World Bank Reprint Series; Number Forty

Gary P. Kutcher and Pasquale L. Scandizzo

Pa- dial nalysis ofSharetenancy Relationshipsin No---heast :razil

Reprinted from the Journal of Development Economics 3 (1976)

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Journal of Development Economics 3 (1976) 343-354. © North-Holland Publishing Company

A PARTIAL ANALYSIS OF SHxARETENANCY RELATIONSHIPSIN NORTHEIST BRAZIL

Gary P. KUTCHER and Pasquale L. SCANDIZZO*Woi Id Bank, Washington, DC 20433, U.S.A.

Received July 1975, revised version received August 1976

In order to explicitly examine the implications of sharecroppers and landowners havingdifferent objective functions, and to handle a multiple-outpu t complication, a mathematicalprogramming structure is employed to analyze sharetenaney relationships. For a typicalsharecropped plot in northeast Brazil, simulations are obtained when the landowner and share-cropper respectively are the decision-makers, and for policies involving abolition of sharecontracts, land reform, and variations in share of the cash crop accruing to the landowner.The observed shares permit agreement by the two agents on the farm plan, and this agreed-upon solution is Pareto-optimal. Beyond a narrow range around the observed share, thedesired farm plans diverge, Pareto-optimality does not hold, and enforcemcnt costs would berequired.

1. Introduction

For centuries, shiarecropping has been the dominant form of agriculturalcontract in the semi-arid interior (Sertao) of the Brazilian Northeast. This vastregion is characterized by a highly skewed distribution of land rights, productionof a single cash crop (cotton) and several subsistence crops (usually corn andbeans), and primitive production relationships involving little more man/hoe/land technology.

In considering possible rural development projects, a clear understanding ofthe interrelationships between landowners and sharecroppers is crucial. There isevidence that sharecropping contracts may constrain the adoption of newtechnology [e.g. Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971, pp. 54-57)], which is almostalways a major conmponent of rural development schemes. Sutinen (1975)demonistrated that share contracts miay be the least-cost mearns of spreadingrisk; crop insurance programs may thus result in loss of sharecropper employ-ment if lanidowvners have other alterna,ives. Likewise, if variaUions in the share

*The authors are economists in the Development Research Center of the World Bank. Datafor the study was provided by a survey undertaken by the Superintendencia do Desenvolvi-mento do Nordeste (Brazil) in collaboration with the Bank. The authors appreciate the in-sights of two anonymous referees. The opinions expressed in this paper are the sole responsi-bility of the authors.

344 G.P. Kiutcher and P.L. Scandi=-o, Sharetenancy relatiouiships

contract are legislated, landowners may evict the sharecroppers and switch toeither wage labor or livestock activities.

The recent flurry of literature on sharecropping is not readily adaptable tomany such questions, particularly in the Brazilian case. First, there remains agood deal of confusion in the current debate about the maximization processesinvolved (Newbery (1974, p. 1060)], as well as the nature of the eqtuilibriuimobtained from neoclaissical models with embedded production functions[Bardlian and Srinivasan (1974, pp. 1067-1968) and Bell and Zusman (1976)].Second, the mix of crops produced by the sharecropper is imnportant in theNortheast (as, we assume, it must be in other parts of the world where share-cropping is a factor); an adequately functioning mar,'.et only exists for the cashcrop, cotton, so the landowner is obliged to 9ermit the sharecroppers to plantsubsistence crops (corn, beans, cassava and rice). Thus, conventional single-output,/two-inputs production function approaches are not appropriate.

For these reasons, we have elected to take a fresh approach to understandingthe relationships involved, and the likely consequences to changes in the statusquo, whether these changes are brought about by the availability of new tech-niques, or by institutional changes such as land reform, abolition of sharecontracts, or restrictions on such. We shall attempt to stinmlatc the nature ofsharecropping arrangements with a mathematical progranmming model. Thisapproach appears promnising, not only because we can handle the multiple-output complication, but because, through the use of alternative objectivefunctions, we can explicitly examine the implications of the two agents (land-owners and sharecroppers) having different preferences.

2. Sharecropping in the Sertao'

A typical fazenda in the Sertao is often larger than 1,000 hectares and ischaracterized by several features: (1) a wide range of activities (annual andperennial crops, livestock), (2) a large and diverse dependent labor force (share-croppers, resident and nonresident permanent labor, and temporary wagelabor), and (3) its own institutional infrastructure (artisans, shops, possiblyeven a school and church) which make it an independent and largcly isolatedsociety. The ilndowvnew influences or controls virtually all aspects of the depen-dent laborers' lives in a paternal, though often dictatorial, manner.

The suipply of sharecropper labor to the fazenda can be taken as perfectlyelastic above subsistence wage levels given excess labor stupply in the region andthe paucity of alternative opportunities for permanernt employmient. fn the typicalshare contract, of which there may be twe~nty or thirty per fazenda, the landowncrallows the sharecropper to produce enough subsistence crops to supply hisfamilyrs consumption of basic foo(dstuffs; his other conisumptioni is met from his

'For a more complete description, see Johnson (1971).

G.P. Kutteler anid P.L. Sfrandlz:o. S11a1rCiCna71nCy relationshiips 345

retained share of the cash crop proceeds and from credit extended to him by thelandowner. If the sharecroppers produce more than their subsistence, the land-owner gets a 30% share, whereas he gets 50%° of the cash crop, cotton.

The size of the p1 - locatecl to each sharecropper depends on labor availablefrom the sharecropper's family. The average Family has 2.2 adult equivalentworkers, or 55 man .'di as of labor per month given a 25-day monith. As the datareveal. a ten hectare plot will exhaust this labor in one or two peak months, andthis size plot is the ob,;er%ed mean.

The shares of the crops retainied by the sharecroppers are marketed throughthe landownier's facilities, wlho retlins 25%' of the proceeds for this service.

The most frequently observed crop technology involves only labor and land.Seeds are saved from the previous year's harvest; fertilizer use is virtually non-exiktent, and only rarely are insecticides and pesticides applied. Up to the limitsof land and labor, then, a fixed-coefficient, constant-returns-to-scale productionrelationship between the two factors is a close approximation to reality. Thesingle complicaling factor in the production activities is the practice of inter-planting two or mor.v crops on the same plot. On slharecropped plots in '.heSertao, it is common to observe beans and corn interplanted with cotton, beansinterplanted with corn, and cotton grov. n alone. Thlese practices have devclopedpartly as labor-saying techniqLLCS. and partly because they reduce the risk oftotal crop failure. 1inlike prodLuLctioll function analysis, this multiple outputcomplication can be handlcd straight for ';ardly in a linear progranmmiing frame-work.

3. The model

In this exercise. we limit ourselves in focus to a single sharecropped plot onthe fazenda. We wish to explain why the observed cropping paitterns and sharesexist and appear to be stable, and what would be the likely consequences ofaltering the terms of the share contract, abolishing it altogether, and undertakinga sinmulated land rerornm whereby the sharecropper is given ownership rights tothe plot. In order to make the sirmulations com-,parable, we retain the identicalconstraint set throughout.

Table l is a tableaui of the basic constraint set. The production activities, X,are based on the u1it of one hectare, and produce outputs entering the totalp! oLllCt balance rows TP,.. Note that XS is cotton alone, X2 is cotton interplantedwith corn and be:ins. anid A.3 is corn with beans. Each activity uses one hectareof land (row LAIND), and requires the monthly labor shown in the total laborbalance rows LA(B. t *, , . ., 12.

The activities Tk distrihute the total product to the two agents: sk of the /dhcrop accrues to the lanido%% ner's produCt balance Lk, and (1 -sk) is retained bythe slharecropper throu-1.gh balances Sk. 0Sk and OL1, register the totals of eachcrop accruing to the slharecropper and landowner respectively, net of the

01 5 I I I aJN5S> - I

:Ev7.4

0= I- + +

+

+ + WV7.+

0= 1- + +

T= T I Pt= + + 1- £S1

0= + + -iO = T_ TS,_ I

0= r-- Is-- z7-- . . -

0= - +' 170= TAf = I-+ + 'dl;

r + + Tj-r

'9V7H 7uL zO TO £SO ZSO TSO £770 70 T70 C.L ZL Ti EX ZX 'X

nuolqvi julvi3SUOD

Ti I qeL

G.P. Kutcher and P.L. Scandizzo, Shlaretenancy relationships 347

sharecroppers consumption requirements: C1 and C 2 are two alternativeconsumption bundles intensive in corn and be: respectively, both having thesame market value. The choice between the two, therefore, depends on therelative costs of production. Row M is a colivex combination constraint fixingthe level of sharecropper consumption.

Activities TL,4Bt register total labor demand by month, and are constrainedby the available sharecropper labor in constraints SLAB,. Under certain as-sumptions, these constraints may be relaxed by hiring temporary wage labor(activities IILAB,).

The objective function for each simulation will differ, and this can be expectedto lead to different production and consumption patterns and, possibly, to adifferent pattern of binding constraints.

4. Solutions

Table 2 reports four potentially polar solutions for the constraint set definedabove. In column (1), the landowner is assumed to be the decision-mnakler, andthe maximand is

E> Pk( flOSk, +04), (I)k

where Pk are market prices and in is the marketing margin, i.e., the landownermaximizes the income accruing to him from the marketing margin on thesharecropper's retained output and the market value of the landowner's sharessubject to the limitations on the given plot size, sharecropper labor, and mini-mum sharecropper consunipt ion.

In column (2), the sharecropper is the assumed decision-maker, and themaximand is

(I-m) ZpkOS,-Sk-w Z TLAB,+v(Cl + C2), (2)k t

i.e. the slharecropper maximizes his real income as defined by his retained marketearnings plus the fixed value (r) of his COnIsliulptioll less his reservation, wagebill.2 The reservation wage rate 1V is taken to be half that of the day labor wagerate of $Cr 8 per day, assuming that 0.5 is about the probability of the shalrc-cropper finding alternative employment.

Quite suLrplisingly, the solutions shown in columns (1) and (2) are identical.Given the observcd crop shares (0.5, 0.3, 0.3, for cotton, corn and beans respec-tixlY), there is full igreemiient by both agents as to the farm plan, alttlouglh a

2 Unless otherwise stated, sharecropper labor is not CxhaLIsted in any of the solutions. Thusthe activities HLAB, are not activated and questions of cost-sharinig can be ignored.

41.co

Table 2

'Polar' solutions.

Landowner as decision- Sharecropper as decision- Landowner without share Sharecropper asmaker maker contracts owner-operator D

(1) (2) (3) (4)

Cotton (kg) 2634 2634 2751 2669Corn (kg) 149 149 - 104Beans (kg) 141 141 - 99Gross output' ($Cr) 5554 5554 5502 5538Total labor (man days) 248 248 232 243Gross outputlha ($Cr) 555 555 550 554Gross output/man day ($Cr) 22.4 22.4 23.7 22.8Net OUtpUtb ($Cr) 4562 4562 3646 4566Net output/ha ($Cr) 456 456 365 475Net output/man day ($Cr) 18.4 18.4 15.7 18.8Incomes ($Cr)

Landowner 3403 3403 3646 -Sharecropper 2151 2151 - 5538

'Gross output = FPkSTk.bNet output = ZkPkTk-w , TLAB,-(w M -w) St HLABt.

G.P, Kutcher and P.L. Scandizzo, Slharefeina,iy relationships 349

priori reasoning would suggest that the sharecropper would desire a differentplan. These identical desired plans have an important implication for the opera-tions of fazenda: since, at the given crop shares, the sharecropper is in agreement,no supervision nor enforcement costs are required.

In Column (3) we simulate the abolition of share contracts; the landowner hasthe choice of using daily wage labor or not cultivating at all, and the slharecropperconsumption is no longer relevant. The objective function is:

E PkTk - W" YE HLABt,,3k t

where w' is the market wage for day labor. In this solution, the landownereultivates only cotton, and his income from the plot is 7° I higlher than underslharecropping. Why then, is sharecropping observed? Under the assunmptionsof this model the answer must concern managerial costs: temporary hired laborrequires close supervision, whereas the sharecropper, when he agrees with thelandowner's desired farm plan, requires none. Presumably, then, the supervisioncosts would be higher than the increases in landowner income obtainablethrough self-cultivation.

Column (4) simulates a naive land reform. The shalrecropiper is given owner-ship rights (and thus decision-mak-ing power) to the plot, an(d niaxilnlizes

E pkTk-w E TLAB,-(w'" - w) E HLAB. * (4)k t t

As the landowner chose a different cropping pattern (all cotton) when he wasa self-cultivator, the sharecropper chooses a different pattern (more corn-beansintense) when he is the owner-operator. His income, of course, is markedlyhigher, although we have ignored many aspects of his prior contract with thelandowner (e.g. the marketing channels). Thus the income figurc is probablyoverstated unless compensatory programs are provided concurrentJy with theland reform.

In terms of efficiency, there is little difference between solutions (3) and (4),and those under the sharecropping solutions, although the latter do produtcemarginally higher gross output. As expected, the landowner chooses a lesslabor-intensive farm plan when he is reqLuired to hire labor, and thus has thehighest output/man and the lowest output/hectare. Since the slharecropper-as-owner operator chooses a farm plan very close to that of the sharecroppingsolutions, his efficiency measures are virtually unchanged.

5. Variations in the share contract

A conmmonly recomminzended policy for increasing the welfare of sliarecroppelsis to legislate changes in the share of the cash crop accruing to the landowner.

350 G. P. Kiitchler antd P.L. Scandizzo, Silareteiancy relatiotnships

Although the landowner has alternatives other than sharecropping available tohim, and is likely to switch to these alternatives if the returns to having share-croppers fall, the model is partially applicable to such simulations.

Table 3 reports solulions for a range of shares of cotton due the landownerunder both objective functions: (1) the landownner as full decision-mnaker(objective function (1)) and (2) the sharecropper as full decision-maker (objec-tive function (2)). Since the shares of the food crops are held constanit at 0.3,as are all other parameters and constraints, we can expect divergence in thecropping patterns desired by the two agents, as well as shifts in the level anddistribution of income from .he plot.

Table 3Variations in the share contract.

Share due landowner

0.3 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.7

Landoiwner aM de(isiwn-makerCotton (kg) 2402 2402 2634 2634 2634 26341 2634Corn (kg) 444 444 149 149 149 149 149Beans (kg) 421 421 141 141 141 141 141Gross output ($Cr) 5658 5658 5554 5554 5554 5554 5554Net output ($Cr) 4539 4539 4562 4562 4562 4562 4562Incomes ($Cr)

Landowner 2662 3023 3206 3403 3601 3799 4194Sharecropper 2996 2635 2348 2150 1953 1755 1360Sharecropper (real) 1877 1516 1356 1159 961 763 368

Slurecropper tas deci.sion-makerCotton (kg) 2634 2634 2634 2634 2402 2402 1753Corn (kg) 149 149 149 149 444 444 816Beans (kg) 141 141 141 141 421 421 773Gross output ($Cr) 5554 5554 5554 5554 5658 5658 5074Net output ($Cr) 4562 4562 4562 4562 4539 4539 3918Gross incomes ($Cr)

Landowner 2613 3009 3206 3403 3563 3751 3437Sharecropper 2941 2545 2348 2150 2094 1907 1637Sharecropper (real) 1949 1553 1356 1159 976 788 481

Since the share of cotton due the landowner enters the constraint mlatrix intwo places as a coefficient, it is not possible to parameterize this share conlinlLl-ously. Instead, we obtained solioinols for the discrete values 0.3, 0.4, 0°45, 0.5,0.55, 0.6, and 0.7. As table 3 reveals, the production patterns desired by eachagent diverge at shalres below 0.45 and above 0.5. Below 0.45, the landownerdesires a cropping pattern of more corn and beans and less cotton, and above0.5, the sharecropper also desires less cotton and more corn and beans. Only

G.P. Klthewr andP.L, Scanlizzo, Sliareteniatncy relationships 351

within the relatively narrow range 3 of (0.45-0.5) are the two agents in agree-ment on the farm plan. Outside of this range, the lanidowner and sharecroppcrdesire different plans and enforcemenit costs would have to be incurred by thelandowiner.

The income levels for each agent are identical for a share between 0.45 alnd0.5, regardless of the obhcctive fujnctioni, but also diverge, in olipohite dlirectionis,outside this range. Within the 'agreement' range, the solution is Pareto-optimal:net farm income (defined as total output minus the reservation wage bill) ismaximized and any chanige in the share can make one of the agents better offionly at the expense of the other. In other words, a legislated change in the slharecontract or a change in the bargaining power of one of the agenits which coulcdinduce a different share, would result in a zero-sumi game.

Fig. 1 graphs the income-possibility rrontiers for the landowner and share-cropper under the two polar cases claracterized by the two objective fuLnctiOns.The graph reveals that, beyond the limits of the 'agreement' range, Pareto-optimality as well as absence of enforcement costs, no loniger cxists. Co1niderthe point on the landowner's frontier (dalshed line) corresponding to a share of0.4. The landowner wnould be equally as well off by mnoving rightward to thesharecropper's frontier: he coLuld aive up decision-nmaing power. retalill thesame income level, yet permit the harecroplper to attain a hiiglher incomle. I.ike-wise, if the share is above 0.5 and the sharecroplpric were decision-mnalker, hecould give up dleckion-mAkilii poo\ er, move vertically to the lalnldownr'sfrontier without loss of incomine, and permit the landowner to achieve a higherincome from the plot.

6. Conclusions

The principle conclusion from this exercise appears to be that the system ofcrop shares which is observed permits full agreement on the productiol patternsdesired by the two potentiall) opposing agents. Within a nairrow range aroundthe observed share of the cash crop, the agents not only agree, but the farm planis Pareto-optimiial since neitlher canl achieve a higher income level without in-ducing a decline in the income of the Other. Furthermore, the landownler neednot be concerineid with supervision or enforcemiienlt costs, since there is ag;reelnmton the farm plan.

Seconed, the solution abolislhing share contracts shows that lanldowmlers areprobably close to indifferenice between entering slhare contracts and empiflovinghired wage labor. Policies such as legislated lower shares due the landowner mayresult in sharecroppers beinn evicted and other nmode.s of priOduction hcinfgadopted.

3Tfic linear programminiilg approximations do not permit exact determination of this range.However, the lower bound is greater than 0.4 and less than 0.45, and the upper bound isgreater than 0.5 and less than 0.55.

352 G.P. A'utchlc andIP.L. Scaindizzo, Share'wuancy relationtsl/ips

4,200711-~ -- ---

4,t0 - I 7- -

-LANDOWNER AS4,000 - - DErISjiUr MAIr -- ----

3,900 -- -. -- - -- .

(S -s1'.6)3,800- -- --- -N -- - - - - - - -- - ----

3.700 - - -- / r. - -

° 3,500 - -. XiwUo3( .5)

3,400 -- t ----- * 4- -

z

.330

'0

3F00. I. Inom -. si - ll .onties{

3,100-- --

3,000 - - -- * -4

Third, a land reformn in this regionl would apparently have only dlistrib)utionalleffects: the ernicieney measures (output per hectare, outpult per an;l) do notdiffer apprelciably among anly of the solutions,

MIathematical appendix

This appendix amlplifies some of the undlerlying analysis of the mlodel. Al-though the very specificaltion of the model makaes the numlericall simulaltion

G.P. KRtchier and P,L. Scandizzo, Sliaretenianicy relaftishlsips 353

necessary to reach any quantitative conclusion, some algebra is still interestingto portray the mechanics of the decisi n-mnakinig process embedded in theprogramming framework.

Define:

r = income of the landowner from the average sharecropped plot,q = income of the sharecropper,X = an ni x 1 vector of enterprise levels xj,C = an n x 1 vector of unit costs ej,

M = an n x n diagonal matrix of enterprise yields with jth diagolnal entry n'j,Y = the in x I vector of total outputs,P = an n x 1 vector of prices pj,A = an 77 x n diagonal matrix of shares of crop aj due to the landowner.

The problem of the landowner is to maximize r, through the choice of X,under the constraint DX - b, where D is an mn x I input-output matrix and ban in x 1 vector of constraints. For simplicity we assume that all the costs cjare borne by the sharecropper. In addition to the usual feasibility, complemen-tarity and nonnegativity requirements, then, a necessary Kuhn-Tucker con-dition for the maximization of the landlord income is

P'A-V'D < 0, (A.l)

where V is a vector of dual values (Vk).

For the sharecropper, on the other hand, the corresponding condition, whenhe is the sole decision-maker, is

P'(I-A)- U'D-C < 0, (A.2)

where U is a vector of dual values (zuk). Since U # V if A # (I- A) and C :A 0,the two agents will agree on the farm plan if for each activity the followingdouble inequality is respected:

1 [Ci + Ell,(kts;

EZVkdk.<-aj [±Zkdi (A3)Pj k J

If we assume that the landlord incurs enforcement or supe rvision costs, (A.3)indicates that there is potential disagreement over the farm plani (the X-vectorof enterpr ise levels), and thus creates the possibility of bargaining. Let us shownow that any solution in the bargaining interval in (A.3) is Pareto-eflicienlt.

Theorem. The In/illortd and the s/har ecropper will m laxiilmize, tota/farmn incomneby acting as separate decision-makers (with one's dlecisions dmninalting over theothler's) if and only if they agree on the farm plani.

354 G.P, Kitchzer and P.L. Scandlizzo, Sh1aretentantcy r elationslips

Proof. The relevant Kuhn-Tucker conidition for maxmization of totalincome is

P-C-A'D •0 O. (A.4)

Assume that the landlord is the decisioni-maker. We can rcwritc (A.l) as

P < P'(I-A)+ V'D. (A.5)

It is easy to see that (A.4) will be respected when (A.5) holds if and only if

P'(I-A) + V'D < C+ A'D

-P'(1-A) • C+A'D, (A.6)

where U = A - V. But (A.6) is nothing but the relevant Kuhn-Tucker conditionfor sharecropper's maximization when he is the decision-maker. [Q.E.D.]

An analogous proof can be obtained if we start from the case where the share-cropper is the decision-maker. The conclusion of the above analysis is that thecrop share is likely to fall in the interval defined by (A.3) for two reasons: (i)because in that interval the two agents agree on the farm plan and no enforce-ment or bargaining on the farml plain is needed, and (ii) because total farm incomeis maximized so that it is impossible to move the share outside of the intervalwithout making at least one of the agents worse off.

It is also clear that there is no a priori reason why the agreement intervalshould be around 0.5, and the numerical result obtainied depends entirely on themodel specification and the data used.

References

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Bardhan, P.K. and T.N. Srinivasan, 1974, Cropsharing tenancy in agriculture: Rejoindelr,American Economic Review 6,1057-1060.

Bell, C.L.G. and P. Zusman, 1976, A bargaining theoretic approach to cropNharing contracts,American Economic Review (forthconling).

Brazil Regional Studies Project Phase I Report: The data collection effort, 1975, DevclopmcntResearch Center, WVorld Bank, and Superintendency for the Developmelnt of the Northeast(SUDENE).

Johnson, Allen W., 1971, Shirecroppers of the Sertao (Stanford University Press, Stanford,CA).

Nash, J., 1953, Two person cooperative games, Econornetrica 21, 128-140.Newbei -. D.M.G., 1974, Cropsharing tenancy in agriculture: Comment, American Economic

Review 6, 1060-1066.Sutinen, J.G., 1975, The rational choice of share leasing and implications for efficiency,

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The Philippines: Priorities and Prospects for Development by Russell Cheetham,Edward Hawkins, and others, distributed by The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1976

Senegal: Tradition, Diversification, and Economic Development by HeinzBachmann and others, distributed by The Johns Hopkins University Press,1974

Turkey: Prospects and Problems of an Expanding Economy by Edmond Asfourand others, distributed by The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975

Yugoslavia: Development with Decentralization by Vinod Dubey and others,published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975

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Shamsher Singh and others, published by The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1977

Malnutrition and Poverty: Magnitude and Policy Options by Shlomo Reutlingerand Marcelo Selowsky, published by The Johns Hopkins University Press,1976

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A Development Model for the Agricultural Sector of Portugal by Alvin C. Egbertand Hyung M. Kim, published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975

The Future for Hard Fibers and Competition from Synthetics by Enzo R. Grilli, dis-tributed by The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975

Public Expenditures on Education and Income Distribution in Colombia by Jean-Pierre Jallade, distributed by The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974

Tropical Hardwood Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region by Kenji Takeuchi, dis-tributed by The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974

Methods of Project Analysis: A Review by Deepak Lal, distributed by The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1974

Other PublicationsWorld Tables 1976, published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976The Tropics and Economic Development: A Provocative Inquiry into the Poverty

of Nations by Andrew Kamarck, published by The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1976

Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data by Shail Jain, distributed byThe Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975

Redistribution with Growth by Hollis Chenery, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C.L.G. Bell,John H. Duloy, and Richard Jolly, published by Oxford University Press, 1974