Abstract

The establishment of the Banco National de Investimento (BNI), the Mozambican development bank, in 2010, was regarded as a lower-cost alternative source of funding for development, espe-cially with regard to economic and social Infrastructures. The present Devenvolvimento Review (ResR) shows that, in addition to the failure of being a development catalyst, BNI has been a des-tabilising institution of the Mozambican banking system due to poor capital management, high operating costs, high rates of non-performing loans and low profitability of its banking assets.

DESENVOLVIMENTO REVIEW

Maputo, Março 11th, 2020 Number 5 English

A Harmful Development Bank to Financial Stability in Mozambique

BANCO NACIONAL DE INVESTIMENTO (BNI)

1. Context

The Banco Nacional de Investimento (BNI) was established on June 15, 2010, with a share ca-pital of USD 500 million (Government of Mo-

zambique - 49.5%, Government of Portugal - 49.5% and Banco Comercial de Investimento - BCI - 1%)1. BNI was created as a development bank dedicated to long-term investments in Mozambique, including so-

cio-economic infrastructure with a direct impact on re-ducing poverty and improving the population’s living conditions. However, 10 years after the creation of this institution, infrastructure remains one of the main factors that penalise the business environment in Mo-zambique, poverty has stagnated2 and Mozambicans’ quality of life has been decreasing year after year3.

1 As of 2012, the Mozambican state became the sole shareholder through the State Participation Management Institute (IGEPE).

2 According to data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF, 2016), despite the reduction in the percentage of poor people, between 9/9 and 2014/15, the number of Mozambicans living in absolute poverty 11,136,448 11,826,280.

3 Data from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2019), Mozambique is the 10th poorest economy in the world, with a human development index worse than countries like Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo and East Timor.

2 Desenvolvimento Review I www.cddmoz.org

In fact, BNI is an unknown institution for most of Mozambicans, and definitely has moved away from its role of an investment bank for catalysing econo-mic development. Contrary, BNI has been focusing on “hunting” financial commissions by providing financial assistance services to government institu-tions searching for loans in the international financial markets. BNI’s role and payments received during various consultancies provides clear examples of this. According to the 2017 Independent Audit re-port (Kroll, 2017) that analyses the illegal loans contracted by ProIndicus SA, EMATUM SA and Mo-çambique Asset Management SA, BNI and Ernst & Young (EY) were involved in the restructure of the EMATUM debt. For this service, contracted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), the “con-sortium” received USD 17,317,264, but Kroll made it clear that they did not obtain additional informa-tion about the services provided by BNI and EY. In

2019, BNI brokered financing for the Mozambique Electricity public company (EDM) valued at USD 80 million, granted with state guarantees by the African Development Bank. However, it remains unknown how much BNI has earned in commissions.

This Desenvolvimento Review (DesR) shows that, in addition to not fulfilling its role as a development bank, BNI creates instability in the Mozambican fi-nancial system due to its poor financial performan-ce. This is based on assessment against prudential, economic-financial indicators, and the standards es-tablished by the Bank of Mozambique (BM), as the supervisory authority of the Mozambican financial system. Following this introduction, this DesR then analyses some risks of instability in the Mozambican financial system generated by BNI, and finally, the last section outlines the main conclusions of this pa-per.

2. The risk of instability in the mozambican financial system generated by the banco nacional de investimentos (BNI)

This section has four subsections, each t analysing the four criteria used by the Bank of Mozambique (BM) to monitor the stability of the Mozambican financial system. These are: (i) capital (leverage ratio), (ii) asset quality (ratio of non-performing loans), (iii) management (operating cost) and (iv) results (return on assets). These indicators suggest there is harmful financial management at BNI that defrauds public funds and destabilises the Mozambican financial system along the same lines that culminated in the famous political, economic and financial scandal of the already bankrupt Popular Development Bank (BPD)4

2.1. BNI is the banking institution in the Mozambican financial system that makes the most use of debt financing, currently having a debt ratio of 28.1 percentage points above the market average

Graph 1 shows the leverage ratio of the Mozam-bican banking system during the period between 1 October and 31 December 2019. The leverage ratio measures the degree to which a company uses debt financing. This index is also called the debt ratio. The more debt financing the bank uses, the greater the financial leverage, which means more interest pay-ments and, consequently, negatively affecting profi-

tability. In this sense, with a leverage ratio of 54.28% (the market average is 26.21%), BNI is the banking institution in the Mozambican financial system with the greatest risk of insolvency, thus being on the ver-ge of generating distortions and turbulence to the financial system, similar to those recently created by the bankrupt “Nosso Banco” and “Moza Banco” (two banks dominated by Mozambican capitals).

4 Hanlon, Joseph. (2002). Bank corruption becomes site of struggle in Mozambique. Review of African Political Economy. 91. 10.1080/03056240208704584.

3Desenvolvimento Review I www.cddmoz.org

Graph 1: Leverage Ratio (%) of the Mozambican Banking System: October 1 to December 31, 2019

Graph 2: Defaulting Ratio (%) of the Mozambican Banking System: 1 October to 31 December 2019

2.2. BNI “déjà vu”, the famous case of non-performing loans from the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD).

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019)Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco

Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Coope-rativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019)Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco

Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Coope-rativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

Graph 1: Leverage Ratio (%) of the Mozambican Banking System: October 1 to December 31, 2019

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019) Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Cooperativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

2.2. BNI “déjà vu”, the famous case of non-performing loans from the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD).

The scandal of non-performing loans in Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD), the former Mozambican development bank, is certainly one of the most media cases that Mozambique has experienced in the last 30 years. It has captured public attention, not only due to its negative effects on the stability of the national financial system but also, due to the related violent murder of the then CEO, Siba Siba Macuacuá, in August 2001.

Graph 2: Defaulting Ratio (%) of the Mozambican Banking System: 1 October to 31 December 2019

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019) Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Cooperativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

14,8

6

36,9

4

21,6

5

21,4

54,0

3

14,8

1 21

18,4

2

11,7

54,2

8

25

11,2

3

29,4

8

9,81

23,1

2

52,9

18,5

1

16,3

1

37,5

1

16,5

1

41,0

3

12,3

7

14,0

3

7,88

16,8

7

0

6,85

21

3,32 4,

53

28,1

7

2,62

1,38

8,62

16,4

4

24,9

6

5,51

22,0

5

3,76

4,05

1,6

37,7

2

market average: 11.61%

market average: 26.21%

The scandal of non-performing loans in Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD), the former Mozambican development bank, is certainly one of the most media cases that Mozambique has experienced in the last 30 years. It has captured

public attention, not only due to its negative ef-fects on the stability of the national financial sys-tem but also, due to the related violent murder of the then CEO, Siba Siba Macuacuá, in August 2001.

Graph 1: Leverage Ratio (%) of the Mozambican Banking System: October 1 to December 31, 2019

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019) Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Cooperativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

2.2. BNI “déjà vu”, the famous case of non-performing loans from the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD).

The scandal of non-performing loans in Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD), the former Mozambican development bank, is certainly one of the most media cases that Mozambique has experienced in the last 30 years. It has captured public attention, not only due to its negative effects on the stability of the national financial system but also, due to the related violent murder of the then CEO, Siba Siba Macuacuá, in August 2001.

Graph 2: Defaulting Ratio (%) of the Mozambican Banking System: 1 October to 31 December 2019

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019) Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Cooperativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

14,8

6

36,9

4

21,6

5

21,4

54,0

3

14,8

1 21

18,4

2

11,7

54,2

8

25

11,2

3

29,4

8

9,81

23,1

2

52,9

18,5

1

16,3

1

37,5

1

16,5

1

41,0

3

12,3

7

14,0

3

7,88

16,8

7

0

6,85

21

3,32 4,

53

28,1

7

2,62

1,38

8,62

16,4

4

24,9

6

5,51

22,0

5

3,76

4,05

1,6

37,7

2

market average: 11.61%

market average: 26.21%

4 Desenvolvimento Review I www.cddmoz.org

In that time, the bank was already called Banco Austral following its privatisation (Mozambican State held only 40 % of the bank’s share capital). Macua-

cuá died when he was preparing to disclose the list of defaulting debtors, mostly individuals linked to the country’s political and business elite.

2.3. BNI’s administrative costs/banking product ratio (72.31%) is the third-largest in the Mozambican financial system.

One of the prudential and economic indicators used by BM to monitor the stability of the Mozam-bican financial system is the operational efficiency of institutions operating in the Mozambican financial

market. One of the tools used to evaluate this indi-cator is the operating costs, which, in turn, are mea-sured using the administrative cost/banking product ratio.

In that time, the bank was already called Banco Austral following its privatisation (Mozambican State held only 40 % of the bank's share capital). Macuacuá died when he was preparing to disclose the list of defaulting debtors, mostly individuals linked to the country's political and business elite.

2.3. BNI's administrative costs/banking product ratio (72.31%) is the third-largest in the Mozambican financial system.

One of the prudential and economic indicators used by BM to monitor the stability of the Mozambican financial system is the operational efficiency of institutions operating in the Mozambican financial market. One of the tools used to evaluate this indicator is the operating costs, which, in turn, are measured using the administrative cost/banking product ratio. Graph 3: Operating Cost the Mozambican Banking System: October 1 to December 31, 2019

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019) Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Cooperativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

In this context, operational efficiency implies minimising this ratio. However, BNI has the third-highest relative operating cost (72.31%) of the Mozambican banking system, performing better only against banco ABC (110.21%) and Letshego bank (32.09%). 2.4. BNI's assets return is only 0.21% which is 3.2 percentage points below the average of the

Mozambican banking market.

Profitability ratios are used to determine how efficiently the company is using its assets. It reveals aspects of the economic situation and relates the results to the activity it generates, or the results to the invested capital and possible activities (Silva, 2013). There are several basic measures to assess bank profitability. To better monitor the stability of the Mozambican financial system, BM has chosen the return on assets (ROA). ROA is typically used to assess the efficiency of the bank's management. Graph 4 compares the ROAs of the 21 banking institutions in the Mozambican financial system between October 1 and December 31, 2019.

110,

27

50,1

3

25,5

8

35,2

33,1

5 54

67 67,0

7

45,5

4 72,3

1

69,0

1

19,2

5

231,

32

69,7

2

78,8

2

32,0

9

74,9

5

71 70,0

2

47,7

7

50,3

4market average: 65.45%

Graph 3: Operating Cost the Mozambican Banking System: October 1 to December 31, 2019

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019)Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco

Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Coope-rativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

In this context, operational efficiency implies mi-nimising this ratio. However, BNI has the third-hi-ghest relative operating cost (72.31%) of the Mo-

zambican banking system, performing better only against banco ABC (110.21%) and Letshego bank (32.09%).

2.4. BNI’s assets return is only 0.21% which is 3.2 percentage points below the average of the Mozambican banking market.

Profitability ratios are used to determine how effi-ciently the company is using its assets. It reveals aspec-ts of the economic situation and relates the results to the activity it generates, or the results to the invested capital and possible activities (Silva, 2013). There are several basic measures to assess bank profitability. To

better monitor the stability of the Mozambican finan-cial system, BM has chosen the return on assets (ROA). ROA is typically used to assess the efficiency of the bank’s management. Graph 4 compares the ROAs of the 21 banking institutions in the Mozambican financial system between October 1 and December 31, 2019.

5Desenvolvimento Review I www.cddmoz.org

According to the graph 4, BNI has the fifth-lowest profitability in the market (0.21%), only slightly bet-ter in small banks such as Moza Banco (-2.12%), Uni-ted Bank for Africa (- 1.19%), African Banking Corpo-ration (-0.99%) and Societé Générale Mozambique

(0.02%). Curiously, the Cooperativa de Poupança e Crédito (Savings and Credit Cooperative), a banking institution belonging to BM staff, has the highest profitability ratio (21.98%) that is 3.2 percentage points higher than the market average (3.39%).

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019)Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco

Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Coope-rativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

Graph 4: Return on assets, ROA (%) of the Mozambican Banking System (%): October 1 to December 31, 2019Graph 4: Return on assets, ROA (%) of the Mozambican Banking System (%): October 1 to December 31, 2019

Source: Banco de Moçambique (2019) Notes: ABC – African Banking Corporation; Banco Mais – Banco Moçambicano de Apoio; Bayport – Bayport Servicos Financeiros; BIM – Banco Internacional de Moçambique; BIG – Banco Internacional Global; BAU – Banco Único; BOM – Opportunity Bank; BBM – Barclays Bank Moçambique; BCI – Banco Comercial e de Investimentos; BNI – Banco Nacional de Investimento; CBM – Capital Bank; CPC – Cooperativa de Poupança e Crédito; Ecobank – Ecobank Moçambique; FNB – FNB Moçambique; GAPI – Gapi Sociedade de Investimento; Letshego – Banco Letshego; Moza Banco – Moza Banco; SGM – Banco Societé Générale Moçambique; SOCREMO – Socremo Banco de Microfinanças; SB – Standard Bank; UBA – United Bank for Africa Moçambique.

According to the graph 4, BNI has the fifth-lowest profitability in the market (0.21%), only slightly better in small banks such as Moza Banco (-2.12%), United Bank for Africa (- 1.19%), African Banking Corporation (-0.99%) and Societé Générale Mozambique (0.02%). Curiously, the Cooperativa de Poupança e Crédito (Savings and Credit Cooperative), a banking institution belonging to BM staff, has the highest profitability ratio (21.98%) that is 3.2 percentage points higher than the market average (3.39%). 3. CONCLUSIONS

This Desenvolvimento Review analysed some prudential and economic indicators of the Banco Nacional de Investimento (BNI) regarding the Bank of Mozambique's standards of financial monitoring and supervision during the period between October and December 2019. This paper showed that BNI harms the Mozambican financial market due to its poor operational and financial performance, which generates distortions in the stability of the system. Specifically, (i) BNI is mostly financed by debt, (ii) it has one of the highest market ratios of non-performing loans; (iii) it has high operating costs and (iv) it has low profitability. These indicators suggest that; as happened with the bankrupt BPD, BNI is striding towards insolvency and currently, it is one of the main drivers of instability in the Mozambican financial system. In fact, BNI is an unknown institution for most of the Mozambican, and definitely, it has been away from its role of an investment bank to catalyse economic development. Contrary, BNI has been focusing on "hunting" financial commissions from financial assistance services to government institutions searching for loans in the international financial markets.

-0,9

9

7,33

4,49

4,47

9,2

1,84

1

3,25

2,46

0,21 1,

6

21,9

8

1,4

0,32

0,21

7,52

-2,1

5

0,02

4,55

4,4

-1,1

9

market average: 3.39%

3. Conclusions

This Desenvolvimen-to Review analysed some prudential and economic indicators of the Banco Nacional de Investimento (BNI) regarding the Bank of Mozambique’s standards of financial monitoring and supervision during the pe-riod between October and December 2019. This pa-per showed that BNI harms the Mozambican financial market due to its poor ope-rational and financial per-formance, which generates distortions in the stability of the system. Specifically, (i) BNI is mostly financed by debt, (ii) it has one of the highest market ratios of non-performing loans; (iii) it has high operating costs

and (iv) it has low profita-bility. These indicators su-ggest that; as happened with the bankrupt BPD, BNI is striding towards in-solvency and currently, it is one of the main drivers of instability in the Mozam-bican financial system. In fact, BNI is an unknown institution for most of the Mozambican, and defini-tely, it has been away from its role of an investment bank to catalyse economic development. Contrary, BNI has been focusing on “hunting” financial com-missions from financial

assistance services to government institutions sear-ching for loans in the international financial markets.

“In fact, BNI is an unknown institution for most of Mozambicans, and definitely has moved away from its role of an investment bank for catalysing economic development. Contrary, BNI has been focusing on “hunting” financial commissions by providing financial assistance services to government institutions searching for loans in the international financial markets”.

References

Banco de Moçambique (20019). Indicadores Prudenciais e Económico-Financeiros – IV Trimestre. Availa-ble at: http://www.bancomoc.mz/fm_pgtab1.aspx?id=293. Accessed at 26 de February 2020.

Hanlon, Joseph. (2002). Bank corruption becomes site of struggle in Mozambique. Review of African Po-litical Economy. 91. 10.1080/03056240208704584.

MEF (2016) Pobreza e Bem-Estar em Moçambique: Quarta Avaliação Nacional. Maputo. PNUD (2019). 2018 Human Development Indices and Indicators. Washington DC.Kroll (2017). Auditoria independente relativa aos empréstimos contraídos pela ProIndicus S.A., EMATUM

S.A. e Mozambique Asset Management S.A. Maputo.Silva, E. S. (2013). Gestão financeira - Análise dos Fluxos Financeiros (5a Edição). Porto, Portugal: Vida

Económica - Editorial, SA.

Property: CDD – Centro para a Democracia e Desenvolvimento Diretor: Prof. Adriano NuvungaEditor: João Nhabanga Tinga Author: Agostinho Machava Team: João Nhabanga Tinga, Agostinho Machava, Ilídio Nhantumbo, Denise Cruz, Isabel Macamo. Layout: CDD

Address:Rua Eça de Queiroz, nº 45, Bairro da Coop, Cidade de Maputo - MoçambiqueTelefone: 21 41 83 36

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