpre ta t ion . But they w ere no longer na ive scho la rs . The dangers o f Aver-° : dial Aristoiroes' doctrine had already been denounced in the strongest terms in philo phi losophy

sophica l docum ents and ec c les ias t ica l condem nat ions . The focus of the i r a t - .. ; : ; - we re left intent ion shifted, then, from the m ere exege sis of Aris tot le 's texts to the ana lysis between hisof Averroes ' interpretat ion and i ts phi losophical difficul t ies. More than radical ā . . Siger shareAristotelians , these masters can be called »Averrois tso. Among them, only the ` u I . T h o ma s , n ^

• Anony m ous m aste r edited by Gie le did not hes i ta te to say: »quod ho m o pro- ; ' the t ruth akF. . . : . prio sermone intelligit, non concedo. <<"All the others tried to find, in the rational eff

com plexi ty of Averroes ' doctrines , and through a sophist icated analysis of his 'l reason to sut exts , a sa t is fac tory explana t ion for the par t i c ipa t ion of hum an be ings in the solid as Alb

s act of intellection. The importance that I have given to Siger of Brabant in God, Alber tth i s paper i s j us ti f ied by the fac t tha t l a te r Averrois ts , even w hen they do no t ` cessi ty that :quote the i r predecessor , benef i ted f rom the theore t ica l f ramew ork se t by the ' . nation of IBrabant ine m as ter . Many of the au thors wh o represen t the d i f feren t phases o f empha sis or.

i.. Lat in Averroism dist inguished by Kuksewicz are witnesses to the importance; , th ing not or .of Siger 's contribut ion to the his tory of Averroism . 7 9 H is doubts , his succesives as a univers ;views and the in te ll ec tua l hones ty of h i s c r i t ica l approach to the prob lem fed a n d b e c a m ethe debate well into the fourteenth century. God.82 Und(

But S i g e r 's suc c e s so r s b e c a m e p rog re s s i ve ly ob se s se d w i th t he i r ow n e x = a u t o n o mo us

^ : - eget ical problems, centered more on solving the obscuri t ies of Averroes ' corn- theology —mentary than in enlightening Aristotle's De anima with an original interpre- »ha rmon i outa t ion , and end ed up be ing a c losed group a ffec ted by a k ind of conse rva t i sm

s oof i t s own , paradox ica l re sul t of the ir inbreeding . ef lec ting backw ards in t ō '

;.:. 77 Bianchi quotes James of Dual (»viri philosophici hiis diebus Bunt oppresi«) and Johnof Pouilly (»hoc fuit quod volui dicere in aula, sed non potui, impeditus«). -----

78 Anonymus, Qu aestiones in A ristotelis Lib ros I et II De anima II, 4, ed. Giele, 75, v. 45. r evo lu t ion ,79 What follows is based on KuxsEwicz 1968: e. g., Giles of Orleans (100-101), the dans l'hist

Anonymous master of Paris, MS Bibl. Nat. lat. 16609 (105), John of Gottingen (128'

mē me [..._Anthony of Parma (150; 153-154; 163-165), Thomas Wilton, John of Jandun arc' d'assimiler

Matthew of Gubbio (197-198; 205-207; 237-238; cf supra, nt. 73), Taddeus of Par 81 C£ DE Lima (321) and James of Plaisance (360; 373; 398).

l'antiaristot

80 C£ GILSON1976, vol. 2, 688-689: »[...] l'averroisme, malgr ē son aspect hardi e 82 C£ Btnrren

I^ ,

Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties o f Artc 25



i red of them , i . e . , what happened in mid-thirteenth century, it can be said that the authority ofoppresed, though, , Aristotle as source of truth in the field of human nature (as well as in other

s not wi thout a l so dom ains ) was shor t - l ived . $ ' I t f e l l v i c t im o f t hose w ho re ve re d h i m a s a n a u -ch e rror in A ris to- thor deserv ing fa i thful his torical exegesis , even i f that cou ld result in unde rlin-t he y suppose d t o ing the opposition between Aristotle and the Christian W eltanschauung, and ofsk i ll s? Som e m as - those who a lways d i s t rus ted h im as a source of doc t r ines tha t were dangerousSiger and to keep < for the syncre t ic cul tura l pro jec t l ed by the conse rva t ive theologians . Alber t

i de d b y Ave r roe s ' r ,'nd Thomas – who in many respects could be considered to be the most ra-da ng e rs o f Ave r dical Aristotelians because of the truth value that they granted to Aristotle's

st terms in philo- phi losophy i f i t wa s unders tood a ccording to the i r he rmen eut ica l pr inc ip les -

focus of their at- were left in an unconfortable position, caught as they were in the cross fireexts to the analysis ' between his torical exegesis and doctrinal eclect ic ism. Radical Aris totel ians l ike. More than radical Siger shared however something basic and fundamental with Albert and

ong them, only the T hom a s , na me l y t he p r i nc i p le a c c o rd i ng t o w h i c h ph i lo sophy sh ō u l d s e a rc h: »quod homo p ro - the truth about the nature of man and the universe through an autonomous

vied to f ind , in the ` rational effort – although Siger 's confidence in the capability of naturalGated ana lysis of his ` x - ;eason to suc ceed in f inding tha t t ru th wi th Aris to te li an pr inc ip les wa s not as'rum a n b e i ng s in t he sol id as Alber t 's or Thom as ' s . Though ex t remely respec t ful of the f ree w i ll ofS ige r of Brabant in God , A l b e r t, T homa s a nd S i g e r w e re a l so r e spe c t fu l o f the m e t a phys i c a l ne -In wh en t h ey do n o t cess i ty tha t fo l low s the wi l l of God, onc e H e had dec ided. Afte r the Condem -am ework se t by the nation of 1277 something deep changed in that intellectual framework. Thegg

different phases of - emphas is on potentia absoluta m a de o f God a n i n f i n it e a g e n t w ho c a n do e ve ry -s to the imp ortance : t h ing no t on l y f r e e l y b u t i mm e di a t e ly , a nd t he w or l d c e a se d t o b e t houg h t o foubts, his succesives as a un ive rsa l s truc ture pres ided over by l aws based o n essent ia l connec t ions ,to the prob lem fed and became a structure which holds only from the mysterious free will of

G od . 8 2 Under those cond i t ions , sc ience and phi losophy cou ld not asce r ta in anw i t h t he ir ow n e x - autonom ous projec t and ha d to cons ide r them se lves as in tr inseca l ly sub jec t toI i I ^

^s of Averroes' corn- theology – or brake entirely with theology and abandon the search for ani.n original interpre »harm onious« syn thes i s of fa ith and reaso n as par t of the in te l lec tua l pro jec tI: ind of conservatism:t ing back wards into i !

unt oppresi«) and John I;.

impeditus«) .ci. Giele , 75, v. 45. revolutionnaire, fut essentiellement conservateur. IIn'y a peut-etre pas d'exemple.Drleans (100-101), the

`

dans I'histoire de Ia philosophie dune ecole aussi completement fermee sur elleohn of Gott ingen (128) ,mme [...] C'est 1'averrolsme, et non la scolastique en general, que Pon a le droitz, John of Jandun and • d'assimiler a un aristotehsme obstine et borne .«

it. 73), Taddeus of Par 81f DE Ln3ERA 199363: »Jusqu'a un certain point on pourrait meme dire que

l1 l

I antiaristotelisme a ete la tendance .predominante du Moyen Age .«

!

!re son aspect hardi et 82f.BANfu1990, ch. 2.!'I

M1

!I

[;RAJ. Carlos Baz ā n adical A n



BibliographyRestricted to thirteenth-century Latin writings specifically conceived as commentaries „nAristotle's De anima, in chronological order:

PETRUS HIsPANus, In De anima [c. 1240?], ed. Manuel Alonso, Pedro Hispano. Obras h io-s ō ficas 2. Comentario al De anima de Aristō teles, Madrid 1944.

Ps.-PEZRus HIsPANus, In II–IIIDe anima [1245?], ed. Manuel Alonso, Pedro Hispano. Obras'filos ō ficas 3, Madrid 1952.

ANorwanJs , Se ntentia super II et III De anima [c. 1246-1247], ed. B. C. Bazā n (Philosopher, `mē d iē vaux 37), Louvain 1998.

ANoc vMus , Lec tura in Librum De anima [1245-1250] , ed . R . -A . GAU rH IER (Sp ic i leg ium Bonaventurianum 24), Grottaferrata 1985.

A N o N m l u s , Quaestiones super Librum De anima (Siena, L.111.21, £ 134 ra -177 a ) [c . 1250], pedi t ion (ff. 136' x-138"a) by Paola Bernardini, La scienza dell'anima, in: Studi Mediev'3 a Serie, 40/2 (1999), 924-939.

Ai.BERZVs MAGNUS, De anima [1254-1257], ed. Cl. Stroick (Ed. Colon. 7/1) Munster 1968ANoN ym u s , Que stions in tres libros de anima (Adm ont , St i f tsbiblio thek, cod . lat . 367) [c. 12691

ed. J. Vennebusch, Ein anonymer Aristoteleskommentar des XIH. Jahrhunderts, Pader;born 1963.

SIGERUS DE BRABANTIA, Quaestiones in tertium De anima [c. 1265], ed. B. C. Baz ā n (Phi losophermē d i ē vaux 13), Louvain 1972.

T H O M A S D E A r m c o , Sentencia libri De anima [1267-1268], ed. R.-A. Gauthier (ed. Leō g

45/1), Roma /Paris 1984.ANoNym u s , Quaestiones in A ristotelis Libros Jet II De anima [1270-1275], ed. M. Giele, in: Gri=:

I.E /VAN STEENBERGH EN / BAZAN 1971, 13-118.ANO NYhtus ( fo rmer ly a t t r ibu ted to S ige r o f Braban t ) , Qcaestiones in libros A ristotelis De ani Y '

[1273-1277], ed. F. Van Steenberghen, in: Gim /vAN STEENBERGHEN/BAZAN 197,

121-343.ANorri us, Quaestiones supe r A ristotelis Librum De anima [1272-1277], ed. B. C. Bazā n,;in

GmLE/vAN STEENBERGH EN/BAZAN 1971, 352-514.I A C O B U S D E DuAGO, Quaestiones in De anima (Par is , Bibl. Nat . lat . 14698) [af ter 1277], se lec ted

quest ions ed. by M. Grabmann, Mit te lalter liches Geis tes leben 3 , M ūnchen 1956, 169-179.,E

ANoNYMus, In De anima [1277-1299] , ed . Z . KuxsEwicz , Un c omm en ta i re ave r roYs te anonym 1

sur le Trai tē de l ' am e d 'Ar i s to te , i n : Revue Ph i lo soph ique de Louva in 62 (1964) , 421-465:S I M O N I S D E F A V E R S H A M , Quaestiones super tertium De anima [end 13 ' century], ed. D. Sharp, in

Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littē raire du moyen age 9 (1934), 309-368.

For their close relationship with the interpretation of Aristotle's De anima, the following'ings should be added to the list:

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De homine [Secunda Pars Summae De Creaturis] [c. 1242], ed. A.gnet (Ed. Paris. 35), 1-704.

THOMAS DE AQurrro, De unitate intellectus [1270], Ed. Leon. 43, 289-314.

SIGERUS DE BRABANTIA, De anima intellectiv a [1273-1274], ed. B. C. Bazā n (Phi losophes .d iē vaux 13), Louvain 1972, 70-112.

RADul.r i ius BRrro, Q, de anima (partial ed. of 2 questions on sensus agens), in: A. Pattin, Il'histoire du lens agent. La controverse entre Barthelemy de Bruges et Jean de Janeses antecedents et son evolution, Louvain 1988, 19-31.

AI.BER-rus MAGNUS, De natura loci, Ied. P. Hossfeld (Ed. Colon. 5/2

A . O N Y M U S , Quaestiones in libros Aris;Munich, Clm 9559, f. 74-82), cc

BAZAN 1971, 121-343.; A N o N ym u s , Lectura in Librum De anh

24), Grottaferrata 1985.

I A N O N Y M U S , Quaestiones in A ristotelss La

' i :

121) , ed . M. G ie le , in : GIEI .E / vA N O N Y M U S , Quaestiones super Arutotelis

BERGH EN/BAZAN 1971, 352-519. " t l rroNYIUs, Magister Artium (c. 12"

leian Libr., Lat. Misc. c. 70, £ I

1 ed. B. C. Bazān (Phi losophes m ÂvERROEs, Commentarium magnum in A

t a r io rum Averro i s i n Ari s to t e lem.HENRICUS A GANDAVO, Quodlibet IX .

i 'tIoHANNES DE JANDUNO, Q u a e s t i o n e s i n

IoKANNEs BLoNDUS (Blund), Tractat• Brittanici Medii Aevi 2), LondonPErRUs HisPANus, In De anima, ed. I: r tar io al De anima de Aristō teles,

PETRUS HIsPANus, Scientia libri De acmiento, Colaboraciō n 4) Barcelc

Ps.-PE'rRus H Isp ANus, In II–III De as•,; Madrid 1952.

'..SIGERUS DE BRABANTTA, De anima i. Louvain 1972, 70-112.

r– . Qu aestiones in tertium De anim a, e:.' 1972, 1-69.-' Les Quaestiones super Librum De Ca, . : . diē vaux 12), Louvain 1972.

Tractatus de aeternitate mundi, ed. Bx:.113-136.I' i IO N I A S D E A Q ,uINo, De p rincipiis nat

torum , De op erationibus occu ltis natucente et e ssentia, ed. H.-F. Dondain

-: Sente ncia libri De anima, ed. R.-A.

Summa theologiae (Ed. Leon. 4-12,-: Quaestiones disputatae de anima, ed .

Qu aestiones disputatae de v eritate (E dCommentum in secundum librum sent

= Summa contra gentiles (Ed . Leon . 1

Radical A ristotelianism in the Faculties of Artr 27



References

td as commentaries o4-

ources

-o Hispano. Obra.sfj rus MAGNus, De natura loci, De causis proprietatum elementomm, De generation et cormptione,ed. P. Hossfeld (Ed. Colon. 5/2), Munster 1980.

Pedro Hispano. Obra MONYMU5, Qu aestiones in libros A ristotelis De anima (Oxford, Merton College 275, f. 67-84;Munich, Clm 9559, f. 74-82), ed. F. Van Steenberghen in: GIEIÆ / vTEENBERGHEN /

C. Bazån (Phiosophesi_______ BAZAN 1971, 121-343.

A N o N ym us, Lectura in Librum De anima, ed. R.-A. GAtrrsllait (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum

mrSpici legium Bo- 24), Grottaferrata 1985.A NoNyus, Qu aestiones in A ristotelis Libros Jet lIDe anima (Oxford, Merton College 275, f. 108-

l77) [c. 1250], part ia l y.

21), ed. M. Giele , in: GiELE/vAN STEENBERGREN/BAZAN 1971, 13-118.

na, in: Stud i Medieva l i

____ •

r.wrus, Q uaestiones supe r A ristotelis Librum De anima, ed. B. C. Bazán, in: GrEI.E/v TEEN-

BERGH FN/BAZAN 1971, 352-514.)n. 7/1) Munster 1968

_________MorwMU s , Magister Artium (c. 1246-1247), Sentent ia super II et H IDe anima Oxford, Bod-

cod. lat . 367) [c. 1260], leian Libr., Lat. Misc. c. 70, f. 1'-25b; Roma Bibl. Naz. V. E. 828, f. 46k, 48-52),

I. Jahrhunderts,Pader________ ed. B. C. Bazán (Philosophes médiévaux 37), Louvain 1998.

A V E R R O E S , Comme ntarium m agnum in A ristotelis De anima libros, ed . S . Crawfo rd (Corpus Comrnen-tar iorum Averrois in Aris tote lem. Versiones Lat inae 6,1) , Cambridge , Massachuset ts 1953.

l iENRicus A GANDAVO, Qjudlibet IX , ed. R. Macken (Opera Omnia 13), Leuven 1983.C. Bazán (Philosophes_

\. Gauthier (ed. Leon:__oHs DEJANDTJNO, Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysicae, Venice 1553 , r ep r . F rankfur t 1966.

Ioaas BL0I'mus (Blund), Tractatus de anima, edd. D. A. Callus / R. W. Hunt (Auctoresed. M. Giele, in: Gt- Brittanici Medii Aevi 2), London 1970.

PE11urs p us, In De anima, ed. M. Alonso, Pedro Hispano. Obras filosóficas 2. Comen-

bros A ristotelis De anim________ tario al De anima de Aristóteles, Madrid 1944.

S E R G H F . N / B A . z97 i, -Entus Hisp us, Scie ntia libri De anima, ed. M. Alonso (Obras filosóficas 1 / Libros Pensa-miento, Colaboración 4) Barcelona 1961.

ed. B. C. Bazan, in: ; Ps.-PETRUs HisPANus, In II–HIDe anima, ed. M. Alonso, Pedro Hispano. Obras filosóficas 3,Madrid 1952.

3) [after 1277], selected SIGFRUS DE BinANrr ' . , De anima intellectiva, ed. B. C. Bazán (Philosophes médiévaux 13),

Unchen 1956 , 169-179 . Louvain 1972, 70-112.

t ire averroIs t e anonym ' – Qu aestiones in tertium De anima, ed. B. C. Bazán (Philosophes médiévaux 13), Louvainain 62 (1964), 421-46Š: 1972, 1-69.

t u ry ] , ed . D. Sha rp , i n : ' -

Les Q uaestiones super Librum De C ausis de Siger de Brabant, ed. A. Marlasca (Philosophes me-

, 309-368.

diévaux 12), Louvain 1972.

– Tractatus de aeternitate mundi, ed. B. C. Bazán (PhilosophesmCdiévaux 13), Louvain 1972,thna, the fol lowing writ-

,113-136.

THOMAS DE AQuINo, Dep7inczpiis naturae, De aelernitate mundi, De m otu cordis, De mix tione elemen-

[c . 1242], ed . A. Bor- , tonim, De op erationibus occ ultis naturae, De iud iciis astrorum, De sortibus, De unitate intellectus, Deente et esse ntia, ed. H.-F. Dondaine (Ed. Leon. 43), Rom 1976.

314. Sentenc ia libri De anima, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Ed. Leon. 45,1), Rorna/Paris 1984.

azán (Ph i lo sophes mé- Summa theologiae (Ed. Leon. 4-12), Roma 1888-1906.-

Quaestiones disputatae de anima, ed. B.-C. Bazan (Ed. Leon. 24,1), Roma 1996.

ms), in: A. Pattin, Pour Qu aestiones disputatae de v eritate (Ed. Leon. 22,1-3), Roma 1972-1976.

ges etJean dejandun, -ommentum in secundum librum sententiarum, ed. R. P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929.

Smma contra gentiles (Ed. Leon. 13-15), Roma 1918-1930.

-.......

IIl i F U l i f l

628 . Carlos Bazcin



Translations

HErr, W. S. (1957), Aristotle. On the Soul, London / Cambridge Mass. (The Loeb Clas-sical Library).

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