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INTERNATIONAL PANELON FISSILE MATERIALS

IPFM

Companion Volume to Global Fissile Material Report 2008

Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons:

Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons:

Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

Companion Volume to Global Fissile Material Report 2008

www.fissilematerials.org

On the cover: the map shows existing and planned uranium enrichment

and plutonium separation (reprocessing) facilities around the world.

© 2008 International Panel on Fissile MaterialsThis work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial License

To view a copy of this license, visit www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0

About the IPFM 1

Foreword 2

Summary 3

Country Perspectives

China 7 France 14 Germany 17 India 22 Israel 27 Japan 34 Pakistan 37 Russia 42 SouthAfrica 45 UnitedKingdom 50 UnitedStates 54

Dealing with the Challenges: Achieving an FM(C)T 64

Endnotes 70

Contributors 81

Table of Contents

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TheInternationalPanelonFissileMaterials(IPFM)wasfoundedinJanuary2006.Itisanindependentgroupofarms-controlandnonproliferationexpertsfrombothnuclearweaponandnon-nuclearweaponstates.

ThemissionofIPFMistoanalyzethetechnicalbasisforpracticalandachievablepolicyinitiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpilesofhighly enricheduraniumandplutonium.Thesefissilematerialsarethekeyingredientsinnuclearweapons,andtheircontroliscriticaltonuclearweaponsdisarmament,tohaltingtheproliferationofnuclearweapons,andtoensuringthatterroristsdonotacquirenuclearweapons.IPFMresearchandreportsaresharedwithinternationalorganizations,nationalgov-ernmentsandnongovernmentalgroups.

ThePanelisco-chairedbyProfessorR.RajaramanoftheJawaharlalNehruUniversityofNewDelhi,India,andProfessorFrankvonHippelofPrincetonUniversity.Itsmem-bersincludenuclearexpertsfromsixteencountries:Brazil,China,France,Germany,India,Japan,theNetherlands,Mexico,Norway,Pakistan,SouthKorea,Russia,SouthAfrica,Sweden,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.

PrincetonUniversity’sProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurityprovidesadministra-tiveandresearchsupportforIPFM.

Forfurtherinformationaboutthepanel,pleasecontacttheInternationalPanelonFis-sileMaterials,ProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurity,PrincetonUniversity,221Nas-sauStreet,2ndFloor,Princeton,NJ08542,[email protected].

About the IPFM

About the IPFM

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Nuclear weapons—whether in the hands of governments or terrorist groups—poseoneofthegreatestdangerstohumankindtoday.Theneedforachievingstableglobalnucleardisarmamentisurgentandcompelling.Clearly,anessentialpre-requisiteforreachingthisgoalisendingtheproductionoffissilematerialsforweaponsanddispos-ingof theirvast accumulated stocks.The importanceof this stephasbeen realizedfromthebeginningofthenuclearerabutactualprogressincarryingitouthasbeenremarkablyslow.

Asfarbackas1946,theUnitedNationsAtomicEnergyAgency’sreporttotheSecurityCouncilrecommendedprohibitingnationalmanufactureandpossessionoffissilema-terials.Adecadelater,in1957,theGeneralAssemblyadoptedaresolutiontobantheirproductionforweapons.In1993,theUNGeneralAssemblycalledforthenegotiationofatreaty.TheConferenceonDisarmamentinGeneva(CD)thenagreedonanegoti-atingmandate.Thesenegotiationshavenotyetbegun.

Meanwhilethenumberofcountrieswithnuclearweaponshasgrowntonine.Ifprog-resswas impededbydisagreementsbetween just theUnitedStatesandtheUSSR intheearlyyears,onecanimaginethecomplexityoftheproblemtoday.Theissuesthatworrydifferentnationsvaryfromtheadequacyoftheirexistingnucleararsenalstotheintrusivenessandcostofverifyingaproductionban.

Thisreportprovidesacountry-by-countryanalysisoftheconcernsofindividualna-tionstodifferentaspectsofaprospectiveFissileMaterial(Cutoff)Treaty,orFM(C)T.Theword“cutoff”isputinbracketsherebecausesomecountrieswouldlikethetreatyalso to assure thatpre-existing civilianfissilematerials andweaponsmaterials thathavebeendeclaredexcessarenotconvertedtoweaponuse.

Thereportcovers11countries:China,France,Germany,India,Israel,Japan,Pakistan,Russia,SouthAfrica,UnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates,i.e.,alltheweaponstatesotherthanNorthKoreaandthreekeynon-weaponstates.Theanalysesarebasedongovernmentstatementsaswellaspersonalinterviewsonthesecurityconcernsofthecountryinquestion.Whilethereportseekstodescribethepositionsorlikelypositionsoftheindividualnations,theauthorsofthecountrystudiesareindependentscholarsandtheirsummariesdonotconstitutetheofficialpositionsoftherespectivegovernments.

TherearesomereasonstohopethatnegotiationsmayfinallygetunderwayattheCDinthenextyearortwo.Itishopedthatthestudiespresentedherewillclarifysomeoftheissuesinvolvedandhelpspeedtheprogresstowardsatreatybanningtheproduc-tionoffissilematerialsfornuclearweapons.

R. Rajaraman, Co-Chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials

Foreword

Foreword

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Theproposalforabindinginternationaltreatybanningtheproductionoffissilemate-rialsfornuclearweaponshasattractedattentionandsupportforoverfiftyyears.Today,auniversalandeffectivelyverifiedfissilematerialcutofftreatycouldstrengthenthenonproliferationregime,reducetheriskofnuclearterrorism,andhelplaythebasisfornucleardisarmamentby:

MakingbindingthemoratoriaoftheNonproliferationTreaty(NPT)weaponstatesontheirproductionoffissilematerialforweapons;

EndingproductionoffissilematerialforweaponsinIsrael,India,andPakistan;

Meeting the demands of the United Nations General Assembly and the NuclearNonproliferationTreaty;

Extending toall states theNPTbanonproductionoffissilematerial forweaponsandassociatedInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)safeguardsthatcurrentlyapplyonlytonon-nuclearweaponstates;

Improvingnationalmonitoringandregulationoffissilematerial;

Helpingmakenuclear-weaponreductionsirreversible;and

Creatinginstitutionsandpracticesnecessaryforanuclearweaponsfreeworld.

In light of these potential benefits, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1995adoptedtheso-calledShannonMandate(namedafterCanadianAmbassadorGeraldShannon)“tonegotiateanon-discriminatory,multilateralandinternationallyandef-fectivelyverifiabletreatybanningtheproductionoffissilematerialfornuclearweap-onsorothernuclearexplosivedevices.”Despitethisinitiative,negotiationshavenevergottenoffthegroundforanumberofreasons.Asthecriticalassessmentsofthevariousnationalperspectivesdescribedinthisreportmakeclear,boththenuclearweaponstatesandthenon-weaponstateshaveconcernsthatwillhavetobeaddressed.

Forthenuclearweaponstates, theseconcernsrangefromquestions inChina, Indiaand Pakistan about whether they have enough nuclear-weapon materials to doubtsinRussia, theUnitedStatesandothercountriesabout the intrusivenessandcostofinspections.SomeoftheNPTweaponstatesalsoquestionthepointofanFM(C)Tif

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Summary

Summary

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IndiaandPakistan,whicharestillproducingunsafeguardedfissilematerial(thereisuncertaintyaboutIsrael),refusetojointhetreaty.Theweaponstatesforthemostpartwantatreatythatsimplycutsofffurtherproductionoffissilematerialforweaponsanddoesnotcoverpre-existingstockpilesofweapons-usablematerial.

Thenon-weaponstates,incontrast,wantanFM(C)Ttoserveasasignificantstepto-wardtheeventualeliminationofnuclearweapons.Theythereforewantacutofftreatythatincludesdeepcutsintheexistingweaponsstockpiles—atleastinthoseofRussiaandtheUnitedStates—andconstraintsthatwouldpreventtheconversiontonuclearweaponsofpre-existingstockpilesofcivilianandotherfissilematerialdeclaredexcesstomilitaryneeds.

Pakistantoois inthecampofcountriesthatwanttoincludereductionsinexistingstocksbecauseitfearsacutofftreatycouldlockitintoapositionofdisadvantagerela-tivetoIndia.WhetherPakistanactuallyhasasmallerstockpilethanIndia,however,dependsuponwhetherIndia’sreactor-gradeplutoniumisconsideredcivilianorweap-onmaterial.

Finally,thereisIsrael,whichfearsthatanFM(C)Twouldrequireittoacceptintrusiveverificationandplacepressuresonittodisarm.IsraelalsostronglyobjectstoatreatythatdoesnotblockIran’son-goinguraniumenrichmentprogram.IntheabsenceofadditionalconstraintsonIran,IsraelseesanFM(C)Tasirrelevanttoitscurrentsecurityconcerns.

A Way Forward IfitispossibletobreaktheimpasseoverthenegotiatingagendaoftheConferenceonDisarmament,FM(C)Tthepartieswillhavetobemakecompromisesonanumberofverydifficultissues.

TheUnitedStateswillhavetodealwithChina’sconcernsabouttheU.S.ballistic-mis-sile-defenseprogram,thepotentialweaponizationofspaceandanemergingU.S.con-ventionalthreatagainstitsstrategicforces.ThiscouldincludeU.S.agreementtobegintalksamongkeyconcernedcountriesonaTreatyonthePreventionofanArmsRaceinOuterSpace.

IndiaandPakistaneachwillhavetodecidethatitisintheirinteresttoagreetoaveri-fiedhaltintheirbuildupsofnuclear-weaponmaterials.

Israelanditsneighborswillhavetocometoanaccommodationontheirnuclearpro-grams.Thismayrequire,forinstance,thattheFM(C)Tbecomecoupledwitharegionalagreement,suchasafuel-cycle-facility-freezonethatwouldgiveIsraelincreasedassur-ancethat itsneighborswillnotacquirenuclearweapons.Israel’sneighborsontheirpartwouldrequireincreasedassurancethatIsraelwilleliminateitsnuclearweaponsaspartofabroaderMiddleEastpeaceagreementandsettlementwiththePalestinians.

At a minimum, a verified FM(C)T should require the IAEA to verify that any HEUproducedandplutoniumseparatedbyanFM(C)TParty after the treaty comes intoforceisnotdivertedtoweaponsuse.ThiswouldinvolveIAEAmonitoringofallenrich-mentandreprocessingplantsandanyfissilematerialthattheyproduceaftertheTreatycomesintoforce.

Summary

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Someverifiablearrangementwillhavetobereachedtoassurethatpre-existingstocksof civilian fissile materials and materials declared excess for weapons purposes canneverbereturnedtoweaponsandareplacedirreversiblyunderIAEAsafeguards.

Finally,earlyentryintoforcewouldbedesirableformanyreasons.Thiswouldbefacili-tatedbyanentry-into-forcerequirementthatdoesnotspecifyratificationbyparticularstatesbutonlybyasubsetofNPTweaponstatesandnon-NPTstates.

Summary

Country Perspectives

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Duringthepastdecade,severalarmscontrolnegotiationshavebeenproposedattheConferenceonDisarmament(CD),includingmostprominentlyaFissileMaterial(Cut-off)Treaty,orFM(C)T,banningtheproductionoffissilematerialsforweapons;atreatyforthePreventionofanArmsRaceinOuterSpace(PAROS);atreatyon“negativese-curityassurances”againstthreatsoruseofnuclearweaponsagainstnon-weapon-statePartiestotheNPT;andatreatyonnucleardisarmament.Differentgroupsofcountrieshaveverydifferentpreferencesconcerningthesenegotiationsandnoconsensushasbeenreachedonamandateforanynegotiation.Chinahaspushedveryhardfornego-tiationsonPAROS,isverycautiousaboutFM(C)T,andechoesotherCDmembersonnegotiationsofnegativesecurityassurancesandonnucleardisarmament.ThispaperdiscussesChina’spositiononanFM(C)Tfromtheperspectiveofcost-benefitanalysis.

How Much Is Enough?AkeyquestionintheFM(C)Tcost-benefitcalculationiswhetherornotChina’scur-rentfissile-materialstocksaresufficienttomeetitsfutureweaponsneeds.China’sfis-silematerialsusableforweaponsincludebothweapon-gradeplutoniumandweapon-gradehighlyenricheduranium.Recentnon-governmentalestimatesofChina’sstocksofweapon-gradeuraniumrangefrom17to26tonsandofitsplutoniumfrom2.3to3.2 tons.1 These estimates are based on very limited publicly available informationaboutthecapacitiesandhistoriesofChina’sfissile-materialproductionfacilitiesandthequoteduncertaintiesintheestimatesappearsmallerthantheuncertaintiesintheinputdatawouldsuggest.

Chinahasreportedverylittleonitsfissilematerialproduction,andinformationonpossibleworkstoppages,lossesandinefficiencyisnotpublic.Thenon-governmentalestimatesmaythereforebehigh.

China’sweapon-gradeplutoniumhasonlyoneuse,theproductionofpitsfornuclearwarheads.Twotonsofplutoniumcouldbeusedtoproduceuptoabout500warheadpits.IftheamountofChina’sweapongradeplutoniumissomewhatless,thenumberofnuclearwarheadpitsthatcouldbeproducedwouldbecorrespondinglyfewer.

Twenty tons of weapon-grade uranium could produce up to another one thousandwarhead pits. However, China’s weapon-grade uranium has other potential uses: inthesecondariesofthermonuclearwarheadsandinthefuelofnuclear-submarineandresearchreactors.Thesediverseusesofweapon-gradeuraniumreducethemaximumnumberofwarheadpitsChinacouldpotentiallyproduce.

China

Country Perspectives: China

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AccordingtothemostrecentestimatespublishedintheNRDCnuclearnotebook,Chi-nahasabout240nuclearwarheadswith176deployed.2Thisnumberhasbeenrela-tivelystableinrecentyearsalthoughChinacouldproducemanymoreifitwished.Thissuggests thatChinafeelscomfortablewithandconfidentwithsuchasmallnuclearforceintoday’ssecurityenvironment.Assumingthat:(1)Chinahastoreserveallitsweapon-gradeuraniumforotherpurposesthanproducingnuclearwarheadpits;(2)allChina’sweapon-gradeplutoniumstockpileisavailableforproducingnuclearwarheadpits;and(3)therealamountofChina’sweapon-gradeplutoniumissomewhatsmallerthan the publicly estimated 2–3 tons, we can conclude that China’s weapon gradefissile stockpiles can support anuclear forceof a fewhundrednuclearwarheads. If,however,China’sactualstockpileofweapon-gradeplutoniumisconsiderablyless,itssecurityexpertsmaynotbeabletoassuretoChina’sdecisionmakersthatitsweapongradefissilestockpilescanmeetallpossiblefutureweaponneeds.ThiscouldexplainChina’scautiousandreluctantpositionsonanFM(C)Tduringthepastdecade.

Three factors couldaffectChina’sperceived requirements fornuclearwarheadsandthereforeweapon-gradefissilematerials.These three factors are changes in:nucleardoctrine,theinternationalsecurityenvironment,andmilitarytechnology.

China’sleadersfullyunderstandtheconstraintsofthenucleartabooagainsttheuseofnuclearweaponsandthereforeregardnuclearweaponsasa“papertiger.”ThepurposeofChinesenuclearweaponsistocounterpossiblenuclearcoercionbyothernuclearweaponstates.Forthispurpose,Chinadoesnotneedalargenumberofnuclearweap-onsorweaponsthatarekeptlaunchready.3

Accordingtopublicreports,China’sproductionoffissilematerialforweaponsstoppedin theearly1990swhen its economybegan to takeoff.4This suggests that itwasapoliticaldecisionratherthaneconomicconstraintsthatledtoaproductionhalt,i.e.,China’sleadersfeltthattheChinesedidnotneedmorethanarelativelysmallnuclearforceatthetime.

ThereisnoevidencethatChina’semphasisonnuclearweaponshasincreasedsince.Chinahasrepeatedlyreconfirmeditsno-first-usecommitment.5China’snuclearweap-onsarereportedlystilloffalertanditssingleballistic-missilesubmarinehasreportedlynever conducted a deterrent patrol.6 Although China is developing land-based mo-bilemissilesandperhapsnewsubmarinesandsubmarine-launchedballisticmissilestoraisethesurvivabilityofitsnuclearweapons,itcanrecyclethefissilematerialsinoldwarheadsonweaponsystemsbeingretiredintothewarheadsforthereplacementsystems.Atpresent,itappearsthatanynetgrowthinChina’sstockpileofwarheadsisnotlargeenoughtorequiretheproductionofmorefissilematerial.

Alsoatpresent,China’soverallinternationalsecurityenvironmentremainsfavorable.7

China’s relations with all other nuclear weapon states are much better than at thetimewhenChinafirstdevelopeditsnuclearweapons.NuclearweaponsarenolongeramajorfactorinChina’srelationswiththeotherfourNPTnuclearweaponstates:theUnitedStates,Russia,FranceandtheUnitedKingdom;orwithitsnewnuclearneigh-bors:India,PakistanandNorthKorea.Chinadoesnotneedalargenuclearforcetodealwiththesecountries.Asmallnuclearretaliatorycapabilityshouldbeenoughtocounteranyattemptsatnuclearcoercion.

Possible revolutions in military technology are the major sources of uncertainty incalculatingChina’s futureneeds fornuclearweapons. If the technologiesofmissiledefenseandofconventionalstrategicoffensiveweaponsbecomematureandeffective,


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Chinamayneedmorenuclearweapons tooffset the losses fromapossibleconven-tionalfirststrikeagainstitsnuclearforcesandthentobeabletosaturatetheattacker’smissiledefensewithitssurvivingforce.

Itseemsthatbothconventionalstrategicoffensiveweaponsandmissiledefensesstilllackthecapabilitiestoidentifyrealtargetsamongdecoysandthereforetheireffective-nessremainsabigquestion.

China’sdecisionmakersareunwillingtoruleoutthepossibility,however,that,iftheUnitedStatescontinuestoinvestheavilyinthesecapabilitiesinthefuture,sometech-nicalbreakthroughmayfixthediscriminationproblemsofconventionalstrategicof-fensivesystemsandmissiledefense.AsafestrategyforChinatohedgeagainstunfavor-abletechnicaldevelopmentsisthereforetoreservetheoptionofexpandingitsnuclearforceasalastresort.AsitscurrentfissilestockpilesmightonlymarginallymeetChina’sneeds for its existing smallnuclear force, itmight thenhave toproducenewfissilematerials.ThisuncertaintyaboutfutureneedsisacentralquestioninChina’sFM(C)Tcalculations.

Relative Security GainsAnarmscontrolagreementbringssecuritybenefitstoitsstatepartiesbyputtingcon-straintsonthearmsdevelopmentsoftheotherstateparties.Thisiswhystatesarewill-ingtoacceptsameconstraintsonthemselves.However,theFM(C)TwouldposemuchstrongerconstraintsonChina’snuclearcapabilitythanonatleastsomeothernuclearweaponstates.

RelativetoChina,theUnitedStatesandRussiahavehugenuclearforces,hugenumbersofwarheads inreserve,andhugestockpilesoffissile-material.Theywouldnotneednewfissilematerialstobuilduptheirwarheadstockpilesagain.AnFM(C)Tthereforewouldplacenegligibleconstraintsontheirnuclearcapabilities.Thus,therelativesecu-ritygainofFM(C)TforChinawouldbemuchsmallerthanforothernuclearweaponsstates.

DuringtheColdWar,Chinarepeatedlycomplainedabouttheunbalancedgains(orconstraints) of arms control treaties. China believed that United States and SovietUnion promoted arms control agreements only when they felt that they no longerneededtheoptionsthatwereforeclosed.SomeoftheseagreementstargetedChina.ThePartialTestbanTreatyandtheThresholdTestbanTreatyaretwoexamples.

TheendoftheColdWarchangedthisperceptioninChina.TheChemicalWeaponConvention(CWC)didnot targetChinaasChinadidnothaveachemicalarsenal.TheCWCwasnegotiatedattheCDlargelybecausetheUnitedStatestooktheleadingivinguptheoptionofkeepingaretaliatoryreserveofchemicalweapons.8Intheearly1990s, therefore, China no longer felt that arms control agreements were targetingChinaorbroughtlittlerelativegainstoChina.ThisnewperceptionencouragedChinatobeveryactive inthenegotiationsof theComprehensiveTestBanTreaty (CTBT).AlthoughthetimingofthenegotiationswasbadforChina,Chinawasveryconstruc-tiveandcooperative.

AftertheconclusionoftheCTBT,however,theglobalarmscontrolsituationworsened.TheUnitedStateshasbeenopposingthenegotiationofatreatyonPreventionofanArmsRace inOuterSpace (PAROS).TheUnitedStatesalsowithdrewfromtheABMtreaty,whichChinabelievedtobeimportant.ThearmscontroldynamicsattheCDandelsewhererevivedChina’sconcernover the imbalanceof relativegainsofarms


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controlagreements.ItisquiteobviousthatanFM(C)TwouldposeastricterconstraintonChina’snuclearcapabilitythanonthoseofRussiaandtheUnitedStates.China’seffortsto launchaPAROSnegotiationwererejectedbytheUnitedStatesrepeatedly,whichconfirmedChina’sperceptionthatanFM(C)TmightbearelativelossforChinaamongthefivenuclearweaponstates.

Inprinciple,anFM(C)Twouldplayaroleinpreventingemergingnuclearstatesfromacquiringmorefissilematerials.InanFM(C)Tnegotiation,Chinawouldpushforitsnewnuclearneighborsto jointhetreaty inthesamewayas itpushed intheCTBTnegotiationsfortheratificationsofthesecountriesasconditionsfortheTreatytoenterintoforce.TheexperienceofCTBTraisedabigquestionabouttherolesofarmscontrolagreementsforChina,however,asthreeof itsneighbors,India,PakistanandNorthKorea,allconductednuclearexplosiontestsaftertheconclusionoftheCTBT.

ItisnotclearhowthesecountrieswillrespondtoanFM(C)T.Theymightsimplyrejectthe treatyas theydid theCTBT.Or, theymightask foradditional rewards in sepa-ratedeals.Forexample,NorthKoreaisaskingforenergycompensationandbenefitsintheSixPartyTalksinexchangefordisablementofitsplutonium-productioncom-plex.ChinahasbeenpayingeconomicallyandpoliticallytoencourageNorthKoreatofreezeanddismantleitsnuclearprogram.IndiaandtheUnitedStatesareconsideringanucleardealthatmayhelpIndiaincreaseitsrateofproductionoffissilematerialforweapons.IfChinaencouragedIndiaandPakistantostoptheirfissilematerialproduc-tion for weapons, China could pay the price of damaging its political relationshipswith these countries. Alternatively, if India and Pakistan delayed their accession totheFM(C)T—ascurrently seemsquitepossible—its securitybenefit toChinawoulddiminish.

Atthesametime,anFM(C)Tmayencouragenuclearweaponstatestotakemoreactivestepstodisposeofexcessfissilematerials,whichwouldcontributetoeffortstocombatnuclearterrorism.IftheFM(C)Tcanplaythisrole,itwouldbeanetsecuritygainforallnuclearweaponstates,includingChina.

On-Site InspectionsTheabuseofon-site inspectionshas longbeena concern forChina.ChinaworriesthatotherstatepartiesmightaskforchallengeinspectionsinChinathatcouldrevealsensitiveinformation.ThisconcernismoreseriousforanFM(C)TthanaCTBT.Area-sonableon-siteinspectionunderaCTBTwouldbeconductedinadesolateareathatwouldnotnecessarilyhavegreatmilitarysignificance.Anon-siteinspectionundertheFM(C)Twouldmostlikelybeconductedinindustrialfacilitiesthatmighthavemilitaryorcommercialsignificance.

ToanalyzeChina’sattitudestowardFM(C)Ton-siteinspections,ascenarioofverifica-tionisassumedhere.AftertheentryintoforceoftheFM(C)T,thestatepartieswouldberequiredtodeclaretheirshutdownmilitaryfissileproductionfacilitiesandopera-tionalcivilianproductionfacilities.TheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)wouldthendeploysensorsatboththeshutdownmilitaryfissileproductionfacilitiesandatoperatingcivilianproductionfacilities.Routineinspectionswouldbeconduct-edatbothcategoriesofsites.

Atoperationalcivilianproductionfacilities,routineinspectionsaretoensurethatnocivilian fissile material is redirected to weapons production. At shut-down militaryfissileproductionfacilities,routineinspectionsaretomakesurethatthereisnonewproductionactivity.Besidesroutineinspections,somechallengeinspectionsmayalso


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beallowedbythetreatytoclarifyconcernsaboutpossibleundeclaredproductionoffissilematerial.StatepartiesortheIAEAcouldproposeachallengeinspectioniftheysuspectedundeclaredproductionbyanotherstateparty.TheIAEAwouldneedcertainprocedurestoapprove(greenlight)ortodeny(redlight)aproposalforsuchaninspec-tion.

Routine inspections at operational civilian production facilities under an FM(C)TwouldbesimilartothesafeguardsmeasuresimplementedbytheIAEAinnon-weaponstates. SomeChinese civiliannuclear facilities arenowunder IAEA safeguards, andChinahasbecomeusedtothiskindofroutineinspectionincludingvisitsbyinspectorsandcontinuousmonitoringbyon-sitesensors.ChinawouldfeelcomfortablewiththiskindofroutineinspectionatitscivilianproductionsitesifitwaspartofanFM(C)Tverificationsystem.

ChinadoesnotwanttheFM(C)Ttoincludedeclarationsofthesizesofexistingfis-silestockpiles.Thismayalsobethepositionoftheothernuclearweaponstates.Evenroutineinspectionsatshutdownmilitaryfissile-materialproductionfacilitiesthereforemightbeworrisome toChina if it believed that the inspections could reveal sensi-tiveinformationaboutthequantityorisotopiccompositionofthefissilematerialsinChina’snuclearweapons.

Technically,sensorsdeployedattheshutdownmilitaryfissile-materialproductionfa-cilities could be designed not to reveal such information. For example, the sensorscouldbelimitedonlytoopticalcameras,seismicsensorsandelectricalmeters.Opticalcameraswouldbeusedtodetecthumanactivities,seismicsensorstodetectmovementsofheavy trucks,andelectricalmeters todetect the supplyofpower tokey itemsofequipment.Noneofthesesensorscoulddetectnuclearradiationandprovideinforma-tionaboutthequantityandisotopiccompositionoffissilematerialsproducedthereinthepast.Similarlimitscouldbeputontheequipmentcarriedbytheinspectionteamonroutinevisits.Buttheinspectorscouldeasilytakedustsamplesbywipingfacilitysurfacesattheinspectedsite,eveniftheydidnotcarryanycomplicatedequipment.Itwouldbedifficulttostopthemfromtakingdustsamplesandbringingthembackforanalysis.Thedustsamplescouldpossiblycontaininformationabouttheproductionhistoryandthecompositionofthefissilematerials,whichChinawouldnotwantre-vealed.ThiscouldbecomeadifficultproblemintheFM(C)Tnegotiations.

ChinaalsowillbeconcernedwiththeprocedurestobeadoptedinconnectionwithchallengeinspectionsunderanFM(C)T.Theseprocedureswouldcover:(1)thekindsofinformationthatcouldbeusedasabasisforanaccusationofaclandestineviolation;(2)thebasisforacceptingorrejectingachallengeinspection;and(3)howsensitiveinformationirrelevanttothetreatywouldbeprotected.

Chinaalwaysfeelsuncomfortableifhumanintelligenceisusedasthebasisofanac-cusationofaclandestineviolation.Unlikeinformationgainedbymostremote-sensingtechnologies,statepartiesthatmakeaccusationonthebasisofhumanintelligenceareunwillingtoprovidethesourcesoftheirinformation.Thiscreatesanopportunityfortheabuseofon-siteinspections.Iftheinformationgainedbyhumanintelligencecan-notbeexcludedfromthebasisforadecisiontotriggerachallengeinspection,Chinawouldwantahighthreshold,forexample,alargemajorityvoteofthetreatypartiesforauthorizinganinspection.Chinawouldalsolikeadditionalmeasuresthatwouldhelpprotectsensitiveinformationirrelevanttothetreaty,forexample,managedaccessduringtheinspection.9


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Therecenthistoryofon-siteinspectionsinarmscontrolverificationmayencourageChinatobemorereceptivetosuchinspections.Todate,therehasnotbeenasinglechallenge inspection conducted under the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC),eventhoughthethresholdoftriggeringaninspectionunderCWCisverylow.Thissuggeststhattheinternationalcommunityisdevelopingaseriousandcautiousculturewith regard to on-site inspections, and that abuses of challenge inspection are notlikely.China’schemicalindustryhasbecomeaccustomedtoCWCroutineinspections.ThisexperiencemaymakeChina’ssecurityexpertsmorewillingtoaccepton-sitein-spections.

Beyond Costs and BenefitsWe have discussed the direct security costs and benefits an FM(C)T could bring toChina.ButthedebatesoveranFM(C)TinChinawouldcertainlygobeyondsuchdirectcalculations.Onereasonisthattheuncertaintiesindirectcost-benefitcalculationsaf-fectthereliabilityoftheconclusions.AnotheristhatChina’sleaderswillcertainlytakethelargerpoliticalandeconomiccontextintoaccount.

TheuncertaintiesonsomeFM(C)Tconsiderationsaresolargethattheymayleadtoverydifferentconclusions.Oneexampleistheabuseofon-siteinspections.Inthene-gotiationoftheChemicalWeaponConvention,theUnitedStatespushedveryhardforaneasytriggerforchallengeon-siteinspections.Intheevent,however,thingswentintheoppositedirection.

WhentheUnitedStatesSenate ratified theChemicalWeaponConvention, itaddedreservationsthatwouldconstrainchallengeinspections,althoughreservationsarenottechnicallyallowedbythetreaty.10ThissuggeststhattheUnitedStatesmaynotafterall like the easy trigger for on-site inspections that it appeared to support initially.Also,therelativelyeasytriggerintheCWChasnotencouragedtheabuseofon-siteinspection in CWC implementation. China now feels quite comfortable with CWCverification.

SomeuncertaintiesaboutFM(C)Ton-siteinspectionsaretechnicalinnatureandthere-forecouldbeclarifiedbytechnicalapproaches.Forexample,dustsamplescollectedatoldmilitaryfissileproductionsitesmaynotbeabletoprovidemoreaccurateinforma-tionabouttheamountandcompositionoffissilematerialsproducedatthesitesinthepast thanother technicalapproaches.Or itmaybeconcludedthat the informationprovidedbydustsamplesisnotsosensitiveafterall.Acarefulstudycouldhelpclarifythisquestion.

Someuncertainties lie inthedynamicsof interactionsamongcountriesaboutarmscontrolandaredifficulttopredict.Forexample,othernuclearweaponstatesmayormaynotshareChina’sworriesaboutpossibleabuseofon-siteinspections.Iftheydo,theymaysupportastrictlycontrolledmechanismforon-siteinspections,forexample,byaddingwell-designedaccessmanagementtoprotectsensitiveinformationirrelevantto the treaty. The CWC experience suggests that the United States and some othercountrieswouldnotappreciateacultureoffrequentandintrusivechallengeinspec-tions.Chinadoesnothaveconfidence,however,inthestabilityoftheU.S.positiononthisissue.

Theanswertothequestion,“howmuchisenough,”alsohasbiguncertainties.If,inthefuturetheU.S.Congresslimitsthebudgetsformissiledefenseandstrategiccon-ventionaloffensiveweaponsasstrictlyas ithaslimitedprogramsfordesigningnewnuclearweaponsfornewmissionsinrecentyears,China’sconcernsaboutthechance


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oftechnicalsurprisesintheseareaswillbereduced.Undersuchcircumstances,Chinawouldcontinuetofeelcomfortablewithasmallnuclearforceandtherewouldbenoneedtoreserveanoptionforresumingfissile-materialproduction.

TheseuncertaintiesdonotnecessarilysuggestthatChinawouldopposeanFM(C)T.Instead, theuncertainties adddifficulties toFM(C)Tdecision-making inChinaandwouldmakeeverystepforwardverydifficult.Facinglargeuncertaintiesinthedirectcost-benefitcalculations,thedecisionwouldhavetorelymoreonthejudgmentoftheChinesegovernmentabouttheoverallarms-controlsituationanditsassessmentofitsoverallnationalpoliticalandeconomicinterests.

IfChina feels that theoverallarmscontrol situation isgoodandcanconstrain thefuturecompetitioninstrategicweaponsatalowlevel,itwillputmoreemphasisonthebenefitsoftheFM(C)Tandthereforebecomemoresupportiveofthetreaty.

One indicator for China to judge the overall arms control situation would be armscontrol in space. Even if the FM(C)Tnegotiations aremandatedat theCDwithoutparallelnegotiationsonothertopics,thespaceissuewillcontinuetobeChina’scentralconcern.HowthisisdealtwithcouldchangeChina’sconfidenceintheroleofarmscontrolandthereforeimpactChina’sapproachtotheFM(C)Tnegotiations.

InChina,armscontroldecisionsaremadeonthebasisofbroaderconsiderationsthanthoseoftraditionalmilitarysecurity.11Political,economic,social,andenvironmentalfactorsalsocontribute to thecomprehensivesecurityofacountry.Therefore,arms-controldebatesinChinaarealwaysputintothebigpictureofChina’soverallpoliticalandeconomicinterests.InChinatoday,economicandsocialdevelopmentiscentralandtheintegrationofChina’seconomyintotheworldisstillageneraltrend.Thebigpictureofnational interests suggests that, although it is adifficult topic forChina,ChinawouldbeflexibleontheFM(C)T.

ConclusionThecalculationofdirectsecuritycostsandbenefitsanFM(C)TcouldbringtoChinasuggests that it is a difficult topic for China. China worries that an FM(C)T wouldruleoutChina’soptionto respondtounfavorablestrategicdevelopmentsbysimplyincreasingthesizeofitsnuclearforce.Italsoworriesaboutabuseofon-siteinspectionsunderanFM(C)T.Thedirect security calculationshavevery largeerrorbars so theconclusionsmaynotbeveryreliable.Iftheoverallarmscontrolsituationimprovesinthefuture,ChinawillhavemuchhigherconfidenceinitssmallnuclearforceandwillbecomemuchmoresupportiveofanFM(C)T.OneimportantindicatoroftheoverallarmscontrolsituationwillbeU.S.attitudestowardspacearmscontrol.IftheUnitedStates gives some positive feedback to China’s proposals on PAROS, this would sig-nificantlyaffectChina’sconcernovertheimbalanceofsecuritygainsofarmscontrol.China’sgrandcalculationaboutitstotalnationalinterestsisinfavorofarmscontrolingeneral.ThissuggeststhatChinacouldbeflexibleontheFM(C)T,eventhoughitisadifficulttopicforChina.IfPAROSnegotiationsgoforwardtogetherwiththeFM(C)Tnegotiationsat theCD,Chinawouldregainfaith inthecooperativenatureofarmscontrolandbewillingtobeflexibleintheFM(C)Tnegotiations.

Li Bin


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Francehascalledforallnuclearweaponstatestosupportthenegotiationofafissilematerialcutofftreaty,toestablishanimmediatemoratoriumontheproductionoffis-silematerialsforweapons,andseekstransparencymeasuresagreedbetweenthefiveNuclearNonproliferationTreaty(NPT)nuclearweaponstates.

FranceseeksanearlystarttoFM(C)Tnegotiations,withoutpreconditions.Itsupportsaverifiabletreaty,butonethatwillonlyendproductionoffissilematerialsforweaponspurposes.Itwouldnotsupportlimitsonfissilematerialstocksheldbeforetheentryintoforceofthetreaty,orlimitsontheproductionoffissilematerialsforpeacefulpur-posesornon-explosivemilitaryuses.

Francerecentlyhastakeninitiativestoreduceitsnucleararsenalandincreaseitstrans-parency.12ItsarsenalisnowabouthalfofitsColdWarpeak.FrancealsohasshutdownandisdismantlingitsPierrelatteandMarcoulefacilitiesfortheproductionrespectivelyofHEUandplutoniumfornuclearweapons.Ithasinvitedinternationalobserverstoconfirmthis.

Reductions in the French Nuclear ArsenalTheFrenchnucleararsenalhas twocomponents: theStrategicOceanicForce (ForceOcéanique Stratégique) and the Strategic Air force (Force Aérienne Stratégique). In2005,independentanalystsbelievedthearsenalincluded348deployednuclearweap-ons, comprising 288 submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads (3 submarineswith16missileseach,with6warheadspermissile),50air-launchedcruisemissilesand10airbornebombs.13OnMarch21,2008,PresidentSarkozyannouncedareductionbyathird“ofnuclearweapons,missilesandplanes”fortheairbornecomponent,withtheresultthat“theFrencharsenalwillincludelessthan300nuclearwarheads,”andde-claredforthefirsttimethatFrancehas“nootherweaponsthanthoseinitsoperationalstocks.”14Thisannouncementalsoconfirmeda2006officialstatementthatsomesub-marine-basedM-45ballisticmissileswouldcarrylessthansixnuclearwarheads.15

Theannouncedreductionsmeanthatthestrategicairforcewilllikelyconsistoffortyplaneseachcarryinganuclear-armedcruisemissile,andthatthesubmarineforcehasdecreasedfrom288to259warheads.Takentogether,thiswouldgiveFranceatotalof299operationalwarheads.ThereductioninFrance’sarsenalfromabouttheColdWarpeakwouldfreeupabout1200kgofplutoniumand7,500kgofhighlyenrichedura-niumfromdismantledweapons.16Francehas,asyet,however,notdeclaredanyfissilematerialasexcesstoitsmilitaryrequirements.

ThedismantlingoftheexcessnuclearweaponswillbedoneattheValduccenteroftheCommissariatàl’EnergieAtomique(CEA).17Previously,fissilematerialsfromdisman-

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tledweaponswererecovered,treatedandre-usedinnewnuclearwarheads.18AccordingtoCharlesMillion,MinisterofDefenseduring1995–1996,“Francehasafissilematerialstocksufficientforthenextfiftyyears,”and“beyondthesefiftyyears,wewillknowhowtorecyclematerialscurrentlyemployedinourweapons.”19

TheFrenchnucleararsenalcontinuestobemodernized.Atthebeginningof2009,theair forcewill receive thefirst squadronof thenewRafaleF3nuclearfighter-bombertobeequippedwithanewcruisemissile,theASMP-Awithanewwarhead,theTêteNucléaireAéroportée(TNA).20Thedevelopmentofanewballisticmissile,M-51alsocontinues,andisexpectedtobeoperationalin2010,withanewwarheadexpectedin2015,TêteNucléaireOcéanique(TNO).

InhisMarch2008speech,PresidentSarkozystatedthatnucleardeterrenceremainstheprincipalelementofFrenchdefensepolicy,andthattheFrenchnucleararsenalisessentialforthesecurityofallEuropeancountriesagainstallthreats.21ThemostrecentDefenseMinistryWhitePaper(“leLivreBlanc”)detailingFrenchmilitarystrategywaspresentedonJune17,2008.Itstatesthat“France’snucleardeterrentmustremainasFrance’sultimatestrategicguarantorinallpotentialsituations,evenasthedoctrinesaccompanying itaremodifiedtocorrectemerginggaps.”TheWhitePaperproposesseveral concrete goals for European defense, including “dialogue with its Europeanpartners,whowouldwish,ontheroleof(French)deterrenceanditscontributiontocommonsecurity.”22

Marcoule, Pierrelatte and Fissile Material ProductionFrancehasdecidedtocloseanddismantlethefacilitiesthatproducedthefissilemateri-alsforitsnucleararsenal.23Thetotalcostofproducingthehighlyenricheduranium,plutoniumandtritiumforFrenchnuclearweaponsandtofuelitsnuclearsubmarineswasestimatedatnearly32billioneuros.24

Marcoule:After40yearsofactivity,plutoniumproductionwasstoppedinNovember1992.TheMarcoulereprocessingplantwasconvertedtocivilpurposesandthenshutdown at the end of 1996. Dismantling began in 1998 and is expected to finish by2035–2040.25TheCEA iscarryingout thefirstphaseofdismantling, involving theconditioningofcertainwastes,removalofwastestoredinstoragepools,etc.Theover-allcostoftheseoperationsisestimatedat5.6billioneuros.26

Pierrelatte: FinalshutdownofthisHEU-productionfacilitywasdecidedin1996.27Dis-mantlementbeganthesameyearandisexpectedtocostontheorderof500millioneuros.28

PresidentSarkozyhasinvited“internationalexpertstocometonotethedismantlingofourinstallationsatPierrelatteandMarcoule.”29AForeignMinistryofficialhasarguedthat“[t]hisinvitationshowsthewillingnessofFrancetopromotethetransparencyofitseffortsatdisarmamentinanunequalledway.”30IAEAinspectorsandindependentexpertscouldbeamongthoseinvited.31MembersoftheCDwereofficiallyinvitedtosendrepresentativestovisitthesitesonSeptember16,2008.32

FrancecontinuestoreprocessspentnuclearfuelatitsLaHaguesite.33ConstructionoftheGeorgesBesseIIcentrifugeenrichmentplantcontinues.Enrichmentisduetostartin2009andthefacilityistobefullyoperationalin2014.GeorgesBesseIIwillulti-matelyreplaceEURODIF’sgaseousdiffusionenrichmentplant(GeorgesBesseI),whichhasoperatedatthesamelocationsince1978.34InFrance,allciviliannuclearfacilities,includingenrichmentandreprocessingplants,aresubjecttoEuratomsafeguards.OnSeptember10,2007,theFrenchgovernmentsenttheIAEAstatementsonitsholdings


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ofcivilseparatedplutonium,theestimatedamountsofplutoniumcontainedinspentcivilreactorfuel,andholdingsofcivilhighlyenricheduraniumasofDecember31,2006.35

The French Position on the FM(C)TTheFM(C)TisforFranceanimportantinstrumentofnucleardisarmament.Atmeet-ingsoftheFirstCommitteeoftheUNGeneralAssembly,Frenchdiplomatshavesup-ported all resolutions relevant to thematter.36According to a Frenchofficial at theCD“Francewantstomakeprogressinstoppingtheproductionoffissilematerialsfortheweapons,which is inoureyesapriority”.France ishoweverclear that“for thisyear[progressontheFM(C)T]iscompromisedbecauseofwaitingfortheresultoftheAmericanelectionandtheblockingofsomecountries.”37

PresidentSarkozy’seight-pointactionplanof2008laidoutattheCDincludedthreeitemsdirectlyconcernedwith theFM(C)T:First, support thenegotiationofafissilematerialcutofftreaty;Second,establishanimmediatemoratoriumontheproductionoffissilematerialsfornuclearweapons;Third,developtransparencymeasuresbetweenthefiveNPTnuclearweaponstates.38Francewantsrapidandstrongactionbyothermembersoftheinternationalcommunity,inparticularbythenuclearweaponstates,onthesesteps.

ForFrance,theFM(C)Tisthenextstepinmultilateralnegotiationasregardsnucleardisarmament.Franceseeksacutoffthatisatotalbanonfutureproductionoffissilematerialsfornuclearweapons,butthatdoesnotconstrainstocksheldbeforetheentryintoforceofthetreaty,norlimitsproductionoffissilematerialsforpeacefulpurposesornon-explosivemilitaryuses.

Francedoesnotwishtoseeconstraintsonnavalfueltobeincludedinafuturetreaty,althoughitappearsthatthelatestFrenchnuclearsubmarines(theTriomphantandtheRubis classes)donotemployhighlyenricheduraniumfuelbut rather lowenricheduranium(below20%).39

Franceisreadytostartnegotiationsimmediatelyonthebasisofthe2007proposalbythesixpresidentsoftheCD.Thisisapositionsupportedbymanydelegationsandcallsfornegotiationswithoutpre-conditionsontheFM(C)Tinparallelwithdiscussionsofanumberofotherarmscontrolmeasures.IthasbeensupportedbyFranceformanyyears—bothasanindividualstateandwithintheEuropeanUnion.40

ItappearsforFrancethatnegotiationswithpre-conditionswouldriskpreventingdis-cussion on the delicate questions of verification and stocks. Consequently, Francethinksthatthereshouldbenopre-conditionsandtheissueofverificationshouldbesolved during the negotiation itself. France continues to accept the 1995 ShannonMandate for “a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectivelyverifiabletreatybanningtheproductionoffissilematerialfornuclearweaponsorothernuclearexplosivedevices.”Itunderstands“verifiable”tomeanthatsignificantcheat-ingislikelytobedetected.Noverificationarrangementscouldprovideperfectassur-anceregardingcompliancewiththetreaty.

FranceisopposedtocreatinganFM(C)TnegotiatingprocessoutsidetheUnitedNa-tionsConferenceonDisarmament.41FranceaffirmedtheimportanceofthestructureofnegotiationforanFM(C)TbyabstainingfromanOctober2007JapaneseresolutionattheFirstCommitteeoftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblythatdidnotspecifi-callymentiontheCDasthenegotiatingbodyforacutoff.

Jean-Marie Collin


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GermanyhasalwaysattachedahighprioritytoanFM(C)T.ItwelcomedtheproposalwhenitwasfirstputforwardandactivelyparticipatedintheConferenceonDisarma-ment(CD)inworkingoutthe1995compromiseShannonMandatefromwhichithasneverdeviated.42

InApril2008,Germanysubmittedaworkingpapertothe2008Prepcomforthe2010NPTReviewConferenceon“CreatingaNewMomentumforaFissileMaterialCut-OffTreaty(FMCT).”43Thispaperurgestheimmediatestartofanincrementalandphasedprocess,withoutprejudicetothecontinuingdifferencesregardingsomekeytreatyis-sues:scopeandverification.Inafirststep,commitmentstoenternegotiationsandtoimplementsecuritymeasuresforfissilematerialwouldbedeclared.Inanextstep,aframeworktreatywouldsetupagradualimplementationprocessinvolvingvoluntaryandbindingmeasuressuchasinformationexchanges,threat-reductionmeasures,oraccountancyprocedures.Inparallel,aGroupofScientificExpertscouldbeestablishedinGenevatoexaminetechnicalaspects.Furthermore,thiscouldbecomplementedbyanadditionalFissileMaterialControlInitiative(FMCI).ThispapersuggeststhatGer-manywillshowinitiativeandcommitmentalongwithawillingnesstocompromiseduringthenegotiations.

The Debate in Germany ThegeneralbackgroundofGermany’spositionontheFM(C)Tcanbefoundinitssecu-ritypolicyanditspolicywithregardtociviliannuclearenergy.Germanyseesitssecu-rityandforeignpolicybestservedinmultilateralframeworksandregimes.Thisisthestartingpointforshapingpositionsonarmscontrol,includingtheFM(C)T.GermanyconsiderstheNPTtobeacornerstoneofthenonproliferationregime.ImplementationofArticleVI,i.e.,progressinnucleardisarmament,isagoalofGermannucleararmscontrolpolicyfortworeasons:First,GermanysharesthebeliefthatitisaprerequisiteforcredibilityoftheNPT.Second,intheopinionofalargemajorityofthepopulation,nucleararsenalsshouldbereduced.Opinionsonwhetherornotthisshouldendinanuclear-weapon-freeworldaredivided.Lessambitiousgoalsareuncontested,however,amongthemthereductionofthenumberofnuclearweapons,securingfissilemateri-als,implementingtheCTBT,andbeginningnegotiationsofanFM(C)T.AhighpriorityhasbeenattachedtotheCTBTandFM(C)TsincetheNPTReviewandExtensionCon-ferencein1995,whentheywereexplicitlynamedasnear-termnucleararms-controlobjectives.

Germany is constrained, however, with regard to the initiative it can take towardsreachingthesegoals.ThesourcesofitsconstraintsareGermany’sNATO-nuclear-plan-ning-groupmembership,andthecontinuingdeploymentofU.S.nuclearwarheadson

Germany

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Germansoil.Whileanincreasingnumberofvoicesdemandtheendofthisdeploy-ment,decision-makingwithinNATOonthefutureoftheseweaponshasnotyettakenplace.Sometimes,fearsarevoicedthatanendofthenucleardeploymentwoulddam-agetransatlanticties,whichareregardedasanimportantfactorforsecurityandpeaceinEurope.TheGermanGovernmenttriestoavoidtoodeepfrictionswiththeUnitedStates.Itisalsoargued,however,thatremovaloftheweaponswouldnotseriouslyaf-fecttherelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.

AsecondrestraintagainststrongGermanpolicyinitiativestowardsnucleardisarma-ment isEU integration.Germanydoesnotwant todeviate fromcommonEUposi-tions,whichareshapedinpartbythenuclearweaponstates,FranceandBritain,whichdonotendorsetoofar-reachingpositionsandthatareveryactiveinadvancingtheirviews.

Third,Germany’sdomestic lobbypromotingnucleardisarmamenthasbecomeverysmall.SincetheendoftheColdWar,themajorityofthepopulationdoesnotworryaboutnuclearweapons.Manyjournalistsfindthetopicboring.

Germanyhasalargenuclearindustrywithdeepexpertiserelatingtothenuclearfuelcycle. Currently, the official policy is to phase out nuclear power in Germany overroughly twodecades.Thisphase-outpolicydoesnotaffectGermany’spositionsonnucleararmscontrol.

Germany’s nuclear-energy industry does not oppose nuclear arms control. On thecontrary, its representativesbelieve thatFM(C)T-relatedverificationmeasures in thenuclearweapon states would reduce the inherentdiscriminationof theNPTwhichrequires IAEA safeguardsonly in thenon-weaponstates.The industryopposesnewinitiativesthatwouldincreasethisdiscrimination.Thus,whentheAdditionalProtocolwasnegotiated,theGermannuclearindustryinitiallyvoicedoppositionbecauseitwasconcernedaboutadditionalsafeguardsburdensonthenon-weaponstates.44

EventhoughGermanyendeditsownreprocessingprogramin1991,itdoesnotopposereprocessingbyothercountries.Germany isamemberof theUrencomultinationaluranium-enrichmentconsortiumandrecentlylaunchedaninitiativetopromotemul-tinationalenrichmentcentersasanalternativetonationalenrichmentfacilities.45

There isnoofficialGermanpositiononmanykeyaspectsof theFM(C)Tbeyondarather short but clear statement of the desirability of negotiations and verification.MoredetailshavebeenoftendiscussedbyGermanstakeholders fromvariousback-groundsthatmakeupGermany’sFM(C)Tcommunity.46Although,inthepast,someofitsmemberswouldmeetinaworkinggrouporganizedbytheForeignOffice,thiscommunityisunofficialandinformal.Nevertheless,arangeofviews,includingtheimportanceofverification,mayberegardedasaconsensuswithinthiscommunity.Thischaptersummarizessomeoftheirviewson:verification,treatyconstraintsontheusesofpre-existingstocksoffissilematerials,productionofHEUfornaval-reactorfuel,minimizationofcivilianuseofHEUandthenumberofcountriesthatwouldhavetoratifytheFM(C)Tforittoenterintoforce.

VerificationTheGermanGovernmentseesverificationasamajorbenefitofanFM(C)T.ThisisincleardisagreementwiththeofficialU.S.positionthat,since2004,hasrejectedverifica-tion.AftertheU.S.refusaltoconsiderverificationatall,manydelegationsseemtohavebecomerathercautiousabouttheirpositionsonverification.Germany’sofficialprior-


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ityistostartnegotiations,includingonverification.Inthiscontext,adetailedofficialstatementonverificationwouldprobablybecounterproductiveatthistime.Thereisthehopeinthecutoffcommunitythatbythetimethenegotiationsgetgoing,theU.S.positionwillhavechangedagain.

PriortotheU.S.shiftagainstverification,therewerebilateralU.S.-Germanyconsul-tationsonverification.TheGermancutoff communityprefersmorecomprehensiveverificationthantheso-called“focusedapproach”thathasbeenadvocatedespeciallybyAustralia.47Thereasonisthattheprobabilityofdetectionofillegaldiversionishighonlywhenthereisverificationofmaterialaccountancythroughoutthefuelcycle.Oth-erwise,therewouldbetoomanyrisksofundetectednoncompliance.

Thusfar,therehasbeennodetailedGermanestimateofthecostsofthevariousveri-fication scenarios that could be considered. A 1995 cost assessment by the IAEA ofseveralverificationscenarioswasroughandisnowoutdated,butprovidedapracticalestimateoftherelativecostsofvariousscenarios.48Withthisbackground,manyGer-manexpertsviewclaimsbynuclearweaponstatesthatintrusiveverificationis“fartoocostly”asanexcuse—especiallygiventhesizesoftheirsecurity-relatedbudgets.

Itsstatusasanon-nuclearweaponstateanditscommitmenttotheNPTarecentraltoGermany’sviewofitsroleintheinternationalcommunity.Germanyseespossessionof fissile materials as implying duties and responsibilities towards the internationalcommunity.Thesecurityandaccountancyofitsownfissilematerialsareseenasoneoftheseinternationalresponsibilities.Incontrast, innon-EUnuclearweaponstates,fissilematerials—betheyformilitaryorforcivilianuse—areregardedasamatterofonlynationalconcern.Germany’shopeisthatverificationofanFM(C)Twouldpro-moteachangeofthisattitudewithconsequentbenefitsfortheoverallsecurityoffissilematerials.

Onvariousoccasions,Germanyhas joinedcalls topromotethetransparencyoffis-silematerialsandputtingexcessfissilematerialsunderIAEAsafeguards.49Thisviewissupportednotonlybynucleardisarmamentexperts,butalsobythenuclearindustry,whichperceivesthelackofIAEAsafeguardsinnuclearweaponstatesasunderminingGermany’sinternationalcompetitiveness.

Pre-existing Stocks of Fissile MaterialsThegoalofreducingthequantitiesofexcessfissilematerialsworldwideissharedbymostmembersoftheinternationalcommunity.Germanyhastakenpartinstudiesofdispositionoptionsforplutoniumrecoveredfromexcessnuclearweapons.50TheU.S.-Russian agreement towards this goal51 was welcomed in Germany and the GermannuclearindustrybidforcontractsinsupportoftheU.S.projecttodisposeofitsexcessplutoniuminMOX(mixeduranium-plutoniumoxide) fuel.Germanyhas industrialexperiencewithMOXproductionbuthasstoppeditsowndomesticactivitiesduetoitsnuclear-energyphase-outpolicy.Currently,MOXforGermanlightwaterreactorsisstillbeingproducedinFranceandBritainbutthecontractswillnotberenewed.

Giventhehugestocksoffissilematerialsformerlyorstilldedicatedtomilitaryuse,thedisarmamenteffectofanFM(C)Twillbemarginalifthereductionofexistingstocksoffissilematerialavailablefornuclear-weaponmanufactureisnotpartoftheTreaty.ThereisthereforenooppositioninGermanytotheTreatyincludingconstraintsontheweaponsuseofpreviouslyproducedfissilematerials.Thereisbroadagreementthatnuclearmaterials released fromweaponsuseasa resultof the reductionofweaponstocksmustbeputunderIAEAsafeguardsassoonaspossible,andneverwithdrawn


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again.Thiswouldmakenucleardisarmamentanirreversibleone-waystreet.Thereisalsoagreatdealofsupportforanobligationtodeclareallstocksoffissilematerialin-cludingthatinmilitaryuse.

Duringthenegotiationsoverwhatbecamethe1995Shannonmandate,however,Ger-mandiplomatsbecameawareofthestrongoppositionofthenuclearweaponstatestoinclusionofpre-existingmaterials inanFM(C)T.AstheFM(C)Twouldbedesirableevenwithoutthereductionofpre-existingstocks,theyhaverefrainedfromtakingafirmofficialpositiononexistingstocksforthemoment.Startingnegotiationsisper-ceivedasthefirstpriority.

Production of HEU for Naval Reactor FuelWithregardtofutureproductionofHEUfornavalreactors,whilethereisnoofficialpositionatthistime,thereisastrongsentimentwithintheGermancutoffcommunitythatabanbeincludedinthetreaty,foratleastthefollowingthreereasons:

Suchproductionwouldconstitutealoopholethatcouldunderminethetreaty;

TherearealreadysuchhugequantitiesofexcessHEU,thatanyneedfortheproductionofevenmorebytheNPTnuclearweaponstateswillnotmaterializeformanydecades.Inthiscontext,suggestingthatmilitaryHEUwouldstillbenecessarysuggeststhatanu-clear-weapon-freeworldwillnevercome,incontradictiontoArticleVIoftheNPT;and

AbanontheproductionofHEUfornavalreactorswouldbecompatiblewithandreinforcethegoalofphasingouttheuseofHEUincivilianresearchreactors.

Minimization of Civilian Use of HEUThegoalofminimizingcivilianuseofHEUisofficialGermanpolicy,notleastbecauseGermanyhasexperiencedagreatdealofinternationalcriticismforconstructinganewHEU-fueled research reactor, the FRM-II and ignoring the consequences fornuclearnon-proliferation.TheexplanationaboutwhyHEUinsteadofLEUfuelwaschosenforFRM-IIiscomplex.52AregrettableoutcomeistheconsequencethatGermanyinsistsontherighttouseHEUforcivilianfuel.Atthe1995ReviewandExtensionConferenceoftheTreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons(NPT),Germanyblockedlanguagethatwouldhavebanned“newcivilreactorsrequiringhighly-enrichedura-nium.”53ThecurrentofficialpositionfavorsminimizingthecivilianuseofHEUandaphaseoutassoonassuitableresearchreactorfuelsareavailable.Thispositioniscon-troversialwithintheGermancommunityinterestedinthematter.

Entry into ForceInGermanytheprevailingviewisthattheexperiencewiththeentry-into-forceclauseoftheCTBTshouldnotberepeatedfortheFM(C)T.GermanywaswillingtobringtheCTBTintoforcewithoutsomeweaponstates,inthehopethattheywouldjoinlater,ashadhappenedwiththeNPT.WithregardtoanFM(C)T,Germanywillcertainlytrytoavoidthetreatyfallinghostagetothenon-ratificationofoneortwocountries.Atthesametime,Germanywillinsistthatmostofthenuclearweaponstates,includingIndia,Pakistan,andIsraelmustbepartofit.Asitisclearthatsomecountrieswillonlyaccedeifcertainothercountriesdo,Germanyprobablywillencouragetheirsimultane-ousratification.

GermanycouldendorseanFM(C)Twithout Israel’smembership.Theprevailingas-sumption is that Israelhasprobablyproducedenoughfissilematerials for itsneeds.AslongasDimonaisrunning,itisassumedthatIsraelwillhaveproblemsaccepting

1.

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verification.Butthereisthehopethat,afterashutdown,itcouldbecleanedupinawaythatwouldallowverificationofitsclosurewithoutrevealingsensitiveinformation.ItisbelievedunlikelythatIsraelwillconstructanewplutonium-productionreactor.

ConclusionIn sum,Germany’s interest inFM(C)Tnegotiations is strong. Itbelieves thatnucle-ar arms control, nuclear disarmament, and the nonproliferation regime need to bestrengthened. Its positions are shaped by a group of stakeholders of various back-groundswhogenerallyagreeonmost issues.Thisgroup is small,however,as is thenumberofactivistsgeneratingpublicpressureformoreprogressinarmscontrol.Thegoalsofnucleararmscontrol—althoughhardlycontested—arethereforeindangerbe-inggivenalowerprioritythanotherunrelatedforeignpolicygoals,especiallywhenother countries oppose German arms control positions. Other foreign policy goals,suchastheeconomy,EUdecision-making,goodrelationswithothercountries,haveamuchhigherrankinginGermany’slistofpriorities.Germandiplomatswhonegotiateonarmscontrolthereforesometimesdonothavemuchleverageinpromotingtheirpositionsincomparisontodiplomatsfromcountriesinwhichtheseissuesrankhigh.Thisisthecaseespeciallywithregardtothenuclearweaponstatesthathavelesspro-gressivepositions.

Germanycanbeexpectedtomakeconstructiveandprogressiveproposalsandatthesametimetobeopentosomecompromises.Germanyalsohasagreatdealofexperi-enceinnuclearsafeguardsandmonitoring,andatthesametimeastronginterestinpromotingverificationandtransparency.ItthereforemaybeexpectedthattherewillbespecificGermaninputinthisregard.

Annette Schaper


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India’sofficialpositionisthatitsupportsthedevelopmentofaFissileMaterial(Cutoff)Treaty, or FM(C)T. Notwithstanding statements of in-principle support, however, ifIndiawereaskedtosignsuchatreatytodayitwouldnotbereadytodoso.Thatistrueofsomeothernuclearweaponstatestoo.ButIndiaandPakistanarealsounwilling,asofnow,tojointhevoluntarymoratoriumoftheNPTweaponstatesagainstproducingmorefissilematerialsforweaponpurposes.

India’spostureisdictatedbyitsperceptionofitsstrategicrequirements.Beforesign-ingontoanFM(C)T,Indiahastopersuadeitselfthatitssecurityinterestswillnotbejeopardizedbydoingso.

India and the FM(C)TIndiahasformanyyearssupportedtheevolutionofsomeformofafissile-material-control regime—activelyduringcertainperiods. India co-sponsoredUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyresolution48/75L,in1993,whichcontainedthemandatetonegoti-ateanFM(C)T.ThissupportwasreiteratedbyIndiaaftertheConferenceonDisarma-ment(CD)adoptedanegotiatingmandatein1995,54andin1998,followingthees-tablishmentofanegotiatingcommittee.55AspartoftheIndo-U.S.Agreement(knowncommonlyastheIndo-U.S.nucleardeal)announcedinJuly2005,Indiaalsoagreedon“workingwiththeUnitedStatesfortheconclusionofamultilateralFissileMaterialCut-offTreaty.”56

India’spositiononafissilematerialproductionmoratoriumpriortoanFM(C)Twasstatedquitecategorically,however,bythePrimeMinisteronMay17,2006,whenhesaid, “India has made it clear that it is not prepared to accept a voluntary morato-riumonproductionoffissilematerialfornuclearweaponsorothernuclearexplosivedevices.IndiaisonlycommittedtonegotiateaFissileMaterialCut-offTreatyintheConferenceonDisarmamentinGeneva.Indiaiswillingtojoinonlyanon-discrimi-natory,multilaterallynegotiatedandinternationallyverifiableFMCT,asandwhenitisconcludedintheConferenceonDisarmament,againprovidedoursecurityinterestsarefullyaddressed.”57

ThedifferencebetweentheIndianpositionandthatoftheNPTnuclearweaponstatesonafissile-materialmoratoriumisnothardtoexplain.TheUnitedStates,Russia,theUnitedKingdom,andFrancehavealreadybuiltnucleararsenalsas largeastheyex-pect toneed in the foreseeable future.Thesecountriesalsohaveadequate stocksoffissilematerialtosignificantlyexpandtheirnucleararsenals.Theyhavealldeclaredamoratoriumon furtherproduction.China’s case falls somewherebetween thatofthesefournuclearweaponstatesandIndiaandPakistan.Chinaseemstohavestopped

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productionoffissilematerials,buthasnotmadeanofficialdeclarationofaunilateralmoratorium.Aplausibleexplanationisthatitwantstokeepopenitsoptionsofpro-ducingmorefissilematerialshoulditssecurityenvironmentchangeinthefuture.ThemostfrequentlycitedconcernisaU.S.ballistic-missiledefensesystemthatbringsintoquestionChina’sdeterrent.

India’simplicitviewappearstobethatitisarecententranttothegroupofnuclearpowers,thatitsnuclearforcesarestillatthegrowingstageandthatitneedsmoretimebeforeitcanconsideranyconstraintsonitsfissile-materialproduction.ItisunlikelythatIndiawillacceptanyrestrictiononitsproductiontillsuchtimeasitfeelsthatithasanadequatenucleararsenaltodeterallforeseeablenuclearthreatstoitssecurity.India’spostureduringanyFM(C)Tnegotiationsonthecriticalissuesofexistingstocksandverificationalsowillbeinfluencedbyitsestimateofitsrequirements.

Fissile Material Stocks and Production CapabilitiesIndia’sunwillingnesstostopfissile-materialproductionforweaponsandothermili-tary purposes is clear from the civil separation plan negotiated between India andtheUnitedStatesaspartoftheirnucleardeal,andfromthebilateraldiscussionsthatprecededtheplan’sfinalization.58ThisplanseparatesthoseofIndia’snuclearreactorsthatwouldbeconsideredcivilianandplacedunderIAEAsafeguardsfromthosewhichwouldbekeptoutsideanysafeguardsorexternalinspection.IntheManmohanSingh-BushAgreementin2005,theidentificationofthosefacilitiesthatwouldbedeemedci-vilianwaslefttotheIndians.Butinpractice,thisseparationhadtobenegotiatedwiththeU.S.government,whichthenhadtoconvincetheU.S.Congress,onthestrengthoftheseparationplan,topasstherequiredlegislationenablingtheDeal,59andthereafter,convincetheNuclearSuppliersGrouptoliftitssanctionsagainstIndia.

ThemostcontentiousitemintheseparationplanwasIndia’sPrototypeFastBreederReactor(PFBR).DuringthenegotiationswiththeAmericans,Indiakeptinsisting,inthefaceofconsiderableinitialresistancefromtheU.S.side,thatthePFBRandsomePressurizedHeavyWaterReactors(PHWRs)neededtosupplyplutoniumfuelforthePFBRbekeptoutsidesafeguards.Intheevent,notonlythePFBRbut8PHWRswereexemptedfromIAEAsafeguards.ThewholenegotiatingprocesswasaccompaniedbyextensivemediacoverageandpublicdebateinIndia.VariouspublicstatementsbyIn-diangovernmentofficialsexplicitlyinvoked“nationalsecurity”andstrategicconsider-ationsastheprimaryreasonsforwantingtokeeptheBreederoutsidesafeguards.

Translatingwhatthephrase“nationalsecurity”meansinthecontextofreactorsca-pableofproducingweapon-gradeplutonium,theIndiangovernmenthadinessencepubliclystatedthat,initsjudgmentitscurrentstocksoffissilematerialsplusthefutureoutputofitsexistingtworesearchreactors(CIRUSandDhruva)thatproduceweapon-gradeplutoniumwerenotsufficientforitsstrategicneeds.Thus,farfromdeclaringamoratoriumIndiahasdonetheopposite.Ithasdeclareditsperceivedneedforasignifi-cantenhancementinitsweapon-gradeplutoniumproductioncapability.

WeestimateIndiahascurrentlyabout550kgofweapon-gradeplutonium—mostofitseparated.Ithasproducedapproximately13tonsofreactor-gradeplutoniuminthespent fuel of its unsafeguarded power reactors. There is no official information onhowmuchofthisreactor-gradeplutoniumhasactuallybeenseparatedsofar.About7.5tonscouldhavebeenseparatedifthereprocessingplantsatTarapurandKalpak-kamhadbeenoperatedonaverageat50percentoftheirdesigncapacityor3.7tonsiftheyhaveoperatedatonlya25-percentcapacityfactor.AccordingtotheU.S.-Indianuclearagreement,the13tonsofreactor-gradeplutoniumwouldnotbesafeguarded.


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Itisthereforenot“civilian”plutoniumandisavailableforstrategicpurposessuchasconversiontoweapon-gradeplutoniumbyunsafeguardedbreederreactors.Thisisdis-cussedfurtherbelow.AccordingtooneinterpretationofthedraftFM(C)TtabledbytheUnitedStatesinMay2006,suchconversioncouldtakeplaceevenaftertheFM(C)Tcameintoforce.60

Indiaisgenerallybelievedtobeproducinghighlyenricheduranium(HEU)of20–40%enrichment,primarilytofuelanavalreactortopowerIndia’sfirstnuclearsubmarine,theAdvancedTechnologyVessel(ATV).In2007,AlbrightandBasuestimatedthattheHEUenrichmentfacility,theRareMaterialsProject,inRattehalli,mayhaveacapac-ityof9600kgSWU/y,sufficienttoproduceabout48kgofweapon-gradeuraniumperyear.61

How Much is Enough?UnliketheNPTweaponstates,Indiahasnotjoinedthemoratoriumonfissile-materialproductionbecauseitviewsitsnuclearbuildupasincomplete.ThereisalsonopublicindicationthattheIndiangovernmenthassetaspecifictargetorceilingonthedesiredsizeofitsnucleararsenal.Thatmakesitdifficulttogiveanobjectiveandreliableesti-mateofwhenIndiamaybereadytoenditsfissile-materialproductionforweapons.

ButsomeinformationisavailableaboutthegeneralcontoursofIndia’snuclearplans.UnlikeChina,PakistanorIsrael, IndiahasmadepublicaNuclearDoctrine.62 Itwasfirstreleasedin1999intheformofadraftdocumentproducedbyanadvisorycom-mitteeand,inJanuary2003,theessenceofthedraftwasconfirmedasofficialpolicybytheCabinetCommitteeonSecurity.63ThevigorouspublicdiscussionofthetermsoftheIndo-U.S.dealprovidedsomeadditionalinsightsintothethinkingofthegov-ernment’snuclearestablishment.Theseindicationsgivesomeroomforoptimismthat,inafewyears,bythetimeothernationsarereadytosignanFM(C)T,Indiamayalsobereadytodoso.

ThisoptimismstemsfromIndia’sownstatedpolicyonitsnuclearforces.TheNuclearDoctrinedocumentclearlystates,inSection2.3,that“Indiashallpursueadoctrineofcredibleminimumnucleardeterrence.”Furthermore,inSection2.4,isstatedthat“[t]hefundamentalpurposeofIndiannuclearweaponsistodetertheuseandthreatofuseofnuclearweaponsbyanyStateorentityagainstIndia”andinSection8.2that“no-firstuseofnuclearweaponsisIndia’sbasiccommitment.”

ThegeneralconsensusamongindependentIndianexpertsonthesubjectisthattheseclausesinthedoctrinearecredibleandgenuinelyreflectthegovernment’spolicyofdeveloping only a credible minimal deterrence rather than a major offensive capa-bility.Therefore,oncethegovernmentisconvincedthatithasenoughwarheadsforminimumdeterrence,andacorrespondingback-upstockpileoffissilematerial,onecanhopethatitwillbewilling—liketheNPTnuclearweaponstates—tostopfurtherproduction.Itmayalsobewillingtodeclareapartofitsexistingstockpileofreactor-gradeplutonium“excess”toitsmilitaryneeds.

Theproblemliesindecidinghowmuchisenough?Thatrequirestranslatingthequali-tativerequirementofminimumdeterrenceintosomeconcretenumberofwarheads.Minimumdeterrencedoesnotrequirethatyoushouldmatchthearsenalsofyourper-ceivedadversaries.Itonlyrequiresthatyouhaveenoughsurvivingweaponsafterafirststrikebytheenemy,toinflict“unacceptabledamage”totheotherside.

Thatinturnrequiresestimatinghowmuchdamagewouldbe“unacceptable”tothead-versary—partlyamatterofsubjectivejudgment.Inmyview,anarsenalofadozenorso


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weaponsshouldsuffice,sinceevenahalfadozen“modest”Hiroshima-levelweapons,ifdroppedonacoupleofmajorcities,couldkillamillionpeopleinminutes.Thatismorethanenoughtobeunacceptabletoevenaremotelyrationalgovernmentofanymodernstate.Iftheadversaryiscontrolledbyirrationalandsuicidalleadership(ascanconceivablyhappen)noarsenalofanysizecoulddeterthemanyway.64

Asagainstthisrequirementofadozenwarheads,Indiaalreadypossessesastockofoverahalfatonofweapon-gradeplutoniuminseparatedformorinitsspentfuel—enoughtomakeahundredwarheads.Thisprovidesasubstantialsafetymargintocompensateforpossiblelossesduetosurvivability,reliabilityandinterceptionandstillleaveseveraldozendeliveredweapons,quitesufficientforcreatingunacceptabledamageandthusactingasadeterrent.

Even if it is felt thatahundredweapons isnotquiteenough, there is still the largestockof reactor gradeplutoniumseparated in the reprocessingplants. Someof thiswillnodoubtbeusedtofuelIndia’sPrototypeFastBreederReactor(PFBR)andothersimilarreactorsinthefuture.ThePFBRisdesignedtogenerateabout1250MW(th),withaninitialinventoryof1910kgofreactorgradePu(tobeobtainedfromthespentfuelofpowerreactors),andtohaveanequilibriumbreedingratioof1.05.AdetailedstudybyGlaserandRamanaconcludesthatthePFBRcanproducemorethan140kgperyearofweapon-gradeplutoniuminitsradialandaxialblankets,whileusingjusttheradialblanket’soutputformilitarypurposeswouldyieldabout90kgperyearofweapon-gradeplutonium.65UndertheIndo-U.S.nucleardeal,thisPFBRwouldremainun-safeguarded.

Reactor-gradeplutoniumcanalsobeuseddirectlytomakeweapons,albeitwithmoretechnicaldifficultiesduetoitshigherheatandradiationoutput,and,forfirst-genera-tiondesigns,anuncertainyield.Indiahasnotmadeanypublicstatementsrestrictingitsoptionsonhowitwilluseitsstockofunsafeguardedreactor-gradeplutonium.

Giventhelargestockofweapon-usableplutoniumthatalreadyexists,somehavear-guedfromtheearlystagesoftheIndo-U.S.nuclearnegotiationsthatIndiacan,afterretainingitscurrentstocksofplutonium,affordtoopenallitspressurizedheavy-waterpowerreactorstosafeguards.66Intheevent,however,astheSeparationPlanrevealed,the Indiangovernmentdidnotdo thatanddecided instead toenhance itsproduc-tioncapabilitiesfurtherbykeepingthePFBRand8heavy-waterpowerreactorsoutsidesafeguards.

ButthatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatIndiahaschangeditspolicyofminimaldeter-rence.Nationalsecuritydecisionsofcountriesarenotalwaysbasedonpreciselytai-loredrequirements.Itisnotunusualforplannerstoplaysafeandstockupwithmoreweaponrythanisneeded,ratherthanbeguiltyof“compromisingnationalsecurity.”Besides,lessthan10yearshavepassedsinceIndiabecameovertlynuclearandittakessome“turn-aroundtime”—bothpoliticallyandpsychologically—beforeitcancapitsnuclearprogram.RecallthattheUnitedStatestookover40years,from1945to1988beforeitstoppedproductionofplutoniumforweaponsandChinatoostarteditsarse-nalbuild-upthirtyyearsbeforeitisbelievedtohavestoppedproducingfissilematerialforweaponsintheearly1990s.

ThebestwaytoacceleratethisprocessinthecaseofIndiaistocontinuetopersuadeitthatitscurrentstockoffissilematerial,smallthoughitmaybecomparedtothoseoftheNPTnuclearweaponstates,isstillsufficientforthestatedgoalofminimaldeter-rence.


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Theresponseofmanynations,includingIndia,tonewnuclearregimesliketheFM(C)Twillalsobefavorablyinfluencedbyfasterprogressinworldwidedisarmament.IftheUnitedStatesandRussiacouldproceedmorerapidlywiththeirdisarmamentprogramsandbringthesizesoftheirarsenalsdownclosertothoseoftheothernuclearweaponstates,thenajointeffortbyallnuclearweaponstatestowardsfurtherarmsreductioncouldbeinitiated.Withthemajornuclearpowersstillpossessingnearly10,000war-headseach,itisdifficulttoconvincenewernuclearweaponstatestoseethewisdomincappingtheirarsenalsandassociatedfissile-materialstocksatlessthanafewpercentofthatlevel.

R. Rajaraman


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IsraelhasalwaysviewedanFM(C)Tasa“slipperyslope”towardsprematurenucleardisarmament,mainlybecauseitwouldundermineitslong-standingcommitmenttoapolicyof“nuclearopacity,”underwhichitneitherconfirmsnordeniespossessionofnuclearweapons.Forthisreason,IsraelofferedonlytokensupporttotheFM(C)TproposalsputforwardbytheUnitedStatesduringtheadministrationsofG.H.W.BushandBillClinton.WithitsgrowingconcernaboutpossibleIranianacquisitionofnucle-arweaponsandtheconvictionthatanFM(C)Tcannotdealwiththisperceivedthreat,Israel’s attitude towards anFM(C)Thasnowevolved into strongopposition.At thesametime,Israelisattemptingto“balance”thisoppositionanditspurelyrhetoricalsupportfortheestablishmentofaMiddleEastNuclearWeaponsFreeZone(NWFZ)byemphasizingvariousactionsithastakeninrecentyearsinsupportoftheglobalnon-proliferation regime such as its active participation in the Comprehensive Test BanOrganizationanditsadherenceto internationalnormswithregardtotheexportofnuclearandothermilitarytechnology.Inthismanner,itseekstomakethecasethatIsraelisa“responsible”albeitopaquenuclearstateincontrastto“rogue”statessuchasIran.

Inthefollowing,wediscussIsrael’sevolvingattitudetowardstheFM(C)T,and,givenitsoppositiontosuchatreaty,whatotherinitiativesmightbeundertakentolessenthedangeroffurtherproliferationandpossibleuseofnuclearweaponsintheMiddleEast.Toprovideacontextforthisdiscussion,webeginwithasummaryofIsrael’snuclearhistory,withanemphasisonthekeyroleofnuclearopacity.

Israel and the Bomb Recently, at various international meetings, the leaders of the Israeli nuclear estab-lishmenthaveemphasized“Israel’slongstandingcommitmenttonormsofsecurity,responsibility,accountabilityandrestraintinthenucleardomain.”67Thisnewtermi-nology,withitsstrongresemblancetothelanguagetheUnitedStatesnowusestoreferto India,allows Israel tohintatbutnotexplicitlyacknowledge itsnuclearweaponscapability,whilepromotingitscredentialsasasupporteroftheinternationalnon-pro-liferationregime.68Thus,while fullyconsistentwith Israel’s long-standingpolicyofnuclearopacity,this“facelift”representsatacitbutsignificantdeparturefromIsrael’spastnuclearpolicythatwascharacterizedbyadeterminedefforttobea“freeagent”outsidetheobligationsandconstraintsofthenonproliferationregime.69

Israel’snuclear-weaponprogrambeganinearnestinthelate1950s,roughlyinparallelwiththeearlyattemptsbytheinternationalcommunitytodealwiththeriskofthespreadofnuclearweapons.Adecadelater,around1967–68,Israelcompleteditsweap-onsR&Dandproduced itsfirstnucleardevices just as theNon-ProliferationTreaty

Israel

Country Perspectives: Israel

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(NPT)wasbeingfinalized.BythetimetheNPTwasopenedforsignatureinthesum-merof1968,Israelalreadyhadthebombandwasnotwillingtogiveitup,makingitimpossibleforIsraeltojointhetreatyasanon-nuclearweaponstate.

Ayearlater,inaone-on-onemeetingattheWhiteHouseinSeptember1969betweenU.S.PresidentRichardNixonandIsraeliPrimeMinisterGoldaMeir,Israel’spolicyofnuclearopacitywasborn.AslongasIsraeldidnotadvertiseitspossessionofnuclearweaponsbypublicdeclarationortesting,theUnitedStateswouldtoleratethecapabil-itythatwasforIsraelessentialtoitsnationalsecurity.70

FromanIsraeliperspective,thepolicyofopacityhasbeenagreatstrategicanddiplo-maticsuccess.Ontheonehand,bothdeliberateandinadvertentleaksovertheyearsleavenodoubtthatIsraelhasasophisticatednucleararsenal.71Ontheotherhand,thefactthatIsraelhasnotflaunteditsnuclearcapabilitywhiletakingactionsinsupportofglobaleffortstolimittherisksofnuclearproliferationandterrorismhaspersuadedotherstatestofollowtheUnitedStatesleadandacquiescetoitsexistence.72

Havingnowattainedanadvancednuclear-weaponcapability,however,Israel’sprior-ityistoburnishitscredentialsasademocratic,responsiblenuclearstate,andthusin-creaseinternationalsupportforretainingitscapabilitywhiledenyingittoautocratic,“rogue”regimessuchasthecurrentgovernmentofIran.TheleadersofIsrael’snuclearestablishmentpointtoanumberofactionsthatithastakeninrecentyearsinsupportofthenormsoftheglobalnonproliferationregime.Firstandforemostisitsactivesup-portfortheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty(CTBT).Israel,liketheUnitedStatessignedtheCTBTsoonafteritwasopenforsignaturebuthasnotratifiedit.UnliketheUnitedStatesunderthecurrentBushAdministration,however,itparticipatesactivelyintheworkoftheCTBTOrganization(CTBO),andsupportsentryintoforceofthetreaty.

Inaddition,Israelhas:(1)completedamulti-yearefforttoharmonizeitsexport-controllegislationwiththeguidelinesofvariousregimessuchastheNuclearSuppliersGroupandtheWassenaarArrangement;(2)endorsedandlaunchedtheratificationprocessoftheamendmenttotheConventiononthePhysicalProtectionofNuclearMaterial(CPPNM)andtheConventionontheSuppressionofActsofNuclearTerrorism;and(3)increasedthesecurityatitsinternationalbordercrossingsagainstillicittraffickingofnuclearandradiologicalmaterials.73

Israelhasnotthreatenedtheexistenceofotherstatesbynuclearweaponsoranyothermeans,andhasreinforceditspublicactionsinsupportofthenonproliferationregimebyprivateassurancesthatitisaresponsiblecustodianofitsnuclearweaponswithre-gardtoboththedoctrineandproceduresgoverningtheirpotentialuse.

Bycontrast,thestrongevidencethatIranisseekingtoacquireanuclearweaponsca-pabilityunderthecoverofapeacefulnuclearprogram,coupledwithitsrejectionofIsrael’slegitimacyandtheperceivedthreatstoIsrael’sexistencebyIran’sleaders,havebeenusedtosupporttheargumentthattreatingIsraelandIrandifferentlywithregardtotheirnuclearstatus—thesocalled“nucleardoublestandard”—isjustified.74

Whilebasingnon-proliferationpolicytowardastateonthecharacterandactionsofitsgovernmenthasacertainlogic,however,itisalsodifficulttoimplement.Notonlydogovernmentschange,butthejudgmentaboutwhetheragovernmentfitsintothe“responsibleor rogue”category is inevitably subjective.Moreover, thepossessionofnuclearweaponsbyanystateinthenameofnationalsecurity,particularlyoneinavolatileregionsuchastheMiddleEast,providesastrongincentivetoitsneighborsto


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acquire them.Thishasmotivatedefforts to implementarmscontrol initiatives thatwould“level theplayingfield”with regard to theobligationsofweaponsandnon-weaponsstatesandhencecouldbeimportantstepping-stonesalongtheroadtonucleardisarmament.75Prominentamong these suggested initiatives isaverifiable treaty tocaporcutofftheproductionoffissilematerialsfornuclearweapons,theFM(C)T.76

TheissueforthefiveNPTandthethreenon-NPTweaponsstatesiswhetherthebenefitsofagreeingtosuchatreatyoutweighitscosts.ForIsrael,thereisauniquedimensionthatitmustconsiderinweighingthesecostsandbenefits:whetheranFM(C)Tiscom-patiblewithitslong-standingcommitmenttothepolicyofopacity.And,ifnot,wheth-erthebenefitsofanFM(C)Toutweighthecostsofcompromisingorevenabandoningthispolicy,whichfordecadeshasbeenthecornerstoneofIsrael’snuclearpolicyanditsnuclear relationshipwiththeUnitedStates,andhaswithstoodmanychallenges,includingthedecisionbyIndiaandPakistantotesttheirnuclearweaponsin1998.

Inourview,IsraelwillmaintainitscurrentoppositiontoanFM(C)T.Weexplainwhyinthefollowing,andthensuggestwhatIsraelmightdoinsteadtoreducetheriskoffurtherproliferationandpossiblenuclearuseintheMiddleEast.

Israel and the FM(C)T: A Brief HistoryWhiletheideaofcappingfissilematerialstockpilesisasoldasthenuclearageitself,itsapplicationtotheMiddleEastisrelativelynew.ItwasproposedforthefirsttimeinJune1991aspartofaU.S.armscontrolinitiative,whichwasanattemptinthewakeoftheAmericanvictoryinthefirstGulfWarto“rethink”theMiddleEast.WhilenostatewasmentionedspecificallyintheU.S.FM(C)Tproposal,itsfocuswasclearlyonIsrael,theonlyMiddleEasternstatethatproducesfissilematerial.Thiswasanovelty:eversincethe1969NixonandMeiragreementonnuclearopacity,theIsraelinuclearprogramhadnotbeenontheU.S.politicalagenda.Israel,whichhadnotbeencon-sultedinadvanceontheU.S.proposal,tooka“waitandsee”attitude,holdingoffitsofficialresponse.

Internally,however,theU.S.proposalstimulatedaheateddebatewithintheIsraelina-tionalsecurityestablishment.WhilesomethoughtthattheAmericanproposalcouldofferinterestingopportunitiesforIsrael(e.g.,providing“seedsoflegitimacy”fortheIsraelinuclearprogram),themajoritytooktheviewthatIsraelshouldbewaryofsuchaproposalbecauseitcouldbea“slipperyslope”towardsprematurenucleardisarma-ment.UltimatelythelatterperspectiveprevailedandbecametheconsensuswithintheIsraelinationalsecurityestablishment.

Atthesametime,IsraelconcludedthatitwouldnotbewisetoopenlyrejecttheU.S.proposal. Conveniently, there was little pressure to do so: the Arab states were notendorsingiteitherandtheadministrationofG.H.W.Bushhadnoappetiteforashow-downwithIsraelonthenuclearissue.Formally,IsraelneverrejectedtheU.S.proposal.ThiswasalsoanimportantlessonforIsrael:theremaybenoneedtorejectnuclearproposalsitdoesnotlike,letothersdoitorletitdienaturally.

Inanycase,theU.S.MiddleEastArmsControlInitiativewasshortlived.Afewmonthslater,inthewakeofthe1991MadridPeaceConference,theUnitedStatesdecidedtotakeadifferentapproachandletthepartiesnegotiatetheirdifferences.Fiveworkinggroupswereestablished, includingaWorkingGrouponArmsControlandRegionalSecurity(ACRS),co-chairedbytheU.SandRussia.Bynowthereisagreatdealoflit-eraturethatanalyzesthehistoryoftheACRSworkinggroup,inparticular,howandwhyitfailedtoachieveanysubstantiveresults.77Thereislittledoubt,however,thata


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strongdisagreementbetweentheparties—IsraelandEgyptinparticular—onhowtodealwiththeIsraelinuclearissueledtothecollapseoftheACRSprocessin1995.

Interestinglyenough,anFM(C)TwasneverevenseriouslydiscussedduringtheACRSprocess.Neitherside,eachforitsownreasons,hadanyinterestinit.Nevertheless,theFM(C)TremainedaglobalarmscontrolissuethatIsraelcouldnotavoid.InSeptember1993, inaspeechbefore theUN,PresidentClintonproposedamultilateralconven-tionbanningtheproductionoffissilematerialsfornuclearexplosivesoroutsideinter-nationalsafeguards.TwomonthslatertheUNGeneralAssemblyadoptedresolution48/75Lcallingforthenegotiationofa“non-discriminatory,multilateralandinterna-tionaleffectivelyverifiabletreatybanningtheproductionoffissilematerialfornuclearweaponsorothernuclearexplosivedevices.”In1995,theConferenceonDisarmament(CD)establishedanadhoccommitteetocarryoutthismandate.

Despite its reservations, Israeldecidedbothto jointheGeneralAssemblyconsensusresolution,andtoparticipateinthesubsequentnegotiationsintheCD.Despiteitshighstakesinthesenegotiations,however,Israelkeptalowprofile,calculatingthatitwouldbewisertoletothersimpedethenegotiatingprocess,whichindeedsoonstalled.Thisstrategyprovedcorrectuntilthesummerof1998whenIsrael’sjoiningoftheconsensusbecameessential.

ByearlyAugust1998,aftertheIndiaandPakistannuclearweaponstests,China,IndiaandPakistanjoinedtheconsensus.IsraelwasleftasthelastholdoutintheCD,anditspositionbecamecritical for theentireprocess in the61-nationbody thatmakesdecisionsbyconsensus.Forthefirsttimeinitshistory,Israelfounditselfinauniquepositionofbeingabletoderailaglobalissue.ItwasinthosedaysofmidAugust1998thattheotherwisefriendlyClintonadministrationexertedtheharshestpressureiteverusedagainstanyIsraeligovernment.

Even though no cutoff treaty was on the horizon, Israeli Prime Minister BenjaminNetanyahurecognizedthatanFM(C)T,mighthaveprofoundlong-termimplicationsforthefutureofIsrael’snuclearpolicy,inparticularonopacity.UnderintensepressurefromWashington,heannouncedthatIsraelwasjoiningtheconsensus,butalsoletitbeknownthatitwouldopposethetreaty.Intwolettersandseveralconversationswiththepresident,hetoldClinton,“Wewillneversignthetreaty,anddonotdeludeyour-selves—nopressurewillhelp.Wewillnotsignthetreatybecausewewillnotcommitsuicide.”78

Opacity and FM(C)T: The Unstated OppositionThroughoutthe1990sIsraelwasvague,evensecretive,aboutexplainingthesourcesofitsreservationsandconcernsabouttheFM(C)T.InthewakeoftheshowdowninAugust1998,andinresponsetothestronglettersthatbothNetanyahuandIsraeliDe-fenseMinisterMosheArenssenttotheirAmericancounterparts,however,theClintonadministrationproposedthataquietbutopenstrategicdialogueonthecutoffissuebeinitiatedbetweentheUnitedStatesandIsraelinorderfortheUnitedStatestobetterunderstandthenatureandscopeof theIsraeli reservationstothecutoff treaty.TheAmericansuggestionstriggeredaheateddebateinIsraelaboutwhethersuchadialoguewouldbeinitsbestinterests.Ultimately,themoreconservativeviewwonandIsraeldecidednottoshareitsreservations,beyondstatinglaconicallythatthecutoffwouldbedetrimentaltothesecurityofthestateofIsrael.79

Inthefollowing,weofferourowninterpretationoftheunderlyingreasonsbehindtheIsraelioppositiontotheFM(C)T.Webelievethatthisoppositioninvolvesbothpolitical


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and technical considerations, and, furthermore, that central to both is a perceivedconflictbetweentheFM(C)Tandthepolicyofopacity.

Onthepoliticalfront,themainIsraeliconcernisthatanFM(C)Twouldbea“slipperyslope” tonucleardisarmament. It is likely that theArab stateswouldargue thatanFM(C)Tisnotanacceptablesubstituteforanuclear-weapon-freezoneintheMiddleEast,asitwouldtendtolegitimateIsrael’snuclearmonopolyintheMiddleEast,whichtheycouldneveraccept.Hencetheycouldbeexpectedto“pocket”Israel’sagreementtoanFM(C)T,andtrytoexertfurtherpressureonIsraeltodisarm.ThisisconsonantwiththerecentdeclarationbyArabforeignministersthat,ifIsraeladmitstohavingnuclearweaponsbutdoesn’tcommit todestroythem,theArabstateswill leavetheNPT.80

Technically,itwouldalsobedifficultforIsraeltomaintainitspolicyofopacityunderanFM(C)T—especiallyifthetreatycontainedprovisionsforcredibleverification,apo-sitioncurrentlysupportedbymostoftheinternationalcommunity,ifnottheUnitedStates.WhiletheshutdownofIsrael’sDimonareactor,whichisusedtoproducepluto-niumforitsweaponsprogram,couldbeverifiedremotely,itisknownthatthereactorisalsousedtoproducetritiumvianeutronirradiationoflithium-6targets.81Becausetritiumhasarelativelyshorthalf-life—12.3years—shuttingdownthereactorwouldeventually lead to a degradation of the tritium boosted weapons in Israel’s arsenal.WhileIsraelcouldcontinuetoproducetritiumasapartytotheFM(C)T,itwouldhavetoagreetoverificationtoensurethatthereactorwasnotalsobeingusedtoproduceplutonium. It isnot clear that this couldbeaccomplishedwithout intrusiveon-siteinspectionsthatwouldcompromiseopacity.82

The FM(C)T and IranIn recent years, Israel has become more open and explicit in its opposition to theFM(C)T.OnNovember11,2004,onthelastoccasioninwhichtheFM(C)TresolutionwasvotedattheUNFirstCommittee,Israelprovidedanofficialexplanationofitsdeci-siontoabstain.ThetextoftheIsraelistatementfollows:

“IsraelviewstheFMCTinbothregionalandglobalcontexts,anditspolicyisgovernedbythesetwoconsiderations:

IntheregionalcontextoftheMiddleEast,issuesrelatedtonucleardisarmamentcanbedealtwithonlyafterachievinglastingrelationsofpeaceandreconciliation,andwithin the context of the overall regional security and stability. Israel’s approachonthewaytomoveforwardontheseissues,inspiredbytheexperienceofotherre-gions,isanchoredinIsrael’slong-termvision,andiselaboratedinourdelegation’sexplanationofvoteonthedraftresolutionentitled‘TheEstablishmentofaNWFZintheregionoftheMiddleEast.’

Intheglobalcontext,recentdevelopmentshighlightthefactthat,non-complianceofstateswiththeirinternationalobligations,aswellasthemisuseandun-checkeddisseminationofnuclearfuelcyclecapabilities,havebecomeamongthemostpress-ingchallengesinthenuclearnon-proliferationfield. The FMCT does not address these challenges and can further complicate them.[Emphasisadded]

Wetherefore,believethatanoverallpriorityinnon-proliferationshouldbeassignedtodevelopinganeweffectivenon-proliferationarrangementpertainingtothenuclearfuelcycle.”83

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Evidently,theIraniannuclearissuecreatesapoliticalcontextthatreinforcesandcom-poundsIsrael’sobjectionstotheFM(C)T.Thisoppositionisbothglobalandregional.Herearethemainconsiderations:

AnFM(C)Tallowstheoperationofbothuraniumenrichmentandreprocessingfacil-itiesaslongastheenricheduraniumandplutoniumareusedforostensiblypeacefulpurposes,notweapons.However,evenifthesafeguardstodetectpossiblediversionofthesefissilematerialstoweaponsarecredible,theycannotpreventbreakoutandtheywouldprovideaconvenientrationalefortheacquisitionofexpertiseandtech-nologythatwouldfacilitatetheconstructionandoperationofclandestineenrich-mentandreprocessingplants.

Ontheregionallevel,IsraelinsiststhattheonlyavenuefornucleardisarmamentintheMiddleEastisviatheregionalNWFZroute,nottheFM(C)T,andsucharoutecouldbeinitiatedonlyinthecontextofacomprehensivepeaceprocess,wherethepeaceissueistheprimarydriver,notthenuclearissue.

Thus,IsraelseesanFM(C)Tasanetlossasitrequiresconstraintsonitsnuclearactivitiesthatwouldlessenthebenefitsofopacity,whileitgivesvirtuallynothinginreturn.

ConclusionWhileIsraelhasalwayshadreservationsabouttheFM(C)T,itnowviewsanyinterna-tionalattentiontoitasadangerousdistractionfromtheurgentneedtofocusonthethreatofIraniannuclearization.Beyondtheactionsthatithasalreadytakeninsup-portoftheglobalnon-proliferationregime,however,isthereanythingelsethatIsraelcoulddotolessenthedangersoffurtherproliferationandtheactualuseofnuclearweaponsintheregion,bothnowandinthelongerterm?

Webelievethatthereis,andofferaspecificproposalbelow.WhilesimilarinspirittoanFM(C)T,itwouldoffermoretangiblebenefitsforIsrael,thoughalsoraisingsimilarproblems.Inanycase,inconsideringsuchmeasures,itisimportantnottolosesightofthe“bigpicture”:nuclearweaponseveninthehandsof“responsible”statessuchasIsraelposesignificantdangers,andthusitisessentialtoworkseriouslytowardsriddingboththeMiddleEastandtheworldoftheseweapons.84

IntheMiddleEast,thismeanskeepinginfocustheconnectionbetweentheposses-sionofnuclearweaponsbyIsraelandtheenduringconflictbetweenIsraelanditsArabneighbors. Indeed, itwas theperception that Israel facedanexistential threat fromthesestatesthatmotivatedIsrael’sformerPrimeMinister,DavidBen-Gurion,andhisassociatestoacquirethebombinthe1950s.Althoughthemilitarybalanceinthere-giontodayisquitedifferentthanitwasthen,intheeyesofmanyIsraelisandtheirsup-porters,particularlyintheUnitedStates,Israelstillfacesanexistentialthreat,todayfromIran,andperhapsfromotherstatesintheregioninthefuture,unlessajustanddurablepeaceisachieved.Atthemoment,suchapeaceseemsadistantprospect,whichinthemindsoftheIsraeliGovernmentjustifiestheretentionandpossibleupgradingofIsrael’snucleardeterrent.

WhiletheviewthatIran’songoingnuclearactivitiesposeathreattoIsrael’sexistenceisnotuniversallyaccepted,85insteadofdebatingthispoint,itmakesmoresensetoac-ceptthepremisethatajustanddurablepeaceintheregionisanecessarypreconditionforanuclearfreeMiddleEast,andintensifyeffortstoachievesuchapeace,particularlywithregardtosettlingthe long-standingdisputebetweenIsraelandthePalestinianpeople.86

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Astoourspecificproposal,wesuggestmakingtheMiddleEastafuelcyclefreezone,i.e.,aregionfreeofallenrichmentandreprocessingplants.87UnliketheFM(C)T,thiswould eliminate the risk that Iranor anotherMiddleEastern country couldobtainweapons-useablenuclearmaterialsviamisuseofdeclaredandsafeguardedenrichmentorreprocessingplants.Additionally,crediblemeanstoverifythatsuchplantshavenotbeenconstructedclandestinelyaswellasstrongmeasurestoinsurethatifsuchplantsarefoundthattheybedestroyedwouldalsoberequired.However,incommonwiththeFM(C)T, therewouldbe significantproblems in insuringcredible andbalancedverification while maintaining opacity with regard to Israel’s nuclear program, andconvincingbothIranandtheArabstatesthatanarrangementthatleftIsraelwithaformidablenucleararsenalwhileprecludingtheirownacquisitionofnuclearweaponswasneverthelessanetbenefittothem.88

Werecognizethattheneedtoworkseriouslyandsynergisticallytowardsthegoalsofanuclear-weapon-freeworldandanuclearweaponsfreeMiddleEastwouldrequirea“seachange”innuclearpolicybothinIsraelandinits“partnerinopacity,”theUnitedStates.Opacity is viewedas a great successby Israel.TheArab stateshavenotonlylearnedtolivewithit,theyseeminglycan’tlivewithoutit.89However,therecentdif-ferencesinnuclearpolicybetweentheUnitedStatesandIsraelwithregardtoIsrael’sapproachtotheNuclearSuppliersGroupanditsstrongsupportoftheCTBTsuggestthatIsraelshouldreexaminewhetheropacityisawastingassetinthatitmakesitdif-ficultifnotimpossibletoimplementarmscontrolmeasuresthatmaybenecessarytothwarttheIranianthreat.90

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Japan has always been a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and has attachedspecialimportancetoaFissileMaterial(Cutoff)TreatyasitspriorityattheConferenceonDisarmament(CD).JapanhasnotedthesignificanceofFM(C)TtotheNon-Prolif-erationTreaty(NPT)ArticleVIandhasstatedthat“quantitycappingofnuclearweap-ons”91 shouldbeachievedthroughearlycommencementandconclusionofFM(C)Tnegotiations.

Japan’smost recentWorkingPaperonanFM(C)Twas submitted to theConferenceonDisarmamentinMay2006.Thefollowinginformationonscope,verificationandentry into force is largely taken fromastatementonthis subject to theCD inMay2006,92 basedon the aforementionedWorkingPaper, and earlierofficial statementsandpapers.93

Scope of an FM(C)TJapanbelievesthatthebanontheproductionoffissilematerialshouldbelimitedto“materialfornuclearweaponsornuclearexplosivedevices”asagreedinthe1995Con-ferenceonDisarmament’sShannonMandate.Japan’spositionisthatfissilematerialforciviluseshouldnotbethesubjecttoaproductionbanunderanFM(C)T.Japan’sciviliannuclearprogram,whichpromotesreprocessingandrecyclingoftherecoveredplutonium,hastodayastockpileof43tonsofseparatedplutonium.94Asaresult,Japanopposesanyrestrictiononcivilianplutoniumprograms.Inclusionofabanonthepro-ductionofHEUforreactorfuelmaynotbeaproblemforJapan,sinceitiscommittedtoendingtheconsumptionofHEUinresearch-reactorfuelandissendingspentHEUfuelbacktotheUnitedStates.95

Japanbelievesthat,afteranFM(C)T,fissilematerialproductionfacilitiesfornuclearweapons“will inevitablybecloseddown,decommissionedorconverted tonon-nu-clear-weaponuse.”Confirmation that those facilitieswillneveragainbe“operated”asproductionfacilitiesfornuclear-weaponpurposes“wouldbenecessaryandsignifi-cant.”Thisimpliesaverifiabletreaty.

Japanalsoarguesthat“diversion”ofexistingstocksoffissilematerialfornon-nuclearweaponusetonuclear-weaponpurposeswouldbe“substantiallythesameasproduc-tion,”andtherefore“shouldbebanned.”96

Japanalsoviewstheenrichmentofpre-existingfissilematerialas“production”andthereforewouldrequireittobebannedbytheFM(C)T.Thatis,theFM(C)Tshouldpro-hibitenrichmentofplutoniumtohigherPu-239concentrationsandofHEUtohigherconcentrationsofU-235.97Japanalsonotesthatreceivingfissilematerialsfornuclear

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weaponsfromanotherstateshouldbesubjecttoabanundertheFM(C)T,asitwouldbeequivalentto“production.”

Although it considers theproductionoruseofHEU fornavalpropulsion tobeoutofthescopeofFM(C)T,JapanbelievesthatdiversionofnavalHEUstockstonuclearweaponpurposes shouldalsobebanned. Itmightbedifficult toverify suchaban,however,asHEUfornuclearsubmarinescurrentlyisnotsubjecttointernationalre-portingrequirements.

Japanthinksitisnecessaryfornuclearweaponstatesto“declareallpastproductionoffissilematerials”underanFM(C)T.98Atthesametime,Japanrecognizesthatsuchadeclarationforsomecountriesmightbe“unrealisticfromtheperspectiveofprolifera-tionofsensitiveinformation.”Japanalsonotesthat“identifyingproductiontimeandpurposeoffissilematerialswould alsobe challenging andwould require the activeinputofthestatespossessingsuchmaterials.”99

VerificationThere is no agreement so far about which organization should be responsible forFM(C)Tverification.100But,inits2003WorkingPaper,Japannotedthat“TheFMCTrequiresabodytoimplementverification.Thereisanadvantagetousingexistingex-pertiseandknowledgeoftheIAEA,anditsrobustinfrastructure,includingadministra-tionandequipmentoftheIAEA.Bestutilizationofthealreadyexistingexpertiseandinfrastructurewill save administrative costs and reduce financial burdens on Statesparties.”101

Inits2006WorkingPaper,JapanreferstotheIAEAastheverificationorganizationforthe“TrilateralInitiative”forfissilematerialsvoluntarilydeclaredexcessbytheUnitedStatesandRussia.AndexpertsclosetoJapan’sgovernmentoftenmentiontheIAEAasan“appropriate”organizationforFM(C)Tverification.Japanbelievesthatverificationshouldassurethefollowing:

Thestockoffissilematerialsfornuclearweaponsornuclear-explosivedevicesisnotincreasedaftertheFM(C)Tentersintoforce.Verificationshouldassurethatproduc-tionreactorsandotherfacilitiesformerlyusedfortheproductionoffissilematerialfornuclearweaponsornuclear-explosivedevicesarecloseddown,decommissioned,orconvertedtonon-nuclear-weaponuseandremainso;andthat,

Fissilematerials inuse fornon-nuclear-weaponpurposesandfissilematerials thathavevoluntarilybeendeclaredasexcessasaresultofnucleardisarmamentarenotdivertedtonuclear-weaponpurposes.

Itisdifficulttodetect“undeclaredactivities”suchasproductionandrecoveryofplu-tonium in an undeclared facility. In this context, the Additional Protocol could beuseful,andJapan’s2003FM(C)Tworkingpapersays“TheIAEAAdditionalProtocol(INFCIRC/540)hasalreadyintroducedverificationarrangements(expandeddeclara-tionandcomplementaryaccess)forthedetectionofundeclaredactivities,andsuchasetofmeasuresshouldbeconsideredasoneofthepillarsofverification.”102

ThereisnoofficialstatementonhowtheverificationcostsofanFM(C)Tshouldbefinanced. But it is Japan’s position that the FM(C)T is a nuclear disarmament trea-tymainlytargetedatnuclear-armedcountries.ThecostofverificationofanFM(C)Tshould therefore be paid from a different account from that used to pay for IAEA

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safeguardsofciviliannuclearprogramsinnon-weaponstates.Itisnotclearhowmuchoftheverificationcost Japaniswillingtoshare,but itbelievesthatthecostshouldprimarilybebornebythenuclearweaponstates.

Entry into forceThereisnoclearstatementinJapan’s2006WorkingPaperaboutspecificcountriesthatwouldhavetoratifytobringtheFM(C)Tintoforce.Butthe2003WorkingPapersaid“ratificationsbytherecognizedfivenuclearweaponStatesandthoseStatesnon-partytotheNPTareessentialfortheoperationoftheFMCT.”103

Withregardtothenon-NPTstates,Japan’spositionhasbeenthattheyshouldjointheNPTasnon-nuclearweaponstates.Specifically,JapanwouldlikeIsraeltojointheNPTasanon-weaponstate.ForIndiaandPakistan,thesituationmightbedifferent,astheyofficially claim that theyhavenuclearweapons. Japanhas introducedofficial sanc-tionstargetedonthosestates.IftheyjoinFM(C)T,itisessentialthatbothcountriesalsoratify theAdditionalProtocol,whichwouldmake iteasier for the IAEAtofindundeclaredfacilities.

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PakistanhasbeenanactiveparticipantinthedebatesontheproposedFissileMate-rial(Cutoff)Treatyformanyyears.Inordertodealwithwhatitseesasasignificantasymmetrybetween itsfissilematerial stocksand thoseheldby India,PakistanhasinsistedthatanyFM(C)Tshoulddomorethansimplybanfurtherproductionoffissilematerialsforweapons.Itseeksatreatythatwillcoverexistingstocks,requireverifieddeclarationsandmonitoringofsuchstocks,andascheduleforthetransferofexistingmilitarystockpilestocivilianusewithaviewtoequalizingunsafeguardedstocks“atthelowestlevelpossible.”

Pakistan and the FM(C)T PakistanhashistoricallyfavoredapossibleFissileMaterial(Cutoff)Treaty.ItsupportedtheDecember1993UNGeneralAssemblyResolutioncallingforanegotiationsona“non-discriminatorymultilateralandinternationallyandeffectivelyverifiabletreatybanningtheproductionoffissilematerialfornuclearweaponsorothernuclearexplo-sivedevices.”104HoweveritplayedanimportantroleindelayingthestartoftalksattheUnitedNationsConferenceonDisarmamentbyinsistingondebatingthescopeofthetreatywithaviewtohavingitincludeconstraintsonexistingstockpilesoffissilema-terialsanddeclaringasimplecutofftreatytobea“wasteoftime.”105TheMarch1995ShannonmandatelayingoutthebasisfortalksattheCDonanFM(C)Tfinessedtheissuebynotingthatthemandatedidnotprecludeanystatefromraisingtheproblemofexisting stockpilesaspartof thenegotiations.This,however,wasnotenough tosatisfyPakistan.AfterthenucleartestsbyIndiaandPakistaninMay1998,Pakistan’sAmbassadorMu-nirAkramsoughttoexplainattheCDthatPakistanwasonlyseekingnuclearbalanceinSouthAsia.Hearguedthat“asregardstheFMCT,forPakistanthisissueisnowde-pendentonIndia’snuclearstatus,itsdegreeofweaponizationandthe sizeandquality ofitsfissilematerialstockpiles.PakistancannotallowIndiatoonceagaindestabilizethebalanceofdeterrenceinfuturethroughasymmetry in the level of stockpiles.”106[Em-phasisadded]

Respondingtothetests,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilunanimouslycalledupon“IndiaandPakistan immediately to stoptheirnuclearweapondevelopmentprogrammes,torefrainfromweaponizationorfromthedeploymentofnuclearweapons,toceasedevelopmentofballisticmissilescapableofdeliveringnuclearweaponsandany further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,toconfirmtheirpoliciesnottoexportequipment,materialsortechnologythatcouldcontributetoweaponsofmassdestruc-tionormissilescapableofdeliveringthemandtoundertakeappropriatecommitmentsinthatregard.”107[Emphasisadded]

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PakistanandIndiaignoredtheSecurityCouncilresolution.UnderpressurefromtheUnitedStates,Pakistanacquiescedtothefissilematerialtalks.108Pakistanmadeclear,however,thatitwouldnegotiatefromthesamepositionthatithadtakenearlierand“raiseitsconcernsaboutandseekasolutiontotheproblemofunequalstockpiles.”109

TheambassadortotheCDexplainedthat“Tomaintaindeterrence,Pakistanneedstoensurethatitisnotinapositionofstrategicvulnerabilityincertainareas—suchasfissilematerialsandballisticmissiles.”110

TheconnectionbetweenstockpilesandstabilitywasmadeexplicitbyPakistan’srepre-sentative,whoarguedthat“WebelievethatawidedisparityinfissilematerialstockpilesofIndiaandPakistancoulderodethestabilityofnucleardeterrence.”111Inparticular,heexplainedtwoweekslater,Pakistanassumed“Indiawilltransformitslargefissilematerial stocks into nuclear weapons” and thus needed to “take into account bothIndia’snuclearweaponsandfissilematerialstockpiles”andthat“Wecannotthereforeagreetofreezeinequality.”112ThispositionpersiststodayandisthecoreofPakistan’spositionontheFM(C)T.ThismakesitverylikelythatPakistanwouldneithersignnorratifyanFM(C)TunlessIndiadoessoatthesametime.

Current Stocks and ProductionAsof2007,Pakistanmayhaveaccumulatedastockofabout1.4tonsofhighlyenricheduraniumforitsnuclearweapons(enoughforperhaps50–60weaponsassuming25kgperwarhead).Itmaybeproducingperhaps0.1tonsofHEUperyear(i.e.about4weap-onsworthayear).113Pakistanalsohasabout90kgofweaponplutonium(enoughfor15–20warheads)fromitsreactoratKhushab,whichyieldsabout10kg(about2weap-onsworth)peryear.114ThissuggeststhatPakistanmayhavefissilematerialsufficientforperhaps65–80weaponsandmaybeincreasingitsstockbytheequivalentofabout6weaponsworthperyear.

Pakistanisexpandingitsfissilematerialproductioncapacity.TherearetwoadditionalproductionreactorsunderconstructionatKhushab.115Eachofthesenewreactorscouldproduceabout10kgofplutoniumayear,iftheyarethesamesizeastheexistingreac-toratthesite.Imageryfromlate2006showsthatPakistanhasalsobeenworkingonanewreprocessingplantatChashma,presumablytoreprocessthespentfuelfromthenewproductionreactors.116

Pakistanalsohasabout1.2tonsofsafeguardedreactor-gradeplutoniuminthespentfuelfromitsnuclearpowerreactors.Thisisnotreprocessed.

FM(C)T, Stocks and AsymmetryPakistan refers to a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) rather than a Fissile Material Cut-offTreatyasawaytoemphasizetheimportanceofstocks.Pakistanarguesthat“theproposedFMTshouldalsodealwiththeissueofpast production of fissile material and,throughtheirprogressive and balanced reduction,promotethegoalofnucleardisarma-ment.Thetreatymustthereforeaddressthequestionofproduction—past, present and future—initsentiretyatbothregionalandgloballevels.”117Ithasarguedthat“existingstockpiles,unlessaccountedforandmonitored,couldbeusedforthedevelopmentofnewandmostsophisticatednuclearweapons.”118

ItwouldseemthatPakistanwantsanFM(C)Tinwhichfissile-materialstockswouldbedeclaredandthesedeclarationswouldbeproperlyverified.Itisnotclearhowthiscouldbedonewithoutverificationoffissilematerialsinweapons,whichwouldseemtoundercutPakistan’straditionalrelianceonkeepingsecretthesizeofitsfissilestocksanditsarsenal.PakistanmayintendtoconsidertheseissuesastheyariseinpossibleCDdiscussions.


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IfaccountingforandverifyingstocksistobediscussedinFM(C)Ttalks,akeyques-tionwillbewhatstocksaretobeincluded.Asnotedearlier,Pakistanmayhavesuf-ficientfissilematerialsforupto80weaponsorso.ItisestimatedthatIndiamayhavesufficientweaponsplutoniumforabout130weapons.119Thiswouldnotseemtobea“widedisparity”instocks.However,PakistanisalsoconcernedaboutIndia’sstockofunsafeguardedpower-reactorplutonium.120TherearereportsthatatleastoneIndiantestin1998usedplutoniumthatwaslessthanweapongrade.121

Indiamayhaveaccumulatedatotalofalmost13tonsofplutoniuminunsafeguardedspentpower-reactorfueldischargedasofmid-2007.Consideringonlyspentfuelthathashadtimetocoolforthreeyearsanda50%capacityfactoratIndia’sreprocessingplants, Indiamayhaveaccumulatedperhaps7.5tonsofseparatedreactor-gradeplu-tonium.Assumingthat8kgofsuchplutoniummaybesufficientforaweapon,thiswouldbeenoughforover900weapons.Thisstockpileislikelytogrowrapidly.122

IfPakistan’sconcernsaboutanasymmetryinfissilematerialstocksstemfromIndia’slargeandgrowingunsafeguardedpowerreactorplutoniumthenPakistanislikelytoseektohaveitdeclaredandverified.

A Production Moratorium and the U.S.-India Nuclear DealOn26October1998,Pakistan’s ForeignMinister, SartajAziz,wasquoted to the ef-fectthat“NuclearscientistshaveadvisedthegovernmentthattherewasnoharminsigningtheCTBTandFMCTatthisstageaswehadenoughenrichednuclearmaterialtomaintainthepowerequilibriumintheregion.”123Itwasmadeclear,however,thattherewasnopossibilityofaunilateralorbilateralmoratorium.TheForeignMinisterlaterexplained“They[theUnitedStates],ofcoursewantustoimposesomekindofamultilateralorunilateralmoratoriumontheproductionoffissilematerial.ButwefeelthatwewillonlyabidebytheTreatyonceit isconcludedbecauseyoucan’tdoanythingunlessthereisaframework.ThereisasymmetrywithIndia…soIthinkourposition isquite reasonable.”124Thiswas reformulatedto imply thatPakistanwouldnotagreetohaltitsfissilematerialproduction,“wecannotdothatunlesstheFMCTcomesintoforce.”125

ThereisnowgrowingconcernthatIndia’scapacityforproducingweaponsgradeplu-toniummayincreasesignificantlyincomingyears,inpartbecauseofthe2005U.S.-Indiadeal.126ItisestimatedthatIndiacouldproduceabout40–50weaponequivalentsworthayearofweapongradeplutoniuminitsunsafeguarded‘military’facilities—upfromperhapssevenweaponsequivalentsayeartoday.Themajorcontributorstotheincreasewouldbefromweapon-gradeplutoniumproducedintheblanketofthepro-totypefastbreederreactorthatisexpectedtobecompletedin2010andthediversionoffreedupdomesticuraniumtoproduceweapon-gradeplutoniuminsomeofIndia’sunsafeguardedheavy-waterpowerreactors.

Responding to the U.S.-India deal, Pakistan’s National Command Authority, whichhasresponsibilityforitsnuclearweaponsprogram,declaredinAugust2007that“theUS-IndiaNuclearAgreementwouldhaveimplicationsonstrategicstabilityasitwouldenableIndiatoproducesignificantquantitiesoffissilematerialandnuclearweaponsfromun-safeguardednuclearreactors…[and]expressedfirmresolvetomeetthere-quirementsof future credibleminimumdeterrence.”127Thiswould seem to implyaPakistanidecision to increase itsownfissilematerialproductioncapacity.Citing itsconcernsabouttheU.S.-Indiadeal,Pakistanhasagainemergedasperhapsthekeyob-stacletothestartoftalkstowardsaFissileMaterialCutoffTreatyattheUnitedNationsConferenceonDisarmament.128


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Reductions PakistanhasmadeclearthatitwillresistanFM(C)Tthatonlyservestofreezestocksatexistinglevels.Ithasproposedthat“Acut-offinthemanufacturingoffissilemate-rialmustbeaccompaniedbyamandatory programme for the elimination of asymmetriesinthepossessionoffissilematerialstockpilesbyvariousstates.Suchtransferoffissilematerialtosafeguardsshouldbemadefirstbystateswithhugestockpiles,bothintheglobalandregionalcontext.”129

Ratherthanleavesuchreductionsinthelargeststockpilestoarmscontrolagreementsarrivedamongnuclearweaponstates,Pakistanhasrecentlyarguedthat“Afissilemate-rialtreatymustprovideaschedule for a progressive transfer of existing stockpiles to civilian use and placing these stockpiles under safeguards so that the unsafeguarded stocks are equal-ized at the lowest level possible.”130

Pakistanhasnotofferedanyindicationofwhatitconsiderstobe“thelowestpossiblelevel”offissilematerialstocks,howthisistobedecided,orwhatitbelievescouldbeascheduleforreductions.ItmaybethatPakistanassumesthatitwouldnothavetoreduceitsstocks,sinceithasthesmallestfissilematerialstocksofanyoftheweaponstates(apartfromNorthKorea,which,inanycase,hasalreadycommittedtogivingupitsnuclearweaponsandplutoniumstocksaspartofapeaceprocesswithSouthKoreaandtheUnitedStates).

FM(C)T and VerificationPakistanhasconsistentlyarguedforaverifiabletreaty.ItarguedinJune2007attheCDthat“weinsistontheverificationofcurrentstocks.”131Ithasindicatedinthemostgeneraltermsthatthetreatyshouldnotbetoointrusiveordiscriminatory,withallsignatoriessubjecttothesamestandardsofverification.

IfandwhenFM(C)Tcomesintobeing,Pakistanhasindicatedthatitwilluseitsexist-ingmilitaryenrichmentandreprocessingfacilitiesforcivilianpurposes.Pakistanhasnotrevealedallthefacilitiesinitsnuclearweaponscomplex.Undera1988agreement,however,PakistanandIndiaexchangeannuallyalistofnuclearfacilitiesthatarenottobeattacked.132Thelistisnotmadepublic,butithasbeenreportedthatbothstatesleftatleastonefacilityofftheirlists.133

IndeterminingitsapproachtowardsverificationunderanFM(C)T,Pakistanmaynotyethaveconsideredwhether,underwhatcircumstances,andwithwhatconstraintsitwouldbewillingtoallowinspectorsintoitsenrichmentandothernuclearfacilities.

Pakistan isasignatoryof theChemicalWeaponsConvention,whichdoesallowin-spectionsatfacilitiessuspectedofproducingorstoringchemicalweapons.ButPaki-stanmaynothaveconsidereddevelopingmanagedaccessprotocolsfor,say,theKahutauranium-enrichmentplant.InthestatementaccompanyingitsCWCratification,Paki-stanannouncedit“willexerciseitsrights…toindicateitsnon-acceptanceofinspec-torsandinspectionassistantsasitdeemsappropriate…[and]PakistanwillatalltimesretainitssovereignrighttotakeallnecessarymeasuretoprotectitsnationalsecurityinterestsagainstdisclosureofconfidentialandsensitiveinformationunrelatedtotheCWCorintrusionintosensitivefacilitiesunrelatedtotheconventionoriftheConven-tionisusedtojustifydegradingPakistan’sdefensecapabilitiesunrelatedtotheCWC.Pakistanregardstheseasmattersof‘supremenationalinterests’asrecognizedunderinternationallawandprovidedforunderArticleXVIoftheCWC.”134Inotherwords,PakistanwouldexerciseitsrighttowithdrawfromtheCWCifitfeltitsnationalsecu-ritywasjeopardizedbyaninspectionitfelttobeinappropriate.PakistanmayextendthisperspectivetoverificationunderanFM(C)T.


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ProspectsInJune2008,PakistanagainlaidoutitspositiononanFM(C)TattheCD.Itcontinuestoinsistonnegotiationofanon-discriminatoryandverifiabletreatywith“spaceforaddressingthequestionoftheexistingandfuturestocks,asitwasdoneintheShan-nonreport.”135Itisconcernedthat,withouttheseconditionsbeingspelledoutaspartofthenegotiations,“Thediceisloadedfromthestart.”

Ifthereweretobeadecisionbyothercountries,especiallyalltheothernuclearweap-onstates,toproceedonFM(C)TtalksattheCD,itisnotclearthatPakistanwouldbewillingorabletoblockprogressbyitself.Instead,Pakistancouldchoosetoparticipateinthetalksandcontinuetoraiseitsconcerns,withsupportfromothercountrieswhoalsowantbothverificationand stocks tobe includedaspartof thepossible treaty.ThesecountriesincludeNewZealand,136Iran137andBrazil.138IfthefinaltreatydoesnotmeetPakistan’sconcerns,ithastheoptiontosimplynotbecomeaparty.

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Russiasupportsaverifiablebanontheproductionoffissilematerialsforweaponpur-poses and other explosive devices. In its view the conclusion of such treaty wouldpreventboththeNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatyanddefactonuclearweaponstatesfromincreasingthestocksofmaterialstheyhaveavailableforweaponspurposesandwouldbea logical step in strengthening thenuclearnonproliferationanddisarma-mentregime.139

Russia’sofficialpositiononanFM(C)Twasformulatedaround2000andapparentlyhasnotchangedsignificantlysincethen.Russia’sproposedapproachtotheFM(C)TisthatallPartiestothetreatyshouldacceptthefollowingobligations:

Nottoproduceweapon-gradeuraniumandplutoniumforuseinnuclearweapons;

Nottoassistorencourageotherstatesintheproductionofthesematerials

Nottotransferfissilematerialsfromciviltonuclearweaponuse;140

Toacceptinternationalmonitoringofnuclearmaterialsandfacilitiesforverificationofcompliancewithobligationsunderthetreaty.141

Russia’sviewsonthescopeofthetreaty,associatedverificationmeasuresandparticipa-tionaregivenbelow.

Fissile Material Production in RussiaTheproductionoffissilematerialsforweaponsinRussiaendedin1994andRussiahasconfirmed its continuing commitment to a moratorium on production.142 Weapon-gradeuraniumhasnotbeenproducedsince1989.143TenoutofRussia’sthirteenpluto-niumproductionreactorswereshutdownby1992.Thethreeremainingreactorsoper-atedexclusivelytogenerateheatandelectricityfornearbycities,buttheyproducedas aby-product some1.2 tonsofweapons-gradeplutoniumperyear. Since the fueldischargedfromthesereactorsisnotdesignedforextendedstorage,ithasbeenrepro-cessed,buttheseparatedplutoniumwasstored.Newlyseparatedplutoniumhasnotbeenusedfornuclearweaponssince1994.144ThetwoplutoniumproductionreactorsatSeverskwereshutdowninthesummerof2008.Completionofworkoncoal-firedplantstoreplacetheheatandelectricpowerfromthethirdreactoratZheleznogorskisexpectedbytheendof2010.Afterthat,Russiawillhavefullyendeditsproductionofweapon-gradeplutonium.

RussiahasneverreleasedinformationonhowmuchHEUandweapon-gradeplutoniumitproduced.Accordingtonon-governmentalestimates,itcurrentlyhas945±300tons

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ofHEUand145±20tonsofweapon-gradeplutonium.145Asacontributiontomakingitsnuclearweaponreductionsirreversible,Russiadeclared500tonsofweapon-gradeHEUand34tonsofweapons-gradeplutoniumexcessforweaponspurposes.UndertheRussian-U.S.HEUPurchaseagreement,the500tonsofexcessweaponsHEUisbeingblendeddownto4–5%U-235andshippedtotheUnitedStatesformakingpower-reac-torfuel.ThiscontractisaccompaniedbyatransparencyprotocoltoassuretheUnitedStatesthatitisindeedweapon-gradeuraniumthatisbeingblendeddown.AsofMarch2008,325tonshadbeenblendeddown.146Russia’sexcessweapon-gradeplutoniumistobemixedwithuraniumandmostlyusedtofuelthefast-neutronBN-800powerreac-tor,whichisunderconstruction.

Definition and Declaration of Fissile MaterialsTheFM(C)Ttreatywouldbanfutureproductionofnuclearmaterialsfornuclearweap-onsandthereforeshouldfocusonmaterialsthatareuseddirectlytoproduceweapons.AccordingtoRussianGovernmentalexperts,theseare:

Uraniumenrichedto90%orgreaterinU-235;and

Plutoniumcontainingmorethan95%Pu-239.

TheFM(C)Tshouldnotprohibittheproductionoffissilematerialforothermilitaryand civil non-explosive purposes, such as naval reactors or medical isotopes. Also,technologicaloperationsrelatedwiththe“cleaningup”plutoniumrecoveredfromnu-clearweaponsbeforereuseshouldnotbeconsideredas“new”productionofweaponsfissilematerials.

Thetreatyalsoshouldnotbringalreadyproducedfissilematerialsunderinternationalsafeguards.Russiaconsiderstheinclusionofexistingstocksofweaponsmaterials inthetreatyas immediatenucleardisarmament,whichwouldbeunrealistic. Itwouldrequireintrusiveinternationalinspectionsofthemostsensitivenuclearfacilitiesand“lead to establishing cumbersome verification mechanisms, and, accordingly, unac-ceptablyhighcostfortheirmaintenance.”147

Russiaalsoopposesdeclarationsofpre-existingstocksofnuclearmaterialsinweaponsordesignatedforweapons.Itbelievesthatthiswouldbecounter-productive.Itbelievessuchdeclarationscouldnotbeverifiedandthereforewouldnotenhanceconfidence.Anyattempttoverifysuchdeclarationsindirectlythroughreconstructionofpastpro-duction and disposition would require an enormous effort to examine records andphysicalevidencefromseveraldecadesoflarge-scaleactivities.

Inthemid-1990s,Russiaexpresseditsreadinesstoconsiderexchangesamongnuclearweaponstatesofinformationonthequantitiesandstoragelocationsoffissilematerialsreleasedintheprocessofdismantlementofexcessnuclearweapons.ItwasalsowillingtoconsiderplacementofthesematerialsunderIAEAmonitoring.148ThisideahasnotreappearedinRussia’snuclear-armsreductionproposalssince2000,however.

VerificationRussiabelievesthatIAEAsafeguardsshouldbethemaininstrumentforverificationofcompliancewithobligationsunderanFM(C)T.TheIAEAhasthenecessarytechnicalexpertiseandexperiencetoundertakeinspectionsatdeclaredfacilitiesandtoinvesti-gatethepossibilityofundeclaredfissile-materialproduction.

DiscussionontheverificationoftheFM(C)Thascenteredaroundtwoalternativeap-proaches:a“comprehensive”approachanda“focused”approach.Russiaopposesthe

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“comprehensive” approach, which would place all civilian nuclear activities underinternational safeguards. Applying safeguards to nuclear installations that were de-signedwithouttechnicalfeaturestofacilitateverificationandwhicharethereforenot“verification friendly” would be technically difficult and require great financial ex-penditures.Moreover,themilitaryandciviliannuclearactivitiesinRussiaarecloselyinterconnected.RosAtom,whichisresponsibleformostofRussia’snuclearenergyandweapons-productioncomplex,wouldliketominimizeverificationcostsandintrusive-nesstothemaximumextentpossible.

For these reasons,Russiaconsidersa“focused”approach,coveringonlyenrichmentandreprocessingfacilitiescapableofproducingfissilematerialsandthefissilemateri-alsproducedbythesefacilitiesafteranFM(C)Tcomesintoforce,moreacceptablefromapragmaticpointofview.149Initsview,thisapproachseemsmorelikelytobebothnegotiableandcosteffective.

Russia’spositionisthatinternationalverificationshouldnotcoveractivitiesbynuclearweaponstatesassociatedwiththemaintenanceoftheirnuclear-weaponarsenals.Thismeans that facilities at which weapons components containing fissile materials arefabricated,maintained,assembledorstored,orwhereweaponsplutoniumiscleanedshouldnottobesubjecttoverification.AlthoughRussiaagreedtotheChemicalWeap-onsConvention,withitsprovisionforchallengeinspectionsandmanagedaccessin1997,itwoulddefinitelyobjecttothepossibilityofchallengeinspectionsatitsnuclear-weaponsfacilitiestoday.

ParticipationRussiabelievesthatanFM(C)Tshouldincludenotonlyallnuclearweaponstates,butalsocountriesthatarepotentiallycapableofproducingnuclear-explosivedevicesandthatpossessuraniumenrichmentandspentfuelreprocessingfacilities.Russiabelievesthatnon-participationinanFM(C)Tbyanyofthede factonuclearweaponstates(In-dia,Israel,NorthKoreaandPakistan)wouldcompletelynegateitsvalue.Finally,itshouldbenotedthatanFM(C)TisnotcurrentlyasubjectofdiscussionbyRussia’s nuclear-arms-control community.This canbe explainedpartlyby the longperiodofnoprogressindiscussionsonpossibleFM(C)TnegotiationsattheConferenceonDisarmament(CD).Asaresult,manyexpertsconsidertheFM(C)Ta“dead”topic.ThereareneithergovernmentalorganizationsnorevenindividualexpertsinRussia’sgovernmentwhoareactivelyinterestedinpromotingnegotiationsontheFM(C)TattheCD.ThepositionsregardinganFM(C)Tdescribedherethereforeshouldbeconsid-ered“starting”positions.IfthecurrentdeadlockattheCDisresolvedandnegotiationsbegin,someelementsoftheRussianapproachmightbereconsidered,inparticularitsapproachtothedefinitionoffissilematerialsundertheFM(C)T.

Anatoli S. Diakov


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SouthAfrica’spositionontheFissileMaterialTreatyderivesfromitsuniquepracticalexperienceinbuildingandthendestroyinganuclear-weaponprogram,andthesub-sequentinvestigationundertakenbytheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)toverifythecompletenessofSouthAfrica’sdeclarationofitsstocksoffissilematerial.ItsprincipledpositiononnucleardisarmamentanditsleadingroleinboththeNon-AlignedMovement(NAM)andtheNewAgendaCoalitionenabledSouthAfricatogaintractionon itspositionthataFissileMaterialTreatyshouldhavebothnuclearnon-proliferationandnuclear-disarmamentobjectives.Reflecting thisview,SouthAfricahasconsistentlyrefrainedfromusingthemorecommon,butlimitedinscopenameforthefuturetreaty,“FissileMaterialCut-offTreaty”preferringinsteadtorefertoaFissileMaterialTreaty(FMT).

Duringthe1994/95consultationsthat ledto the“Shannonmandate,”SouthAfricawasoneofafewcountriesthatarguedthatthefuturetreatyshouldnotonlycappro-ductionoffissilematerialfornuclearexplosivepurposes,butshouldalsocoverexist-ingstockpiles.OtherNAMcountriesthatheldthisviewincludedAlgeria,Egypt,Iran,MexicoandPakistan.While,the1995ShannonReportstatedthattheConferenceonDisarmament(CD)should“negotiateanon-discriminatory,multilateralandinterna-tionallyandeffectivelyverifiabletreatybanningtheproductionoffissilematerialfornuclearweaponsorothernuclearexplosivedevices,”itemphasizedthatthisdidnotprecludeanydelegationfromraisingthe issuesofscopeandverificationwithintheCommittee.Thisleftthenegotiatingmandateopen-endedwhichwasconsiderednec-essarytogetconsensusonthemandateintimeforthe1995NPTReviewandExtensionConference.

At the2000ReviewConference,SouthAfricaargued that, for the treaty tobecon-sideredasaneffectivedisarmamentmeasure (as itwas listed in the1995PrinciplesandObjectivesforNuclearNonproliferationandNuclearDisarmament),itshouldhavebothnuclearnonproliferationandnucleardisarmamentobjectives.InSouthAfrica’sviewa“cut-off”treatythatdidnotaddressstockpileswouldfreezethestatusquoofnu-clear-capablecountriesbutnotservetoreducenuclearweaponsovertime.Itissignifi-cantthat,asaresultofSouthAfrica’sefforts,the2000NPTReviewConference,whileitreiteratedtheoriginalShannonmandateamongtheso-called13stepstowardnucleardisarmamentinthefinaldeclarationadoptedbythatconference,alsostatedclearlythatboth“nucleardisarmamentandnuclearnon-proliferationobjectives”shouldbetakenintoconsiderationduringthenegotiationsofthetreaty.

SouthAfricawasoneofthefirstdelegationsintheCDtoputforwardconcretepropos-alsonanFMTwhenitsubmittedaworkingpaperduringthe2002session.TheSouth

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AfricanworkingpaperdealtwithsomeofthemostvexingissuesthatnegotiatorsofanFMTwillface.SouthAfricaargued,andcontinuestoargue,themeritsofaverifiabletreatythatwouldcoverbothpastandfutureproductionofweaponsusablefissilemate-rial.SouthAfricaalsoemphasizedthat,whiledeclarationsofstocksofweaponsmateri-alsbyallnuclear-capablestateswouldnotbefeasible,declarationsofexcessmaterialsshouldbemadeirreversiblebythetreaty.

ThemostrecentstatementsbySouthAfricandelegationstotheCD,theGeneralAs-semblyFirstCommitteeandinthecontextoftheNPTreviewprocessshowthatSouthAfrica’spositionhasnotchanged.InfacttheintroductionbytheUnitedStatesofadraft treaty thatexcludednotonlyadisarmamentdimension,butalsoverification,furtherfueledSouthAfricanargumentsthatthetreatyshouldbeaverifiablenonpro-liferationanddisarmamentmechanism.

A FissBan sans “C” SouthAfricabelieves thatanFMTshouldprohibitproductionoffissilematerial fornuclear-weaponornuclear-explosivepurposesbyallparties,includingtheNPTnuclearweaponstatesandthenon-NPTstates.ThenotionthateffectiveverificationofanFMTcannotbeachievedsuggeststhattheNPTtooisnotverifiable.ThesuccessandfuturecredibilityofanFMTwouldrequireverifiedassurancesthatfissilematerialisnolongerbeingproducedforweaponspurposes.

The nonproliferation component should prevent or regulate further production ofweapon-gradematerialsforlegitimate(non-proscribed)usessuchasfuelforresearchreactors,navalreactors,etc.AnFMTcouldalsoprohibitthetransferofpreviously-pro-ducedfissilematerialbetweenweaponstatesforweaponpurposes.

Thedisarmamentelementshouldcaptureinanirreversiblewayweaponsmaterialde-claredasexcess.Tothisend,anFMTshouldprohibittheuseinweaponsoffissilema-terialsproducedbeforetheTreatycomesintoforceforacountryiftheyare:inusefornon-militarypurposes;inaweapon-productioncomplexbutdeclaredtobeexcesstomilitaryneeds;orinareserveforfutureuseasfuelinmilitary(e.g.naval-propulsion)reactors.

Thetreatyshouldalsoaddressthesecurityofstockpiledfissilematerial.Internationalmonitoringofcivilianandexcessweaponsfissilematerialswouldaidinsecuringthemagainst theft.The treaty shouldencourage states toapplymeasuresofphysicalpro-tectionequivalenttothoseprovidedforintheConventiononPhysicalProtectionofNuclearMaterialandinIAEArecommendationsandguidelines.

An old policy with a twist.GiventhecloserelationshipbetweenanFMTandcurrentinternationaleffortstominimize,ifnoteliminate,theuseofhighlyenricheduranium(HEU)intheciviliansector,itisimportanttoconsiderSouthAfrica’spositioninthisregard. After dismantling its nuclear weapons and associated programs in the early1990s,over800kilogramsofunirradiatedHEU(averagingroughly80%uranium235)wasplacedunderstrictAdditionalProtocoltypeIAEAsafeguards.150Ofthisamount,SouthAfricatodaymaintainsanestimated400–450kgofunirradiatedHEUstocksinahighlysecuredvaultatitsPelindabaresearchfacilitysiteunder24-hourIAEAsurveil-lance.Inaddition,IAEAteamsinspectSouthAfricannuclearfacilities,includingtheHEUonaregularbasistoverifythatthestockpileissecureandnotdivertedforanyweaponrelatedpurposes.Pretoriaconsidersthisstockpileasastrategicnationalassetbasedontwomainconsiderations.


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Commercial value:NotonlydidtheapartheidgovernmentinvestconsiderableresourcesinproducingtheHEUoverthelifeofthenuclearweaponsprogram,butastheworld’sthirdlargestsupplier151ofindustrialandmedicalisotopes,suchasmolybdenum-99152,theHEUrepresentsamajorcommercialasset(theHEUisusedasa“target”forneutronbombardmenttoproducemolybdenum-99).In2002/2003theNuclearEnergyCorpo-rationofSouthAfrica(NECSA)sold131millionrand(approximatelyUS$21million)worthofisotopesandexported86percentofthesesalesto50differentcountries.153

Political leverage: Avery importantconsiderationfromaSouthAfricanstandpoint isthatthestockpileprovidespoliticalleverageinsupportofSouthAfrica’slongstandingnucleardisarmamentobjectives.WhileSouthAfricandelegationsatseveral interna-tionalnonproliferationconference indicatedthatPretoriawould inprinciplenotbeopposed tominimizing theuseofHEU in the civilian sector, they linked it to theeliminationofexcessmilitarystockpilesoftheNWS.

Assuch,Pretoria’sHEUstockpilehasaclearstrategicvalueifconsideredagainstthebackdropof SouthAfrica’s longstandingposition thatfissilematerial removed fromwarheadsanddeclaredasexcessmilitarymaterialstocksshouldbecoveredbyafutureFMT.Infact,theHEUstocksheldatthePelindabasitecouldbecategorizedasmaterialremovedfromwarheads.SouthAfricathereforeconsidersthestockpileasapoliticalstrategicassetinitsgoalofachievinganFMTthatcoversbothnonproliferationaswellasdisarmamentobjectives.InthisregardtherelevanceofSouthAfrica’sHEUstockstoafutureFMTwasdelineatedatthe2006OsloInternationalSymposiumonHEU.AmbassadorAbdulSamadMinty154clearlylinkedtheneedtominimizeoreliminatecivilianHEUtofissilematerialdeclaredasexcessinmilitarystockpiles:

“WecannotexclusivelyfocusonHEUwithoutsimilarattentionbeinggiventoothermaterialsusedintheproductionofnuclearweapons, including plutonium, tritium and other transuranicelementsthathaveaproliferationpotential”and“forany(FMT)tobeconsideredasadisarmamentmeasure,itwouldneedtoad-dress,attheveryleast,theissueofexcessstocks—thatis,weap-onsmaterialdeclaredasexcess,aspartofanongoingandirre-versibleprocessoftheverifiedeliminationofallfissilematerialfornuclearweaponsorothernuclearexplosivedevices.”

Elements of an FMT Stocks. South Africa holds the view that, for an FMT to be truly credible, it has toincludestockpiles.Ifnot,stockpilesofcivilianweaponsusablefissilematerialandma-terialoriginatingfromdismantledweaponscouldpotentiallybefabricatedintonewweapons.Evenifafuturetreatycompletelyprohibitstheproductionofweaponsusablematerial,sufficientmaterialwouldexistinthesecategoriestoincrease—notdecrease—existingnumbersinthearsenalsofthosestateswithnuclearweapons.ThiswouldmakeacompletemockeryoftheFMTasoneofthekeydisarmamentmeasuresinclud-edinboththe1995PrinciplesandObjectivesforNuclearNonproliferationandNuclearDisarmamentandthe2000ReviewConferencefinaldocument.

Coveringtheseexistingstockswould:

Contributetonucleardisarmament,particularlyintermsoftransparency,account-ability,andirreversibility;

Strengthennon-proliferationbypreventingthetransferofexistingmaterialsfromtheNWSordefactonuclearweaponsoutsideofsafeguardstoanynon-weaponstate;

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Tendtoequalizethesafeguardsburdenbetweenweaponandnon-weaponstates;

CloseaverificationloopholewherebyastatecoulddeclaremilitaryfissilematerialproducedaftertheTreaty’sentryintoforceaspre-Treatystocks;and

Helppreventthesematerialsfromfallingintothehandsofterrorists.

Thesestocksshouldbesubjecttotheverificationmachineryprovidedforinthetreaty.Newly-producedmaterialandweaponmaterialdeclaredasexcessinthefuturewouldcontinuouslybeaddedtothestartinginventoryinanirreversibleway.

While someexcessmaterial could still be in sensitive geometrical or compositionalforms,therebyrulingoutdirectaccessbytheIAEA,theapproachesdevelopedintheIAEA-Russia-U.S.TrilateralInitiativealreadyprovideforverificationofsuchmaterialthroughan“informationbarrier.”

Onceoriginalweaponsmaterial,whichhadbeendeclaredexcess,hasbeenreworkedintoaninsensitiveform,itcanbeintroducedintothestandardIAEA-typeverificationsystem.TheHEUwouldprobablybedownblendedtoLEUandtheplutoniumusedfortheproductionofMOX(mixedoxide)fuelormixedwithhigh-levelradioactivewastefordirectdisposal.Therestof thematerialwillbestoredundernormalverificationconditions.

WhileSouthAfricastronglybelievesthatthefuturetreatyshouldnotonlycoverfu-tureproduction,butalsocivilianandexcessweaponmaterials,ithasstatedonseveraloccasionsthatthelackofagreementtoexpandthescopeofthetreatyinthismannershouldnotdelaynegotiations.SouthAfricaisoftheviewthatthisissueshouldbead-dressedduringthenegotiationsinthesamemannerasotheraspectsofthetreaty.

Verification.ThesuccessandfuturecredibilityofanFMTwouldrequireverifiedas-surancesthatfissilematerialisnolongerbeingproducedforweaponspurposes.ThenotionthateffectiveverificationofanFMTcannotbeachievedsuggeststhattheNPTtooisnotverifiable.SouthAfricaisalsooftheviewthatsubjectingthenuclearweaponstatesandthethreede-factonuclearweaponpossessorstointernationalmonitoringofatleasttheirciviliannuclearactivitieswouldredressalong-standingconcernofthenuclear industry in thenon-weaponstates that it iscompetitivelydisadvantagedbyhavingtoacceptIAEAmonitoring.

SouthAfricabelievesthatanFMTverificationsystemshouldbebasedonasetofle-gallybindingagreementsbetweeneachStatepartyandtheTreaty’sdesignatedverifica-tionentity.TheseverificationagreementsshouldbeidenticalforallStateparties,buthavesomeprovisionssuspendedtoreflectthefactthatthescopeofverificationunderthetreatyinweaponstateswouldbelimitedtofissilematerialsubjecttothetreaty.Afteritsentryintoforce,theverificationsystemshouldrequiredeclarationswithinaspecifictimeframeofallmaterialcoveredunderthetreaty.SouthAfricabelievesthat,whiledeclarationsofhistoricalproductionshouldbewelcomed,thepracticaldifficul-tiesregardingverifyingtheircompletenessandcorrectnessshouldbeacknowledged.

Decommissioned production facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants) shouldbedeclaredandinspected.Whilerecognizingtherightofstatestoproduceandem-ployfissilematerialfornon-explosivemilitaryapplications,anFMTverificationsys-temshouldalsorequiresomeformofverificationthatthismaterialisnotdivertedtonuclear-weaponproduction.

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Given the IAEA’s expertise andexperience indealingwith issuesof safeguardsandverification,SouthAfricafavorstheAgencyasthemostlogicalverificationentityforanFMT.However,toeffectivelyimplementanFMTverificationsystemwouldrequiretheIAEAtoincreaseitsinspectionforce,whichcouldtakeseveralyears.

Asfarascomplianceisconcerned,SouthAfricabelievesthatanyconcernsovernon-complianceshouldbedealtwithinatimeframeconsistentwiththethreat.ApromptlyconvenedFMTConferenceofStatepartieswouldofferopportunitiestopresenttheal-legationsandtheresponseofthesuspectednoncompliantStateparty(orparties).TheConferenceshouldhaveplenipotentiarypowerstorequireareportfromtheverifica-tionentityonprogressmadetowardscompliancebyanoncompliantStateanddecidewhethertorefertheallegationstotheUNSecurityCounciland/orrecommendothermeasuresasappropriate.

ConclusionWhileSouthAfricamaintainsstrongpositionsonboththeinclusionofstocksandontheneedforaverifiabletreaty,theSouthAfricandelegationtotheCDhasonnumer-ousoccasionsstateditswillingnesstostartnegotiationswithoutpreconditions.

This shouldnotbe interpreted,however, aswillingnessbySouthAfrica toacceptatreatywithoutthesecoreelements.Indeed,SouthAfrica’spositionsonnuclearmattershaveinrecentyearsbecomemorehardline.Pretoriamayverywellarguethatatreatythatdoesnoteffectivelymakenucleardisarmamentirreversibleisnotworthpursuing.SouthAfricamayalsobecomeevenmorecriticalofattemptstorestrictcivilianusesoffissilematerial,includingHEU,andtomaketheAdditionalProtocolamandatorycon-ditionofsupplyunderArticleIIIoftheNPT.SouthAfricahasalreadylinkedinitiativestoreduceoreliminatecivilianuseofHEUtotheneedforstateswithnuclearweaponstoirreversiblyreducetheirstocksofweaponmaterials.Attemptstopreempttheinclu-sionofstocksunderafuturetreatythroughinformal,andnon-bindingdeclarationsoffissilematerialholdings,ortocreatea“partialFMT”willlikelyresultinincreasedSouthAfricanskepticismoverthevalueofthetreaty.

SouthAfrica’sincreasedinterestinnuclearenergyshouldalsobeconsidered.By2015to2020,PretoriaplanstohavemorethanhalfofSouthAfrica’selectric-powerneedssatisfied by nuclear energy. As a consequence, Pretoria could be highly sensitive toany treatyobligations (whetherpreambularornot) that imply that there shouldberestrictionsoncivilianfissileproductionfacilitiesorstocksoffissilematerialsuchasSouthAfrica’sstockpileofHEUthatisalegacyofitsnuclearweaponprogram.Givenincreasedglobalinterestinnuclearfuelasasustainableenergysource,andthecurrentenergycrisisintheSouthAfrica,thegovernmentisunlikelytosubjectitsenergyneedstothemercyofexternalsuppliersofenrichmentservices.Forthisreason,anydraftFMTtextshouldfocusonlyonthe“nuclear-weaponspurposes”offissilematerialasoriginallyprovidedintheShannonmandate.Ifnot,thetreatyislikelytocomeunderfirebyoneofitsstrongestsupporters.

Jean du Preez


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OnFebruary5,2008,UKSecretaryofStateforDefence,DesBrowne,tooktheunusualstep of addressing the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on the subjectof“LayingtheFoundationsforMultilateralDisarmament.”155 Inhisspeech,BrownespokeoftheUK’s“visionofaworldfreeofnuclearweapons”andreiteratedthattheUKgovernmentregardsa“FissileMaterialCut-OffTreaty,”orFM(C)T,asa“keymilestonetowards building this climate for disarmament.” He declared that it “will limit theabilityofsignatorystatestoexpandtheirnucleararsenalsand…providetheneces-saryreassurancetotheirneighboursandtheinternationalcommunity.”BrownealsoreaffirmedtheUK’s1995moratoriumontheproductionoffissilematerialsforweap-onsandsubsequentplacementof“excess”militaryfissilematerialunderinternationalsafeguards.Hedidnot,however,makeanynewofferstoputmoremilitaryplutoniumorhighlyenricheduranium(HEU)undersafeguards.

Browneconfirmedthattheresearchprojectonverifyingnuclear-warheaddismantle-ment,conductedat theUK’sAtomicWeaponsEstablishment (AWE)atAldermastonfrom2001–2005,wasbeingcontinuedandexpanded.ThisincludesworkrelevanttotheverificationofanFM(C)T.

ThischapterprovidesthelatestgovernmentfiguresforUKholdingsofmilitaryandcivilfissilematerialsandthenlaysoutUKpositionsandapproachesformovingfor-wardonaFissileMaterial(Cutoff)Treaty.156

Fissile Materials in the Military Nuclear StockpileIn1995,theUKdeclaredamoratoriumontheproductionoffissilematerialsforweap-onspurposes,whichitcontinuestoabideby,pendingnegotiationsonafissban.157Un-derthe1998StrategicDefenceReview,theUKdeclared300kgofweapons-gradeplu-tonium(sufficientforabout60weapons)as“excesstodefencepurposes.”158ThiswasplacedunderEuratomsafeguardsandmadeliabletoinspectionbytheIAEA.ThoughitappearsunlikelythattheUKwouldwanttowithdrawthismaterialfromsafeguardsanduseitforweaponspurposesinthefuture,theUKhasnotrelinquishedits‘right’todoso.

In2000and2006,theUKpublishedthefollowingfiguresafterreviewingrecordsgo-ingbacktothe1950s.Themilitarynuclearstockpileisreportedtocontain:159

3.51tonsofweapon-gradeplutonium,heldatAWEsites (principallyatAldermas-ton).

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21.86tonsofuraniumenrichedabove20percent(i.e.HEU)heldinAWEandotherfacilities,includinginspentnaval-reactorfuel.160

TheUKdeclaresitsholdingsofcivilianplutoniumandhighlyenricheduraniumtotheIAEAaspartofitsannualINFCIRC/549statement.161

Negotiating forumTheBritishgovernmenthaslongbeenanadvocateofaverifiedfissilematerialscutofftreaty.ItcontinuestoregardtheCDtobethemostappropriateforumfornegotiatingthistreatyandvotedfortheShannonnegotiatingmandateattheCDinMarch1995andinsubsequentresolutionsattheUNFirstCommittee.

TheUKgovernmentcontinuestoregardtheFM(C)TasthenextlogicalsteptowardsfulfillingArticleVIoftheNPT,andbelievesthatitalsohasintrinsicvalueforstrength-ening the broader international non-proliferation regime. Codifying agreementsamongtheNPTnuclearweaponstatesthroughnegotiationsamongthemselveswouldnotachievethepracticaleffectandsymbolismofaglobalcaponproductionoffissilematerialforexplosivemilitarypurposes.

WhiletheUKmightseeapragmaticrationalefornegotiationsbetweenthefiveNPTnuclearweaponstatesandthethreedefactonuclearweaponpossessors,recognizingthatthiswouldbypasstheobstaclesplacedinthepathbyotherstates’politicalagen-das,itdoesnotadvocateorsupportmovestotakenegotiationsoutsidetheCD.TheUKdoubtsthatthetreatywouldbeeasiertonegotiateoutsidetheCD,andconsidersthatattemptstodosocouldweakentheCD,perhapsfatally,andharmbroadermultilateralarmscontrolefforts.Also,theUKandtheEuropeanUnionhavealong-standingpolicyofcallingfortheuniversalisationoftheNPTandforIndia,IsraelandPakistantoac-cedeasnon-nuclearweaponsstates.Inthiscontext,theUKgovernmentwouldregardascounterproductiveanapproachthatmaybeconstruedbynon-nuclearweaponstatesparties totheNPTas ‘privileging’ thethreenon-NPTnuclearweaponpossessorsbytreatingthemineffectasnuclearweaponstatesinaneightpartynegotiation.

VerificationAftertheUnitedStatestableditsowndraftmandateandtextfora“TreatyontheCes-sationofProductionofFissileMaterialforUseinNuclearWeaponsorOtherNuclearExplosiveDevices”inMay2006,162theUKbecameoneofthefirstintheCDtosupporttheU.S.positionthatnegotiationsshouldgetstartedonthisbasis,i.e.withoutrequir-ingverificationasaprecondition.ThoughsomeCDdelegationsinterpretedthisasachangeofUKposture,Governmentofficialsstressthatthis isnotso:afteradecadeofdeadlock, thekeytask is togetnegotiationsunderway,withoutpreconditions. Inthe circumstances, the UK government was prepared to back the U.S. approach forpragmaticreasons.IftheUnitedStatescontinuedtoopposeamandatethatspecifiesamultilaterallynegotiatedinternationalverificationsystem,thennegotiationscouldnotevengetofftheground.ThelongimpassewithoutaprogrammeofworkhasalreadycausedsometodoubttheviabilityoftheConferenceonDisarmament,andUKoffi-cialsbelievethatcompromisesshouldbemadeifthereisachancetogetnegotiationsstarted.TheverificationissuecanberevisitedifU.S.policychanges.

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Whileviewingamultilateralverificationsystemtobedesirable,theUKtakestheviewthatthecurrentU.S.approachdoesnotamounttoanunverifiedtreaty,asisoftenar-gued,butamultilateraltreatythatwouldestablishthelegalrestrictionandthenrestonnationaltechnicalmeans(NTM)forverification.TheUKwouldbepreparedtolivewiththis,atleastasafirststep,sinceNTMarenowhighlysophisticatedandtheIAEAalreadyverifiesthenon-productionoffissilematerialsforweaponsforallnon-nuclearweaponstateparties.

Inhis2008speech,DesBrowneannouncedthattheUKwantedtohosta“technicalconferenceofP-5nuclearlaboratoriesontheverificationofnucleardisarmamentbe-forethenextNPTReviewConferencein2010.”163Onefocusofsuchameetingcouldbe for theUnitedKingdom, theUnited States andRussia to share their verificationexercisesthatmaybeofvaluetotheFM(C)T.

The treatment of pre-existing stocks of fissile material under the FM(C)TTheUKsharestheU.S.viewthatthescopeofthefissbanshouldbelimitedtohaltingfutureproduction.TheUKsupportsvoluntarymeasuresbynuclearweaponstatestoplaceexcessfissilematerialsundersafeguards,butthinksthatgettingagreementonaworkabledefinitionofstocksofpre-existingmaterialstobeexcludedfromfutureweap-onsuseintheFM(C)Twouldbeextremelydifficult.Fornationalsecurityreasons,theUKwouldnotacceptverificationonactualquantitiesinthemilitarystocks—eveniftheseweredefinednottoincludethefissilematerialscontainedinwarheads.

UKofficialsalsostress,however, that theyarenotarguingforstockstobeformallyruledoutofthenegotiations.Theyhavenoobjectiontoquestionsaboutstocks—oranythingelse—beingraisedinthecourseofthenegotiations,butdonotenvisageasituationinwhichtheUK,theUnitedStatesoranyothernuclearweaponstatewouldagreetoanycontrolsonpre-existingmaterialsbeingpartofthefinalisedtreaty.

Entry into ForceFortheUK,animportantobjectiveishaltingfurtherproductionoffissilematerialsforweaponsbyIndia,IsraelandPakistan.FourofthefiveNPTnuclearweaponstateshavealreadycommittedthemselvestoaproductionmoratoriumandtheUKunderstandsthatChina is, inpractice, implementingamoratorium.TheUK is cognizantof theproblemsfortheCTBToftherigidentry-into-forceprovisionthatBritain(amongoth-ers)designedtolockinthethreenon-NPTstatesin1996.Officialsarenotwillingtotalkabouttheirnegotiatingpositionsinadvanceoffissbannegotiations,arguingthattheirpositionisforthistobedevelopedaspartofthenegotiations.Itappears,however,thattheywouldnotagainmakethemistakeof insistingonsucharigidentry-into-forceprovision.Naval use of HEU TheUK—liketheUnitedStates—usesweapon-gradeuraniumtofuelitsnuclear-pow-eredsubmarines.TheUKstocksofHEUshouldbesufficientforboththecurrentnucle-arweaponstockpileandtofuelthesubmarinesfordecades.164ThelargeU.S.stockpileofexcessweapon-gradeuraniumthathasbeensetasideforfutureU.S.navalreactorusemightbeavailabletosupplyUKsubmarinesaswell.MuchoftheUKstockofHEUwasacquiredfromtheUnitedStatesunderthe1958U.S.-UKMutualDefenceAgree-ment.165


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ConclusionsAlthoughtheUKmovedearlytosupporttheU.S.draftmandateof2006forFM(C)Tnegotiation,itscorepositiononanFM(C)Tislargelyunchanged.TheUKgovernmentseestheFM(C)Tasthenextessentialstepinthedisarmamentagenda—and,indeed,thefirstmajornucleardisarmamentmeasureformanyyears.TheGovernmentwantstoseenegotiationsgetgoingintheCDwithoutpreconditions,intheexpectationthatverificationwouldbeoneofthekeyissuesaddressedduringnegotiations.

TheUKdoesnotwanttogobeyondacutoffofproductionforfutureexplosivemilitaryuse;itconsidersthatsuchacutoffwouldachieveitscoreobjectiveandreducethetimeneededfornegotiation.TheUKwouldopposetheinclusionofstocksanywhereinthefinaltreaty,butiswillingtoconsidervoluntaryarrangementsbynuclearweaponstatestoputmore‘excess’materialsundersafeguards.

Rebecca Johnson


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Although both President Dwight Eisenhower (1956) and President Lyndon Johnson(1964) called for the conclusion of a U.S.-Soviet fissile material cutoff treaty, it wasnotuntilaftertheendoftheColdWar,whenboththeUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionhadstoppedtheproductionoffissilematerials fornuclearweapons, that theUnitedStatestookaseriousinitiativetonegotiateaFissileMaterial(Cutoff)Treaty,orFM(C)T.

InhisstatementonnonproliferationonSeptember27,1993,PresidentClintoncalledforan“international treatyprohibiting theproductionofhighlyenricheduraniumandtheseparationofplutoniumfornuclearexplosivesoroutsideinternationalsafe-guards.”InDecember1993,theUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyadoptedbyconsen-susa resolution(48/75L)ontheprohibitionof theproductionoffissilematerial fornuclearweaponsorothernuclearexplosivedevices.Thisresolution,interalia:

Expressedtheconvictionoftheinternationalcommunitythatanondiscriminatory,multilateralandinternationallyandeffectivelyverifiabletreatybanningtheproduc-tionoffissilematerialfornuclearweaponsorothernuclearexplosivedeviceswouldbeasignificantcontributiontonuclearnon-proliferationinallitsaspects;

Recommendedthenegotiationofsuchatreatyinthemostappropriateinternationalforum;

RequestedtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)toprovideassistanceforexaminationofverificationarrangementsforsuchatreatyasrequired;and

CalleduponallStatestodemonstratetheircommitmenttotheobjectivesofsuchatreaty.

TheClintonAdministrationworkedhardintheGeneva-basedConferenceonDisar-mament(CD)tobeginnegotiationsonthetextofanFM(C)Tassoonaspossible.In1995,afterconsultationsamongthestatesparticipatingintheCD,itagreedtobeginnegotiationsbasedonthe“Shannonmandate,”namedafterCanada’sambassadortotheCDatthetime.Unfortunately,thatnegotiationmandateexpiredwiththeendofthatyear'sconferencesession,andsincethenhasonlybeenrenewedonce,forthreeweeksin1998.DespiterepeatedcallsfromtheUNGeneralAssemblyandNPTreviewconferences,negotiationsonanFM(C)Thavenotresumed.BecausetheCDoperatesonthebasisofconsensus,asmallnumberofstateshavebeenabletoblockfurtherne-gotiationsonacutoffbecauseofdisagreementsaboutitsscopeandpurposeaswellaslinkagestonegotiationsonotherissues.

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Country Perspectives: United States

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TheU.S.Senate’srejectionoftheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty(CTBT)in1999alsocastalongpalloverCDeffortstogetnegotiationsunderwayonthecutofftreaty.Fi-nally,theU.S.decisiontoestablishanationalmissile-defensesystemledChinatolinkthecutofftreatynegotiationstotheestablishmentofaneweffortattheCDtobanspace-basedweapons.ThislinkageremainsanimportantobstacletothenegotiationofaFissileMaterialCutoffTreaty.

TheBushAdministrationdidnotenterintoofficeasanenthusiasticsupporterofanFM(C)T. It then undertook a two-year review of the U.S. position on the FM(C)T.FinallyonJuly29,2004,theU.S.ambassadortotheCDannouncedthattheUnitedStates supported thenegotiationofa legally-binding treatybanning theproductionoffissilematerialforuseinnuclearweaponsornuclearexplosives.Twoyearslater,inMay2006,theBushAdministrationsubmittedadrafttexttotheCDthatprovidedforadurationofonly15years.Adecisionbyconsensusofthepartieswouldbenecessaryforthetreaty’sextensionbeyondthe15years.Stocksofalreadyexistingfissilematerialandtheproductionoffissilematerialfornon-explosivemilitarypurposes,suchasfuelfornavalpropulsion,wouldnotbecovered.166

Mostimportantly,theBushAdministration’sproposedtextoftheFM(C)Tcontainednoprovisionsforverification.TheStateDepartmentissuedanexplanatorystatement,thatsaid,167

“Ourextensivereviewhasconcludedthatthereareseriouscon-cernsastowhetheran‘effectivelyverifiable’FMCTisrealistical-lyachievable.EffectiveverificationofanFMCTwouldrequireaninspectionregimesoextensivethatitcouldcompromisekeysignatories’ core national security interests and so costly thatmanycountrieswillbehesitanttoacceptit.Moreover,wehaveconcluded that,evenwithextensiveverificationmeasures,wewillnothavehighconfidenceinourabilitytomonitorcompli-ancewithanFMCT.”

ThustheBushAdministrationadoptedthesameapproachtoanFM(C)Tasittookto-wardtheBiologicalWeaponsTreatyandtheStrategicReductionsTreaty,i.e.,toacceptanarmscontroltreatywithoutverificationprovisions.

In addition to their overall skepticism about verification, high-level officials in theBushAdministrationbelievedthat:

Adequate verification would require extremely intrusive inspections includingsamplinginandaroundU.S.DepartmentofDefensefacilities,and

Itwouldbedifficultorimpossibletoverifytheabsenceofclandestineproductionfacilities—especiallyenrichmentplants.

Moreover,theBushAdministrationhadotherconcerns,includingthepotentialloop-holeprovidedbytheexclusionoftheproductionofHEUfornavalpropulsion.

BothcandidatesforPresidenthavestatedsupportforanFM(C)T.SenatorObamahassaidthathewillworkfor“averifiableglobalbanontheproductionofnewnuclearweaponsmaterial.”168AndSenatorMcCain,inaspeechonMay27,2008,urgedthattheUnitedStates“shouldmovequicklywithothernationstonegotiateaFissileMaterialCut-offTreatytoendproductionofthemostdangerousnuclearmaterials.”169McCain

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hasnotindicated,however,whetherhewouldsupportverificationprovisionsforsuchatreaty.

ItisnotclearhowmuchpriorityanewAdministrationwillassigntotheconclusionofanFM(C)T.StrongandenduringsupportfromtheUnitedStateswillbeanecessary(butnotsufficient)conditionforthesuccessfulconclusionforanFM(C)T.ThismeansthatanewAdministrationwillhavetodevotethetime,attentionandresourcesnotmerelytoconductingnegotiationsintheCDbutalsotopromotetheFM(C)Tincapi-talsoftheotherstatesthathavenuclearweapons,includingboththosethatarepartiestotheNPTandthosethatarenot.TheUnitedStatesmayalsohavetocompromiseonpositionsthat ithastakentowardother issues intheCDinordertopersuadesomestatestoallownegotiationsonanFM(C)Ttogoforward.

Assuming thatanewAdministrationassignspriority toconcludinganFM(C)TandthatitabandonsthepositionoftheBushAdministrationtowardverificationandwillfavorsubmittingfacilitiesandmaterialssubjecttothetreatytosafeguards,thefollow-ingisanattempttopredictwhat itsapproachmightbebasedonthethinkingthathadoccurredduringtheClintonAdministrationfrom1993until2000.Muchofthefollowingisnecessarilyspeculativeinnature.

Basic UndertakingsAU.S.AdministrationseriouslypursuinganFM(C)TislikelytotakethepositionthateachstatepartytoanFM(C)Tshouldrefrainfromproducingfissilematerialsforuseinnuclearexplosivedevices.Specifically,thetreatywouldprohibittheproductionofHEU, plutonium, and uranium-233 for nuclear explosives. The United States wouldregardreactor-gradeplutoniumasanuclear-weapon-usablematerialandwouldinsistonincludingaprohibitionofreactor-gradeplutoniumfornuclear-explosivepurposesinanFM(C)T.ItwouldthusinsistthattheprovisionsofanFM(C)T,includinginspec-tions,applytoallgradesofplutonium(exceptplutoniumcontainingmorethan80%plutonium-238).Itisalsolikelytoproposeabanonthe“production”ofamericiumandneptuniumfornuclearexplosives.170Thetreatyalsowouldprohibit theenrich-mentofHEUtohigherconcentrationsofU-235andtheenrichmentofreactor-gradeplutoniumtoweapons-gradeplutoniumfornuclearexplosivepurposes.

TheUnitedStateswouldnotenvisagethetreatyasprohibitingtheproductionofHEUortheseparationofplutoniumundersafeguardsforcivilnuclearactivities.Inaddition,anFM(C)TwouldnotbartheproductionofHEUfornon-explosivemilitaryusessuchasnavalreactors.IfsafeguardswereappliedtoHEUfuelproducedafterentryintoforceofanFM(C)Tinanavalreactororareactorthatisbeingusedfortritiumproductionforweapons,inspectionswouldhavetobecarriedoutwithoutexposinginformationthatStatesconsiderclassified.171

BoththeClintonandBushAdministrationssupportedacutofftreatythatwouldapplyonlytofutureproduction,notexistingstocks.AnewAdministrationislikelytotakethesameposition,whichisconsistentwiththeviewsofRussia,France,ChinaandIs-rael.Itispossible,however,thattheUnitedStatescouldsupportanapproachinwhichthenuclearweaponstatesassumeanobligationtotakestepsingoodfaithtodeclaresomefissilematerialproducedpriortoentryintoforceoftheFM(C)TasexcesstotheirdefenseneedsandtosubmitsuchmaterialtoIAEAsafeguards.Insuchanapproachthetreatywouldpermit,thoughnotrequire,statestosubmitadditionalmaterialsforsafeguards,therebyremovingthemirreversiblyfromweaponsuse.Anadditionalob-ligationunderanFM(C)TwouldbetorefrainfromassistingotherStatestoproducefissilematerialsforproscribedpurposes.Thiswouldnotpreclude,however,thetransfer


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offissilematerialsfromonepartytoanotherforpeacefulpurposesorfornavalfuelpropulsion.Finally,theStatesPartytoanFM(C)Twouldhavetoacceptsafeguardstoverifytheundertakingnottoproducefissilematerialsforpurposesproscribedbythetreaty.ItwouldbeparticularlyimportantthatthebanonHEUproductionandplutoniumsepa-rationfornuclearexplosivesbecrediblyverified.TheUnitedStateswouldseetheIAEAastheappropriateagencytocarryouttheinspections.

Other Key Design Characteristics of an FM(C)TTheUnitedStateswillalsolikelytakethepositionthatanFM(C)Tshouldbeuniversalinmembershipandnon-discriminatory.Membershipwouldhave to includeall thenuclearweaponstates(NWS)andnon-nuclearweaponstatespartytotheNPTaswellasthosestatesthatarenotpartytotheNPTsuchastheDemocraticRepublicofKorea,India,IsraelandPakistan.And,althoughthepreciseverificationmeasuresmaynotbeidenticalinnuclearweaponstatesandnon-nuclearweaponsstates,anydifferencesingoals,burdensandcostsofverificationmeasuresshouldbeminimized.

Financing.AnotherissueofconsiderableinteresttotheUnitedStateswillbetheques-tionofhowtheverificationmeasuresofanFM(C)Tshouldbefinanced.TheUnitedStates(aswellastheotherNWS)wouldlikelytakethepositionthattheFM(C)Tshouldbe financed through the assessed budget of the IAEA. As with NPT safeguards, theUnitedStateswouldprobablyarguethatallcountriesbenefitfromFM(C)Tsafeguardsandthereforeall shouldpay.This is likely tobeadivisive issue,however, since thenon-nuclearweaponstatesare likely to insist that theNWSbearalloradispropor-tionateshareofthecostsofverifyingthetreaty.Asafeguards“shielding”formulawasestablishedintheearly1970stoscreenallbutthemostdevelopedcountriesfromthefinancialimpactofNPTsafeguards.Asaresult,theUnitedStatespays30%oftheIAEAsafeguardsbudget,comparedto25%ofthenon-safeguardsbudget.

Verification. ThebasicobjectivesofsafeguardsunderanFM(C)Twouldbea)toverifythatfissilematerialbeingproducedindeclaredfacilitiesisnotbeingusedfornuclearexplosivepurposes,andb)todeterandtodetectanyclandestineproductionoffissilematerial.Therewouldbenoattempt,however, todetectundeclaredfissilematerial,since existing stocks would be excluded from verification for national security andnonproliferationreasons.

SafeguardswouldbeappliedtoallreprocessingandenrichmentfacilitiesinStatespar-tytothetreatyaswellastheplutonium,U-233andHEUproductsoftheseplants.Inordertoprovidecredibleverificationofthebasicundertakingofthetreaty,safeguardswouldhavetoapplytothesematerialsatleastuptothepointoftheirirradiationinareactor.SafeguardswouldthereforeapplytoplutoniumorHEU(producedafterentryintoforceofthetreaty)throughfuelfabricationandloadingintoareactor.Safeguardswould,ofcourse,alsoapplytoanyreprocessingofthespentfuelproducedfromirradi-ationofanyplutoniumorHEUfuelproducedafterentryintoforceoftheagreement.

Ideally, the safeguards obligations of nuclear weapon states and NPT non-weaponstatesshouldbethesameforallenrichmentandreprocessingactivitiesandallfissilematerialsproducedafterentryintoforce.Thismaynotbepracticalorcost-effective,however, inall instances.Specifically,achievingIAEAsafeguardsobjectives forNPTnon-weaponstatesinsomeoftheoldreprocessingfacilitiesinweaponstatesmaynotbepossible.Insuchinstances,thesafeguardsobjectivescouldformallyparallelNPTsafeguardsagreements,i.e.,timelydetectionofthediversionofsignificantquantities


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offissilematerial—butthe“timely”and“significant”couldbeinterpreteddifferentlyinstatesthathaveexistingstocksoutsidesafeguards.Whethersuchanapproachwouldbeacceptable tonon-weapon states like Japan,whichhas aparticularlyheavy safe-guardsburdenonitsreprocessingplants,remainstobeseen.

Inaddition, itmaybenecessary toprovide for special safeguardsprocedures in thecasewhereastateusesHEUfuelsubjecttotheFM(C)Tinordertoproducetritiumorfornaval-reactorfuel.AdequateverificationofthistreatyalsowillrequiretheIAEAtohavetherighttocheckforundeclaredactivitiesprohibitedbythetreaty.

Thesafeguardsappliedinnon-weaponstatesunderacutoffwouldbesatisfiedbytheimplementationofthestandardNPTsafeguardsagreement—INFCIRC/153anditsAd-ditionalProtocol(AP).172Suchstateshavealreadyplacedalltheirpeacefulnuclearac-tivitiesunderIAEAsafeguards.

Ontheotherhand,anewkindofsafeguardsagreementwouldhavetobeappliedinnuclearweaponstates.Suchanagreementwouldhavetorecognizethelegitimatecon-cernsofsuchstatesrelatingtotheprotectionofnationalsecurityinformationconcern-ingnuclearweaponsornavalpropulsion.Atthesametime,theverificationagreementwouldhavetoacknowledgetherightoftheIAEAtoverifytheobligationstheweaponstates have undertaken in the FM(C)T. To achieve this objective, the United Stateswouldlikelyagreetoeither:

Special inspections and complementary access modeled after the NPT safeguardsagreementsandtheAdditionalProtocolor

SomeformofchallengeinspectionsandmanagedaccessforNWSalongthelinesofthosefoundintheChemicalWeaponsConvention.

Issues of Verification Application in the United StatesAnFM(C)TraisesanumberofissuesfortheimplementationofverificationmeasuresintheUnitedStates.Amongtheseare:

WhatkindofsafeguardsagreementshouldbeappliedintheUnitedStates(andotherNWS)?

WhatfacilitiesshouldtheUnitedStatesdeclareforpurposesofverifyingitsobliga-tionsunderanFM(C)T?

HowshouldtheUnitedStatesdealwithparticularproblemsrelatedtoitsstatusasanuclearweaponstateandastatewithanuclearnavy?Inparticular,whatwilltheU.S.approachbetosuchquestionsaschallengeinspectionsormanagedaccess,environ-mentalsamplingandtheuseofHEUfornavalpropulsion?

WhatkindofasafeguardsagreementshouldapplyintheUnitedStates?TheexistingagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheIAEAfortheapplicationofsafeguardsintheUnitedStates(theso-calledvoluntary-offersafeguardsagreement)wouldnotbeappropriateforverifyinganFM(C)T,sinceitdoesnotobligatetheIAEAtoapplysafeguardsandpermitsaso-called“nationalsecurityexclusion.”

UnderthevoluntaryofferanditsAdditionalProtocol,theUnitedStatesprovidestheIAEAwithalistoffacilitiesandmaterialsthatare“eligible”fortheapplicationofsafe-guardsintheUnitedStates.Withlimitedexceptions,however,theIAEAdoesnotactu-allyapplysafeguardsintheUnitedStatesduetoalackoffinancialresources.

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Also,undertheexistingU.S.-IAEAsafeguardsagreement,theUnitedStateshasthesolediscretiontodeterminewhetheranactivityimplicatesinformationofdirectnationalsecuritysignificanceandthereforewhetherandhowtowithdrawnuclearmaterialsorfacilitiesfromthelistoffacilitieseligiblefortheapplicationofIAEAsafeguardsintheUnitedStates.Incontrast,underanFM(C)T,nuclearweaponstateswouldnotbeal-lowedtowithdrawfacilitiesormaterialsfromthetreaty’ssafeguardsagreement.

ThustomeettheverificationobligationsofanFM(C)T,theUnitedStateswouldhavetoconcludeanewsafeguardsagreementwiththeIAEAthatwouldrequiretheapplica-tionofsafeguardsinperpetuitytofacilitiesandmaterialssubjecttotheFM(C)TintheUnitedStates.

WhatU.S.facilitieswouldbesubjecttoanFM(C)T?Thekeyfacilitiesthatwouldbesubjecttosafeguardsarethoseatwhichfissilematerialcouldbeproduced:enrichmentandreprocessingfacilities.

Enrichment facilities. TheUnitedStateshasstoppedoperationsatitsgaseousdiffusionfacilitiesatPortsmouth,OhioandOakRidge,Tennessee.TheIAEAwouldbeexpectedtoverifytheshutdownoftheseplants.

AtpresentthereisonlyoneoperatingenrichmentfacilityintheUnitedStates—agas-eousdiffusionplantoperatedby theUnitedStatesEnrichmentCorporation (USEC)(leasedfromtheDOE)atPaducah,Kentucky.Thisfacilityistobeclosedonceitsre-placementbeginsoperation.

Plansareunderwaytobuildthreenewfacilitiesbasedoncentrifugetechnologyandonebasedonlasertechnology:

USECisproposingtobuildanewenrichmentplantatitsPortsmouth,OhiositeusinggascentrifugetechnologydevelopedbyDOE,whichwouldreplaceitsfarmoreen-ergy-intensivePaducahgaseous-diffusionfacility.TheAmericanCentrifugefacilityhasaplannedcapacityof3.8millionSWUs,whichitshouldreachin2012.

LouisianaEnrichmentServices(LES),asubsidiaryofUrencoisbuildinginNewMex-icotheNationalEnrichmentFacility(NEF)usingUrencogas-centrifugetechnology.NEFhasaplannedcapacityof3millionSWUs,whichitshouldreachin2013.

Arevaexpects tobeginconstruction in the secondquarterof2010ofa3millionSWUcentrifugeplantnearIdahoFalls.

AjointsubsidiaryofGEandHitachi(GEH)hassignedanagreementwithSilexSys-tems Limited, an Australia-based technology company, to license its laser-enrich-ment technology toproduce lowenricheduranium in theUnitedStates.TheCa-nadianfirm,Cameco,haspurchasedaminoritystakeintheventure.GEHplanstobuildtheplantinWilmington,NorthCarolinawithacapacitybetween3.5and6millionSWU.

TheIAEAhasextensiveexperienceinsafeguardinggascentrifugefacilities.Itisexpect-edthattheAgencywouldapplytheso-calledHexapartiteapproach(oranyupdatedversionthereof)insafeguardingfutureenrichmentplantsintheUnitedStates.Apri-maryobjectiveoftheHexapartiteapproachistoensurethatacentrifugefacilityisnotproducingHEU.Verifyingthenon-productionofHEUshouldnotimposesignificantfinancialburdensontheIAEA.

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Reprocessing facilities.TheUnitedStateshasanumberofshut-downreprocessingfa-cilities:

NuclearFuelServices’WestValleyplantnearBuffalo,NewYorkoperatedfrom1966until1972,reprocessingspentfuel fromaU.S.productionreactoraswellassomecommercialspentfuel.

In1972GEhaltedconstructionofaplantnearMorris,Illinoistoreprocesspower-re-actorfuelanddecidednottopursueanoperatinglicense.Itsspentfuelpoolisused,however,tostorefuelfromshut-downpowerreactors.

In1970Allied-GeneralNuclearServicesbeganconstructionofacommercialrepro-cessingplantatBarnwell,SC.Ithaltedtheproject,however,afterconcludingthatreprocessingwasnotcommerciallyviable.

ThePUREXreprocessingplantinHanford,Washingtonwasbuilttorecoverpluto-niumforU.S.nuclearweapons. It shutdown in1989and inDecember1992, theDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)announceditspermanentclosure.

The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant was used to reprocess naval fuel to recoveritsunusedHEUforrecycleinthedriverfueloftheSavannahRiverplutoniumandtritium-productionreactors.Itshutdownin1992aftertheSavannahRiverreactorsshutdown.

At the Savannah River Plant, the F Canyon was used to recover plutonium fromnaturaluraniumtargetsforU.S.weaponsandtheHCanyonwasusedtorecoverHEUfromthedriverfueloftheSavannahRiverproductionreactors.TheFCanyonisinasafeandstablemodebuthasnotbeendecommissioned.HCanyonwillcontinuetooperatetoprocessimpureplutoniumfordisposalandHEUresearch-reactorfuelsuntil2019.

ThustheonlyoperatingreprocessingplantintheUnitedStatesatthepresenttimeislocatedattheSavannahRiverSite(SRS).SinceSRSwasnotdesignedtofacilitatetheapplicationofsafeguardsandhasneverbeencleanedout,anyinspectionregimeforSRSwouldfaceformidableproblemsindevisingamaterialaccountancysystemthatwouldbecost-effectiveforsuchafacility.Itisnotcertain,however,thatSRSwillstillbeoperatingwhenanFM(C)Tentersintoforce.

Inaddition,aspartoftheongoingAdvancedFuelCycleInitiative(AFCI),theU.S.De-partmentofEnergy(DOE)isengagedinR&Donadvancedseparationandfuelmanu-facturingtechnologies.TheBushadministrationisalsopreparingaPreliminaryEnvi-ronmentalImpactStatementwhosepurposeistodeterminewhethertheUnitedStatesshouldrecyclecommercialspentfuel.173IftheUnitedStatesweretoproceedwithsuchrecycling,theverificationmeasuresofanFM(C)Twouldhavetoapplytothereprocess-ingfacilitiesaswellastheMixed-Oxide(uranium-plutonium,MOX)fuelfabricationfacilitiesthatmightbeconstructedaspartofsuchaprogramintheUnitedStates.ThesafeguardswouldapplyuptothepointofirradiationoftheMOXfuelinreactors.Anysuchprogramwouldgreatly increasethecostofverifyinganFM(C)TintheUnitedStates.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatanyDemocraticAdministrationthatwouldtakeofficein2009ismuchlesslikelythantheBushAdministrationtopromoteearlyplutoniumrecycleintheUnitedStates.ItislikelythatsomeR&Donnewseparationsandfueltechnologieswouldcontinue.Iftheeffortsremainsmall-scale,thesafeguardsimpactwouldbemodest,butlarger-scaletechnologydemonstrationscouldentailsig-nificantsafeguardseffort.

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TheIAEAwillhavetoverifythatalltheabovereprocessingplantsareshutdown.IfHCanyoncontinuestooperate,orifspentfuelrecyclingordeploymenttakesplaceintheUnitedStates,theobjectivewouldbetoaccountforanyfissilematerialthatitpro-duced,includingdownstreamfuelfabricationuptoirradiationinareactor.

Special or challenge inspections and managed access. AnFM(C)Twillrequirethattheinspectingagencyhavetheauthoritytoconductspecialorchallengeinspectionsinordertodetectclandestineenrichmentorreprocessingactivitiesbyastatepartytothetreaty.AtthesametimeanyspecialorchallengeinspectionsregimeunderanFM(C)Tmustincludeprovisionstomanageaccessofinspectorstofacilitiesoractivitiesofdi-rectnationalsecuritysignificancetotheUnitedStates.ThepositionthattheUnitedStatesislikelytotakeonthisissueinanFM(C)ThasperhapsbeenforeshadowedbytheanalysisthattheBushAdministrationsubmittedtoCongressinconnectionwiththeratificationoftheAdditionalProtocoltotheU.S.VoluntarySafeguardsAgreementwiththeIAEA.Thefollowingisbasedonthatdocument.174

TheUnitedStateswillhaveundeclarednuclearmaterialandactivitiesoutsidethescopeoftheFM(C)Tverificationagreement,includingcertainactivitiesatlocationsthatarepartoftheU.S.civilnuclearprogram,consistentwithitsstatusasanuclearweaponstate.175TheUnitedStateswillthereforeinsistontherighttousemanagedaccessinconnection with activities with direct national security significance to the UnitedStatesorinconnectionwithlocationsorinformationassociatedwithsuchactivities.

AnagreementbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheIAEAtoverifytheobligationsofanFM(C)Tthereforewillhavetoprovideformanagedaccessinordertopreventthedis-seminationofproliferationsensitiveinformation,tomeetsafetyorphysicalprotectionrequirements,ortoprotectproprietaryorcommerciallysensitiveinformation.

AnysuchagreementwouldalsohavetopermittheUnitedStatestousemanagedaccesstoprotectactivities,information,orlocationsofdirectnationalsecuritysignificance,e.g.,atreactorsthattestnavalaswellascivilianfuelorfacilitiesthatfabricatebothnavalandcivilresearchreactorfuel.ThisgivestheUnitedStatesthediscretiontousemanaged-accesstoprotectactivities,information,orlocationsofdirectnational-secu-ritysignificance.Suchcircumstancesmayarise,forexample,whereunclassified,civilnuclearactivitiesarebeingconductedatinstallationswherenationalsecurityactivitiesarealsobeingcarriedoutandithasbeendeterminedthatmanagedaccessprocedurescanbe implementedtoallowAgencyaccesstotheunclassifiedactivitieswhilefullyprotectingclassifiedinformation.

TheUnitedStateswouldalsoinsistonexercisingitsrightunderanymanagedaccessprovisionstoprecludetheuseofparticularmeasuresiftheirusewouldresultinaccessby the Agency to activities with direct national-security significance to the UnitedStatesortolocationsorinformationassociatedwithsuchactivities.

Environmental sampling. Severaltypesofenvironmentalsamplingcouldbeemployedinverifying theobligationsofanFM(C)T.These includeon-site sampling todetectclandestineactivities;samplingoutsidetheboundaryofasuspectfacility;andwide-area sampling. Environmental sampling will undoubtedly be a highly controversialissue.TheUnitedStateswillhave todeterminewhetherenvironmental sampling ispossiblewithoutdivulgingproliferation-relatedinformation.

UnderArticle9oftheAdditionalProtocol(AP)totheVoluntaryOffer,theUnitedStatesmustprovidetheAgencywithaccesstolocationsspecifiedbytheAgencytocarryoutwide-areaenvironmentalsampling,providedthat,iftheUnitedStatesisunabletopro-


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videsuchaccess,itshallmakeeveryreasonableefforttosatisfyAgencyrequirementsatalternativelocations.Article9oftheAPfurtherprovidesthattheAgencyshallnotseek such access until the IAEA Board of Governors has approved the use of wide-areaenvironmentalsamplingandtherequiredproceduralarrangementsandfollowingconsultationsbetweentheAgencyandtheUnitesStates.Todate,sucharrangementshavenotbeenbroughtbeforeorapprovedbytheBoard.TheUnitedStatesinformedtheAgency,inconnectionwiththeAP,thatevenifsucharrangementswereapproved,theUnitedStatesdoesnotforeseecircumstancesinwhichtheAgencywouldneedtoproposetoconductwideareaenvironmentalsampling.Wide-areasamplingmayproveimpracticalbecauseitistoocostlyforwidespreaddeployment.176Morerelevantaretheprovisionsforlocation-specificenvironmentalsampling,asprovidedunderArticle5.coftheAdditionalProtocol.

Naval nuclear propulsion program.Asof2007theUnitedStateshassetasidesome128tonsofHEUforitsnavalpropulsionprogram.Additionalquantitiescouldpresumablybesetasidefromexcessweaponsstocksinthefutureifdeterminednecessary.Thus,itishighlyunlikelyfortheforeseeablefuturethattheUnitedStateswillneedtoproduceadditionalquantitiesofHEUfornavalneeds.Nevertheless,theUnitedStatesundoubt-edlywillwanttokeepopenanoptiontodosoandthereforewillinsistonaprovisionin the FM(C)T that would allow for non-proscribed military uses of fissile materialproducedafterentryintoforceofanFM(C)T,i.e.,theuseofHEUproducedafterentryintoforceofthetreatyfornavalfuel.

Thiswouldbesimilartoorthesameasparagraph14oftheNPTsafeguardsagreement(INFCIRC/153)whichprovidesforthenon-applicationofIAEAsafeguardsonnuclearmaterialfornon-proscribedmilitaryuses.SuchaprovisionwouldallowHEUproducedordeclaredfornavaluseaftertheentryintoforceofanFM(C)Ttoavoidsafeguardsonceitentersanavalfuelfabricationfacility.ThesafeguardsapproachthattheIAEApresentlyappliesatcivilenrichmentfacilitiesaredesignedtoverifythatsuchplantsarenotproducingHEU.IftheUnitedStatesorotherstateswithnavalpropulsionpro-gramsdecidedtousefornavalpropulsionHEUproducedafterentryintoforceofanFM(C)T,theAgencymayhavetomodifyitssafeguardsapproachtoenrichmentfacili-tiesusedforsuchpurposes, includingmorefrequentinspectionsandverificationofinventoriesofHEUproduct.

Inaddition,iftheUnitedStatesorothernavalpowersweretoconsiderasclassifiedtheexactisotopiccompositionorthequantitiesoftheHEUproducedfornavalpurposes,suchsafeguardswouldhavetobedesignedtoprotectthissensitiveinformation,Theapplicationof traditional safeguardswouldceaseprior to theHEUentry intoa fuelfabricationplant.Thus,iftheUnitedStatesoranyothernavalpowerweretodecidetoproduceHEUfornavalpropulsionfollowingentryintoforceofanFM(C)T,theIAEAwouldfaceaformidablechallengeindesigninganinspectionregimethatprovidesahighconfidencethattheHEUwithdrawnfromsafeguardswasbeingusedsolelyfornon-explosivepurposes.

ThereprocessingofnavalreactorspentfuelisnotlikelytobeanissuefortheFM(C)TintheUnitedStatessincethespentfuelfromU.S.navalreactorsisnotcurrentlyrepro-cessed.TheDOEstoresthespentfueltogetherwithotherhighlyradioactivewastesoftheU.S.militarynuclearprogramatspecialstoragesitesattheIdahoNationalLabora-torywhereitawaitsultimatedisposal.

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Dealing with the Challenges

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ItisclearthatthenuclearweaponstateshaveavarietyofconcernsthatwillworktodelayandlimitthereachofanFM(C)T.Inparticular,manythinkofanFM(C)Tasacutofftreatythatwouldbanonlyfutureproductionoffissilematerialforweapons.

Thenon-weaponstates,incontrast,wantanFM(C)Ttoserveasasignificantstepto-wardtheeventualeliminationofnuclearweapons.Theywantacutofftobeaccom-paniedbycutsinexistingweaponsstocksandconstraintstopreventtheconversiontonuclearweaponsofexistingstocksofcivilianfissilematerialandmaterialdeclaredexcesstomilitaryneeds.

Overall,thefollowingissueswillhavetobedealtwithifanFM(C)Tistobeachieved:

Howmuchisenough?

Israel’slinkageoftheFM(C)TtoIran’snuclearprogram,

Costandintrusivenessofverification,

Whetherpre-existingcivilianstocksandexcessmilitarystocksareplacedirrevers-iblyunderIAEAsafeguards,and

CountriesthatwillhavetoratifytobringtheTreatyintoforce.

How much is enough? TheU.S.-Sovietarmsracewasdrivenby“counterforce”strategiesthatrequiredeachoftheadversariestohavenuclearweaponstodestroytheothers’nuclearmissilesandbombersandtheircommandandcommunicationinfrastructure.Offensiveweaponsmultipliedfurthertoaccommodateanticipatedlosses,especiallyfromafirststrikebytheotherside.

StatesthatacquirednuclearweaponsaftertheUnitedStatesandSovietUnion,how-ever,sawnopoint,intryingtocompeteincounterforcecapabilitieswitheithernuclearsuperpower.ThenucleararsenalsoftheU.K.,FranceandChinaplateauedwhentheyhadacquiredhundredsofnuclearweapons.IndianandPakistanistrategistsspeakofreachingasimilarlevel.Israelprobablyadoptedthesamelogic.

The situations for China, India and Pakistan are complicated for different reasons,however,andthereforemustbediscussedseparately.

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Dealing with the Challenges: Achieving an FM(C)T


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China. ChinaisconcernedthattheUnitedStatesmaydevelopacapabilityforpreci-sion conventional attack against China’s nuclear weapons backed up by a ballistic-missiledefensesystemthatmightbeabletoshootdownthosemissilesthatsurvived.TheUnited States is deploying adefensenominally against apossible future threatfromNorthKoreannuclear-armedballisticmissilesbutChina’sintercontinentalbal-listicmissileswouldcomefromthesamedirectionandcurrentlynumberonlyinthetens.Theireffectivenessasadeterrentcouldbeputintoquestionthereforebyarela-tivelymodestU.S.missile-defensedeploymentif such a missile defense proved effective.ThismaybewhyChina,althoughitisbelievednottohaveproducedfissilematerialforweaponssincetheearly1990s,alsohasdeclinedtojoinpubliclythemoratoriumdeclaredbyFrance,Russia,theUKandtheUnitedStates.

Foranalystsfamiliarwithhoweasilymid-courseballistic-missiledefense(BMD)canbeoverwhelmedwithdecoys,theBushAdministration’sexpenditureofabout$10bil-lionperyearonBMDseemswasteful.JustincasetheUnitedStatesdevisesawaytodiscriminate between decoys and real warheads, however, China’s nuclear plannerswouldliketheoptionofbeingabletooverwhelmaU.S.defensewithalargenumberofrealwarheads.

TheSoviet-U.S.AntiballisticMissile(ABM)Treatywasnegotiatedtoavertjustsuchawastefuldefense-offensearms race.Now it seems that somesimilar constraintonaChinese-U.S.defense-offensearmsracewouldbedesirable.Chinahas, in fact,beenproposing,that,inparalleltonegotiationsofanFM(C)T,therebediscussionsintheCDonPreventionofanArmsRaceinOuterSpace(PAROS).NeithertheClintonnortheG.W.BushAdministrationwaswillingtoconsideranylinkageofPAROSnegotia-tionstothoseonanFM(C)T.

IfthenextU.S.AdministrationwishestomakeprogressontheFM(C)T,however, itwill have to deal with China’s current thinking that the two issues are linked andenter intodiscussionswithChinaandotherconcernedcountriesonconstraintsonspaceweaponizationandballistic-missiledefense.It isalsopossiblethat, ifthenextU.S. Administration moves away from counterforce strategies and toward deep cuts(to1000orfewerwarheads)Chinawillbecomelessconcernedaboutmaintainingabuildupoption.

India and Pakistan. AspecialproblemarisesinSouthAsiafromthatfactthat,inpar-allelwithitsproductionandseparationofplutoniumforweapons,Indiahasamuchlargerplutonium-separationprogramfocusedonprovidingfuelforitsbreeder-reactorprogram. In the near term, the question is what significance should be imputed toIndia’slargeandgrowingstockofseparatedreactor-gradeplutonium,whichisanorderofmagnitudelargerthanitsstockofweapon-gradeplutonium.Thereareanumberofreasonswhyweapondesignerswouldprefertouseweapon-gradeplutonium,butitiswellknownthatreactor-gradeplutoniumcanbeusedtomakenuclearweaponsand,infact,Indialetitbeknownthatoneofits1998nucleartestsusedreactor-gradeplu-tonium.

Inthelongerterm,inthecontextofnegotiationsontheU.S.-Indiadeal,India’sdecla-rationthatitsbreederprogramhasanational-securitymissioncouldalsocauseprob-lems.Theonlynational-securitymissionthatabreederreactorcouldplausiblyhavewouldbeproducingmoreplutoniumforweapons,and,infact,abreederreactorcouldconsumereactor-gradeplutoniuminitscorewhileproducingweapon-gradeplutoniumintheuranium“blanket”surroundingthecore.IfIndiatakesadvantageofthiscapa-bilityforproducingweapon-gradeplutonium,then,around2015,whenitsfirstlarge


66

breederreactorisscheduledtocomeonline, itsrateofproductionofweapon-gradeplutoniumwillclimbsteeply.

Indiahasenoughweapon-gradeplutoniumforperhapsonehundredweaponsandPak-istanhasenoughHEUandseparatedweapon-gradeplutoniumtoproduceaboutthesamenumberofwarheads.PakistanwouldliketohaveacrediblethreatoffirstnuclearuseinresponsetoanoverwhelmingIndianconventionalattackandapparentlyseesquantitativenuclearinferiorityasundercuttingthatcredibility.ItwouldcertainlybemucheasiertopersuadePakistantojoininanFM(C)TifIndiaremovedtheambiguityaboutitsreactor-gradeplutoniumbydeclaringthatitisforcivilianpurposesonlyandwouldbeplacedunder international safeguardswhen IndiabecomesaParty to theFM(C)T.

Israel’s nuclear weapons and Iran’s enrichment programIsraelistheonlynuclear-armedstatethathasnotovertlytestedanuclearweapon.Itdoesnotacknowledgehavingnuclearweaponseventhoughitisgenerallyunderstoodtohaveacquiredthemoverthreedecadesago.ItisalsotheonlynuclearweaponstatetopubliclyopposetheFM(C)T—inpartbecauseofitspolicyof“opacity.”Thegovern-mentofIsraelconsidersopacitytobetheleastprovocativenuclearposturethatitcanassumetowardtheothercountriesintheregion.

IsraelwouldnothavetoacknowledgepossessingnuclearweaponstojointheFM(C)T.But,underaninternationallyverifiedFM(C)T,itwouldeitherhavetoconvertitsfis-sile-materialproductionfacilitiestopeacefulusesandopenthemtoIAEAinspectionordismantlethemcompletelybeforetheFM(C)Tcomesintoforce.

Although Israel is currently the only nuclear weapon state in the Middle East, it isdeeplyconcernedabout Iran’suranium-enrichmentprogram,which, if it isnotdis-mantled,willgiveIranthecapabilitytoquicklymakehighlyenricheduranium.Thisprogramwould notbe affectedby an FM(C)T because it is already subject to IAEAsafeguards.TheFM(C)TthereforeseemsworsethanuselesstoIsrael.ItwouldthreatenIsrael’snuclearopacitywhilenotreducingthethreatfromIran’suraniumenrichmentprogram.

OnewaytodealwiththisconcernwouldbetocombinetheFM(C)Twithanagree-menttoestablishanuclearfuel-cycle-freezoneintheMiddleEast.Israelwouldhavetoverifiablyshutdownanyenrichmentandreprocessingactivities,i.e.jointheFM(C)Tand,inexchange,Iranwouldhavetoenditsenrichmentprogramandalltheothercountries intheMiddleEastwouldhavetocommitnottoacquireuranium-enrich-mentorreprocessingplants.SuchanagreementwouldbetheMiddleEastequivalentofthe1992KoreanPeninsulaDenuclearizationAgreement(althoughthatalsocom-mittedthepartiesnottomake,receive,possess,testorusenuclearweapons).Despitethisconstraint,SouthKoreahasbeenabletodeploytheworld’ssixthlargestfleetofnuclear-powerreactors(20reactorswith17GWeofcapacityasof2008).

GivenitslackoffaithintheIAEA,Israelwouldprobablybereluctanttoallowinterna-tionalverificationofanFM(C)TonitsterritoryinexchangeforIAEAassurancesthatIranhadgivenupitsenrichmentprogram.Israelhasstatedthat,ifadurableMiddleEastpeaceisbeachieved,itwillagreetoaMiddleEastNuclearWeaponsFreeZonebutalsothatitwillwantIsraeliinspectorstobeabletoverifythattheotherStatesPartyarecomplying.Itwouldlikelyalsoinsistonsuchrightsinconnectionwithafuel-cycle-freezone.Israelpresumablywouldhavetoacceptreciprocalinspectionsofitsownnuclearsitesbyitsneighbors.ThismightbedonethroughtheMiddleEastequivalentofthe


6�

Brazil-ArgentineAgencyfortheAccountingandControlofNuclearMaterials(ABACC)throughwhichArgentinaandBrazilassureeachotherbilaterallyinparallelwithIAEAinspectionsthattheirnuclearfacilitiesareusedonlyfornon-weaponpurposes.

Fortheirpart,Iran,andotherstatesintheMiddleEast,maynotbewillingtogiveuptherighttoenrichandreprocessundersafeguardswhileIsraelkeepsitsexistingweap-onstockpile.Theymightbemoreinterested,however,ifIsraelgivesbindingassurancesthatitwillgiveupitsnuclearweaponsaspartofabroadersettlementintheregion.

Cost and intrusiveness of verificationU.S.policyundertheBushAdministrationhasbeentoopposeinternationalverifica-tionascostly,intrusiveandineffective.AsuccessorAdministrationmighthaveadif-ferentevaluationofthecostsandbenefitsofverification,however,andreturntotheU.S.approachduringthe1990sundertheClintonAdministrationofsupportingan“effectivelyverifiable”treaty.

ApowerfulargumentforFM(C)Tverificationisthatthenon-weaponstatesthatarePartiestotheNon-proliferationTreatyhavealreadyacceptedinternationalverificationaimedatachievingthesamegoal.Theyhaveopenedthemselvesuptorelativelyintru-siveverificationatfacilitiescontainingnuclearmaterialsandthosethathaveratifiedtheAdditionalProtocolhaveopenedupotherfacilitieswhereR&Dandmanufactureis done on nuclear-related equipment such as gas centrifuges. They also accept thepossibilityofchallengeinspectionsatsuspectsitesand,iftheIAEABoardapproves,wide-areaenvironmentalmonitoringforevidenceofclandestinereprocessingoren-richmentactivities.

Theweaponstateshaveacceptedvaryinglevelsof internationalverificationoftheirnuclearactivities.FranceandtheUKhaveprobablyacceptedthebroadestverificationbecause theEURATOMTreaty requires thatallnon-militarynuclear facilities in theEuropeanUnionbeopentoEURATOMinspection.AllU.S.civilianfacilitieshavebeenofferedforIAEAinspectionundertheU.S.VoluntaryOffer,buttherehavebeenrela-tivelyfewinspectionsbecausetheIAEA’ssafeguardsbudgetislimitedandtheAgencyconsidersinspectionsinnuclearweaponstatestobeprimarilyofsymbolicvalue.

InmostdefinitionsoftheFM(C)T,allnewlyseparatedplutoniumwouldbesubjecttoinspectionatleastuntilitwasirradiatedinfuel.Inthenuclearweaponstatesthatarecurrentlycommitted toplutoniumrecycle (China,France, India,Russia) thiswouldresultinaverysubstantialeffortbytheIAEAandbythenationalauthoritiesandfacil-ityoperatorsthatwouldhavetoprovidetheIAEAwithaccessandinformation.Japan’sRokkashoandTokaireprocessingplantsbythemselvesaccounttodayforabout20per-centoftheIAEA’sinspectioneffort.LesscostlyapproachestoIAEAmonitoringofpre-existingreprocessingplantsmaybepossible,butwouldstillbeverydemanding.

Giventhepotentialcostofsafeguardingreprocessingfacilities,itmightbeusefultohavetheIAEA,Japan(theonlynon-weaponstatewithafullydevelopedplutonium-recycleprogram)andthenuclearweaponstateswithreprocessingprogramsagreeonhowtominimizetheburdenofIAEAsafeguardswithoutunderminingtheireffective-nessandhowtodealwiththeissuesassociatedwithexistingreprocessingfacilitiesinnuclearweaponstatesthatweredesignedwithoutsafeguardsinmind.

Russiahasbeenreluctanttoopenitsnuclearfacilitiestointernationalinspectorsandhasplacedonlyasmallnumberontheeligiblelistofitsvoluntarysafeguardsagree-mentwiththeIAEA.Russiaalsoproposedaverynarrowdefinitionoffissilematerials


68

in2000,whenitlastseriouslyaddressedtheissueofanFM(C)T.Ifthatdefinitionwereaccepted,countriescouldenrichHEUupto90%inU-235andseparateplutoniumcon-tainingupto95percentPu-239withouthavingIAEAsafeguardsfollowthematerial.TheHiroshimabombuseduraniumwithanaverageenrichmentofonly80%U-235.And,itisnowwellknownthatplutoniumofalmostanyisotopiccompositioncanbeusedtomakeanuclearweapon.TheRussiandefinitionthereforewouldcompromiseboththenonproliferationanddisarmamentbenefitsofanFM(C)T.

BothIndiaandPakistanhavelimitedIAEAinspectionstofacilitiesandmaterialsim-portedfromabroad,forwhichtheacceptanceofIAEAsafeguardswasaconditionofsupply.AspartoftheU.S.-IndiaproposeddealtoallowIndiatoimportnucleartech-nologyandmaterialswithoutaccepting full-scope safeguards, India’snuclear estab-lishmenthasagreedtoplaceundersafeguardseightofthereactorsthatitbuiltwithoutforeignassistanceandsomefuelcyclefacilities.

ChinahasagreedtoIAEAinspectionatanenrichmentfacilityimportedfromRussiaasaconsequenceofanagreementwithRussia.Chinaisconcerned,however,thatin-ternationalinspectionsatitsshut-downproductionfacilitiesmightrevealinformationaboutitspastproductionoffissilematerialforweapons.

Infact,suchinspectionsmightrevealtheisotopicsoftheHEUandplutoniumusedinChina’sweaponsbut thedesignandperformanceofmodernnuclearweapons isinsensitive to the exact isotopics. It seems unlikely that the minimal internationalinspectionsrequiredtoestablishthatproductionfacilities remainshutdownwouldreducesignificantlytheuncertaintiesinforeignestimatesoftheamountsofweapon-gradeuraniumandplutoniumthatChinahasproduced.China’sGovernmentshouldcommissionitsownstudiestosatisfyitselfonthispoint.

Pre-existing stocks of fissile materialsManynon-weaponstateswanttobeassuredthat,aspartofanFM(C)T,pre-existingstocksoffissilematerialincivilianuseandweaponsmaterialsthatalreadyhavebeendeclared excess for military purposes are prevented from flowing into the weaponscomplexesandswellingthenucleararsenalsinmuchthesamewayaswouldnewpro-ductionoffissilematerialsforweapons.

IfallplutoniumintheciviliansectorsoftheweaponstateswereputunderIAEAsafe-guards,italsowouldbepossibletoavoidthecomplicationofhavingtoseparatepre-andpost-FM(C)Tmaterialsinpeacefuluse.

France,India,RussiaandtheU.K.allhavelargestocksofseparatedcivilianplutonium.Indeed, the stockpiles of civilianplutonium in France, India and theU.K. are eachanorder-of-magnitudelargerthantheirestimatedweaponstocks.CivilianplutoniuminFranceandtheU.K.issubjecttoEURATOMsafeguards.Russia,whichhasahugestockpileofweapon-gradeplutonium,wouldbeexpectedtohavenointerestinusingitscivilianplutoniumforweaponspurposes.Asalreadydiscussed,Indiawouldhavetodecidetoforgotheoptionofusingitspre-existingstockpileofreactor-gradeplutoniumforweaponsbeforebeingwillingtoplaceitunderIAEAsafeguards.TheFM(C)Twouldbecomemoremeaningful,however,ifthesecountriesdidplacetheirstockpilesofreac-tor-gradeplutoniumirreversiblyunderIAEAsafeguards—eitherasapartoftheTreatyorinaparallelcommitment.

RussiaandtheUnitedStateshavealsodeclaredlargequantitiesofseparatedplutoniumexcessformilitarypurposes.Thismaterialisthereforecivilian,althoughmuchofitisstill inweaponcomponents.IttoocouldbeputirreversiblyunderIAEAmonitoring


6�

soastoprovideinternationalassurancethatitwouldremaincivilian.Indeed,RussiaandtheUnitedStateslaunchedtheTrilateralInitiativewiththeIAEAin1996todevisewaysinwhichmonitoringcouldbeginevenwhileweaponsmaterialwasinclassifiedform.Unfortunately,bothRussiaandtheUnitedStatesseemtohavelostinterestinthisinitiativearound2002.

Finally,RussiaandtheUnitedStateshavebothdeclaredexcessverylargequantitiesofweapon-gradeuraniumbuttheUnitedStateshasreservedmuchofitsexcessforfutureuseinnavalreactorfuel.ThismaterialtoocouldbeplacedunderIAEAmonitoring—atleastuntilitisshippedtoafuel-fabricationfacility.Ifacceptablynon-intrusivemoni-toringtechniquescanbedeveloped, theHEUfuelmightbe followedall thewaytoloadinginnavalreactors.SuchmonitoringtechniqueswouldhavetobedevelopedinanycaseifHEUwasproducedfornaval-reactorfuelafteranFM(C)Tcameintoforce.

Countries that will have to ratify to bring the Treaty into forceTheComprehensiveTestBanTreatywasopenedforsignaturein1996.AsofAugust2008,144countrieshadratifiedbuttheTreatyrequirestheratificationsof44specificstates,includingallofthenuclearweaponstates,forittocomeintoforce.Nineofthose44,includingsixoftheninenuclearweaponstates(countingNorthKorea)havenotyetratified.

Incontrast,theNonproliferationTreatyrequiredonlytheratificationofitsthreede-positorystates(theSovietUnion,UKandUnitedStates)andany40otherstates,andcameintoforceinlessthantwoyearsafteritwasopenedforsignaturein1968.

TheU.S.DraftFM(C)Tof2006proposedentryintoforceupontheratificationofthefiveNPTnuclearweaponstates.ChinaandRussiamightbe inclinedtorequirethatIndiaandPakistantojoinaswell.RussiamightaddIsraelandChinamightaddNorthKorea.Oneof the issues thatwillhave tobenegotiated, therefore,will bewhetherornotallofthenuclearweaponstateswillberequiredtoratifytheFM(C)Tbeforeitcomesintoforce.

AswiththeNPT,notrequiringratificationbyallthenuclearweaponstateswouldal-lowforearlyentryintoforceandspeedierdevelopmentoftheattendantverificationpractices.Itmightalsogeneratepressureonthehold-outstatestojoin.

Frank von Hippel, Co-Chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials


�0 Endnotes

EndnotesCountry Perspectives: China

1 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, Chinese Military Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories, InstituteforScienceandInternationalSecurity,Washington,D.C.,30June2005.

2 NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,“ChineseNuclearForces,2008,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,July/August2008,Vol.62,No.3.pp.42–44.

3 LiBin,“UnderstandingChina’sNuclearStrategy,”(inChinese)World Economics and Politics,No.9,2006,pp.16–22;orLiBin,“TrackingChineseStrategicMobileMissiles,”Science & Global Security,Vol.15,No.1,2007,pp.1–30.

4 DavidAlbright,FransBerkhout,andWilliamWalker,Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies,SIPRI,OxfordUniversityPress,1997,pp.128–129.

5 China’s National Defense in 2006, InformationOfficeoftheStateCouncilofthePeople’sRepublicofChina,29December2006,Beijing,p.9.

6 HansKristensen,“ChineseSubmarinePatrolsReboundin2007,butRemainLimited,”www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/01/chinese_submarine_patrols_rebo.php.

7 China’sOfficialWhitePaperin2006believesthat“China’sOverallSecurityEnvironmentRemainsSound,”China’s National Defense in 2006, op. cit., p.6.

8 Fact Sheet: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW—How They Came About, OrganisationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons,www.opcw.org/docs/fs1.pdf.

9 Global Fissile Material Report 2008,InternationalPanelonFissileMaterials,Princeton,NJ,September2008.

10 Thetwomostimportantofthesereservationsare:1)Ifaprivateorganizationrefusestovoluntarilyacceptachallengeinspection,theU.S.Executivemustobtainasearchwarrantfromajudge;and2)AllsamplescollectedintheUnitedStatesbyinspectorsoftheOrganizationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeaponsmustbeanalyzedbylaboratorieslocatedintheUnitedStates,“USChemicalWeaponsConventionRatification,”Disarmament Diplomacy,No.14,April1997.

11 “China’sPositionPaperontheNewSecurityConcept,”China’sworkingpapersubmittedtotheARFforeignministermeeting,31July1999,www.china-embassy.ch/eng/xwss/t138294.htm.


12ThisreportisbaseddocumentsandinterviewswithofficialsfromtheMinistryforForeignAffairs,MinistryofDefense,andtheFrenchdelegationtotheUNConferenceonDisarmament.Thesedepart-mentsareratherreticenttocommunicateontheFMCTandingeneralonmilitarynuclearactivities.

13 RobertS.NorrisandHansKristensen,“FrenchNuclearForces,2005.”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,July/August2005.

��Endnotes

14 SpeechbyM.NicolasSarkozy,PresidentoftheRepublic,Cherbourg,21March2008,www.ipfmlibrary.org/sar08.pdf;forananalysisseeJ.-M.Collin,“SarkozyandtheFrenchnucleardeterrence”,BASIC,GettingtoZeroPaper,15July2008,www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz02.htm.

15SpeechbyM.JacquesChirac,PresidentoftheRepublic,Brest,ÎleLongue,19January2006

16 Assumingathermonuclearwarheadcontainsonaverageabout4kgofplutoniumand25kgofhighlyenricheduranium.

17 ThereductionoftheStrategicAirForcewillseetheclosingofoneortwospecialbunkers(DépôtsAteliersdeMunitionsSpéciales/DAMS)outof thefivecurrentlyoperational. It alsowilldecreasethenumberoftransportsofnuclearwarheadsformaintenancebetweentheDAMSandtheValduccenter.

18MaryByrdDavis,La France Nucléaire matières et sites,Wise-Paris,2002.

19 D.Albright,F.Berkhout,andW.Walker,Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inven-tories, Capabilities and Policies,SIPRI,OxfordUniversityPress,1997.

20DélégationGénéralepourl’Armement,“FranceQualifiesRafaletoFullF3Standard”,pressrelease,7July2008:“ThefirstdeliveriesofaircraftproducedtotheF3standardwillstartatthebeginningof2009.Theaircraftalreadyinservicewillbebroughtuptothenewstandard.TheF3standardallowstousetheASMP-Anuclearmissile.”

21SpeechbyM.NicolasSarkozy,21March2008,op. cit.

22 Défense et Sécurité Nationale: Le Livre Blanc,June2008,availableatwww.defense.gouv.fr.ThepreviousWhitePaperdatesfrom1994.

23Francecloseditsnuclear-weapontestsiteinthePacificin1996.

24BrunoBarrillot,“AuditAtomique:Lecoutdel’arsenalnucléairefrançais1945–2010,”Observatoire des Armements,CDRPC,2000.

25Les grands chantiers de démantèlement au CEA,DossierdepresseCEA,2006.

26“Marcouledismantling,”Les Echos,26November2004.

27MaryByrdDavis,La France Nucléaire matières et sites, Wise-Paris,2002.

28Ibid.

29SpeechbyM.NicolasSarkozy,21March2008,op. cit.

30InterviewwithFredericDesagneaux,AssistantspokesmanofMinistryofForeignAffairs.

31 InterviewwithMicheleRamis-Plum,DeputyofthePermanentRepresentativeattheCD.

32StatementbyJean-FrançoisDobelleAmbassador,PermanentRepresentativeofFrancetotheConfer-enceonDisarmament,24June2008.

33Fordetails,seeMycleSchneiderandYvesMarignac,Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing in France,IPFMResearchReportNo.4,April2008,www.ipfmlibrary.org/rr04.pdf.

34Eurodifisexpectedtoclosein2014andbedismantledby2020.

35INFCIRC/549/Add.5/11, Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regardingtheManagementofPlutoniumStatementsontheManagementofPlutoniumandofHighlyEnrichedUranium,20August2007.

36Thisincludedin2004,resolution59/81introducedbyCanada,andin2005,theresolutionentitled:“Apathtothetotaleliminationofnuclearweapons,”introducedbyJapan.StatementbyMr.FrançoisRivasseau, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament,PlenarySessionoftheConferenceonDisarmament,2March2006.

�2 Endnotes

37 FrancebelievesPakistan,India,andChinadonotwishtoseeanFM(C)Tbecauseitwouldendangerfissile-materialproductionfortheirnucleararsenals.

38The other five points in the plan are to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, dismantle allnucleartestingsitestransparently,negotiateatreatybanningshort-andintermediate-rangesurface-to-surfacemissiles,adheretoandimplementtheHagueCodeofConductAgainstBallisticMissileProliferation,andmobilizeonallotherfieldsofdisarmament.

39MichelPicardandBrunoTertrais,“LaPropulsionNucléaire,UnSavoir-FaireIndispensablealaSou-veraineté Nationale,” Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 30 June 2006; Chunyan Ma andFrankvonHippel, “Ending theProductionofHighlyEnrichedUranium forNavalReactors,”The Nonproliferation Review,Spring2001.

40StatementbyJean-FrançoisDobelleAmbassador,PermanentRepresentativeofFrancetotheConfer-enceonDisarmament,24January2007.

41 TheOttawatreatytobanlandminesandthecurrentOsloprocessforbanningclustermunitionsareexamplesofmultinationalarmscontroltalksoutsidetheUNstructure.


42Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Ex-plosive Devices,CD/1299,24March1995,www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/shannon.html.

43Creating a new momentum for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), WorkingPapersubmittedbyGermany,NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.21,30April2008,www.ipfmlibrary.org/ger08.pdf.

44StatementbytheUtilitiesEmployingNuclearEnergyandtheNuclearIndustryinGermanyontheIAEAProgramme93+2,3June1996.SeealsoA.Schaper,“ImplementingSafeguardsinCountriesofConcern,”in:E.HäckelandG.Stein(eds.),Tightening the Reins: Towards a Strengthened International Nuclear Safeguards System, SpringerVerlag,Berlin,2000.

45Federal Government Seeks Multilateralization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle, GermanFederalForeignOffice,pressrelease,19February2008.

46The people forming this currently rather small community of German experts interested in theFM(C)Taregovernmentofficials(mainlyfromtheForeignMinistry;theMinistryforEnvironment,NatureProtection,andReactorSafety;andtheMinistryofEconomicsandTechnology),expertsfromresearchinstitutes,universities,andthesafeguardscommunity;andrepresentativesofthenuclearindustry.

47Fordetails,seeA.Schaper,Principles of the Verification for a Future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT),FrankfurtPeaceResearchInstituteReportNo.58,2001.

48A Cut-off Treaty and associated costs – An IAEA Secretariat Working Paper on Different Alternatives for the Verification of a Fissile Material Production Cut-Off Treaty and Preliminary Cost Estimates Required for the Verification of these Alternatives,InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,presentedattheWorkshoponaCut-OffTreaty,Toronto,Canada,17–18January1995.

49AnexampleisastatementbytheEUCouncilattheNPTReviewConference,“CallingonnuclearweaponStates,asagreedattheMoscowG7/P8SummitonNuclearSafetyon19and20April1996to place fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes under appropriateinternationalsafeguardsandphysicalprotection,”CouncilCommonPositionof13April2000relat-ingtothe2000ReviewConferenceofthePartiestotheTreatyontheNon-proliferationofNuclearWeaponsOfficialJournalL097,Document400X0297,19April2000,p.1,Article2(2i).

50AnexampleisthedesignstudyofapilotplantforthedispositionofexcessRussianweaponsplu-tonium,Basisauslegung für eine Pilotanlage zur Produktion von Uran-Plutonium-Brennstoff aus waffen-grädigem Plutonium und zum Einsatz dieses Brennstoffs in Kernreaktoren, Abschlußbericht, Gesellschaftfür Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Siemens Aktiengesellschaft und Ministerium fürAtomenergiederRussischenFöderation(MINATOM),28February1997.

��Endnotes

51 “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government oftheRussianFederationConcerningtheManagementandDispositionofPlutoniumDesignatedasNoLongerRequiredforDefensePurposesandRelatedCo-operation,”U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,Washington,D.C.,1September2000,www.ipfmlibrary.org/doe00.pdf.

52AnnetteSchaper,forthcoming.

53Atthe1995NPTReviewConference,eightEuropeancountries(Austria,Denmark,Finland,Hungary,Ireland,theNetherlands,Norway,andSweden)togetherwithAustralia,Canada,andNewZealanddraftedatexttobeincludedintheconference’sfinaldocument,recommending“thatnonewciv-il reactors requiring highly-enriched uranium be constructed,” see NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8,April21,1995.DavidFischerandHaraldMüller,United Divided: The Europeans at the NPT Extension Conference,PeaceResearchInstituteFrankfurtReportNo.40,November1995,p.34.


54Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Ex-plosive Devices,CD/1299,24March1995,www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/shannon.html.

55Draft Decision On The Establishment Of An Ad Hoc Committee Under Item 1 Of The Agenda Entitled ‘Ces-sation Of The Nuclear Arms Race And Nuclear Disarmament,’CD/1547,11August1998,reprinted in“FMT:BreakthroughatLastattheCD,”Disarmament Diplomacy, September1998,www.acronym.org.uk/fissban/fmctaug.htm.

56“India–U.S.JointStatement,”18July2005,www.indianembassy.org,mirroredatwww.ipfmlibrary.org/ind05.pdf.

57www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/17MayIndia.pdf.

58Textofthedocumenttitled“ImplementationoftheIndia-UnitedStatesJointStatementofJuly18,2005: India’s Separation Plan” tabled in Parliament on 7 March 2006, www.indianembassy.org,mirroredatwww.ipfmlibrary.org/ind06.pdf.

59Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,PublicLaw109–401.

60“The term ‘produce fissile material’ does not include activities involving fissile material pro-ducedpriortoentryintoforceoftheTreaty,providedthatsuchactivitiesdonotincreasetheto-tal quantity of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 in such fissile material.” Article II.3,DraftTextforanFMCTproposedbytheUnitedStates,tabledon18May2006inGenevaattheCon-ferenceonDisarmament,www.ipfmlibrary.org/fmct-usdraft.pdf.

61 DavidAlbrightandSusanBasu,India’s Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Program: Growing Capacity for Mili-tary Purposes, InstituteforScienceandInternationalSecurity,18January2007.ThisisabouttwicethatestimatedbyM.V.Ramanabasedonthemeetingtheneedtofuel theprototypesubmarinereactor.SeeM.V.Ramana,“AnEstimateofIndia’sUraniumEnrichmentCapacity,”Science & Global Security,Vol.12,2004,pp.115–124.

62www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html.

63www.thehindu.com/2003/01/05/stories/2003010504810100.htm.

64R.Rajaraman,“NuclearPosture”,The Hindu,EditorialPage,7February2003;R.Rajaraman,“Capthenucleararsenalnow”The Hindu,25January2005.

65AlexanderGlaserandM.V.Ramana,“Weapon-gradePlutoniumProductionPotentialintheIndianPrototypeFastBreederReactor,Science & Global Security 15, 2007,p.85.

66R.Rajaraman,“India-U.S.dealandthenuclearceiling”,The Hindu,10September2005;R.Rajara-man,“FalloutfromNuclearDeal”Economic and Political Weekly,pp.3353–34,5August2006.

�� Endnotes


67 See, e.g., the statement by Gideon Frank, former Chairman of the Israeli Atomic Energy Com-mission at the 2007 annual meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),www.iaec.gov.il/docs/StatementGC51.pdf.

68RecentreportsindicatethatIsraelhasbeenlobbyingtheNuclearSuppliersGroup(NSG)tochangeitsexportcontrolguidelinesthatnowprohibitthetransferofnuclearmaterialsandtechnologytonon-NPTstatessuchasIndiaandIsraelsothatIsraelwillhavethesameaccesstosuchmaterialsandtechnologyastheUnitedStateshasagreedtograntIndiaintheproposedU.S.-Indianuclearagree-ment.UnliketheproposedchangeinU.S.policythatisbasedongrantingIndiaanexemptionfromU.S.lawsandNSGguidelines,theIsraeliinitiativeisbasedonmeetingasetof“nuclearresponsibilitycriteria”ratherthanaspecificexemption.TheU.S.governmenthasopposedtheIsraeliinitiative:whilethereiswidespread,bipartisansupportinWashingtonforstrongertieswithIndiathatpropo-nentsclaimwouldbefacilitatedbytheproposedagreement,theUnitedStateswantstoavoiddealingsimultaneouslywithIsrael(andPakistan)onthesensitiveissueofnucleartechnologytransfer.See,e.g.,GlennKessler,“IsraelSubmitsNuclearTradePlan”,The Washington Post,September30,2007,p.A23.

69Foranoverview,seeAvnerCohen,Israel and the Bomb,ColumbiaUniversityPress,NewYork,1998.

70AvnerCohenandWilliamBurr,“IsraelCrossestheThreshold,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June2006.

71Whichnowincludesasubmarine-basedcomponent.Fordetails,seeLawrencePrabhaker,JoshuaHo,andWalterBateman,The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific,WorldScientific,2006,pp.228–229.

72Strong,albeitopaque, support for Israel’spossessionofnuclearweaponsonthebasisof itsongo-ingneedtodeterthreatstoitsexistence,wasofferedbyformerU.S.SecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeldatapressconferenceinFrankfurt,GermanyinFebruary2004andbyformerUKForeignSecretaryJackStrawinaMinisterialStatementtotheHouseofCommonsonFebruary25,2004.IntheQ&AsessionfollowingRumsfeld’sremarks,thereoccurredthefollowingexchange:“Mr.Secre-tary,youtalkedaboutcountriesthatweretryingtoproduceweaponsofmassdestruction.YoutalkedaboutIraqandyoutalkedaboutIranandNorthKorea.Ihaveaquestion,adirectquestiontoyou.WhatareyoudoingwithIsrael?AsfarasIsraelisconcerned,Israelhasmoreatomicweaponsintheregionthananyothercountry.WhydoyouremainsilentinregardtoIsrael?Ithinkit’simportanttoanswerthisquestionbecausethishastodowiththeworld,thestrategythatwearepursuingtoday.IthinkthatifthepositiontowardsIsraelweredifferentthenthesituationwouldbedifferentintheNearEast,andthisisagreatproblem.”Rumsfeld:“YouknowtheanswerbeforeIgiveit,I’msure.Theworldknowstheanswer.Wetaketheworldlikeyoufindit;andIsraelisasmallstatewithasmallpopulation.It’sademocracyanditexistsinaneighborhoodthatinmany—overaperiodoftimehasopinedfromtimetotimethatthey’dpreferitnotbethereandthey’dlikeittobeputinthesea.AndIsraelhasopinedthatitwouldprefernottogetputinthesea,andasaresult,overaperiodofdecades,ithasarrangeditselfsoithasn’tbeenputinthesea.”AnevenstrongerstatementinsupportofIsraelinuclearizationwasofferedbyStraw:“ThethreatofextinctionplacesIsraelinadifferentcategoryfromanyothercountryintheworld.”

73Formoredetailsabouttheseinitiatives,seethestatementbyGideonFrank,op. cit.

74 Thegenericargumentthatthecharacterandbehaviorofaregimeshouldinfluencetheintensityofeffortsbyotherstatesandtheinternationalcommunitytoopposeitsacquisitionofnuclearweap-onshasbeenmade,e.g.,byRichardHaas,The Opportunity,PublicAffairs,NewYork,2005,p.160.InthespecificcaseofIsraeland“othercivilizedstates”ontheonehandandIranontheother,theargumenthasbeenvigorously—if inadvertently—madeby IsraeliPrimeMinisterEhudOlmert inaninterviewwithaGermantelevisionstationinDecember2006.ForanarticleonOlmert’s“slipofthetongue”andthereactioninIsrael,see,e.g.,PhilippeNaughton,“Olmert’snuclearslip-upsparksoutrage in Israel,” Times Online, 12 December 2006, www.timesonline.co.uk. Besides the case fortreatingIranandIsraeldifferentlywithregardtopossessionofnuclearweaponsonmoralandpoliti-calgrounds,thereisalsoanimportantlegaldistinction:IranhassignedtheNPTasanon-nuclearweaponsstatewhileIsraelhasnot.However,inthisregarditshouldbenotedthatIrancontinuestodenythatitsnuclearprogramhasamilitaryrationale.

��Endnotes

75 Incontrasttonon-nuclearstatepartiestotheNPT,whichareobligatedtoacceptsafeguardsonalltheir nuclear materials and facilities, the acceptance of safeguards on materials and facilities onweaponsstatesNPTpartiesisvoluntary,non-NPTpartiesareonlyobligatedtoacceptsafeguardsonmaterialsandfacilitiesasaconditionoftechnologytransfer.

76 PrimarilybecauseofrecentU.S.objectionstoanFMCTwithverificationprovisions,theissueofveri-ficationisnowbeingreexamined.However,theweightofcurrentopinioninthenon-proliferationcommunityisthatverificationisessential,andthatitscostandlevelofintrusivenesscanbereducedtoacceptablelevels.

77EmilyB.Landau,Arms Control in the Middle East: Cooperative security Dialogue and Regional Constraints,Sussex Academic Press, 2006; Peter Jones, Towards a Regional Security Regime for the Middle East: Issues and Options,SIPRI,Stockholm,1998;andPeterJones,“NegotiatingRegionalSecurityandArmsControlintheMiddleEast:TheACRSExperienceandBeyond,”Journal of strategic Studies,26(3),pp.137–154,2003.

78AlufBenn,“TheStruggletoKeepNuclearCapabilitiesSecret,”Ha’aretz,14September1999.

79Ibid.

80“ArabLeaguewillcallforleavingnucleartreatyifIsraeladmitstoatomicweapons”,The Associated Press, 5March2008.

81See,e.g.,FrankBarnaby,The Invisible Bomb,I.B.Tauris,London,1989,pp.38– 40.

82Onepossiblenon-intrusivewayofverifyingthatplutoniumwasn’tbeingextractedfromspentfuelwouldbetoremotelymonitorthenoblegasfissionproducts,specificallykrypton-85,thatarere-leasedduring the reprocessingof spentnuclear fuel.However, it’s technicallypossible topreventthe releaseof thesegases, so that theArab statesmightdemandchallengeon-site inspections toverifythatplutoniumwasn’tbeingproduced.IfIsraeldidn’twanttoshutdowntheDimonareactor,itcouldinsistthatsuchinspectionsbeconductedaccordingtotheprincipleof“managedaccess”,butitisverydoubtfulthattheprocesswouldworkwithoutcompromisingopacity.IfIsraelcouldbepersuadedtoshutdowntheDimonareactorandproducetritiumatanewreactororanacceleratorspecificallydesignedforthispurpose,itmightbeeasiertoachievecredibleverificationofthenon-productionofplutoniumwithoutseriouslycompromisingopacity.Thispossibilitydeservesfurtherstudy.

83“FMCT: Explanation of vote by Mr. Alon Bar,” UN First Committee, 4 November 2004,www.ipfmlibrary.org/bar04b.pdf.

84Interestinglobalnucleardisarmamenthasbeenrekindledlatelybythepublicationofanop-edbyGeorgeSchultz,WilliamPerry,HenryKissinger,andSamNunn,“AWorldFreeofNuclearWeapons,” The Wall Street Journal,4January2007,p.A15.

85See,e.g.,TonyJudt,“The‘ProblemofEvil’inPostwarEurope”,The New York Review of Books,14Feb-ruary2008,p.35.BesidesanuclearattackbyIranitself,IsraelisalsoworrythatIranmighttransfernuclearexplosivestosub-nationalgroupssuchasHezbollahandHamaswhichareviewedasproxiesofIranthatshareitsviewthatIsraelisanillegitimatestate.

86IsraelhaslongsupportedtheestablishmentofaNuclearWeaponsFreeZoneintheMiddleEastaftersuchajustanddurablepeacehasbeenachieved,butthissupporthasbeenlargelyrhetorical.WhatismissingisrecognitionbyIsraelthatnuclearweapons,eveninthepossessionof“responsible”states,posesignificantdangers,andhenceoftheimportanceofavoidingamind-setandactionsthatmakethelackofprogresstowardsajustanddurablepeaceaself-fulfillingprophecy.

87 Suchazonehasbeensuggestedby,e.g.,MarvinMillerandLawrenceScheinman,“IsraelandaNu-clearWeaponsFreeZoneintheMiddleEast”inMortonBremerMaerliandSverreLodgaard(eds.),Nuclear Proliferation and International Security,Routledge,LondonandNewYork,2007,p.143.

88Inparticular,verificationmeans shouldgobeyond implementationof theAdditionalProtocol toincludetheestablishmentofawide-areaenvironmentalsamplingnetworkintheregion.

89SeerecentstatementbyArabforeignministers,op. cit.

�6 Endnotes

90This view has received strong support from McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe, Jr. and SidneyD. Drell, Reducing the Nuclear Danger, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1993, pp. 62–72.


91 Working Paper submitted by Japanese Government to Conference on Disarmament, “FMCT: Acontribution to Constructive Discussions,” May 2006, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/papers06/16MayJapan.pdf.

92Ibid.

93StatementbyAmbassadorYoshikiMine,PermanentRepresentativeofJapantotheConferenceonDisarmament(FMCT),Geneva,16May2006.www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/060516FMCT.htm.Earlierpapersand statements referred to includeWorkingPaper submittedbyJapanesegovernmenttoConferenceonDisarmament,“WorkingpaperonaTreatytobanthepro-ductionoffissilematerialsfornuclearweaponsandothernuclearexplosivedevices,”August2003.www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/030814FMCT.htm,andStatementbyAmbassa-dorDr.KunikoInoguchi,PermanentRepresentativeofJapantotheConferenceonDisarmament,Geneva, 14th August, 2003, www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/030814CD.htm.TheauthoralsothanksProf.MasahiroKikuchiofHoseiUniversityandDr.KinjiKoyamaoftheJapanInstituteofInternationalAffairsfortheirvaluableadviceandcomments.

94For Japan’s civilianplutoniumprogramsand their challenges, seeTadahiroKatsutaandTatsujiroSuzuki,Japan’s Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges,IPFMResearchReportNo.2,Septem-ber2006,www.ipfmlibrary.org/rr02.pdf.

95AmbassadorYukiyaAmano,“ReducingtheEnrichmentLevelofUraniumFuel(Japan’sExperience),”PresentationattheInternationalSymposiumMinimisationofHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU)intheCivilianNuclearSector,Oslo,Norway,19June2006.AccordingtotheJapanAtomicEnergyCom-mission,theKyotoFastCriticalAssembly(KUCA)wasapprovedforconversiontoLEUfuelinOc-tober2007 and will be converted by March 2009; the Tokai Fast Critical Assembly (FCA), KyotoUniversityReactor(KUR),andUniversityofTokyoreactor(Yayoi),cannotbeconverted,andtherearecurrentlynoofficialplansfortheirfuture;noofficialapplicationhasyetbeensubmittedforcon-versionoftheKinkiUniversitynuclearreactor(UTR-KINKI).

96Mine,2006,op. cit.

97 Theplutoniuminpowerreactorspentfueltypicallycontains50–60%Pu-239,whileweapon-gradeplutoniumhasover90%Pu-239.



100MasahiroKikuchi,“KakukakusanMondaiToKenshouSochi(VerificationMeasuresandProlifera-tion Issues),”Chapter14,AsadaandTozaki (eds.),Kaku-Gunshuku Fukakusan No Ho To Seiji (Law and Politics in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-proliferation),SinzanSha,2007;KinjiKoyama,“VerificationMeasuresforFissileMaterialCut-offTreaty(FMCT),”PaperpresentedattheSeminarConferenceonTechnicalIssuesconcerningFissileMaterialCut-offTreaty,12May1988,Geneva,Switzerland.

101WorkingPaper,August2003,op cit.

102Ibid.

103Ibid.


104UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyResolution48/75L,16December1993.

105WadeBoese,“PakistanSupportsCutoffTalksAtOpeningofThirdCDSession,”Arms Control Today, June/July1998.

��Endnotes

106AmbassadorMunirAkram, Statement at the special sessionof theConferenceonDisarmament,2June1998,www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/06/980602-pak-cd.htm.

107UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1172,6June1998.

108AmbassadorMunirAkram,StatementintheConferenceonDisarmamentonCTBT,FMCTissues,30July1998,www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/docs/980730-cd-pak.htm.

109Ibid.

110Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112Ambassador Munir Akram, Statement at the Conference on Disarmament, 11 August 1998,www.acronym.org.uk/fissban/pak.htm.

113There is an assumed uncertainty of 15% in these estimates of HEU annual production and ac-cumulatedstocks,reflectingalackofinformationabouttheevolutionofthenumberandsepara-tiveworkcapacityofPakistan’scentrifugesaswellas theuraniumisotoperatios in thedepleteduraniumtails.SeeZiaMian,A.H.Nayyar,R.RajaramanandM.V.Ramana,Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,IPFMResearchReportNo.1,September2006,www.fissilematerials.org/rr01.pdf.Theestimateshavebeenupdatedto2007.TheseestimatesdonotincludethepossibilityrecentlyreportedthatoverthepastdecadePakistanmayhaveincreaseditscapacityforuraniumenrichmentforweaponsbymovingtomoreadvancedcentrifugeswiththreetofourtimesgreaterseparativepowerthanitsfirstandsecondgenerationmachines.MarkHibbs,“Pakistan developed more powerful centrifuges”, Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 32, No. 3 , 29 January 2007,andMarkHibbs,“P-4centrifugeraisedintelligenceconcernsaboutpost-1975datatheft,”Nucleonics Week,Vol.48,No.7,15February2007.

114ZiaMianetal.,Fissile Materials in South Asia,op. cit.

115J.Warrick,“PakistanExpandingNuclearProgram,”The Washington Post,24July2006;and“U.S.DisputesReportonNewPakistanReactor,”The New York Times, 3August2006.Seealso,T.Cochran,What is the Size of Khushab II?,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,Washington,D.C.,8September2006,andD.AlbrightandP.Brannan,“Updateon theConstructionof theNewLargeKhushabReactor,”ISIS,Washington,D.C.,4October2006.PicturesofthethirdreactorwerereleasedinJune2007;D.AlbrightandP.Brannan,“PakistanAppearstobeBuildingaThirdPlutoniumProductionReactoratKhushabNuclearSite,”InstituteforScienceandInternationalSecurity,21June2007.

116D.AlbrightandP.Brannan,“ChashmaNuclearSiteinPakistanwithPossibleReprocessingPlant,”InstituteforScienceandInternationalSecurity,18January2007.

117Ambassador Masood Khan, Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 16 May 2006,www.ipfmlibrary.org/pak06.pdf.

118Ibid.

119R.Rajaraman,India,inthisvolume.

120Basedonareportofconversationwithdiplomats.

121G.Perkovich,India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley,1999.

122R.Rajaraman,India,inthisvolume.

123“PakistanMovesClosertoSignNuclearTreaty,”The Nation,Lahore,26October1998.

124AmitBaruah,“N-ArmsDeploymentaReciprocalMatter,”The Hindu,11November1998.

125“NoCTBTSigningDuringUSVisit:FM,”Dawn,15November1998.

�8 Endnotes

126ZiaMianetal.,Fissile Materials in South Asia,op. cit.

127“PressreleasebyInter-ServicesPublicRelations,No.318/2007”,August1,2007,www.ispr.gov.pk/Archive&Press/Aug2007/2-Aug-2007.htm.

128W.Boese,“NegotiationsEludeDisarmamentBodyAgain,”Arms Control Today,October2007.

129AmbassadorMasoodKhan,16May2006,op. cit.

130Ibid.

131Pakistan statement toConferenceonDisarmament, 28 June2007,www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches07/2session/June28Pakistan.html

132Agreement between India & Pakistan on Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities,1988, www.indianembassy.org,mirroredatwww.ipfmlibrary.org/ind88.pdf.Thefacilitiesthateachstatecanincludeinitslistare“nuclearpowerandresearchreactors,fuelfabrication,uraniumen-richment,isotopesseparationandreprocessingfacilitiesaswellasanyotherinstallationswithfreshorirradiatednuclearfuelandmaterialsinanyformandestablishmentsstoringsignificantquanti-tiesofradio-activematerials.”

133www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA2001112047.

134“Pakistan’sInstrumentofRatification,”29October1997,www.stimson.org/?SN=CB20011220107.

135Ambassador Masood Khan, to the Conference on Disarmament, 17 June 2008,www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/2session/June17Pakistan.pdf.

136New Zealand (24 June 2008): “When we begin negotiations, we will certainly argue vigorouslyand present very strong arguments in favor of inclusion of verification and existing stocks.”www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/2session/June24NewZealand.html.

137Iran(26May2008):“WeareinfavorofanFMCTthatiscomprehensive,verifiable,andwhichcov-erstheexistingstocks,”www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/2session/May26Iran.pdf.

138Brazil (20 May 2008): “Brazil favors an FMCT which includes a multilateral verification mecha-nism and stockpile controls,” www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/2session/May20Brazil.pdf.


139 StatementbyAmbassadorValeryLoshinin,16May2006.

140AlthoughthisstatementdoesnotmakeclearwhetheritincludescivilianfissilematerialsproducedbeforetheFM(C)Tcomesintoforce,myunderstandingisthatitdoes.

141Ibid.

142StatementbyAmbassadorValeryLoshinin,PermanentRepresentativeoftheRussianFederationatthePlenaryMeetingoftheConferenceonDisarmament,Geneva,2March2006.

143Vladimir Rybachenkov, “Problems related with elaboration of the international Convention onthebanontheproductionoffissilematerialsforweaponspurposes,”presentationattheMoscowCarnegieCenterworkshop,Moscow,2February2000.

144StatementbyAmbassadorValeryLoshinin,16May2006.

145Includingmaterialdeclaredexcess,Global Fissile Material Report 2007 updatedtotakeintoaccounttheblend-downof40additionaltonsofexcessweapon-gradeuranium.

146USECpressrelease,5March2008.

��Endnotes

147Ibid.

148“SettingtheContextfortheCut-OffTreaty,”StatementbyAmbassadorBerdennikovattheCana-dianworkshop,Toronto,Canada,17January1995.

149VladimirRybachenkov,“ProblemsrelatedwithelaborationoftheinternationalConventiononthebanontheproductionoffissilematerialsforweaponspurposes,”op. cit.


150While the Additional Protocol did not yet exist at the time, its mechanisms such as 24-hr sur-veillancemonitoringweretestedinSouthAfrica.

151SeekeynoteaddressbyMineralsandEnergyAffairsMinisterMosibudiMangena,ataConferenceonPeacefulUsesofNuclearEnergyinJohannesburg,March2007.

152Technetium99m,thedaughterproductofMolybdenum-99(Mo-99),isgloballythemostcommonlyutilizedmedicalradioisotope.Annually,itisusedforapproximately20–25millionmedicaldiag-nosticprocedures,comprisingsome80%ofallnuclearmedicineprocedures.SouthAfricaisoneofonlyafewmajorcommercialproducersofMo-99,allofthemirradiatingHEUtargetsinresearch,test,orisotopeproductionreactorsandrecoveringMo-99indedicatedprocessingfacilities.

153“Nuclear Energy Corp Sells Isotopes Worth R131-M,” Financial Times Information, South AfricanPressAssociation,10September2003.

154AmbassadorMintyistheSouthAfricanGovernorontheIAEABoardofGovernorsandtheAmbas-sadorforDisarmament.


155DesBrowne,UKSecretaryofStateforDefence,SpeechtotheConferenceonDisarmamentplenary,5February2008.

156IamgratefulforbriefingsfromofficialsintheDepartmentforBusiness,EnterpriseandRegulatoryReform(formerlytheDepartmentforTradeandIndustry),theForeignandCommonwealthOffice(FCO)andtheMinistryofDefence(MoD).

157MichaelLittlejohns,“UK‘hashaltedthebuild-uponN-material,’”Financial Times, 19April1995.

158MinistryofDefence,Strategic Defence Review, July1998,www.ipfmlibrary.org/mod98.pdf.

159ThesefiguresaretakenfromaMinistryofDefencebriefingtotheIPFM,October2007.

160TheUKstatementsdefineasHEUalluraniumenrichedto20%ormoreuranium-235.

161SeeChapter1,Global Fissile Material Reports 2007and2008.

162United States of America, Draft Mandate, 18 May 2006 (CD 1776) and Treaty on the Cessation of Production of Fissile Material for Use in Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices,May18,2006(CD/1777).

163Thisechoedacall fornucleardisarmamentbyUK’soutgoingForeignSecretaryMargaretBecketttotheCarnegieEndowmentNonproliferationConferenceon25June2007,andherproposal for“theUKtobeattheforefrontofboththethinkingandthepracticalwork.Tobe,asitwere,a‘disar-mamentlaboratory’.”MargaretBeckett,SecretaryofStateforForeignandCommonwealthAffairs,Speech to the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace Non-Proliferation Conference,WashingtonDC,25June2007.

164Average annual requirements by UK submarines has been estimated at 0.110 tons per year, OleReistadandStyrkaarHustveit,“HEUFuelCycleInventoriesandProgressinGlobalMinimization,”Nonproliferation Review 15 (2008),p.265.

80 Endnotes

165D.Albright,F.BerkhoutandW.Walker,Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996,SIPRI, OxfordUniversityPress,1997,pp.118–119;andS.AftergoodandF.vonHippel,“TheU.S.HighlyEnrichedUranium Declaration: Transparency Deferred but not Denied,” Nonproliferation Review, 14, 2007,p.149.


166U.S.MissiontotheUnitedNationsinGenevaPressRelease,“USTablesDraftFM(C)TTextatConfer-enceonDisarmament,”18May2006.Fulltextavailableatwww.ipfmlibrary.org/fmct-usdraft.pdf.

167USA: White Paper on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty – Conference on Disarmament,U.S.DepartmentofState,18May2006,www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/66901.htm.

168BarackObama,“RenewingAmericanLeadership,”Foreign Affairs, July/August2007.SeealsoS.1977,“NuclearWeaponsThreatReductionActof2007,”whichSenatorObamaco-sponsoredwithSenatorChuckHagel.

169www.johnmccain.com,pressrelease,27May2008.

170Note,however,thattheclean-upofstocksofplutoniumproducedpriortoentryintoforceoftheFM(C)T,suchasremovingthebuild-upofamericiumisnotconsideredreprocessing.

171TheUnitedStatesdoesnotuseHEUtoproducetritium.

172Thisincludesspecialinspections,complementaryaccessaswellasenvironmentalsamplingonthebasisofeitherlocation-specific,orundercertainconditions,wide-areamonitoring.

173“GNEP Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” U.S. Department of Energy, www.gnep.energy.gov/PEIS/gnepPEIS.html.

174U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement: Article-by-Article Analysis of the Additional Protocol,www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/11757.htm.

175Ibid.,p.3.

176Global Fissile Material Report 2007,Chapter9.

8�Contributors

ContributorsAvner Cohen wasaseniorfellowattheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeacein2007–08.HispreviouspositionsincludeteachingphilosophyinIsraeliandAmericanuniversi-tiesaswellasco-foundingandco-directingtheMITProjectonNuclearArmsControlintheMiddleEastinthe1990s.HehasaPh.D.inthehistoryofculturefromtheUni-versityofChicago,andistheauthorofIsrael and the Bomb (ColumbiaUniversityPress,1998)aswellasscoresofjournalarticlesandop-edsonnuclearissues.

Jean-Marie CollinisanindependentconsultantworkingonnationalsecurityissuesinFrance.HisareaofexpertisecoversFrenchnuclearweapons,nuclearproliferation,armscontrolandclusterbombs.HehasbeenaresearcherwiththeCentredeDocu-mentationetdeRecherchesurlaPaixetlesConflits,andhasworkedwithseveralothernon-governmental groups and think-tanks, including theBritish-American SecurityInformationCouncil.

Anatoli DiakovisaProfessorofphysicsand,since1991,DirectoroftheCenterforArmsControloftheMoscowInstituteofPhysicsandTechnology.Diakovhaswrittenpapersonnuclear-armsreductions,thehistoryofRussia’splutoniumproduction,dispo-sitionoptionsforexcessplutonium,andthefeasibilityofconvertingRussia’sicebreakerreactorsfromhighlyenrichedtolow-enricheduraniumaswellasonmanyothertopicsrelatingtonuclear-armscontrolanddisarmament.HeisamemberofIPFM.

Rebecca Johnson isExecutiveDirectorandco-founderoftheAcronymInstituteforDisarmamentDiplomacy,andeditorofthejournalDisarmament Diplomacy,whichpro-videsreportingandanalysesofinternationalarmsnegotiations,includingtheNuclearNonproliferationTreatyandtheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty.From2004to2006shewassenioradvisor to theWeaponsofMassDestructionCommissionheadedbyHansBlix.JohnsonhashadextensiveexperienceasagrassrootsactivistandorganizerandisamemberoftheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies(IISS)andWomeninBlack.

Li BinisProfessorofinternationalstudiesandthedirectoroftheArmsControlPro-gramattheInstituteofInternationalStudies,TsinghuaUniversity,Beijing.HeworkedattheInstituteofAppliedPhysicsandComputationalMathematicsasaresearchfellowandasthedirectorofitsArmsControlDivisionandtheexecutivedeputydirectoroftheProgramforScienceandNationalSecurityStudies.HeisamemberofIPFM. Fred McGoldrick is aprincipal andmanagerof the consultingfirm,Bengelsdorf,McGoldrickandAssociates.HeservedintheU.S.DepartmentofEnergyandwasintheDepartmentofStatefrom1982–1998,becomingDirectorofNon-Proliferationand

82 Contributors

ExportPolicyandlaterActingDeputyAssistantSecretary.HewasMinister-CounselorintheU.S.MissiontotheIAEAforthreeyears.

Zia MianisaResearchScientistandDirectoroftheProjectonPeaceandSecurityinSouthAsiaatPrincetonUniversity’sProgramonScienceandGlobalSecurity.Hisre-searchinterestsrelatetonuclearweaponsandnuclearenergypolicyinSouthAsia.Marvin Millerwasamemberof theMITDepartmentofNuclearScienceandEn-gineering (NSE) from 1976 until his retirement in 1996. Previously, he was on thefacultyoftheDepartmentofElectricalEngineeringatPurdueUniversity,workingonlasertheoryandapplicationsincludingisotopeseparationwhichwasthebridgetohisresearchonnuclearnon-proliferation.HeisnowaResearchAssociateintheScience,Technology,andSocietyProgramatMIT,wherehecontinueshisresearchonnuclearpowerandnuclearproliferation.

Abdul H. Nayyar isSeniorResearchFellowattheSustainableDevelopmentPolicyInstitute,Islamabad.HewasamemberofthefacultyoftheDepartmentofPhysicsatIslamabad’sQuaid-i-AzamUniversityfrom1973to2005.Hehasworkedonnuclear-re-actorsafety,fissile-materialproductioninSouthAsia,theconsequencesofnuclearwarinSouthAsia,andthefeasibilityofremotemonitoringofamoratoriumonplutoniumseparationinSouthAsia.HealsoservedasPresidentofPakistan’sPeaceCoalitionandtheCo-convenerofPugwashPakistan.HeisamemberofIPFM.

Jean du Preez isDirectoroftheInternationalOrganizationsandNon-proliferationProgramofMontereyInstituteforInternationalStudies’CenterforNon-proliferationStudies.PriortoMonterey,heservedintheSouthAfricanMinistryofForeignAffairsfor17years,includingasDeputy-Directorfornon-proliferationanddisarmamentandasseniorpoliticalcounselorfordisarmamentaffairsatSouthAfrica’sPermanentMissi-ontotheUnitedNations.Duringthistime,herepresentedhiscountryatseveralinter-national-negotiationmeetings,includingthe1995and2000NPTReviewConferences.DuPreezhaswrittenextensivelyaboutthepossiblepathsforwardonthenucleardi-sarmamentandnonproliferationagenda,includingtheFissileMaterialCutoffTreaty.HeisamemberofIPFM.

R. RajaramanisprofessoremeritusofphysicsatJawaharlalNehruUniversityinDel-hi. He is a Fellow of both the Indian Academy of Science and the Indian NationalScienceAcademy.HehasbeencontributingarticlestoIndia’snuclear-weaponsdebatesince1970andhasbeenaregularsummervisitorwithPrinceton’sProgramonScienceandGlobalSecuritysince2000.InrecentyearshisfocushasbeenoncappingSouthAsia’snucleararsenals.Heisco-chairofIPFM.Annette SchaperisaseniorresearchassociateatthePeaceResearchInstituteFrank-furt(PRIF).Herresearchcoversnucleararmscontrolanditstechnicalaspects,inclu-dingthetestban,afissilematerialcutoff,verificationofnucleardisarmament,fissilematerialsdisposition,andnonproliferationproblemsarisingfromthecivilian-militaryambivalenceofscienceandtechnology.Shewasapart-timememberoftheGermanCDdelegationinGenevaduringtheCTBTnegotiationsandamemberoftheGermandelegation at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. She is a member ofIPFM.

Tatsujiro Suzuki isaSeniorResearchScientistintheCentralResearchInstituteofJapan’sElectricPowerIndustryaswellasaSeniorResearchFellowattheInstituteofEnergyEconomicsofJapanandProjectProfessorattheGraduateSchoolofLawand

8�Contributors

Politics,UniversityofTokyo.HewasAssociateDirectorofMIT’sInternationalProgramonEnhancedNuclearPowerSafetyfrom1988–1993andaResearchAssociateatMIT’sCenterforInternationalStudies(1993–95),whereheco-authoredareportonJapan’splutoniumprogram.He isamemberof theAdvisoryCommitteeonEnergy (Nucle-arPolicySubcommittee)ofJapan’sMinistryofEconomy,TradeandIndustry.HeisamemberofIPFM.

Frank von Hippel is professor of Public and International Affairs at PrincetonUniversity’sWoodrowWilsonSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairs.Hehaswor-kedonfissile-materialpolicyissuesforthepast30years,includingcontributionsto:endingtheU.S.programtofosterthecommercializationofplutoniumbreederreac-tors;convincingPresidentGorbachevtoembracetheideaofaFissileMaterialProduc-tionCutoffTreaty; launching theU.S.-Russiancooperativenuclearmaterialsprotec-tion,controlandaccountingprogram;andbroadeningeffortstoeliminatetheuseofhigh-enricheduraniumincivilianreactorsworldwide.Heisco-chairofIPFM.

A report published byThe International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM)

www.fissilematerials.org

Program on Science and Global SecurityPrinceton University

221 Nassau Street, 2nd FloorPrinceton, NJ 08542, USA

Over the past six decades, our understanding of the nuclear danger has expanded from the threat posed by the vast nuclear arsenals created by the super-powers in the Cold War to encompass the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states and now also to terrorist groups. To reduce this danger, it is essential to secure and to sharply reduce all stocks of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, the key materials in nuclear weapons, and to limit any further production.

The mission of the IPFM is to advance the technical basis for cooperative international policy initiatives to achieve these goals.

September 2008

Documents

Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear ...fissilematerials.org/library/FMCT-Perspectives.pdf · sau Street, 2nd Floor, Princeton, NJ 08542, or by email at [email protected]