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Barriers to Socialization: Turkey andRegional International OrganizationsJohn A. Scherpereel a & Matthew C. Zierler ba Department of Political Science , James Madison University ,Virginia, USAb James Madison College , Michigan State University , USAPublished online: 06 Jan 2011.
To cite this article: John A. Scherpereel & Matthew C. Zierler (2011) Barriers to Socialization:Turkey and Regional International Organizations, Journal of European Integration, 33:1, 19-36, DOI:10.1080/07036337.2010.526710
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European IntegrationVol. 33, No. 1, 19–36, January 2011
ISSN 0703–6337 Print/ISSN 1477–2280 Online/11/010019-18 © 2011 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/07036337.2010.526710
ARTICLE
Barriers to Socialization: Turkey and Regional International Organizations
JOHN A. SCHERPEREEL* & MATTHEW C. ZIERLER**
*Department of Political Science, James Madison University, Virginia, USA;**James Madison College, Michigan State University, USA
Taylor and FrancisGEUI_A_526710.sgm10.1080/07036337.2010.526710Journal of European Integration0703-6337 (print)/1477-2280 (online)Original Article2010Taylor & [email protected]
ABSTRACT Turkey has long been a productive member of regional international orga-nizations (IOs) like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe.Theorists of socialization would predict that Turkey’s activities within these organiza-tions would encourage European Union (EU) members who belong to these IOs tosupport Turkey’s application for EU membership. In reality, many EU members whoshare memberships with Turkey voice severe reservations about the prospects ofTurkish EU membership. This article seeks to explain this puzzle. It demonstrates whysocialization dynamics have failed to materialize in the Turkey–EU relationship andtests alternative explanations for ‘failed socialization’. It finds empirical support for twosuch explanations. The first involves limitations of IOs’ ability to discourage ‘badbehavior’ by member states. The second involves the increasing importance of masspublics and the dissolution of a ‘permissive consensus’ that has characterized past deci-sions about EU enlargement.
KEY WORDS: international organizations, enlargement, European Union, Turkey
Over the past decade, ‘the Turkish question’ has occasioned spirited debatewithin the European Union (EU). Many commentators have suggested thatit would be folly to admit Turkey to the EU, as Turkey is large, poor,Muslim, and somehow ‘not European’. It is somewhat puzzling that voicesrejecting Turkey’s aspirations are emerging at this historical moment, sinceTurkey has long been a member of regional international organizations (IOs)like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe
Correspondence Addresses: John A. Scherpereel, Ph.D., Department of Political Science,James Madison University, MSC 7705, 2155 Miller Hall, Harrisonburg, VA 22807, USA.Email: [email protected]; Matthew C. Zierler, Ph.D., James Madison College, MichiganState University, 361 South Case Hall, East Lansing, MI 48825, USA. Email:[email protected]
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(CoE), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), andthe European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Despiteoccasionally being seen as an ‘outsider within’, Turkey’s membership in theseorganizations has generally been productive. Given long histories of produc-tive interactions with Turkey, one might expect other Europeans to be lesshostile toward the prospect of Turkish EU membership.
In this paper, we ask why Turkey’s membership in regional IOs has notsmoothed its path into the EU. We approach this question by examining theconcept of socialization as generated from the literature on IO enlargements.This literature suggests that IO membership promotes norm-consistentbehavior and implies that membership facilitates states’ attempts to joinother IOs. In this view, a state’s successful participation in one IO shouldincrease the likelihood of its admission to another IO, especially when signif-icant portions of the two IOs’ memberships overlap. In the Turkey–EU case,this logic carries little predictive weight. Despite the fact that Turkey is along-established member of the IOs to which most EU member states belong,opposition to Turkish membership among EU member states remains robust.In the more than 20 years since Turkey’s 1987 application, public demon-strations and petitions that deny Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ have proliferated,and prominent Europeans (Joseph Ratzinger, Edmund Stoiber, ValeryGiscard d’Estaing, Frits Bolkestein, and Nicolas Sarkozy) have routinelyvoiced concerns about the prospect of Turkey joining the EU.
We argue that there are two barriers to socialization dynamics in theTurkish case. First, socialization theory overstates the ability of IOs to encour-age norm-consistent behavior in ‘poorly behaving’ members. Second, thetheory is excessively elite-centered, underestimating the increasingly impor-tant role played by publics in enlargement decision-making. Our argumenthas four parts. First, we present the socialization logic. Second, we comparedata on Turkish participation in regional IOs with data from other Europeanstates. Third, we evaluate three alternative explanations for the misfit betweenthe socialization dynamic and the observed trends. We find some support forwhat we call the ‘bad behavior’ explanation and significant support for anexplanation involving the dissolution of the ‘permissive consensus’ withinwhich enlargement decision-making has traditionally occurred. Fourth, weoffer conclusions and discuss our argument’s theoretical implications.
The Socialization Dynamic
Membership in an IO is far from automatic. Organizations’ founders havethe privilege of developing rules of entry. Guidelines for membership are typi-cally included in organizations’ founding treaties, but current members retainthe discretion to interpret these guidelines. Scholars have provided variousexplanations for why states welcome other states into IOs. Of these, ratio-nalist and constructivist explanations stand out as particularly prominent.
Rationalist explanations are based on added utility; a new state will bewelcomed into an organization if it provides net material benefits to
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members, or at least to the strongest members (Moravcsik and Vachudova2003). These net benefits can be based on economics, security, domesticpolitical considerations, or some combination of the three (Schimmelfennigand Sedelmeier 2002). The new member, for instance, might generate accessto broader markets or reinforce members’ security vis-à-vis rivals (Walt1987). Acceptance of a new state might placate domestic political actors whomight otherwise sanction member governments (Mattli 1999). Regardless ofthe type of benefit derived from enlargement, rationalists agree that enlarge-ment will proceed if benefits outweigh costs.
If the rationalist account of enlargement is accurate, then the politics ofmembership should be straightforward — decisions to enlarge will be basedentirely on what an applicant state can contribute to an organization’smembers. Also, because membership decisions are driven by self-interest, IOinstability is a real possibility: the memberships of IOs will change to reflectthe changing interests and/or capabilities of their members.
Constructivist explanations assign explanatory preeminence to norms—allIOs are built upon a normative framework and reflect states’ desires to achievecommon goals or reinforce common ties. Still, contestation over the meaningof norms is intense within IOs (Wiener 2007). Actors enter IOs with differentexperiences and frequently disagree about the meanings and behavioral requi-sites of norms. Norms are plastic phenomena, which can be deployed andinterpreted in different ways, by different actors, at different times.
On the constructivist account, IO enlargement depends upon members’reading of applicant states’ normative commitments. Member states willallow applicants into an IO if applicants abide by the IO’s norms (Gstöhl2002; Sjursen 2002, 499–501). Enlargement will proceed (a) if membersendorse and similarly interpret an IO’s underlying norms, and (b) if appli-cants interpret the norms in a community-consistent fashion.
But how do members know whether applicants abide by an IO’s norms?One way to gain such knowledge is to monitor applicants’ domestic andforeign policies. Another way is to apply knowledge gained through commonexperience in other IOs. Constructivists (Checkel 2001; Egeberg 1999;Johnston 2001) and others (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Pevehouse 2002)have suggested that IOs open opportunities for socialization, or ‘the processof inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Zürnand Checkel, 2005, 1046).1 Of course, variables like intensity and durationof contact within an IO, degree of isolation from public pressure, and degreeof specialization of agents’ professional portfolios can intervene to affect thesocialization of IO-participating agents. In general, though, IOs providecontexts for argumentation, discussion, and, ultimately, socialization.
The socialization that takes place within IOs can work in multiple direc-tions. The literature has focused on the ways that membership and ‘pre-membership’ socialize ‘lagging’ and new members. When new members takepart in backroom politics, committee sessions, and plenary sessions, forexample, they internalize the organization’s ways of doing things. A simplesocialization argument, therefore, suggests that IO participation will encour-age new or ‘lagging’ member states to adjust their identities and behaviors
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and act in ways that are progressively more in line with organizationalnorms.
An extension of the socialization logic goes beyond these ‘top-down’dynamics. It suggests that the socialization of laggards can reverberate to affectan IO’s established members, increasing their appreciation of the normativetransformation of laggards and increasing the likelihood of their accepting thelatter states into other IOs. The argument takes the following form. Assumethat a state gains membership in an IO. The state is subsequently socializedinto the IO’s norms. The fact that IO membership has helped to transformthe state becomes evident to other states in the IO. The other states apply theinformation gained from working together in the first IO to business in otherIOs. If the socialized state applies to join those other IOs, then the states thathave worked with the applicant draw on their sense of how the applicant willbehave in the new environment and eventually accept the applicant.
In this view, IOs provide information about member states’ ability to workcooperatively. They serve as fora where shared norms are transmitted, andthey make it easier for states to identify with each other in the future. Whenan opportunity to join an IO arises, states that have interacted with currentmembers have an easier path to admission, as they have been able toconvince members of their ability to act in a norm-consistent fashion.
Turkey’s Membership in Regional IOs
In order to examine the socialization dynamic in the Turkey–EU case, it isnecessary to scrutinize the participation of Turkey and other European statesin IOs. Table 1 displays data on the length of states’ memberships in allmajor regional IOs besides the European Union and its predecessor organi-zations. Scores in the ‘non-EU regional IOs’ column are aggregates. Theywere calculated by summing the total number of ‘member-years’ a state hasbelonged to eight different IOs — NATO, CoE, OECD, OSCE, EBRD, theWestern European Union (WEU), the European Free Trade Association(EFTA), and the European Economic Area (EEA) — as of 2007. In 2007, forexample, France had been a member of the WEU and the OECD (or theirpredecessor organizations) for 58 years apiece, of the CoE and NATO for 57years apiece, and of the OSCE, EBRD, and EEA for 33, 16, and 12 years,respectively. France’s non-EU regional IO score (291) represents the sum ofits member-years in these seven organizations. France’s ‘non-EU, non-NATO regional IOs’ score operates on identical principles; it sums the coun-try’s member-years in all regional IOs besides the EU, the EU’s predecessororganizations, and NATO.
Of course, these are rather blunt measures. They do not account for thequality of a state’s participation in IOs, and they do not distinguish betweenactive (i.e., NATO) and inactive IOs (i.e., the WEU). Nor do the scoresaccount for the fact that the missions of the organizations vary according tothe degree that norm transmission and socialization are goals — it is reason-able to assume, though, that simple membership and basic interaction willproduce some form of mutual learning. Bluntness notwithstanding, the
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Table 1. Aggregate member-years in postwar regional international organizations
Non-EU regional IOs2 Non-EU, non-NATO regional Ios3
State1 Member-years Ordinal Member-years Ordinal
France 291 1 234 1Luxembourg 291 1 234 1Netherlands 291 1 234 1Belgium 289 4 232 4Italy 285 5 228 5Germany 278 6 227 6Iceland 268 7 211 7Portugal 247 8 190 10Denmark 245 9 188 11United Kingdom 245 9 188 11Greece 241 11 187 13Turkey 218 12 164 15Sweden 209 13 209 8Austria 202 14 202 9Ireland 176 15 176 14Spain 175 16 151 16Finland 122 17 122 17Malta 92 18 92 18Hungary 84 19 77 19Poland 83 20 76 20Cyprus 69 21 69 21Bulgaria 65 22 63 22Romania 64 23 62 23Czech Republic 59 24 52 24Slovakia 49 25 47 25Estonia 46 26 44 26Lithuania 46 26 44 26Slovenia 45 28 43 28Latvia 44 29 42 29Albania 42 30 42 29Croatia 37 31 37 31FYROM 35 32 35 32Bosnia-Herzegovina
28 33 28 33
Serbia 14 34 14 34Montenegro 14 34 14 34
Notes:1 The table includes EU member states, candidates, and potential candidates (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/index_en.htm).2 ‘Non-EU regional IO’ member-year values represent the total number of years that each country has been a member of the CoE, EBRD, EEA, EFTA, NATO, OECD, OSCE, and WEU as of 2007. A fraction of a year is counted as ‘0’.3 ‘Non-EU, non-NATO regional IO’ member-year values represent the total number of years that each country has been a member of the CoE, EBRD, EEA, EFTA, OECD, OSCE, and WEU as of 2007. A fraction of a year is counted as ‘0’.
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ordinal rankings are striking. On the NATO-inclusive score, for example,Turkey ranks thirteenth overall, with 218 member-years of IO experience.This total eclipses the totals of 17 EU member states. Is Turkey’s long stintin NATO driving this variation? Not entirely: when NATO is removed fromthe equation, Turkey maintains an impressive ordinal ranking — seventeenthoverall, ahead of 14 EU states.
What is more, Turkey’s overlap with large and founding EU member statesin the four most venerable non-EU regional IOs — the CoE, OECD, OSCE,and NATO — is significant. France, Benelux, Italy, and the UK were found-ing members of all of these organizations. Turkey was a founding member ofthe CoE, and the predecessor organizations of the OECD and the OSCE butwas not admitted to NATO until 1952. West Germany, of course, was a ‘latearriver’ in NATO and the CoE as well. Interestingly, Turkey has logged moremember-years in these foundational institutions than Germany. The moreimportant point, however, is that the EC-6, Britain, and Turkey have beenworking together in common institutional forums for decades.
These points echo the refrain frequently heard from the Turkish govern-ment: Turkey possesses significant experience and ‘IO habitus’ and hasgenerally been a good member of IOs, responding to charges that it is notacting properly by trying to change its offending behavior. Critics of Turkeyimply that Europe is a historical or cultural construct to which Turkey mightnot belong (see Wallace 2000, 478). Turkish leaders, though, insist thatEurope is (also) an institutional phenomenon and that Turkey has beeninstrumental in constructing ‘institutional Europe’.
The Failure of the Socialization Dynamic: Comparing Alternative Explanations
If the socialization dynamic pertained, we would expect Turkey’s pathwayto membership to be relatively smooth. In reality, this outcome has notoccurred. Turkey’s log of member-years in regional IOs continues to expand,but support for Turkish EU accession has not grown in most of the stateswith which Turkey shares memberships. After being promoted to candidatestatus in 1999, for example, Turkey’s EU membership prospects havedimmed. Accession negotiations began in 2005, but EU actors continue towarn that the accession process will take at least a decade. In 2006, theCouncil of Ministers froze eight negotiating chapters. A number of newchapters have been opened since that time, but no chapters have been closed,and the frozen chapters remain frozen. Numerous EU leaders have insistedthat they will hold referendums on Turkish membership. What hashappened? Why have Turkey’s extended memberships not eased its pathwayto the EU? There are at least three alternative explanations to this question.
The ‘Hierarchy of IOs’ Explanation
The first explanation has to do with the relative importance of IOs. The EU,on this account, is a bigger deal — politically, economically, and culturally
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— than other regional IOs. Many observers suggest that the EU is not,strictly speaking, an IO, but a supranational confederation or an experimentin multi-level governance. On this account, the stakes of admitting new statesto ‘mere’ IOs are comparatively low. The CoE, for example, is a glorified‘talk shop’. The OECD is a statistical clearinghouse. The EU, on the otherhand, is a complex behemoth. Whereas non-EU IOs allow states to retainsovereignty, the EU requires national leaders to share authority with actorsbeyond their borders. This fact is particularly important in the case ofTurkey, which has a large and growing population. If Turkey accedes, it willbe the second largest EU member state by population and will likely — givendemographic trends — be the largest member within decades. Turkishmembership would require members to grant Turkey a huge voice in theCouncil and the Parliament.
EU membership also implies immediate economic consequences thatmembership in other regional IOs does not. The EU’s redistributive regime islarger and more institutionalized than those of other European regional IOs.Disproportionately poor Turks would be net recipients of EU cohesion andagricultural outlays. Funds that could be used within the EU-27 if Turkeywere excluded would shift to Turkey in the event of accession; the cost ofsupporting Turkish infrastructure and agriculture would fall on the shouldersof the Union’s most developed members. Similarly, the EU affects regionallabor markets in a more direct and profound way than do other EuropeanIOs. Critics of Turkish enlargement often argue that the effectuation of freemovement rights would encourage Turks — whose per capita GDP inpurchasing power standards was less than 46 per cent of the EU-27 averagein 2008 (European Commission 2009) — to migrate to EU-27 countries, driv-ing up local unemployment and pushing down wages. Critics also routinelysuggest that Turkish membership would encourage ‘social dumping’, as EU-27 employers could relocate to take advantage of cheaper Turkish labor.
The ‘hierarchy of IOs’ explanation also suggests that membership in non-EU IOs is but a stepping stone to the EU pinnacle. The EU is the fullestembodiment of the principles and rights — liberty, democracy, human rights,the rule of law, fundamental social rights — that have recently beenproclaimed in the Lisbon Treaty’s preamble. States that endorse some ofEurope’s principles and rights might be allowed into non-EU IOs, but acces-sion to the EU requires full support of them all.
In short, the hierarchy explanation stresses the EU’s qualitative distinctive-ness. It implies that socialization dynamics might drive the enlargement poli-cies of ‘second-tier’ IOs but that, when important issues are at stake, ahistory of cooperation is not sufficient to assure a state’s accession.
At first glance, there may seem to be much to this explanation, but a closerlook reveals (a) that regional IO membership has been a consequentialforeign policy goal for Turkey itself, and (b) that the behavior of EU memberstates contradicts the explanation’s implications.
Turkey’s leaders have tried assiduously to join regional IOs, both for mate-rial and prestige benefits. The end of the Ottoman Empire left Turkey desper-ate. In addition to losing land mass, the sovereignty of Turkish territory
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under 1920’s Treaty of Sèvres was at risk. In security terms, Turkey’s posi-tion between the USSR and the rest of Europe also put Turkish elites on alertfor the state’s survival. This treaty did not enter into force, but it serves as areminder of the precariousness of Turkey’s strategic position that remains tothis day. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 established Turkey’s place in thepost-World War I state system and helped to assure the republic’s Kemalistelite of its future within that system. Yet it was not until 1932 that Turkeyjoined the League of Nations, downplaying its ties with the USSR and choos-ing to join the West.
NATO membership is perhaps the toughest test for the ‘bigger deal’ argu-ment. Similar to the EU, NATO requires the direct provision of an exclud-able good to all states by virtue of their membership — a collective defenseguarantee. This contrasts with the imprecise material benefits of League ofNations and UN memberships. The reason the rest of the North AtlanticCommunity wanted to include Turkey in NATO was its strategic location.The Truman Doctrine of 1947 made Turkey’s importance in the Cold Warclear, and while Turkey had already committed itself to the West, there wasconcern about what a commitment to Turkey would mean. An additionalconcern was the degree to which Turkey would affect members’ interests inthe Middle East. As Helm (1954, 437–8) suggests,
At first when Turkey sought NATO membership it was thought thatshe should be identified with this proposed Middle East organizationrather than with the Atlantic one. But Turkey wanted a sound refuge,not one of sand, and would have nothing to do with it. Once howeverher NATO membership was assured, and still more so after her actualadmission, she fully associated herself with the Western efforts in theMiddle East.
Turkey learned what NATO members expected of it and aligned its behaviorto clear up partners’ doubts. As General Eisenhower said at the time, ‘Inthirty years you have been establishing a forward-looking democraticgovernment of the kind that is particularly valuable to our organization’(Sedgwick 1952, 1). Additionally, the problem of what constituted the NorthAtlantic Community — a difficult geographic construct — was deemed lessimportant than overarching shared strategic goals, especially given thedisagreements that existed among the member states (Woodhouse 1958;Wilcox 1963). Ultimately, Turkey was admitted, as required, by a unani-mous vote, and the US Senate supported Turkish membership in a 73–2 vote(ALL in NATO 1952, 5).
If the ‘hierarchy of IOs’ argument were decisive for the EU case, we mightreasonably expect every enlargement of the EU — or at least every recentenlargement — to have occasioned spirited debates in EU member states. Theinstitutional and economic implications of eastern enlargement were at leastas threatening to the EU-15 as Turkish enlargement would be for the EU-27.The population of the 2004 accession states, for example, was 75.3 million,compared with Turkey’s population of 70.4 million. Bulgaria and Romania
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added another 30.9 million inhabitants to the EU-25. The shock to the Coun-cil of admitting 12 states with a population of 106.2 million is arguably lesssevere than the shock of admitting one state with a population of 70.4million, but the shocks to the Commission and the Court are arguably moresevere. Economically, eastern enlargements raised the same issues aboutredistribution that the prospect of Turkish accession raises today. Sloveneand Slovak workforces (with relatively high GDP-per-hour-worked ratios of30.6 and 29.2, respectively) were arguably bigger threats to jobs in the EU-15 than the less-productive (23.6) Turkish workforce is to the EU-27, andmost eastern states are more attractive FDI targets because of their infra-structural advantages and continental locations (OECD 2009).
Despite these parallels, eastern enlargement did not occasion the intensedebates in member states that we are witnessing with Turkey today. Citizensin Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) frequently accused their governmentsof marginalizing the vox populi. The Commission and the executivebranches of EU-25 states might have been subjected to similar criticism, but,with few exceptions, they were not. No EU-15 state held a referendum onCEE enlargement, for example, and, at least in 2004 (the ‘masses’ and theirlegislative proxies were more assertive before the 2007 enlargement), legisla-tures and citizens in the EU-15 allowed elites in the Commission and theirnational executives to handle enlargement. The many hurdles that existbetween application and admission were cleared without the rancor thatcharacterizes Turkey’s accession bid. Overwhelming majorities of MPs frommember states and MEPs voted for ratification.
These points suggest real limitations to the ‘hierarchy of IOs’ explanation.If that explanation pertained, we would have seen the same kinds of conten-tious public debates that we are currently seeing every time EU actorsproposed to take in new members. Something else is helping to disrupt thesmooth operation of socialization dynamics.
The ‘Bad Behavior’ Explanation
A second explanation for the failure of socialization suggests that socializa-tion within existing IOs has limits. Specifically, it posits that socializationonly drives enlargement when applicant states act appropriately in the orga-nizations to which they belong. When states behave badly — when they floutthe principles of the IOs to which they belong — they undermine their co-members’ trust and increase the likelihood that co-members will opposeoffenders’ accession into other institutions.
As noted above, constructivists argue that participation in IOs can encour-age appropriate behavior in states that might otherwise flout norms. Perhapsthis is not always the case, though. Opportunities inherent in various institu-tional environments may allow IO members to defy IOs’ normative expecta-tions. Institutional inertia, lax expulsion and sanctioning mechanisms, andopportunities for strategic arguments by offending states may all allow orencourage ‘bad behavior’ by IO members. The implications of this argumentfor EU enlargement are clear: EU member states would be intimately familiar
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with the habitual norm-violating behavior of applicant states in non-EU IOs.Instead of decreasing EU members’ fears about applicants’ behaviors, thenorm-violating behavior would increase those fears. As a result, EU memberswould be unwilling to allow offending states into other IOs.
A variation on this explanation has to do with the quality of the EU’s exist-ing interactions with applicant states. Over the years, the EU has developedan accession process that requires intense interactions before and duringaccession negotiations. Association agreements are signed, the Commissionestablishes a delegation in applicant capitals, and contacts between actorsfrom member state and applicant sides deepen. If applicants ‘misbehave’ inthese fora, we should expect members to oppose their full inclusion.
This explanation stresses that IOs are arenas in which states get to knoweach other but that contact need not generate goodwill. In fact, contact maythrow light on norm-inconsistent behavior. IOs may allow or encourage ‘badbehavior’. Members’ familiarity with this behavior may breed contempt andstymie the will to welcome offending countries into other IOs. The socializa-tion logic overstates IOs’ ability to constrain states and wrongly assumes thatco-membership in an IO predisposes states to support cooperation with co-members in other IOs.
Aspects of the Turkish case support the ‘bad behavior’ explanation.Despite its log of member-years, and despite the norm of democratic civiliangovernance in all regional IOs, the balance between Turkey’s civilian andmilitary institutions remains more tilted toward the latter than anywhere elsein Europe. The Turkish military has staged more coups than any other Euro-pean military — in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The military also played the keyrole in ousting Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist government in 1997. Onemight argue that the balance of Turkish institutional power has shifted moretoward civilians since 2003, when Recep Tayyip Erdo[gbreve] an’s government tookpower. Erdo[gbreve] an’s government has shepherded multiple reform packagesthrough the legislature, some of which have limited the military’s politicalpower. Still, the military has continued to play a major checking role, espe-cially given recent upticks in Kurdish terrorism.
Turkey’s record on human rights might also support the ‘bad behavior’explanation. Again, the regional IOs to which Turkey belongs stress humanand minority rights protections. Turkey’s record in these areas remains farfrom exemplary. In 2006 alone, for example, Human Rights Watch criticizedthe Turkish government for employing excessive force against Kurdishdemonstrators, for arbitrarily holding and torturing prisoners, and forrestricting Kurds’ rights of expression. The most publicized strikes againstTurkey’s human rights record surround an article of the penal code thatcriminalizes ‘insults to Turkishness’. Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink are thetwo most visible Turks to be charged under this dubious statute.
Turkey’s Cyprus policy might also be seen as confirming this explanation.A norm of mutual respect undergirds European regional IOs. Yet Turkeycontinues to deny recognition to the Republic of Cyprus, notwithstandingthe two states’ common memberships in the UN, CoE, OSCE, and EBRD.The EU has made it clear that Turkey’s movement toward membership
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requires the normalization of relations with Cyprus. But the government’ssteps toward this goal have been halting. Recently, Turkey’s failure to meetthe terms of the Ankara Protocol (which required Turkey to allow Cypriotvessels into Turkish ports) led the Council of Ministers to suspend negotia-tions on eight chapters of the acquis.
These points all help to explain why Turkey’s path to the EU has not beensmooth, despite its years of common IO membership. It would be inaccurate,though, to argue that Turkey inveterately acts poorly and violates IO norms.In fact, another plausible argument depicts the IOs of which Turkey is amember as major checks on Turkish ‘deviance’ and sees Turkish domesticpolicy as heavily dependent on IO pressure. Scholars (e.g., Schimmelfenniget al. 2005) have developed this point at length. For the present, it suffices tomention a number of additional episodes of successful normative pressure.
One of the biggest challenges to Turkey’s full recognition by Europe hasbeen the military’s role in politics. The military’s actions to preserve the state’ssecular nature have upset many both within and beyond Turkey’s borders.The rest of Europe has reacted negatively to various cases of military rule.For example, the CoE pushed for Greece’s ejection after the Greek coup of1967 (Howe 1981; Lewis 1969). Turkey was not thrown out of the CoE afterthe 1980 coup, but was forced to leave the Parliamentary Assembly until themilitary had returned to the barracks (Hale 2000, 177). While membershipin the CoE does not confer as many benefits as membership in other IOs,Turkey was well aware of the symbolic importance of being in good standingwith the organization. ‘The chief of the ruling military junta … [reacted toTurkey’s expulsion from the Assembly by saying that] Turkey is an indivisibleand inseparable part of a democratic and free Europe and wishes to stay so’(Howe 1981, 9). Even when it has broken European norms, Turkey has beenconcerned about how it is viewed and has wished to reassure European inter-locutors of its commitment to multilateral institutions.
The CoE has also influenced human rights developments in Turkey andsanctioned Turkey for human rights violations through the European Courtof Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR ruled in 366 cases brought againstTurkey in the time between Turkey’s ratification of the European Charter ofHuman Rights and July 2002 (http://www.khrp.org). In recent years, casesbrought against Turkey at the ECHR have proliferated; in 2006 alone, theECHR made over 200 judgments against Turkey for issues ranging from freespeech violations, to torture, to extrajudicial killing (http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/1I1turkeyI4845.htm).
These examples show that IOs have helped steer Turkish policy in direc-tions consistent with IO norms. There is debate within the literature aboutthe extent to which these behaviors have been compelled by rational incen-tives or socialization; evidence seems to point, in fact, toward the former(Schimmelfennig et al. 2005). It is important to note, though, that behavioralchanges reinforce members’ sense of Turkey’s reliability regardless of theirrational or socialization-based impetus.
The acceleration of incentive-based domestic change has gone hand-in-hand with another set of developments that reinforces Europeans’ sense of
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Turkey’s reliability — Turkey’s record of contributions to regional IOs. InNATO, for example, Turkey has generally demonstrated its willingness toplay by IO rules and contribute to organizational goals. Despite its uniquesecurity pressures, Turkey supported NATO’s actions in the Balkans in the1990s and NATO’s eastern enlargement (Robins 2003, 379–87). Morerecently, Turkey’s lack of cooperation with the United States during the IraqWar demonstrates Turkey’s willingness to go against its staunchest Westernally. This move may have helped to endear Turkey to the European statesthat opposed military action in Iraq.
In other IOs, Turkish representatives have taken on leadership positions.Since 1992, for example, Turkish MPs have frequently been represented onthe bureau of the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly. Turkey has also played astrong role in the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE), where eachstate is guaranteed a vice-president, but chairs of commissions are not subjectto formal quotas. Turkey has been well represented among the ranks ofcommission chairs. Between January 1999 and January 2001, for example,a Turkish representative chaired the PACE’s Commission of the Environment,Territorial Administration, and Local Powers, and since 2005 Turks havechaired the Commission on Political Questions and the Commission on Migra-tion, Refugees, and Population. These examples suggest that member statestrust Turkey to lead. This trust is supported, in turn, by confidence in Turkishelites’ ability to work within the various organizations’ normative orders.
Turkey’s relationship with EU institutions themselves, despite ups anddowns, has had an important positive dimension, shoring up Turkey’s repu-tation amongst allies in EU member states. Most of the reforms undertakenin the last decade — a 2002 package limiting the death penalty and extendingKurdish rights, a 2003 package easing free speech restrictions and reducingthe military’s political role, a 2004 package tackling violence against womenand eliminating the death penalty outright — were explicit responses to EUpolitical conditions. Turkey has also, of course, been ‘associated’ with theEuropean Communities since 1963. That year’s Association Agreementestablished institutions that provided the primary venue for Community–Turkish relations until the end of the 1990s, which have now been supple-mented by bilateral institutions (e.g., those involving the Council, theCommission, and the Turkish side in the accession negotiations). The EU–Turkish customs union came into effect at the beginning of 1996, Turkishpolicymakers have transposed large swathes of the single-market acquis, andthe decision to promote Turkey to candidate status in 1999 took place with-out significant dissension within the EU-15.
To summarize, the ‘bad behavior’ explanation goes some way towardexplaining the failure of the socialization dynamic. The enduring strength ofthe Turkish military, the government’s lackluster record on human andminority rights, and the reluctance to grant full recognition to Cyprus rein-force European suspicions that Turkey falls outside of Europe’s normativeorder. The persistence of Turkish ‘bad behavior’ suggests that the normsgenerated and reinforced through participation in regional IOs are notalways sufficient to discipline member states. But an argument that bad
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behavior has nullified socialization effects would be too facile. Turkey’smultiple contributions to regional IOs have generated trust among otherEuropean elites, and Turkey has been recognized for these contributions withleadership positions. Individuals occupying these positions have performedwell, effectively reinforcing the trust that propelled them to office. Thus,investigation of the bad behavior explanation produces evidence that bothcontradicts and supports the socialization dynamic.
The ‘Dissolution of the Permissive Consensus’ Explanation
This explanation suggests that the socialization logic fails because it omitsthe role of the mass public. It derives from a larger literature in EU studiesthat chronicles the dissolution of the ‘permissive consensus’. When scholarsbegan to analyze the roles of publics in European integration, they generallysuggested (a) that the masses were relatively well-disposed toward integra-tion despite not knowing or caring much about integrative processes, and (b)that European elites, when faced with decisions about how to proceed, wereloosely constrained by public attitudes toward integration (Inglehart 1970;Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). More recent studies (Carubba 2001; Eichen-berg and Dalton 1993; Schmitter 2003) suggest that the permissive consen-sus — if it ever existed — has effectively dissolved. Over the past 15 years,European publics have actively flexed their muscles and constrained elitedecisions about integration. The clearest examples of public assertivenessinvolve referenda — Denmark’s rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, Ireland’sinitial rejection of the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, and the French andDutch rejections of the EU Constitutional Treaty — but there are otherstrong indicators. National media and legislatures, for example, play increas-ingly important roles in scrutinizing EU affairs.
So how might the collapse of the permissive consensus explain the failureof socialization dynamics in the Turkish case? As suggested above, the social-ization dynamic is elite-driven, proposing that iterative, IO-based elite inter-actions increase member state elites’ willingness to welcome applicant states.Broader publics do not figure in the socialization model. It is conceivable,according to this explanation, that in the absence of mass pressure, the elitesthat participate in non-EU regional IOs would form preferences that accordwith the socialization dynamic. Because the permissive consensus hascollapsed, though, elites must now take into account anti-Turkish mass pref-erences. The socialization logic fails when skeptical publics insert themselvesinto debates about enlargement policy.
The idea that the permissive consensus has collapsed has become common-place in EU studies. European citizens, coming to see EU politics as relevantto their lives, have constrained politicians who managed, in past decades, tosteer Europe in their preferred directions. The analysis above, though,suggests that the permissive consensus has been slower to die in enlargement-related questions than it has in other dimensions of EU politics. In otherwords, citizens have continued, until quite recently, to grant discretion toelites in questions concerning the Union’s boundaries. Although discussion
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about the pros and cons of enlargement took place before the CEE ‘bigbangs’, debates in national parliaments were muted, no EU-15 governmentconsidered calling a referendum, and elite opinion was less skeptical thanmass opinion across the EU-15.
Developments since 2004 suggest that the permissive consensus in enlarge-ment policy is beginning to break down. European publics are grappling withthe effects of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements at a time when they are alsopondering immigration and the implications of rapidly changing globaleconomic and security environments (particularly in the wake of the 2008financial crisis). As they consider these developments, they are pressuring poli-ticians to reconsider future enlargements. They are inserting themselves intothe politics of enlargement decision-making, and, in so doing, disrupting thesocialization mechanism that might otherwise promote Turkish accession.
There are a number of signs of political backlash stemming from the 2004enlargement. One highly politicized ‘enlargement effect’ has surrounded thefree movement of labor in the three countries — the UK, Ireland, and Sweden— that first opened their labor markets to CEE workers. The British govern-ment’s prediction that approximately 15,000 workers would seek employ-ment in the UK was eclipsed at least 30 times over; between May 2004 andthe end of 2006, 450,000–600,000 workers from CEE relocated to Britain.Fewer CEE citizens have relocated to Ireland (approximately 80,000 in thesame period) and Sweden (approximately 10,000 total in 2004 and 2005),but the economic and political effects — given the size of these countries’labor pools and the entrepreneurship of right-wing politicians — have beensignificant nonetheless (Doyle et al. 2006; Euractiv 2007). British tabloidsattacked the government’s tame predictions and decried the supposedlynegative effects of the labor influx. British and other politicians used thesenumbers to support a tougher line toward free movement from the 2007member states, to reinforce extant nativist sentiments at home, and to fortifythe emerging public distaste for further enlargement.
The popular reckoning with the effects of recent enlargements and thegeneral economic uncertainty are also interacting with fears of immigrationand Islam to fuel public uneasiness about admitting Turkey. Of course,Muslim emigration to EU states has been occurring for decades. In previousdecades, immigration produced deep resentment among rather narrowsegments of national populations. Although unambiguous statistical data onthe incidence of anti-Muslim sentiment and activity are elusive, a generalconsensus indicates that these phenomena have gained steam in recent years(Cesari 2006; EUMC 2006). Episodes of violence and vandalism (e.g.,destruction of halal butcheries, attacks on women wearing hijab, desecrationof Muslim graves) followed the 11 September 2001, 11 March 2004, and 7July 2005 terrorist attacks. Similar episodes occurred in the wake of the 2004murder of Theo van Gogh, the outspoken Dutch director who was gunneddown by a Dutch assailant of Moroccan origin (Buruma 2006). Danish dailyJyllands-Posten’s publication of cartoons portraying Muhammad created asocial echo in Europe and the broader world in 2005–2006 (Klausen 2009).These events have coincided with homogenizing media stories about
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‘Muslims’ (writ large, abroad and at home) and with the publication ofessentializing tracts by intellectuals like Oriana Falacci, Antonio Elorza, andHerman Philipse. European ‘Islamophobia’ has interacted with ex post eval-uations of recent EU enlargements to bolster many Europeans’ fears aboutletting Turkey in and to empower politicians (e.g., Sarkozy) who opposeTurkish accession.
As European publics have struggled with the implications of the 2008financial crisis, the changes that they see as somehow linked to easternenlargement, and the rise of politicians and cultural observers anxious to tapinto identity concerns, their support for future EU enlargement has stagnatedor declined. In pan-European perspective, the trend lines are clear: in the EU-27, Eurobarometer polls show public opinion in favor of enlargement drop-ping from 55.8 per cent in Autumn 2004 to 53.8 per cent in Autumn 2008.The EU-15 countries experienced a more significant drop, from 47.9 per centto 44.3 per cent in favor of further enlargement. Citizens in the new memberstates — who have traditionally been more supportive of enlargement —grew more skeptical over this period, dropping from 67.7 per cent for furtherenlargement to 65.7 per cent.2
Is the future enlargement of the EU salient to European citizens? Are Euro-pean publics actively confronting politicians about the prospect of Turkishenlargement? A preliminary survey of the evidence suggests that both ques-tions may be answered in the affirmative. The successful French and Dutch‘no’ campaigns successfully mobilized anti-enlargement/anti-Turkish senti-ment in the weeks preceding the two countries’ referenda on the Constitu-tional Treaty in 2005. Enlargement fears drove some voters to the polls.Anti-enlargement activists have also organized nationally based anti-enlarge-ment organizations (examples include the German European Values Associ-ation and the Polish Future Europe Association). They have picked up onfashions for transnational organizing, petitioning, and European directdemocracy to press their claims. A group of German, Polish, Czech, andHungarian activists, for example, spearheaded the Voice for Europecampaign, which has staged numerous public protests and encouraged citi-zens to sign a petition opposing Turkish EU membership.
Even if the socialization dynamics discussed above were operating seam-lessly, increasingly concerned and mobilized publics would stand as barriersto Turkish membership. The socialization dynamic is an elite-centered mech-anism that discounts the possibility of mass influence on enlargement deci-sion-making. ‘Ordinary’ EU citizens, most of whom lack the learningexperiences on which the socialization logic rests, are increasingly voicingenlargement-related demands and helping to disrupt applicants’ (particularlyTurkey’s) desires for membership.
Conclusions
According to the socialization logic, Turkey’s cooperation with core EUstates in a wide range of regional IOs should have eased Turkey’s pathwayto EU membership. In reality, this has not occurred. Rather, opposition to
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Turkish accession has risen in recent years, as public proclamations ofTurkey’s otherness have become increasingly frequent and bold.
The data presented here suggest that the socialization dynamic fails toexplain the Turkish experience. Turkey has continually tried to align itsbehavior with the expectations of the communities it wants to join and hasgenerally acted appropriately within multiple non-EU regional IOs. DespiteTurkey’s efforts, public opinion in the EU-27 has not turned in favor ofenlargement, and political elites in the EU-27 have repeatedly proclaimedtheir opposition to full Turkish accession.
We have found qualified support for the bad behavior explanation andsignificant support for the dissolution of the permissive consensus explana-tion. The misfit between socialization’s predictions and empirical develop-ments exposes two problems with the socialization logic. First, cooperationin multiple IOs does not necessarily increase norm-consistent behavior.Second, the socialization logic excludes important players from the dynamicsof enlargement decision-making. In particular, it fails to account for theincreasing importance of mass action in the member states. In recent years,European citizens have begun to appreciate the difference the EU makes intheir lives, EU-related referenda have been held, and national politicians havefolded EU matters (albeit often in caricatured form) into their campaigningand rhetorical repertoires. As a result, the permissive consensus has begun toerode. In enlargement policy, the permissive consensus survived longer thanin other policy areas. But since 2004, as ‘enlargement fatigue’ has set in andEuropeans have reckoned with immigration, increasing cultural diversity,and global security and economic challenges, enlargement policy has becomeincreasingly sensitive to public inputs. European publics currently voiceopinions that reflect suspicions (a) about past enlargements and (b) aboutwelcoming a large, comparatively poor, overwhelmingly Muslim countryinto the EU fold.
The fact that the permissive consensus’s dissolution plays a strong role inexplaining opposition to Turkish membership might be leveraged in studiesof IO enlargement more broadly. Permissive consensuses are still strong inthe cases of many IOs, at least when it comes to enlargement. Future researchmight test the socialization logic in the context of IOs that are still largelycharacterized by a permissive consensus to enlargement. Such researchwould help to specify the relative importance of the two factors — the failureto promote norm-consistent behavior and the dissolution of the permissiveconsensus — that we posit here as causally relevant. The socialization logicfails in the current case but may well explain outcomes in cases of IOs thatrely heavily on procedures that promote social learning and remain isolatedfrom intense public scrutiny.
Notes1. Zürn and Checkel (2005, 1046) defend this definition, among other reasons, because it allows for
both the ‘the introduction of novices into common standards through the impersonal power of struc-tures’ and the ‘deliberate use of soft means of influence’ by hegemonic states who use IO for their
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own purposes. Ikenberry and Kupchan’s (1990, 289) definition of socialization as ‘a process of learn-ing in which norms and ideals are transmitted from one party to another’ is narrower, focusing onlyon the second mechanism discussed by Zürn and Checkel.
2. Standard Eurobarometers 63 (May–June 2005), 66 (September–October 2006), and 69 (March–May 2008) solicited opinions on enlargement to particular non-member states. In each poll, respon-dents were less supportive of the prospect of Turkish membership than of the prospective member-ship of any other country (including Serbia, Albania, and, in the most recent poll, Kosovo). Turkeyalso consistently led the tables in actively negative opinion. In the spring of 2005, 35 per cent of EU-wide respondents favored Turkish membership, while 52 per cent opposed Turkish membership.These numbers plummeted to 28 per cent vs. 59 per cent in the autumn of 2006 before reboundingslightly to 31 per cent vs. 55 per cent in the spring of 2008.
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