UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY SCHOOLAir Defense Artillery Captain’s Career Course

Fort Sill, OK 73503

ATSA-DT-LS 23 Nov 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ FEILD, Small Group Instructor, Captain’s Career Course, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503.

1. Define the battle:

a. Date, location and principle antagonists.(1) DATE: 19-25October 2007(2) LOCATION: Afghanistan, Kunar Province, Pech District, Korengal Valley.

1

Korengal Outpost (KOP), Yaka Chine Village, Abas Ghar Mountain at Sawtalo Sar Ridge.

2

1 The Korengal Valley

(3) Operation Rock Avalanche.(4) Principle Antagonists.

(a) Us Army, Battle Co, 2nd Bn, 173rd IN BDE (the ‘Rock’)with 1 platoon new Afghan National Army (ANA).(b) Anti Coalition Militia (ACM) made up of insurgent Taliban fighters, unemployed logger villagers, and local militias.

b. Determine your research sources. (1) Evaluate your research sources. Is the source relevant to your study? Is there any bias in the work? What is the bias, and does it add or detract from your study?

2. Review the strategic setting. a. Determine the causes of the conflict. (1) The political actors in this region are the Afghan National Government (ANG), The

U.S. Government and the autonomous local village governments in the Korengal Valley. The new Afghani government wants authority in the region in order to establish infrastructure. The current political power in the region is the local tribal elders who have always been autonomous due to geography and want to keep it that way in order to maintain their livelihoods. US Army seeks Intelligence that will aid in Counterinsurgency effort, lend more legitimacy to the ANG, and stabilize the region.

(2) IN 2006 The ANG banned the export of timber this was the main source of revenue in the Kunar region where the Korengal Valley is located. According to a Wall Street Journal Article “the decree was designed to preserve the nation's dwindling forests”. The ban instantly created a black market trade in lumber making the residents of the area outlaws. Lumber, still in high demand, flowed into Pakistan under Taliban protection and the money from the trade funded their insurgent goals. The residents of the Korengal valley now had every reason to oppose the ANG and US military presence as they were now in need of Taliban protection and supply routes.

b. Compare the principle antagonists. (1) The ACM is a combination of various groups and militias. They consist of relatively

benign unemployed local people including children looking to earn money for sustenance, unemployed local loggers angered by the timber export bans, and local militia veterans from the failed Soviet Invasion of 1979. These all led by various foreign Taliban fighters. ACM War goal is to prevent coalition efforts to neutralize weapons caches as well as smuggling, infiltration and supply routes in order to maintain smuggling operations particularly of lumber.

(2) US Army, a component of the US Armed Forces is a highly trained and well equipped fighting force compared with the ANA and ACM. The US war aim is support Afghan government in establishing afghan government control in Kunar province and Korengal Valley in order to stop illegal lumber smuggling to Pakistan by gaining military control of region.

3

3. Review the tactical situation.

a. Study the area of operation. The Korengal River flows through a valley in the foothills of the Hindukush mountains in eastern Afghanistan. The Kunar province where it is located is a very mountainous area with soaring peaks alongside deep valleys. Elevation ranges from 1000m to 4000m in the immediate vicinity of the battle. The Valley is remote, isolated and sparsely populated. The steep mountain passes in the area make it difficult to land helicopters and virtually impossible for vehicle traffic. Mobility in the area is restricted to platoon sized and smaller elements on foot. Avenues of approach for US troops are thus limited however the enemy moves through the area nearly unrestricted by the terrain. While some paths may seem likely to be avenues of approach none can truly be eliminated. During the battle the enemy fighters used a sheer cliff face as an avenue of approach. They also use elaborate systems of caves and tunnels to mask movements and provide cover and concealment. This aspect of the terrain in the valley favors the enemy fighters who are very familiar with the area. Other cover in the area includes boulders, relief features, trees and the buildings of a few scattered villages and enclaves. These and the grove like vegetation of the region also provide adequate concealment. Observation is limited to well within small arms range in the wooded valley by trees, relief and some buildings. The very bottom of the valley is flat and has much less vegetation however the fighting does not take place there. Both sides will take advantage of the wooded slopes to conceal their movements consequently limiting observation of fields of fire.

2The Korengal Valley as seen fom near the KOP.

b. Compare the opposing forces. (1) CPT Dan Kearney commands the US soldiers of Battle Company. The 173rd arrived in

Afghanistan in May 2007 very well trained for combat. Some Soldiers in the unit have experienced combat in Iraq and other parts of Afghanistan but the Korengal valley is

4

particularly violent. It has been called the “Afghanistan of Afghanistan” due to its remoteness, autonomy, and violence. Battle takes place in late October but, the interim is filled with nearly constant combat in the form of attacks on outposts in the area. Under this steep learning curve, the initial surprise at the level of violence they encountered immediately upon arriving in the area had turned to 6 months of war experience by the time of the battle. (Battle company was attacked with mortars within seconds of exiting their Chinook when they first arrived at the remote FOB.) In addition to all the firepower integral to an infantry unit (within the ranks there are M4s, grenades, M14, M203, .50 Sniper rifles, M249 SAW, M9 pistol, etc.) the commander also has a devastating variety fires and ISR capabilities at his disposal. He will employ Apache Gunships, an AC-130 Spectre, 120mm mortars, B-1 Bomber, and Predator UAV. During the fight the enemy is watched by UAV and listened to by US eves dropping assets via radio. This combined with Armor and night vision would seem to give the Americans an overwhelming advantage but the enemy is wily.

(2) The fighters in the Korengal valley are known to be particularly good at repelling outside military influence. The Soviets failed to gain foothold there during their occupation. The Taliban also had to ignore the area during their subsequent rule in the 90’s up until 2003. The fact that until 2007 no government official above the tribal level had ever set foot there is a testament to this. The ACM is very experienced at combat and will bring some tried and true techniques to bear during the battle. One element of their standard MO is to attack from high ground near the top of a ridge and then simply retreat to the ‘back side of the ridge when counterattacked. The ACM has ways to match or negate most technological advantages that the US brings to any battle. The terrain of the valley itself limits our ground ability essentially taking all vehicles and tracks out of the fight. Their weapons are limited to small arms and RPGs but they avoid the brunt of US firepower by employing guerrilla style tactics and ambushes. They cleverly avoid thermal imaging by masking their heat with that of sun-warmed rocks while hiding under blankets. By observing the movements of crows they have matched our adeptness at pinpointing enemy locations. Etc.

c. Military objectives. (1) On October 20th 2007 CPT Kearney and Battle Co set out to find and destroy, weapons

caches, infiltration routes, and enemy hideouts in Yaka Chine and then on nearby Abas Ghar ridge. This was in order to stem the flow of weapons and fighters into the area.

(2) The ACM will set up two deadly ambushes on the Abas Ghar on 19 October 2007 IOT kill American troops and deter further incursion into their stronghold areas. The Later on Abas Ghar they will set off two effective ambushes.

4. Describe the Actions

a. Disposition of forces at beginning of action. Between 2000hrs and 2100hrs 1st and 2nd platoon along with a squad of scouts are to air assault to their positions to the east, south, and west of Yaka Chine Village respectively. The commander will be located in his CP high on the western ridge of the valley. The enemy is presumably all around at all times but their exact location at the outset during this phase is still unknown.

5

b. Major phases. The plan has to drop two platoons deep into enemy territory near the village of Yaka Chine. This village located 3km south of the KOP was thought to be an active supply and distribution line for weapons and ACM personnel. 2nd Platoon would approach from the south and 1st platoon from the east. They would sweep through the village then meet up before being airlifted on helicopters to the top of the Abas Ghar ridge. From there the unit would patrol generally southward in search of the enemy and their hideouts.

c. Describe opening moves from each antagonist. 2nd platoon is the main effort and as they make the 2k march north towards the village it is bombarded from the air by precision fire from Apache Gunship and AC-130 Spectre. As the two ground units approach the village the scout squad is already set up in positions overlooking the village. At this point the aircraft engage insurgents outside the village. The subsequent search did indeed turn up some contraband weapons confirming that the village was cooperating with the Taliban. They were however, unsuccessful in finding anything that could be described as a weapons Cache. There was another problem as well. CPT Kearney had reluctantly been given permission from his higher command to bomb a house in the village. US air attacks that night had left 5 dead and 11 injured, all women and children. The platoons spent the day treating the wounded and continuing their search. The next morning The Company and BN commander meet with the elders of that village to try and explain their actions and appeal to them for information and allegiance. They are not successful. The villagers, angry about the civilian casualties reinforce their resolve against the Americans.

d. Key Events. (1) 48 Hours after leaving the KOP on Chinooks the Soldiers of Battle Company 2-173 were

air lifted to an LZ atop the ridge that forms the eastern rim or the Korengal valley. They began their patrols in search of the cave hideouts that intelligence indicated should be there. They spend the night searching in vain for enemy fighter using heat signatures. The next morning, the third since leaving the KOP CPT Kearney calls mortars down on a ridge just south of where 2nd platoon, his main effort, is still searching for enemy activity. While they do not encounter the enemy directly they do hear them whispering over the radio and chattering about American troop movement. On the 2nd night on the Abas Ghar there has not been any enemy activity since Yaka Chine. Though, they do continue to hear whispering on the radio. The US forces take up Positions on the Sawtalo Sar ridge with the ANA contingent south, 2nd platoon north, the scouts east and 1st platoon west. The next morning at approximately 0730 the scouts began taking accurate fire from about 50m north of their position near the top of the spur where it meets the Abas Ghar ridge. This area is marked by a nearly vertical cliff face. It had seemed unlikely that the enemy would approach from this direction especially given the quiet of the previous 2 days. From their position at the top of the cliff the enemy overtook the scout’s position and break through friendly lines before being pushed back. When the initiative gained by their surprise attack was exhausted the enemy simply retreated leaving the Americans to deal with the dead and wounded. Reinforcements from 2nd Platoon arrive moments later after hearing the gunshots. The insurgents managed to take one M240, A pair of NVGs, several M4s, and a helmet. The fighting leaves one American dead and 2 wounded.

e. State the outcome.

6

(1) The US Fighter’s task was to seek out and destroy weapons caches. They did not succeed in doing this. Another task of theirs was to find enemy hideouts and infiltration routes. They did not succeed in doing this either. Not only was the mission not a success, but in attempting to carry it out the unit sustained casualties and lost equipment.

(2) The ACM intended to maintain their weapons caches and maneuver routes. They were successful in both goals and in protecting the locations of their hideouts as well. Another insurgent goal is “human terrain.” After the Bombing of Yaka Chine they gained it and the US lost it.

5. Significance of the action. a. Effects of the Battle(1) Short term. One immediate effect of the battle was death. The loss of life suffered by the

Americans increased the already strained relations between the US and the tribal authorities in the valley. Soldiers in the units Mournful of the deaths of their colleagues must continue to simultaneously fill the roles of killers and diplomats, and humanitarians. Their own bias already difficult to contain became nearly impossible to ignore. The 5 civilian deaths caused by US air attacks are a serious blow to efforts at diplomacy and progress. In the aftermath the Platoon Leader, Company Commander, and Battalion Commander all arrive by helicopter with the provincial governor in tow. They land the helicopter on the roof of a home where a villager is sun-drying his corn harvest. They walk on the corn on their way to a meeting with village elders. In this meeting they will try to explain and defend the bombings that killed the civilians. The talks are fruitless, perhaps worsening the situation. Later that day, the valley elders declare Jihad on the Americans in the area. In the days following, this declaration the ACM military tactic changed from “harassment from a distance to all out attacks at close range.

(2) Long term. This particular area while violent has time and time again proved to be unattainable by violence alone. (Russians, Taliban, and US attempts respectively). The insurgents’ ability to continue to fight was sustained by the US inability to win the hearts and minds of the Valley’s inhabitants. This was due partly to a strong economic incentive to resist in the form of the illegal logging trade facilitated by the Taliban. Incidents of accidental killing of civilians such as the ones that took place in Yaka Chine on October 20, 2007 worsen the situation. The US reputation in the area never recovered from the incident and the mistake was not without repeat in the coming months and years. The area was abandoned by the US in 2010 after several more years with no improvement, many lives lost, and at least one catastrophic battle.

b. Establish the military lessons learned. The most important lesson from this battle is that the outcome of conflict depends on much more than technology and troop strength. This is especially true in asymmetric warfare like that being fought in Afghanistan. During Operation rock Avalanche Battle Company spearheaded the 173rd BNs efforts to quell insurgents in the Korengal Valley. They did so with the full technological support of the Brigade and all the fire power one can imagine. However the lesson is that can firepower can be as detrimental in gaining human terrain as it is useful in taking actual terrain. Another takeaway is that technological advantages can be confounded in rough terrain by a much less technologically advanced enemy.

7

(1) Leadership. This battle is at the forefront of the ANG’s struggle for legitimacy and the Taliban’s quest for relevance. The actions of US leaders play a large role in determining the direction of that as yet ongoing struggle. In this case the Taliban was able to strengthen their foot hold by killing Americans, stealing their weapons and making much of collateral damage caused by extremely powerful weapons.(2) Movement and Maneuver. Severely restricted terrain in the area makes maneuver by anything other than foot patron difficult. Air assaults are also limited by the terrain though they are possible. When Battle company air assaulted into the Yaka Chine they lost the element of surprise. (3) Intelligence. Two critical ways that the US gathers intelligence are radio intercept (SIGINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT). In this battle both were employed by the unit commander. The level of collateral damage during the operation incensed the valleys villagers and thereby alienated an essential source of intelligence.(4) Fires. Deciding when it is appropriate to employ fires in asymmetrical combat was CPT Kearneys most costly responsibility. Mortar fires and air to surface fires caused the majority of enemy casualties in this battle. The decision to use them was a key element in the immediate turn of opinion in the valley and its eventual loss to the Taliban.

8