People vs. Baluntong

Facts:

Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete

destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and

inflicting serious physical injuries on Joshua Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of

execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless

do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

The Trial Court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double

murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but in light of the passage of R.A.

9346, it reduced the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Were the courts correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double murder and

frustrated murder?

Held:

The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered

finding appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson

under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

with no eligibility for parole and other civil damages modified.

In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan teaches:

In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were

perpetrated – whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain

the main objective of the malefactor:

(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or

on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;

(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a

building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime

committed is murder only; lastly,

(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already

done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and

distinct crimes committed – homicide/murder and arson.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, “Amending the Law on Arson,” reads:

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. ─ The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua

shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: (2) Any inhabited house or

dwelling;

The Court finds that there is no showing that appellant’s main objective was to kill Celerina and

her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.

Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants,

appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. Celerina was outside

the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her

grandsons.

While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with “Double Murder with Frustrated

Murder,” appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for

Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised

Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act.

As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the

house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence,

absorbed by arson.

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that

proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved,

conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the

offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when

death results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty should be

reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE vs. MURCIAFacts: The premise of the petition at hand is the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which found appellant Jessie Villegas Murcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of arson and frustrated homicide. The above-named accused, motivated by some evil motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire and burn a residential house knowing the same to be inhabited by one Felicidad M. Quilates burning and killing said Felicidad M. Quilates as well as burning and damaging nine other neighboring houses in the process wherein the charge is qualified by the resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. However as the case proceeded, appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide, hence the review is limited to the crime of arson but appellant maintains his innocence of the charge of arson and challenges the credibility of the witnesses who testified against him.

Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of the crime of arson.

Held:The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals further stating that the testimony of the witnesses having withstood the scrutiny of the lower courts is deemed credible. The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.

People v. Malngan (G.R. No. 170470)

Facts:

On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr. was accused

of setting fire the house of his employer resulted in the destruction of his employer’s house and

the death of six persons including his employer Roberto Separa Sr., some seven adjoining

residential houses, were also razed by fire. 

She was apprehended by the Barangay Chairman and was brought to the Barangay Hall.

She was then identified by a neighbor, whose house was also burned, as the housemaid of the

Separas and upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant’s bag.

Thereafter, accused-appellant confessed to the Barangay Chairman.

On January 9, 2001, an information was filed before the RTC of Manila, charging the

accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with multiple homicide. The RTC as well as the Court

of Appeals finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with multiple

homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Edna Malngan was guilty of the crime of destructive arson or simple

arson?

Decision:

The crime committed by the accused-appellant is Simple Arson and not Arson with

Multiple Homicide. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex crime of Arson with

Multiple Homicide. There are two laws that govern the crime of arson where death results

therefrom – Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1613,

quoted hereunder, to wit:

Revised Penal Code

Art. 320. Destructive Arson – xxxx If as a consequence of

the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death

results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

Presidential Decree No. 1613

Sec. 5. Where Death Results from Arson – if by reason of

or on the occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion

perpetua to death shall be imposed.

Both laws provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered

destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The reason is that arson is itself the end

and death is simply the consequence.

The case falls under simple arson since from a reading of the body of the information it

can be seen that it states that “the accused, with intent to cause damage, xxx deliberately set fire

upon the two-storey residential house, xxx that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, xxx

which were the direct cause of their death xxx.” It is clear that her intent was merely to destroy

her employer’s house through the use of fire.

When fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house and

that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code

declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be

purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life.

In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is

murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be

absorbed by the crime of arson. The latter being the applicable one in this case.

PEOPLE vs. OLIVAFacts:

On August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino and his family were sleeping in their house. Avelino went out to urinate. He saw the accused-appellant set roof of their house on fire with a lighted match. One of the neighbors, Benjamin, went to the nearby river and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was shot by the accused. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death. Information for arson and for murder was filed separately against the accused and the other three co-accused.

Issues: Whether accused-appellant is guilty of arson.

Held: Whether the victim was shot while he was on the street or when he was pouring water on the burning roof is irrelevant to the crime. The two witnesses on that aspect are not necessarily inconsistent. The Court agrees with the solicitor general that Benjamin could have been on the street while pouring water on the burning roof. There is no need to prove that the accused had actual knowledge that the was burned is inhabited. There was treachery where the victim, while he was merely acting as good neighbor, innocently helping out the fire, when shot, unaware of the fatal attack on him.

PEOPLE V. ACOSTA (GR. NO. 126351)

FACTS:

Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident ofBarrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a goodfriend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M.Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief thatappellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house ofappellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. Montesclaros lived in the houseowned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, BarrioMakatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant.At about 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew ofprosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellantRaul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of herhouse and approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife,replied that he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen.Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino’s query, she returnedimmediately to her house. A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of brokenbottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant. When she peeped throughher kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainant’s house, which was unoccupied at thattime. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarettelighter. The fire was easily put off by appellant’s wife who arrived at the place.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.

HELD:

In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstancestaken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logicalconclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant.Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trialcourt in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved andon record:First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it isfrequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for thecommission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, theexistence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of thewitnesses. Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate inkind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.Second, appellant’s intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to seton fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainant’s) which

was burned laterin the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon ofthe same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife.