Upload
others
View
2
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Baloch Nationalism and its Impact on
Political and Economic Development
of Balochistan (2001-2014)
THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
By
Javeria Jahangir Roll No.1
Session 2007
Centre for South Asian Studies,
University of the Punjab,
Quaid-i-Azam Campus, Lahore.
September 2015
CERTIFICATE
This is certified that the present thesis entitled, Baloch Nationalism and Its Impact
on Political and Economic Development of Balochistan (2001-2014), is written
by Ms. Javeria Jahangir d/o Maqbool Jahangir, Roll No.1, Session 2007, Centre for
South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, for the requirement of Ph.D
degree in South Asian Studies. To the best of my knowledge the thesis is based on
original research.
_____________________
Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid
Director/Supervisor
Centre for South Asian Studies,
University of the Punjab,
Quaid-i-Azam Campus, Lahore
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this thesis is a result of my individual
research and I have not submitted this thesis concurrently to
any other university for any degree whatsoever.
Javeria Jahangir
Dedicated
To
My Father, Maqbool Jahangir (late),
My Mother, Amina Ambreen
And
My Little Daughter Meerab
i
Abstract
The Baloch Nationalism and their Movement include demands for political and
economic autonomy; perseverance of cultural identity; maximum control over the
natural resources and sometimes, complete independence from Pakistan. The
native inhabitants of Balochistan have been facing continuous oppression,
inequality, injustice, deprivation of freedom, ethnic rights and isolation both on
economic and political level. The Baloch nationalist leaders are continuously
demanding self-determination and independence from Pakistan along with the rights
of economic development, social and cultural identity, The Baloch Nationalist
freedom fighters, are passionately devoted to the struggle for freedom from
Pakistan. The Baloch Nationalists strongly opposed all the development projects and
viewed them as a great threat to their ethnicity and a conspiracy to grab their energy
resources, which would oppress them politically and economically. Many projects of
Mega development have been delayed due to the uncertain circumstances and lack
of suitable peaceful environment. The Baloch Nationalist Movement in Balochistan is
not only destroying the golden opportunity of progress on national and international
level but also playing an influential and vital role in changing the scenario of global
politics. The prevailing situation is providing grounds to foreign players to play their
own games, to achieve their own goals, to attain, maintain and increase their
political and economic power not only in Balochistan but also in other parts of the
world. Balochistan, due to its geo-strategic position, has always been influential on
local, national, and international politics. This present Nationalist Movement is not
only a great obstacle in the social, political and economic development of
Balochistan but has also damaged the security of region as the Baloch insurgents
are dreaming of Greater Independent Balochistan.
ii
Acknowledgements
It is an immense pleasure for me to write an acknowledgement because it is a big
occasion for me to pay my heartiest gratitude and appreciations to all those persons
who facilitated me during my research and helped me attain my ambitious goal. First
of all, I am highly thankful to Allah Almighty for giving me the strength, patience and
willpower that was required for the completion of this research work.
From the core of my heart, I am grateful to my Supervisor Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid;
Director, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab. She is one of the
nicest personalities I have ever met. She has been a source of encouragement and
definitely, I would not be able to complete this thesis on time without her constant
support, kind cooperation and attention. She guided me at every stage of my
research in such a polite and encouraging way that I do not have words to express
my thankfulness to her.
I am very obliged to Dr. Mujahid Kamran, Vice Chancellor, University of the Punjab,
and Prof. Dr. Kanwal Ameen, Chairperson, Doctoral Program Coordination
Committee, for their valuable help during my hard time.
I am also thankful to Mr. Jaffer Riaz Kataria; Lecturer, and Mr. Mian Muhammad
Usman, Librarian, at Centre for South Asian Studies, for their support all the time.
Finally, my family members deserve extraordinary tribute and acknowledgment.
During this research work, my mother provided me financial support and my little
daughter has always been a source of inspiration and motivation for me.
Javeria Jahangir
iii
List of Abbreviations
ASF Agribusiness Support Fund
ARI Acute Respiratory Infections
AGG Agent to Governor General
ANP Awami National Party
ADB Asian Development Bank
BDA Balochistan Development Authority
BRA Baloch Republican Army
BSO Balochistan Students Organization
BPLF Baloch People‟s Liberation Front
BLA Baloch Liberation Army
BHT Baloch Haq Talwar
BLF Balochistan Liberation Front
BRP Baloch Republican Party
BNP Balochistan National Party
BNP-A Baloch National Party Awami
BNDP Balochistan National Democratic Party
BNM Baloch National Movement
BNC Balochistan National Congress
BMDO Baloch Musallah Difai Organization
BNYM Baloch National Youth Movement
CMMC China Mining and Metallurgical Cooperation
CIA Central Investigation Agency
CARs Central Asian Republics
CCHF Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever
CLL Concurrent Legislative List
DSG Defense Security Guard
GoB Government of Balochistan
GDP Gross Domestic Production
iv
Ecnec Executive Committee of National Economic Council, Pakistan
EFA (Plan) Education for All Plan
ECE Early Childhood Education
ECP Election Commission of Pakistan
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area
FC Frontier Constabulary
FDB Fisheries Development Board
FLL Federal Legislative List
GUPC Great United Petroleum Holdings Company
GPI Gender Parity Index
ISO Imamia Student Organization
IP Iran-Pakistan
IP1 Iran-Pakistan-India
IG Inspector General
JWP Jamhori Watan Party
JUI-F Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl
JUP Jamiat-e-Ulema-e- Pakistan
JI Jamaat-e-Islami
LeJ Lashkar-e-Janghvi
LFO Legal Framework Order
LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas
MCC Metallurgical Construction Corporation
MCC Metallurgical Corp of China
MNA Member of National Assembly
MPNR Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources
MDG Mega Development Goals
MMA Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal
NAP National Awami Party
NWFP North West Frontier Province
NP National Party
NP-H National Party-Hai Group
v
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFC National Finance Commission
NES National Economic Survey
NRO National Reconciliation Ordinance
NCHD National Commission for Human Development
OGDCL Oil and Gas Development Company Limited
PPL Pakistan Petroleum Limited
PNP Pakistan National Party
PFAR Popular Front for Armed Resistance
PPP Pakistan People‟s Party
PPPP Pakistan People‟s Party Parliamentarians
PkMAP Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam
PADC Pak-Afghan Defense Council
PSDP Public Sector Development Program
RAW Research and Analysis Wing
SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SMEDA Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority
SDPI Sustainable Development Policy Institute
TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan
TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
TCPL Tethyan Copper Prosperity Limited
TCCP Tethyan Copper Company of Pakistan
UAE United Arab Emirates
UNDP United Nations Development Program
vi
Table of Contents
Title Page
No
Abstract i
Acknowledgements ii
List of Abbreviations iii-v
Table of Contents vi-xv
List of Tables xvi-xviii
List of Maps xix
Chapter One
Introduction
1-15
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review 5
3. Research Methodology 12
4. Research Questions 13
5. Organization of Research 13
References 16
Chapter Two
Balochistan: Land and People
17-69
1. The Baloch and Balochistan: Origin and History 17
2. Balochistan under Foreign Powers 18
2.1 Balochistan under Persian Influence 19
2.2 Balochistan under Arab Rule 20
2.3 Mongolian Invasion 21
2.4 First Organized Baloch Confederacy 21
2.5 Balochistan under British Dominance 22
3. Accession of Balochistan into Pakistan in 1947 25
vii
3.1. Conflicts between Government of Pakistan and Baloch
Nationalists
27
4. Geographical location 28
5. Physical Features and Topography 30
5.1 Topography 30
I. The Upper Highlands 30
II. The Lower Highlands 30
III. The Plains 31
IV. Deserts 31
V. The Coastal Line 31
5.2. Rivers of Balochistan 31
5.3 Forests 32
I. Juniper Forests 34
II. Chilghoza Pine Forests 34
III. Olive-Pistacia Forests 34
IV. Olive – Acacia Forests 34
V. Kohistan Forests 34
VI. Desert Forests 35
VII. Mangrove Forests 35
VIII. Alien/Invasive Forests 35
IX. Tropical Desert Thorn Forests 35
5.4 Mountain Ranges 35
6. Climate and Temperature 36
6.1. Rainfall 37
7. Economy of Balochistan 37
7.1. Natural Resources 38
I. Copper/Gold/Silver 39
II. Chromite 39
III. Iron 39
IV. Lead Zinc 40
viii
V. Antimony 40
VI. Manganese 40
VII. Fluorite 41
VIII. Barite 41
IX. Gypsum and Anhydrite 41
X. Onyx Marble 41
XI. Sand and Gravel 41
XII. Sulpher 42
XIII. Limestone 42
7.2 Energy Resources 42
I. Natural Gas and Oil 42
II. Coal 43
III. Wind Energy Potential 43
IV. Solar Energy Potential 44
8. Agriculture 44
8.1. Fruit Production 45
I. Fruits Grown in Upland Zone 45
II. Fruits Grown in Coastal Zone 45
8.2 Food Crops 45
8.3 Irrigation and Water Supply System 47
8.4 Fisheries 48
8.5 Livestock 49
9. Communication and Infrastructure 50
10. Ethnic and Linguistic Composition 51
11. Religious Behavior 55
12. Administrative Divisions of Balochistan 55
13. Tribes of Balochistan 57
14. Prominent Baloch Tribes 58
I. The Bugti Tribe 58
II. The Marri Tribe 58
ix
III. The Mengal Tribe 59
References 60
Chapter Three
Geo-Strategic Significance of Balochistan
70-109
1. Geo Strategic Significance of Pakistan 70
2. Historical Perspective of Strategic Significance of Balochistan 70
3. Strategic Significance Due to Geographical Position 73
4. Strategic Significance of Balochistan as Marine Passage 74
5. Strategic Significance as a Safe Military Route 75
6. Strategic Significance in Trade and Commerce 75
7. Mega Development Projects of International Significance 76
7.1 Gwadar Deep Sea Port 76
7.2 Infrastructure Associated to Gwadar Port 79
I. Makran Coastal Highway 79
II. Kashgar-Gwadar Trade Corridor 80
III. Other Important Road Networks 82
IV. Rail Networks 82
V. Up-gradation of the Gwadar Airport 82
7.3 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline (TAPI) 83
7.4 Gwadar-Kashgar Oil and Gas Pipeline Project 85
7.5 Pak-Iran Joint Venture in Balochistan 86
I. Pak-Iran Oil Refinery Project 86
II. Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project (IP) 87
7.6 Gold/Copper Mining Projects and Strategic Importance of
Balochistan
89
I. Reko Diq Gold Mining Project 89
II. Saindak Gold/Copper Mining Project 91
8. Balochistan and International Competition for Energy Resources 92
9. Significance of Balochistan in Global Politics 96
References 104
x
Chapter Four
Baloch Nationalism: Past and Present
110-162
1. Definition of Nationalism 110
2. Definition of Ethnic Nationalism 110
3. Baloch Nationalism 111
4. Key Elements in the Formation of Baloch Nationalism 111
4.1 Cultural Heritage and Traditional Values 111
I. Salient Features of Baloch Social Life 112
II. Baloch Literature 113
III. Baloch Songs and Music 113
IV. Baloch Poetry 113
V. Baloch Language 114
VI. The Baloch Anthem: Mulk Balochi (The Baloch Country) 114
4.2 Physical Terrain 114
4.3 Tribal System and Social Organization 115
4.4 Baloch Jirga System 117
4.5 Baloch Sardari System 117
5. Historical Development of Baloch Nationalism 118
I. The Revolutionary Group 120
II. The Constitutional Group 120
6. Emergence of Baloch Nationalist Movement 120
6.1 First Baloch Revolt on the Issue of Accession to Pakistan (1948) 122
6.2 Second Baloch Revolt (1958- 59) on the Issue of One-Unit Policy 124
6.3 Third Baloch Uprising (1963-69) and Policy of „‟Basic
Democracies‟‟
126
6.4 Fourth Baloch Resistance 1973-77 129
7. Current Separatist Movement, 2005- Ongoing 130
8. Baloch Insurgents 136
9. Baloch Grievances and Main Causes of Current Insurgency 137
I. Protection of Cultural Identity 138
xi
II. Lack of Political Representation 139
III. Provincial Autonomy 141
IV. Expropriation of Resources 141
V. Financial Policies and Development Projects 142
VI. Economic Oppression 143
VII. Influx of Other Ethnic Groups and Fear of Marginalization 144
VIII. Presence of Army and Security Concerns 145
10. Governments Policies Regarding Baloch Insurgency 146
11. Interests of Foreign Powers in Baloch Nationalist Movement 149
12. Impacts of Baloch Nationalist Movements on National Level 153
References 156
Chapter Five
Political Development and Baloch Nationalism
163-227
1. Political Culture of Balochistan 163
2. Political Strains in Balochistan 164
3. Influence of Tribal Sardars on Politics 166
4. Political Attitude of Major Baloch Tribes 167
I. The Bugti Tribe 167
II. The Marri Tribe 168
III. The Mengal Tribe 169
5. Contribution of Baloch Political Parties in Political Development 170
5.1 Mainstream Political Parties 170
5.2 Baloch Nationalist Political Parties 170
5.3 Pakhtun Political Parties 172
5.4 Religious Political Parties and Their Influence 173
6. Impact of Baloch Militant Organizations on Political Environment 173
7. Religious Sectarian Groups and Impact on Political Process 176
8. Political Development in Balochistan from 2001-2014 177
9. Political Development of Balochistan during Military Regime of
General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008)
177
xii
9.1 Triggers of Tension between Musharraf and Baloch Nationalists 179
I. Construction of Gwadar Port and Mega Development Projects 179
II. Clash of Economic Interests with the Non Baloch Communities 180
III. Musharraf‟s Support for US and War on Terrorism 181
IV. Involvement of Military in Political Decisions of Balochistan 181
V. Devolution of Power Plan (2002) 181
9.2 General Elections of 2002 and Political Scenario of Balochistan 182
I. Participating Political Parties 184
II. Influence of Military on Election Process 185
III. Election Results and Political Atmosphere of Balochistan 186
IV. Formation of Government 188
9.3 Detachment of Baloch Tribal Leaders from Political Process 189
9.4 Akbar Bugti‟s 15 Point Agenda to Musharraf Government 190
9.5 Baloch Armed Revolt against Musharraf 192
9.6 Musharraf‟s Policy to Appease Baloch Wrath: The Relief Package
2005
194
9.7 Amnesty Offer by Musharraf to Baloch Insurgents 197
9.8 Baloch Response to Amnesty Offer 197
10. Political Development in Balochistan during Democratic Regime
of Pakistan Peoples Party (2008-2013)
199
10.1 Boycott of Baloch Nationalist Leaders of Elections 2008 199
10.2 Election Process and Formation of Government 200
10.3 PPP and Political Development of Balochistan 202
I. Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package 2009 203
II. Baloch Nationalist‟s Response to Balochistan Package 204
III. Political and Financial Autonomy through 18th Constitutional
Amendment and 7th National Finance Commission Award
206
IV. Baloch Response and Attitude towards 18th Amendment and
7th NFC Award
210
11. Political Development in Balochistan during PML-N Regime (2013-
14)
212
xiii
11.1 Pre Election Violence in Balochistan 212
11.2 Baloch Nationalist„s Attitude towards General Elections 2013 213
11.3 Election Process 2013 and Balochistan 214
11.4 Election Results and Formation of Government 214
11.5 Coalition Government of Baloch and Pakhtun in Balochistan 217
References 221
Chapter Six
Economic Development and Baloch Nationalism
228-289
1. Economic Condition of Balochistan 228
2. Population Density in Balochistan 229
3. Economic Strength of Balochistan 231
4. Agriculture and the Economic Development of Balochistan 233
I. Production of Food Crops 234
II. Production of Cash Crops 235
III. Fruit Production 236
IV. Vegetables Cultivation 238
V. Condiments of Balochistan 240
4.1 Major Challenges in the Development of Agriculture Sector 240
I. Lack of Proper Water Sources 240
II. Dominance of Small Farms 241
III. Limited Job Creation 241
IV. Lack of Quality Inputs 241
V. Inadequate Allocations for Development 241
VI. Disorganized Policies For Water Use 242
VII. Improper Access to Markets and Poor Information Systems 242
VIII. Lack of Proper Financial Policies 243
4.2 Provincial Government Plans for the Development of Agriculture 243
5. Live stock/Dairy Sector in the Economic Development 245
5.1 Major Problems of Livestock Sector 246
5.2 Economic Contribution of Live Stock 247
xiv
I. Meat 247
II. Milk 247
III. Fiber 247
IV. Fertilizers 247
V. Labor and Transport 248
VI. Land management 248
6. Fisheries in the Economic Development of Balochistan 249
I. Economic Significance of Marine Capture 250
II. Economic Significance of Coastline Aquaculture 250
III. Economic Significance of Inland Fisheries 250
6.1 Provincial Government‟s Plans for the Development of Fisheries 255
7. Significance of Mining and Energy Resources in the Economic
Development of Balochistan
256
8. Infrastructure Development Projects 259
8.1 Construction of 100 Dams in Balochistan 260
I. Economic Benefits of the Project 263
8.2 Current Economic Development Plans by Provincial Government 264
8.3 Chief Minister‟s Policy Reform Unit 265
I. Employment Opportunities 265
II. Basic Infrastructure Development Strategy 266
III. Economic Corridors Development Strategy 266
IV. Development Strategy for Growth Centers 267
V. Connectivity between Growth Centers and Economic Corridors 267
VI. Reconstruction of Provincial Highways 268
VII. Development Strategy for Coastal Regions 268
9. Major Challenges in the Economic Development 269
9.1 Poverty and Unemployment in Balochistan 269
9.2 Illiteracy and Poor Condition of Education 272
I. Development Project for Education in Balochistan by
Government
274
xv
9.3 Lack of Proper Infrastructure 275
9.4 Natural Disasters and Hazards 276
I. Floods 276
II. Earthquakes 278
III. Land sliding 279
IV. Droughts 279
a. Affects of Droughts on Economic Progress 280
V. Spread of Diseases and Poor Health Awareness 281
10. Impact of Baloch Nationalist Movement on the Economic
Development of Balochistan
281
References 285
Chapter Seven
Conclusion
291-304
Bibliography 306-336
xvi
List of Tables
Sr.
No.
Table Page
No.
1 Table No. 2.1 Rivers of Balochistan 31
2 Table No. 2.2 Forests of Balochistan 33
3 Table No. 2.3 Important Mountain Ranges of Balochistan 35
4 Table no. 2.4 Metallic Minerals of Balochistan 38
5 Table No. 2.5 Non-Metallic Minerals of Balochistan 40
6 Table No. 2.6 Energy Resources of Balochistan 42
7 Table No. 2.7 Statistics on Gas Production 43
8 Table No. 2.8 Major Crops of Balochistan and Average Productivity
Index
46
9 Table No. 2.9 Population of Balochistan in Different Years 51
10 Table No. 2.10 Population of Major and Second Major Ethnic Groups in
Various Districts of Balochistan
53-54
11 Table No. 2.11 Administrative Divisions of Balochistan 55-56
12 Table No. 2.12 Tribes of Balochistan 57
13 Table No. 4.1 Levels of Baloch Jirga 118
14 Table No. 5.1 National Assembly Seats from All Pakistan in Election
2002
186
15 Table No. 5.2 National Assembly Seats from Balochistan 187
16 Table No. 5.3 Party Position in National Assembly 2002 187
17 Table No. 5.4 Composition of Senate 2002 188
18 Table No. 5.5 Baloch Militant Attacks on Government Installations
2001-2011
193
19 Table No. 5.6 Killed and Injured Persons during 2001-2011 194
20 Table No. 5.7 Composition of the National Assembly 2008 200
21 Table No. 5.8 Composition of the Provincial Assemblies 2008 201
22 Table No. 5.9 Party Position in National Assembly 2008 201
xvii
23 Table No. 5.10 National Assembly Seats from Balochistan 2008 201
24 Table No. 5.11 Provincial Assembly Party Position Balochistan 2008 202
25 Table No. 5.12 Gas Production and Consumption among the Provinces
2009
207
26 Table No. 5.13 Share in Total Transfers of Resources to the Provinces
under 7th NFC Award 2009-11
209
27 Table No. 5.14 Per Capita Transfers of Resources by Population 1990-
2011
209
28 Table No. 5.15 Elections 2013 Party Position National Assembly 215
29 Table No. 5.16 Elections 2013 Party Position Balochistan Assembly 216
30 Table No. 6.1 Demography of Balochistan 230
31 Table No. 6.2
District wise Statistics on Population and Land Mass
Balochistan
230
32 Table No. 6.3 Economic Figures of Districts of Balochistan 232
33 Table No. 6.4 Under Cultivation Area of Food Crops in Balochistan 234
34 Table No. 6.5 Production of Food Crops in Balochistan 235
35 Table No. 6.6 Regions of Cultivation of Cash Crops 235
36 Table No. 6.7 Under Cultivation Area of Cash Crops in Balochistan 236
37 Table No. 6.8 Production of Cash Crops in Balochistan 236
38 Table No. 6.9 Area under Fruit Production 237
39 Table No. 6.10 Production of Fruits 237
40 Table No. 6.11 Area under Vegetable Cultivation (Hectares) 238
41 Table No. 6.12 Production of Vegetables in Tones 239
42 Table No. 6.13 Production and Areas of Condiments of Balochistan 240
43 Table No. 6.14 Live stock Population Census Balochistan 2014 246
44 Table No. 6.15 Economic Worth of Live Stock 248
45 Table No. 6.16 Total Fish Landing and its Value on Balochistan Coast in
2013
251
46 Table No. 6.17 Area Wise Quantity of Fish on Balochistan in 2013 253
47 Table No. 6.18 Fishermen Population in 2013 255
48 Table No. 6.19 Government Plans for the Development of Fisheries 255
xviii
2012-13
49 Table No. 6.20 Worth of Minerals and Employment Cost Statistics 258
50 Table No. 6.21 Construction Strategy for 100 Dams 261
51 Table No. 6.22 Construction of 100 Dams, Package -I of 20 Dams 261
52 Table No. 6.23 Construction of 100 Dams, Package –II of 26 Dams 263
53 Table No. 6.24 Unemployed Population of Balochistan 270
54 Table No. 6.25 Statistics on Literacy Rate Balochistan 273
55 Table No. 6.26 Frequently Drought Affected Districts of Balochistan 279
xix
List of Maps
Sr.
No.
Map Page
No.
1 Map No.2.1 Map of Balochistan 29
2 Map No.2.2 Districts of Balochistan 56
3 Map No.3.1 Balochistan under British Rule 71
4 Map No.3.2 Present Balochistan with Map of Pakistan 72
5 Map No.3.3 Location of Gwadar, Balochistan 77
6 Map No.3.4 The Corridors Crossing Through Balochistan 81
7 Map No.3.5 Two Proposed Gas Pipeline Projects IP&TAPI 84
8 Map No.3.6 Gwadar, the Gateway to Central Asia and China
Trade
95
9 Map No.4.1 Conflict Areas of Balochistan 135
10 Map No.6.1 Location of 100 Dams, Package-I of 20 Dams 262
11 Map No.6.2 Location of 100 Dams, Package-II of 26 Dams 264
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1
1. Introduction
This research is basically about the Baloch Nationalism and its impact on political
and economic development of Balochistan, which is a constant cause of conflict
between Baloch nationalists and the Government of Pakistan since 1947. In this
research, the main focus is on the historical background of emergence of Baloch
Nationalism with reference to the geo-strategic importance of this region. This
research proceeds with references to the main factors which are involved in the
political and economic development of Balochistan, while highlighting the role of
Baloch Nationalist Sardars in the process of development and analyzing the causes
behind continuous demand from Sardars of Balochistan for political and economic
autonomy.
Nationalism is defined as a belief, faith and a political philosophy that rivets an
individual who identifies himself or becomes emotionally involved to his nation.
Nationalism consists of national uniqueness, by distinction with the related construct
of devotion and loyalty which involves the social training and personal conduct that
support the judgment and actions of a state. (Despina, 2005:135-155). According to
a political or sociological viewpoint, there are two main standpoints which highlight
the genesis and foundation of nationalism. One is called the
primordialist perspective that explains nationalism as an expression of the ancient
and perceived evolutionary human tendency to classify themselves into distinct
groups based on the resemblance and similarity of birth. The second view describes
nationalism as a modern occurrence that requires the structural conditions of
modern society in order to exist. (Motyl, 2001:251). Ethnic nationalism is also a type
of nationalism, in which a nation defines itself in terms of ethnicity. The innermost
theme of ethnic nationalists is that "nations are defined by a shared heritage, which
usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic
ancestry". (Muller, 2008) Ethnic nationalism also indicates the set of ideas of
a cultureshared group with a same cultural background and common language.
2
However it is something different from entirely cultural definitions of a nation which
prompt people to become members of a nation by cultural amalgamation and purely
linguistic definitions.
The population of Balochistan consists of many ethnic groups. The major ethnic
groups include Baloch, Pakhtuns and Brahvi. Other groups are Hazaras and those
who are usually known as „‟settlers‟‟. The small population of Balochistan has an
exceptional ethnic and tribal variety. Most of the people in cities and town
understand and speak more than two languages along with Balochi. The other
languages such as Pashto, Brahvi, Saraiki, Sindhi, Darri and Persian are also
spoken. (PILDAT, 2012:9)
Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan but at the same time, it has the
smallest amount of population that constitutes only 5% of the total population of
Pakistan. Balochistan‟s geographical area spreads over 347,190 Sq, Kilometers,
which forms 43.6 per cent of the total area of Pakistan.
(http://www.balochistan.gov.pk) this largest province is the least literate and least
developed area. It became a part of Pakistan on August 14, 1947 and got the status
of province in 1972.
The location of Balochistan connects Iranian Plateau with South East Asia, Central
Asia to its long coast line in the shores of the Arabian Sea and makes this region
geographically an important place. Balochistan is a mountainous desert area, which
shares borders with Iran, Afghanistan and on its Southern Boundary is located the
Arabian Sea with strategically important port of Gwadar on the Makran Coast, which
is a direct approach to the Strait of Hormuz. Historically Balochistan‟s western region
was the southern part of Sistan o Baluchestan province in Iran. In the east, was
Pakistani Balochistan and in the northwest, the Helmand province of Afghanistan
existed. The Gulf of Oman is located on its southern border. It shares borders with
all the other three provinces of Pakistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
3
through Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in the north, Punjab in the
extreme north east and Sindh in east.
There were four princely states under the British Raj, three states Makran, Las Bela
and Kharan were attached to Pakistan in 1947 after independence (Hasnat, 2011:
78). At that time the one part of Balochistan was known as the British Balochistan
consisted of Quetta, Pishin, Zhob, Loralai and Lasbela and the second part was
known as native Balochistan constituting Kalat, Kharan and Makran. Makran was
made a district of Balochistan, less than an area of 800 kilometers around Gwadar,
Gwadar used to be a part of Oman until Pakistan purchased it in September 1958.
(„‟Balochistan Problems and Solutions‟‟,2011) and became a part of Balochistan in
1977.
After Pakistan‟s creation in 1947, the new state had to face uprising from Baloch
nationalists of Kalat who were trying to secede in 1948 and 1958. The movement
gained energy by the time and created a regular political chaos; the government of
Pakistan had to launch a military operation in 1973 against the insurgents and
imposed heavy attacks on the baloch separatists with the help of Iran. The
movement was suppressed with the imposition of martial law in 1977. But the
nationalist-separatist groups again became active with the invasion of Afghanistan in
2001and the war in North-West Pakistan worsen the situation of conflict, and
resulted in the killings of non-Baloch settlers in balochistan by separatists since
2006.
Since Balochistan is the largest territory of Pakistan, it holds a huge amount of oil,
gas and other mineral resources, and is an exclusive economic zone of Pakistan
which spreads over 180,000 square kilometers potentially rich in oil, gas and
minerals like gold, chromite, copper, iron, marble. There are two very important
naval bases of Pakistan are located at Gwadar and Omara. Gwadar, as an
alternative to the Karachi port is of significant strategic importance to Pakistan, with
Chinese involvement (Grare, 2006: 4-5). Balochistan provides 49% of Pakistan‟s
4
energy requirements as well as Balochistan‟s natural gas production provide 36% of
Pakistan‟s total gas production. (ICG, 2006: 16). Balochistan has always remained
politically less important. The strong hold of Central Government and the
unacquainted style of the decision-making process have alienated the people of
Balochistan. There have been four insurgencies in Balochistan; in 1948, 1958, 1962
and 1973; and four military operations have been conducted against Baloch
nationalists but they all resulted in a worse chaos and enhanced the sense of
deprivation, disaffection and disappointment in the Baloch People.
The announcement of Gwadar Mega project in 2001 and the assassination of
Nawab Akbar Bugti by Pakistani Military forces in 2006, ignited Baloch nationalism
again and gave it the form of a separatist movement which soon turned into a fight
for an independent Balochistan and the province is facing another rebellion by
Balochi Nationalists groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the
Baloch Republican Army (BRA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF). These
militant groups have been fighting for their political and economic rights according to
the 1973 Constitution. The killing of Baloch nationalists in response by Pakistan
Army narrowed any more cahnces of peace. During 2011-2014, many mega projects
worth billions of rupees in collaboration with foreign countries were launched for
economic development of Balochistan, construction of mega Gwadar Port is the
most prominent and significant of all, but the plan to establish military cantonments
at Khuzdar, Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu, and involvement of other countries,
created an impression on Baloch Nationalists that the development was to be
achieved by keeping Baloch people suppressed and under pressure and the
influence of foreign communities in these projects may harm and damage the basic
Baloch National Identity.
This research brings into the light the impacts and effects on political and economic
development of Balochistan in current scenario while keeping in view the historical
background of Baloch Nationalism, its origins, role and reasons behind it‟s uprising
again and again.
5
2. Literature Review
The topic of Baloch Nationalism is not new in the history; a lot of work has been
done on this topic as it is gaining significance with each passing day. Much has been
written earlier but the present work is an effort to add knowledge and understanding
how Baloch Nationalism has played role in the development of least populated area
of Pakistan. Though it is a difficult task to go through and analyze all the literature
available, yet an effort has been made.
Nina Swidler (2014) examines tribalism and nationalism as historical
processes in Kalat which was slightly colonial in two ways. It was located on
the far reaches of the Indian Empire, and British interests were geostrategic
rather than economic. The British nominated Kalat a native state, but
eliminated the powers of the ruler in favour of Tribal chiefs and tribal
governance through Jirga (tribal court). This created tensions between local
officials and the Central Government, which was determined that the outlook
of Kalat State be maintained. Sardars and jirgas have become significant as a
traditional feature of baloch society. (Swidler, Nina (2014). Remotely Colonial:
History and Politics in Balochistan. New York: Oxford University Press)
Zahid Choudhary‟s book edited and compiled by Zaidi, Hassan Jafar. (2013).
Pakistan Ki Siyasi Tareekh (Balochistan Volume 7), comprises of more then
12 volumes which cover all the historical background of Indo-Pak, Hindu-
Muslim and Colonial conflict at the time of creation of Pakistan.. The book
provides good information about the circumstances which led to the partition
of Sub-Continent.
Maria Malik (2013) elaborates Balochistan, with a special focus on the level of
the socio-political, economic and strategic implications that are involved in
present insurgency is likely to affect Pakistan as well as the region.(Maria
Malik (2013). Balochistan Conundrum-The Real Perspective, Islamabad:
Poorab Academy.)
6
Naseer Dashti (2012) provides knowledge on the historical background of
Balochistan and Baloch nation. He states that, a group of Indo-Iranic tribes,
was called Balaschik about three thousand years ago (Dashti, 2012: 138) and
was established in the northwestern Caspian region of Balashagan. Due to
hard circumstances, they migrated towards south and eastern parts of Iranian
Plateau, and then settled in present day Balochistan. During their hard and
twisted travel from Balashagan to Balochistan, they faced discrimination,
exile, and brutality of Persian, Arab and other powers. During 17th century,
Baloch started cultural and political development and formed a nation state;
Kalat. In 1839, the British occupied Balochistan and divided it into different
parts (Dashti, 2012: 140-150). When the British left India in 1947, Balochistan
recovered its independence but soon Pakistan occupied it in 1948. The book
explains the origin of the Baloch state and their history of survival against
powerful forces. (Naseer Dashti, (2012). The Baloch and Balochistan: A
Historical Account from the Beginning to the Fall of the Baloch State. USA:
Trafford Publishing.)
Malik Siraj Akbar (2011) defines Balochistan as Pakistan‟s largest province
rich with natural gas, gold and copper on the borders of Iran and Afghanistan.
the Baloch have a harsh history of utilization and repression by federal
government and a heavy influence by the country‟s military. The writer
highlights the issue of the disappearance of hundreds of Baloch political
workers and their brutal murder by the Pakistani security services. The
government and the Baloch nationalists have confronted each other four
times since the creation of Pakistan in 1947; the ongoing conflict involves
more organized and drastic magnitude. The author takes a look at the
changes in the dimension of Baloch movement changed during last decade.
(Malik Siraj Akbar (2011). The Redefined Dimensions of Baloch Nationalist
Movement, USA: Xlibris, Corporation)
Feroz Ahmad (1999) presents a very significant work about the
ineffectiveness of ethnic politics in Pakistan. He gives a detailed picture of
different ethnic groups in Pakistan, the evolution of their group identity and
7
the social and economic conditions of the state in which they work together.
He provides a detailed analysis of the challenges of identity which the
emerging state faced with the creation of Pakistan. The volatile nature of
Pakistan‟s ethnic problem and the role of state have been emphasized with a
complete detail about the East Pakistan crisis and armed resistance in
Balochistan. The author has successfully highlighted the problems of ethnic
groups in Pakistan and the factors which are realted to their national
integration. (Ahmed, Feroz (1999). Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan. Karachi:
Oxford.)
Adeel khan (2005) has provided very valuable knowledge about ethnic politics
in Pakistan. He talks about a diverse range of issues related to ethnic conflict
in Pakistan and presents an obvious picture of centre state relationship and
the tyrannically centralizing policies of the Pakistani state. The book is a
detailed study of the absence of representative rule, provincial autonomy,
ethnic and regional restlessness and deals ethnic conflict as a political issue,
and an effort for power gain between the major and the minor elements.
(Khan, A. (2005). Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in
Pakistan. New Dehli: Sage Publications)
An autobiography of Khan of Kalat state is very helpful in every research on
Balochistan. He recalls every event in pre and post independence period and
exposes many secrets. He has given a detailed account of accession of Kalat
state with Pakistan. (Baloch, A. Y. K M. (2009). 2nd Edition, Inside
Balochistan. Karachi: Royal Book Company.)
A book by Kundi (1994) provides rich information on the socio-cultural and
political aspects of Balochistan. The writer describes many socio-cultural,
political, economic and administrative aspects of Balochistan, while analyzing
them. The book is a compilation of his published articles which were written to
highlight the ancient and historical legacies of Balochistan. (Kundi, A. M
(1994). Balochistan; A Socio-Cultural and Political Analysis. Quetta: Qasim
Printers).
8
Syed Iqbal Ahmad (1992) presents very significant and valuable work the geo
strategic and political importance of Balochistan. He highlights the factors
which make this region the most significant for the security of Pakistan as a
link between South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. The writer also
discusses the consequences of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 and its
impact on Balochistan and overall political situation of Pakistan. (Ahmad,
Iqbal Syed. (1992). Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance. Karachi: Royal
Book Co.)
A very important work on the historical and political background and process
is found in the book written by A.B Awan, (1995) which provides knowledge
about historical background to post-independence Pakistan and the evolution
of political process in Balochistan. He explains the nature of Baloch ethnicity
along with their struggle from a nomadic life to the British rule. Later on, the
author describes the evolution of political events and processes in
Balochistan after the creation of Pakistan. The book does not only provide
important information about domestic inconsistency but also highlights the
influence of political, economical and cultural impacts of Russia, on baloch
neighboring country; Afghanistan. (Awan, B. A (1995).Balochistan: Historical
and Political Process. Landon; New Century Publishers).
Selig S. Harrison (1981) contributes a lot in any research about Baloch
nationalism and briefly gives a good back ground to the origins of the Baloch
people then he talks about the real nature of Baloch nationalism rather than
the made up theories about nationalism. The author views Baloch nationalism
as a vibrant and self motivated observable fact which draws attention in its
own right rather than as a subsidiary aspect of the larger problems of
Pakistani and Iranian nationalism. He carefully examines Pakistani and
Iranian political and strategic attitudes to the Baloch and their demands. He
further emphasizes upon the long lasting impacts of these political attitudes
which are important in the formation of Baloch movement and affect the
probabilities for conciliation between the Baloch and Government. The book
successfully explains the major grievances of baloch nationalists such as their
9
demands for autonomy and the possibilities of due adjustments between the
Baloch and Central Government. The author also considers Russian
influence and attitude toward Baloch separatism and explains the ideology
behind the Baloch struggle for both independence and justice. (Harrison,
Selig. S, (1981). In Afghanistan‘s Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet
Temptation. New York; Carneige Endowment for International Peace)
A very precious and valuable book of Justice Mir Khuda Buksh Marri (1974).
This book, by Justice Marri really provides a valuable knowledge about the
origin, civilization, language and history of Baloch people from Tell-Harire and
Allepo in Nothern Syria to ancient Babylonian, Kerman, Balochistan and Delhi
from the beginning to the present. (Marri, Mir Khuda Bakhsh.
(1974).Searchlights on Balochs and Balochistan. Karachi: Royal Book
Company.)
Fred Scholz (2002) explores the long-term impacts of prevailing external
influence on local nomadic societies especially on Balochistan. the author
explains the externally stimulated twist of internal structures and their
importance for the development of the present time. This book presents a
valuable knowledge about the different aspects of life of nomads, tribal
societies, and Balochistan. This is a deep study of the transformation of the
nomadic structure of Balochistan into their present developed society.
(Scholz, Fred. (2002). Nomadism and Colonialism: A Hundred Years of
Baluchistan (1872-1972). USA: Oxford University Press.)
Farhan Hanif Siddique (2012) explains the Pakistani government‟s treatment
and attitude towards different ethnic groups after military operation in East
Pakistan. The author gives a detailed description about the ethnic movements
that took place after the creation of Bangladesh such as the Baloch revolt in
the 1970s, the Sindhi uprising in the 1980s and Mohajir movement in the
1990s. This book is a critical analysis of ethnicity and nationalism and
evaluates the nationalist ideology within ethnic groups as a basic factor in all
the cultural movements. He challenges the argument that nationalism is only
related to modern-industrialized socio-economic settings (Siddique, 2012: 3).
10
He takes evidence from Pakistan and tries to state that ethnic movements
originate from three distinct socio-economic territories; tribal (Baloch), rural
(Sindh) and urban (Mohajir). His provides knowledge about the origins of
Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir ethnic conflicts in Pakistan and their relations with
the central government. (Siddiqi, Farhan Hanif. (2012). The Politics of
Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements
(Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series). USA: Routledge.)
Robert G. Wirsing (2008) examines the current Baloch separatist insurgency
in the context of energy and natural resources of this region. The writer is of
the view that a rapid increase in the demand of energy in Pakistan and other
neighboring nations, and the turbulence in resource rich province of
Balochistan regarding their energy deposits has magnified the importance of
Balochistan on national and international level. The situation becomes more
complicated when Pakistan has not been able to cope with the separatist
movement launched by baloch tribes. The writer suggests that Pakistan
needs to renovate its policies regarding baloch demands and their protest
against government in order to control the unlimited conflict and to treat the
Baloch people as associates in energy development, not as opponents or
rivals. (Wrising, Robert.G., (2008). Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of
Energy Resources: A Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan, retrieved
from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a480237.pdf on 2 April, 2015)
Jason R. Murtha, (2011) gives a detailed introduction of strategic significance
of Balochistan regional affairs which is increasing day by day due to the
natural gas, oil and other precious minerals. The author explains why
Balochistan is gaining attention from foreign investor and developers. In
addition to natural resources, the geographical location of Balochistan makes
it the most important region to connect the Middle East, Central Asia and
South Asia. The emphasis of the author is upon the construction of Gwadar
Port, which is likely to play the key role in bringing economic and political
globalization to the region. But the same port is also the main cause of
current baloch insurgency and has created an unstable situation both on
11
national and international level. As many surrounding nations such as China,
India, Iran, US, Russia and Afghanistan; has their own interest in Balochistan.
(Murtha, Jason R. (2011). „‘The Strategic Importance of Balochistan‖
California: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.)
Martin Axmann, (2008) explains the origin of Baloch nationalism during the
20th century and analyzes the emergence of Baloch national movement in
British India. The author discusses the reasons of decline and collapse of
Kalat. The Khanate of Kalat lacked the ability to integrate itself with British but
at the same time, increased connection and attachment to British Indian
affairs, and the political, administrative, and constitutional development of
Balochistan. The author tries to highlight the facts behind the materialization
of Baloch movement and their attempt to turn Balochistan to its pre-colonial
status. He also searches into the causes of rapid rise of Baloch nationalist
movement, and the political and cultural structure of Baloch society. The book
also discusses the political demands of Baloch nationalists. The writer states
that the emergence of a Baloch national movement based on their ethnic
identity is a result of the historical and political conditions created by the
British and a reaction to the territorial, political, and cultural inclusion in the
Pakistan movement (Axmann, Martin (2008). Back to the Future: The
Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baluch Nationalism 1915-1955. London:
Oxford University Press).
Mir Sherbaz Khetran, (2011) narrates that Balochistan is Pakistan's most
neglected province, where the basic facilities are still almost non-existent,
people are living as they did centuries ago. He also highlights the powerful
influence of strong tradition of the tribal system where law made by tribal
chiefs, rules all aspects of lives of people. Political and economic negligence
has made Balochistan a centre of lawlessness. The chances of civil war
continue to float and the possibilities of province's split from the rest of the
country in the wake of current insurgency. This writer attempts to explain the
major causes or factors of Balochistan crises which have strong historical
roots, demands a multi-dimensional and an urgent solution. Mir Sherbaz
12
Khetran is a Baloch native and son of the chieftain of the historic Khetran tribe
and takes keen interest in the province's political and development affairs.
(Khetran, Mir Sherbaz. (2011). Crisis in Balochistan: The Way Forward, LAP
LAMBERT Academic Publishing.)
Alexander Kouzminov, (2010) explains that Baloch people were not willing to
join Pakistan and they have always been challenging the Pakistani
Government as an independent entity. That‟s why there is a constant
atmosphere of violence in this region. He also emphasizes the role of external
forces which try to exploit baloch alienation from Pakistan. He discusses the
progress of post colonial Balochistan, its geopolitical worth, and the
fundamental grievances of the Baloch. The writer attempts to analyze the
reasons behind recent phase of violence in Balochistan and highlights the
latest position of insurgency. He predicts the possible impacts of long-lasting
violence in Balochistan on Pakistan. (Kouzminov, Alexander. (2010).
Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroads. Manas Publications)
Mehmood Ali Shah‟s book is worth studying to be aware of social construction
of Baloch Society after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 onwards. The writer
provides details on gradual development of local government system in
Balochistan and keeps his focus on the function and influence of these
political systems on tribal society of Balochistan. The writer successfully
brings into light the socio-economic organization and the administrative
system of the baloch tribes. (Shah, A. M. (1994). Sardari, Jirga and Local
Government System in Balochistan. Lahore : Idara-e-Tadrees.)
3. Research Methodology
This research work is a qualitative type of study with a historical and analytical
research method. A convenient approach is adopted according to the requirement of
research work. Primary data collection was made through autobiographies of
relevant personalities and Government documents etc. Secondary sources include
13
data collection from books, journals, articles, news papers, internet search, articles,
magazines, research papers and dissertations.
4. Research Questions
In this study, an effort has been made to answers these research questions:
1. What role has been played by Baloch Nationalism in the political and
Economic Development of Balochistan?
2. What factors have led to Baloch Nationalism?
3. How can the Baloch Nationalists be brought into mainstream politics?
4. What kind of projects for economic and political development have been
launched in Balochistan during last decade and how they are beneficial for
the improvement of Baloch region?
5. How much Baloch Nationalism is effecting the process of development in
Balochistan, whether the Baloch Nationalists are rendering their co-operation
for political and economic development or not? Keeping a focus on the tribal
system and their internal conflicts.
6. What is the present scenario of political and economic development, keeping
in view the influence of an ongoing insurgency (started in 2005) in
Balochistan by Baloch Nationalists.
5. Organization of Research
The research is divided into seven chapters.The Chapter One is an introduction to
the research topic, which includes literature review, research questions, and
methodology and chapter scheme.
14
The Chapter Two; Balochistan: Land and People; provides detailed information
about the Land and people of Balochistan, its historical background with an
emphasis on Baloch struggle for protecting the integrity and identity as a unique
Ethnic Group. Moreover, it includes the basic information about natural resources,
ethnic composition, social attitude, political attitude and geographical features of
Balochistan.
This Chapter Three; Geo Strategic Significance of Balochistan; elaborates in detail
the geo-strategic significance of Balochistan, while focusing on those factors which
have given this region an increased importance on national and international level.
The strategic importance of Balochistan has great potential of becoming the major
participant in the development of Pakistan. Moreover, the reasons of developing
interests of foreign and regional nation‟s powers in Balochistan have been high
lightened in context of Mega Development Projects and geographical location of the
region. This chapter analyzes the strategic significance of Balochistan as a key
factor in global politics.
The Chapter Four; Baloch Nationalism: Past and Present; is about the historical
development of Baloch Nationalism, and a detailed discussion about baloch Tribal
System and highlights the history of uprising of Baloch nationalism which includes
the basic elements in the formation of Baloch Nationalism. Baloch tribal structure
and internal conflicts on national level have been emphasized. It discusses the
genesis of Baloch Sardari system and its influential role on the social and political
conditions of Balochistan. Baloch relations and conflicts with central government and
the history of all the baloch uprisings have been discussed with a special reference
to ongoing Baloch insurgency.
The Chapter Five; Political Development and Baloch Nationalism; provides
information on political structure of Balochistan, during the period from 2001-2014,
Government policies regarding betterment of political system in Balochistan and role
of Baloch Politicians and local Nationalists leaders. This chapter will discuss political
15
issues between Baloch Nationalists and Central Government as well as the internal
political conflicts between major political parties of Balochistan with an analytical
approach to understand the overall political structure and performance of political
institutes in the development of Balochistan.
The Chapter Six; Economic Development and Baloch Nationalism; will discuss in
detail the major projects of economic development of Balochistan, launched by the
Government of Pakistan, during 2001-2014 some of which are sponsored and
supported by foreign countries, and the impact of these projects on economic
conditions of Balochistan in context of Baloch Nationalism. The factors involved in
the success and failure of economic development programs will be studied in the
light of Baloch ideology of their ethnic identity and current insurgency.
The Chapter Seven; Conclusion; will conclude the overall written chapters with
suggestions to bring Baloch Nationalism into mainstream political and economic
scenario.
16
References
Balochistan Problems and Solutions, (2011) retrieved from
http://www.thevision21.org/article-detail.php?cid=14&aid=31 on December 9, 2014
Despina, Rothi, (2005). National Attachment and Patriotism in a European Nation: A
British Study, Political Psychology, 26. pp 135-155
Motyl, Alexander, ed. (2001). Encyclopedia of Nationalism.1., San Diego: Academic
Press
Muller, Jerry. Z., (March/April 2008) Us and Them, The Enduring Power of Ethnic
Nationalism, retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2008-03-
02/us-and-them on 2014,Dec.8
PILDAT (March, 2012) Balochistan: Civil-Military Relations, Islamabad: Pakistan
Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency.
CHAPTER TWO
Balochistan: Land and People
17
1. The Baloch and Balochistan: Origin and History
The current land of Balochistan is divided into three parts, Northern Balochistan,
Western Balochistan and Eastern Balochistan, extended between three countries
that are Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan by a differentiating border called Goldsmith
Line. It was drawn by British General Goldsmith in 1870-1872. Balochistan became
a part of Pakistan on August 14, 1947 and got the status of province in 1972. The
location of Balochistan which connects Iranian Plateau with South East Asia and the
Central Asian States to the coastal line on the Arabian Sea provides it with a great
significance in the terms of geography.
The evidence for the origin of Baloch people and their arrival to the present land is
available through many archeological, historical and anthropology theories yet their
origin has not been recognized accurately. The Baloch always managed themselves
as a tribal union. Balochistan is the land where one of the earliest human
civilizations; Mehrgar is found in Eastern Balochistan; (PIPS, 2009:14) the Kech
civilization in Makran has its history in 4000 BC.
Baloch people have been living and ruling their land for a thousand of years as most
ancient tribes of the world. A theory about the origin of Balochs is Semitic
Connection, according to which the Baloch had a correlation with civilization of
Western Asia in the valley of Allepo. According to historians, Baloch were a Semitic
race inhabited in Syria during second millennium BC. (Britannica, 1990: 60) They
moved from Allepo to Iran and then shifted to present day Balochistan. The Baloch
people were basically nomadic, roaming in search of water, food and shelter. And
the region which became their final destination was called Balochistan, the Land of
Balochs. (Britannica, 1990: 62) Prior to their arrival from Kirman to Makran, two
other tribes, Brahvi and Pakhtun were already settled in Balochistan. It is also
mentioned in historical evidences that Kurds and Balochs were two groups of the
same tribe which migrated to Balochistan from Allepo during 4 A.D. Majority of the
18
Kurds settled down in Iraq, Turkey and North Iran and the Baloch decided to make
Mount Al Burz Valley, their homeland.
According to Marco polo, this area was called Kesmacoran, headed by an
independent ruler and the people were involved in agriculture and trading both
overland and by sea in all directions. (Spooner, 1989:609) Baloch started
immigrating into the coastal area Makran in the 11th century AD, and became strong
in 13th century with the invasion of Turkish Tribes into the Iranian Plateau from the
East. According to the Baloch Epic tradition, they belong to Arabic Origin and
Migrated from Aleppo in Syria after the battle of Karbala in 680 AD. According to the
tradition, they claim to have fought against Caliph Yazeed in the Battle of Karbala,
the epic tradition claims that Baloch were Shia Muslims who migrated from Hallab
Allepo, Syria to Bampur in Seistan, Iran and subsequently to Makran and other Parts
of Balochistan (Dames, 1907:2) but a historical evidence states that the Baloch
already existed in 1665 AD. in the region called Kirman (Baloch, 1965: pp8-9)
According to the Baloch epics, the administration of Mir Chakar and Mir Hammal in
15th and 16th century created in them a true Islamic force and after fighting on the
side of Hazrat Imam Hussain, they left Karbala and reached Sistan where they
settled in the region of Rudbar, peacefully under the rule of Shams-ul-Din, but due to
the unfriendly behavior of the next ruler , Badar-ud-Din, the Balochs had to leave
Rudbar, some tribes migrated to south east ward and some went towards south
west ward.(Elfenbein,1989:640) Another theory reveals that during 5th to 8th
centuries, Balochs migrated from the Southern Caspian to Iran and Afghanistan and
later on, they marched towards Pakistan due to unavailability of sufficient pastures
and suppression of feudal land controls.
2. Balochistan under Foreign Powers
Throughout the history, the land of Balochistan has been a significant centre of
attraction to various external powers. The geographic location of this region has
19
been a major factor in creating interest of different forces to capture the Baloch
region to enhance their political power. Being a resource rich land and a safe link to
the other countries, Balochistan has always been attacked and ruled over by various
external intruders.
2.1. Balochistan under Persian Influence
Balochistan was a link between Mesopotamia and Iranian Palteau and Indo-
Gangetic Plain, and was called as Gedrosia. Alexander the great chose as a route
for his army in 325 BC at the time of his return from India after conquering Punjab.
(Kokaislova and Kokaisl, 2012) Alexander crossed Lasbela, Hub River and Makran
Coast. After the death of Alexander, Gedrosia became a part of the Parthian Empire
which was a political power in ancient Iran and the Persian Sassanid Dynasty in 3rd
Century A.D. Sassanid Empire was the last pre-Islamic Iranian empire from 224 to
651 A.D. In 1849, Iran overpowered Baloch people in Kerman and gained control of
Bumpur.
The Baloch political condition experienced an extreme change in 19th century when
the British and Persian Empires divided Balochistan between India and the Persian
Kingdom. In the 19th and 20th century, the Baloch demonstrated their contempt for
the twisted and unfair division and revolted against British and Persian rule. Due to
that division, many parts of Balochistan were handed over to Iran and
Afghanistan. In 1928, the Persian forces again started the invasion procedure
against Baloch and occupied Balochistan. The Baloch were defeated and Western
Balochistan became a part of Persia. In 1932, the Baloch Conference of Jacobabad
chaired by Baloch Nationalist leader, Nawab Yousaf Aziz Magsi rejected the Iranian
occupation of Western Baluchistan. (Forbes, BTV). He initiated the Baloch national
independence movement to secure the Baloch cultural identity and the rich
traditional values which were badly crushed by the ruling states. In 1933, Mir Abdul
Aziz Kurd, a prominent Baloch leader, strongly opposed the partition of Balochistan
and introduced the first map of Greater Balochistan. In 1934, Magsi, the head of the
20
Baloch national movement, recommended an armed resistence for the freedomof
Balochistan.
2.2. Balochistan under the Arab Rule
The Arabs invaded Balochistan in the 7th century AD and brought social, religious,
economic and political changes into the region. Balochistan came under Islamic
influence for the first time in 40 AD, when the Arabs conquered Iran and entered into
Makran. They established their strength in the region as Daulat Mehdania Makran
and Daulat Mutaghariba Tooran (Sabir, 2010) which is now known as Kalat Zone.
The Arab rule spread the teachings of Islam in the area and the Baloch tribes
gradually embraced Islam.
The second invasion of Arabs was made from the west by an Arab General,
Muhammad Bin Qasim in 712 AD. Qasim came though Mekran, and conquered
Sindh, parts of Balochistan and Punjab up to Multan and then in 10th century, a
Turkish Sultan from Ghazna, Mehmood Ghaznavi captured the region. After that,
Balochistan came under Mughals who ruled over there for more than two thousand
years. (Mubarakpuri, 1987:256) The Arabs ruled Balochistan from 7th to 10th century.
Khuzdar was made its capital. (Encyclopedia of Islam, 1936: 634) Balochistan made
remarkable progress in the fields of agriculture and over all social structure was
developed by the Arab rulers. During the last years of Arab rule, the Baloch tribes
developed the tendency of establishing their own semi-independent tribal
confederation. The influence of the Arab Caliphate strated destabilizing in 10th
century and Balochistan once again slipped into Persian track. (Britannica, 1990: 62)
In the 11th century, Nasir-ud-din Subuktagin became the new ruler of Balochistan
and it was the beginning of Ghaznivid dynasty. The Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (999-
1025 A.D.) attacked Hind and Sindh many times, and successfully gain control over
some parts of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan. In 1219, Muhammad Khan of
Khawarizem made Balochistan a part of Saljuk Empire, which is now known as
Khewa in Central Asia. (Gazetteer of India, 1984:275) In the 1595 it became a part
21
of the Mughal Empire and later in 17th century, Nadir Shah and Abbas Safavid of
Persia captured it (PIPS, 2009:16) then Ahmed Shah Durrani of Afghanistan
established his rule in 1747.(„‟Explore Balochistan‟‟, 2013) The Khanate of Kalat
emerged in 1758 when Nasir Khan revolted against the Afghans. From 1400 to 1948
AD, hold of the ruling and invading powers on Balochistan had got weakened and
the Baloch emerged as a powerful force, the decline of Islamic Caliphate gave rise
to Baloch command and dominion. By the end of 14th century, the Baloch had got
control over most of the Balochistan (Baloch, 1983:11). The authority and
remarkable progress of Baloch social, political and cultural organization is the
feature of this era. During 14th century, the Baloch tribes who had migrated from
western parts of present Balochistan in Iran took over in the area up to Jhalanwan.
This tribal alliance which was headed by Mir Jalal was the first Baloch confederacy.
Ahmed Shah Durrani from Afghanistan started his rule in 1747. The Kalat come into
view in 1758 when Nasir Khan protested against the Afghans. Kalat remained the
dominant authority in Balochistan by the 18th century.
2.3. Mongolian Invasion
At the beginning of the l3th century, in 1223 A.D Balochistan came under pressure
of severe attacks by the Mongols. Mongolian attacks badly damaged and shattered
Baloch polity. (Gazetteer of India, 1984:275) Along with Mongols, the Turkish
invaders from the 10th to 13th century, caused heavy loss and destruction to
Balochistan and played an important role in creating a strong emotion of patriotism
in the Balochi Tribes to get them united against these forces and to become loyal to
their Tribal Chiefs.
2.4. First Organized Baloch Confederacy
In the 15th century, a Baloch leader Mir Chakar Rind launched a Baloch union which
included area from Multan, through Mari-Bugti territory to Kharan, and from the
Sulaiman Mountain in the north to Mekran coast. (Gazetteer of India, 1984:276) Mir
22
Chakar ruled for about twenty five years. During his period of influence, His
leadership and well managed policies created new values in the fields of art,
literature, bravery and devotion.
He was the man who is still idealized and loved by Baloch people with a great sense
of respect and honor. He was the first great leader who successfully managed to
control the politically and economically scattered Baloch tribes. He helped his people
by restoring the lost martial values of the Baloch confederacy. While giving them an
identity by uniting them as one nation, about three hundred and fifty years before the
British conquered Quetta and Kalat. His period is called the "classical age" (Baloch,
1977:72) He was the first leader to establish control of Baloch people over their own
land, Balochistan. The classical age ended with the death of Mir Chakar Rind in
about 1556 A.D. (Marri 1974: 17)
2.5. Balochistan under British Dominance
Before the first Afghan war in 1839, British increased their interest and involvement
into the region and they started efforts to gain control over Balochistan. For this
purpose, they adopted different strategies like military expeditions and treaties
(Gazetteer of India, 1984:289). The conract between the British and Khan of Kalat
occurred in 1838, when the Indian army crossed over the Bolan Pass to reach to
Afghanistan. (PILDAT, 2012:13) The rapidly rising threat from Russia compelled the
British to arrange for a safe passage from Kalat to Kandhar through Ahikarpur-
Jacobabad-Dhadhar-Bolan Pass-Quetta-Khojak. (Dupree, 1973:378) The British had
to choose Bolan Pass as their route because the ruler of Punjab, Ranjit Singh had
refused to allow British to cross through his region.
In 1876, British Balochistan came into existence when areas of Sibi, Pishin,
Chaman, Shararod and Thal Chotyali were taken over by British from Afghanistan.
In 1876 Sir Robert Sandeman accomplished a treaty with the Khan of Kalat to bring
the states of Kharan, Makran, and Las Bela, under British control (Isa: 2007:8).
23
According to the treaty Kalat handed over the matters of foreign affairs and defence
to British. Under this treaty, political agents were appointed by British who held
supreme power and Khan of Kalat became powerless. The British occupied Quetta
in 1877 and established their dominance in Balochistan. They divided Balochistan
into three different areas based on ethnic divisions and military strategy. (Gazetteer
of India, 1984:333) The divisions were as:
1. British Balochistan
2. Agency territories including Marri and Bugti Area
3. Native states of Kalat, Lasbela, Makran and Kharan
The Sandeman system gave the Tribal Sardars, complete self-sufficiency under the
supervision of British. They were paid their remuneration by the British. The Khan of
Kalat lost the power to run the affairs of Sardars, even the development projects
were supervised by the British political agents only. The British goal was to appease
Baloch Sardars to prevent any freedom-movement and to strengthen British
influence in a strategically significant region. Sandeman used the tribal chiefs for this
purpose by supporting them and giving other privileges like honorable titles and
financial aid. This was an important system which increased autonomy and power of
Sardars, but consequently, damaged the traditional baloch social system and
intensified class divisions. This new administrative system drastically changed the
character of the Jirga, an assembly which used to play the role of public court to
provide justice to people and a new system of Shahi (royal) Jirga was introduced
instead, (Ahmed, 1973:10) which was consisted of only the Sardars and aristocrats.
This system empowered the British with strength to control any uprising against
them while damaging the last institution of a purely tribal nature, gave rise to
unbreakable class difference and gave the Sardars vast powers over the lives and
property of the people. The Shahi Jirga was permitted to compel taxes in property
and could confiscate women. The Political Agent knowing as AGG (Agent to
Governor General) had the authority to modify all the decisions. The role of Sardars
24
was too much extended that they could take decisions independently, even against
the benefit of people. They preservation of law and order was the duty of Sardars,
establishment of levy corps was made to supervise the process. (Ahmed, 1973:10)
The levies use to recruit tribal staff with the approval of the Sardars. The Sardars
were bound to pay salaries to the tribal workers, and kept the rest of the capital with
their ownselves, which was provided by British Army for that puprospe.
In the year of 1883, British government got Bolan Pass, on permanent lease from
Kalat. (PIPS, 2009:18) British rulers gave complete freedom and autonomy to
Baloch Tribal chiefs to manage all their internal tribal affairs according to their
cultural traditions and customs. In 1893, after two fights with Afghanistan, the area
from Chitral to Balochistan, of the Durand line was ceded to Afghanistan by Sir
Mortimer Durrand. (Khan, 2009:1073). The British wanted to turn Balochistan into a
buffer zone between India and Russia, and as a protected way from Sindh to
Afghanistan. The Durand Line with Afghanistan and Goldsmith Line with Iran
borders were drawn by British colonial rulers while ignoring the significance of native
inhabitants and historic ethnic territories. These borders were drawn to create
division between the Pakhtuns and Baloch tribes of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The British formulated laws and regulations to support the reliance of Balochistan
and gain control over its socio-political system.
The border line of western Balochistan was fixed in 1872, when Iran conquered it.
The main objectives of the British were based on strategic and military interests, so
they did not pay attention to the economic development of Balochistan. Increased
taxes led to the landlessness of many Baloch farmers, spreading economic decline
(Khan, 2009: 1074). A new business class from the Punjab and Sindh regions came
over and gained control of economic developments in Balochistan. This activity
inspired nationalist attitude and reaction amongst the local Baloch people. (Khan,
2009: 1074). Ethno-nationalist movements started uprising throughout the 1930s,
with local elites promoting a separate state towards the end of the British Raj (Grare,
2006: 9). The British occupation of Kalat in 1839 was a significant incident in Baloch
25
history which changed the destiny of the Baloch people. The Baloch were detached
of their land and had to face long-lasting occupation by foreign forces. The social
structure of Balochistan was based on tribal communities which were the only
authority to maintain political structure of Baloch region without any concept of single
state authority. Political unity was inappropriate and an unfamiliar to the tribal mode
of their social life. ―Whilst several conquering armies including Persian, Afghan,
Sindhi and Sikh continuously overran the region, all avoided permanent control of
the tribes‖ (Khan, 2003: 282) In 17th century, the most prominent tribal confederacy
was established in Kalat, and in 18th century, a successful effort was made by Khan
of Kalat, Nasir Khan, to unite and organize the tribes of Kalat. And the first unified
Baloch Army was established operating an administrative and military system (Khan,
2003: pp 282-286).
3. Accession of Balochistan into Pakistan in 1947
Balochistan was an important land, so the demand for the inclusion of Balochistan
into Pakistan became a priority of the Muslim League. Allama Muhammad Iqbal
included and high lighted the significance of Balochistan in his famous Presidential
address of All India Muslim League in December 1930, prior to that, Quaid-e-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah had also included democratic reforms for Balochistan in his
famous „fourteen points‟ of 1928. (Talbot, 1990:117). Since then, the Muslim league
continuously insisted upon the inclusion of Balochistan but there was no proper
establishment of Muslim League in that province.
The Pakistan Movement in Balochistan was initially launched by Nawabzada Yousaf
Ali Khan who was a great admirer of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Allama Iqbal. He
organized first All India Baloch Conference at Jacobabad on 29th December 1932
and introduced the Islamic political ideas in Balochistan. (Quddus, 1990:119). Later
on Quaid-e-Azam selected Qazi Isa to launch Pakistan Movement in Balochistan
and asked him to organize the Muslim League in the province. In September 1939,
26
Balochistan Provincial League was recognized as a part of All India Muslim League.
(Quddus, 1990:120)
The main objective of Muslim League was to spread its influence in Balochistan
regarding Pakistan Movement but with the hope of British withdrawal from sub
continent, the National Party and other Baloch nationalist parties joined the
movement led by Khan of Kalat for the independence of Balochistan. (Harrison,
1981:24). The British Government sent a mission, called Cripps, to Sub-Continent in
March 1946 to negotiate with Indians regarding the partition of Sub-Continent. The
Khan of Kalat approached the mission and discussed the independence only of
Balochistan. He requested the Cripps mission to restore the Balochistan‟s pre 1876
status by regaining full independence all over Kalat territories which were held or
leased by British rulers. (Baluch, 1975:255-295). Another memorandum signed by
the Baloch Sardars, was sent to the British government to join Khanate. (Baluch,
1975:144). In 1947, when the British government was about to grant independence
to the Sub-Continent, the Khan of Kalat filed a legal case for independence, arguing
that Kalat had already been given a legal independent status like Nepal based on
direct treaty relations with England and the state was not bound to deal with the
British Indian Government just like the other Indian princely states. (Baloch,
1987:174). Sardar Khan Baluch, the Secretary to the Khan of Kalat stated that ―To
begin with the question of a unified and freed Baluch race, the question of greater
Baluchistan is inevitable‖. (Baloch, 1947:20)
But in June 1947 the tribal leaders of Balochistan were asked to take decision about
the status of Balochistan, most of the Baloch Sardars decided to join Pakistan. The
Nawab of Lasbella, sardars of Kharan and Makran states, the Khan of Kalat himself
showed their willing to join Pakistan. (Shah, 1997:95). The British Government
declared Indian Independence Act on 18th July, 1947 according to which ―Two
Independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India
and Pakistan‖. (Indian Independence Act: 1947).The territories of Independent
States, India and Pakistan were specified and „‟The Chief Commissioner‟s Province
27
of British Balochistan‟‟ (section 2 (2) (b) was included into Pakistan. There were no
specification of Indian State but the Act mentioned as ‗‘nothing in this section shall
be interpreted as preventing the accession of Indian states to either of the new
Dominions‘‘ (section 2 (4). Kharan, Lasebela and Makran willingly acceded to
Pakistan and the last ruler of Kalat stated that ‗‘I signed the merger documents in my
capacity as Khan-e-Azam on 30th March, 1948 (Khan. A Yar 1975:162) and having
done s upon receipt of M.A. Jinnah‘s letter, dated 2nd February, 1948, calling upon
him to: ‗‘I advise you to join Pakistan without further delay‘‘. (Baloch, 2008). In 1947,
when Pakistan got independence, princely states were given the choice of either join
Pakistan or India or to remain independent. Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan
declared Kalat as an independent state on the basis of Kalat‟s Treaty Relations
1976 with British India which were of the same status as Nepal and India. (Ali,
2005:45) The reason behind Baloch resistance was their sense of uncertainty about
the future of their ethnic identity. Both the house of parliament at Kalat refused to
join Pakistan. However, in 1948, Kalat was forced to annex to Pakistan with the help
of army, Khan of Kalat signed an accession agreement in 1948 ending Kalat's de
facto independence, (Titus, 2000:48)
3.1. Conflicts between Government of Pakistan and Baloch
Nationalists
Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, there is an on going series of conflicts in
Balochistan between government of Pakistan, Government of Iran and Baloch tribes.
There have been five major insurgencies in Balochistan till date. These insurgencies
have their roots in both historical and contemporary factors based on Baloch
Nationalism. Relations between Baloch nationalists and Central Government have
always been offensive since 1947 and turned into violent reactions from Baloch
nationalist tribes against the Pakistani military, central government and civil society
time to time. The occurrence of nationalism includes demands of the Baloch people
for political, economic and cultural autonomy.The present conflict (2005- onwards) is
the fifth insurrection in Balochistan since Independence. Prior conflicts occurred in
28
1948, 1958-59, 1963-69 and 1973-77. (the causes and factors involved in these
insurgencies will be discussed in detail in a separate chapter) all the uprisings were
associated with a stable and firm strength of nationalist sentiment. Balochistan has
constantly remained under the occupation of oppressive system. The indigenous
inhabitants of Balochistan have been facing continuous oppression, inequality,
injustice, deprivation of ethnic, economic and political rights. The Baloch nationalist
leaders are continuously demanding self-determination along with the rights of
economic development and cultural identity. The Baloch Nationalist are passionately
devoted to the struggle for freedom from Pakistan.In 1928 Iran occupied the western
Balochistan against which hundreds of Baloch tribesmen fought and sacrificed their
lives and in 1948 Pakistan invaded the Eastern Balochistan by killing hundreds of
Baloch Nationalists and annexed the Baloch territory. Baloch has never accepted
the political boundaries dividing its territory nor has accepted the occupation of these
states. Baloch nationalists have been struggling for the liberation of Balochistan.
Pakistan and Iran‟s military have carried out a number of military operations to
suppress the Baloch ambition of liberty, peace and justice till date.
4. Geographical location
Balochistan, the largest province of Pakistan is smallest in population and covers
almost 44 percent of the country‟s total land area. According to 1998 Census, its
population is about 6, 511,000. Balochistan geographically is bounded by 60 52'
east longitudes to 24 54' north latitude and 70 17‟ east longitudes to 32 6‟ north
latitude. (Census Report Balochistan, 2001:58) About 80 percent of the area is inter-
mountainous. 20 percent area consists of flood and coastal plains. The important
mountain ranges are Sulaiman, Toba-Kakar, Central Brahui, Kirthar, Chagai,
Raskoh and central Makran and Makran coast. The Greek historian, Herodotus
divided Balochistan into three parts: (Pakistan Progressive, 1980: 3)
a) Aracosia; consisting of Kandahar and Quetta region,
b) Drangiana; comprising Helmund, Seistan and Chagai, and
29
c) Gedrosia; including Mekran Coast
Balochistan is a mountainous desert area and shares borders with Iran, Afghanistan
and the Arabian Sea with strategically important port of Gwadar on the Makran
Coast, which is a direct approach to the Strait of Hormuz. Balochistan shares 900
kilometer long border with Iran and 1,002 kilometer long border with Afghanistan
(Sial and Basit, 2010:5). The Gulf of Oman is located on its southern border. It has
common borders with the other three provinces in Pakistan, North West Frontier
Province through Federally Administered Tribal Area in the north, Punjab in the
extreme north east and Sindh in east.
Map. No. 2.1 Map of Balochistan
Source: http://www.nttfc.org/balochistanMap.asp accessed on 06 May, 2015
30
5. Physical Features and Topography
Balochistan is located at the Southeast border of the Iranian plateau and
strategically connects the Middle East and South-West Asia to Central Asia and
south Asia and provides the marine frontage for the landlocked countries of central
Asia. The Suleiman Mountains cover the northeast corner and Bolan Pass is a
natural path to Afghanistan which was used by British as a passageway .The capital,
Quetta is located in the north east of the province on the bank of the river valley near
the Afghan border with a road to Kandahar in the northeast. On the east, the
Sulaiman Ranges separate it from the Iranian part, in the north, Toba Kakar, in the
west, Chagai hills separate it from Afghanistan and Iran. (Britannica, Vol. III, 1970:
60)
5.1. Topography
In the terms of Topography, Balochistan consists of the following features:
I. The Upper Highlands
The upper highlands are located in central and northeastern areas and are
surrounded by the Sulaiman Range to the east and the Toba Kakar Range to the
northwest. The height of Khorasan is 3,700 meters, about 1,500 meters above sea
levels. („‟About Balochistan‟‟ 2013). The upper highlands drain into the Indus River
including Makran, Kharan and Chaghi in the West and Sulaiman, Pab, Kirther in the
east. (Hughes, 1997:25) They descend in districts Zhob, Killa Saifullah, Pishin,
Quetta, Ziarat and Kalat.
II. The Lower Highlands
The lower highlands include the eastern Sulaiman Range, the lower ranges of
the Makran, Kharan, and Chagi on the west; and the Pab and Kirthar ranges on the
southeast. They drain southward into the Arabian Sea with an elevation ranging from
31
1970 to 3940 ft. („‟About Balochistan‟‟ 2013). Some extensions of lower high lands
exist at Gwadar, Turbat, Panjgur, Kharan and Chaghi districts.
III. The Plains
Balochistan has small area of plains whic include the Kachi plain in the south of Sibi
and extend towards Nasirabad, the southern part of Dera Bugti, and a narrow plain
along the Mekran coast stretches from Kachi to the Iranian border. The plains of
Kachi, Las Bela and river Dasht cover area in addition to the Quetta and Kalat.
(Gazetteer of India, 1976:266) Balochistan has two raised plains or plateau. One is
the Quetta Valley and the other is in Kalat. The other is the quadrangular Plateau,
measuring about 300 miles by 300 miles. On this plateau lies the ancient city of
Kalat at the height of 6,318 feet. (Britannica, VOL III, 1971: 60)
IV. The Deserts
The north western part consists of deserts mostly in Kharan which is an extension of
the Iranian Seistan and Dasht-e-Lut (Hughes, 1997:25) and Chaghi districts vast
plains are covered with black sand.
V. The Coastal Line
The coastal-line is about 760 Kilometers long, with many peninsulas. The coastal
area is located on Arabian Sea with the vertical hills. Important ports such as
Somiani, Pasni, Jiwani and Gwadar form the Coastal Line of Balochistan. (Ahmad,
1976:45)
5.2. Rivers of Balochistan
Table No. 2.1. Rivers of Balochistan
Nari River
Kaha River
Gaj River
Hingol River
32
Dasht River
Nal River
Porali River
Hub River
Mushkel River
Zhob River
Gomal River
Source: Generated by the researcher during research
The rivers in Balochistan do not flow in any particular direction. Nari, Kaha and Gaj
Rivers in the northeastern and eastern parts are the branches of the Indus River.
The southern rivers float towards the Arabian Sea. The rest conclude in lakes and
swamps, which are called Hamuns. (Gazetteer of India, 1984:26). The largest river
of Balochistan is Hingol. It flows southward and falls into the Arabian Sea. Other
southem rivers in the Mekran coastal area are Dasht, Nal, porali, Hub and Mashkel.
The Zhob River flows towards the Gomal River and joins the Indus River. („‟About
Balochistan‟‟ 2013). Mashkel is the only river which flows northward and ends in
Hamun-i-Mashkel. In Balochistan, the main water-bearing areas are along the
Quetta-Jacobabad-Hyderabad-Karachi and Quetta - Kalat - Khuzdar - Bela - Karachi
arrangements
5.3. Forests
There are different types of forests in Balochistan which play a significant role in the
supply of feed for livestock and a good potential of Balochistan in the terms of
natural resources while providing fuel wood, timber, wildlife products and other forest
products. Balochistan has only two percent forest cover of total forestry of Pakistan.
Balochistan has world‟s second largest juniper forest in Ziarat and Harboi areas of
Kalat districts. There are eight different environmental regions with a vast diversity in
plantation. This feature differentiates Balochistan from the rest of the country. The
forest area is 2,306,910 hectares in Balochistan. (Baloch, 2015, Jan.25) Forests play
33
an important role in the economic growth of any region and fulfill many other human
needs. Important forests of Balochistan are as under:
Table No. 2.2. Forests of Balochistan
Name of Forest Covered Areas
1 Juniper Forests Zarhun, Zarakhu, Takatu, Murdar, Surghund,
Ziarat, Khatuka, Chautair, Harboi in Kalat and
Targhatu
2 Chilghoza Pine
Forest
Shingher, Kaisaghar and Speraghat hills in Zhob,
Sherani and Musa Khel districts and Torghar in
Killa Saifullah
3 Olive-Pistacia
Forest
Zhob, Sherani, Barkhan, Loralai, Harnai, Killa
Saifullah, Musakhail, Kohlu, Washuk, Khuzdar,
Kalat,
4 Olive – Acacia
Forest
Sibi, Loralai, Musakhail, Zhob, Khuzdar and
Lasbella district.
5 Kohistan
Forests
Salvadora, Kandi, Ber, Tamarix, Mazri, Chagird,
Panjgur, Kech, Gwadar, Lasbella, Sibi and
Khuzdar
6 Desert Forest Kandi, Ghaz, Ber, Mazri, Haloxylon, Gugal,
Chagai, Washuk, Kharan, Nushki, Lasbella,
Kachhi, Sibi and Awaran
7 Mangrove
Forests
Lasbela, Gwadar and Pasni
8 Alien /Invasive
Forests
Lasbella, Gwadar, Kech, Barkhan, Sibi, Loralai
and Musakhail districts
9 Tropical Desert
Thorn Forests
Mekran, Lasbella, Sibi, Khuzdar and Awaran
Sources: Generated by the researcher during research
34
The details about these forests are as under:
I. Juniper Forests
The Juniper forests are located in Zarhun, Zarakhu, Takatu, Murdar, Surghund,
Ziarat, Khatuka, Chautair, Harboi in Kalat and Targhatu areas. Balochistan‟s
Junipers are one of the biggest forests in the world. A major portion of Ziarat is
covered with juniper trees.The juniper forests are spread over an area of about
2.30,000 acres. („‟The Juniper Forests‟‟, 2008) Juniper berries are used as a spice
while a kind of very useful oil is also extracted from juniper trees. They also produce
medical herbs like Epherda and Artimesia.
II. Chilghoza Pine Forests
In the north of Balochistan, Shingher, Kaisaghar and Speraghat hills in Zhob,
Sherani and Musa Khel districts and Torghar in Killa Saifullah district are the main
areas of chilgoza pine forests.
III. Olive-Pistacia Forests
Zhob, Sherani, Barkhan, Loralai, Harnai, Killa Saifullah, Musakhail, Kohlu, Washuk,
Khuzdar, Kalat, Bolan areas have forests of Pine-nuts and olives which are very
significant in terms of export and are widely used in medicines and other purposes.
IV. Olive – Acacia Forests
Theses forests are located in Sibi, Loralai, Musakhail, Zhob and Khuzdar districts
and adjoining area of Lasbella district.
V. Kohistan Forests
kohistan forests are located in Salvadora, Kandi, Ber, Tamarix, Mazri, Chagird,
Panjgur, Kech, Gwadar, Lasbella, Sibi and Khuzdar districts.
35
VI. Desert Forests
Desert forests are mainly found in Kandi, Ghaz, Ber, Mazri, Haloxylon, Gugal,
Chagai, Washuk, Kharan, Nushki, Lasbella, Kachhi, Sibi and Awaran districts.
VII. Mangrove Forests
Mangrove forests protect coastal areas from cyclones, these forests are located in
Lasbela, Gwadar and Pasni.
VIII. Alien/Invasive Forests
Theses are located in Lasbella, Gwadar, Kech, Barkhan, Sibi, Loralai & Musakhail
districts.
XI. Tropical Desert Thorn Forests
Mekran, Lasbella, Sibi, Khuzdar and Awaran districts are known for tropical desert
thornforests. („‟Forest Resource‟‟, 2015). The forests are decreasing rapidly because
majority of the population is facing energy shortage like gas and electricity and
people are cutting off trees to produce fuel and to overcome the insufficiency of
basic facilities in terms of energy and to provide food to the livestock.
5.4. Mountain Ranges
Baluchistan has many barren but rich in mineral sources mountain ranges. There
are many passes located in these mountains which connect Pakistan with
Afghanistan.
Table No. 2.3. Important Mountain Ranges of Balochistan
Sr.
No
Mountain Range Location
1 Chaghi Range Along Iran and Afghan Border
2 The Central Brahvi Range Central Balochistan as a Southern Branch of
Himalaya, Bolan Pass, Harnai Pass and Mula
36
Pass are located here
3 The Suleiman Range North to south direction equivalent to the Indus
River. Kaisargarh with a height of 3,441
meters and Takhat-e-Suleiman 3,379 meters
are the highest peaks in the North.
4 The Toba Kakar Range In the north on the border with Afghanistan
5 Bugti Hills Dera Bugti District and Sibi Division
6 Central Mekran Range Kech District
7 Giandari Range On the Border of Balochistan and Punjab in
Dera Bugti and Sibi
8 Marri Hills Kohlu Distraict in Sibi Division
9 Mekran Coast Range Gwadar District
10 Ras Koh Hills On the border between Kharan District of Kalat
Division and Chagai District of Quetta Division
Source: Generated by the researcher during research
6. Climate and Temperature
Balochistan has an extraordinary variety in the terms of landscape which is
prominently visible in climate. The climate of Balochistan contains almost all the
types such as hot, humid, temperate and cold in the various places. The major
portion of Balochistan possesses a steamy and humid climate. The Upper Highlands
face severe conditions during winter season, the temperature falls many degrees
below freezing point, whereas the summers are moderate. (Kazi, 1976:45) In the
valleys of Balochistan temperature has a variety according to their altitude, soil
structure, nearness to lakes, and direction of winds.
The valleys of Quetta, Zhob and Ziarat are usually cold with high chances of fog,
rain, and snow in winters. The valleys of Kalat and Khuzdar in Lower Highlands also
37
fall in the same category along with Panjgur in the Upper Coastal Region (Gazetteer
of India, Vol. VI, 1976:273) The plains and deserts become extremely hot during
summers and the temperature normally exceeds fifty degree centigrade. Noshki in
the north, Sibi and Dhadar in the middle, and Turbat in the Coastal region are
considered to be among the hottest. Strong winds also play a prominent role in the
climate of Balochistan. These winds blow from the North West by the mountains like
Himalaya and Hundukush from Siberia to the areas of Chagi. The Coastal region
remains under the influence of Arabian Sea and the climate is hot, humid in
summers, and moderate in winters. (Kazi, 1976:45)
6.1. Rainfall
The climate of Balochistan is semi- arid Mediterranean, with annual rainfall from 200
to 350 mili meters. („‟Provincial Disaster‟‟, 2006:11) and a changeable quantity of this
total fall in the form of snow and rain in the winter season and as extreme spell of
rain in summer. The constant aridity makes agriculture almost impossible.
Balochistan never receives the Monsoon rains like other parts of Pakistan. The
average of annual rainfall is between two to three inches in winter season.
(Gazetteer of India, Vol. VI, 1976:273) Some parts of the Lower Highlands and the
coastal areas enjoy rain mostly in the summer.
7. Economy of Balochistan
The economy is largely depends upon the production of natural oil, natural gas, coal,
and minerals which is utilized for domestic use and export. The Baloch people are
farmers basically but in the coastal area fishery is also a second big source of
income. Due to the constant political and security disturbance and tensed situation,
Balochistan is not profiting from its vast resources and therefore the people live in
poorest conditions. Limited farming and fishing is another contributing factor in the
economy of Balochistan. The important economic sectors include mining of copper,
38
gold and other precious minerals. The agriculture sector and live stock are also a
part of rural economy and livelihood.
7.1. Natural Resources
Balochistan is spreading over largest territory of Pakistan, it holds an extensive
amount of oil, gas, coal and other mineral resources and is an exclusive economic
zone of 180,000 square kilometers rich in oil, gas, gold, chromites, copper, iron,
marble, along with two coastal ports, Gwadar and Omara. Gwadar plays a substitute
to the Karachi port in Sindh province and is of great significant strategic importance
to Pakistan (Grare, 2006: 4-5). Balochistan is a rich land in terms of minerals which
are divided into two categories, metallic and Non-Metallic mineral resources.
Table No. 2.4. Metallic Minerals of Balochistan
Mineral Estimated
Deposits
Location
1 Copper 2 Billion Tons Chaghi, Khuzdar, Lasbela
2 Gold 20 Billion Ounces Chaghi, Khuzdar, Lasbela
3 Chromite Unknown Khuzdar, Lasbela, Chagi, Khuzdar,
Kharan, Killa Saifulla, Wad, Sonaro
and Muslim Bagh
4 Iron 200 Million Tons Chaghi, Khuzdar, Lasbela, Mastung,
Dilband, Chilghazi, Chigendik, Amir
Chah, and Pachin Koh.
5 Lead Zinc 26 Million Tons Lasbela , Khuzdar
6 Antimony 26,000 Tons Qila Abdullah, Panjgure, Turbat and
Kharan District
7 Manganes
e
580,500 Tons Lasbela, Khuzdar, Qila
Saifullah,Chaghi and Zhob
Source: Generated by the researcher during research
39
The details about the importance of these minerals are as under:
I. Copper Gold/Silver
Balochistan has vast resources of copper and all these reserves are found in
Chaghi, Khuzdar, Lasbela districts, in Chaghi at least 12 deposits are found with
substantial quantities of gold and silver. („‟Geological Survey of Pakistan‟‟, 2009)
Two major projects of mining copper gold are Sandak Copper-Gold and Reko Diq
copper-Gold deposits. The Sandak project was started in 1995 and is producing
15,672 tons of copper blister, 51852 ounces of gold and 97356 ounces of silver are
being produced annually.(„‟An Overview of Mineral Potential‟‟, 2013:7) Reko Diq
deposit was discovered in 1978-79 in Chaghi as a joint venture between
Balochistan, Canada and Chile partnership. The mining of about two billion tons of
copper and twenty million ounces of gold reserves and a large scale of silver deposit
are estimated in this project.
II. Chromite
Lasbela, Chagi, Khuzdar, Kharan, Killa Saifulla, Wad, Sonaro and Muslim Bagh are
the parts of Balochistan having deposits of Chromite, („‟Mineral Resources of
Balochistan‟‟, 2013) in Zhob Valley is the most significant source chromite. Some
other areas such as Ras Koh and Wad in southern Balochistan have some deposits.
The entire amount of explored Chromite is exported.
III. Iron
The reserves of Iron are estimated at 200 million tons, and mainly found in the areas
of Chaghi, Khuzdar, Lasbela and Mastung Districts. („‟Mineral Resources of
Balochistan‟‟, 2013) Chaghi alone produces about 30 million tons of Iron. Many other
deposits of iron have been found in Dilband, Chilghazi, Chigendik, Amir Chah, and
Pachin Koh..(„‟An Overview of Mineral Potential‟‟, 2013:7)
40
IV. Lead Zinc
Reserves of lead-zinc have been recognized in Lasbella and Khuzdar districts at
Duddar, Gunga and Surmai areas and total reserves estimated are about 26 million
tons. Lead is used in ammunitions. (Geological Survey of Pakistan, 2009 )
V. Antimony
Antimony is found near Qila Abdullah, Panjgure, Turbat and in district Pishin.
Recently found in Kharan district. Present estimate of Antimony is 26,000 tons.
Antimony is an important metal. which is used in the production of safety matches, in
cartridges, in tracer bullets and similar light signals. (Geological Survey of Pakistan,
2009).
VI. Manganese
Manganese is found in Lasbela, Khuzdar, Qila Saifullah, Chaghi and Zhob districts.
(„‟An Overview of Mineral Potential‟‟, 2013:15). A total of 580,500 tons of manganese
has been estimated.
Table No. 2.5. Non Metallic Minerals of Balochistan
Mineral Estimated Reserves Location
1 Fluorite 100,000 Tons Maran, Phad-i-Maran and
Dilband
2 Barite 30 Million Tons Kalat, Lasbella, Uthal and
Khuzdar
3 Gypsum & Anhydrite 7 Million Tons Sibi and Lora lai
4 Onyx Marble
12 Million Tons Chagi, Khuzdar, Lasbela
and Bolan
5 Lime Stone Enormous Reserves Chaghi and Zhob
6 Sulpher 787,000 tons Chaghi and Kachi District
Source: Generated by the researcher during research
41
The details are as under:
VII. Fluorite
Significant reserves of fluorite are found at Maran, Phad-i-Maran and Dilband areas
of Mastung district. The total estimated reserves are about 100,000 tons. („‟Mineral
Reserves in Balochistan‟‟, 2013)
VIII. Barite
Vast reserves of barite are found in Kalat, Lasbella, Uthal and Khuzdar districts Total
estimated reserves are over 30 million tons. Average annual production is about
25,000 tons.
IX. Gypsum and Anhydrite
Gypsum and anhydrite deposits are extracted in Spintangi in Sibi district and at
Chamalong-Bahlol in Loralai district. („‟An Overview of Mineral Potential‟‟,2013,15).
The reserves have been estimated as over 7 million tons.
X. Onyx Marble
The high quality onyx deposits are present in the Chagai belt and also are found at
many areas in the central and western parts like Lasbela, Khuzdar and Bolan. The
main deposits are ZardKan, Patkok, Julhi, Butak, Mashkichah, Tozghi, Chilgazi, and
Zeh. („‟Mineral Reserves in Balochistan‟‟,2013). The estimated reserves of marble in
the province are more than 12 million tons.
XI. Sand and Gravel
Sand and gravel extraction is counted as the biggest mining industry in Balochistan.
The sand and gravel are used widely by the construction industry in Portland
cement, concerts, mortar and plaster. The reserves of sand and gravel are in huge
and enormous amount.
42
XII. Sulpher
The best quality deposits of Sulphur are located in Chagai district. The deposits are
found around the southern and southwestern side of a died out volcanic basin
called, Koh-i-Sultan. Some deposits of sulphur are found near Sanni in Kachi district.
(„‟Mineral Reserves in Balochistan‟‟, 2013). Total estimated reserves of sulphur are
about 787,000 tons.
XIII. Lime Stone
Balochistan has vast resources of limestone expanding from coastal region near
Karachi to the areas of Chagai and Zhob in the north. Limestone is a raw material
which is widely utilized by cement manufacturing industries. Mostly, the limestone is
found along with roads. (Geological Survey of Pakistan, 2009)
7.2. Energy Resources
Table No. 2.6. Energy Resources of Balochistan
Energy Resource Location
Natural Gas Sui, Loti, Pir Koh, Uch,
Oil Khuzdar, Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Zarghun
Coal Bolan, Sibi, Quetta, Lora Lai and Chamalang
Source: Generated by the researcher during research
I. Natural Gas and Oil
Gas and Oil are most important amongst the mineral resources of the province and
are being consumed widely for domestic use and export purposes. In 1952, the
natural gas was first discovered in Balochistan, and within a few decades
Balochistan started producing almost 50 percent of the country's natural gas by
1980. (World Bank Report, 2013: 12) Balochistan provides 49 percent of Pakistan‟s
total energy requirements as well as only the reservoirs of natural gas in Balochistan
produce and provides 36% of Pakistan‟s total gas production.(ICG, 2006: 16)
43
presently the natural gas and oil are being produced in the areas of Sui, Loti, Pir Koh
and Uch. More gas and oil reserves have been discovered at Khuzdar, Dera Bugti,
Kohlu and Zarghun. (World Bank Report, 2013:4)
Table No. 2.7. Statistics on Gas Production
Area Production Value in Pak. Rs.
Sui 281,996 (MMCFT) 22.14
Pir Koh 32,838 (MMCFT) 66.92
Uch 56, 535 (MMCFT) 3.17 US Dollars
Loti 14,085 (MMCFT) 63.20
Source: PIPS, Balochistan: Conflicts and Players, (2009). Islamabad, P.31
II. Coal
Coal is also a traditionally important mineral resource and great factor in the
economy of Balochistan. The coal production of around two million tons forms the
highest provincial share in the national coal production (World Bank Report, 2013: 5)
Coal reserves are present in Bolan, Sibi, Quetta and Lora Lai Districts. The other
areas include Khost, Shahrig, Harnai, Duki, Pir Imail Ziarat, Mach and Chamalang.
(Geological Survey of Pakistan, 2009). Coal is extracted by underground mining
method. Total estimated reserves of all the coal fields are about 217 million tons.
(„‟An Overview of Mineral Potential‟‟, 2013, 11)
III. Wind Energy Potential
Balochistan possesses a substantial probability for the development of alternative
sources of energy like wind and solar. The regions of Nokkundi in the north-western
corner and the Chaghi area have significant potential for developing wind energy
resources. Balochistan's wind resource potential was estimated to be nearly equal to
the total established generating capacity of Pakistan in 2011. (World Bank report,
2013: 12)
44
IV. Solar Energy Potential
Balochistan is considered at the highest position in the country for being potential for
solar energy. ‗‘About 40 percent of the land area of Balochistan receives direct solar
rays with an energy potential of more than 6 kWh per square meter per day, while
the rest of the province receives direct solar radiation with an energy potential of 4.5
kWh per square meter per day. Extrapolation from these numbers gives way a total
power generation potential of as much as 1.2 million Mega Watt.‖(World Bank
Report, 2013:12)
8. Agriculture
Agriculture contributes one-third of the provincial GDP and about 40 percent of
population is employed as labor force. Agriculture sector forms the great factor in the
economy of Balochistan. (World Bank Report, 2013: 51) Agricultural production
faces the shortage of water, power supply, and sufficient infrastructure. Wheat, jowar
(sorghum), maize, Barley and rice are the major food crops, while fruits are the
principal cash crops.
The main hurdle in the growth and progress of agriculture is insufficiency of water
supply. Mostly, the cultivation in large areas depends on rain water. Under-ground
water in Balochistan has fallen very low to the depths of 800 to 1000 feet. (Naseeb
Ullah, 2014). Therefore the farmers now have to rely on tube wells. Tube wells
require electricity which is also limited in Balochistan. Consequently, more than 50
percent of the agricultural land in Balochistan is facing problems and is becoming
infertile. Fruit gardens and agriculture farms are uncultivated due to the shortage of
electricity and proper water supply. In Balochistan the drought from 2000 has turned
down the water Table low and underground water sources almost dried up. (Naseeb
Ullah, 2014). Climate change is another obstacle in the rapid progress and
development in crop production. Extreme weather conditions have a major impact
on Balochistan's agriculture. In the hot regions, the extreme temperature increases
the water requirement for cultivation and ample water supply is not possible through
tube wells, high temperature also affects the underground water resources. Dry
45
years, with no rain fall, also cause a great loss to the farmers in the form of reduced
crop production. (World Bank Report, 2013: 8)
8.1. Fruit Production
Balochistan is known for the production of grapes, cherry, almonds, peach,
pomegranate, apricot, apple and date. (Waseem, 2011:28). In this regard,
Balochistan is divided into two zones, Upland Zone and Coastal Zone.
I. Fruits grown in Upland Zone The areas of fruit cultivation are Quetta, Pishin, Qilla Saifullah, Qillah Abdullah,
Zhob, Loralai, Ziarat, Kalat, Khuzdar and Mastung which are famous for the
production of apple, apricot, peach, plums, grapes, cherry, almonds, pear,
pomegranate and melons. Red and golden varieties of apples grown in Ziarat are
very famous for their delicious taste and fragrance.
II. Fruits grown in Coastal Zone
Coastal zone comprises of the districts of Turbat, Panjgoor and Kharan and Makran
are famous for the production of high quality varieties of dates. The province
produces about 130 varieties of date. (Haider, „‟Fruit Production in Balochistan‟‟).
The contribution of Balochistan in production of fruits is 16.67 percent in Pakistan‟s
total area production. (Waseem, 2011:28) high quality mango is also produced in the
tropical areas of Balochistan.
8.2. Food Crops
In terms of food crops, the land of Balochistan has been categorized for the
cultivation of different food grain in different areas according to the suitability of
climate and temperature of the region. Cold-resistant crops are grown in eastern and
southern areas and drought-resistant crops are produced in western and northern
areas. (Safi, Gadiwala, Burke, Azam and Baqa, 2014:294) However, Wheat, rice,
maize, jowar, bajra and barley are the important food crops of Balochistan. Wheat
46
and jowar are cultivated on more than 50 percent of the total cultivated area of
Balochistan. Jowar can be grown both as Rabi and Kharif crops. Wheat is produced
mostly in the dry areas. Wheat cultivation is restricted to the areas which are able to
be given sufficient and appropriate water supply.
Table No. 2.8. Major Crops of Balochistan and Average Productivity Index
Major
Crops
Areas of Cultivation Average Index
1 Wheat Nasirabad, Jafferabad, Lasbela, Quetta, Bolan, Jhal
Magsi, Harnai, Sibi, Mastung, Qilla Saifullah,
Khuzdar, Dera Bugti, Kharan, Washuk, Ziarat and
Musakhel
83.7 kilogram
Per Hectare
2 Rice Nushki, Panjgur, Bolan, Sherani, Washuk,
Nasirabad, Jafferabad, Gwadar, Dera Bugti, Kharan
Khuzdar, Qilasaifuula
71.7 kilogram
Per Hectare
3 Jowar Awaran district is important in high productivity of
Jowar. Other areas with moderate productivity levels
include Chagai, Nushki, Washuk, Kharan, Ladbela,
Khuzdar, Jhal Magsi, Nasirabad, Dera Bugti, Sibi,
Harnai, Loralai and Barkhan, Loralai and Musakhel.
97.4 kilogram
Per Hectare
4 Maize Sibi, Pishin, Harnai, Chagai, Nushki, Lasbela, Killa
Saifullah, Zhob, Sherani, Khuzdar, Kalat, Kohlu,
Loralai, Musakhel, and Barkhan district
95.6 kilogram
Per Hectare
5 Bajra Chagai, Panjgur, Nushki, Musakhel, Dera Bugti,
Washuk, Kharan, Gwadar, Sibi, Harnai, Loralai and
Barkhan districts.
105 Kilogram
Per Hectare
6 Barley Bolan, Jhalmagsi and Gwadar 108 kilogram
Per Hectare
Source: Safi, Ghulam Murtaza; Gadiwala, Muhammad Sohail; Burke, Farkhunda; Azam, Muhammad; and Baqa, Muhammad Fahad (2014).Agricultural Productivity in Balochistan Province of Pakistan, A Geographical Analysis, Journal of Basic & Applied Sciences, Volume 10. pp. 295-297
47
8.3. Irrigation and Water Supply System
Although, the province of Balochistan is gifted with a large territory of lands which
constitutes 44 percent of country‟s geographical area, hardly 5.6 percent land is
suitable for cultivation and agriculture. Water resources of Balochistan are described
in two categories:
a. Indus basin canal supplies
b. Water resources outside the Indus basin.
The sources outside the Indus basin consist of groundwater like springs, karezes,
tube wells, dug wells and perpetual surface water resources. Most of the perpetual
streams and springs have smaller sizes with wide sequential variation. (Javaid, &
Shahid, 2008:2) There are about three hundred dams in Balochistan, along the
irrigation plains as check dams and delay action dams. (Provincial Disaster Risk
Management Plan, 2006:19) The Irrigation network in Balochistan includes canals,
drains, tube-wells, small dams and flood protecting constructions on the major rivers.
The major source through the centuries has always been the underground water
supply system which is called Karez. But later, the construction and maintenance of
karezes became a costly issue because the farmers had to bear all the expenses for
digging and maintaining karezes. The share of expenses was according to the area
in their possession and it was not an affordable expense for majority of the farmers.
With the time, tube wells have taken place of Karezes and have become the major
source of irrigation, making water resource utilization more comfortable, efficient,
time saving and affordable. The maintenance of privately tube wells is the
responsibility of the owners themselves, while the government tube wells are looked
after by the Irrigation Department. The karezes and springs are maintained through
community contribution. („‟Productive Sectors‟‟ 2013)
Shortage of water is the critical restriction to Balochistan's agricultural development.
Agriculture sector in Pakistan mostly is dependant on water of the Indus Basin
Irrigation System. Balochistan is situated at its side-line region and relies on
inconsistent and a few consistent sources of water supplied by Indus River.
48
Balochistan has only 18 river basins for its vast region. Agriculture sector along with
livestock was badly affected by a drought from 1998–2005. To fulfill the
requirements of water for irrigation, the flood water, which accounts for almost two-
thirds of total available water, can be utilized. This flood water is called Sailaba
Water which can be stored by dams and can become a good alternate to water
supply to support the production of crops and fruits. The highest potential for the
agriculture sector lies in Sailaba farming, because of availability of unutilized flood
water (World Bank Report, 2013: 7-8)
8.4. Fisheries
Almost all the fish produced in Balochistan come from open water oceanic capture
fisheries along the 750 km coastline of the province and account for about 5.7
percent of the fish production of Balochistan. There is almost no commercial
production from managed ponds and fresh water fish farming. (World Bank Report,
2013:11). Balochistan accounts for more than 70 percent of the coastline of Pakistan
and about one-third of the country's fishermen, but because of the lack of skilled
labor and advance facilities, contributes only around 15 percent of Pakistan‟s total
fish production. (World Bank Report, 2013: 60) however, the fisheries sector in
Balochistan is a good sector to provide employment to a large number of people in
fish catching, and other small industries related to it like boat building. In coastal
areas of Balochistan, fisheries account for up to 70 percent of the local employment.
Fish produced by Balochistan, rank fourth among export commodities of Pakistan
and contribute a significant share in economy. (World Bank Report, 2013:9). More
than 135,000 tons of fish was caught in 2011 by an estimated 52,000 fishermen
operating 7,186 boats. This represents a third of the total Pakistan fish catch (World
Bank Report. 2013:9) According to Fisheries Data, Government of Balochistan 2013,
inland fisheries of Balochistan caught from the areas of Nasirabad, Makran, Kalat,
Quetta, Zhob and Sibi districts, contributed 932,700,000 Pakistan Rupees in the
economy. („‟Fisheries Department‟‟ 2013) Since Balochistan is located in large and
varied Marine fisheries resources area, especially in closeness of the Gulf of Oman,
unlike the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans this area is free of hurricanes. It can be
49
more productive than the other portion of the Indian Ocean due to the reversible
wind system and long fishing season. (The Dawn, 2003, March. 17) Although,
Balochistan coast is larger twice than the length of Sindh coast but fish production is
less than expectations due to many reasons. The fish industry is not flourishing on
modern lines because of the shortage of proper industrial frame-work. The lack of
trained specialists, or education in fisheries, modern technology of fishing,
manufacture of modern boats instead of small powered wooden boats, absence of
modern machinery and other fish finding techniques and tools, and shortage of fish
storage and preservation facilities could not properly establish fish industry in the
province .
8.5. Live Stock
The livestock sector of Balochistan adds about one-third of Balochistan's agricultural
GDP and about eight percent of its total GDP. Almost 70 percent of the total
population is directly or indirectly associated with livestock sector to earn their
livelihood. The livestock resources of Balochistan include sheep, buffaloes, pack
animals, camels and poultry but sheep and goats keeping hold dominant and
significant position among all. According to the Livestock Census 2006 sheep and
goats are counted as 53.7 and 26.4 million respectively (World Bank Report,
2013:11) for 35 percent of the national population of such animals.
Balochistan is a waterless region and climatic conditions are not supportive enough
to provide suitable opportunities for agriculture. However, sheep, goats and camels
have the ability to survive well under these harsh weather conditions and are quite
capable of change the meager vegetation into useful foodstuffs. Livestock is a multi-
puprpose sector in Balochistan's rural economy. They provide meat and milk, which
are an important source of food, it is a market product that can be sold out to earn
cash, it also provides transport and farm power and most of all, the only source to
provide wool and leather. Livestock occupies great share in the economy of
Balochistan and is a dominant factor in rural livelihoods. Majority of rural people in
Balochistan is engaged in livestock production, and some population in the urban
50
areas also maintains goats or sheep. This direct or indirect involvement in livestock
production contributes 33 percent of Balochistan's agricultural value added and 8
percent of its GDP. The livestock sector is essential in Balochistan‟s economic
progress for providing employment, income, and may be very helpful in the poverty
mitigation. (World Bank Report, 2013: 56). Sheep raising is also a good source of
income for the great majority which provides high quality wool for domestic use and
export purpose. Livestock is also important and helpful in the establishment of small
scale industry like cotton and wool manufacturing, food processing, carpet making,
textile and leather embroidery and handicrafts.
9. Communications and Infrastructure
The road network and mediums of connectivity in Balochistan are in very poor
condition. Good roads are available only in those areas where it is necessary to
provide agricultural farms easy access to markets. The total length of the highways
in Balochistan is 2,300 kilometers. („‟Provincial Disaster Risk‟‟, 2006:12) Balochistan
has the lowest concentration of roads in Pakistan. Poor connectivity and difficult
access have always been the major problems especially for the people of rural
areas. There are roads to connect the major towns, Quetta, the capital of
Balochistan, is connected to the port of Karachi in Sindh province by road. There is
also a railway network in Quetta which connects the capital with other cities and
other provinces as well. Quetta airport also offers domestic and international
services. (Awan, 1985:131)
In the urban areas of Balochistan, the buildings and houses are constructed with
cement and concrete but the economically poor majority still builds up their houses
using mud. In the rural areas, mud is widely used in house building which is the most
traditional method of structure building in Balochistan. The majority of population has
migrated to the urban areas in search of basic facilities and affecting the rural
economy by putting pressure on the urban infrastructure. The towns have the
51
facilities of water, gas and electricity but theses are not sufficient according to
demand. („‟Provincial Disaster Risk‟‟, 2006:12)
10. Ethnic and Linguistic Composition.
Table No. 2.9. Population of Balochistan in Different Years
Census Total Population Urban out of Total Population
1951 I,167,167 12.38%
1961 1,353,484 16.87%
1972 2,428,678 16.45%
1981 4,323,376 15.62%
1998 6,565,885 23.89%
2009 11,934,339 23.89%
Source: Majeed, Gulshan, (2011) National Integration in Pakistan: A Socio-Political Analysis of Balochistan (1972-2005), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore. P. 69
Balochistan is a land of many ethnic groups and minorities which form a multicultural
society in terms of linguistics and ethnicity. It has been estimated that there are
about five hundred tribes and sub-tribes in Balochistan (Quddus, 1990:13) Despite
of small Sindhi, Persian and Sariki communities, there are three major historical and
ethno-linguistic groups, Baloch, Pakhtuns and Brahvi. Other includes Hazaras and
ethnic minorities from other provinces like Punjabi and Hindko speaking
communities are generally known as settlers. The Punjabi community is normally
considered as non-Baloch people. Akbar Bugti introduced the term „Balochistani‟ for
those who had been living in Balochistan for a long time.(Sial and Basit, 2010:12)
Hazara tribes are found mostly in Quetta, but also found in Khuzdar, Zhob, Loralai
and Dera Murad Jamali districts other than Quetta. (Sial and Basit, 2010:14) Sindhi
and Siraiki speaking Jat or Jadgals in the plains of Kachhi, Naseerabad and Lasbela
areas while Persian speaking Dehwars in Mastung and Kalat. (Sabir, 2010:19).
52
Balochistan consists of racial and tribal multiplicity. Majority of the Baloch people can
understand and speak more than two languages, including the National Language,
Urdu. In addition to Balochi, Pashto and Brahvi languages, Saraiki, Sindhi, Darri and
Persian are also spoken. (PILDAT, 2012:9) Balochi is dominant language of ten out
of twenty three districts of the province. Brahvi is mostly spoken in Kalat districts.
Pashto language is dominant in nine districts. Sindhi language is spoken in two
districts. (Sayed Dr., 2008:21). Balochi is an Indi-Iranian language having three
major dialects known as Western or Mekrani, Eastern or Sulaimani and in the Chagi,
Kharan, and Panjgur district known as Rakhshani Balochi. (Sabir, 2010:19) The
Baloch Tribes are in majority in the south and east of Balochistan, and the majority
of Pakhtuns constitute the northern side. In the capital of the province Quetta,
Pakhtun majority is dominating whereas Baloch, Hazara, and Punjabi are in
minorities. Brahvi Tribes are mostly found in the Kalat region. Along the coastal line,
Makrani Balochis constitute the major portion of population. Persian-speaking
Dehwars mainly reside in Kalat. There are nearly 769,000 Afghan refugees including
Pakhtuns, Tajiks, and Hazaras. („‟Provincial Disaster Risk‟‟2006:12).
Brahvi is another important ethnic group in Balochistan and they constitute about
twenty-five percent of the total population. The ancient inhabitant of the Central
Balochistan known as Brahvis belonging ancient Dravidian stock (Sabir, 2010:18)
have their separate language, culture and identity. The Brahvi dominating areas are
from Bolan Pass through the Bolan Hills to the coastal area of Ras Mari on the
Arabian Sea. (Scholz, 2002:22)
The Baloch-Brahvi ethnic division was based upon the theory about their ethnic
origin as the Baloch claim their origin in Syria and Brahvi count them as a native
nation. The Brahvi maintained their origin based ethnic identity til 1970 then they
merged with the Baloch. (Sial and Basit, 2010:11) Besides their own identity many
Brahvis are very similar to the Baloch in their cultural values. Because of the cultural,
historical, geo-political and economical resemblances, Brahvis regard themselves as
Baloch. (Sabir, 2007:182) They speak a language from Dravidian group. The Brahvi
53
is the oldest language of the province. There are different opinions about origin of
this language mostly it is considered a Dravidian language.(Sindhi, 2005:51) Brahvi
a north Dravidian language separate the Balochi language is spoken in the Central
Balochistan from Quetta valley to Gizri Karachi.(Sabir, 2010:19)
The Pakhtun community constitutes another major ethnic group in Balochistan. The
estimated population of Baloch make up between 40 to 60 percent, while the
Pakhtuns form between 28 and 50 percent of the total population of Balochistan.
(Sial and Basit, 2010:11) There is always an extensive prejudice against the
Pakhtun refugees. Quetta has Pakhtuns in majority. They speak Pashto language
which belongs to Indo Arian group (Sabir, 2010:20) mostly in the northern areas of
Balochistan. The Dehwars community with a Tajik origin in Mastung and Kalat is
also an ancient inhabitant of the Balochistan. (Sabir, 2010:23) They speak a
language close to Persian known as Dewari. The Hazara community from Mongol
origin mainly lives in Quetta city has their distinct culture and language known as
Hazargi. (Sabir, 2010:23) Hazargi is a kind of Persian language that is spoken in the
Quetta city by the Hazara community while Sindhi and Siraiki in the plain areas
mostly adjourning areas to the Sindh province.
Table No. 2.10. Population of Major and Second Major Ethnic Groups in
Various Districts of Balochistan
District Total
Population
Major
Ethnic
Group
% of Major
Ethnic
Group
2nd Ethnic
Group
% of 2nd
Ethnic
Group
Awaran 118173 Balochi 99.72 Other 0.094
Barkhan 288056 Balochi 58.02 Sindhi 17.70
Bolan 103545 Baloch 74.74 Other 23.2
Chaghi 202564 Balochi 93.64 Pashto 3.14
Dera 181310 Balochi 95.81 Punjabi 1.19
54
Bugti
Gwadar 185498 Balochi 97.77 Punjabi 0.81
Jafar
Abad
432817 Balochi 62.25 Sindhi 23.62
Jhal
Magsi
109941 Balochi 68.80 Saraiki 8.22
Kalat 237834 Balochi 98.56 Sindhi 0.52
Kech 413204 Balochi 99.15 Punjabi 0.33
Khuzdar 417466 Balochi 96.69 Punjabi 1.026
Qilla
Abdullah
370269 Pashto 97.44 Balochi 1.62
Qilla
Saifullah
193553 Pashto 99.21 Urdu 0.33
Kohlu 99846 Balochi 91.22 Pashto 6.63
Lasbela 312695 Balochi 64.99 Sindhi 23.95
Lora Lai 297555 Pashto 92.04 Balochi 3.42
Mastung 164645 Balochi 80.11 Other 11.46
Musa khel 134056 Pashto 78.91 Balochi 13.59
Naseer
Abad
245896 Balochi 54.93 Sindhi 30.49
Panjgur 234051 Balochi 99.56 Punjabi 0.14
Pishin 367183 Pashto 99.20 Urdu 0.19
Quetta 759941 Pashto 29.97 Balochi 27.6
Sibi 180398 Pashto 44.32 Balochi 28.6
Ziarat 33340 Pashto 99.52 Punjabi 0.13
Zhob 275142 Pashto 96.82 Saraiki 1.27
Source: Roofi, Yasmin, (2013). Ethnic Nationalism and Political Development: A Case Study of Pakistan, (1973-2000), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science & International Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. P. 130
55
11. Religious Behavior
Most of the Baloch tribes are Hanafi Sunni Muslims. Alongwith Muslim population
there is also Hindu, Christian and Ahmadi minorities residing in Balochistan.
Christian minority dominates in the district of Quetta; Ahmadi minority concentrates
in the areas of Sibi and Quetta whereas Hindus are mostly concentrated in Sibi
division. (Balochistan Census Report, 1981). The Muslims of Balochistan belong to
two schools of thought, Hanafi Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. There is a non-
Hanafi Zikri community in Makran. Shia Muslim Baloch are also found in Sindh and
Punjab areas. (Breseeg, 2004:73)
12. Administrative Divisions of Balochistan
Balochistan is the fourth province of Pakistan and divided administratively into six
divisions and thirty districts as under:
Table No. 2.11. Administrative Divisions of Balochistan
Sr.
No.
Divisions Regions and Districts
1 Quetta
Division
Quetta, Chaghi, Qilla Abdulla, Pishin and Nushki districts.
2 Zhob
Division
Zhob, Musakhel, Qila Saifullah, Loralai,, Barkhan and Sherani
districts are included in Zhob Division
3 Kalat
Division
Kalat, Mastung, Khuzdar, Kharan, Washuk and Lasbela
districts constitute the Kalat Division. Another district of this
region is Awaran which used to be a sub-division of Khuzdar
district till the year 1992 and started functioning as a separate
district in 1996.
4 Sibi
Division
The areas of Sibi, Ziarat, Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Harnai districts
are the parts of Sibi Division.
56
5 Naseer
Abad
Division
Naseerabad Division is spread over the areas of Naseerabad,
Jafferabad, Jhal Magsi and Kacchi. The Bolan district was a
part of Kacchi district formerly, then it was made a separate
district in 1991.
6 Mekran
Division
Kech, Panjgur and Gwadar constitute Mekran Division of
Balochistan.
Source: http://balochistan.gov.pk/DistrictProfile/Profiles.htm on 22 January, 2015
Map No. 2.2 Districts of Balochistan
Source: http://www.findpk.com/yp/html/balochistan_.html on 13 March, 2015
57
13. Tribes of Balochistan
There are several tribes which compile Balochistan. Three major tribes are Baloch
Brahvi and Pashtoon.
Table No. 2.12 Tribes of Balochistan
The Baloch Tribes The Brahvi Tribes The Pakhtun Tribes
Rind
Lashar
Marri
Jamot
Ahmedzai
Bugti
Domki
Magsi
Kenazai
Khosa
Rakhashani
Dashti
Umrani
Nosherwani
Gichki
Buledi
Notazai
Sanjarani
Meerwani
Zahrozai
langove
kenazai
Khidai
Raisani
Shahwani
Sumulani
Sarparrah
Bangulzai
Mohammad Shahi
Lehri
Bezenjo
Mohammad Hasni
Zehri
Sarparrah
Mengal
Kurd,Sasoli
Satakzai
Lango
Rodeni
Kalmati
Jattak
Yagazehi
Qambarani
Kakar
Ghilzai
Tareen
Mandokhel
Sherani
Luni,
Kasi
Achakzai
Source: (http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/ )
58
Each tribe has many branches. The leader of a tribe is called Sardar and head of
sub-tribe is called Malik, Takari or Mir. They are members of district and other local
Jirgas (local court). Among the eighteen major Baloch tribes, Bugti, Mengal and
Marri tribes are the prominent and participate actively in the political and economic
matters and affairs of the region. The Talpur tribe from Sindh province also claims
their Baloch origin. Most of these tribes speak Balochi and Brahvi Languages.
14. Prominent Baloch Tribes
Three Baloch tribes, The Bugti, the Marri and the Mengal tribe are the most
prominent in terms of their political involvement and activities.
I. The Bugti Tribe
The Bugti tribe was headed by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. The Bugti tribe consists of
about 130 Baloch tribes of almost 180,000 members. (Tahir, 2008, April.4). They are
basically mountain dwelling tribes. This tribe is divided into the sub-tribes named
Rahija Bugti, Masori Bugti, Mondrani, Shambani, Mothani, Pirozani and Kalpar
Bugti. (Ahmed, 1998:392). All these tribes are greatly influenced by the Rahija Bugti
family of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti who was a prominent Baloch nationalist. Nawab
Akbar Bugti became the tribal leader in 1939.
II. The Marri Tribe
The Marri tribe resides on the Dera Ghazi border of Balochistan, native from the
Kohlo district. Their chief is Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri and founder of a separatist
movement called Baloch Liberation Army. Marri became a Marxist politician in 1958.
In 1981, he shifted to Afghanistan and organized an armed force of about 5,000 men
for the purpose of liberation movement. (Weaver, 2002:104). The Marri Tribe is also
divided into more sub-tribes
59
III. The Mengal Tribe
Ataullah Khan Mengal is the leader of the Mengal tribe with a central and dominant
role in the politics of Balochistan. Unlike the Marri and Bugti tribes, the Mengals are
less involved in armed struggle, although Ataullah never condemned and criticized
the armed resistance against central government of Pakistan. He has been an active
person in the battle with the Pakistani Army, during 1070s. Mengal exiled himself in
1980 because the domination of Punjabi community was not acceptable for him.
(Harrison, 1981:66)
60
References
Afzal, Rafique, M. (2001). Pakistan: History and Politics 1947-1971, Karachi: Oxford
University Press.
Awan, A.B., (1985). Balochistan: Historical and Political Processes, London: New
Century Publishers.
Ahmad, Kazi, (1976). The Geography of Pakistan, Karachi.
Ahmad Aijaz. (1973). The National Question in Balochistan, Pakistan Forum, Vol. 3,
No. 8/9, Middle East Research and Information Projects (MERIP)
Ahmed Feroz, (1998). Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University
Press
Ali, Imtiaz, (April, 2005). The Balochistan Problem, Pakistan Horizon Journal, Vol 58,
No.2, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of National Affairs.
Andley, Priyashree. (2006). Special Report 32, Balochistan: A Backgrounder, New
Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
About Balochistan, (2013). Retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37&I
temid=783 on 21 January, 2015
An Overview of Mineral Potential of Pakistan, (2013). Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Resources, Government of Pakistan, Natural Resources Wing, Retrieved
from http://www.gsp.gov.pk/images/mineral-potential-of-pakistan.pdf on 28
January, 2015
61
Breseeg, Taj Muhammad. (2004). Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development.
Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Bansal, Alok. (2008). Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, June, Vol. 19, No.2
Baloch, Mir Khuda Baksh Bijaranai Marri, (1974). Searchlight on Baloch and
Balochistan, Karachi: Royal Book Company
Baloch, Sardar Muhammad Khan, (1977). History of Baloch Race and Balochistan,
Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab
Baluch, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan,(1975). Inside Baluchistan, Karachi: Royal Book
Company.
Baloch, Inayatullah, (1983). The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self-
Determination, Hamburg: Dentshes Orient Institute.
Baloch, Inayatullah, (1987). The Problem of Greater Balochistan; A study of Baloch
Nationalism, Stuttgart stmer verlag Wiesbaden.
Balochistan: Civil-Military Relations, (March 2012). PILdAT Issue paper, Islamabad:
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency.
Balochistan: Conflicts and Players (2009). Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace
Studies.
Balochistan Problems and Solutions, (2011) retrieved from
http://www.thevision21.org/article-detail.php?cid=14&aid=31 on December 9, 2014
62
Balochistan: Development Issues and Prospects, (2013). Islamabad: Multi Donor
Trust Fund, World Bank, Pakistan
Baloch, Salar, (2008). Instruments of Accession of Kalat State, retrieved from
http://balochistaninhistory.blogspot.com/ on 21 January, 2015
Baloch, Bari, (2015,Jan.25). Balochistan‘s shrinking forests, retrieved from
http://thenaturenews.com/2015/01/balochistans-shrinking-forests/ on 23 January,
2015.
Dames, M. Longworth, (1907). Popular Poetry of the Baloches I-II, London: David
Nutt.
Elfenbein, Josef, (1989). Baluchistan III: Baluchi Language and Literature, In
Encyclopedia Iranica 3.
Explore Balochistan, (2013) retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=38&I
temid=784 on 22 January, 2015
Encyclopedia of Britannica, (1990) VoL 25.
Encyclopedia of Britannica, (1970). Vol. III,
Encyclopedia of Britannica, (1971). VoL III
Encyclopedia of Islam, (1936). London: Lucaza &Co.
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, Fruit production in Balochistan, retrieved from
http://pakissan.com/english/allabout/horticulture/fruit.production.in.balochistan.shtml
on 28 January, 2015
63
Forbes, Shawn, Modern History of the Conflict in Balochistan, Balochi TV & Radio
Online Vancouver, Canada, retrieved from http://www.balochitvonline.com/modern-
history-of-conflict-in-balochistan.html on Dec 4, 2014
Forest Resource, (2015). Retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124
9&Itemid=100413 on 7 February, 2015
Fisheries Department, (2013). Retreived from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=2
4&Itemid=191 on 25 February, 2015
Grare, Fredric, (January, 2006). Pakistan: The resurgence of Baloch Nationalism,
Washington DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications:
South Asia Project.
Grare, Fredric, (April, 2013), Balochistan: The State versus the Nation, Washington
DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications: South Asia
Project
Gankovsky, Y. V. (1973). The People of Pakistan, Lahore: Peoples Publishing
House.
Harrison, Selig S. (1981). In Afghanistan‘s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet
Temptations, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Hughes, A.W. (1977). The Country of Baluchistan, Quetta.
Hasnat, Syed F. (2011). Global Security Watch—Pakistan (1st ed.). California:
Praeger
64
Isa Qazi Faez, (2007). Balochistan: Case and Demand, PILdAT Briefing Paper
No.33, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency.
Indian Independence Act, 1947, Constitutional Documents (Pakistan), Vol 111,
Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi
Imperial Gazetteer of India (Balochistan) Provincial Series (1984). Lahore: Sang-e-
Meel Publications
Jones, Seth G., and C. Christine Fair. (2010), Counterinsurgency in Pakistan.
Washington, DC: Rand Publications.
Javaid Ijaz, Ahmad Shahid Dr. (2008). Water for Balochistan, Policy Briefings, Vol
(4), No (6), Government of Balochistan
Khan, Adeel. (2003). Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerilla War to
Nowhere, Asian Ethnicity, June, Vol. 4.
Khan, Adeel. (2009). Renewed Ethno-nationalist Insurgency in Balochistan,
Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation, Asian Survey,
Vol. 49.
Khan, Mir Ahmed Yar, (1975). (ex Khan of Kalat) Inside Balochistan, A Political
Autobiography, Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Kokaislova, Pavla and Kokaisl, Petr (2012), Ethnic Identity of the Baloch People,
Central Asia and the Caucasus, Volume 13, Issue 3, Journal of Social and Political
studies, Sweden: CA&CC, retrieved from
https://balochilinguist.wordpress.com/2013/12/27/ethnic-identity-of-the-baloch-
people/ on on 22 January, 2015
65
Kakar, Hazrat Wali, (2012) Geo-Strategic importance of Balochistan, from
awamisoch.blogspot.com/2012/10/ on 25 December, 2014
Mubarakpuri, Qazi Ather, (1987) Arab Rule in India, Sakkar: Fikr-o-Nazar
Publications.
Mateen Amir, Too many things going wrong simultaneously, The News, July 27,
2010.
Mazhar, Muhammad Saleem, Javaid, Umbreen & Goraya, Naheed S. (2012).
Balochistan (From Strategic Significance to US Involvement. Journal of Political
Studies. Vol. 19 (1). University of the Punjab. pp
Majeed, Gulshan, (2011). National Integration in Pakistan: A Socio-Political Analysis
of Balochistan (1972-2005), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, University
of the Punjab, Lahore.
Mineral Profile of Balochistan (December, 2009). Geological Survey of Pakistan,
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, retrieved
from http://www.gsp.gov.pk/images/mineralprofileofbalochistan.pdf on 12 February,
2015
Maira, S., (2009, Nov.7). Mountain ranges of Baluchistan, retrieved from
http://pakistan360degrees.com/mountain-ranges-of-baluchistan/ on 10 February,
2015
Mineral Resources of Balochistan, (2013) retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=40&I
temid=789 on 12 February, 2015
66
Mineral Reserves in Balochistan, (2013). Retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/images/minespdf/Mineral%20Reserves%20in%20Bln
%20DGMM.pdf on 13 February, 2015
Naseeb Ullah, (2014). Plight of Agriculture Sector in Balochistan, from
http://thebalochistanpoint.com/the-plight-of-agriculture-sector-in-balochistan/ on 25
January, 2015
Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, (2006). International Crisis Group,
Asia Briefing No. 119
Productive Sectors, (2013) retreived from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=837
&Itemid=1087 on 22 February, 2015
Provincial Disaster Risk Management Plan,. (2006). Government of Balochistan
Provincial Census Report of Balochistan, (2001). Statistic Division, Government of
Pakistan, Islamabad.
Quddus, Syed Abdul, (1990). The Tribal Baluchistan, Lahore: Feroz Sons
.
Roofi, Yasmin, (2013). Ethnic Nationalism and Political Development: A Case Study
of Pakistan, (1973-2000), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science &
International Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan
Sial, Safdar and Basit, Abdul, (Oct-Dec 2010). Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan:
Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security, Conflict and Peace
Studies, Vol 3, Number 4, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
67
Swidler, N. & Titus, P.(2000). Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-Nationalism and Regional
Dynamics in Post-Colonial Balochistan, USA: International Journal of Middle East
Studies
Scholz, Fred, (2002). Nomadism & Colonialism; A Hundred Years of Baluchistan
1872-1972, Karachi: Oxford University Press
Shah, Mehtab Ali, (1997). The Foreign Policy of Pakistan; Ethnic Impacts on
Diplomacy (1971-1994), London: I.B. Tauris and Company.
Sabir, Abdul Razzaq, Dr. (2010). Multiculturalism: A Case Study of Balochistan,
Balochistan Review, VOL XX111 No. 2, Balochistan Study Centre, Quetta:
University of Balochistan.
Shahid, Saleem, (2002). Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, in ABS Jafri‟s, The
political parties of Pakistan, Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Sabir, Abdul Razzaq, (2007). Cultural Values and Traditional Treatment System
Among Brahui Nomads, IJDL KeralaS India: ISDL Therivenanthapuram. Jan-June
Sayed, Javed Haider, Dr.(2008). Balochistan: The Land and the People, Journal of
South Asian Studies, VOL 23, No.1., University of the Punjab.
Spooner,Brian, (1989). Baluchistan 1: Geography, History and Ethnography, In
Encyclopedia Iranica, III, Yarsheter Ehsan (ed.), London/New York: Mazda
Publishers
Safi, Ghulam Murtaza; Gadiwala, Muhammad Sohail; Burke, Farkhunda; Azam,
Muhammad; and Baqa, Muhammad Fahad (2014).Agricultural Productivity in
Balochistan Province of Pakistan, A Geographical Analysis, Journal of Basic &
Applied Sciences, Volume 10.
68
The Dawn, (2003, March.17) Balochistan Fisheries
Talbot, Ian, (1990), Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement; the Growth of
the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47, Oxford University
Press.
Tahir, Muhammad,(2008,April.4). The Players in the Balochistan Insurgency,
retreived
fromhttp://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/International_3/The_Players_in_the_Balo
chistan_Insurgency_printer.shtml on 9 June, 2015
The Problem of Baluchistan, (1980). Pakistan Progressive, Vol. III, IV, New York.
The Juniper Forests,(2008). retrieved from
http://pakistanpaedia.com/jungles/juniper_forests.htm on 23 January, 2015
Tribal Analysis Centre, (Nov.2009) The Baloch and the Brahui and Their Rebillions,
retrieved from http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-
TAC/Baluch%20and%20the%20Brahui.pdf on 28 March, 2015
The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Baluchistan, (1976). Vol. VI, Lahore
Wasim, Muhammad Pervez, (2011), Trends, Growth and Variability of Major Fruit
Crops in Balochistan- Pakistan: 1989-2009, Research Report, ARPN Journal of
Agricultural and Biological Science, VOL. 6, NO. 12, Asian Research Publishing
Network.
Weaver, Mary Anne, (2002). Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Press
69
World Bank Report, (2013). Balochistan: Development Issues and Prospects,
Islamabad: Multi Donor Trust Fund, Pakistan
Yousafzai, Rahimullah, And now there is Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan, The News,
March 4, 2009
CHAPTER THREE
Geo Strategic Significance of
Balochistan
70
1. Geo Strategic Significance of Pakistan
There are many factors which make Pakistan a prominent and significant country of
South Asia. Pakistan is a state that connects the regions of South Asia and South
West Asia. The neighboring countries of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan possess rich
energy resources but India and China do not. China needs access to Indian Ocean
and Arabian Sea through Pakistani region, Korakaram. Pakistan provides the
straight route of 2600 kilometers to Central Asian Republics. („‟Special Article‟‟,
2013, April.12) Pakistan is a passage between South Asia, West Asia and Central
Asia, an easiest way to connect energy rich countries to deficient regions.
2. Historical Perspective of Strategic Significance of
Balochistan
The land of Balochistan has been visited by different conquerors, travelers, settlers
and traders throughout the history. Although Balochistan has witnessed many
periods of obscurity, this marvelous land never lost its geo-strategic importance as it
is close to Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and Indian Ocean. This region has
been a passage for historian, politicians and large foreign armies like Persian,
Greek, Arab, Mongol, Ghaznavids, Ghoris, Mughals and British, which has given
Balochistan an international importance. (Gazetteer of India, 1908:274) Historically,
the land of Balochistan was used only as a facilitating passage and not for the
purpose of permanent settlement by foreign intruders. Except for Arabs and British,
who sustained for a period of three and one century respectively. The British
occupied Balochistan as a mean of communication between their Indian and Afghan
bases. They had no intentions to take advantage of the natural resources of
Balochistan. Alexander was the first warrior, who realized the significance of Baloch
region, while returning back from India. His army marched through the areas of
kalat, Quetta, Kandhar, Helmund to Kirman and Hurmuz and along Makran coast.
(Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908:275).
71
Map No. 3.1. Balochistan under British Rule
Source:http://www.thesiasat.com/2013/06/23/pakistani-medias-role-on-balochistan/ on 21 January, 2015
Alexander followed new passage between South Asia and the Middle East. In later
times, these routes gained immense strategic importance for the other invaders who
traveled from north towards Arabian Sea, or in opposite direction upwards from the
southern shores throughout the centuries. Since two thousand years, these routes
have been assuming great importance and are continuously being used. Afterwards,
the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 created far reaching impact on the
significance of Balochistan. The location of Balochistan near Afghanistan, and most
prominently air and land routes from and to Soviet Central Asia to the Arabian Sea.
During the Arab rule, the Coast of Makran was the most suitable mean of
communication. It was largely used from 7th to 10th centuries, (Holdich, 1977: 148)
72
as the best route in the region. Many areas located on Makran Coast were
developed as military centers by the invading forces. Muhammad Bin Qasim, before
proceeding to India, established a strong base for his army in Makran. He first
occupied the regions of Panjgur and Lasbela to get secure lines of communications
before attacking Debal in Sindh. (Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol I, 1936:pp634-635) he
did not follow the old northern route, instead he discovered a new southern route
from Makran along with the Arabian Sea. Being a wise strategist, he realized the
significance of that parallel land and sea route, which would be an advantage to
utilize his land and naval forces at once.
Map No. 3.2.. Present Balochistan, with Map of Pakistan in Set.
Source :http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/04/11/balochistan-state-versus-nation/fz4a on
11 March, 2015
73
3. Strategic Significance due to Geographical Position
The geographical location of Balochistan, which makes it a sensitive region of
Pakistan, plays the key role in determining the significance of this region both. Any
politico-military development in Afghanistan, Iran and the Gulf Region directly affects
the security of Balochistan. (Khan. Lt. Col. 1997:2) strategically it is located in the
Warm Water Belt, which has always been a region of historic interest for the super-
powers, especially Soviet Union. Because of the High mountain ranges on the east
and west, of Zagros range in Iran and Toba Kakar range in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, Balochistan provides the most convenient route to western Afghanistan
and markets of Central Asia. The plains of Balochistan are the ideal crossroads for
traders between the regions of Middle East and South Asia. The Kej, Gomal, Zhob
and the other passes located in the mountain ranges, from north to south, like Bolan
Pass, Khojak Pass and Mulla Pass are the most accessible passages and means of
communication for intruders and traders through mountains. (Holdich, 1977:290)
These passes between high mountains connect the areas of Kandhar, Quetta and
Kalat with Indus Basin. These passes also connect the Upper Highlands with the
Lower Highlands, providing an opportunity to move vertically from Arabian Sea to
Afghanistan and the Kej valley is a passage to move horizontally from East to West
direction. (Holdich, 1977:297)
Like wise, the mountains of Brahvi, Kirthat and Suleiman ranges, running from East
to West play the role of a great barrier for the movement from Makran Coast to
Afghan border and on the other hand they create hurdle in the southern direction
from the north to the Arabian Sea through central Balochistan. The Kharan desert is
also a big blockage to any movement from the West to Baloc region. The travelers
are confused to choosebetween the north route; Zahidan to Quetta; and the
southern route that constitute the areas of Panjgur to Bela. (Holdich, 1977:302)
Eventually, these two routes are the shortest passages to the Indus Basin from the
west side through Zahidan-Pishin-Dera Ghazi Khan route or Panjgur- Bela route, at
the same time, it is very difficult to move towards East away from the Indus basin
74
because the Eastern side of lower Indus river is bordered by Thar and Cholistan
deserts. The mountains in the west and deserts in the east, create a big difficulty for
any invading force from approaching to the land of Balochistan. In past times, the
most of the invaders from the west, selected the northern pass of Khyber to enter
Sub-Continent.
4. Strategic Significance of Balochistan as Marine Passage
The ideal combination of geographical location, natural resources and the peculiarity
of Baloch people are the main factors in establishing the strategic importance of
Balochistan. Balochistan is situated at the possible marine passage in the Indian
Ocean of the Eastern, Central, and Western divisions of Asia and the Indian Ocean
has high significance on international level by developing great competition for
dominating its sea paths which are now fundamental for the enormous world
business and energy transfer. Balochistan is located in the middle of the Central,
Western Southern and South-western Asia, so it is directly affected by global geo-
politics.
Located at extreme proximity to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and on the border with Iran
and Afghanistan, Balochistan covers almost the whole coast of Pakistan of about
470 miles on the Arabian Sea with a high value port, at Gwadar. (Mazhar, Javaid
and Goraya, 2012:117) The Asian countries like China and India are rapidly
increasing their demand for energy supply as emerging economic states. So, they
want to establish their regional hegemony by taking hold of world energy resources
and their transportation corridors, major land and maritime trade links routes,
Balochistan has become the focal point of global geopolitical strategy in this region.
Balochistan has got a great maritime significance with the construction and progress
of Gwadar Port because Gwadar port is strategically the access to the South Asia,
Central Asia through Afghanistan, the Middle East and the eastern coasts of Africa.
It also provides a land-route to Russia. (Ismail, 2014: 183). Balochistan has a
potential to become an international trade path and a passage for energy
75
transportation. Moreover, the large deposits of mineral and energy resources make
this region extremely important in the perspective of geo-political competition among
global powers.
5. Strategic Significance as a Safe Military Route
The region of Balochistan has got a special importance as a military route because it
has proven to be at an important position for the quick and abrupt increase of
influence and becoming more unbeaten deployment and supplying to the Central
Asia, South Asia, Middle East, China and Russia. Stations of air force and navy at
Gwadar are also useful for a keen observation on any military activity and foreign
control over important international choke point in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of
Hormuz, and the shipping trade through the Indian Ocean. (Ismail, 2014:184).
Presently, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) war in Afghanistan also
highlights the magnitude of Balochistan, being an entry point and most safe route for
the easy supply of military goods fight areas in Afghanistan.
6. Strategic Significance in Trade and Commerce
Because of a unique and outstanding physical geography, Balochistan is extremely
important in regional relationships. The vast reserves of oil and gas and other
valuable minerals, are attracting the interest of foreign investors. The Government of
Pakistan has planned and launched many important projects for economic
development in Balochistan with the support and cooperation of national and
international actors. These mega projects are meant to facilitate the transportation of
commodities and services in the entire region more efficiently and rapidly.
Topography and environment of Balochistan makes it a major site for the
construction of communication infrastructure like roads and pipelines to connect the
Middle East, Central Asian and South Asian regions, in addition, the Gwadar Port
has the prospective of making this region globalized. The projects include High-
speed Road and Rail Networks and Pipeline Projects. These projects are a benefit
for Balochistan as millions of dollars would be obtained from regional and foreign
76
organizations. Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asia, Russia, India and China, all are
interested to earn profit from these projects.
7. Mega Development Projects of International Significance
Mega Projects are infrastructure projects based on large civil-engineering such as
highways, dams, canals and ports, built for economic development. These are
equally important for the recognition of a state on national and international level.
7.1. Gwadar Deep Sea Port
Gwadar consists of 15, 216 square kilometer area and is the largest coastal district
of Pakistan, located on its south western border. It consists of 600 kilometer long
coastline that covers 78 percent of the provincial coastline and 55 percent of the
total coastline of Pakistan. Fishing is the greatest resource of the district and about
70 percent of the population is associated directly or indirectly with fishing sector.
(„‟Disaster Risk Management‟‟, 2008:11) Gwadar is situated at the doorway to the
Persian Gulf about 390 marine miles east of the Gulf of Hormuz and about 234
marine miles west of Karachi, about 80 kilometers from Iran, about 320 kilometers
from Oman, close to ports of Chahbahar and Bander Abbas in Iran, Gwadar is a
major waterway for worldwide oil supply. The importance of Gwadar was first noticed
internationally during the first Gulf War. The areas of Makran Coast including
Gwadar remained under Portuguese control in the 16th and 17th Century, Gwadar
was a property of State of Oman, gifted by Khan of Kalat to the Sultan of Oman in
the 18th century. (Zaheer, Capt. 2007:24). Gwadar was under the control of Oman
until September 1958 as it was located right on the Gulf of Oman. Pakistani Prime
Minister Feroz Khan Noon decided to purchase the region of Gwadar due to its ideal
geographical conditions. After four years of negotiations, Sultan of Oman, Said bin
Taimur sold it out to Pakistan for a payment of 3 million pounds sterling on 8th
September 1958. Although Pakistan declared Gwadar a port site in 1964 but due
financial problems, no further progress could be made in this regard. At that time
77
China offered the required sources for the construction of that Gwadar port.
(Naseem, 2014:520) The construction of a port at Gwadar, the south western city of
Balochistan is the most significant factor in determining and establishing the
strategic values of Balochistan on national and international level. It is not only a
great booster to the economy of Pakistan but can also play an important role in the
political strategies of world powers to attain their economic supremacy over the
warm waters.
Map No. 3.3. Location of Gwadar, Balochistan
Source: www.aboardthedemocracytrain.com on 10 March, 2015
Gwadar is positioned near Persian Gulf as a sharing point for the natural resources
of Central Asia. (Shah, 2007:46) Gwadar port project is increasing the significance
of Pakistan‟s potential as a local center of trade and has the capability of bringing
78
change in the national economy. Pakistan presently has only two commercial ports
in the Indian Ocean, Karachi and Bin Qasim, largely fulfilling the domestic needs.
Karachi and Qasim ports have reached their cargo handling capability and would not
be able to meet future demands soon. (Shah, 2007:48). Gwadar is the most suitable
alternate port amongst other potential locations of Keti Bandar, Sonmiani, Hingol,
Khor Kalmat, Pasni, Jiwani and Ormara. (Malik, 2012:59) and the Government of
Pakistan decided to build another port at Gwadar, on the outstanding geographic
location near the key shipping routes in and out of the Persian Gulf, as the central
export corridor in this region. It is about 533 km from Karachi and 120 km from the
Iranian border. („‟Gwadar Port‟‟ 2015)
In 2002 China and Pakistan signed an agreement for the construction of Phase 1 of
the Port which was completed in 2006, Phase II of the Gwadar project is in process.
(Zaheer, 2007:25) During the 1988-1992, initially a small port was constructed at
Gwadar but in 2002 the project of construction was given to China. Gwadar was
inaugurated by General Pervez Musharraf and Chinese Minister for Communication,
Li Shenglin, in 2007.(Naseem, 2014:521) It was at first built by China and is currently
undergoing further expansions. China is providing both technical and financial
assistance to extend it into a naval base.The port inaugurated practically with the
arrival of a commercial ship „Pos Glory‟ on March 15, 2008. (Malik, 2012:59) then a
ship from Canada carrying 52000 tons of wheat arrived at Gwadar Port. The honor
of this official inauguration was done on 21st of December in the year 2008. (The
Dawn, 2008, Dec. 22). The Gwadar was integrated into Balochistan in 1977. In
1993, it was decided to utilize the potential of Gwadar as a profitable place with the
construction of a deep-sea port, and the construction of roads and railway networks
was initated to connect it with the other parts of the country. The Phase I of the port
is now being used for shipping, commercial and industrial activities. Work on phase
II has been started in May 2005 at a cost of 865 million dollars. Gwadar is declared a
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to facilitate commercial and economic development.
At present, the economic operations performed through this port generate about
79
nine percent of the gross income, and the development of an economic zone would
increase the revenues. („‟Economic Gateway, 2015, Jan.22)
7.2. Infrastructure Associated to Gwadar Port
The purpose of Gwadar port was to utilize the region to enhance commercial and
strategic significance of Balochistan as well as the development of the province.
Gwadar is a port which is controlling trade and shipping transfer between the land-
locked Afghanistan and the Central Asian states. Not only it is playing great role for
the Gulf but also connects the China with the Middle East. Gwadar port is providing
golden opportunities for economic development to Baloch people and other
provinces of Pakistan as well. Keeping in view the value of Gwadar in the long-term
economic potential, it must be connected with the other parts of the country and
region through roads and communication infrastructure.
I. Makran Coastal Highway
The construction of the port provided stimulation for other major projects that include
the 700 kilometers long Makran Coastal Highway to connect Karachi with the ports
of Ormara, Pasni and Gwadar and would be extended to the Iranian border soon.
This highway provided remarkable reduction in travel time to Karachi from 48 hours
to only 7 hours. (Anwar, 2010:98) The link of Gwadar with Karachi was a most prior
requirement for the construction of the port, because there was no proper and
modern road linking Gwadar with Karachi, there are unpaved long routes between
and around the hills of Makran Range. The Coastal Highway is an essential part of
the Gwadar Mega Project itself. (Budhani and Mallah, 2007:7). Because of this
highway, the area has become valuable for international and national investors by
creating large business opportunities. It is also a shorter trade route between
Karachi and Iran. (Shah, 2007: 52) the construction and development of Makran
coastal highway is sponsored and assisted by China by providing financial and
technical assistance to Pakistan. (Kataria and Naveed, 2014:406)
80
II. Kashgar-Gwadar Trade Corridor
Kashgar-Gwadar or Pak-China Motorway which is called a big trade corridor will be
about 2,000 kilometer long within the land of Pakistan. (The News, 2013, Sep.20)
This trade corridor will provide great transport facility to China, as traders can export
their commodities to the international markets through the Gwadar Port in a fast and
easy way, because this is the shortest possible route to the western provinces of
China. The economic corridor is a step to develop strategic partnership between
China and Pakistan as only an efficient transport system would provide economic
and social opportunities such as improved and fast access to markets and further
investments. Transport sector has an essential role in the economic expansion of a
region. The economic corridor from Gwadar to Kashgar will strengthen the economy
of Pakistan, Iran, Nepal, Russia, Middle East and the Central Asian Republics. (Daily
Times, 2014, Apr. 26)
The 2,000 kilometer long trade corridor from Makran Coast to Kashgar in China‟s
Xingjian province has been called a “game changer” by Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. (Gulf News, 2013, Jul.13) This project will provide
China with the shortest possible route for its essential energy imports and exports
from the Gulf States, Africa and Europe. Simultaneously, the project has huge
advantages for Pakistan in up gradation of economy by developing high- rank
infrastructure, opening jobs for local people and helping as a strategic medium for
energy imports. The cost of this project is expected to be in billions of dollars. The
project includes the road and rail links passing through almost 2,000 kilometers
including vast lands of unpopulated areas in Balochistan and the northern
mountainous regions in Pakistan to the Karakoram Highway. (Gulf News, 2013,
Jul.13).
81
Map No. 3.4. The Corridors Crossing Through Balochistan
Source: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2014-06/28/content_17621525.htm on 11 March, 2015
There is a plan to set up trans-freight locations along the Kashgar-Gwadar corridor
to facilitate the transportation of heavy goods, and the plan to establish economic
zones and industrial parks at the major exists of Kashgar–Gwadar corridor has been
prepared, according to which, each economic zone would be dealing with particular
products and services, while analyzing the availability of local raw material,
employees and other factors. The proposed sites for such freight stations and
industrial parks include Sust, Gilgit, Abbotabad, Lorala, Kohlu, Dera Ghazi Khan,
Bhakkar, Rajanpur, Kashmore, Jaccobabad, Khuzdar, Basima, Punjgur, Turbat and
Gwadar. (The News, 2013, Sep.20)
82
III. Other Important Road Networks
Other important road projects include the Gwadar-Quetta-Chaman road, Pasni to
Gwadar road, Ormara to Gwadar and Gwadar to Turbat road are planned to be built.
Later on, these roads would be connected to each other and Pasni will be connected
to the Iranian border. The entire network will finally be connected with China through
Indus Highway. (Anwar, 2010:101)
Other important road networks include Gwadar-Turbat-Hushab-Khuzdar Road,
Khuzdar-Ratodero Road, Gwadar-Ahmedvai Road and Gwadar-Gabd-Iran road
connecting on to the highway from Chahbahr northwards. (Zaheer, 2007:25) This
road network will smooth the process of the trade from China and Central Asian
States to the Persian Gulf, Middle East, East Africa, the Indian Ocean through the
port of Gwadar.
IV. Rail Networks
A rail track Gwadar-Dalbadin is an important link which connects the existing Quetta-
Dalbadin Taftan Zahidan line but despite of strong wish of Chinese and Pakistani
Government to complete this project, the process is still pending of the construction
railway lines from Gwadar to Chinese south-western province because of the
persistent unrest and worse conditions of law and order in Balochistan. (Ismail,
2014:187) the continuous damaging attacks on railway tracks by Baloch insurgents
to stop these projects are major hurdle in the completion of this project.
V. Up-gradation of the Gwadar Airport
At present, there is a small airport at Gwadar that is suitable only for small aircrafts.
The Government of Pakistan has started working on the plan for its expansion to
provide facility of accommodating all major airlines. The planning to build a new
airport with a long runway for the landing of giant air crafts has been outlined and the
83
construction will be started soon. The construction of the new modern airport will
provide great opportunities to air cargo to and from Gwadar. After the completion of
roads, railways and modern airport, Gwadar will attain the high position of a
multimodal transport service provider to the regional and international traders. It will
significantly reduce the overall cost of transport domestically while making the goods
competitive in the international market. There are chances and capacity to start Air-
Sea and Air-Land cargo services from Gwadar to the Middle East and South Asia.
The construction of Gwadar airport was approved by Executive Committee of
National Economic Council, Pakistan (Ecnec) in January 2010 at a cost of Rs. 7.7
billion. But the project has been facing delays because of its cost estimate and
design structure. But recently, Ecnec has approved the construction of the New
Gwadar International Airport with a modified and more feasible design. This will be a
46.6 billion dollars investment program for Pakistan, and China is likely to provide
662 million dollars in assistance for developing land, airport and seaport facilities in
Gwadar. The State of Oman has promised a grant of 17.5 million dollars for the
construction and the Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan is expected to bear one-
tenth of the total cost from. Until 2014, Rs. 803 million had been spent on the
development of Gwadar air port. (The Express Tribune, 2015, Jan.13)
7.3. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline (TAPI)
In near future, Gwadar is predicted to be a major centre for gas and oil supply from
Central Asia and Iran to South Asia and other regions because of its economic
practicability. Due to an incomparable and unique geo-economic significance,
Balochistan is competent enough to be an energy corridor for many states. The
conditions of war in Afghanistan, Indian competition with Pakistan and stressed US -
Iranian Relations can be major reasons of the delayed materialization of this
passage. The Gwadar port is highly significant for China‟s future in terms of energy
needs currently lies in pipeline projects. Balochistan is located at the centre of geo-
economic activity which has huge potential of enriching the surrounding regions. The
84
rising geo-political and geo-economic environment has highlightened the advantage
of Balochistan in West Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia.
Map No. 3.5. Two Proposed Pipeline Projects IP & TAPI
Source http://www.dawn.com/news/1134880 on 23 February, 2015
The project of moving natural gas from Central Asia to South Asia had been jammed
for many years due to persistent conditions of war and insecurity in Afghanistan. In
the beginning, agreements were made between Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan
(TAP) gas pipelines to connect Turkmenistan with southern neighbors, including
Pakistan through Afghanistan but in 2008, the project was also officially joined by
India which is now known as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline
(TAPI) with a strong support from United States. (Foster, 2008:4) The Asian
Development Bank (ADB) is organizing the Project. In 2010, after inter-
governmental deliberations, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India signed
an agreement in Ashgabat to build the 1,680 kilometer long pipeline. (Ahmed, 2010:
3). The proposed TAPI pipeline is expected to transport about 33 billion cubic meters
per year of natural gas from the Dauletabadgas in southeast Turkmenistan along the
Herat, Helmand and Kandahar highway through southern Afghanistan, through
85
Quetta and Multan in Pakistan, concluding in India. India and Pakistan will equally
divide the production, and a small percentage will go to Afghanistan. (Foster, 2008:
pp 1-4)
The contract of TAPI pipeline project is almost finalized. In 2014, Pakistani Federal
Minister for Petroleum & Natural Resources visited Turkmenistan to get the deal
finalized, which will provide a well designed intercontinental gas pipeline to the four
countries. It would be a billion dollar project as many US based companies are very
anxious to get the contract. (Daily Times, Jul.10, 2014). Turkmenistan has asked
Pakistan‟s official companies, OGDCL and PPL to participate in activities of gas
exploration under the TAPI project. OGDCL planned to drill 35 oil and gas wells
during the year 2014 and so far it had drilled six wells. OGDCL has marked 31
locations for drilling and another four locations would soon be marked to speed up
the searching process. (Express Tribune, 2014, Dec.5)
7.4. Gwadar-Kashgar Oil and Gas Pipeline Project
Gwadar-Kashgar oil and gas pipeline is another proposed project which would give a
boost to strategic importance of Balochistan on national and international level and
will provide a great support to the economic development and prosperity of Pakistan
as well as Balochistan. In 2009, China started the construction of an oil refinery at
Gwadar which is planned to link to Kashgar in China. The total length of the pipeline
is about 2, 500 kilometers. This pipeline can be also be used for moving Saudi oil to
China. (Khan, Dr.2015: 86). China is also interested in the establishment of a
petrochemical oil city in Gwadar which would include an oil refinery with
petrochemical logistics and storage facilities. Pakistan and China signed a deal in
this regard in February, 2006 when President Pervez Musharraf‟s visited China. A
Chinese company; GUPC; showed interest to carry out the viability study for the oil
city project in Gwadar with an investment of 12.5 billion dollars. The proposed oil
refinery will be capable of refining 60,000 barrels of crude oil daily. („‟Balochistan:
Iran to Establish‟‟, 2013). The project is a part of the proposed Pak-China Energy
Corridor. The pipeline from Gwadar to China will definitely save time and reduce the
86
transport distance from the Gulf to China and will support improve China‟s oil
imports.
7.5. Pak-Iran Joint Venture in Balochistan
I. Pak-Iran Oil Refinery Project
Iran is intended to set up the largest refinery at Gwadar, at the cost of 4 billion US
dollars. The project will have the capacity to produce almost 400,000 barrel oil daily.
The plan was discussed in Tehran between Pakistan and Iran in December 2012.
The agreement on project was signed by Iran and Pakistan on March 11 2013, the
very day both countries announced the revival of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline project.
An oil pipeline from Iran‟s territory will be constructed to Gwadar, to carry crude oil
for processing. The proposed refinery in Gwadar would enable China to resume
work on Gwadar oil refinery which was stopped in 2009. (Fazl-e-Haider, 2013,
Mar.7) The proposed project will be completed in assistance of Pakistan State Oil
(PSO).
As Pakistan is facing energy crisis and deficiency, oil imports from Iran would be
highly supportive for Pakistan to fulfil its furnace oil requirements of about nine
million tons per year. Iran has offered Pakistan a permanent supply of 100,000
barrels crude oil per day on delayed imbursement. (Fazl-e-Haider, 2013, Mar.7).
This is one of the important proposed projects of economic developments which will
enable the two neighboring countries; Pakistan and Iran to increase their business
and commercial relations, and will bring a big enhancement to the economic
significance of Balochistan. The proposed Refinery will help transformation of
imported oil into high speed diesel which is highly demanded. (Pakistan Observer,
2003, Jan.17)
This project will help both the countries reviving their relation and promoting
economic cooperation which had been going under bitter situation for last many
years due to the political confusion. This will also provide an economic force to
Balochistan by opening gates to great job opportunities. In addition, it will fulfil the
87
growing demand of high-speed multi purpose diesel. Moreover, heavy crude oil from
Iran and its related project will result in the income of about 300 million dollars per
year. (The Dawn, 2010, Mar.23). Therefore, great economic wealth and
development in Balochistan would be achieved.
II. Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project (IP)
This project is a great significant development which would not only enable Pakistan
to beat the prevailing energy crisis but also highly important for Balochistan itself as
its gas and oil resources are not sufficient to fulfill the mounting requirements.
Balochistan is the biggest energy supplier to the other regions of Pakistan and
increasing energy demand in the region has exaggerated the economic and
strategic importance of Balochistan. Balochistan is the only land route for the
planned pipeline, the long route which would connect Iran‟s gas field to Pakistan‟s
main supply system in Nawabshah, crosses through Baloch areas of Iran and
Pakistan. (The Dawn, 2010, Mar. 23).
The IP project is under debate since 1994. Iran signed an opening agreement with
Pakistan in 1995 and wished to expand the pipeline from Pakistan to India and
signed another agreement with India in 1999 as well and was called as Iran-
Pakistan-India (IPI) Gas Pipeline. Pakistan. (Munir, Ahsan and Zulfiqar, April 4,
2014,). In 2008, Iran showed interest in participation of China in the project. In 2010,
Iran encouraged Bangladesh to be a part of the project. In 2008, India signed a
nuclear agreement with US and in 2009, withdrew from IPI project with an objection
on cost and security matters. In 2010, the United States pressurized Pakistan to
discard the pipeline project in lieu of monetary aid for the construction of a liquid gas
terminal and electricity import from Tajikistan through Afghanistan‟s Wakhan
Corridor. (Munir, et al. April 4, 2014,)
Since the last two decades, no prominent progress has been made due to regional
politics and pressure from US because US is aware of the fact that that IP project
will bring the great projection of energy and revenues for Pakistan without US
support. The project needs completion from Pakistan, while Iran has completed the
88
construction on its terrain up to Pakistan„s border. China is also wants the pipeline to
be extended to Western China. (Khan, Dr. 2015:84-85)
The project has been deferred due to the threats from United States to Pakistan
about sanctions of loans, which may be stopped if Pakistan goes for any deal with
Iran. The reason behind these warnings is the concern of US regarding the IP
project which would enable Iran to receive a large sum of foreign currency to
accelerate the process of Iran‟s nuclear weapons program.
Pakistan‟s Federal Cabinet approved the plan of constructing a pipeline on
Pakistan‟s side, with financial and technical assistance from Iran on January 30,
2013 and despite all the threats of economic sanctions and warnings from US,
President, Asif Ali Zardari, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad started the
construction of the 7.5 billion US dollars IP gas pipeline in March 2013. (Ansaree,
2014:53). The pipeline will transfer 750 million cubic feet of gas daily to Pakistan at
the location near Gwadar, from Iran‟s South Pars field, which is the second-biggest
gas field in the world. The project will generate around 4,000 megawatts of power.
Iran has offered 500 million US dollars loan to Pakistan as compensation after US
threat for sanctions. The amount of loan will be used in the construction of Pakistani
side of pipeline which is estimated to cost Pakistan 1.5 billion dollars. Iran has
offered more amounts for the construction of pipeline and an oil refinery at Gwadar.
(Ashraf, 2013: pp1-2). IP Gas Pipeline project is facing the problem of security in
Balochistan because the major portion of pipeline will pass through Balochistan and
face major security threats especially when insurgency by Baloch Nationalists in
Balochistan is at an intensified level. There is an inclination between Baloch people
of damaging development projects with a perception that their economic interests
are being disregarded. The production of oil in Pakistan is lesser than utilization; it
has become a necessity for Pakistan to import 80 percent of its total requirement.
Although, Pakistan has abundance of gas, but the extraction in is not sufficient to
assure future demand, the pipeline project would have multi-dimensional benefits for
Pakistan‟s plan to emphasize on natural gas for power generation projects. (Khan,
2012: 127-128)
89
7.6. Gold/Copper Mining Projects and Strategic Importance of
Balochistan
I. Reko Diq Gold Mining Project
Reko Diq is a located at a remote area in the north west of Chagi district which is
thinly populated desert on the wetern side of Balochistan. Reko Diq is one of the
eroded relics of volcanic centers in the Chagi volcanic chain of mountains which
moves in the east west across Balochistan between the Quetta city to Taftan railway
and the border along with Afghanistan. Rickodek is known as the “Hillock of Gold”
containing world‟s 4th largest treasures of gold and copper (Ismail, 2014:188).
Reko Diq is close to the borders of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, at Chaghi in
Balochistan, situated at the distance of hundered kilometers from Zahedan, the city
of Iran. (Siddique: February 18, 2011) It is a fact that Balochistan has a plenty of
reservoirs of precious minerals but at the same time Pakistan has to rely upon
foreign companies for the process of exploring, mining and refining. Reko-Diq gold
can turn Balochistan into the richest province of Pakistan. It is a big need of the time
that Pakistan should convert the strategic possession in Balochistan into
opportunities for economic development. Reko Diq deposits are believed to hold
about 12.3 million tons of copper and 20.9 million ounces of gold. (Khokhar, The
News, 2011, Jul.18) The mining project at Reko Diq has always been under foreign
companies, many international forces are interested in getting contract of extraction
and exploration. An Australian firm; Tethyan Copper Prosperity Limited; started the
exploration in 1993 with the investment of thirty million dollars but in 2006 sold the
company to a Canadian and Chilean joint venture named Tethyan Copper Company
of Pakistan for 230 million dollars. (The News, 2011, Jul.18). A Chinese company,
China Mining and Metallurgical Cooperation is also trying to gain the mining license
for Reko Diq because the reserves of gold and copper at Reko Diq are four times
larger than that of Saindak. (Ashraf, 2011, Jan.4) The Balochistan Government
signed the contract for the exploration with an international mining company BHP
90
Billiton in 1993, according to which Balochistan was entitled to receive 25 percent
and Billiton had rights over 75 percent. TCC continued exploration under an
agreement til 2006. (Lake Resource N.L.,2013). In 2006, Australian Mincor
Resources; Antofagasta; singned an agreement with BHP and owned Reko Diq with
37.5 per cent, Barrick Gold with 37.5 per cent, and Balochistan with 25 percent
share. (Syed, Dawn, 2013, Jan.22,) The original and initial deal was made between
BHP and Balochistan Development Authority (BDA), but this process of selling and
buying interests between so many companies created great problems and
confusions between the involved parties including Balochistan Government.
The inability of Baloch government and mishandling of the relevant issue regarding
royalty and shares pushed the project into a lingering and complex legal process in
the international court. The TCC had spent about 400 million dollars till 2006, but in
2011, the Balochistan government rejected lease application of TCC with an
allegation that the company violated the rules of agreement. After fruitless
negotiations with the Balochistan government, TCC took the matter to the
international court to seek compensation for the investement in the project. (Syed,
Dawn, 2013,Jan.22). Balochistan‟s inability to handle the Reko Diq project issues
resulted in a big loss. They lost a great chance of the economic progress dependent
upon the development of copper and gold mine in Chagi. Balochistan missed the
great chance to earn multi billion dollar foreign investment because foreign investors
had lost their interest due to the constant insurgency in the region. Due to the lack of
funds, Balochistan was not in a position to bear the expenses of the legal combat in
the international court. The Federal Government refused to provide any financial
assistance to plead the international case filed by the TCC. So, the Government‟s
incompetencey made it a disputed project where no one would be able to invest till
the court completes its trial. (Fazl-e-Haider, Dawn, 2013. Jan.22). The Baloch
Nationalists were never happy with the involvement of foreign companies in the
mining project as they thought that they were not given the justified royalty from the
reserves of their own territory. The Punjab president of Watan Party, filed a petition
in Supreme Court of Pakistan stating that Pakistan should get eighty percent share
of the assets and the exploring foreign companies should be given only twenty
91
percent share. And a move was launched by Chief Minister of Balochistan Aslam
Raisani that the government of Balochistan will itself look after the Riko Diq gold
project, the vast mineral treasure worth over 3 trillion dollars and it will be linked with
Saindak Copper Project after the expiry of the contract with a Chinese company in
2011. (The Nation, 2010, May.29) The Supreme Court of Pakistan has declared void
and illegal a mining deal for the Reko Diq copper project which was signed 20 years
ago between Balochistan government and international mining companies. The
court said that the agreement reached on July 23, 1993 was in conflict with the laws
of the country. (The Dawn, 2013, Jan.22)
II. Saindak Gold/Copper Mining Project
Saindak Copper-Gold Project is situated about 1250 km away from Quetta.The
Saindak copper porphyry deposit was first recognized by Geological Survey of India
in 1901 during the British era. The Geological Survey of Pakistan continued the
investigation in early 1960 and again in 1970s when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the prime
minister of Pakistan ordered the implementation of the project to appease the Baloch
people. The dissolution of Balochistan Government by Bhutto provoked an agitation
movement and the continuation of Saindak project could be a concession for the
people of Balochistan. (The Dawn, 2012, May.16). The copper deposits at Saindak
were discovered by a Chinese firm in 1970 and the mining process was started in
1995 by a Pakistani Government company, Saindak Metals Ltd. (SML). The project
estimated reserves of 412 million tons containing on average 0.5 gram of gold per
ton and 1.5 grams of silver per ton. The mine had produced about 50,000 tons since
2003 and is expected to have the capacity to produce 15,800 tons of copper, 1.5
tons of gold and 2.8 tons of silver with the average of about 2,000 tons per month,
which means that it can produce 24,000 tons per year. (Shah, 2010:68) .The
Saindak Project in Chagi is one of the extremely large schemes that went into trial
production in 1995 at a cost of Rs17.5 billion but was closed down soon after but
was revitalized in the late 1990s and given in 2002 to a Chinese company,
Metallurgical Construction Corporation (MCC) on ten years lease with an agreement
92
of an annual rent of 500,000 dollars and fifty percent share of sales to the
Government of Pakistan. (Kiani, Dawn, 2006, Sep. 20)
The Government of Pakistan decided to extend this deal for next five years after its
expiry in 2012, as MCC has agreed to give additional five percent shares to
Balochistan. Currently, Balochistan receives 35 percent shares, 15 percent goes to
Central Government while MCC gets 50 percent. After 2012, this 15 percent share of
the Centre will be given to Balochistan. And with the implementation of revised
agreement, Balochistan will receive 55 percent. (The Express Tribune, 2011,
May.17). China has also great demand for copper because of speedy economic
development and need of new infrastructure. China as the producer and buyer of
Saindak copper is a founder of transferring technology in metal mining in copper,
needs copper from Chaghi. (Fazl-e-Haider, 2006, Oct.5)
8. Balochistan and International Competition for Energy
Resources
Present Balochistan is a geographic territory of international strategic importance
moreover the factor of political problem within Balochistan where the Baloch people
are struggling for autonomy, better governance, and perhaps even independence
from Pakistan, and the impacts of this struggle on the security of not only
Balochistan but also of surrounding regions, have much high lightened the geo
strategic significance of this region. “Balochistan acts as a common denominator to
them. ‗‘In fact no policy of any of the countries competing for power in the region
could be called comprehensive and practical unless it considers Balochistan in its
defence plans. The conflicting interest of the Great Powers in the region-ranging
from peripheral to central, converge in Balochistan, in a way that they subject to
political pressures of varying degrees at various points of time and space‖ (Ahmad,
1992: 148)
Right after the creation of Pakistan and annexation of Balochistan into Pakistan, the
Baloch have been protesting against this inclusion. Baloch nationalists have been
93
operating many armed campaigns to protect their economic and cultural rights.
These attempts from Baloch people have always been resulted in an armed clash
between government of Pakistan, Pakistan Military and Baloch Nationalist Groups.
These nationalist movements have gained the status of insurgency by the time.
There have been five periods of Baloch insurgencies in the history of Pakistan, in
1948, 1952, 1962, 1973 and then in 2005, which is still going on and not only
affecting the situation of law and security but also creating major obstacles in the
way to economic development of Balochistan. The many projects of Mega
development have been delayed due to the uncertain circumstances and lack of
suitable peaceful environment. The on going insurgency in Balochistan is not only
destroying the golden opportunity of progress on national and international level but
also playing an influential and vital role in changing the scenario of global politics.
The prevailing situation is providing grounds to foreign players to play their own
games, to achieve their own goals, to attain, maintain and increase their political and
economic power not only in Balochistan but also in other parts of the world. The first
two insurgencies 1948 and 1958 were considered as an internal political matter of
Pakistan which was hushed up with the help of Pakistani Military forces. But the
creation of Bangladesh, alarmed the central government to take serious interest in
Balochistan and during 1972-77 Balochistan government was dismissed by the
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with a military action to handle the insurgents. Iran
supported and assisted Pakistani government to control the situation but Russia and
Iraq was in favour of Baloch insurgents. 1980 Balochistan had already gained
attention of the world due to newly discovered gas, coal and copper reserves.
The proposed Iran-Pakistan pipeline projects and the involvement of China also
increased international interests in Balochistan. Moreover, the war in Afghanistan
highlighted the powerful consequence of millions of refugees reaching the
Balochistan after 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the Afghan
occupation, Russia was trying to influence the Baloch to lift revolt against Pakistan
once again. The Baloch insurgents were promised by Soviet that they would be
pleased with greatest autonomy after the Soviet triumphs over Afghanistan. (Shah,
94
1997). The current ongoing insurgency in Balochistan was provoked during 2001-02
with the announcement of Gwadar Port and later on, the construction of Gwadar
gave rise to another nationalist militancy between government of Pakistan and
Baloch Tribal Chiefs on the issue of the security of their ethnic identity and control
over the resources of Baloch region. The lack of participation of local Baloch in the
project caused many Baloch to raise objections on the project. (Khan, 2009:1078)
The conflict converted into a powerful insurgency in 2005 when tensions shoot up
between the Bugti tribe and the central government, and the chief of Bugti Tribe,
Akbar Bugti was killed during a military action. The death of Nawab Bugti increased
the regional tensions and Baloch demanded full autonomy over the regional
economic as well as political affairs. Before 2005, the problem was restricted to few
tribes but after that incident, the circumstances became suitable for regional forces
to exploit the situation and demands of Baloch insurgents, in their own favor.
Balochistan, due to its geostrategic position, has always been influential on local,
national, and international politics. This present insurgency is not only an obstacle in
the social, political and economic development but has also damaged the security of
region as the Baloch insurgents are dreaming of Greater Balochistan which includes
the Baloch living in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. (Ismail, 2014:181). As
Balochistan borders two very significant strategic countries Afghanistan and Iran,
and having majority of Baloch residents in Afghan and Iranian areas, any type of
unrest or violent uprising in Pakistani Balochistan would disturb regional stability
affecting the adjacent countries and consequently become a regional dispute.
Baloch insurgency may create large troubles in Iran and Afghanistan due to the
strong demand for greater Balochistan which includes Baloch areas of Iran and
Afghanistan. (Javaid, 2010:116) . Being located in the middle of the Central,
Western Southern and South-western Asia, Balochistan is always under the effects
of global geo-politics. The maritime significance and potential of port Gwadar to
connect Afghanistan and the Central Asian states to the Indian Ocean have given
rise to global geo-political rivalry and Balochistan became an ideal profitable aim for
almost all the nations.
95
Map No. 3.6. Gwadar-The gateway to Central Asia and China Trade
Source: https://www.flickr.com/search/?q=gwadar%20map on March 11, 2015
Balochistan, with plenty of energy resources and trade routes; is highly importan on
international level . This unique and valuable situation provides golden opportunity to
the global powers to instigate their regional play. The world is increasingly moving
towards multi-polarity and economic powers are increasing in the Asian regions.
USA has been at a powerful position exclusively since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The objectives of Asian states like China and India are to become
economically more powerful to get global hegemony by controlling the major portion
of world‟s energy resources. The situation of emerging economies is likely to create
disturbance in energy supply and demand so major preference is a focus on energy
markets. Demand for energy supply of China, India, and other Asian countries is
quickly increasing, so it is the biggest requirement of time to spread their influence
over energy resources, transit corridors and important land and naval trade links. For
this purpose, Balochistan is the main focus of geo-political manipulation. The
resettlement of borders as Greater Balochistan would definitely affect the economic
expansion of China, Iran, India and Pakistan. United States have many times
highlighted the geo-strategic and geo-political significance of Balochistan and
96
supported the idea of an independent Balochistan which could provide security to
US political and geostrategic benefits.
9. Significance of Balochistan in Global Politics
In order to counter Iran, the land of Balochistan is of much importance for America.
The natural resources of China and oil of the Arab world are going to eliminate in
coming 30 to 40 years (Mazhar, et al. 2012: 120) and then the USA will have to take
help from Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan; and for this purpose, US would to
cross Balochistan and its Coast, due to the interference of China in Balochistan, it
would not be possible for USA to attain an influential position. America would not be
able to extend its economic hegemony for a long time, it will be substituted by China
which is going to be influential over Gwadar Port and coastal line of Balochistan.
That is the main reason behind USA displeasure with the construction of Gwadar
Port in collaboration with China. When the Taliban administration ended in Kabul
and rebellious groups of Taliban crossed the Pak-Afghan border to enter into
Balochistan and organized revolutionary struggle against the aliened forces in
Afghanistan. Moreover, the re emergence of the Baloch nationalist insurgency also
complicated the internal situation of Pakistan‟s security; Balochistan obtained a new
geo-strategic significance and became focus of USA as a Trans border energy
route. The Baloch insurgency was recharged with the development of Gwadar sea
port and their demand to share the benefits of Gwadar Project attracted strong US
interest in Balochistan because it has the capacity to convert Balochistan in a main
corridor of energy transportation from Central Asia and Iran to other parts of the
region in minimum time. The US has to maintain a crucial and essential role in the
new great game of resource development in Balochistan and in other parts of Asia.
Therefore, all the three prominent factors; the Taliban militancy, Baloch insurgency
and future significance of Balochistan as an energy transit route, played a very
strong role in attaining and developing serious attention of US to Balochistan.
(Aazar, 2010:164) Prior to that, Balochistan due to its defensive proximity with
Afghanistan had a significant hand in the early triumph of US war on terror post 9/11.
97
Pakistan provided US the access to airspace and airfields in Balochistan for US
aerial bombing on Kabul to destroy the Taliban regime and their network in
Afghanistan. (Aazar, 2010:165) Balochistan has been playing a central role in the
geo strategic expansion of South and West Asia long before the US war on terror
post 9/11 but during war, Balochistan‟s territorial proximity to Afghanistan was a
great strategic advantage which was fully exploited by US forces.
American involvement in Balochistan is somehow blamed for supporting Baloch
insurgents in order to deal with the Chinese influence in Balochistan. It is believed
that CIA agents in Afghanistan provide financial support to the Baloch insurgents.
(Bansal, 2008, pp.182–200) it is discovered that the US spy agency CIA is involved
in enrollment of local agents in Balochistan to trace the members of Quetta based
Taliban Shura. The Quetta Shura is a US term for the Taliban commanders.
(Waheed, 2011, Apr.27) The incident of the arrest of a CIA Spy Raymond Davis in a
murder case of two Pakistani in January 2011 increased the tension in Pakistan-US
relations and exposed the CIA immoral actions in Balochistan. Above all, CIA‟s
activities in Balochistan are clear sign of US growing interest in this state. In
actuality, “Greater Balochistan” is the top most schemes of US, India and Israel
cooperation. (Hassan, 2011, May.04) Apparently, US propagate her concerns for the
stabilization of Pakistan, but at the same time, she has a deep interest in interrupting
those projects that would enable China to be strategically present in this region and
establish herself as an emerging economic power particularly at the Port of Gwadar.
US are also interested in mounting their influence in Gwadar and other parts of
Balochistan. Therefore, the any harm caused to Gwadar port is one of their main
interest in Balochistan. Thus, any type of violence in Balochistan protects US
interests in the region because it is helpful in delaying the development projects
between China and Pakistan.
The basic objective is to limitate increasing Chinese existence in Balochistan. China
is an economic rival to US and its presence in Balochistan is not beneficial for the
strategic and economic future of US. The Gwadar port can serve as the marine base
98
for Chinese forces which is a matter of great anxiety for US. The Indian Ocean, near
the Strait of Hormuz, a route for the export of oil from the Gulf States, will definitely
come under the observation and influence of China will create serious problems for
US in maintaining its monopoly in the region. The divergence of interests of various
powers is also worsening the situation in Balochistan. Under the unstable and
insecure circumstances in Balochistan, China will not move forward to provide any
further technical or financial assistance to Pakistan for the development and
progress of any economic project. (Mazari, 2005, Feb.2)
The clear objectives of US are to deteriorate Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan to
establish a strong hold in Central Asian Region; to harm Chinese economic welfare
in African and Middle East; by creating obstacles in the Gwadar project. This can be
possible only by supporting Balochistan Nationalist Movement to disturb the situation
and creating unfavorable environment for any economic investment by China. ‗‘CIA
supported elements are using America, United Kingdom, India and Afghanistan as
their platforms for organizing, planning and operational bases for execution of the
plan of Independent Balochistan‘‘. (Hassan, 2011, May.04) US interests are also
intended to counter Iran, The United Sates is not happy with the expansion of
Chinese energy and military assets, particularly so close to Iran and the Gulf region.
An unstable Balochistan is most preferable to US than an established and flourished
Balochistan. Any disturbance in Balochistan reduces the possibility of development
of the Iran-Pakistan oil pipeline. The US has openly shown her discomfort with the
proposed pipeline project. (Bansal, 2008:182). The US is not only interested in
Balochistan, but also has strong concerns about the massive resources of Central
Asian States and Balochistan is the most convenient available path to these
resources. US is much anxious to get control over the whole region for their future
security plans and eliminate the influence of their only rival and competitor China.
US interest in Balochistan highlights two long term objectives, firstly, US need a
secure route to the energy resources of Central Asia, and secondly to control China.
Balochistan provides the shortest passage between the Indian Ocean and Central
Asia outside of the Gulf. Therefore any unrest in Balochistan directly affects and
99
effectively discourages Trans-Afghan pipeline project, planned for transferring
Central Asian resources to South Asia as the control of economically strong and
established states of South Asia over this region will not allow US to flourish
economic hegemony.
USA and Russia have always focused their interest on Balochistan to exploit the
land as a tool to make Pakistan a weaker state. Russia has encouraged the
―Secessionist Movement of Sindhu Desh, Pakhtonistan or (Independent) or Greater
Balochistan‖ (Najmuddin, 1984: 60). With the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in
1979, it was predicted that the Soviet would try to take possession of deep sea port
on the Indian Ocean, and the Baloch nationalists and their rebellious activities would
be significantly helpful to Soviet attempt. (Harrison, 1981:173) Having controlled
Afghanistan, Russia tried hard to convince the Baloch to revolt against central
government of Pakistan and the Baloch insurgents were assured by Russia that they
would be given autonomy over Balochistan after the Soviet completely conquers
Afghanistan. (Ismail, 2014:184) The Russian strategies were to establish their grip in
Kabul as their base to raise the issues of Pakhtunistan and Greater Balochistan from
the land of Kabul, and try to separate and disconnect Balochistan from Pakistan to
create a new independent state under the control of Moscow or to amalgamate it
with Afghanistan. ―Whether Russian loose their interest in Afghanistan, yet in
Balochistan and Indian Ocean its interest would not die down‖ (Ahmad, 1992: 253).
Russia also needs a suitable way to the warm waters of the Indian Oceans. Like
USA, Russia also needs to preserve its monopoly in Central Asia. All the CAS are
entirely depend on Russia for their energy projects export. Soviet Interests in
Balochistan have various aspects which are not much different than that of US.
Russia wants to control the Gulf oil, which constitute almost 60 percent of world‟s
known reserves. Any trouble in Balochistan gives Russia a chance to daunt Trans-
Afhgan pipeline or other projects. A Russian influenced Balochistan would bring the
natural resources of the Indian Ocean and Antarctica under direct control and
pressure of Russia. Fish catch from Indian Ocean and particularly from Arabian Sea,
which constitutes almost 1/3rd of total fish catch, will be transported to Central Asia
100
Republics over lands, without any trouble, in less time, thus will be more economical.
(Ahmad, 1992: 256) Balochistan is also the shortest route to the world‟s largest
untapped mineral resources of Antarctica. (Mazhar, et al. 2012:119). All these future
probabilities which can provide economical stability to Russia are related to
Balochistan.
Balochistan is the only Province with direct border with Iran. The geographical
location plays a very significant role in shaping the relations between Pakistan and
Iran in the socio-cultural and economic perspectives. Balochistan is the only factor
which can directly influence Pak-Iran relations both negatively and positively.
Unfortunately, there are some disappointing and inadequate factors which are
causing confusions, doubts and stress and making Balochistan a weakening factor
in Pak-Iran relations. Balochistan plays a key role in the Pak-Iran economic and
social incorporation. The close relation between the people of both countries on the
basis of many religious and cultural similarities significantly increases the economic,
cultural and social communication. Infrastructure projects of roads and railways
networks can make possible easy trade. The proposed venture of oil refinery in Hub
will do a lot for the promotion and betterment of economic cooperation between
Pakistan and Iran, which has been going through a tensed situation in the past few
years because of political misunderstanding over Afghanistan issue. (Khan,
2012:137). The project will be an economic momentum to this least developed
province. It will also make possible the exploration of oil and gas in Baloch region.
The project of gas pipeline between Iran-Pakistan is the most constructive feature of
economic relationship which would bring profit to both the countries equally. The
ongoing insurgency in Balochistan has badly affected the friendly relations of the two
countries as the Iranian government blame Pakistan for being associated with the
Balochistan based Jandullah Organization which is a group of Baloch nationalist
militants which is also creating political disturbances in Iranian areas with the
assistance of US. (Khan, 2012:137) Moreover, the increasing competition between
Gwadar and Chabahar Port, and strong rivalry between India, China and Pakistan to
101
increase their influence in Central Asia through these ports, have already disturbed
economic and political relations of Iran and Pakistan.
Chabahar seaport is situated at about 70 kilometer distance from Gwadar,
completed with Chinese assistance. Both ports are great competitors as both are
constructed with the same objectives in a same region. The difference between the
two lies in the fact that Gwadar port is facing many issues like the bad security
situation in Balochistan and lack of proper infrastructure of connecting links to main
highways. The project is not making progress due to slow and process of
development. While there is no such situation at Chabahar which is being developed
rapidly and also has gained attention and interest of China successfully. Not only
China but also Iran, Afghanistan and India are equally emphasizing at Chabahar
Port ahead of Gwadar as regional trade and commerce center. The Chabahar is
located outside the Strait of Hormuz, in Economic and Industrial Zone of Iran, away
from the route of intense sea traffic in the Gulf waters and provides more convenient
entrance to ships. A rail and road infrastructure is also being constructed between
Chabahar and Herat to connect with Central Asian States. India is seriously
interested in the development of Chabahar just to stay away from Pakistani route to
Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. (Hussain, 2015:146) Chabahar is somehow is an
Indian financed Port and a plan to counter and decrease the emerging power of
Gwadar and to diminish the reliance of Central Asia on the port of Gwadar. (Khan,
2012:135) As Gwadar port is expected to improve not only Pakistan‟s but also
Chinese influence in Central Asia and beyond. Because it is a trade route for the
landlocked Central Asian States and this new trade route would have tremendous
economic impetus to Pakistan in the form of new and great investments as the
CARs will rely upon Pakistan for their trade and commerce. Chabahar is providing
India with an easy approach to Afghanistan through the Indian Ocean. An
agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan has been signed according to that,
Central Asia and Afghanistan are bound to give special preference and tariff
reduction to Indian trade goods. (Khan, 2012:135) Therefore, Gwadar port is a
threatening factor to Indian trade through Indian Ocean. Gwadar would create
102
harmful impact on commercial interest of India by enabling Pakistan to implement
vast control over entire energy routes. Gwadar will also enable China to observe and
examine Indian naval movement in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea and any
nautical cooperation between India and Iran will be easily monitored by China.
Similarly, Iran has clear apprehensions about the use of Gwadar port by the US to
observe activities inside Iran. (Asia Times, 2005, April.29).
India is trying also to counter the Chinese sway in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf,
and the Indian Ocean. So India chose Iran as her strategic ally. India has spent
gigantic amount on the construction and development of Iranian Port of Chahbahar
which will facilitate Indian trade activities to Afghanistan and Central Asia through
roads and rail links. The Chinese involvement in Pakistani Gwadar and Indian
influence on Iranian Chahbahar has resulted not only in economic competition and
strategic rivalry between India, Pakistan and China but also has increased risk of
controversy for the resources of Central Asia. The antagonism between China and
India has an unfavorable impact on the Pak-Iran relations. Gwadar and Chahbahar
are the main factors in geo-strategic and economic rivalry. China is largely alarmed
by the Indian intensification in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. Moreover, the
progress in Indo-US relations and mutual aid for Afghanistan and Central Asia by
Iran and India became a matter of serious attention for China. (Khan, 2013: 79-80)
India is trying for good associations with Pakistani neighbors just to contain Pakistan
and to counterbalance Chinese emerging power, because China is the only power
which is quite capable of competing and suppress Indian hegemony and supremacy
in the region. As Indian navy is greater than that of Pakistan, therefore to surpass
India, Pakistan needs Chinese support and cooperation in all the Mega Projects in
Balochistan which is in the best welfare of both China and Pakistan. Through the
Gwadar, China can keep a strict watch on Indian approach and emergence in the
Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf. (Khan, 2013: 79-80).
So far as Afghanistan is concerned, she has historically been remained a dispute
between major powers. Mostly, Afghanistan remains in state of war and process of
103
nation building, so there is no functional type of economy in Afghanistan and mostly
depends on limited agriculture which does not fulfil the food requirements of Afghans
and they have to depend upon foreign donations for survival. (Shah, 2007:65) The
TAPI project is a big hope to help restore the Afghan economy as the project could
generate about 300 million dollars royalty to Afghanistan and other foreign
investments in the project may do a lot to stabilize and revive Afghan economy with
the renovation of other infrastructure. Afghanistan used to manage its trade through
the Karachi port, but now the Gwadar port will serve this purpose well. Afghanistan
has admitted the significance of Gwadar as a gateway to wealth for Afghanistan and
also has offered support for the development of the Gwadar port. (The Dawn, 2003,
Aug.5)
104
References
Ahmad, Lt. Col. Syed Iqbal. (1992). Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance, Karachi:
Royal Book Company.
Ansaree, Air Cdre. (R) Naveed Khaliq, (Winter 2014), New Great Game and Limits
of American Power, IPRI Journal Vol. XIV, No. 1, pp 38-65
Anwar, Zahid, (2010). Gwadar Deep Sea Port‘s Emergence as Regional Trade and
Transportation Hub: Prospects and Problems, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 17,
Issue 2, pp 97-112
Aazar, Tamana, (2010). US Pakistan Cooperation and Pakistan Security Post 9/11,
Ph.D Thesis, School of Social Sciences and Asian Languages, Curtin University of
Technology, Australia.
Ashraf, Sajjad, (2013, Mar. 29). The Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline: Pakistan‘s energy
life line, East Asia Forum, Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the
Pacific, at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/27/the-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-
pakistans-energy-lifeline/ on 3 March, 2015
Ashraf, Maimuna, (2011, Jan.4) Hopes for Balochistan, retrieved from
http://defence.pk/threads/hopes-for-balochistan.87324/ on 18 March, 2015
Annual Report on Chagi Mining & Explorations, (2013), Lake Resources N.L.
Australia. Retrieved from http://www.infomine.com/index/pr/PB384905.PDF on 1
March, 2015
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, (2010). Pakistan's Future Role as Regional Energy Corridor,
International Workshop on Pakistan-Russian Collaboration & the Afghan Crisis,
105
November 1, 2010, London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute.
Budhani, Azmat and Mallah, Hussain Bux, (2007). Mega Projects in Balochistan,
Research Paper, Karachi: Collective for Social Science Research, retreived from
http://www.researchcollective.org/Documents/Mega_Projects_in_Balochistan.pdf on
23 February, 2015
Balochistan and its Strategic Importance Divide and Rule, (2008, June.2), retrieved
from http://balochis.blogspot.com/2009/03/balochistan-and-its-strategic.html on19
February,2015
Bansal, Alok, (2008). Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, June, Vol. 19, No.2, pp 182- 200.
Balochistan, Encyclopedia of Islam,(1936) VOL I,
Balochistan: Iran to Establish Oil Refinery in Gwadar, (March.7, 2013) retrieved from
http://www.unpo.org/article/15604 on 18 March, 2015
Economic Gateway: Gwadar as Special Economic Zone, (2015, Jan.22) retrieved
from official website of Prime Minister‟s Office, Board of Investments, at
http://boi.gov.pk/ViewNews.aspx?NID=%20260 accessed on 22 February, 2015
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, China digs Pakistan into a hole, retrieved from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ05Df01.html on 1 March, 2015
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, (Mar. 7, 2013). Balochistan: Iran to Establish Oil Refinery in
Gwadar, retrieved from http://www.unpo.org/article/15604 on 4 March, 2015
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, (2006, Oct.5) China digs Pakistan into a Hole, retrieved from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ05Df01.html on 21 March, 2015
106
Fazl-e Haider, Syed, (2013, Jan. 22). The Reko Dic Saga. The Dawn.
Foster, John, (2008). A Pipeline through a Troubled Land: Afghanistan, Canada and
a New Energy Game, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), Foreign
Policy Series, Vol 3, No. 1.
Government of Balochistan, (November, 2008). Disaster Risk Management Plan
District Gwadar, District Disaster Management Authority Gwadar.
Gwadar Port, retrieved from official website at
http://www.gwadarport.gov.pk/about%20us.html on 9 March 2015
Harrison, Selig S., (1981). In Afghanistan‘s Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet
Temptations, Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Hussain, Dr. Nazir, (2015). Thaw in Iran-US Relations: Opening of Chahbahar
Trade Link and its Impact on Pakistan, Chapter 10 of the Book, „‟Pakistan„s Strategic
Environment Post-2014‟‟, Islamabad Policy Research Institute. pp 14-148
Hassan, Munawar, (Sep.20, 2013) „‟Proposed Kashgar-Gwadar trade corridor‘‘, The
News.
Hassan, Lt Col. (R). Zaheerul, (May.4, 2011). US Involvement in Balochistan,
Pakistan Observer.
Holdich, T. (1977). The Gates of India, Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab
Ismail, Muhammad, (2014). Geostrategic Importance of Balochistan: Baloch
Insurgency and the Global Politics of Energy Resources, Journal of Political Studies,
Vol. 21, Issue – 2, pp-181-201
Javaid, Umbreen, (Winter, 2010). Concerns of Balochistan: Effects and Implications
on Federation of Pakistan, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2, pp.113-125
107
Khan, Muhammad Usman,Lt. Col., (1997). Tribal Politics in Balochistan 1947-1990,
PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Karachi.
Khan, Shabir Ahmad, Dr., (2015). Dynamics of Trade Corridors and Energy
Pipelines, Politics, Chapter 4 from ‗‘Pakistan‗s Strategic Environment Post-2014‘‘,
Islamabad Policy Research Institute, pp 71-90
Khan, A. (2009). Renewed Ethno-nationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan:
The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation, Asian Survey, Vol. 49,
No. 6, pp.1071-1091.
Khan, Zahid Ali, (2012).Balochistan Factor in Pak-Iran Relations: Opportunities and
Constraints, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp-121-140
Khan, Zahid Ali, (2013).China‗s Gwadar and India‗s Chahbahar: An Analysis of Sino-
Indian Geostrategic and Economic Competition, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.
XXXII & XXXIII, No.4 & 1
Khokhar, Khalid, A. (July.18, 2011). Diq project — exploiting own treasures, The
News.
Kataria, Riaz Jafar and Naveed, Anum, (2014). Pakistan-China Social and Economic
Relations, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No.2, July –
December, pp. 395-410
Kiani, Khaliq, (Sep. 20, 2006). Saindak project: excessive mining goes unchecked,
The Dawn.
Leason, Athanasiadis, (April 29, 2005,). Stirring the Ethnic Pot, The Asia Times.
Mazari, Shireen, (Feb. 2, 2005). Balochistan and the Great Power Games, The
International News.
108
Munir, Muhammad; Ahsan, Muhammad and Zulfiqar, Saman, (April 4, 2014). Iran-
Pakistan Gas Pipeline: Cost-Benefit Analysis, retrieved from
http://www.ipripak.org/iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-cost-benefit-analysis/ on 28
February, 2015
Malik, Hasan Yaser, (2012). Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port, Journal of
Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 2, pp-57:69
Mazhar, Muhammad Saleem; Javaid, Umbreen and Goraya, Naheed S. (2012).
Balochistan (From Strategic Significance to US Involvement), Journal of Political
Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, pp-113-127
Naseem, Naheeda, (2014). Geopolitical Value of Gwader for the Region (Mainly for
Pakistan, China and the Region), A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol.
29, No.2, July – December, pp. 519-530
Najmuddin, Dilshad. (1984). Threat of Insurgency; Consequences and Measures,
(Unpublished Research Paper). Rawalpindi: National Defence College.
Shah, Abid Hussain, (2007). The Volatile Situation of Balochistan - Options to Bring
It Into Streamline, Masters Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey,
California.
Siddique, Shoaib-ur-Rehman, (18 February, 2011). The Reko Diq Project, retrieved
from http://www.brecorder.com/home/opinion/3409-the-reko-diq-project.pdf on 1
March, 2015
Special Article on India-Afghanistan-Pakistan Triangle, (2013, April.12) retrieved
from http://ecurrentaffairs.in/blog/special-article-on-india-pakistan-afghanistan-
triangle/ on 12 March, 2015
109
The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. VI (1908). Oxford: Claredon Press
TAPI -Pipeline, or Pipe Dream? (2014, Sep.28) The Dawn, retrieved from
http://www.dawn.com/news/1134880 on 23 February, 2015
Waheed, Hamid, (Apr.27, 2011). The Balochistan Dynamics, The Nation.
Zaheer, Captain K. Raffat, (2007). Pakistan‘s Ambitiuos Port Plans, Annual Review
2006-2007, International Federation of Shipmasters Associations (IFSMA),pp.24-25,
retrieved from http://www.ifsma.org/tempannounce/aga33/IFSMAAnnualReview.pdf
on 26 February, 2015
CHAPTER FOUR
Baloch Nationalism: Past and Present
110
1. Definition of Nationalism
The term nationalism is normally applied to explain two conditions, firstly, it
describes the attitude of the people of a nation who care about their national identity,
and secondly; it refers to those steps and actions which are taken by a nation to
achieve or maintain their right of self-determination.
‗‘The territorial state as political unit is seen by nationalists as centrally belonging to
one ethnic-cultural group and as actively charged with protecting and promulgating
its traditions.‘‘ („‟Nationalism‟‟, 2015, Dec.14). Whereas an ethnic group is
categorized as a social group of people who identify themselves on the basis of
common inherited culture and social practices, they are liable to be related with a
mutual cultural heritage, history, language and ideology, and with figurative systems
like religion, folklore and ritual, cuisine, and costumes. (Siddiqi, 2012: 2)
2. Definition of Ethnic Nationalism
‗‘Ethnicity refers to rather complex combination of racial, cultural, and historical
characteristics by which societies are occasionally divided into separate and
probably hostile, political families. Ethnicity is basic since it provides for a sense of
ethnic identity where cultural and linguistic symbols are used for internal cohesion
and for differentiation from other groups.‘‘ (Laif and Hamza, 2009:50). The cultural
and linguistic are more important factors in the formation of ethnic nationalism.
These are two very features which assign a distinctive identity to a specific group.
Groups which possess a distinctive ethnic identity can be found in various states but
they exist within the state and national structures. The sense of a unique identity
creates problems only when ethnic movements take the form of nationalist
movement and try to establish their own state. (Amin, 1993:2) nationalism is the
political belief of a particular community which demands an equal and independent
status. Nationalism is an emotion of protection of interests of the inhabitants and
state. But the Ethnic nationalism defines the nation in terms of ethnicity that includes
111
the same culture, social values, traditions and language of a group, which they
inherit from their forfathers.(Laif and Hamza, 2009:51-53)
3. Baloch Nationalism
Baloch nationalism claims that the Baloch people of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan
are a unique and distinctive ethno-linguistic group and should be honored as a
distinct nation. The Baloch Nationalists are of the view that ethnic loyalty is greater
than religious loyalty so the Baloch people should not be considered a nation on the
basis of Islam. (Harrison, 1978:140). This theory is totally opposite of the idea
behind the creation of Pakistan, under which all Muslims are one nation. Baloch
nationalism promotes secular ideology where racial and kinfolk‟s loyalties are most
important features of Baloch society and play an essential role in determining their
sovereign identity.
4. Key Elements in the Formation of Baloch Nationalism
The main elements which constitute the foundations of Baloch Nationalism are the
basic reasons of the Baloch nationalists‟ demands, which range from bigger cultural,
economic and political rights and political autonomy, to absolute independence and
the creation of a separate state. Divided among Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the
Baloch are very possessive about their ethnic identity which lies in their traditional
nomadic life and they do not accept the barriers of national boundaries and any type
of central administration. According to Baloch, their nationalism has its foundation on
these basic factors:
4.1. Cultural Heritage and Traditional Values
The culture can be defined in different ways. The Cultural heritage is a blend of
language, ideas, beliefs, customs, values, attributes, codes of honor, institutions,
religion, law, ethics, rituals, fairs and festivals of a specific group of people. The
Baloch are very proud of their cultural distinctiveness with their centuries old folk
literature. The folk literature explains the magnificence of Baloch land and tales
112
about their triumphant battles against the foreign invaders. (Harrison, 1978:140) and
the Baloch people have been successfully protecting the remnants of their cultural
values which have very strong and unshakable impact on the society and contribute
a lot in the formation of such circumstances which make Balochistan rich in terms of
ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity.
I. Salient Features of Baloch Social Life
The Baloch are generally sociable and friendly people. They are generally
intellectual, cultured, and cultivated. Culturally, they are rich and self dependent. A
prominent tradition of irrigation system introduced by the Baloch is Karez system,
(the underground water supply used for cultivation) is unique to Baloch society and
manifest their civilized intellect. (Baloch: 2002:09-11) The social life of Baloch
people is very simple. They are much concerned and aware of their ancient social
traditions and they feel much delight in following those values and customs. Cultural
values, customs and traditions are followed according to Islamic faith. Baloch
handicraft is world-renowned. Shalwar Qamis is the common and popular dress
among all tribes in Balochistan. In the rural areas turban is also an essential part of
the casual and formal dress. Different tribes have their own turban tying styles.
(Sabir and Razzaq, 2010:21-23)
The Baloch language and cultural heritage provides a significant base for their
theory of nationalism. A combination of social standards, value systems, traditions,
folklore and cultural environment is of the central importance in the nationalist
demands of cultural independence. The Baloch have a strong belief that their
ancient culture has been a source of strong strength which still is playing an
important role in shaping their individuality and enable them to counter the risk of
amalgamation and incorporation into the other cultures. "It is the vitality of this
ancient cultural heritage that explains the tenacity of the present demand for the
political recognition of Baloch identity". (Harrison, 1981:11)
113
II. Baloch Literature
The Baloch rich folklore is widely and prominently visible in Balochi proverbs, songs
and tales. The salient feature of Baloch folklore is its strong national sentiment which
is frequently referred to the Baloch and Balochistan and the Balochi literature is a big
inspiration for nationalist emotions which has been a medium for conveying their
language, culture and national feelings to the next generation and definitely literature
has an important place in the life of Baloch and they have always successfully
protected their cultural heritage. The Baloch have preserved several myths,
proverbs, poems and songs. They are very enthusiastic about their enigma and
historic sagas which consist of long narrations in both prose and poetry.
III. Baloch Songs and Music
Balochi poetry is the oldest form of literature in the region which is always combined
with music and is considered as a worthy art. Balochi music along with folklore is an
asset to them which they transmit from one generation to the other. Music is the
most effective medium in protecting and maintaining the Balochi language and
culture. Moreover, it is a cultural link between all the Baloch communities.
Remarkable historical events are narrated through music and songs and the lyrics
are never altered. Baloch epic songs are directly related to nationalism and a great
source to gain knowledge about Baloch history customs, traditions and their moral
values like courage, bravery and honor. (Breseeg, 1981: 97-98)
IV. Baloch Poetry
Baloch literature is dependent on poetry which provides information about the
glorious history of the Baloch race, their migrations from one region to the other,
their prominent wars, religion, and belief system. Most part of their poetry is related
to the stories about rule of Rind Lashari in 15th and 16th centuries. Narrations about
their wars against other nations are salient features of the Baloch poetry and portray
the Baloch people as a free and autonomous nation which has always been stood
firm against other invading powers.
114
V. Baloch Language
Language and culture are primary foundation on which the overall formation of the
perception and a sense of national identity depend. Balochi language is a uniting
knot between the several groups which identify themselves as Baloch. The Baloch
people have retained their tradition of story telling in both Pakistani and Iranian
Baloch regions. The domination of the Iran and Pakistan has motivated the Baloch
spirit to transfer their heritage to their next generations. Language has a powerful
role in their effort for their right of self determination. The Baloch people honor their
language as a proof for their distinct and separate identity. (Harrison, 181:pp-95-96)
VI. The Baloch Anthem: Mulk Balochi (The Baloch Country)
Since the 15th century, the theory and concept of Mulk Balochi is frequently being
highlighted and admired in the Baloch poetry showing great affection towards the
Mulk Balochi. The poetry of Baloch National Anthem depicts the Baloch nationalism
in a clear manner: "We have conquered all the area which is now our homeland. It is
real and true Balochistan. If we are separated and demarcated, then so what, this is
a temporary division, our soul is one. We will destroy these walls. We are like a rain
and a storm".(Bresseg, 2004:92)
The land of Balochistan is honored by the Baloch as „‟the paradise on the earth‟‟ and
the relation of a Baloch with his homeland is just like the relation of soul to its body.
According to a Baloch saying: ‗‘the place from which we came and to which in death
we will return‘‘. (Baluch, 1987:13). This deep love towards the Mulk Balochi has
given them the sense of independent identity.
4.2. Physical Terrain
The Baloch Nationalism is also has roots in their territorial homeland. Physically, it is
separated from India by the huge northern barrier of the Sulaiman Mountains On the
south, a long expansion from Kalat makes it an impossible highland country, which
faces the desert of Sindh, the underneath part of which outlines the Indian boundary.
115
However, it does not have boundaries in the modern sense of the term, the Baloch
region is at present politically divided between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, is
physically a compact unit. (Baloch,1987:19).
As mentioned earlier in chapter one of this research, the western part of Balochistan
was included in Iran by the British in 1896 after the demarcation of Goldsmith line
and the larger eastern part was left under British control. The Durand Line which
was drawn by the British in 1894 assigned the small portion of northern Balochistan
to Afghanistan and Balochistan was further divided between British Balochistan and
Afghanistan, later on these borders came under the control of Pakistan, Iran and
Afghanistan. Presently the Eastern Balochistan region constitutes the Pakistani
Province of Balochistan. ‗‘For the Baloch nationalists, the whole region from the east
of Bandar Abbas; Kerman to the west of the Indus River, and from the Sulaiman
mountains in the northeast, to the Dasht-Lut in northwest, is known as Balochistan‘‘.
(Bresseg, 2004:92)
4.3. Tribal System and Social Organization
The Baloch people live into groups and sub-groups. The one is the Eastern or
Sulaimani Baloch, and second is Western or Mekrani Baloch. Sulaiman Baloch
have their dominance in Sibi District of Balochistan and the Mekran is considered
as the “original nucleus” of the Baloch people. (Scholz, 1974:27). However, the
details about the Baloch tribes have been given in chapter 2 of this research but
anyways, the Sulaiman Baluch include the Bugtis, Buledi, Buzdar, Dombki, Kaheri,
Khetran, Magasi, Marri, Mugheri, Rind and Umrani tribes while the Mekran consists
of the Buledi, Dashti, Gichki, Kandai, Rais, Rakhshani, Rind, Sangu and Sanjrani.
The Marri and Bugti; have always been leading Baloch politics and are considered
responsible for the unrest in Balochistan. The Baloch tribes and sub tribes are
independent in all their affairs and don‟t accept any external influence. Every tribe
is headed by a chief who is the authority over matters relevant to the lives and
property of their tribes. (Shah, 2007:15). The traditions and customs of one tribe
may be different than of the other tribes. Sometimes, the adoptions of the customs
116
of other tribes are taken as major abuse. The structure of Baloch society is based
on blood kinship and people mostly belong to the same ancestral background and
each group has common interests and responsibility. The traditional tribal
association is mandatory for Baloch social structure. The sub-clans or tribes are
called „‟Paro‟‟ which represent a family, and the group of a few paros constitute a
clan. Numerous clans make a tribe which is called „‟Tuman‟‟. („‟Balochistan Tribal
System‟‟, 2011, July.7) The Baloch are comprised of various tribal divisions,
independent from each other and follow their domestic hierarchical constitution.
The hierarchical structure is a unique feature that differentiates the Baloch from
other tribal societies such as Pakhtun tribes. This hierarchic structure has
fundamental effect on Baloch tribal unity. The Baloch tribal structure can be
described as follow:
1. A Tribe is called Tuman which is headed by a chief who is called Tumandar.
The term tuman also refers to a Baloch village.
2. Tumans are divided into clans which are called Paras and are led by a
Muqaddam or Tukkri nominated by the tribal chief or elected by the Waderas.
3. Paras are then sub-divided into Palis which are led by Wadera.
4. Palis are further divided into family groups headed by the eldest member of
the family called a Motabar. („‟Tribal Analysis Centre‟‟, 2009). In hereditary
system, the election is made among the children of the former Mugaddam.
The position of tribal Sardar is always inherited. After the death of a Sardar,
the eldest son of late Sardar automatically becomes next sardar. In case of
any inability of the elder son, selection of next sardar is made by Muqaddams.
And the final decision of Tukkreis is accepted by all with no objection.
In Baloch tribal society, the elders and chiefs, both tribal and of family; are given
high respect because they are the main caretaker of the society. The chiefs occupy
the highest position of social administrators and judicial heads and are the most
privileged persons with a divergent superiority and their unlimited powers and
decisions are never challengeable.
117
4.4 Baloch Jirga System
The Jirga system is a prominent feature of Baloch tribal culture and an essential
part of Baloch society. Jirga is an institution where the elders of tribes gather
together to handle the different disputes of people as per prevailing customs, to find
out solution to the disputes among two parties and to provide justice to them. The
Jirga occupies the position of high court and the decisions taken by Jirga are fully
respected by all. The dispute may be between the members of a same tribe or
sometimes it is between two tribes. Inter tribal disputes is another common feature
of almost all tribal societies. If a member of a tribe is involved in any matter that is
considered an offence as per laws of a tribe, the whole of his tribe is considered to
be responsible for it. Now it is the moral and social duty of the tribal Sardar to take
revenge from the other tribe.
There have been many inter-tribal disputes and quarrels, which mostly turn into
wars between tribes. There is another institution called "Mairh" or "Marka" which
deals with the disputes between tribes. The war and grudge may continue for years
till the total destruction of one tribe or till one party surrenders before the other
party. In case of acceptance of crime and surrender by one party, leaders of the
charged tribe appeal to the elders of the other party for the resolution of the issue.
The heads of the other side may take any decision which is always acceptable.
This process is known as Mairh which has great importance in baloch society. The
twenty years long Marri-Bugti war was settled in three days through Mairh.
(„‟Balochistan Tribal System‟‟, 2011, July.7) that‟s why, the Baloch tribes always
disliked and opposed any other system of law and punishment such as police
administration, because they are fully satisfied with their traditional system of Jirga
and Mairh.
4.5. Baloch Sardari System
As it is clear now that the basic entity in political organization of Baloch society is the
tribe and the loyalty to the tribal chief. The conventional type of Baloch government
118
is the centuries old Sardari system in which it is mandatory for the tribesmen to give
their faithfulness to Sardars for social justice and uprightness of tribe. Sardars are
elected by a committee consisting of tribal elders. The Jirgas maintain law and order
and play the the roles of police, magistrate and court at the same time. There are
four levels of Jirga as under.
Table No. 4.1. Levels of Baloch Jirga
First Level Local Jirga
Second Level District Jirga
Third Level Joint Jirga
Forth Level Shahi Jirga
Source: Kundi, Dr. Mansoor Akbar, (2005). „‘Tribalism in Balochistan: A Comparative Study‖ in Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses, edited by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute. P. 20
The details about these levels are as uncer
Local Jirga deals with disputes of low intensity
District Jirgas deal with serious crimes such as theft and murder.
Joint Jirgas handle disputes regarding tribal enmity.
The Shahi Jirga is composed of the Sardars of the individual tribe and is only
involved to resolve major issues or decision taking process such as the
decision to include Balochistan into Pakistan in 1947. (Kundi, 2005:22)
5. Historical Development of Baloch Nationalism
As it has been discussed in a previous chapter that before the creation of Pakistan,
Balochistan used to be chief commissioner‟s province governed by the Agent to the
Governor General (AGG) of India. The certain areas of Balochistan came under
British influence by the discourse of time. In 1854, the British made an agreement
with the ruler of Kalat, and in treaty in 1876, the British rulers promised with the
119
Baloch Sardars to respect the independence of Baloch areas. (Ahmad, 1992:101).
The majority of Baloch population comprised almost 91 percent of the total
population. Balochistan was a multicultural region with many languages i.e. Baluchi,
Pushtu, Sindhi, Bruhi, and Persian. Six districts were managed by the British agent
and adjacent to province were the regions of tribal areas of Marri and Bugti and
states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Lasbela. The Balochistan was facing economic
and political backwardness and was the most undeveloped region of sub continent
which was not even able to maintain itself and had to rely upon the loans from
Central Government by the early 1940s. (Talbot, 1990:17). Balochistan was not only
economically weak but also facing lack of a proper political system and the situation
of Balochistan, both economic and political was far more different than other parts of
sub continent because British rulers didn‟t pay attention to the implementation of
democratic rules and reforms in Baloch region which they had introduced in other
regions of sub continent. (Isa, 1944:17) and almost all political reforms which were
introduced in the country were denied in Balochistan.
Before the creation of Pakistan, there was no proper administrative structure in
Balochistan The Pushto speaking areas of Balochistan such as Zhob, Loralai, and
Chaman districts along the Afghanistan border were controlled by British or tribal
administration. (Shah, 1997:94) and there was no platform available to represent the
viewpoint of the Muslims of Balochistan. (Ahmad, 1992:103). Although the Baloch
Sardars were loyal to the British but they were set free and independent in their
internal political affairs and had full freedom in their own private tribal system. The
British Political agent used to look after the overall administration of the Baloch
territories but soon they started influencing Baloch Tribes through Sundeman system
as a part of their political set up in that area. (Mahmand, 1989:164). The Baloch
nationalists started efforts to unite as a force for an independent Balochistan. The
Baloch were divided into two groups for the achievement of the same goal in a
different manner. These two groups are categorized as:
120
I. The Revolutionary Group
This Baloch group was headed by Misri Khan Baloch of the Marri Tribe during 1917.
The revolutionary group of Baloch nationalists preferred to migrate from Balochistan
to Soviet Union to get support against British.
II. The Constitutional Group
The constitutionalists were educated Balochis of middle class and were in favor of
the style of the Indian nationalists. This leaders of this group; Yousaf Ali Magsi and
Abdul Aziz Kurd; organized the Anjuman-e-Ittehad-Balochistan in 1920 which was
working as an under ground political institute and was known as The Kalat State
National Party. (Breseeg, 2004:222-223) which was first organized political party in
Balochistan. This party generally known as National Party was launched in February
1937 with the same objectives like Anjuman-e-Ittehad-Balochan.
6. Emergence of Baloch Nationalist Movement
The Baloch have been struggling for the preservation of their ethnic identity and
freedom as an independent nation in Baloch regions of Pakistan and Iran, despite of
their failure as yet, Baloch nationalist movements have always been creating
problems for both countries that is why it is a matter of deep concern to both states.
Baloch nationalists had actively started advocating the idea of the "Greater
Balochistan" in early years of 20th century. The Greater Balochistan is supposed to
cover an area equal to present day Pakistan. But this movement got attention on
national and international level after the Second World War. Baloch nationalist
movements exist in Iran for the development of Baloch political and cultural identity,
but main centre for their activities has been situated in Pakistani Balochistan. Baloch
Nationalism is evolved more properly in Pakistan due to the historical circumstance
and the political atmosphere. In the 15th century, Rind-Lashari tribal Confederacy
was established in Eastern Balochistan and later on the whole Baloch region,
including Iranian portion of Baloch majority, was under the rule of Kalat 19th century
till the emergence of the question of Baloch Nationalism. (Breseeg, 2004: 8-9). It is
121
important to mention that the Pakistani Baloch nationalism is more organized than
that of Iranian Balochistan. Although, Baloch nationalist movement has deep roots in
almost two thousand year long history, but the emergence of Baloch nationalism as
a struggle against the colonial system is recorded in the late 19th century, when state
of Kalat was included into present day Pakistani Balochistan. The enmity between
British and Russia that caused the British invasion of Afghanistan showed them the
way to Balochistan when they attempted to control the road to Kabul. (Breseeg,
2004:159–60). However, at that time the British were not intended to meddle with
the domestic affairs of Balochistan and established their control along the Afghan
border only.
Baloch nationalism took a modern shape with the development of the Anjuman-e-
Ittehad-e-Balochistan based in Mastung in 1920 with the objectives of establishing
political and constitutional reform in Kalat, the end of British era, elimination of the
sardari system, and the amalgamation of all Baloch areas into an independent state.
The Baloch Nationalists formed another organization with the same objectives in
Sindh province, which was called the Baloch League. In 1937, the Anjuman-e-
Ittehad-e-Balochistan became the Kalat State National Party with same goal of
achieving an independent Balochistan. The founders and members of the Party
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Mir Gul Khan Naseer and Abdul Aziz Kurd were secular-
minded persons. (Kech, 2013, May.21). Baloch nationalism emerged in a true sense
just before the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The Nationalists Baloch leaders were
highly inspired by Russian revolution and independence movement in India led by
Gandhi and Nehru, the Baloch nationalist leaders started a campaign for an
independent Balochistan for the sake of their distinct identity like Muslims and
Hindus.
As it is mentioned earlier, The Baloch Nationalist Movements always have their roots
in Ethnic Nationalism instead of religion. While the purpose behind the creation of
Pakistan as an independent state was purely religious. After the creation of
Pakistan, the khan of Kalat declared his state independent with an option to consult
Pakistan in the fields of defense and foreign affairs only. But Kalat was forced to join
122
Pakistan only after nine months of the creation of Pakistan. (Harrison, 1981:24). This
was the incident which gave rise to first Baloch conflict with the Government of
Pakistan in 1948 on the basis of Baloch Nationalism and turned into a series of
conflicts between the Pakistani state and Baloch nationalists, on many other issues;
including Baloch Nationalism; in 1958, 1962 and 1973.
The Baloch conflict which revolves around the protection of their ethnic identity was
inspired by Marxist-Leninist liberation movements which came into view shortly after
the Baloch revolt of 1962. Sher Mohammed Marri, leader from the Marri tribe,
gathered his men and formed the militant Baloch Liberation Front to fight against
Pakistan Government for Baloch Freedom. The formation of a militant violent group
resulted in another insurgency in 1973. Under the leadership of the Marri tribe,
twenty two camps were established in the areas of central Balochistan to the
northeast of the province. (Harrison, 1981:30)
The demand for an independent state reached its highest point during the 1973–
1977 when President and later Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had refused to
provide Balochistan with the rights which were promised in the democratic
Constitution of Pakistan (1973) and dissolved the government of National Awami
Party (NAP) while accusing its leaders of damaging the foundation of Pakistan.
Major fundamentals of the growing Baloch movement joined the guerilla force of the
Marris and Mengals and even Pakistani army could not eliminate the insurgency.
Later on during the regime of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq negotiations began
and resulted in the withdrawal of the army and the release of the Baloch leaders and
activists. (Ahmed, 1999:176-77) The province of Balochistan remained peaceful until
2005.
6.1. First Baloch Revolt (1948) on the Issue of Accession to
Pakistan
When the British India was divided into India and Pakistan, the Baloch states tried to
porch themselves with the British for independence but their efforts failed and British
123
declared them as an independent state on August 15, 1947. This declaration was
made on the fact that since 1876 Kalat, the most influential Baloch state had been
given the status of a sovereign state under the British Raj. (Khan,1975:111).
After the creation of Pakistan, The Khan of Kalat offered Pakistan a special
relationship in which Pakistan would only maintain the matters of defense, foreign
policy, and communications in Baloch Region while the autonomy of Balochistan
would not be disturbed. Moreover, the Kalat Assembly voted in favor of independent
Balochistan, showing an interest to remain with Pakistan but not under the rule of
Pakistan. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, who was a member of the Kalat Assembly,
stated: ‗‘If Pakistan wants to treat us as a sovereign people we are ready to extend
our friendship. But if Pakistan does not do so and forces us to accept this fate, flying
in the face of democratic principle, every Baloch will fight for freedom.‘‘ (Harrison,
1981:25). In March 1948, the Pakistani Government employed military force to
pressurize the Khan of Kalat to join Pakistan. Prince Abdul Karim Khan, brother of
Mir Ahmed Yar Khan decided to initiate a protest against Pakistani action, he
designed a separatist movement and declared a revolt against the Pakistani
Government for announcing the independence of Kalat and rejection of the
accession agreement which was signed by Ahmed Yar Khan. He formed the Baloch
National Liberation Committee and published a manifesto demanding the autonomy
of Balochistan. He also used guerrilla warfare through Afghanistan against the
Pakistan Army. This was the first example of Baloch Insurgency in the region. Karim
Khan requested the leaders of Baloch nationalist political parties to take part in the
struggle for the creation of an independent „Greater Balochistan‟.(Awan, 2013) Karim
also tried to seek help from Afghanistan because Afghanistan was against the
inclusion of Baloch and Pakhtun areas in Pakistan, but Afghanistan government did
not provide any practical support to Karim because Afghanistan wanted the inclusion
of Balochistan in Afghanistan rather than its existence as an independent state.
(Baloch, 2008, Oct.9). However, due to the lack of required support Karim Khan
agreed to negotiate with Pakistan army as a response to the request from his
brother Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. So, after a few months of guerrilla warfare conducted
124
from the Afghan border, Karim laid down his arms in 1950 before Pakistan Army on
the promise of amnesty. But the government broke their amnesty agreement, Karim,
along with his companions, was arrested and sent to jail on their return to Kalat.
(Harrison, 1981:27) This was the first of many further broken agreements between
the Pakistan government and Baloch. This event is very significant and still has
great impact on the psyche of the Baloch people preventing them from trusting the
government.
6.2. Second Baloch Revolt (1958- 59) on the Issue of One-Unit
Policy
The revolt and demand of the Baloch on the issue of a distinct identity and
autonomy, was viewed as a threat to the Center because the Baloch attitude created
big problems in the process of state formation. The use of military power by the
Government and the counter response by the Baloch has been creating turbulence
and instability in the region. There was a need to bridge difference and distance
between the ethnic groups to promote the ideology of one nation. Therefore the
government tried to eliminate the concepts of distinct regional identities. This policy
is known as One Unit Policy, announced by Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali
on November 22, 1954 (Shah, 2007:32) the policy constituted a single provincial
entity that counted all the administrative units of West Pakistan including princely
states. (Justin, 2006:32) The implication of this policy in 1955 was a significant step
taken by Ayub Khan which completely changed the nature of Pakistani politics and
the political development in Balochistan. The basics of the plan were to amalgamate
the entire country into one single entity and merge the four provinces into One Unit.
The policy was also supposed to counter the strength of East Pakistan (which later
began Bangladesh in 1971) and to balance the power between two wings of the
state.
But the implication of One Unit policy did not do much in the establishment of a
Pakistani identity and brought very little development to Balochistan as it did not
125
guarantee equal rights for provinces with lesser population. The lack of any
development worsened the Baloch displeasure with the government. The lack of
development was caused by the constant distrurbence in Balochistan, which made
the Central Government hesitant to carry out development projects moreover the
lack of Baloch political representation at provincial level in the regime of Military
General Ayub Khan increased tension. In addition, the unshakable traditional sardari
system did not facilitate the development projects in Balochistan. (Kundi, 1975:16).
Although, initially Khan of Kalat accepted One Unit Policy but the failure of this policy
provided grounds for the recreation of nationalist movement in Balochistan and
many political parties started gathering together. This alliance was given the name of
National Awami Party (NAP) in pursuance of their previous and fundamental
objective; the configuration of four ethnically distinct provinces, free elections, land
reform, nationalization of industry, and abolition of Pakistan‟s association with
western alliances. (Justin, 2006:32). Therefore, One Unit plan implemented by the
federal government became the cause of second outbreak of violence in
Balochistan. (Andley, 2006:4). That scheme was protested by the Baloch because
One Unit Scheme was a threat to their identity. In 1958, Khan of Kalat demanded
abolition of One Unit and recognition of Baloch political identity.
The Baloch considered One Unit Scheme as an offence against their little power at
the provincial level. Prince Karim, after got released from jail formed the People‟s
Party and started a protest against the policy. To put the situation under control, in
1958, the Pakistan Army once again reached Kalat and arrested the Khan. Pakistan
Army controlled the rebellions with force but had to face another wave of violence
when they demanded that the tribesmen turn in their weapons. (Harrison, 1981:28)
consequently a large anti-one unit movement led by Nawab Nauroz Khan Zehri,
along with his armed force led the guerrilla war to counter the Pakistan Army. This
time the insurgents gained much support from the Baloch people in comparison to
the first revolt of 1948 because of the ancient message of the separatist leadership
in response to the government‟s use of military power. The Pakistan Army employed
126
heavy handed strategy against the insurgency. After a war like situation of one year,
Nauroz Khan agreed to surrender in exchange for amnesty. Nawab Nauroz was
sworn in by the army on a Quranic oath. Security forces took oath of Holy Quran that
Nauroz Khan and his companions would be given amnesty if they surrendered.
(Kakar, 2014, Sep.29) Relying on the promise, he surrendered in May, 1959.
However, promise was broken again and Nauroz Khan was arrested. According to
Baloch nationalists, Nauroz Khan agreed to surrender only for the dismissal of the
One Unit plan when he was assured of amnesty. But the Pakistan army arrested him
and five of his men were hanged on charges of treachery. Nauroz Khan himself died
in jail in 1964 at Kohlu and became the martyr of the Baloch nationalists. He is
considered a symbol of the deception by the Pakistani government. (Justin, 2006:32)
This act of breach by Pakistan Government refreshed the memory of 1950 and
provided the Baloch nationalist movement with a solid base for mistrust. It was
another significant event which re-energized the separatist attitude among Baloch
people. Following the death of Nauroz Khan the insurgency apparently ended up but
remained dormant.
6.3. Third Baloch Uprising (1963-69) and Policy of ‘’Basic
Democracies’’
The turnaround of Khan of Kalat on One Unit Policy caused Martial Law in Pakistan
and General Ayub Khan, who was trying to enhance his influence, introduced a
policy known as Basic Democracies as a political structure to initiate government
councils at the local, municipal, district and divisional level; and the officials were to
be appointed or elected. But the Baloch nationalists had doubts about the council
members appointed by government, as they were a symbol of the government‟s
intrusion in the political autonomy of local governments. After the second Baloch
conflict the martial head of the state, Ayub Khan started building military
cantonments in Balochistan and the new bases in significant areas of Balochistan
made Baloch nationalist anxious about their future and created a great sense of
127
insecurity among Baloch nationalists. In addition the continuation of One Unit
Scheme, distribution of land between non-locals Baloch residents and Government‟s
forceful attitude towards Baloch leaders leveled grounds for another agitation among
Baloch Nationalists. Therefore, in 1960, the political parties of Baloch Nationalist
leaders led to the formation of National Awami Party (NAP) in opposition to One Unit
Scheme and included demand for privileged treatment for Baloch people in
government services.
Ayub Kahn also introduced a new constitution in 1962 and the elections were held
on the recurrence of political parties. In the elections of 1962, the influential Baloch
Sardars from three prominent tribes; Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ataullah Mengal, and
Ahmad Nawaz Bugti; got a chance to establish their political identity for the first time
and gained the positions of government officials as Members of National Assembly
(MNA). But they started aggressive speeches in favor of Baloch people and against
the government. The Central Government got alarmed and considered these leaders
as a threat to the aim of Basic Democracies which meant to reduce the influence of
the tribal Sardars. So, the elected Baloch leaders were immediately substituted by
new Sardars by Central Government.
This incident gave spontaneous rise to another wave of violence and the newly
appointed Sardars were murdered by Baloch Nationalists started attacks on the
Pakistani Army. Government had already removed the titles of formerly elected
Sardars, Atta Ullah Mengal was arrested under the accusation of murder, tried by a
Jirga under the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and imprisoned. A tribal sardar,
Sher Muhammad Bijrani Marri, who was a Marxist-Leninist; formed the Baloch
nationalist party named Parari. Parari is a Baloch word used for an offended person
or a group whose grievances cannot be solved through talk. (Harrison, 1981:30).
Parari is considered as main actor in the insurgency which was responsible for much
of the violence of 1962. they created insurgent bases, spread over about
72,000 kilometers from the south to the north. (ICG, 2006:4). By the year of 1963,
Parari had established twenty two base camps throughout Balochistan with
thousands of militant fighters. (Harrison,1981:30). Their major aim was to compel
128
Pakistan to share revenue generated from the Sui gas fields with the tribal sardars.
To pressurize the government, Parari used the same tactics as they used in the
revolt of 1948, such as bombing railway tracks, attacking public groups and raiding
military camps.
The Pakistan Army hit back and destroyed vast agricultural areas of the Marri tribe's
land. The response of Army also included air attacks on rebel stronghold. Although
Parari got a significant position during the decade of 1960s, but the dominant player
in the Baloch nationalist movement was NAP which always remained a strong
opponent of the government of Ayub Khan. (Nina, 2014: 30) Because not only
politicians, but many other people with deep insight in the inability and inequality of
central government‟s policies regarding political and economic development of
Balochistan which was totally failed in providing proper education and medical
facilities to the public; were active members of NAP. All NAP members were aimed
at the elimination of Basic Democracies and the conduct of direct elections and for
this purpose; they demanded the dissolution of One Unit and full political and
economic autonomy.
In 1969, Ayub Khan was succeeded by another army General, Yaha Khan. General
Yahya Khan abrogated the Constitution of 1962, dissolved the National Assembly
and the two Provincial Assemblies. Till then, the antagonism by the NAP has
reached its peak. And the pressure on Government by Parari had been raised so
high and great that Yaha Khan had to abolish One Unit Policy. So, this revolt ended
in 1969, when Yaha Khan agreed to restore provincial boundaries and new
elections. With the Baloch separatist‟s agreement on ceasefire, the One Unit Policy
was abolished and Balochistan announced as the fourth province of Pakistan,
including all the Baloch princely states and Gwadar. (ICG, 2006:4) Yahya Khan
announced the Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) on 30th March, 1970, which laid
down the basic principles to which constitution confirmed. Yahya Khan also
announced the general elections to be held on 5th October, 1970 on the basis of
adult franchise. (Shah and Khan, 2012:61). Despite strong uncertainties about the
LFO, the political parties appreciated the decision to hold elections. The Baloch
129
political parties decided to participate in the elections and also issued their party
manifestos.
6.4. Fourth Baloch Resistance 1973-77
In 1970, the nationwide election were held and NAP got succeeded in establishing
government in Balochistan with Ataullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri as the chief
administrator and chairman of NAP. Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, who was highly honored
by Baloch and known as Father of Balochistan became governor of Balochistan. The
1970 nationwide election also empowered the Awami League in East wing of
Pakistan (present Bangladesh). This event again changed the political scenario of
not only Pakistan but of the Balochistan too. The results of the elections led to the
deferral of all political activities, civil war and the creation of Bangladesh. Moreover,
the removal from office of the NAP government in Balochistan by Zulfiqar Bhutto in
1973 became strong reason for another Baloch rebellion that continued for four
consecutive years.
As it is explained above that after the termination of the One Unit Policy, the
Balochistan was allowed to take part in general elections. In 1972, the Government
allowed Balochistan to hold first provincial elections, and National Alwami Party
(NAP) came into power. But the President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto removed the NAP
government and dismissed the provincial government in early 1973 with the charges
of conspiring with foreign governments and promoting negative impression of
Pakistani government among Baloch people. (Titus and Nina, 2000:60) This act of
Bhutto set off another violent Baloch insurgency expanded over about four years.
The four years of armed violence resulted in a war and involved about 55,000
Baloch fighters and 80,000 Pakistani military troops. About 5,300 Baloch militants
and 3,300 Pakistani army men were killed. (Harrison, 1996: 298) It is believed that
the militant reaction of the Baloch was a result of their contention towrads the
Punjabi community and their dominance in administrative fields. So, the removal of
the Balochistan provincial assembly was seen by Baloch nationalists as an attack on
their ethnicity. Bhutto‟s Pakistan People‟s Party gained power at the center and the
130
demands of the nationalist NAP destabilized the control of the PPP and its Punjabi
support. In addition, the dominance of Punjabis in Pakistan military, and a harsh
response from them was motivated by ethnic distress. The army was very cautious
about every ethnic demand after the formation of Bangladesh in 1971. (Talbot,
2005:224). The secession of East Pakistan was a great lesson to Pakistan army that
gave rise to the fear of being repeated in Balochistan by the Baloch nationalists and
thus sought to crush the insurgency. So, just to control the situation and preventing
another ethnic separation within the country, the military takeover in 1977 and
General Muhammad Zia ul Haq came to power. General Zia, didn‟t compromise on
the issue of Baloch autonomy instead he worked on a ceasefire with Baloch
nationalists, he released Baloch prisoners and successfully hushed up the
insurgency for next twenty five years. The Baloch agreed on reconciliation due to
several reasons. Firstly, the breakdown of the insurgency in the 1973-77
discouraged many fundamental Baloch people. Secondly, the fall down of the
Afghan Government in 1978 stoped the Afghan support for Baloch insurgents and
lastly, Zia allowed Baloch nationalists to conduct elections as long as they were not
attached with any party. So, the provincial assemblies formed through such elections
had very little power. (Khan, 2009: 1077) that is why Balochistan remained peaceful
for many years, though the roots and reasons of the conflict remained unresolved,
which sprouted again in 2004.
7. Current Separatist Movement, 2005- Ongoing
The existing phase of violence in Balochistan is the 5th insurgency under
troublesome circumstances and rose up after about twenty five years of the last
conflict which was settled down by Zia ul Haq in 1979. This insurgency has been
more intense than ever, with new tactics and capabilities of the insurgents. Like the
insurgencies of 1948, 1959, 1962, and 1973, the current uprising in Balochistan has
affected almost the entire region. Balochistan has become strategically very
important not only for Pakistan, but other regional and international powers have
developed their interests too. The Army gained power again in 1999 and the military
General Pervez Musharraf became president of Pakistan. During the regime of
131
Military General, Pervez Musharraf, the construction of a deep-sea port at Gwadar,
in 2002, is the most controversial event between the central government and Baloch
nationalists. The port is situated on Makran Coast at Gwadar and is an important
counterbalance to the Iranian port at Chahbahar. The project began in 2002, with
Chinese financial and technical assistance. The Pakistani government and the
Chinese government would respectively benefit fifty percent and forty eight percent
of the proceeds while Baloch people are left with only two percent. This is the main
cause of Baloch grievance. The contracts for construction have been given to
foreign firms and the greater part of the labor consists of Punjabis or other non-
Baloch employees. (Laif and Hamza, 2009: 62)
President Musharraf‟s arrival and his planning for mega development projects could
not alleviate the unrest among Baloch nationalist, instead Baloch demand for
political autonomy increased on the issues of unjustified royalty from Sui gas. In
addition, the involvement of Punjabis and Sindhi communities in economic and
political system and induction of Frontier Guards and other permanent army groups
increased the level of tension. The situation became more tensed when the
government established ex-servicemen on tribal land in a large number and shifted
more Pukhtuns from NWFP to Quetta. The Musharraf Government did not
succeeded in finding a solution for disputed matter of gas, copper, silver, gold and
coal royalty. (Laif and Hamza, 2009: 63)
On one side, General Pervaiz Musharraf strongly believed that the mega project of
Gwadar for the development in Balochistan will be a great economic advantage to
both the local Baloch and Pakistan as a whole. But on the other side, the Baloch
nationalists looked at it from a different perspective. They argued that Balochistan
was the last province to have access to its gas resources moreover they were
always granted with excessively low percentage of the income produced from their
land. This fact made them suspicious about the government‟s intentions and
assured them of the central government‟s planned policy of resource exploitation.
So, the Gwadar port has become a point of disputation between nationalists and
government, the government is hopeful that the huge project will provide great
132
benefits to Balochistan, but the Baloch are concerned that they about being
neglected badly as jobs and revenue is going to non Baloch communities and
foreign nations. Therefore, the Baloch nationalists perceive Gwadar as a central
government‟s strategy to take possession of Balochistan by shifting Punjabis and
other settlements of the military and bureaucracy in Balochistan, just to make the
Baloch people a minority in the region. According to Baloch leaders, the land of
Gwadar is being sold out to military and other non Baloch officials, against the will of
Baloch, on a very low cost and this process is not only involving outsiders in the
purely Baloch areas but also enabling them to own the land of Balochistan forever.
Moreover, the project will modify the demography of the area from a 70,000 Baloch
population to about two million, mostly non-Baloch people.. („‟The Plight of the
Baloch‟‟ 2015, March) The Baloch are of the view that Gwadar project is a major
threat to their ethnic identity and a great danger to their sovereignty over their own
state. The gas revenue issues and the Gwadar project are major disputes between
the Baloch and Central Government. They are the result of the basic grievance that
led Baloch nationalists to become violent and creating constant unrest since 2002.
The only biggest grudge of Baloch is government‟s interference with their political
and economic systems. The contradiction between Baloch and government‟s views
is responsible to push the conflict towards an insurgency.
Since 2002, the tension between government and Baloch nationalists continued and
soon it was transformed into an armed struggle by Baloch nationalists who
demanded for an independent Balochistan with full political sovereignty and control
over their resources. The current insurgency started in real manner in 2004, when
majority of Baloch people were thrown out of power, (Bansal, 2010). The Baloch
militant insurgents started armed war with the government by attacking military
cantonments, government and army officers and other infrastructure related to any
project of economic development. The insurgents mainly targeted gas pipelines,
railway tracks, bridges, power transmission lines, telephone exchanges and military
and government installations. It is believed that the nationalistic movement in
Balochistan reached at the highest level when a rape incident was reported in Sui at
the hands of a Defense Security Guard in January 2005. This suddenly ignited the
133
anger of tribal Baloch people to the extent that they started armed attacks on DSG
and Frontier Constabulary (FC) employees. (Javaid, 2010:117) there was a war like
situation which lasted for four days, during that period, the insurgents totally
destroyed the gas pipeline supplies from Balochistan to industrial units in Punjab
and Sindh. It took many days to restore gas supplies. (Bansal, 2010). All these
incidents and attacks resulted in a battle in Dera Bugti. A trivial exchange of fire
between the tribesmen and the FC personnel soon turned into heavy firing of rockets
and other ammunition from both sides. This war also affected civilian population as
well. The day-long shelling claimed sixty lives from both parties. Gas supplies from
Sui were also attacked and destroyed by Baloch people, and Nawab Akbar Bugti,
the leader of Jamhoori Watan Party of Balochistan defended his people by saying
that they did it only to show the intensity of their anger and was not a part of their
struggle for independence. The Baloch tribesmen were also very offended with the
army cantonments in Balochistan. A rocket was attacked on General Musahrraf
when he was visiting Kohlu in December 2005. That attack invited a severe reaction
from the Army. A full fledged military operation against Baloch rebellions was
launched in Dera Bugti and Kohlu by Pakistan Army. (PIPS, 2009:20)
General Musharraf, in response ordered the Army to crush revolting Baloch forces of
Akbar Khan Bugti. At a conference of corps commanders in 2006, Musharraf boldly
declared that, ―the writ of the Pakistani government will never be challenged. Let that
be a warning… if anyone challenges the writ of the government, I will crush it.‖
(Pipes, 2010:21) very soon, Akbar Bugti, the Sardar of more than 200,000
tribesmen, was killed when the Pakistan Air Force bombed his cave in the
Bhambhore mountain in the Marri area.(Laif and Hamza, 2009:69) Nawab Bugti is
said to be buried in the ruins of the same cave. (Masooad, 2006:22) The
assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti increased disorder and instability in the region
and provided solid grounds for protest against government of Pervez Musharraf.
This situation not only involved the tribal Sardars but also provide incentive to
common Baloch people for raising their voice against army and government.
Musharraf was and still is blamed for an unjustified killing of Bugti. This episode
became another grievance of Baloch towards the Central Government and the
134
Army. Bugti is considered as a hero who sacrificed his life for the sake of rights of
Baloch people. His killing was condemned by almost all political leaders of the
Pakistan. (Javaid, 2010:119). The sense of hatred and anxiety which was created
by Bugti‟s death has made the whole situation more crucial and law and order
conditions of Balochistan got worse than before. Nawab Bugti‟s legacy did not die
and the armed tribal resistance in Balochistan still continues. He still occupies a
special place in the hearts of Baloch masses. After his death, military operations in
Balochistan motivated the nationalistic tendency. The Baloch people have lost their
faith in the political system and developed significant anger towards the Punjabis
and the Army.
The Baloch nationalists now faithfully think that projects of economic development
and political reforms are a part of the long history of the colonization of Balochistan
and these project are nothing but a conspiracy against Baloch people of exploiting
the resources of their land at the expense of the Baloch people. They strongly
oppose military operations which are; they think; to subjugate the local Baloch and
establish a more forceful military presence within the province (Justin, 2006:5). The
Baloch nationalists do not believe in political system introduced by government in
Balochistan as it seems to them that killing of Bugti in August, 2006 and murder of
Nawabzada Ballach Marri in 2007, clearly indicated the federal government‟s
intention to handle the demands of Baloch by eliminating their leaders, rather than
coming to a political settlement. (Bansal, 2010). In 2008, General Musharraf‟s
regime was ended. In February 2008 general elections were held and Pakistan
Peoples Party came into power and formed a democratic government. It was
expected that the end of military regime and revival of democracy would alleviate the
Baloch grievances and the situation would be normalized in Balochistan. The
president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari from People‟s Party openly apologized to
Baloch people for past violence and injustices during his visit to Capital of
Balochistan; Quetta; and tried to cool down the rebels in a peaceful manner. But
according to Baloch nationalists, the military establishment takes its own decisions,
autonomous of the political rulers. Baloch nationalists insurgents promised and
declared a one-sided ceasefire in September 2008, but they did not receive any
135
positive response and appreciation by the Pakistani government and the subsequent
killing of Baloch nationalists by Pakistan Army, instigated them to recommence their
struggle. Since 2009, Pakistani security forces are reported to have killed Baloch
leaders. This attitude and approach has deeply disappointed a major portion of the
Baloch population on permanent basis. (Bansal, 2010) In fact, the shift from the
military government to the democratic government did not help alleviating Baloch
aggression and the unsatisfied Baloch continued to express there discontent through
various attacks. In 2009, about 792 attacks resulted in 386 deaths. (PIPS, 2010) out
of which, about ninety two percent of the attacks were made from Baloch
nationalists, in 2010, 730 attacks were reported resulting in 600 deaths. (PIPS,
2011) Since then, there has been a continuous series of civilian targeting as well as
political attacks and killings. It is reported that almost 25,000 army and paramilitary
forces were involved in counter operations in Balochistan, which could not oppress
the insurgency but rather has increased ethnic grievances. (Rajsree, 2009, 215)
Map No. 4.1. Conflict Areas of Balochistan
Source:://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/data/balochistanmap201 on
06 May, 2015
136
8. Baloch Insurgents
As it has described in chapter one of this research, there are three main tribes in
Balochistan which are headed by nationalist Sardars, The Marri Tribe, The Bugti
Tribe and The Mengal Tribe. The head of Marri Tribe is Mir Kher Baksh Marri, and
Bugti and Mengal Tribes are headed by Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti and Sardar
Ataullah Mengal respectively. The the Marris and the Bugtis, are said to be
responsible for most of the violence in the province. The tribe Mengal is less
involved in militant activities but provides strong moral encouragement to the
militants of other tribes and does not oppose any armed struggle regarding
independence of Balochistan. (Wrising, 2008:22) Mainly, there are some militant
groups organized and sponsored by these tribes which are responsible for creating
extremely bad situation of law and order through their violent activities and armed
attacks. There are many insurgent groups in Balochistan, mainly the Baloch
Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF), Popular Front for
Armed Resistance (PFAR), Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and the Balochistan
Liberation Front (BLF) are famous but the BLA is the largest and most widely-known
as terrorist militant group.
The BLA is working on the agenda based on Baloch nationalist tendencies and
fighting against Central Government for the liberation of Balochistan. This group is
considered an underground, secret organization which is working under the
guidance of Marri Tribe. Although, BLA is considered to be active from 1970 with a
big support from Soviet Union, it was officially formed in 1999 by Balach Marri until
his assassination in 2007, now his brother, Hyrbyair Marri is leading the group.
(Grare, 2013:5)
BLA strictly stands for an independent Greater Balochistan, which includes Iranian
and Afghan areas of Baloch population as well. The main objective of BLA is to
reduce the government‟s presence in the province and for this purpose; they target
the areas which are abundant in natural resources and where the government has
137
initiated different projects for economic development such as gas pipelines and oil
fields. Their campaign is designed to damage the economic stability of central
government in Balochistan to reduce the influence of government and army officials.
The most common targets are soldiers and government employees.. Journalists
from out side the Balochistan are also their prominent targets. The BLA attacks
include both bombings and armed assault. BLA is estimated to have more than
3,000 fighters; most of them are tribal men. (Grare, 2013:5) BLA has been declared
a terrorist group by the central government, and is banned in 2006 for its violent and
anti state activities. („‟List of Banned‟‟ 2014, Oct.24). The organization of BLA
consists of various training camps under different leaders. Weapons in Balochistan
are easily available which are supplied from Afghanistan. Generally, BLA use
Kalashnikovs, rockets, grenades and land mines. („‟What are Short Term
Objectives‟‟ 2012, Nov.5)
Another group of insurgents is known as Baloch Republican Army (BRA) which has
also been banned by government of Pakistan due to its militant attacks and violent
activities. It is supposed to be working under the leadership of Brahamagh Bugti, the
grand son of Akbar Bugti. BRA is also known as a wing of Baloch Republican Party
(BRP), which used to be associated to Bugti Tribe. (Brwon, Dawod, Irantalab, Naqi,
2012, June.21) BRA targets gas pipelines and attacks on military convoys and
recently has been able to pull off more refined attacks on paramilitary checkpoints.
9. Baloch Grievances and Main Causes of Current
Insurgency
The use of forcing tactics instead of peaceful talks by the federal government has
always been the major cause of bitterness in Baloch nationalists and the main factor
in making them rise as a militant force rather than a political unit. The policies of the
federal government towards Baloch and Balochistan have always been playing a
very crucial role in formation of Baloch nationalist movements. In the entire past and
present Baloch occurrence, the most important responsibility for activating the
138
conflict, lays with the policies of an arrogant centre towards Balochistan. Twice, in
1948 and then in 1973-77, Baloch insurgency took place in the period of civilian
government. And in the other three instances; 1958-59, 1962-63, and 2005-till now;
Baloch militant protest regained its power under the rule of army. In all these five
insurgencies, the Baloch armed struggle has mainly been a reaction to central
government‟s heavy-handed policies. For their survival and protection of rights, the
four major Baloch nationalist parties formed Baloch Ittehad (alliance) on September
14, 2003 at Dera Bugti for what they called Baloch rights within Pakistani federation.
Prior to 2005, the Baloch protest was restricted to the parts of Kohlu and Dera Bugti
districts accounting for a seven per cent of Balochistan, but after the death of Bugti
in 2006, militant violence has overwhelmed about eleven districts and the
assassination of Bugti brought together about 380 Baloch leaders in a grand Jirga,
which was called after 137 years for a common cause, held on September 21, 2006.
Musharraf was of the view that there were only three sardars who were responsible
for creating problems, but on the contrary, 85 Baloch sardars participated in the jirga
and resolved to move International Court of Justice over the violation of accord
signed between the state of Kalat and government of Pakistan back in 1948.
Ironically, 70 of these sardars were allegedly the beneficiaries of state patronage.
(Kakar, Dec.7, 2014) Grievances of Baloch nationalists revolve around political and
economic deprivation, cultural identity, provincial autonomy, control over natural
resources, more representation in Central government, more and justified share
from gas revenues, abolition of military camps in Baloch region and limiting Army‟s
presence, abuse of human rights, lack of trust in the government, destruction of
Baloch identity through heavy invasion of non Baloch outsiders. (Javiad, 2010:113)
I. Protection of Cultural Identity
In fact, the army of Pakistan has never been in favor of distinct ethnic identities.
General Zia ul Haq, an army ruler, has openly declared that: ‗‘I would really like to
break up the existing (four) provinces and replace them with fifty-three small
provinces, erasing ethnic identities from the map of Pakistan altogether‖ (Grare,
139
2006: 3). But the Baloch have always been very sensitive about their cultural identity
spread over more than 2,000 years. There are many examples of Baloch unity under
the banner of their cultural identity such as the amalgamation of forty-four tribes
under the leadership of Mir Jalal Khan in the 12th century, the confederation in the
15th century, and the establishment of the Khanate of Balochistan in the 17th
century (Grare, 2006: 6). The central government has been reluctant to recognize
Baloch as a distinctive nation on the basis of their ethnicity and this response is
growing nationalist demands which have tended to strengthen separatist movements
II. Lack of Political Representation
The military has never paid attention to Baloch demands autonomy and they only
find military solutions, rather than political ones. This preference was a major cause
of armed insurrections in 1948, 1958, and 1973 (Khan, 2009: 1080-1084). But the
Baloch were given participation in the political process during the decades of 1980s
and 1990s, that‟s why these decades remained peaceful to some extent. General
Zia-ul Haq ruled Pakistan for about eleven years and put many efforts to please the
Baloch sardars. His policy was to support US in Afghanistan by throwing out the
Soviet Army and for this purpose, he tried to appease the wrath of Baloch Sardars
and win their loyalties by adopting different strategies to gain peace in the region.
His policies created a corrupt political culture in Balochistan. (Ahmed, 1999:177) Zia
received war material from US in huge quantity to help Afghanistan to counter Soviet
Union and consequently, the provinces of NWFP and Balochistan became the base
for Afghan Mujahids.
After 1988, with the end of Zia regime the Baloch tribes were given political
representation during the democratic governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif, and tensions between Baloch and government seemed to be settled down.
Baloch nationalist were given an opportunity to express their grievances through
elected representatives on national and provincial level. In the 1988 elections,
Baloch National Alliance (BNA) which was an alliance of tribal leaders and left-wing
140
nationalists, headed by Akbar Bugti; won many seats in the provincial assembly.
(Andley, 2006:5). But again in 1999, the removal of civilian government by Pervez
Musharraf refreshed the most recent Baloch insurgency (ICG, 2006: 6). Musharraf
manipulated the constitution to give power to the Federal Government, and transfer
the hold of power to military at the local level. This act went beyond the authority of
provinces and frustrated the Baloch for demand for greater provincial autonomy.
(ICG, 2006: 7). Musharraf's policy of eliminating the power of provincial governments
also affected Baloch representation at both the federal and provincial levels. This
new system motivated the sense of political marginalization and economic
exploitation in Baloch nationalists. (Bansal, 2008: 185).
The strong feeling of being oppressed in the political system of Pakistan is another
big cause of the uprising Baloch nationalism. According to Baloch nationalists, there
has always been an imbalance in representation of Baloch ethnicity in the Federal
Government and they are rarely appointed on any key positions in the Central
bureaucracy and Federal Government. (Bansal, 2008: 186). In addition, there are
only a few hundred Baloch in the armed forces, with very few in senior positions.
These facts promote sense of deprivation among Baloch nationalists and helped
increasing hatred for the military governments. (Khan, 2009: 1082). Baloch
representation in the armed forces is very low, about only 1.3 percent of the total
armed forces while the Punjabis dominate on superior positions in civil services and
Army. (Rizvi,2000:240)
The lack of representation on political and administrative level, gave rise to Baloch
fear of marginalization and feelings of isolation. So they react to rescue their land
and resources for the Baloch people. The central government‟s policy of keeping
Baloch people away from democratic political system has reduced the possibilities of
integration of Baloch people into Pakistan. Baloch nationalist firmly believe that
democracy denied to them, appears in the forced Baloch merger into Pakistan in
1948, the One Unit scheme in 1955, the 1973–77 uprising, and the 2002 elections.
141
III. Provincial Autonomy
A key demand of the Baloch nationalists is a desire for increased political autonomy
over the province. In the political structure of Pakistan, more power and decision
making authority has been granted to the Central Government at the expense of the
provinces, as a result, demands for increased autonomy have been a constant
feature of Baloch nationalism since 1948. The agitation among the Baloch and
government on the issue increased when Musharraf further centralized the
government, giving more dominating role to Centre. (ICG, 2006: 7). Moreover, prior
to Musharraf, the two democratic governments of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto,
did not fulfill their promises to increase autonomy to Balochistan, in addition the
Musharraf used military forces to find solutions to the political and administrative
grievances of the Baloch people which provoked a violent intensification in the
conflict (Khan, 2009: 1081).
IV. Expropriation of Resources
The central government‟s projects and plans to utilize the natural resources of
Balochistan for the benefit of the central government and other provinces, these
natural resources exist in the form of minerals and energy resources. In past, these
energy resources have been a key reason to various intrusions in Baloch region.
(Harrison, 1981:7). The gas field, founded in Sui, located in Balochistan was the
biggest natural gas field in Pakistan. Balochistan provides about 45 percent of the
national demand for natural gas. But unfortunately, many regions in Balochistan are
still without gas transmission facilities, even some areas near and around the Sui
gas field. Only four of the twenty-six Balochistan districts receive natural gas. (Fazl-
e-Haider, Dawn, 2006, Feb. 6) although, Balochistan is abundant in natural gas, but
has gained very little benefit from its own gas fields as compared to Sindh and
Punjab. Gas was firstly supplied to Multan and Rawalpindi in Punjab in 1964 on
priority bases but Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, remained deprived of this facility
till 1986 and waited for its share of gas. Gas was supplied to Balochistan only when
142
a Corps Headquarters was established there. Dera Bugti was also facilitated with
gas supply when a military camp was established there in mid nineties. (Grare,
2006:5). Balochistan was and still is the poorest province of Pakistan, both
economically and financially even after the 65 years of creation of Pakistan. During
Musharraf regime, the military developed their camps and operation centers at
centering resource-rich areas of Balochistan. No doubt, Musharraf took significant
steps to expand oil drilling and other mineral exploration in the province, but
according to Baloch nationalists, all these development projects were launched
without the consent of the Baloch. (Wirsing, 2008:4) The expropriation of natural
resources is the most persistent grievance of the Baloch.
V. Financial Policies and Development Projects
The Baloch are of the view that the government has been evidently prejudiced in
making the financial policies regarding Balochistan and all the mega projects for
economic development were initiated without the consent, counsel, or profit sharing
of the Baloch. In 2002, during Musharraf regime, Pakistan received international
attention as the critical supporter of the United States in the Afghanistan War.
Musharraf smartly and wisely utilized this global attention to initiate the Gwadar
Mega Project with intentions to construct a deep-water port that would be able to
compete with the best ports in the world. This project was initially decided in 1992,
during Nawaz Sharif regime. This was a cooperative project and the financial and
technical partner of this project was China. Gwadar is located in the middle of the
Balochistan coast near the resource rich areas of Balochistan. The port would
transform the small Baloch town of Gwadar into a grand economic zone. (Wirsing,
2008:16) . As this project was to gain attention of various international elements, and
may become the centre point of economic benefit to regional and global powers,
which would definitely invite foreigners as labors and traders, many Baloch feared
this project would place them in the minority within their own territory. In response to
this development project, Baloch insurgents launched multiple attacks on Gwadar
and other key development projects related to this port. This campaign gained
143
international attention when two Chinese engineers working on the Gwadar project
were assassinated by Baloch tribal men in 2006. The government of Pakistan
ignored the concerns that the Baloch had over Gwadar for the sake of major
economic progress on national level. Once again the Baloch resistance movement
began to undermine the Pakistani writ in the region.
The Baloch tribes think that all the developmental projects in Balochistan are for
greater economic benefit only of the government and the military institutions as The
Gwadar project was completely under the control of the central government. Initially,
Baloch nationalists did not oppose the port but following developments such as
establishment of a land market, a military base and the huge inflow of non-Baloch
population in Balochistan, were not discussed with the Baloch. This led Baloch
people to feel dissatisfied with the government and developed the fear of becoming
a minority in their own land.
VI. Economic Oppression
Economic oppression has been a long-term factor and cause of aggression among
Baloch nationalists. „‘Since the mid-1970s its share of the country‘s GDP has
dropped from 4.9 to 3.7 percent. Balochistan has the highest infant and maternal
mortality rate, the highest poverty rate, and the lowest literacy rate in Pakistan.‘‘
(Sanaullah. 2007: 5). The central government of Pakistan has been making efforts to
support Baloch economy by initiating different development projects, but
unfortunately, nothing helped due to the harsh and non cooperative attitude of
Baloch nationalists. The utilization of the natural gas has always been the most
prominent Baloch grievance since 1952. The Constitution of 1973 determined the
provincial gas royalties at 12.5 percent, prior to that, the price of gas from each
province was based on per capita provincial income. This policy resulted in a much
lower than Sindh and Punjab, and Baloch were given less share in royalties and
revenues than other major provinces. Furthermore, the government had more
reduced the Balochistan‟s share in royalty citing the need to recover operating costs.
144
(Kupecz, 2010:100) This step taken by central government extremely deprived
Balochistan and the dismissal of the government in 1973 by Bhutto, also left Baloch
people with almost no practical hold over their own land recourses.
VII. Influx of Other Ethnic Groups and Fear of Marginalization
The Baloch and Pakhtun divide is also counted as another big cause of Baloch
unrest and factor in uprising of Baloch nationalism on the basis of their ethnic
identity. This issue is of historical as well as current importance. Baloch-Pakhtun
divide was actually motivated by British in the region. The British had to follow the
strategy of using Afghanistan as a buffer state against Russian growth and for this
purpose they fought several wars in Afghanistan. And to gain their hold on the land
of Balochistan, the British constructed an extensive infrastructure including road and
rail links in the northern parts of Baloch region, along with Afghan border which was
heavily inhabited by Pakhtuns. This infrastructure, which is still a major medium of
commercial transportation from Balochistan to Afghanistan, provided the Pakhtuns,
in the north of Balochistan, with great opportunities to achieve economic progress
than the Baloch.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 further provoked the Baloch
apprehension of political domination by Pakhtuns, because Afghan Pakhtuns, as
refugees, migrated across the border into Baloch regions in thousands. To Baloch
people, these migrant Pakhtuns were nothing than a foreign nation which fled into
their own land without their permission. Political domination of Pakhtuns was
confirmed by the success of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, a Pakhtuns
nationalist party which was formed in 1989. (Khan, 2005:124) Underdeveloped
economic conditions during British period and increased Pakhtun migration are
important factors in motivating Baloch nationalism. Domination by Punjabi
community is another historical conflict driver since the British period. The British
were also preferential in giving administrative control of the region to the Punjabi
people under an arranged political structure which was in favor of the British
145
interests instead of the Baloch people. The administrative and military institutions
were under Punjabis while Balochs were completely ignored. (Talbot, 2005:56) The
Baloch people at that time were small and disjointed inhabitants of Balochistan so
they were directly and badly affected by British policy more than any other ethnic
group. The trend of economic and political dominance of Punjabis and Pakhtuns set
by the British became the structural legacy of Balochistan which continued till the
partition of subcontinent and the simultaneous departure of the British in 1947.
The Baloch tribes could never trust Punjabi and Pakhtun majority and this
atmosphere of mistrust gave rise to Baloch disobedience and caused the
implementation of the One Unit Scheme in 1955. According to Baloch theory, the
One Unit Policy was an attempt by Punjabi community to merge the ethnically
dissimilar provinces of Pakistan in their own interests; into a single administrative
body just to get aligned against another powerful ethnic nation, Bengalis of East
Pakistan, which was a very powerful and superior group being large in number living
in East Pakistan. Although the Baloch revolt against One Unit was ended in 1958
through government oppression and the arrest of numerous Baloch leaders. For the
next many years, Balochistan was treated like a colony where Punjabis and other
non-Baloch groups were holding the administrative posts. Furthermore, resource
utilization by the Central Government, low literacy, and high level of poverty weighed
down balochistan. (Khan, 2003:287)
VIII. Presence of Army and Security Concerns
The Baloch tribes also have a great sense of hatred towards the security agencies in
Balochistan. The Frontier Corps (FC) which is a para-military force operating under
the guidance of federal government is highly mistrusted by Baloch nationalists. The
Baloch repeatedly accused FC for misconduct, dishonor, threats and the use of
force. The problem is that, the security personnel are not local Baloch and the
Baloch strongly demand the exclusion of FC check posts. Baloch also demand the
elimination of the army and the release of political captives for the re-establishment
146
of peace. (Andley, 2006:6) Pervaiz Musharraf had a mind to establish new army
cantonments in Balochistan at Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Gwadar; (Javaid, 2010:119),
as these areas of Balochistan are considered most sensitive due to the mega
development projects and resistance form Baloch towards these plans. But almost
all the Baloch tribes strongly opposed the idea of building army cantonments in
these areas and it became the major demands of Baloch people that there would be
no army camps because the military cantonments were viewed by Baloch tribes as a
settlement for further repression and control and not for the purpose of development.
Due to the strong opposition, the idea of building cantonments was withdrawn in the
next regime of civilian government of Pakistan Peoples Party.
10. Governments Policies Regarding Baloch Insurgency
Throughout the history, the central government has been trying to integrate Baloch
people into Pakistan and for this purpose different strategies have been adopted to
control and cease the current Baloch insurgency. In this regard, Pakistan‟s first
policy was a “closed-border” policy that did little to help the Baloch people, this policy
was made to defend the Baloch‟s traditional sense of autonomy but , during Bhutto‟s
regime as prime minister, a new policy named “forward policy” was introduced that
gave more emphasis to the need for development and integration of Balochistan.
(Siddiqi, 1991:37)) This was an attempt to integrate the province and to maintain the
writ of the government but this policy resulted in the third insurgency in 1973 but
after Bhutto, a new army dictator, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, took the charge
of country and imposed marshal law. He took some significant steps to appease the
Baloch insurgents by releasing about six thousand Baloch prisoners, captured by
Bhutto government during the third insurgency. Furthermore, he declared amnesty
for other remaining Baloch insurgents, including those hiding in Afghanistan.
(Harrison, 1981:40) No doubt, Zia‟s policy of amnesty and reconciliation did a lot to
put down the insurgency but practically he did not do anything else to address the
problems of Baloch and did not pay sufficient attention to eliminate the causes of
Baloch insurgency forever. During Zia‟s reign until 2002, Baloch problems and
147
demands were not so big to handle but being constantly ignored by the central
government, the Baloch nationalist could not remain calm for a long time and it was
only after the start of the fourth insurgency in 2004-05 that the government began
taking serious steps to attempt integration. The most significant step taken since
2002 was the creation of the Senate Committee on Balochistan. In 2004, the
establishment of this committee was ordered by government it was given the task of
responding to the challenges in Balochistan. The government dealt with not only the
law and order situation but also paid attention to the political demands of the Baloch.
The result was a report that recommended significant changes in the government‟s
military, political, economic, and energy policies regarding the Baloch.
(„‟Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan‟‟, 2005:9) The committee was given the
task to inspect the situation in Balochistan for making recommendations for
improvement of conditions and promotion of inter-provincial harmony. The
Committee prepared a detailed and comprehensive report by the end of 2005 and
gave recommendations for many plans and reforms such as an increased share of
natural gas revenues, implementation of the job quota for Baloch people in the
central services, representation on the Gwadar Port, construction of new dams to
alleviate drought conditions and stoppage of unkind treatment of citizens at security
check points maintained by the Frontier Corps personnel throughout the province.
(„‟Senate of Pakistan‟‟, 2005:95-101).
The Baloch nationalists gave a profound response to the committee‟s report and a
70 percent drop in insurgent violence from the previous three months was
significantly noticed. After the end of Musharraf regime in 2008, the new Pakistani
President, Asif Ali Zardari committed to solve the Baloch issue. He initiated the
“Balochistan Package,” which was a combination of measures aimed at addressing
the demands of the Baloch and integrating them into the nation. (The News, 2009,
Dec. 8). President Asif Ali Zardari promised Baloch tribes to solve their problems
and fulfill their demands through negotiations which were a non violent, democratic
way to address the Baloch grievances. Therefore a parliamentary committee was
formed to look into Balochistan‟s issue. The suggestions made by the committee
148
were given the name of the Agaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package which was
presented in the Parliament on 24th November 2009. (Javaid, 2010:121). That
package covered almost all the conflicts such as constitutional issues, economic
matters, natural resources, political and administrative issues. Along with this
Balochistan Package, 7th National Finance Commission Award in December 2009
and the 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan were also initiated by the
Zardari Government.
The Balochistan Package included:
Release of Baloch political prisoners
Political dialogue with the province
Establishment of a commission to investigate into the death of Nawab Akbar
Bugti
A judicial inquiry into the killing of Baloch leaders
Elimination of the idea of building army cantonments at Kohlu and Sui
Withdrawal of army forces from these areas
Under the 7th NFC award, more resources were transferred to Balochistan while the
18th amendment fully restored a parliamentary democracy, giving more power to the
provincial governments. (PILDAT, 2012:20). These three steps taken to address the
insurgency in Balochistan can be termed as major and historic changes to reshape
and readjust the balance of power between provincial and federal governments. The
regime of Peoples Party ended with the general elections 2013 and Mian
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif from Pakistan Muslim League became prime minister of
Pakistan for the third time. The PML-N, the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party and
National Party together won with majority in the Balochistan Assembly and mutually
agreed to form a combined government. Prime Minister Nawaz Shrif promised
Baloch people to provide them basic facilities and jobs to and bring development in
education, health, agriculture, irrigation and other sectors with a further commitment
to remove the deprivation of the Baloch people. (The Dawn, 2013, May.20)
149
11. Interests of Foreign Powers in Baloch Nationalist
Movement
There has always been a belief in Pakistan that some outsiders are playing a role in
the Baloch insurgency. The geographical location and huge mineral and energy
resources of Balochistan, make this land extraordinarily important for almost all the
world and specially a mark of special interest among regional political actors such as
the US, India, Russia, UAE and Afghanistan, all have one common interest in this
region and an independent Balochistan is in high favor of their geo-strategic
interests. Pakistan has always been claiming that the Baloch insurgents possess
highly refined artillery and modern military training which may be a clear sign of
foreign support and interference in the province. (The News, 2005, Feb. 2)
A major example took place in 1973, during Bhutto regime; when Pakistan
government found an ammunition store at Iraqi embassy in Islamabad. Weapons
including about three hundred submachine guns and forty eight thousand 48,000
rounds of ammunition were located by Pakistanis officials. Akbar Bugti was the only
Baloch Sardar at that time that fully supported central government in dismissal of
NAP government in Balochistan and got the designation of Governor of Balochistan.
He had administered the worst military operation against the Baloch insurgents
during 1973-77 revolt. The government claimed that the Iraqi weapons were being
sent to help out the Baloch insurgents. („‟What are Short Term Objectives‟‟ 2012,
Nov.5)
India developed its interest in Afghanistan in 1970s after the creation of Bangladesh
and simultaneously, India started its efforts to put Balochistan in the same condition
through encouraging an insurgency in Balochistan. For this purpose, India exploited
the enmity between the state and the rebellious Baloch Sardars. The aims of India
were to keep away Pakistan from the energy resources to turn Pakistan into an
economically weak state. This kind of economic and political instability would
damage the strength of Pakistan to survive as an independent state. The
150
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) occurred during the era of 1970s as the most
active insurgent group with a strong leaning towards Soviet Union. It is believed that
BLA received arms from the Soviet Union and the insurgents were secretly trained
there. The Baloch leaders have openly listed India among their sponsors. Grand son
of Akbar Bugti, and a BLA leader, Brahamdagh Bugti, had accepted help from India
and Afghanistan. ―We love our Indian friends and want them to help and rescue us
from tyranny and oppression. In fact, India is the only country which has shown
concern over the Baloch plight. We want India to take Balochistan‘s issue to every
international forum, the same way Pakistan has done to raise the so-called Kashmiri
issue. We want India to openly support our just cause and provide us with all moral,
financial, military and diplomatic support.‖ (Khan, 2011:4)
The style of attacks with modern weapons clearly shows the fact that the Baloch
rebels have received proper military training. Such a large scaled mutiny cannot be
managed without heavy funding as they cannot rise on their own. It is estimated that
the financial expenditure of BLA is about 50-90 million rupees monthly. Supposedly,
they are getting considerable amount from Afghanistan through US. („‟What are
Short Term Objectives‟‟ 2012, Nov.5). It is said that US has been encouraging
Baloch separatist movements for a long time through the help of India by
encouraging India to reinforce its spy network in Afghanistan and helped India open
consulates along the Afghan border. The Indian consulates were used as centers of
Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Baloch
rebels are receiving financial and other assistance through these Indian centers. In
2004, the Chief Minister of Balochistan Jam Muhammad Yusuf openly declared that
the RAW had established almost forty terrorist camps all over Balochistan. The
Pakistani officials have been continuously referring to Indian involvement and also
have expressed their doubt about Iranian and US involvement. (The News, February
2, 2005)
The Gwadar port is estimated to be the focal point of an energy and trade passage
to and from China and the Central Asian Republics. China has got legal right on
151
Gwadar as it has invested a lot in this project financially and technically. China has
also invested in a coastal highway to link Gwadar with Karachi. China is also
involved in the Saindak gold and copper mining project in Balochistan. China and
India have been engaged in several trade plans for their joint benefits but there has
always been a sense of rivalry and an economic competition between the two
countries. So, India may not desire to see the development of Gwadar port as
profitable for China as well as for Pakistan. The former Governor of Balochistan,
Owais Ahmed Ghani stated ―India is not only helping annoyed people with weapons,
but is training them as well, India is financing the insurgency and Afghan warlords
and drug barons of arming the militants‘‘(Aziz, „‟Foreign Hand‟‟ 2009)
India has established nine training camps along the Afghan border to provide military
training to the members of the Baloch Liberation Army. India and the UAE are also
alleged for providing armed and economic assistance to Baloch rebels. The aim is to
create hurdles in the construction of the Gwadar port. Russian government has been
directly involved in supporting the Baloch insurgents. Former president Pervez
Musharraf had also raised the point with US officials in September 2007 and he
asked the US to get involved on issue of attempt from Afghanistan and India to
destabilize Balochistan. Musharraf stated that ‗‘Pakistan had proof that India and
Afghanistan were involved in efforts to provide weapons, training and funding for
Baloch extremists through Brahamdagh Bugti and Baloch Marri, two Baloch
nationalists, who were living in Kabul.‖ (The Express Tribune, 2012, Dec 3)
Afghanistan has also played role in supporting Baloch separatist movements. It is
believed that during the first three insurgencies, the Baloch militant insurgents
were provided with political and logistic support by Afghanistan. The first
insurgency in 1948 led by Abdul Karim, was initiated during his stay in Afghanistan.
(Harrison, 1981:26) and he was seeking support from both Soviet Union and
Afghanistan. Although, Karim received significant support from Afghanistan but
Baloch nationalists never admitted it openly. (Harrison, 1981:26). When Karim
instigated the second Baloch insurgency in 1958, again Karim had appealed
Afghanistan for support of the insurgency.(Harrison, 1981:28).
152
During the third insurgency of 1962, Afghanistan directly and openly supported
Baloch rebels. The prime minister of Afghanistan, Mohammad Daud granted
permission to Baloch insurgents the Pararis to establish their camps along the
Afghan-Pakistan border. These camps were initially established to provide refuge to
the Baloch migrants but in fact, these refugee camps were largely utilized as Baloch
insurgent headquarters. (Harrison, 1981:39) that‟s why, when Zia ul Haq extended
amnesty to the Baloch rebels, he also included Baloch living in Afghanistan and
allowed them to return to Pakistan. (Harrison, 1981:40)
The government of Pakistan also suspects Iran of supporting Baloch militants. Iran is
of the opinion that Pakistan; in collaboration with US; is planning to turn Balochistan
into a front base for a future offense against Iran. (Daily Times, 2005, Jan. 29)
because Iran is ambitiously trying to become the favorite passage to the sea for
Central Asia at Pakistan‟s expense, and for this purpose, has built its own port at
Chahbahar with Indian support to counter Pakistani Gwadar Port. But Iranian
government never admitted any involvement in Balochistan, claiming that Iran has
no intentions to harm the Gwadar project by helping Baloch Militants. (Daily Times,
2005, Feb.7)
However, Iran does not need to get involved in the Baloch insurgency directly as
Iran probably would not be able to openly oppose Pakistan because both countries
have a common interest of exporting Iranian gas to India, and an revolution in
Balochistan would only spoil the chances of building a gas pipeline through the
province and consequently, it would be a big economic loss to both the countries.
(Daily Times, 2005, Feb. 5) The only concern of Iran regarding Baloch insurgency is
the unrest caused by Iranian Baloch, living within the territory of Iran and supporting
their Pakistani Baloch companions for the liberation of Baloch regions located in
Iran. It was for this reason that Iran assisted Pakistan during the insurgency of 1973
to help it put down the Baloch rebellion. The Government of Pakistan has doubts
about the role of United States as a probable agitator. It is believed that US would
use Balochistan against Iran and would also get China out of the region by
supporting Baloch insurgents. (Daily Times, 2005, Jan. 30). US have been seeking
153
permission from Pakistan to open a US consulate in Quetta and install CIA to watch
the Taliban based Quetta Shura. However, Pakistan did not allow this. („‟Govt. to
Give Proof‟‟, 2012, Feb.19) it is said that the US and British intelligence agencies are
supporting the Baloch militants to destabilize the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project and
to weaken the Gwadar port from becoming purposeful due to Chinese involvement
which would definitely be a major threat to US interests in the Gulf region. But the US
intentions are never clearly explained by Pakistan, it is difficult to understand
whether US is opposing the Baloch nationalists because they get support from Iran
or whether US is supporting the Baloch because they are aggressive towards China.
The US involvement is also seen as a part of the “Great Power game” between
global powers in Central Asia since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is widely
believed that the US wants to compete China and Iran through controlling the oil
supply lines of Middle East and Central Asian States, ‗‘US is using its Greater
Middle East initiative to dismantle the major Muslim states and redefine borders in
the region‘‘. (The News, February 3, 2005.). On the other hand, the Baloch
nationalists put blame on government of Pakistan for conspiring with the US to crush
down the Baloch fight for freedom.
12. Impacts of Baloch Nationalist Movements on National
Level
The condition of law and order in Balochistan is getting worse with the passage of
time and has become a matter of serious attention on national, regional and
international level. The sense of hatred among various ethnic and linguistic groups
of Balochistan has given rise to target killing. This target killing, as an action and
reaction is leading to high degree violence and distraction. Consequently, a lot of
people belonging to different fields, such as doctors, teachers, professors etc. have
left Balochistan due to uncertain circumstances and fear of being killed. This
migration has put very bad affect on the already insufficient organizations in
Balochistan. Due to security threats the non Baloch government officers are afraid of
going there. This situation has totally damaged the administrative structure of
154
Balochistan. (Javaid, 2010:118). The current on going insurgency has created
various challenges for Pakistan. Unlike the previous Baloch uprisings, it cannot be
controlled and getting longer than any of the past movement, and has involved the
armed struggle more widely which has affected almost all the areas in Balochistan
from rural mountainous regions to the city centers. This time, it is not a conflict
between the Nationalist Sardars and Central Government, but the movement has
also involved Baloch women and youth who fully support the armed groups and
struggle for an independent Balochistan. Moreover, during the past insurgencies, the
Baloch tribes and insurgents used to attack only army camps and infrastructure
related to government projects, but this time, the insurgents are also attacking at non
Baloch residents and other minorities to throw out all the non Baloch nations to
protect their ethnicity and to preserve their own identity and land.
The current Baloch resistance has got more attention of international and regional
powers than any previous insurgency. In 2012, the U.S. Congress supported the
demand for a free Baloch land. The conflict in Balochistan has significant influence
on India-Pakistan relations as Pakistan has accused India of supporting the Baloch.
(Akbar, 2014, Mar.11) The death of Akbar Bugti in 2006 and murder of Balach Marri
in 2007 were main motives behind target killings of Punjabi and other non-Baloch
ethnic groups in Balochistan. Target killings have continued till now and the intensity
of such killings was very high during the last many years. Such attacks have spread
to Noshki, Khuzdar, Mastung, Gwadar, Turbat and Kech, where this type of violence
was moderately low in the past. (Kaleem, Herald, October 2008: 64). It is reported
that in 2010 only, almost 252 Punjabi settlers were assassinated in targeted killings.
(ARY News, 2010, July. 27). A constant insurgency in Balochistan is becoming a
great threat to the image and development of Pakistan as it would split the nation in
different ethnic groups as it has gained the status of a separatist movement. The
Baloch demand and armed struggle and separatist movement for an independent
Balochistan have strategic impacts not only on Afghanistan, India and United States
but also it has economic impacts on Iran, UAE, China and Central Asia. In addition,
it has very strong affect on people all over Pakistan. The Baloch nationalist
155
movement for an independent state can set trend for more movements for separate
lands for Pakistan‟s other ethnic groups. And consequently, the central government
would lose more administrative control than they have today. It is predicted that the
even the existence of Pakistan could be at great risk. (Khan, 2009, Time
Magazine). This situation would bring dramatic changes in the economic, political,
and strategic landscape of South and Southwest Asia. There are numerous other
problems such as social unrest, poverty, illiteracy, and economic underdevelopment
which are a result of this ongoing crisis. Furthermore, international pressure from
India, Iran, China, Afghanistan, and Central Asia is complicating and weakening
Pakistan‟s position on international level. These countries have strategic energy and
economic interests tied up in Balochistan by means of pipelines, ports, and roads.
Although, the government of Pakistan has a vast range of resources to put down any
insurgency such as a highly competent army, well-equipped police force, and a
broad network of paramilitary forces, but the government of Pakistan has been
unable to control insurgent violence in Balochistan and to resolve the issues
regarding their old grievances. Consequently, the government of Pakistan has not
succeeded in bringing the Baloch people into the mainstream. (Pakistan Times,
2010, Jan. 21). The peaceful integration of the Balochistan into the nation of
Pakistan has become the most sensitive and significant issue because it has
involved many other serious domestic, regional, and international
factors.Domestically, Balochistan is a symbol of great economic development for
Pakistan and a possible way out of current economic decline. Pakistan would
achieve great development through utilizing the rich natural and energy resources,
establishing international oil and gas pipelines and completing the construction and
utilization of Gwadar seaport. Balochistan is a potential economic advantage to
Pakistan and without political stability in this region; it is not possible to succeed at
even one of these mega projects. Additionally, a separatist movement among the
Baloch is threatening even the existence of the Pakistani state as it could motivate
existing movements among the other ethnic groups such as Sindhi and Pakhtun and
could result in the collapse of Pakistan as a state.
156
References
Ahmad, Lt. Col. Syed Iqbal, (1992). Balochistan: Its strategic Importance, Karachi:
Royal Book Company.
Ahmed, Feroz, (1999). Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, London: Oxford University
Press.
Amin, Tahir, (1993). Ethno-Nationalist Movements of Pakistan, IPS, Islamabad.
Andley, Priyashree, (2006). Special Report 32, Balochistan: A Backgrounder. New
Delhi, India: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
Akbar, Malik Siraj, (2014, Mar.11). The End of Pakistan‘s Baloch Insurgency?
Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/the-end-of-pakistans
balo_b_6090920.html on 15 April, 2015
Awan, Junaid Iqbal, (2013) Balochistan Insurgency, retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/5106344/Balochistan_Insurgency on 10 Dec, 2014
Aziz, Sameera, (2009). Foreign Hand in Balochistan Chaos?, retrieved from
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20090
41535146 on 16 April, 2015
Baloch Militants killed 252 settlers in 2010, (2010, July.27). ARY News.
Baloch, Ayoub, (Oct-2002). Sharing the vision, Directorate of Public Relations,
Government of Balochistan, Quetta-Pakistan.
Baloch, Inayatullah, (1987). The Problem of "Greater Baluchistan": A Study of
Baluch Nationalism, Coronet Books: Michigen.
Baluch, Muhammad Sardar Khan,(1977). Literary History of the Baluchis. Quetta:
Baluchi Academy
157
Baloch, M. Sardar Khan, (1958) History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, Karachi:
Process Pakistan
Breseeg, Taj Muhammad, (2004). Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development,
Karachi: Royal Book Company
Bansal, Alok. (2008). Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, June, Vol. 19, No.2
Bansal, Alok,, (Feb.1, 2010). Understanding the Baloch Insurgency, retrieved from
http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2010/02/understanding-the-baloch-insurgency/ on
March 28, 2015
Baloch, Sanaullah. (March 2007). The Baloch Conflict: Towards a Lasting Peace,
Pakistan Security Research Unit No. 7
Brown, Michael; Dawod, Mohammad; Irantalab, Arash; and Naqi Mahmud, (2012).
Balochistan Case Study, retrieved from
http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1398.pdf on 12 April, 2015
Balochistan Tribal System, (2011, July.7) retrieved from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/baloch-tribes.html on 20 March,
2015
Baloch, Salar, (2008, Oct.9). Instruments of Accession of Kalat State, retrieved from
http://balochistaninhistory.blogspot.com/ on 21 January, 2015
Brown, Michael; Dawod, Mohammad; Irantalab, Arash; and Naqi, Mahmud, (2012,
June 21) Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences and Management: Balochistan
Case Study, retrieved from http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1398.pdf on
10 April, 2015
158
Dunne, Justin.S., (2006). Crisis in Baluchistan: A Historical Analysis of The Baluch
Nationalist Movements in Pakistan, Masters Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School,
Monterey, California.
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, (Feb.6, 2006). Higher Poverty in Balochistan, The Dawn
Grare, Fredric, (2006).The resurgence of Baloch Nationalism, The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace: South Asia Project, January, No. 65.
Grare, Fredric, (April, 2013), Balochistan: The State versus The Nation, The
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: South Asia Project.
Govt. to Give Proof of US, Indian Role in Balochistan Insurgency, (2012, Feb.19)
retrieved from http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/02/19/national/pakistan-to-
expose-us-indian-interference on April 14, 2015
Harrison, Selig S. (1996). Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baluch Case, in
Hutchinson, John and Anthony Smith eds. Ethnicity Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harrison, Selig S.,(1978). Nightmare in Baluchistan, Foreign Policy, Vol.32
Harrison, Selig S.,(1981). In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet
Temptations, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Isa, Qazi Muhammad, (1944). Baluchistan, Case Gazette Press.
International Crisis Group, (2006). Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan,
Asia Report No 119.
Javaid, Umbreen. Dr., (2010). Concerns of Balochistan: Effects and Implications on
Federation of Pakistan, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2, pp. 113-125
159
Jetly, Rajsree. (2009). Resurgence of the Baluch Movement in Pakistan: Emerging
Perspectives and Challenges, in Jetly, Rajshree. ed. Pakistan in Regional and
Global Politics, New York: Routledge
Kundi, Dr. Mansoor Akbar, (2005). „‘Tribalism in Balochistan: A Comparative Study‖
in Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses, edited by Pervaiz Iqbal
Cheema and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research
Institute.
Khan, Ahmad Yar,(1975). Inside Baluchistan: A Political Autobiography of His
Highness Baiglar Baigi, Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Khan, Ehsan Mahmood, (January 2011). Internal Security Strategy for Pakistan,
SAN Analysis, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Kech, Atif Abid, (2013, May.21) Baloch Nationalism, retrieved
from http://bolanvoice.com/2013/05/21/baloch-nationalism/ on 21 March, 2015
Khan, Adeel. (2009), 'Renewed Ethno-nationalist Insurgency in Balochistan,
Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation', Asian Survey,
Vol. 49. No. 6, pp. 1071- 1091
Khan, Adeel, (2005). Politics of Identity, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Khan, Adeel, (June. 2003). Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Geurilla
War to Nowhere?, Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 4. No.2.
Khan, Waheed, (1 Nov. 2009). Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan, The
Time Magazine.
160
Kakar, Farman, (2014, Dec.7). The Baloch Quagmire, retrieved from
http://tns.thenews.com.pk/the-baloch-quagmire/#.VRqRwCKUemq on 31 March,
2015
Kakar, Tariq, (2014, Sep.29) Origins of Baloch Insurgency, retrieved from
http://thebalochistanpoint.com/origins-of-baloch-insurgency/ on 22 March, 2015
Kupecz, Mickey, (Spring, 2012). Pakistan‘s Baloch Insurgency, History, Conflict
Drivers, and Regional Implications, International Affairs Review, Volume XX,
Number 3, pp, 95-111
Kaleem, Moosa, (October, 2008) No Place to Call Home, Herald, Karachi.
Laif, Muhammad Ijaz and Hamza, Muhammad Amir, (2009). Ethnic Nationalism in
Pakistan: A Case Study of Baloch Nationalism during Musharraf Regime, Pakistan
Vision, Vol. 10. No. 1, Journal of Pakistan Study Centre, Pakistan: University of the
Punjab, Lahore, pp. 49-81
List of Banned Organizations in Pakistan, (2014, Oct.24) retrieved from
http://tribune.com.pk/story/456294/list-of-banned-organisations-in-pakistan/ on 10
April, 2015
Mahmand, Jan, (1989).Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, Emergence,
Dimensions, Repercussions, Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab.
Masooad Wajahat, (2006). The murdere of Akbar Bugti, Monthly Nawa-e-Insan.
vol.7, September, .LRL No. 279.
Nationalism, (2015, Dec.14) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/#BasConNat on 20 March, 2015
Pipes, Gregory D.,(2010). Baloch-Islamabad Tensions: Problems of National
Integration, Masters Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School.
161
PIPS, (2009). Balochistan: Conflicts and Players. Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace
Studies.
PIPS, (2010). Pakistan Security Report 2009, Pak Institute of Peace Studies
(January 2010).
PIPS, (2011). Pakistan Security Report 2010, Pak Institute of Peace Studies
(January 2011).
Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan,(2005) Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad.
Rizvi, Hasan Askari, (2000). Military State and Society in Pakistan, London:
Macmillan Press.
Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan, Report 7, Senate of
Pakistan, Islamabad: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 2005.
Swidler, Nina, (2014). Remotely Colonial: History and Politics in Balochistan. New
York: Oxford University Press
Shah, Syed Fakharuddin and Khan, M. Zubair, (April, 2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s, Global Journal of Human
Social Science, Volume 12 Issue 7 Version 1. pp. 61-68
Siddiqi, Akhtar Husain, (1991). Baluchistan (Pakistan): Its Society, Resources and
Development, Lanham: University Press of America.
Siddiqi, Farhan Hanif, (2012). The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Balouch,
Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements. Oxon and New York: Routledge.
Sabir, Dr. Abdul Razzaq & Razzaq, Waheed, (2010). Multiculturalism: A Case Study
of Balochistan, Balochistan Review, Vol. XXIII No. 2, Balochistan Study Centre,
University of Balochistan, Pakistan. pp. 17-25
162
Shah, Mehtab Ali, (1997). The Foreign Policy of Pakistan; Ethnic Impacts on
Diplomacy (1971-1994), London: I.B. Tauris and Company.
Talbot, Ian, (1990). Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement; the Growth of the
Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47, Karachi: Oxford
University Press.
Talbot, Ian, (2005). Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Titus, Paul and Swidler, Nina,(February 2000). Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-
Nationalism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial Balochistan, International
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1.
Tribal Analysis Centre, (Nov.2009) The Baloch and the Brahui and Their Rebillions,
retrieved from http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-
TAC/Baluch%20and%20the%20Brahui.pdf on 28 March, 2015
The Plight of the Baloch (2015, March) Breifing Note retreived from
http://unpo.org/downloads/1288.pdf on 1 April, 2015
Wrising, Robert. G., (2008). Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy
Resources: A Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan, retrieved from
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a480237.pdf on 2 April, 2015
What are the Short Term Objectives of Baloch Insurgents?, (2012, Nov.5), retrieved
from http://pksecurity.blogspot.com/2012/11/what-are-short-term-objectives-of.html
on 3 April, 2015
CHAPTER FIVE Political Development and Baloch
Nationalism
163
1. Political Culture of Balochistan
The political culture and behavior is normally determined by the climatic conditions
and geographical location of a region. The extreme geographical features of
Balochistan such as mountains, plains, coastal areas and extreme weather
conditions in different parts of this land have a major role in the formation of political
attitude and character of people living in various areas. According to the variation in
culture due to different climatic and geographic location, the Baloch people are
divided into following six main cultural units. (Khan, 1996:264)
I. Southern coastal area of Makran
II. Western areas of Chaghi and Kharan
III. Eastern Chaghi, Kalat, Khuzdar and Bolan Pass
IV. Kachchi, Sibi, Southern Naseerabad and Lasbela
V. Northen Naseerabad and Marri-Bugti areas
VI. Quetta city
The overall political culture in Balochistan is based upon a very narrow minded and
unsophisticated approach and attitude due to chronic tendency of illiteracy and
fundamental traditions of sardari system especially in rural areas. However, the
diversity in geographic location and culture is a key factor in the formation of various
different political attitudes. Therefore, the political approach and attitude, varies from
one cultural unit to the other. The population of Marri-Bugti areas and Naseerabad is
fully under the control of their tribal chiefs and do not know much about their political
and basic rights. In fact, they have no awareness about their individual and collective
social rights. They have learnt only to follow the instructions and orders from their
tribal sardars, and are supposed to obey them just like puppets. The political system
in rural or tribal structure is heavily influenced by tribal elites who do not allow their
people to deviate from the prevailing old traditions. The other cultural units
comparatively have some awareness about their rights but they are still bound to
remain within the limits of their social norms and traditions. Historically, the
164
population of Balochistan is comprised of two major ethnic groups, the Baloch and
the Pakhtuns. The pakhtun community is distinct from baloch in their political
approach due to a different cultural background and traditions.
2. Political Strains in Balochistan
All the baloch uprisings against Central Government, including the ongoing
nationalist movement, are nothing but a revolt against an unfamiliar culture and
political and administrative structure; and a forceful movement for their cultural,
social, political and economic rights. Unfortunately, people of Balochistan could
never be accommodated in the policy making process, and always been under-
represented. Although, the Senate of Pakistan provides representation for all
provinces but it does not has the power of taking financial and political decisions.
These duties are performed by the National Assembly where Balochistan has only
14 seats out of 342. There are 30 districts in Balochistan; but the divisions of
constituency according to the population; confined the seats to only fourteen,
therefore, the Baloch are not represented in majority.
The political issues revolve around the economic exploitation of strategic and natural
resources especially when the local people do not benefit from their own resources.
The best example in this regard is the discovery of Sui gas in 1952, which was
discovered in the Bugti area by Burma Shell and under the India Mining Act 1935;
Balochistan was entitled to get five percent of the revenue. But when Nawab Akbar
Bugti, the then defense minister of Pakistan, demanded the due amount, he was told
by legislation that all resources above and underground belong to God and the state.
(The Daily Times, 2012, Oct. 10) Nawab Akbar protested against the injustice and
resigned. Due to the agitation caused by Bugti tribesmen, Burma Shell signed a rent
agreement with Bugti. The deal continued til 2005 and then Musharraf ordered
Pakistan Petroleum Limited to stop the rent. That step created tensions between
Bugti and Musharraf. (The Daily Times, 2012, Oct. 10) the matters related to sui
gas such as revenues, compensation, employment, gas generating and distribution
165
companies; remained the causes of tension between Bugti and the Federal
Government for many years . The governments of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and
General Pervez Musharraf, all were of the view that Nawab Bugti was obtaining
money from Central Government on behalf of the Bugti workers at gas plants but
actually he was utilizing that amount to blast the gas pipelines whenever the central
government was not ready to comply with his own wishes. (Laif and Hamza, 2009:
66). However, the award of political, economic and cultural rights, according to the
Lahore Resolution of 1940, has always been the only demand of all the baloch
political leaders. But there were no political dialogue in this regard between Central
Covernment and Baloch leaders in the past instead they have always been
suppressed by the military, especially during the last decade, and the demand for
autonmoy turned into the demand for the right to self-determination and total
separation from Pakistan. The interests of military in Balochistan are always
strategic rather than political for many reasons:
The coastline of Balochistan has three naval bases and the Gwadar Port is
the most significant route for all the oil exports from the Gulf pass.
Balochistan shares borders with two strategically significant countries; Iran
and Afghanistan.
Balochistan is a second line of defense against India and the vast deserted
lands of Balochistan and the strategic resources are very attractive to army.
Because the uninhabited lands are ideal and safe places for testing nuclear
and other conventional weapons. The Baloch Sardars were offended with
nuclear test at Chaghi Hills without consulting the provincial government. (Laif
and Hamza, 2009: 63)
The baloch nationalist always blame military for treating Balochistan like a colony.
The military has a record to change all the democratic and political set up of
administrative institutions in its favor, which creates problems for the democratic
government. Military‟s intervention in the political process has always been criticized
and condemned by democratic governments. The Baloch are of the view that the
166
military is the real ruler of Balochistan even during democratic regime. Pakistan is a
multi-national state, not an identical one. This factor has never been recognized by
the Pakistani political administration, which has always been trying for the
implementation of a unitary political, cultural and socio-economic structure for all.
Baloch are of the view that they have a different cultural and political history, and
they should be treated as a distinct ethnic community and should be given their due
cultural and socio-economic rights which have always been denied by central
government of Pakistan. (The Daily Times, 2012, Oct.10)
3. Influence of Tribal Sardars on Politics
The society of Balochistan is mainly based on tribal system which has been clearly
described in the Chapter 4 of this research. The sardars of baloch tribes are
considered the elites of their society. The majority of baloch sardars take active part
in the political process of Balochistan. There are three big tribes in Balochistan
which have always been very prominent and influential in the political history of
Balochistan. These are Marri, Mengal and Bugti tribes. All the sardars of these tribes
are active political leaders and heads of their own political parties. They always
participate in national and provincial level elections to win more strength and to
attain the position of powerful political figures. The politically influential sardars are
categorized as:
I. Religious minded leaders
II. Nationalist leaders
The areas of Chaghi, Kalat and Turbat are influenced with religious minded leaders
whereas the nationalist leaders do not include religion in their political manifesto.
(Khan, 1996:269). They are so powerful personalities that they even do not have to
ask for votes to win national or provincial elections. They are the masters of the fate
of their people and they are sure of their victory because of their full control over
their areas of jurisdiction. Sometimes, there are various areas which are inhabited by
many tribes and all the tribal sardars participate in elections. Under such
circumstances, usually, the leader of a larger tribe always wins by seeking support of
167
other smaller tribes. Traditionally, all the sardars are highly conscious of maintaining
their control over their territories and they strongly oppose any kind of change or
development which may enlighten the people and give them awareness about their
rights. That is the main reason that baloch sardars are always blamed for keeping
the baloch people backward in terms of education and progress. Education brings
drastic change in the thoughts and lifestyle, provides better opportunities for good
income and thus an educated and enlightened population may learn to demand for
their basic rights and may protest against inhuman attitude of baloch sardars. So,
the development projects and education is the biggest danger to the rule of the
baloch sardars. Although, the majority of baloch tribal sardars is highly educated, but
they never let their people get educated just to keep them dependent and
suppressed forever.
4. Political Attitude of Major Baloch Tribes
Three Baloch tribes, The Bugti, the Marri and the Mengal tribe are the most
prominent in terms of their political involvement and activities.
I. The Bugti Tribe
The Bugti tribe was headed by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and consists of about 130
Baloch tribes of almost 180,000 members. They are basically mountain dwelling
tribes. The tribe is again divided into the sub-tribes named Rahija Bugti, Masori
Bugti, Mondrani, Shambani, Mothani, Pirozani and Kalpar Bugti. (Ahmed,1998:392).
All these tribes are greatly influenced by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti who was a
prominent Baloch nationalist. Nawab Akbar Bugti became the tribal leader in 1939.
Akbar Bugti belonged to an educated and renowned family. Bugti studied at Oxford
University and served at various significant and positions in Balochistan as governor,
chief minister of Balochistan‟s first provincial government in 1988 and federal interior
minister. (Ahmed,1998:392). He was the founder and leader of a political party
Jamhori Watan Party (JWP) which was established in 1990. He was assassinated in
168
August, 2006 by Pakistani armed forces during General Pervez Musharraf regime. It
was Nawab Bugti who raised the issue of royalties of gas field in Dera Bugti, which
fulfils the 39 percent of the country‟s total gas needs. The issue of revenues
generated by gas field in Dera Bugti has been the main cause of fifth on going
armed conflict between the Baloch tribes and the Government of Pakistan since
2005.
After Akbar Bugti‟s death, his two sons, Nawabzada Talal Akbar Bugti, and Jamil
Akbar Bugti and a grandson, Shah Zain Bugti refused to lay down weapons and
continued on fighting for their rights and complete autonomy over Balochistan and its
natural resources. His grandson, Nawab Sardar Brahamdagh Khan Bugti, is also
considered the leader of Baloch nationalists. After the death of Nawab Bugti,
Brahamdagh Khan decided to work for the political and economic rights of the
Baloch people independent of Jamhori Watan Party and he established another
political party named Baloch Republican Party (BRP) to promote nationalist feeling
among young Baloch to fight for their freedom and full control over their motherland
resources.
II. The Marri Tribe
The Marri tribe is located on the Dera Ghazi border of Balochistan, native from the
Kohlo district. Their chief is Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri and founder of a separatist
movement called Baloch Liberation Army. Marri became a Marxist politician in 1958.
In 1981, he organized a guerilla force for liberation movement. (Weaver,
2002:104)The Marri Tribe is divided into more sub-tribes:
Gazni
Bejarani
Zarkon
Lohrani
The total population of the Marri tribe is around 98,000 and their relations with the
Central Government have always been aggressive. (Tahir, 2008, April.4). The
169
political philosophy and approach of the Marri tribe is closer to the communists. The
tribal chief, Nawab Khair Bukhs Marri, took refuge in Kabul, Afghanistan when he
was unable to resist the Pakistani military in 1979. Nawab Marri, along with his men,
stayed in Kabul till Russian withdrawl from Afghanistan. Khair Bakhsh Marri prefers
armed struggle for independence of Balochistan. He lost his son Balach Marri in his
fight for independence, who also was a leader of Baloch Liberation Army.
(Balochistan Express, 2007, Nov. 22).
III. The Mengal Tribe
Ataullah Khan Mengal is the leader of the Mengal tribe, and has a central role in the
politics of Balochistan. Unlike the Marri and Bugti tribes, the Mengals are less
involved in militant confrontation, although he never condemned and criticized the
armed resistance against Central Government of Pakistan. He has been an active
person in armed struggle during the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Mengal exiled himself
in 1980 because the domination of Punjabi community was not acceptable for him.
(Harrison, 1981:66)
Attaullah Mengal started his political career with National Awami Party led by a
Pakhtun nationalist Wali Khan. Atualla Mingal became the first chief minister of
Balochistan in 1972 to 1973. He started his nationalistic political career when under
the banner of NAP he held a meeting of Pakhtun and Baloch nationalists in London
and declared the independence of the North-West Frontier Province and
Balochistan. After that meeting, he was arrested in 1973 and the military operations
were started in Balochistan to defeat the Baloch nationalists (BBC Urdu, February
11, 2005). After got released from jail, Atualla Mengal went to London, and in the
mid 1990, he returned back and established the Balochistan National Party in 1996
and his son Akhtar Mingal became Chief Minister of Balochistan. Akhtar Mengal was
sent to jail by Pervez Musharraf in 2006 on account of terrorism and involvement
with the present Baloch insurgency. (Tahir, 2008, April.4).
170
5. Contribution of Baloch Political Parties in Political
Development
Political parties in Balochistan can be divided into three categories:
Mainstream political parties
Baloch and Pakhtun nationalist parties
Religious political parties.
5.1. Mainstream Political Parties
Mainstream political parties in Balochistan include:
Pakistan People‟s Party
Pakistan Muslim League-N
Pakistan Muslim League-Q
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl
Jamaat-e-Islami
These parties believe in parliamentary politics as the only way to find better solution
to the conflict and crisis between Baloch Nationalists and federal government. All
mainstream political parties except the Jamaat-e-Islami are included in the ruling
combination of Balochistan. Mainstream political parties are usually in favor of
Baloch demands.
5.2. Baloch Nationalist Political Parties
Baloch nationalist parties include:
National Awami Party
National Party
Pakistan National Party
National Party-Hai Group
171
Baloch National Party (Mengal)
Baloch National Party-Awami
Jamhoori Watan Party-Aali
Jamhori Watan Party-Talal
Baloch National Movement
National Awami Party (NAP) was created in 1956 by Nauroz Khan which represents
Baloch independence movement. Pakistan National Party (PNP) is a moderate
Baloch group founded by Ghous Baksch Bizenjo in the 1970, Baloch National
Movement (BNM) led by Ataullah Khan Mengal, Baloch National Party (BNP) was
formed from the merging of the PNP and BNM in 1996. (Grare, 2006: 7-8). The BNP
demands full provincial autonomy. (Baluch, 2002:16)
Jamhori Watan Party was initially founded by Nawab Akbar Bugti. In 2003
Balochistan National Democratic Party (BNDP) decided to merge with the main
faction of Balochistan National Movement (BNM) which was headed by Abdul Hayee
Baloch. The merger of BNDP into BNM created a new party named National Party
chaired by Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch. (Majeed, 2011:105) the National Party is a
strong opposition to the development projects in Balochistan like construction of
Gwadar port, and it demands for Baloch rights to be the masters of their own political
and economic affairs. (ICG, 2006:10)
All these parties believe in Baloch nationalism and demand for political autonomy,
and full control of the natural resources of Balochistan. They also have a great
sense of disliking for intrusion of central government in the provincial matters. This is
an interesting fact that the Baloch nationalists have traditionally been part of
parliamentary politics and have been associated with mainstream politics at the
provincial and federal level. About a decade ago, Baloch leaders like Nawab Akbar
Bugti, Nawab Khair Bux Marri and Sardar Ataullah Mengal were part of the
parliamentary procedure. There are some conflicts and differences found between
and among Baloch tribal leaders and their political nationalist parties. Mengal tribal
172
chief Ataullah Mengal and Akhtar Mengal believe in parliamentary politics, they have
a rejection against violent politics and try to remain within the structure of the
federation. Khair Bukhs Marri believes in fighting for a separate homeland with the
help of violent and armed reactions against government. Interestingly, Marri‟s son,
Changez Marri is a member of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. The grandson of
Akbar Bugti, Brahamdagh Bugti demands an independent Balochistan through
armed insurgency while Bugti‟s sons Talal and Aali, prefer parliamentary politics.
Both Talal Bugti and Aali Bugti are heads of their own splinter groups of Jamhoori
Watan Party. While Brahamdagh Bugti leads his own political party under the title of
Baloch Republican Party. (Majeed, 2011:104)
5.3. Pakhtun Political Parties
There are two prominent Pakhtun political parties:
Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
Awami National Party
Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party was created by Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai
(Majeed, 2011:106) in 1987. The concern of Pakhtun political parties is rooted in
Pakhtun nationalism. These parties are of the view that Baloch and Pakhtuns are
two nations in Balochistan. Pakhtuns have their own unique and separate culture,
language, identity and particular areas of intense inhabitants. The main cause
behind the formation of PKMAP was a dispute between a Pakhtun leader Khan
Abdul Samad Khan and Baloch leader Khair Bakhsh Marri on elevating Balochistan
as an administrative province. PKMAP strongly advocates the belief that there
should be a separate province for pakhtuns or form a or they may be merged with
Pakhtun majority in NWFP. (Shahid, 2002: 79-81). Pakhtun nationalists support
Baloch ideology and struggle for provincial political and economic autonomy but
reject the use of violent means.
173
5.4. Religious Political Parties
The major parties include:
Jammiat-e-Ulema-e Islam
Jammiat-e-Ulema-Pakistan
Religious political parties do not oppose the struggle of the Baloch people based on
the ideology of nationalism but mostly they do not support their militant actions. They
promote the theory of nationalism which is based on Islam, not on ethnicity.
6. Impact of Baloch Militant Organizations on Political
Environment
Currently there are many insurgent groups in Balochistan:
Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
Baloch People‟s Liberation Front (BPLF)
Popular Front for Armed Resistance (PFAR)
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)
Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)
Lashkar-e- Balochistan
Jhalawan Baloch Tigers
Baloch Musallah Difai Organization (BMDO)
The Baloch Haq Talwar (BHT)
Balochistan Students Organization (BSO)
BLA is the most famous nationalist group which strongly demands separation of
Balochistan and alongwith other militant organizations like Balochistan Liberation
Front (BLF), Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and
Jhalawan Baloch Tigers have been resisting against the Central Government. (Iqbal,
2008:2) These groups or parties are called responsible for attacks on gas pipelines,
174
power transmission lines, security check posts, security forces, railway tracks,
government offices, official residences and civilians. („‟Balochistan Problems and
Solutions‟‟, 2011) In 2010, Baloch Liberation Army, Baloch Liberation Front, Baloch
Republican Army, Lashkar-e-Balochistan and Baloch Musallah Difai Organization
were banned by the Government. (Sial and Basit, 2010:20)
The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is leaded by Marri chiefs and has strong hold in
Kohlu, Khuzdar, Quetta, Sibi, Ziarat, Mand, Mastung, Kalat, Makran and Hub
districts. BLA‟s objectives are based on demands for an independent State or more
authority over Balochistan. BLA considers government‟s projects such as Gwadar
Port as an opportunity for the Punjabi community to overpower the Baloch nation.
BLA is largely supported by Baloch people from Afghanistan and Iran. In 2006,
General Pervaiz Musharraf put a ban on the BLA as a terror organization. (The
Nation, 2006, April.10). The Blaoch Haq Talwar (BHT) is also headed by the Khair
Bux Marri to resist the military rule in Balochistan. The Government of Pakistan has
accused his son; Balach Marri for the insurgency of 2005. (Andley, 2006:6)
The Baloch Republican Army is led by Brahamdagh Khan Bugti. It is influencial in
Dera Bugti, Quetta, Mastung, Kalat, Noshki, Naseerabad, Jaffarabad and Chagi.
Brahamdagh Khan Bugti is a prominent Baloch leader. He is the grandson of Nawab
Akbar Bugti. After the split of Jamhoori Watan Party, Brahumdagh Khan Bugti
formed his own faction; Baloch Republican Party. After the death of Akbar Bugti in
2006, he escaped to Afghanistan where he stayed for many years then he got
asylum in Switzerland in 2011. Baloch Republican Party has been financing and
heading terrorist activities in Balochistan. („‟Brahamdagh Bugti Says‟‟ The Dawn,
2012, April.6) Baloch Liberation Front is led by Mengal tribes and has strong
influence in Awaran, Makran and Quetta, Amir Nasir son of Mengal is the founder of
the BLF. Lashkar-e-Balochistan, subjugated by a subtribe of Mengals, is activated in
Lasbela, Makran, Khuzdar, Kalat and Quetta districts. Lashkar-e-Balochistan is
following an anti-state plan, it was created to contradict the objectives of BLA and
BLF and to enhance the authority of Mengals. Baloch Musallah Difai Organization
175
(BMDO) is an anti-separatist organization which was founded by Naseer Mengal, the
chief of a Mengal sub-tribe, to counter the influence of Attaullah Mengal. (Sial and
Basit, 2010:20) BMDO came in the view after the murder of Secretary-General of
Balochistan National Party; Habib Jalib. It is active in Quetta and Khuzdar. (Almeida,
Dawn, July 25, 2010.) Balochistan Students Organization is a political wing of
Baloch youngsters. BSO was founded in1967 and supports the cause of an
independent Balochistan. Somehow the people associated with BSO are involved in
aggressive activities. BSO does not take part in elections. Some of its branches are
linked National Party and Balochistan National Party. (PIPS, 2009: 109-110.) In the
beginning, BSO was under influence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Shah
Muhammad Marri, a prominent Baloch leader, started a campaign for an
amalgamation of Baloch nationalism and the Marxism. He introduced the guerilla
fighting known as Pararis. These Pararis were greatly involved in violent activities
during the years from 1969 to 1972. (Breseeg, 2004:340) The BSO is divided into
three main wings:
BSO-Azad (Independent)
BSO-Pajar, or Bajar
BSO- Mutahidda (United)
BSO-Pajar and BSO- United are the student wings of Balochistan National Party and
National Party. BSO-Azad is an independent wing and is not aligned with any
political organization. BSO-Azad ideologically supports armed struggle and activities
of Baloch Liberation Army and Baloch Republican Army. BSO-Azad was formed in
2006 and is a result of an alliance of three wings of this organization, BSO-
Mutahidda, headed by Dr. Imdad Baloch, BSO-Mengal, of Amanullah Baloch, and
BSO-Hai group, of Asif Baloch. The BSO-Azad is active in those areas which are
under the influence of nationalist political parties. Being a student organization, BSO
has developed a very strong campaign for an independent Balochistan in colleges,
universities and other institutions of higher education in Balochistan. (Sial and Basit,
2010:28)
176
7. Religious Sectarian Groups and Impact on Political
Process
In Balochistan, many religious sectarian groups are present which are accused of
being involved in militant and violent activities in the name of religion. These
sectarian groups include Afghan and Pakistani Taliban known as Tehrik-e-Taliban
Balochistan (TTP), al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
(SSP), Imamia Student Organization, (ISO) and Sipah-e-Muhammad are established
in Balochistan. (Rana, The News, July 29, 2012.) another ethno-sectarian group
Jundullah is also active in Balochistan. (Sial and Basit, 2010:21). These religious
organizations follow their own agenda based on religious ideologies that is somehow
different than that of Baloch cause of struggle for independence. ‗‘Their presence is
partly the result of Pakistani security agencies pushing them there from Punjab,
partly a result of a vast network of Deobandi madrassas, and partly a consequence
of the Islamization policies pursued by the federal state since the 1970s. At the
same time, some analysts credit the Afghan refugee camps in the province as a key
source of recruits for the Taliban.‘‘ (Grare, 2013:17). The close proximity of Quetta to
the Afghan border provides opportunity to Afghan refugees to Baloch region. The
movement of Taliban between Pakistan and Afghanistan is very easy an unchecked.
The areas of Nawankilli, Khurtabad, Pakhtunabad, Killi Khotik Chashma and Killi
Raiti Bulledi in Quetta have large number of Afghans. (The News, 2010, July. 27)
The presence of Taliban is much distinct in Chaman, Khurtabad and Gulistan areas
located on the border of Quetta. Afghans population constitutes almost thirty percent
of total population. (Sial and Bast, 2010:23)
Pakistani Taliban emerged in Balochistan in 2009. They do not admit their
association with the banned organization of Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP). The TTP claims to have an agenda to fight against only non-
Muslims foreign forces that attack and occupy Islamic countries. The TTB rejects
armed struggle against Pakistani security forces and law-enforcement agencies
rather they show their enmity only against the enemies of Islam. (The News, 2009,
177
March .4). Jundullah is an anti-Shia militant squad which is based in the Iran
bordering Chagi, Kharan, Panjgur, Kechand and Gwadar. (The Daily Times, 2007,
April.5) Jundullah identifies itself similar to anti-Shia groups in Balochistan such as
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan to suppress the Shia Muslims of
Balochistan. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Lej) and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) are
two major anti-shia groups and largely supported in Balochistan. LeJ was actually
based in Afghanistan but after the destruction of their camps in Kabul and Kandhar
by US forces in 2001, the moved to Balochistan and settled down in Quetta. SSP is
a supporter of LeJ and provides support for sectarian insurgents of Lashkar-e-
Janghvi. The Imamia Student Organization is popular among Shia youth and is
playing its role in sectarian violence. (The Friday Times, 2012, Aug. 3)
8. Political Development in Balochistan from 2001-2014
This research is intended to analyze the process of political development in
Balochistan during the years from 2001 to 2014. During these fourteen years, the
politics of Pakistan has been in the hands of three different rulers. From 1999 to
2008, political system remained ceased during the rule of Pervez Musharraf. After
the general elections of 2008, Pakistan Peoples Party got a chance to form central
government. In the general elections of 2013, Pakistan Muslim League (N) won and
formed central government of Pakistan. Balochistan has witnessed two democratic
and one military regime during this period.
9. Political Development in Balochistan during Military
Regime of General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008)
After the fourth baloch insurgency of 1973-77 during Bhutto era, the situation of
Balochistan remained slightly peaceful due to the strategic policies of reconciliation
by Gen. Zia ul Haq. This peace lasted for about twenty five years; even the regime
of democratic rule of PPP and PML (N) during the 80‟s and 90‟s, did not witness any
178
uncontrollable violence in the province. The angry baloch nationalist leaders started
to take part in national and provincial politics, though they never backed out of their
basic demands. Many prominent and offensive baloch Sardars rendered their
cooperation to the Central Government for the betterment of political situation in
Balochistan. Two major political parties were established during the democratic era;
Jamhori Watan Party (JWP) by Nawab Akbar Bugti and Balochistan National Party
(BNP) by Sardar Mengal. But the period of democratic government could not remain
stable due to challenging and difficult political circumstances. On 12 October, 1999,
Military General Pervez Musharraf dismissed the democratically elected government
of Nawaz Sharif and imposed marshal law in the country. The political process was
ceased once again and the Baloch nationalists completely rejected military rule.
Pervez Musharraf imposed emergency and declared himself Chief Executive of
Pakistan, he put ban on all the political activities and political parties of Pakistan and
introduced the policy of devolution to centralize the powers. (Ali, 2012:172) the
Constitution of Pakistan was abandoned and suspended, National Assembly,
Senate and all provincial assemblies were dissolved. In August, 2002, he
introduced LFO (Legal Frame work Order) to introduce more changes into the
constitution of Pakistan to got strength as the President of Pakistan. Through LFO,
he assigned the authority of dissolving national and provincial assemblies. In
addition, he also got the power of appointing provincial governors and got control
over Election Commission of Pakistan too. (Askari, 2013:28) all these steps were
taken to assure his own victory in next general elections. Though, initially he did not
show any intentions of holding new elections in ninety days as per policy. On
October 17, 1999 he addressed the nation on television and presented his seven
points as an agenda of his government. (Ali, 2012:173) These points are as under:
I. Reshaping the nation‟s confidence and uplift of the moral of people
II. Disparity removal between the provinces to achieve the goal of national
integration.
III. Rebuilding investing policies to accelerate the economic condition of
Pakistan
179
IV. Preservation of law and order and provision of justice
V. Removal of political elements and activities from key institutions
VI. Decentralization of powers to the masses
VII. Introduction of a quick process of accountability for a corruption free
society.
Musharraf totally ignored the political demands and problems of baloch people;
instead he laid the emphasis completely on economic development. Balochistan,
which was already facing the socio economic problems of high rate poverty, illiteracy
and unemployment, had to suffer a lot in the years of Musharraf regime. The military
operations against baloch insurgents, biased policies and poor control resulted in
extreme decline of Balochistan and became the main cause of significant turn down
in social and political development. (The Dawn, 2008, Nov.2)
9.1. Triggers of Tension between Musharraf and Baloch
Nationalists
I. Construction of Gwadar Port and Mega Development Projects
Musharraf started many mega development projects in Balochistan such as Gwadar
port, Mirani dam, coastal highway, cantonments and the mining of copper and gold,
but due to the defected and improper policies and management, these projects did
not improve the economic as well as political stability of Balochistan as the
development can only be achieved through political stability, trusted local
participation, education, employment opportunities, increased income and peace.
Musharraf believed in the forceful development instead of participatory development,
and that manner was never acceptable for baloch nationalists. Musharraf tried to
bring development in the region by the establishment of military cantonments and
check posts to suppress the politically susceptible Baloch people. (The Dawn, 2008,
Nov.2), which gave rise to chronic and historical grudge of baloch nationalists
180
against military and became the root cause of another baloch revolt. The tension
between the government and nationalist baloch people provoked with the
announcement of mega developmental projects especially the construction of
Gwadar Port with Chinese involvement and assistance, because the
commencement of this project opened the roads for political migration from other
provinces and from China in Balochistan. The influx of Pakhtun, Punjabi and other
foreigners in Balochistan was viewed as an intended effort to marginalize the Baloch
in their own land (Bansal, 2006:50) so the Baloch Sardars strongly opposed and
rejected the construction of Gwadar Port.
II. Clash of Economic Interests with the Non Baloch Communities
The issues such as the demand for provincial autonomy, larger share of revenue
and development funds, payment of insufficient gas royalty, lack of economic
development, proper political representation and control over the natural resources;
have always been major causes behind clash between baloch people and all the
democratic and military governments. The announcement of new mega
infrastructures and proposed industrial zones, opened doors to qualified and skilled
workers and labor from Punjab, Sindh and other areas of Pakistan, in addition,
Musharraf government awarded major work orders to people from Punjab and Sindh
provinces. Since Musharraf took hold of the government, the Baloch leaders have
been feeling insecure due to the army cantonments and the mega projects,
especially the Gwadar port. The baloch nationalist leaders viewed it suspiciously as:
"In the name of gigantic projects is a plan under way to settle the Punjabis in
Balochistan," (Laif and Hamza, 2009: 63). The heavy influx of the Punjabis,
Pakhtuns, Sindhis and Chinese work forces increased the level of apprehensions
about the intentions of government. The already under stress Baloch people;
developed a sense of rivalry regarding their economic interests with the Chinese and
other Pakistanis. Moreover, many ex-servicemen were appointed in tribal areas and
government inducted more pakhtuns from NWFP to Quetta. Some baloch Sardars
were bribed and disinherited by wealthy Punjabis and army personnel. Musharraf
failed to formulate an acceptable procedure for royalties. (Laif and Hamza, 2009: 63)
181
All these steps were alarming to baloch leaders as they could lose their hold over
their own region.
III. Musharraf’s Support for US and War on Terrorism
The incident of 9/11 2001 totally changed the scenario of world politics. The US
government confidently put all the blame on Afghan Taliban and decided to attack
Afghanistan and announced to commence a war against terrorism. Pakistan was
also forced to support and provide assistance to the US as Pakistan was the
neighboring country of Afghanistan and could provide the easiest access to
Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan was among those few countries that had
recognized the Taliban government in Kabul. (Khan, 2011:94). Another phase of
tension between Musharraf and Baloch nationalists started when Musharraf
independently allowed US to use the areas of Pasni, Gwadar, Dalbandin and
Jacababad as their basis to fight against Afghan Taliban without consulting baloch
leaders.
IV. Involvement of Military in Political Decisions of Balochistan
Moreover, Musharraf took another dictatorial decision to involve army for the safety
and security of Chinese and other non baloch workers at the construction site for
Gwadar Port. The Baloch nationalists flared up with that decision and their
resistance got increased. The involvement of military in political decisions without
the prior approval of Baloch nationalist worsen the tension and led to sporadic
attacks on military installations, gas pipelines, foreigners, army check posts, and on
civilians.
V. Devolution of Power Plan (2002)
In 2000, Musharraf initiated a policy to transfer administrative and financial power to
local government. That policy was called political devolution. The policy was
introduced to give strength to local control and accountability and to provide power
182
to backward people by bringing them into mainstream, the policy of devolution
weakened and destabilized the already established political parties on national and
provincial level. With the result, the provincial governments lost their power and
control over the provinces. (ICG, 2004:6). The devolution policy was less helpful in
minimizing corruption and enhancing democracy, instead it made military rule much
stronger and dominant. Subsequently, the risk of internal conflicts increased to a
remarkable level.
Under the Devolution of Power Plan, the new local governments were to be elected
through voting. District and sub-district governments were established in 101
districts to work under Provincial Local Government Ordinance 2001. Every district
had a Nazim and Naib Nazim; equal to mayor and deputy mayor, an elected council
and administration. (ICG, 2004:i) In 2001 Pervez Musharraf announced the Local
Government Ordinance, 2001, the new political set up was a step towards the
establishment of a powerful representative local government, and initially the district
nazim was given full authorities over police, district administration and revenue. The
post of Nazim was equivalent to chief minister of the districts. This new policy was of
devolution was also disliked and rejected by baloch Sardars.
9.2. General Elections of 2002 and Political Scenario of Balochistan
General Pervez Musharraf got his position of President of Pakistan verified through
Supreme Court of Pakistan under the law of necessity and gained above mentioned
powers to amend the constitution for the security of his president ship in future.
Being the president of Pakistan, he was asked by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to
hold general elections within a period of three years. (Khan, 2011:94). General
Musharraf then introduced various controversial amendments to the constitution
after the decision of the Supreme Court. The notification for general elections was
issued in August, 2002 and the polling day was fixed on 10 October, 2002. (Rizvi,
2013:28) the coming up days witnessed drastic change in political scenario and
attitude of political parties throughout Pakistan, especially in Balochistan. The US
183
war on terrorism and support provided to US by Pervez Musharraf caused great
frustration among the Pakhtun population of NWFP and Balochistan. The baloch and
Pakhtuns; both from Balochistan and NWFP have always been very close to
Afghanistan due to Baloch and Pakhtun community in that neighboring country.
Therefore, to show the unity with Afghan brothers, and to oppose Musharraf‟s war
against Taliban, thirty five political and religious parties and groups formed the Pak-
Afghan Defense Council (PADC). The three major religio-political parties of PADC
Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (F), Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (S) and Jamaat-i-Islami, and their
Pakhtun leaders were in the favor of Taliban regime in Afghanistan and had strong
ideological and political affiliations with them. (Khan, 2011:95) PADC strongly and
jointly disapproved Musharraf‟s policy of war against Taliban. In response to their
protest, Musharraf started a concentrated effort against the major religio-political
parties and blamed them for being involved in terrorist activities along with Taliban.
Maulana Samiul Haq of JUI (S) the Chairman of PADC insisted upon the military
government to end the crack down against religious parties (The News, 2002, Jan.
13). In January 2002, General Pervez Musharraf banned the six religious groups of
different sects for their association with terrorists in and outside the country. These
included:
Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan
Tehrik-i-Jaferya Pakistan,
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi,
Jaish-i-Muhammad,
Lashkar-i-Tayaba and
Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (The News, 2002, Jan.17).
These organizations were branches of the major religio-political parties so this ban
was strongly criticized by PADC. In May 2002, Muttahidda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) was
formed by PADC as an electoral union to contest Elections of 2002. (Khan, 2011:95)
MMA included six political parties including:
184
Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazalur Rehman Group)
Jamaat-i-Islami,
Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Samiul Haq Group)
Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan,
Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith Pakistan and
Islami Tehrik-i-Pakistan.
Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani became the president of MMA. It was announced by
the alliance that MMA was formed to introduce the concepts of freedom and unity in
real manner; and a pure Islamic and democratic system will be formulated in
Pakistan.
I. Participating Political Parties
Before the elections, Musharraf established another faction of Pakistan
Muslim League in his own favor and gave it the name of PML-Q. Q stood for
Quaid-e-Azam and Musharraf promoted his party as the biggest leading
political party of Pakistan. Perhaps he was inspired of a previous army ruler,
General Ayub Khan. (Gilani, 2013:61) but unlike Ayub Khan, he did not
became the president of PML-Q, instead he chose a prominent and strong
politician, Ch. Shujaat Hussain to hold the seat of president of PML-Q. This
party was the biggest supporter for Musharraf in the elections 2002 and was
often called „‟The King‟s Party‟‟.
Pakistan Peoples Party and Muslim League-N also participated in the
absence of their leaders; Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif respectively.
Four other small parties united as National Alliance (NA), which included
Millat Party, National People‟s Party, Sindh Democratic Alliance and Sindh
National Front.
The alliance of six major religio-political parties; MMA; has been described
above.
185
From Balochistan, Balochistan National Movement (BNM), Jamhori Watan
Party (JWP) and Balochistan National Party (BNP), Balochistan National
Democratic Party (BNDP) and Balochistan National Congress (BNC)
participated. (http://ecp.gov.pk/GE/2002/GE2002.aspx)
In the absence of their leadership, the PPP established a new party as
Pakistan People‟s Party Parliamentarians,(PPPP) to participate in elections
without any legal complications. PPPP was headed by Makhdoom Amin
Fahim (Rizvi, 2013:29).
II. Influnece of Military on Election Process
The campaign for 2002 Elections could not be justified as a fair process as
Musharraf had been openly criticized for manipulating the whole procedure in favor
of PML(Q) and National Alliance (NA) for his own victory. It is said that military
regime of Musharraf pressurized the politicians to join PML(Q) to gain majority in
king‟s party. The main stream political parties like PPPP and PML (N) were being
disturbed by putting different blames through NAB to level the grounds in favor of the
PML(Q). The national television was also projecting PML (Q). Election Commission
of Pakistan itself was campaigning for the PML(Q) by showing its symbol in the
sample polling advertisement in the national media (Khan, 2011:100). The
Governors, Chief Ministers, Chief Secretaries, and some of the Nazims campaigned
for the PML(Q). it is reported that the offices of the Governors of Punjab and Sindh
were working as campaign Cells for Musharraf‟s party. („‟Election Observer Group
Reports‟‟, 2006: 19-45). Different political parties blamed military government for
harassing and arrest of their workers. It is widely believed that the elections were
engineered by the military regime and had extraordinarily affected the electoral
process for the October 2002 Elections. His aim was to form a parliament which
would give all the powers and authority to the president-cum-army chief of Pakistan.
186
III. Election Results and Political Atmosphere of Balochistan
MMA successfully grabbed the attention of a large population including Pakhtuns,
just because of its anti-US approach and promise of establishing a pure Islamic
system in Pakistan. The MMA called the election as a referendum between the US
agents (Musharraf Government) and Islamic forces and requested the people to vote
for MMA to free the country from the US influence. MMA fielded 183 candidates for
272 seats of the National Assembly out of which 45 were returned. After computing
the women‟s and minority seats, the total members of MMA were 59 in the house of
342. MMA got majority in provincial assemblies of NWFP and Balochistan and
emerged as the largest party of Balochistan with 13 seats. PML(Q) was the second
largest party with 11 seats. The third largest group was of independents. The final
party position of Balochistan Assembly showed that MMA got 18 seats adding the
reserved seats and independents that joined MMA, as compared to 21 of PML(Q) in
the house of 65 members. The Baloch ethnic parties like Balochistan National Party
(BNP) and Jamhoori Wattan Party (JWP) could not be able to grab the attention of
their voters and it was also an exceptional change in the political scenario of
Balochistan. MMA exploited the Islamic sentiments of the Baloch and Pakhtun
people, this was the biggest reason of MMA‟s success in Balochistan because MMA
was the only party that was evidently opposing General Musharraf and his role in
war on terror. Through MMA‟s success, people of Balochistan showed their mistrust
upon General Musharraf and his policies regarding Afghanistan and US.
Table. No. 5.1. National Assembly Seats from All Pakistan in Election 2002
Source: Gilani, Ijaz Shafi, Interpretation, Part Two from ‗‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan; A Story of Pakistan‘s Transition From Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under Rule of Law 1970-2013‘‘. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. (PILDAT) p.62
Name of Party Votes % Seats Won
PPPP 26 63
PML (Q) 26 78
PML (N) 12 15
MMA 11 45
MQM 3 13
Independent 9 28
All Others 13 30
Total 100 272
187
Table No. 5.2. National Assembly Seats from Balochistan
Party
All Balochistan Balochistan-1
Quetta Zone
Balochistan-2
Kalat and Makran Zone
Votes % Seats Votes % Seats
MMA 22 6 38 4 11 2
PML (Q)/ Others 16 2 13 - 17 2
JWP 8 1 0 - 14 1
PKMAP 8 1 19 1 1 0
BNP 11 1 - - - -
Independent 7 1 4 0 9 1
Regional/Others 39 3 26 1 48 2
100 14 100 6 100 8
Source: Gilani, Ijaz Shafi, Dr. (May 2013). (May 2013). Electoral Data: Its Deconstruction and Interpretation, Part Two from ‗‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan; A Story of Pakistan‘s Transition From Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under Rule of Law 1970-2013‘‘. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative
Development and Transparency. (PILDAT) p-64
Table No. 5.3. Party Position in National Assembly 2002
Sr. No. Party Seats Won
1 Pakistan Muslim League-Q PML-Q 130
2 Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal MMAP 59
3 Pakistan People‟s Party Parliamentarian PPPP 63
4 Pakistan Muslim League-N PML-N 18
5 Muttahida Quomi Movement MQM 18
6 Pakistan Peoples Party PPP 19
7 National Alliance NA 16
8 Balochistan National Party BNP 1
9 Jamhori Watan Party JWP 1
10 Pakistan Awami Tehreek PAT 1
11 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf PTI 1
12 Pakistan Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party PPMAP 1
13 Independent Candidates IND 14
TOTAL 342
Source: http://www.geo.tv/election2008/statistics_links.html#2 on 30 June, 2015
188
Table No. 5.4. Composition of Senate 2002
Sr. No. Province General Seats Women Technocrats Total
1 Islamabad 2 1 1 4
2 Punjab 14 4 4 22
3 Sindh 14 4 4 22
4 NWFP 14 4 4 22
5 Balochistan 14 4 4 22
6 FATA 8 0 0 8
Total 68 17 17 100 Source: http://www.geo.tv/election2008/statistics.html on 30 June, 2015
IV. Formation of Government
Pakistan Muslim League (Q) was the largest party in National Assembly with 118
seats. The second largest party was PPPP with 80 seats and third largest was the
MMA with 59 seats. None of them was in a position to shape the government. MMA
negotiated with PML(Q) to form combined government but they could not reach at
any decision. The military regime tried to deal with MMA for the formation of central
government but negotiations failed due to some major demands from MMA; firstly
they demanded the post of prime minister and secondly, they wanted a confirmation
from General Musharraf that he would leave the seat of Chief of the Army Staff. The
MMA also demanded the abolition of pro-US policies adopted by Musharraf and all
those demands were not acceptable to General Musharraf for many reasons. Firstly,
when Musharraf agreed to join hands with US in their war on terror, after 9/11, his
alliance with a party having pure Islamic ideology and sense of hatred for US war
against Afghanistan, would have create a negative impact on Pak-US relations,
secondly MMA was demanding the post of Prime Minister for Maulana Fazalur
Rehman which was never acceptable even on the national level. General Musharraf
himself stated that the Maulana personally tried to convince him for the post of Prime
Minister and assured a very friendly approach towards the US. Moreover he was
also ready to lend a support against Al-Qaeda and all other extremists. (Musharraf,
2006:175-176). General Musharraf wanted to make PML-Q the most powerful party
189
as to form the supporting government. So efforts to win majority did not stop and
PML-Q succeeded in gaining support from some independent members of National
Assembly, some members from other different parties also agreed to co-operate
with PML-Q. PML- Q also got the support of MQM, which had 17 National Assembly
seats, in addition, the defectors from the main stream party, PPPP were also
approached to support PML-Q to form the central government and they succeeded
in winning the support of 10 members of PPPP, from national assembly .(Rizvi,
2013:30) PML-Q nominated Zafar ullah Jamali for the post of Prime Minister, the
inauguration session of National assembly was held on 16 November, 2002 and
elected Mir Zafar ullah Jamali as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Balochistan
assembly was inaugurated on November 28 and Jam Mir Muhammad Yousaf, from
PML-Q, took the oath as the head of an aliened government. (Rizvi, 2013:31)
9. 3. Detachment of Baloch Tribal Leaders from Political Process
The three prominent baloch Sardars; Ataullah Mengal, Nawab Khair Bukhsh Marri
and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti remained absent from political scenario during this
period, their major emphasis was on their inter-tribal affairs or protest against military
regime of Musharraf through other means instead of taking part in political process.
Their absence and inactive role as political leaders created a vacuum in the political
set up of Balochistan and provided golden opportunity to religious minded political
parties to gain control over the political matters of Balochistan. Khair Bukhsh Marri,
and Sardar Attaullah Mengal, had been in self exile, and Nawab Bugti had confined
himself to Dera Bugti. During the absence of the former two leaders, Balochistan
had been facing various tribal disputes and many tribal sardars were killed in
clashes among various tribes. (Baloch, 2002, Oct.18.The Dawn) When Marri and
Mengal returned to Balochistan, they were expected to become more active political
leaders, but those prevailing tribal disputes were more important to them so they
devoted their time to the resolution of such clashes. Their absence from political
scene caused many important developments. The religious parties had got a chance
190
to establish themselves and they had also started influencing the areas of Baloch
nationalists.
Nawab Bugti could very efficiently play a leading role in Baloch politics by uniting all
groups of Baloch nationalists including Pakhtun nationalist community because he
was equally honored by the Pakhtuns. But his political inactivity provided a chance
to his opposite elements of creating problems for him by inciting inter tribal feuds.
His appointments in tribal conflicts affected his political role and there was no other
such influenced person who could re-unite the scattered nationalistic politics. Sardar
Ataullah Mengal, was disqualified from taking part in the 2002 election because he
did not possess graduate degree, which was made mandatory by constitutional
amendments to participate in elections. Nawab Marri did not pay much attention to
politics when he returned from Afghanistan after fourteen years; he gave all his time
to the rehabilitation of his companions. Moreover, he had to face a rebellion from a
fraction of his own tribe; Bijarani Tribe; who had refused to accept Nawab Marri as
their chief. (The Dawn, 2002, Oct.18)
9.4. Akbar Bugti’s 15 Point Agenda to Musharraf Government
In 2004, the leader of Jamhoori Watan Party, and chief of Bugti tribe, Nawab Akbar
Khan Bugti formulated a 15-point charter of demands on behalf of baloch
nationalists and forwarded it to National Security Council to resolve Balochistan all
the issues. The 15-point demand included:
i. Provincial autonomy according to the will of the baloch people.
ii. Baloch people should be considered as the real owners of their natural
resources and their own affairs should not be interfered.
iii. Balochistan government should be given powers to deal with all the
administrative, financial and planning matters and schemes related to
mega projects including Gwadar and other infrastructure such as coastal-
belt schemes.
191
iv. The revenue generated from mega projects should be totally at provincial
government‟s disposal. employment in the projects should be the right of
the local population;
v. The establishment of army cantonments at resource rich areas should be
abandoned and land acquired by force be returned to owners.
vi. Rectification of the revenue record.
vii. Senate should represent the four federating units and inclusion of
Islamabad and Fata in the Upper House by canceling the amendments
made during Zia ul Haq's regime.
viii. The levies force recruited by the ISI in the Marri area to suppress
tribesmen should be disbanded.
ix. All armed forces from central Balochistan should be withdrawn.
x. The provincial government should control all civil armed forces.
xi. The provincial assembly should be authorized to draw laws for
Balochistan.
xii. In the federating units the federal law should not override the provincial
laws.
xiii. Problems of gas companies should be resettled
xiv. All prisoners kept under various political reasons allegations should be
released. (The Dawn, 2004, Sep.22)
But General Musharraf, just like a military dictator, refused to negotiate over these
points with Bugti and other Baloch Sardars, and preferred a forced implication of law
192
and order through army actions and tried to resolve all the political issues by using
power instead of peaceful talks.
9.5. Baloch Armed Revolt against Musharraf
Although, the reasons behind baloch conflict which started during Musharraf regime
and took the form of an ongoing insurgency, have been discussed many times from
different angles in the previous chapters of this research, however it is needed to
give the highlights again just to maintain the continuity of the topic. The harsh and
non cooperative attitude of Musharraf Government provided a strong cause of
resistance to baloch tribes, as a reaction, BLA launched a large scale militant
movement and started attacks on government installations. The JWP leader Nawab
Akbar Bugti considered army reaction as a matter of disrespect and an attack on
their honor. So he fully supported the baloch rebellions. The militant protest resulted
in various attacks on military and Sui gas installations. In January 2005, the
nationalists started to detain Sui gas field. The fight lasted for four days with heavy
firing from both sides and Nawab Akbar Bugti supported banned groups. The
situation got more tensed when Musharraf and Commander of the Paramilitary force
were attacked by the insurgents during their visit to Kohlu, where a new army
cantonment was to be established. (Ahmad, Daily Times, 20 Dec. 2005). The
military responded in a hostile way and Musharraf threatened Baloch Sardars, he
said, ―It is not the 70‘s and we will not climb mountains behind them, they will even
not know what and from where something has come and hit them‖ (Zaidi, Herald,
2005). The baloch Sardar, Mengal gave reply as: ―It is not the 70‘s for us, it is also
not the 70s for them. If there is any change, it will be for all. If we have to face
severe consequences of change, then they will also not be in a comfortable
position‖. (Hussain, News Line Magazine, 2005:23).
The same year, In December, BLA fired rockets on a meeting between Musharraf
and some tribal chiefs in kohlu. In response, the security forces attacked the Marri
tribes and not only hurt Marri tribesmen but also damaged some area of Dera Bugti.
193
(Shahid, Daily Dawn. 19 Dec. 2005) The Baloch militants were viewed as
challenging force to the writ of the government. The whole Balochistan came under
the influence of their attacks. They blamed Musharraf for using poisonous gases to
smash the baloch militants. It is reported that at least six army brigades and
paramilitary forces were involved in the operation against baloch people with heavy
ammunition such as combat jets, gunship helicopters and artillery to hammer baloch
militant camps (ICG, 2006:9)
Table No. 5.5. Baloch Militant Attacks on Government Installations 2001-2011
Year Target Killing Bomb Blast Rocket Attacks Sabotage Acts
2001 19 42 22 9
2002 25 40 25 25
2003 20 33 30 30
2004 20 40 20 30
2005 40 69 30 40
2006 95 210 150 90
2007 90 250 140 110
2008 80 290 112 80
2009 203 340 280 103
2010 353 329 275 120
Source: Saeed, Rehana Hashmi, (2013) The Politics of Ethnicity: An Issue to National Integration to Pakistan, PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore, Chapter 3, Page no. not available, accessed from accessed from www.eprints.hec.gov.pk/10860 on 30 June 2015
194
Table No. 5.6. Killed and Injured Persons during 2001-2011
Year No. of Attacks Killed People Injured People
2011 640 710 853
2010 737 600 1117
2009 792 386 1070
2008 692 296 807
2007 536 224 564
2006 403 277 676
2005 154 92 190
2004 130 70 160
2003 100 65 165
2002 90 50 140
2001 10 45 100
Source: Source: Saeed, Rehana Hashmi, (2013) The Politics of Ethnicity: An Issue to National Integration to Pakistan, PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore, Chapter 3, Page no. not available, accessed from www.eprints.hec.gov.pk/10860 on 30 June 2015
9.6. Musharraf’s Policy to Appease Baloch Wrath: The Relief
Package 2005
A significant step was taken in 2002 with the announcement of the Senate
Committee on Balochistan to resolve the issues between government and baloch
Sardars. The objective behind the formation of the committee was to discuss matters
ranging from security issues especially the de-escalation of the confrontation
between security forces and Bugti tribal militias, to the other issues such as the jobs
for local baloch, renewal of royalties, provincial monetary awards, legal check on
non-local landownership, and the purchase of land for military cantonments. The
parliamentary committees proceeded with the hope that the solution to all these
various issues could be determined within the federal frame (Gazdar, 2006:4100). In
195
2004, the Prime Minister Ch. Shujaat Hussain ordered the establishment of this
committee to pay attention to the political demands and respond to the grievances of
baloch people. The result was a report that recommended significant changes in the
government‟s military, political, economic, and energy policies regarding
Balochistan. („‟Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan‟‟, 2005:9) The committee
was formed to inspect the circumstances in Balochistan and to give suggestion for
improvement. The Committee submitted its report in 2005 which has been
discussed in detail in chapter four of this research. However, the reopr included
many reforms regarding revenues, Gwadar Port , jobs and check posts. („‟Senate of
Pakistan‟‟, 2005:95-101).
The Baloch nationalists gave a profound response to the committee‟s report and a
significant drop in insurgent violence was noticed. Although the representatives of
Balochistan National Party, National Party and Jamhoori Watan Party boycotted the
parliamentary committee‟s meetings because there was no clause to address the
demand of Provincial Autonomy which was the nucleus issue. He said; ‗‘the
committee had vindicated their apprehensions about its incompetence as it had
reiterated the Mushahid‘s report which was already made public and which offered
only ‗cosmetic resolutions‘ of the problem‘‘. (The Dawn, 2015, June.24). The
recommendations of the report were declared public in June, 2005 after several
discussions with baloch leaders. The approved recommendation were named as
The Relief Package for Balochistan and included:
A development package for the province worth Rs. 10 billion.
The package includes Rs. 1 billion for hospitals, Rs. 2 billion for Sui, Rs.3
billion for Gwadar and Rs.4 billion for the improvement of Quetta.
5.4 percent of job quota in the federal government for Baloch people.
In the job quota the people of Gwadar would be given first priority, then from
Makran and then from entire Balochistan. The Baloch apprehension being
outsiders' dominance in new jobs that are to be created by the mega projects
currently under way in the Gwadar area, it has been suggested that the first
preference for such jobs should be local candidates, and the second
196
preference should be given to people of Mekran and other parts of
Balochistan.
Fishermen disturbed due to the construction at Gwadar, would be given
proper compensations.
Gas and petroleum royalty should be rewarded to the areas from where they
were extracted.
The royalty arrears, the volume of which is to be determined by the relevant
provincial and federal authorities, be paid soon.
Baloch people would be representated on the board of directors of the Oil and
Gas Development Company and the Sui Southern Gas Company.
5.7 percent of all posts lying vacant with the Federal government should be
filled with candidates from Balochistan in line with an earlier constitutional
commitment
A one-time waiver on gas charges would be provided in local areas and
Balochistan is likely to have a share of more than Rs.6 trillion as arrears of
gas royalty which would ultimately help develop civic facilities of the so far
neglected areas.
The Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court would investigate the
irregularity in the land Sale at Gwadar.
The Coast Guards and Frontier Constabulary would only check smuggling of
drugs and other goods in the border areas and all other checkposts would be
eradicated.
To manage the affects of droughts, construction of new dams would be
initiated including waiver of government dues. (The Dawn, 2015, Jun. 24)
But these parliamentary recommendations could not be helpful enough to control
outrageous baloch militants as there was no proper implementation seen in this
regard. Moreover the constant attacks by baloch militants and counter attacks by
military, had reached at its peak after a rape incident of a lady doctor by FC
personnel in the same year. The violence and anger of baloch people went out of
control with the assassination of Nawab Bugti on 26 August 2006 by the military
197
forces of Musharraf. This great incident brought a new and more powerful wave of
aggressive revolt in Balochistan and Bugti‟s death made baloch tribes more united
and determined about their cause. He became the hero and symbol of Baloch
resistance for their identity and independence. Consequently, the violence broke out
across Balochistan the Musharraf government was still insisting to establish “the writ
of the government” by using all means (The Dawn, 2006, Feb.4). This time the
insurgency got support not only from the other tribes but most of the Baloch living in
other countries were involved ideologically in their struggle for identity.
9.7. Amnesty Offer by Musharraf to Baloch Insurgents
When all the tactics applied by military failed to subdue the baloch militants and their
damaging attacks, Musharraf adopted a new policy to control the wide spread
insurgency by baloch militant groups by taking a step towards the process of
reconciliation and announced amnesty for all baloch insurgents and showed his
interest in peaceful talks with a promise that government would not take any action
against all those baloch insurgents willing to surrender. He stated: "Our doors are
open to everybody willing to negotiate for peace and development in Balochistan, I
would not beg anybody to come to the dialogue table, If somebody wants to meet
me, he should come forward… I am ready to meet him," (Shahid, The Dawn, 2006,
Dec.9) he stated that he wanted the development of neglected Balochistan. ―And for
the purpose, I am ready to hold talks with anybody, I don‘t believe in finding
temporary solutions. I want permanent solutions to all issues," he said. (Shahid, The
Dawn, 9 Dec.2006)
9.8. Baloch Response to Amnesty Offer
But the political leaders and tribal Sardars of Balochistan rejected his offer because
of his typical rude attitude as he warned them to be ready for more destruction by
army in case they would not accept his offer of amnesty. The baloch leaders viewed
that kind of threat as an insult to their honor and dignity. Weapons are always
considered a part of Baloch personal luggage and a sign of their honor. No serious
198
efforts have been made by any government to de-weaponize the province in the
past and it has always been a tradition of Baloch tribes to take refuge in the hills of
Balochistan while protesting against government. According to baloch tribes, the
army itself was responsible for their armed protest by launching a military operation
against Nawab Bugti, which resulted in his assassination and caused an extensive
resentment against the military. The conditional offer of amnesty by Musharraf was
viewed with great sense of hatred by many Baloch leaders as quoted in the national
newspapers. Nawabzada Baramdagh Bugti, the grandson of Akbar Bugti and the
founder of a split wing of Jamhori Watan Party; Baloch Republican Party; went to
self-exile after that assassination of Akbar Bugti; rejected the offer and said: ―The
Baloch resistance is not confined to just two tehsils (in Balochistan). Militants are
forcefully resisting government forces in vast areas of Balochistan, the rulers are
trying to find a way to pull their forces out of the area because of the severe
resistance being offered by Baloch insurgents‘‘. (Shahid, The Dawn, May 19, 2007).
Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo of the National Party declared that the suggestion of
surrender was very annoying to baloch people as they were offended with the tone
adopted by Musharraf. The Baloch were struggling for their rights and Musharraf
should not have been treated them as foreign invaders by ordering them to
surrender with the threat of terrible penalty. ―Such threats are hurled only when
someone is fighting a foreign enemy or those who are against the state. This is not
the case in Balochistan. People are struggling for their legitimate rights, after the
killing of Nawab Bugti, General Musharraf should have apologized to the nation, and
especially to the Baloch people.‖ (Shahid, The Dawn, May 19, 2007). Almost all the
political leaders and insurgent groups unanimously rejected the offer and were
totally against the attitude adopted by Musharraf. They all were of the opinion that it
was military that forced Baloch people to take up arms for their constitutional and
legal rights. In a tribal society, everyone hates the word “surrender”. ―If they are
really sincere about resolving the Balochistan issue, they should hold meaningful
negotiations with Baloch and Pakhtun leaders and settle all issues, otherwise, the
situation would worsen. They are taking whimsical decisions without any respect for
199
people‘s will, now, the situation is beyond amnesty and such offers would not bring
about any change.‖ (Shahid, The Dawn, May 19, 2007)
10. Political Development in Balochistan during
Democratic Regime of Pakistan Peoples Party (2008-
2013)
Pervez Musharraf was elected as the President from a parliament, but when five
weeks were left in the expiration of his term, he issued the controversial National
Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) on October 5, 2007, under which all the cases
against many politicians were closed. (Rizvi, 2013:33) After that Benazir Bhutto,
Chairperson of PPP and Nawaz Sharif, leader of PML-N, the two big leaders of
mainstream political parties returned to Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto arrived on Oct 18,
2007, and Nawaz Sharif on Nov 25, 2007. The return of these political leaders
brought electrifying change in the election environment. (Mehdi, The Dawn, Apr.16,
2013) but prior to election 2008, the murder of Benazir Bhutto on 27 December,
2007, caused a change in the leadership of PPP and his husband; Asif Ali Zardari;
decided to lead PPP as acting chairperson in the coming up elections. According to
the available data, 49 political parties participated in 2008 elections, out of which
only Balochistan National Party, Balochistan National Party (Awami) contested for
National and Provincial assemblies. Most of the nationalist parties boycotted the
2008 elections because of the killing of Akbar Bugti. Their decision caused a
massive manipulation in the polling process. (Grare, 2013:11)
10.1. Boycott of Baloch Nationalist Leaders of Elections 2008
Most prominent Baloch nationalist parties did not contest the general elections in
2008 as a protest against military operations, extrajudicial killings and the illegal
detention of political workers. Three parties, Jamhori Watan Party, Balochistan
National Party (Mengal) and National Party decided to boycott the elections
2008.(Rizvi, 2013:34). The absence of major political leaders and their parties in
200
2008 elections provided a golden opportunity to tribal leaders who were more pro-
establishment to take over an election whose reliability always remained
questionable and who could never get a chance to come forward in the presence of
prominent nationalist baloch leaders. With the abrasion of state authority and the
control of security forces over vast areas, Balochistan was rapidly moving towards a
disappointing situation of lawlessness.
10.2. Election Process and Formation of Government
The general elections 2008 were contested mainly between three mainstream
political parties PML-N, PML-Q and PPP. This time, the PPP, led by Asif Ali Zardari,
topped in the tripartite elections. The party got three million votes, 95 general seats.
Moreover, it won in all the provinces of Pakistan. With the addition of seats reserved
for women and minorities, the PPP‟s numbers at the federal level went to 122. The
co-chairman of Pakistan Peoples Party, Asif Ali Zardari was elected the President in
September 2008. (Mehdi, The Dwan, Apr.16, 2013)
Table No. 5.7. Composition of the National Assembly 2008
Province General Seats Seats Reserved for
Women
Total Seats Reserved for Non
Muslims
Federal
Capital
2 - 10
Punjab 148 35
Sindh 61 14
NWFP 35 8
FATA 12 -
Balochistan 14 3
Total 272 60
Grand Total 342
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, General Elections 2008, Report Volume II, p- (ii), retrieved from www.ecp.gov.pk/Misc/ReportGeneralElection2008Vol-II.pdf on 13 July, 2015
201
Table No. 5.8. Composition of the Provincial Assemblies 2008
Assembly General
Seats
Seats Reserved for
Women
Total Seats Reserved for
Non Muslims
Total
Punjab 297 66 8 371
Sindh 130 29 9 168
NWFP 99 22 3 124
Balochistan 51 11 3 65
Total 577 128 23 728
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, General Elections 2008, Report Volume II, p-(iii) retrieved from www.ecp.gov.pk/Misc/ReportGeneralElection2008Vol-II.pdf on 13 July, 2015
Table No. 5.9. Party Position in National Assembly 2008
Party Votes % Seats
PPP 31% 89
PML-Q 23% 42
PML-N 20% 68
MQM 7% 19
ANP 2% 10
Independent 11% 30
All Others 6% 13
Total 100% 271 Source: Gilani, Ijaz Shafi, Dr. (May 2013). (May 2013). Electoral Data: Its Deconstruction and
Interpretation, Part Two from ‗‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan; A Story of Pakistan‘s Transition From Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under Rule of Law 1970-2013‘‘. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. (PILDAT) p 65
Table No. 5.10. National Assembly Seats from Balochistan 2008
Party All Balochistan Balochistan-1 Quetta-Zhob Zone
Balochistan-2 Kalat and Makran Zone
Votes% Seats Votes% Seats Votes% Seats
PPP 22 4 23 2 22 2
PML-N/IJI 4 - 8 - 1 -
PML-Q/O 5 4 23 1 23 3
JUI-F/MMA 13 2 23 2 6 -
Independent 24 3 13 1 33 2
Regional/Others 34 1 10 1 15 1
Total 100 14 100 6 100 8 Source: Gilani, Ijaz Shafi, Dr. (May 2013). (May 2013). Electoral Data: Its Deconstruction and
Interpretation, Part Two from ‗‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan; A Story of Pakistan‘s Transition From Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under Rule of Law 1970-2013‘‘. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. (PILDAT) p-67
202
Table No. 5.11. Provincial Assembly Party Position Balochistan 2008
Party Seats
PPP 14
PML-N 0
PML 19
MQM 0
ANP 4
MMA 9
PML-F 0
BNP-A 7
PPP-S 0
NPP 0
MJUF 1
JUI-S 0
NP 1
PMLZ 0
Independent 10
Total 65 Source: Party Position National Assembly, (2012, Dec.18) retrieved from
http://ecp.gov.pk/Misc/PartyPosition/PAPosition.pdf on 14 July, 2015
10.3. PPP and Political Development of Balochistan
When Zardari became the president of Pakistan, Balochistan had been suppressed
politically and economically by the military and the baloch people were completely
alienated from the mainstream politics. The leading Baloch political parties;
Jamhoori Watan Party, Balochistan National Party (Mengal) the Pakhtoonkhwa Milli
Awami Party, and the National Party of refused to the 2008 elections.
During Musharraf regime, the massive attacks from both sides pushed Balochistan
back to the Stone Age. In addition, arrests of many political leaders and workers,
ban on political activities and most importantly, killing of Akbar Bugti, had completely
alienated the Baloch people and caused serious problems in the relations between
Government and baloch nationalists. Due to the policies adopted by Musharraf,
Balochistan lost ideological support for the Baloch people in the other provinces of
Pakistan. Asif Ali Zardari, adopted an understanding political approach to address
the baloch grievances and deprivations. Zardari, in his maiden speech mentioned
203
that, ―for every hope, we need a plan and for every plan, we need an agenda,
without doubt, a heavy national agenda challenges your government. This is the
agenda of moving quickly to heal the wounds of past, to restore the trust in the
federation; tendering an apology to the people of Balochistan was a long overdue
step. The release from the captivity of the former chief minister of Balochistan is also
a positive move. The resolution recently of the long standing dispute and payments
of billions of rupees to Balochistan is a step in the right direction but much more
needs to be done…the federation, it needs to be strengthened for this the bitterness
of the past must give way to reconciliation and harmony. I believe that the 1973
constitution is the only consensus document that can freshen such a social contract.
I also request the government to start the consensus building process on the
provincial autonomy and allotment of resources through a new formula that meets
the needs of a united federation.‖ (Chandran, 2008:3)
I. Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package 2009 The federal leadership made efforts to calm tension; the PPP apologized for the
abuses committed in Balochistan. Asif Ali Zardari showed intentions to restore
Baloch confidence in the Center. The government constituted an all party
parliamentary committee to explore the Baloch sufferings and give proposals for
their resolutions. During Musharraf regime, two committees were also formed to
negotiate with the Baloch leaders but their recommendations were not accepted by
the baloch nationalists. In October 2009, the Reconciliatory Committee on
Balochistan disclosed its plan for settlement with Baloch nationalists, the renovation
of provincial institutions, and a new formula to reallocate resources. (“Balochistan
Matters,” The Dawn, October 28, 2012.). A political development took place in
November 2009 when Baloch were assured for more political autonomy. On
November 24, the government presented a 39-point plan before the Parliament for a
more sovereign Balochistan, the “Balochistan Package.” This included the safe
return of political leaders in exiles, the release of Baloch political activists from jails,
the army‟s withdrawal from significant areas, job opportunities, and more provincial
204
authority to Balochistan to control its own resources. In the Balochistan Package,
the government tried to cover and address all preliminary Baloch grievances,
including the most controversial issues such as the release of political workers from
jails, political dialogue, investigations into missing persons, and judicial inquiries.
The package also included provisions related to the economic situation of
Balochistan and showed an initiative to transmit additional funds and to create jobs
for baloch people. (Grare, 2013:12) To show the real concern about the baloch
grievances against military and government, The Balochistan Package also gave
recommendations for the formation of a commission to investigate the incident of
assassination of famous baloch leader, Akbar Bugti including the judicial
investigation into the circumstances of killing of other prominent baloch leaders. The
baloch were also assured of the withdrawal of army and construction of proposed
army cantonments at Kohlu, Sui and Dera Bugti. In addition, the baloch leaders were
promised for holding serious efforts to locate the missing persons during insurgency.
(PILDAT, 2012:20). It was proposed that no more mega development project would
be launched in Balochistan without seeking consent from baloch government.
Special development plan for the rehabilitation of people of Kohlu, Sui and Dera
Bugti was presented and one billion rupees for the settlement of local people from
these areas, was also promised. The provincial and district government shall be
awarded with more share in gas revenues and profits from explorations and the
areas of gas exploration would be provided with gas facility on priority basis. In
addition, representatives from Balochistan would be appointed at OGDCL and PPL.
(Hamid, 2009:12)
II. Baloch Nationalist’s Response to Balochistan Package
As usual, the extremist baloch nationalist leaders immediately objected to the plan
because they wanted complete provincial autonomy in terms of political and
economic matters. Some moderate Baloch nationalists also showed their concerns
over those proposals due to their old apprehension of being deceived and they could
not be convinced that self-government was the only solution to all the issues and
205
problems faced by Balochistan and its people. All the major Baloch nationalists
rejected the Balochistan Package and it could not be put into operation in its true
sense. Despite all the efforts by government for the settlement of the crisis, the
situation of peace in Balochistan was getting bad to worst. Suicide bombing, target
killing, sectarian violence, rocket fire, bombing on military cantonments and
government installations were not stopped by baloch militants.
The Baloch nationalist called the Balochistan package a charity for Balochistan and
they totally rejected it. The Baloch union of eight parties; BNF rejected the proposal
at once without leaving an option of negotiation on it with the government instead
they demanded complete independence. Harbiyar Marri, a son of Khair Bakhsh
Marri said: ‗‘no change had come in the mindset of the Pakistani rulers, we even
cant imagine any agreement with Pakistani rulers until and unless Balochistan
becomes an independent State‘‘. (The News, 2009, Nov. 25) . He further objected
on the formation of only a judicial commission by the President Asif Ali Zardari, to
investigate into killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti while he was spending millions to
look into the killing of Benazir Bhutto through United Nations.
Baloch leader and former President of National Party, Abdul Hayee Baloch also
rejected the package and demanded for Constitutional rights; ‗'Pakistan is a multi-
national State and all nationalities should be given equal rights‘‘, (The News, 2009,
Nov. 25) he further stated that it was Pervez Musharraf who killed Akbar Bugti but
PPP government is not taking any action against him. Attaullah Mengal stated as :‘'I
deem even any comment on this package an insult, rulers of this country did not
bother during last 60 years to know what is the real problem of Balochistan‘‘.Senator
Abdul Malik Baloch called the package a fraud and nothing else, 'without accepting
the right of ownership of Balochistan on its resources and coast, problems will not be
solved‘‘, Jamil Bugti, son of Akbar Bugti viewed it as a strategy to switch the
concentration of people from National Reconciliation Ordinance issued by
Musharraf. Packages, committees and commissions were no more trustworthy for
Baloch people. They rejected the package and demanded for a social contract which
should guarantee the rights of self-determination to the baloch people. Pakhtun
206
Khuwa Milli Awami Party also refused to accept the Balochistan Package with the
objection of being absolutely ignored in the Package. (The News, 2009, Nov. 25)
Former head of Jamaat-i-Islami Balochistan Abdul Haq Hashmi was of the opinion
that the demand for provincial autonomy has always been an important problem of
Balochistan which the government did not include in the package.
III. Political and Financial Autonomy through 18th Constitutional
Amendment and 7th National Finance Commission Award
The issue of Provincial autonomy has always been one of the biggest matters of
concern between provinces and the federal government. An effort to resolve this
issue in a political manner was made by PPP, with the 18th amendment in the
constitution of Pakistan on April 8, 2010. (Mujahid, 2012:145). The 18th Amendment
brought important institutional changes as it eliminated the Concurrent Legislative
List (CLL) of the Constitution and made some changes in the Federal Legislative List
(FLL). The CLL was transferred to the provinces, with the only exception of
electricity which was brought under FLL. Fifteen Ministries and seventeen Divisions
of the Federal Government were delegated to the provinces. The economic authority
of the provinces was simultaneously improved though some functions of ministries
remained at the federal level, but also being transferred as a joint responsibility of
the federal and provincial governments. The 18th Amendment was aimed at more
balanced and decentralized structure of government of Pakistan with an increased
empowerment by the provinces. (Pasha, 2011:7) the constitution of Pakistan, 1973,
had been modified many times by the army dictators according to their own interests
and requirements. With the 18th amendment, it became more democratic and
parliamentary which was needed for political instability in Pakistan. It was a great
demand of time to reinstate the 1973 Constitution and to modify the authorities
which were given to the president by Zia ul Haq and General Pervez Musharaf. The
changes made in the Constitution by military dictators had destabilized the
democratic institutions and deprived the provinces of their legal rights. (Mujahid,
2012:149). Therefore, the 18th amendment is called the historic event which
207
abolished the Concurrent Legislative List and entitled the Provincial Governments to
legislate on their subjects. Under the amendment, 102 articles were reviewed, 69
articles were cancelled, 20 articles were substituted and inserted 7 new articles. It
also revoked 4 articles and the 6th and 7th Schedules. It inserted article 25-A
according to which the state is responsible to provide free education to all children.
(„‟18th Amendment Bill‟‟, 2010, April.19). The new amendment brought a significant
change to the political culture of Pakistan as it introduced parliamentary type of
government instead of semi-presidential. Under the new amendment, North-West
Frontier Province was renamed as „Khyber Pakhtunkhwa‟ and the word
“Baluchistan” was replaced with the word “Balochistan” and “Sind” with the word
“Sindh”. („‟18th Amendment Bill‟‟, 2010, April.19)
The 18th amendment was aimed to address the baloch demand of control over their
natural resources through Article 172-3 which states that the Provincial and Federal
Government will be mutual and equal owners for any Mineral Oil and Gas explored
in Balochistan. The Article 158 states that: ―The Province in which a well-head of
natural gas is situated shall have precedence over other parts of Pakistan in meeting
the requirements from that well-head, subject to the commitments and obligations as
on the commencing day‖. (Tareen, March 6, 2015)
Table No. 5.12 Natural Gas Production and Consumption among the Provinces
2009
Province Total Gas Produced
MMIC (Percent of Total
Production)
Total Gas Consumed
MMIC (Percent of Total
Production)
Consumption as
Percentage of
Production
Sindh 1,000,415 (70%) 459,369 (37.59%) 45.91%
Punjab 68,608 (4%) 638,008 (52.21%) 930%
KPK 26,370 (1%) 42,480 (3.48%) 161%
Balochistan 318,188 (22%) 82,138 (6.72%) 25.81%
Total 1,413,581 (100%) 1,221,995 (100%)
Source: (PILDAT, 2012:15)
208
Many division and areas of Balochistan are still deprived of gas supply for domestic
use despite Balochistan being the key supplier of Gas. The 18th Constitutional
Amendment predicted a formula for fair and acceptable distribution of financial
resources through 7th National Finance Commission Award. But according to a
report, the 18th Amendment did not benefit Balochistan in its real sense as most of
the key ministries were not transferred to provinces. The Labour Ministry was
devolved but revenue generating was kept under the Federal Government. Similarly
the matters related to ports and electricity is shared subject under Federal
Legislative and provinces were not given complete control over them. (Tareen,
March 6, 2015)
The Article 160 of the Constitution has made compulsory for the president of
Pakistan to constitute NFC Award after every five years. National Finance
Commission was formed for the resource distribution. The National Finance
Commission reviews the formula for the distribution of funds, taxes and other
fiscal resources among the Center and the four provinces of Pakistan namely,
Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhawa.( „‟NFC Award‟‟, 2010,
July.9).These revenues are further distributed by provinces among lower levels of
the provincial government to run the matters of a province. The NFC Award had
been delayed for about last 13 years, which was announced during PPP regime in
2009. (Qudrat Ullah, 2009, Dec.14). The NFC Award, announced by PPP in 2009
was signed in Gwadar by the Finance Ministers of the four provinces and the
Federal Government. The 7th NFC Award increased Balochistan's share to 9.09 per
cent, made an amount of Rs. 83 billion in the first year of implication. Due to the
extraordinary economic requirements of Balochistan, the share of Punjab was
dropped by 1.27 per cent, Sindh by 0.39 per cent and the NWFP by 0.26 per cent.
This allotment is based on 82 percent weight age to population, 10.3 percent to
poverty, 2.5 percent to revenue generation, 2.5 percent to revenue collection and 2.7
percent to area. (Dawn. 31 December, 2009). PPP claimed that the 7th NFC Award
was constituted to efficiently address the economic deprivation of all the provinces
and their discontent with the federation; especially of Balochistan, because the
share of Balochistan had been increased more than it were in past.
209
Table No. 5.13.Share in Total Transfers of Resources to the Provinces under
7th NFC Award 2009-11
1990-91
1991-92
1996-97
1997-98
2005-06
2007-08
2009-10
2010-11
Total Federation Transfer to provinces, (Rs. In Billions)
33.8 65.8 139.4 131.7 316.0 506.7 718.3 1068.7
Punjab 55.3 45.1 51.3 47.0 47.1 47.3 47.2 46.7
Sindh 24.0 23.9 24.9 23.8 30.1 29.8 29.3 26.7
KP 12.7 19.0 15.9 17.8 14.4 14.8 15.2 17.1
Balochistan 7.9 12.0 7.9 11.4 8.4 8.0 8.3 9.5
Pakistan 100.0 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: (Pasha, 2011:31)
Table No. 5.14. Per Capita Transfers of Resources by Population 1990-2011
1990-91
1991-92
1996-97
1997-98
2005-06
2007-08
2009-10
2010-11
Punjab 0.953 0.778 0.884 0.810 0.821 0.824 0.822 0.815
Sindh 1.030 1.026 1.069 1.021 1.270 1.257 1.235 1.127
KP 0.948 1.418 1.186 1.043 1.043 1.072 1.099 1.234
Balochistan 1.453 2.264 1.491 1.647 1.647 1.569 1.565 1.857
Pakistan 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Source: (PILDAT, 2012:20)
Baloch people have been blaming the central government responsible for their
underdevelopment, political and economic backwardness. But after the NFC award
and 18th amendment, Balochistan received extraordinary and exceptional and more
autonomy. Balochistan got increased finances and political powers to improve its
socio-economic condition. The 18th amendment was a step towards fulfillment of
baloch demand for provincial autonomy. They received Rs. 83 billion in 2010-11
compared to Rs. 29 billions in 2009-10. Balochistan was also awarded with Rs.120
billions in gas development surcharge arrears imminent since 1954. The increase in
funds and gas price and the repayment of gas arrears helped raise revenue by 95
percent to Rs. 116 billions in 2010-11. (Fazl-eHaider, The Dawn, August, 25, 2012)
210
IV. Baloch Response and Attitude towards 18th Amendment and 7th
NFC Award
The Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms was consisted of
representatives from almost 14 political parties and Federally Administered Tribal
Area (FATA) to prepare a unanimous draft bill. (Nawa-i-Waqat, April 5, 2010).
Senators Mir Hasil Khan Bizenjo of the National Party, Agha Shahid Bugti of the
Jamhori Watan Party, and Israrullah Zehri of the Balochistan National Party were the
prominent Baloch leaders who signed the 18th Amendment Bill. (Mujahid, 2012:151)
Many Baloch nationalist could not get representation in Parliamentary Committee on
Constitutional Reforms as they boycotted the general elections 2008.
Although, after the 18th amendment, a large number of legislative powers were
transferred to the province as political autonomy, and the fiscal share was raised up
to fifty percent according to the demand of baloch nationalists, but the Baloch
nationalists completely rejected the constitutional reforms except the National Party.
(Mujahid, 2012:152) All major nationalist groups declared that they would not
compromise on anything less than full autonomy and independence. To them, no
relief from the government was acceptable, and they kept on insisting for an
independent Balochistan. After the military operations launched by Musharraf
against the baloch insurgents, which could not be stopped even by democratic PPP
government, the baloch nationalists were not ready to accept any reconciliation and
relief from Pakistan government. Since 2001, there has been an uprising among
baloch nationalists and the demand for separation of Balochistan from Pakistan as
an independent state had become phenomenon of the day by Baloch militants.
Other modest nationalist parties such as BNP and NP have also been demanding
provincial autonomy. (The Dawn, 2010, Mar.28). .The PPP government was sure
about the constitutional reforms package that it would really tackle the demands of
the Baloch nationalists. But almost all the nationalist groups showed distrust on the
pledges of government. Habib Jalib, Secretary General of the Balochistan National
Party showed his distrust on government because the Frontier Corps check-posts,
211
which were promised to be abolished in Aghaz-e-Huqooq-i- Balochistan package
were not removed. He also demanded the right of self-determination and provincial
autonomy. He said that, "Pakistan has failed and its constitution has failed to solve
the Baloch issue. We want the United Nations to intervene and play the role of a
mediator," (Mujahid, 2012: 155). In this way, the biggest Baloch nationalist party;
BNP; which used to be considered a slightly moderate in its views and ideology, took
a strong stance against constitutional reforms and unconditionally rejected them by
saying that the government „April-fooled‟ the Baloch with the constitutional package.
(Mujahid, 2012: 155) BNP was not a part of the constitutional committee and the
new Concurrent List was entirely unsuitable in the present war-like circumstances in
Balochistan.
They were of the view that the 18th Amendment or the Balochistan package was
presented only to trap and suppress them and to divert their attention from their
goal; the independent Balochistan. Another incident stimulated violent protests
throughout the province with the assassination of BNM president, Ghulam
Muhammad Baloch and his two companions, Muneer Ahmed (known as Lala
Muneer) and Sher Muhammad, by security forces on April 3, 2009 in Turbat.
(Bansal, 2010:269). The most rebellious nationalist party; Balochistan National
Movement (BNM) announced its support for the armed struggle of Baloch Liberation
Army (BLA). On the other hand, member of the Parliamentary Committee for
Constitutional Reforms and Vice-President of the National Party, Senator Hasil
Bizenjo appreciated the 18th Amendment and called it the biggest success since the
1973 Constitution. He expressed his views that even the most prominent and
influential baloch leaders such as Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Khair Bux Marri and
Ataullah Mengal, struggled a lot for the abolition of the concurrent list but they could
not convince Zulfiqar Bhutto on their demand, so it should be declared it as a great
achievement of baloch people. (Mujahid, 2012:153). Senator Dr. Malik Baloch,
President of the National Party and member of the Constitutional Reforms
Committee, said that some Baloch demands were accommodated by PPP and the
abolition of concurrent list and giving 50 percent share to provinces on oil and gas
212
was a remarkable progress, though the demand for complete provincial autonomy
was neglected but even then, ―…it will be disaster if the implementation of 18th
amendment is stopped.‖ (Mujahid, 2012:153)
11. Political Development in Balochistan during PML-N
Regime (2013-14)
In 2013, the tenure of PPP came to an end and the next general elections were held
on 11 May, 2013. This time, PML-N got majority and formed the central government.
Nawaz Sharif., the leader of PML-N was selected as Prime Minister of Pakistan.
11.1. Pre Election Violence in Balochistan
Prior to elections, the situation of law and order had got very critical throughout
Pakistan especially Balochistan Target killings, bomb blasts, kidnapping and militant
assaults on political leaders, government officers, common people and government
infrastructure had become the routine of the province. The held of peaceful elections
had become a challenge to all the administrative institutes of government. The same
issue was being faced by the political parties of Balochistan and they were confused
about peaceful elections. On March 12, 2013, the Baloch Liberation Army killed the
District Commissioner of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) in Quetta;
Muhammad Ziaullah Qasimi; and also issued a warning, „‟ "We will not let Pakistan
hold elections in Balochistan," (Akbar, 2013) the other armed baloch groups; BRA
and BLF also showed the same intentions of disrupting the election process in
Balochistan. (The Express Tribune, 2013, Feb. 9). The extraordinary challenges of
law and order created by violent activities of Taliban, different sectarian group,
ethnic nationalists and armed groups of political parties; brought the political parties
under pressure. The incident of the assassination of the election officer was a
warning to the politicians and they had to limit their election campaigns due to the
fear of attacks on their candidates and voters. Sardar Akhtar Mengal, president of
the Balochistan National Party (BNP) blamed Pakistan security forces for the
213
situation of Balochistan and said that arrest of the political leaders and extra-judicial
killings by security forces had made the election process too difficult to hold. In 2008,
major political parties of Balochistan boycotted the general elections just to oppose
the military rule and policies of General Pervez Musharraf and as a protest against
Akbar Bugti‟s nuredr. Moreover, the military dictatorship made the Baloch people
believe that the 2008 elections were a campaign by Pakistani military and
intelligence agencies to control their province and their mineral wealth and they were
being kept away deliberately from country's civil, armed and foreign services. But
their decision of the boycott brought into power a disliked and dishonest government
in Balochistan that even the ruling PPP was required to discharge it on January 14,
2013 although the Balochistan government remained under PPP. (Akbar, 2013)
11.2. Baloch Nationalist‘s Attitude towards General Elections 2013
The situation in Balochistan became worse during the democratic period of PPP, the
elected government could not do much to alleviate the level of baloch militant
resistance during its rule of five years. The PPP government had failed to provide
security to the lives and property of the population of Balochistan. The issues of
enforced disappearances, target killing, ethno-sectarian violence, and kidnapping for
ransom had become a routine matter. These were reasons which were discouraging
the political parties to bring themselves into the electoral ground. Apart from the
warnings from baloch militant groups and volatile situation of Balochistan, many
political parties decided to participate in elections 2013 to get the people of
Balochistan their legal rights and for the restoration of democracy. In this regard,
the major political parties such as Balochistan National Party Awami, Balochistan
National Party, Pakhtun Khawa Milli Awami Party, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-
Ulema-e-Islam announced to take part in political process. (The Express Tribune,
2013, Mar.27). The Election Commission of Pakistan tried to convince the political
leaders of Balochistan to come forward and participate in electoral process and not
to repeat the same blunder as they committed in 2008, when baloch boycott cleared
214
the grounds for an unwanted government. The army chief General Ashfaq Pervaiz
Kiyani has also advised the political forces of Balochistan to contest the elections
and assured them of security. („‟Baloch Nationalist Parties Participation‟‟, 2013,
Apr.9) Till the last week of March, almost all the prominent Baloch nationalist political
parties agreed to participate in the elections.
11.3. Election Process 2013 and Balochistan
There was an atmosphere of irregular violence in most parts of the country, and
despite an alarming security situation, but the voters turned out in large numbers to
caste their votes on May 11, 2013. Fear of attacks overwhelmed the voting process
in Balochistan. To ensure peaceful elections and to provide security to the voters
and other officials, more than 70,000 security personnel were appointed in different
areas of Balochistan. (The Express Tribune, 2013, May.12) particularly in the
Baloch-dominated districts although the baloch militant separatist groups such as
the BLA, BLF and BRA had threatened the whole population of the province against
using their constitutional right to vote. Baloch-dominated districts such as Kech,
Panjgur, Awaran remained closed due to the strike call from baloch insurgents,
consequently these areas showed a low turnout. It is reported that most of the
polling staff did not reach the polling stations in these areas due to the fear of Baloch
separatists, in Pakhtun dominated districts, the situation was better when people in a
large number came out to caste their votes. (The Express Tribune, 2013, May.12)
11.4. Election Results and Formation of Government
The Pakistan Muslim League (N) under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif won the
largest number of seats; 123 of the 272 parliamentary seats, but still it had to secure
six more seats to form the government. („‟Nawaz Sharif‟s PML‟‟, 2013, May.14) This
shortage of seats resulted in a „‟hung parliament‟‟ where no party was in majority.
The PML-N defeated its two political strong rivals; the Pakistan Peoples Party and
Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf. PML-N succeeded to win the support of about
215
nineteen independent candidates to fulfill the requirement and became the winning
party to form a simple-majority government. The leader of PML-N, Nawaz
Sharif became the new Prime Minister of Pakistan for the third time
Table No. 5.15. Elections 2013 Party Position National Assembly
Party Genera
l Seats
Independen
t
Wome
n
Minorities Total
Pakistan Muslim League (N) 126 19 26 05 176
Pakistan Peoples Party 31 0 7 1 39
Pakistan Tehraik Insaf 28 0 6 1 35
Muttahida Qaumi Movement 18 0 4 1 23
Jamiat Ulmai Islam (F) 10 0 3 1 14
Pakistan Muslim League (F) 5 0 1 0 6
Jammat Islami 3 0 1 0 4
Pakhtunkha Mili Awami
Party
3 0 1 0 4
National Peoples Party 2 0 1 0 3
Pakistan Muslim League 2 0 0 0 2
Awami National Party 1 0 0 0 1
Balochistan National Party 1 0 0 0 1
Qawmi Wattan Party 1 0 0 0 1
National Party 1 0 0 0 1
Pakistan Muslim League (Z) 1 0 0 0 1
All Pakistan Muslim League 1 0 0 0 1
Awami Muslim League 1 0 0 0 1
Awami Jamhuri Ittehad 1 0 0 0 1
Independents 8 0 0 0 8
Total
Source: Party Position in Election 2013, retrieved form
http://electionpakistani.com/ge2013/party-postion.html on 12 July, 2015
216
Table No. 5.16. Elections 2013 Party Position Balochistan Assembly
Party General
Seats
Independent Women Minorities Total
Paikistan Muslim
League-N
10 5 3 1 19
Pakistan Peoples Party
Parliamentarian
0 0 0 0 0
Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf 0 0 0 0 0
Muttahida Qaumi
Movement
0 0 0 0 0
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-
F
6 0 2 0 8
Pakistan Muslim
League
5 0 1 0 6
Pakhtunkhawa Milli
Awami Party
10 0 3 1 14
Jamaat-e-Islami 0 0 0 0 0
Pakistan Muslim
League-F
0 0 0 0 0
National Party 7 0 2 1 10
Qaumi Watan Party 0 0 0 0 0
Awami National Party 1 0 0 0 1
Awami Jamhori Ittehad 0 0 0 0 0
Balochistan National
Party
2 0 0 0 2
National Peoples Party 0 0 0 0 0
Pakistan Muslim
League-Z
0 0 0 0 0
Jamote Qaumi
Movement
1 0 0 0 1
217
Pakistan National
Muslim League
0 0 0 0 0
All Pakistan Muslim
League
0 0 0 0 0
Bahawalpur National
Awami Party
0 0 0 0 0
Majlis Wehdat
Muslimoon Party
1 0 0 0 1
IND 3 5 0 0 3
Total 46 5 11 3 65
Source: Party Position, Provincial Assemblies, retrieved from http://ecp.gov.pk/overallpartypositionPA.pdf on 12 July, 2015
11.5. Coalition Government of Baloch and Pakhtun in Balochistan
Nawaz Sharif, as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, made his first effort to calm down
the nationalist parties in Balochistan. He met the leaders of PKMAP and National
Party and announced the nomination of Dr Abdul Malik of National Party as the
Chief Minister of Balochistan, for the designation of Governor, he asked for a
nominee from Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party. (The Nation, 2013, Jun. 2)
Nawaz Sharif was of the view that the tensed situation and political distress in
Balochistan could only be dealt through good governance and democracy could be
the only best solution to eliminate violence. PML-N won 8 out of 51 seats in the
provincial assembly of Balochistan while the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party of
Mahmood Khan Achakzai won 9 seats. So, despite having majority in the Provincial
Assembly of Balochistan, he decided to set good traditions and the posts of Chief
Minister and Governor were given to the coalition partners to address the old
grievances of Baloch nationalists because prosperity, development and progress
can only be achieved in a peaceful environment. The objective behind bringing the
218
nationalists parties into power in Balochistan was to appease baloch uprising against
government and to address their long-held grievance of lack of political
representation in the mainstream politics of Pakistan. Abdul Qadir, a newly elected
Member of Parliament of PML-N said. ―We are in talks with all nationalist parties,
they are our priority and we hope that we will form a coalition government with them,
we want to form the government with both the Baluch and Pakhtun nationalist
parties,‖ („‟Balochistan:Nawaz Shrif Looks to‟‟, 2013, May. 15) Nawaz Sharif chose
Dr Abdul Malik Baloch, as the Chief Minister of Balochistan for many reasons. He is
not a tribal sardar, and does not belong to any family of previous rulers. He belongs
to an educated middle-class family. (Shahid, The Dawn, June 3, 2013). in the
general elections of 1988, he had won a seat in Balochistan Assembly from the
platform of Balochistan National Alliance headed by Akbar Bugti and Ataullah
Mengal. He is the founder of BNM.
In 2004, the National Party was formed with the merger of Dr Malik‟s BNM and Mir
Hasil Khan Bizenjo‟s National Democratic Party. Dr Malik is the most well-liked
leader of the National Party. During his election campaign in 2013, he successfully
won support from tribal sardars who won their traditional seats. (Shahid, The Dawn,
June 3, 2013). The first talk given to Chief Minister Dr Abdul Malik Baloch by Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif was to start reconciliation process with the baloch insurgents
to stabilize the political and security situation of Balochistan through dialogue.
(„‟Nawaz Sharif Calls‟‟, 2013, June.11) The settlement of all the issues was
necessary for the settlement of baloch constant revolt, and it could be done only by
winning their trust so that all the baloch leaders and political parties could be brought
into mainstream politics and work for the betterment and development of the
neglected province. Nawaz Sharif adopted the policy of joint working to create a
friendly atmosphere between central government and baloch nationalists.
The step towards formation of a joint government of Baloch, Pakhtun and Punjabis,
and to get all the political parties involved in the political process was appreciated by
Baloch and Pakhtun leaders of Balochistan. Leader of PkMAP, Mahmud Khan
Achakzai expressed his gladness over broad heartedness showed by Punjab and
219
said that Punjab attitude towards Balochistan was democratic in its real sense and
democracy along with political cooperation was highly needed to counter terrorism
and corruption and Pakhtun and Baloch would extend full support to Central
Government. „‟If Punjab would take one step for friendship and reconciliation,
Pakhtuns and Baloch will respond by taking two steps‘‘. (The Nation, 2013, Jun. 2)
The gesture of friendship shown by Nawaz Sharif was warmly welcomed by Baloch
and Pakhtuns. The representatives of both ethnic groups were happy about his
decision to overcome the problems of Balochistan through joint efforts. They
assured the central government of PML-N of their full cooperation in government‟s
efforts for political peace in the burning region through bringing all the political
parties together.
Mir Hasil Bizenjo of National Party appreciated Nawaz Sharif for taking along the
leadership of small communities. He also showed his determination that they would
not repeat the things that caused bitterness between Balochistan and Central
Government during last decade.(The Nation, 2013, Jun. 2). Nawaz Sharif
recommended that the civil and military leadership should plan a joint approach to
ensure long-lasting peace in Balochistan and the security forces should play their
role to secure peace and develop harmony in Balochistan. He insisted that the
military and civil leadership should work in collaboration to adopt a combined
approach to bring peace. PML-N claimed that it was committed to the resolvution of
Baloch problems and would putt it on the way to progress and development.
The Government promised that Balochistan would be providing utmost resources for
resolving all the disputes and issues such as shortage of electricity, gas supply,
health, education and unemployment. Balochistan was granted Rs 8 billion for
completion of Gwadar-Rato Dero and Khuzdar-Naag highways and Rs 10 billion for
Kalat-Chaman highway. (The Daily Times, 2014, Jan.31). Nawaz Sharif assured the
Baloch people that Gwadar-Khanjrab Highway Project would be an affirmative step
towards economic development of Balochistan and would create numerous jobs for
them. in addition, 90 percent of revenue earned thorough the highway would be
220
given to the provinces that the highway passes through. PML-N was intended to
provide solar energy in rural and remote areas for agriculture and household
purposes. ―This program on one hand redresses power shortage problem for the
domestic consumers, on the other it would provide sufficient power for agriculture
purpose.‖ (The Daily Times, 2014, Jan.31) The prime minister announced a Youth
Business Loan program for the establishment of small business.
In the beginning of their tenure, the PML-N was determined to eliminate terrorism
and sectarianism from not only Balochistan but from all parts of Pakistan. Regarding
the problem of sectarian violence in Balochistan, the federal government promised
to ruin all the violent and militant organizations involved in terrorist activities. All
these promises made by Nawaz Sharif in the initial days of PML-N regime, were
higly admired and appreciated by Baloch nationalist political leaders.
221
References
Ali, Ghulam, (2012). Federalism in Pakistan during Musharraf Regime, Macrothink
Institute, Journal of Public Administration and Governance, Vol. 2, No. 3. pp. 171-
188
Akbar, Malik Siraj, (20 March, 2013) Will Balochistan Vote in Pakistan's Next
Elections? Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/will-
balochistan-vote-in-_b_2905256.html on 10 July, 2015
Ahmed Feroz, (1998). Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University
Press
Andley, Priyashree. (2006). Special Report 32, Balochistan: A Backgrounder, New
Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
Almeida, Cyril, (July 25, 2010.) All Baloch should not be tarred with same brush, The
Dawn,
Ahmad, S. (2005, Dec.20). Musharraf‘s Kohlu Visit, not a Wise Move. Daily times. And now there is Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan, (2009. March 4).The News
Baluch, Siddiq, (2002). Balochistan National Party, in ABS Jafri‟s, The Political
Parties of Pakistan, Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Baloch, Latif, (Oct. 18, 2002). Leadership vacuum in Balochistan, The Dawn
Breseeg, Taj Muhammad. (2004). Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development.
Karachi: Royal Book Company.
222
Bansal, Alok (2010) Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroads, New Delhi:
Manas Publications.
Balochistan: Conflicts and Players (2009). Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace
Studies
Balochistan Problems and Solutions, (2011) retrieved from
http://www.thevision21.org/article-detail.php?cid=14&aid=31 on December 9, 2014
Balochistan:Nawaz Shrif Looks toForm Coalition with Baluch Nationalists, ( 2013,
May. 15) retrieved from http://www.unpo.org/article/15908 on 16 July, 2015
Baloch Nationalist Parties Participation in the Election 2013, (2013, Apr.9) retrieved
from http://historypak.com/baloch-nationalist-parties-participation-in-the-election-
2013/ on 10 July, 2015
Brahamdagh Bugti says he will be killed if he returns to Pakistan, (2012, April.6) The Dawn
Balochistan Matters, (October 28, 2012). The Dawn
Chandran, Suba, (September, 2008) ―I have a dream for Pakistan‖ A Critique of
Zardari‘s Plan, Issue Brief No. 83, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New
Delhi. pp1-4
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?,(2004, Mar.22),
Islamabad:International Crisis Group, Asia Report No.77.
Disarming of Militants needed for Peace: President Denies Army Action, (2006,
Feb.4) (Editorial). P.7, The Dawn
223
Election Observer Group Reports (2006). Pakistan National and Provincial Assembly
Elections, 10 October 2002, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, pp.19-45.
General Elections 2008, Report Volume II, Election Commission of Pakistan,
retrieved from www.ecp.gov.pk/Misc/ReportGeneralElection2008Vol-II.pdf on 13
July, 2015
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed (August 25, 2012), Balochistan‘s Duty, The Dawn
Grare, Fredric, (January, 2006). Pakistan: The resurgence of Baloch Nationalism,
Washington DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications:
South Asia Project.
Grare, Fredric, (April, 2013), Balochistan: The State Versus The Nation, Washington
DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications: South Asia
Project
Gazdar, Haris, (Sep. 30, 2006) Bugti and the Baloch Cause, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 4100-4101 Gilani, Ijaz Shafi, Dr. (May 2013). (May 2013). Electoral Data: Its Deconstruction and
Interpretation, Part Two from ‗‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan; A Story of
Pakistan‘s Transition From Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under
Rule of Law 1970-2013‘‘. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development
and Transparency. (PILDAT) pp. 39-76
Hamid, Shahid, (December, 2009). Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package An
Analysis, Background Paper, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Legislative
Development and Transparency , PILDAT.
Harrison, Selig S. (1981). In Afghanistan‘s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet
Temptations, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
224
Hussain, Zahid. (Feb. 2005). ―Gathering Storm,‖ News line Magazine, PP.23-24. Hussain, Zahid, (6 May, 2013) Balochistan: A province divided, retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/pakistanelections/2013/04/20134281355
33521674.html on 9 May, 2015
Iqbal, Khurram, (2008). Counter Insurgency in Balochistan: Pakistan‘s Strategy,
Outcome and Future Implications, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Khan, Rehmat Ibad, (1996). Impact of political Culture on Political Development of
Balochistan, Ph.D Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of
Karachi
Khan, Kamran Aziz, (Summer 2011). 2002 Elections in Pakistan: A Reappraisal,
Journal of Political Studies, Vol. I8, Issue-1, pp. 93-108
Laif, Muhammad Ijaz and Hamza, Muhammad Amir, (2009). Ethnic Nationalism in
Pakistan: A Case Study of Baloch Nationalism during Musharraf Regime, Pakistan
Vision, Vol. 10. No. 1, Journal of Pakistan Study Centre, Pakistan: University of the
Punjab, Lahore, pp. 49-81
Majeed, Gulshan, (2011). National Integration in Pakistan: A Socio-Political Analysis
of Balochistan (1972-2005), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, University
of the Punjab, Lahore.
Mujahid, Abdul Basit, (2012). Balochistan and Eighteenth Amendment, Pakistan
Vision Vol. 13 No. 2, pp 145-159
Musharraf, Pervez. (2006). In the Line of Fire: A memoir. London: Simon & Schuster.
Mehdi, Tahir, (April 16, 2013). An overview of 2008 general elections, The Dawn
225
Nawaz Sharif Calls for Bringing Baloch Leaders into Mianstream, (2013, June.11)
retrieved from http://www.geo.tv/article-104773-Nawaz-Sahrif-calls-for-bringing-
Baloch-leaders-into-mainstream on 7 June, 2015
Nawaz Sharif‘s PML emerges as single largest party in Pak polls, (2013,
May.14)retrieved from http://zeenews.india.com/pakistan-elections-2013/nawaz-
sharif-s-pml-n-emerges-as-single-largest-party-in-pak-polls_848470.html on 12
July, 2015
NFC Award, National Finance Commission Award of Pakistan, (2010, July.9)
retrieved from http://www.einfopedia.com/nfc-award-national-finance-
commission-award-of-pakistan.php on 7 July, 2015
Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, (2006). International Crisis Group,
Asia Briefing No. 119
Party Position National Assembly, (2012, Dec.18) retrieved from
http://ecp.gov.pk/Misc/PartyPosition/PAPosition.pdf on 14 July, 2015
Pakistan, 18th Amendment Bill, (2010, April.19) retrieved from
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/18th-amendment-bill-pakistan/p21953 and from
lgkp.gov.pk/.../2014/03/Full-text-of-18th-Amendment-Bill.pdf on 20 July, 2015
Party Position, Provincial Assemblies, retrieved from
http://ecp.gov.pk/overallpartypositionPA.pdf on 12 July, 2015
Party Position in Election 2013, retrieved form
http://electionpakistani.com/ge2013/party-postion.html on 12 July, 2015
Pasha, Aisha Ghous, (2011). Fiscal Implications of the 18th Amendment: The
Outlook for Provincial Finances, World Bank Policy Paper Series on Pakistan, PK
226
02/12, November 2011 retrieved from www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/ on 1 July, 2015
Qudrat Ullah, (2009, Dec.14), 7th NFC Award- a step towards fiscal federalism in
Pakistan, retrieved from http://www.pkhope.com/7th-nfc-award-a-step-towards-
fiscal-federalism-in-pakistan/ on 20 July, 2015
Rizvi, Hassan Askari, (May 2013). A Narrative of Pakistan‘s Nine Elections (1970-
2008), Part One of ‗‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan; A Story of
Pakistan‘s Transition From Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under
Rule of Law 1970-2013‘‘. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development
and Transparency. (PILDAT) pp.11-38
Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan, (2005) Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad.
Rana, Muhammed Amir, (July 29, 2012) The Growing Nexus: Ethnic/Sectarian
Violence Is Expected to Continue to be a Long Term Challenge, The News.
Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan, (November 2005), Senate of
Pakistan, , Report 7, Islamabad: Senate Foreign Relations Committee,.
Shahid, Saleem, (2002). Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, in ABS Jafri‟s, The
political parties of Pakistan, Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Sial, Safdar and Basit, Abdul, (Oct-Dec 2010). Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan:
Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security, Conflict and Peace
Studies, Vol 3, Number 4, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Shahid, Saleem, (Dec.10, 2006). President offers amnesty to Baloch fighters:
Dialogue option kept open, The Dawn
227
Shahid, Saleem, (May 20, 2007). Baloch leaders reject president‘s conditional
amnesty offer, The Dawn.
Shahid, Saleem. (Dec19, 2005) Troops move against Marris in Kohlu. The Dawn,
Karachi
Shahid, Saleem, (June 3, 2013). Dr Malik Baloch — a profile, The Daily Dawn.
Saeed, Rehana Hashmi, (2013) The Politics of Ethnicity: An Issue to National Integration to
Pakistan, PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore, Chapter
3, Page no. not available, accessed from www.eprints.hec.gov.pk/10860 on 30 June 2015
Tareen, Mahmood, (March, 2015). Implementation of 18th Amendment Is Must for
Viability of Pakistan, from http://thebalochistanpoint.com/implementation-on-18th-
amendment-is-must-for-viability-of-pakistan/
Tahir, Muhammad, (2008,April.4). The Players in the Balochistan Insurgency,
retrieved
fromhttp://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/International_3/The_Players_in_the_Balo
chistan_Insurgency_printer.shtml on 9 June, 2015
Too many things going wrong simultaneously, (2010, July 27), The News,
The Growing Nexus, (2012, August 3) The Friday Times
Weaver, Mary Anne, (2002). Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Press
Zaidi, Mubashir. (February, 2005). ―State of Confusion,‖ The Herald, (pp.64-65)
CHAPTER SIX
Economic Development and Baloch Nationalism
228
1. Economic Condition of Balochistan
The economic development of Balochistan has always been a great subject of
confrontation between the Baloch people and federal government. Despite other
political issues, the problem of economic development and maximum control over
the natural resources of Balochistan has been a key factor in all the major conflicts
between Baloch nationalists and federal government of Pakistan. This is also one of
the main causes behind Baloch demand for a separate and independent land. The
Baloch nationalists have always been blaming federal government for keeping
Baloch people economically suppressed and deprived of their rights over their own
resources. In fact there are many other hurdles in the economic development of this
province, the region is mostly mountainous with large number of areas which are
located in remote places and are almost unapproachable moreover the problem of a
thin population is a big hurdle in development and progress. The 6.51 million
population of Balochistan is spread over a huge area of about 347190 sq.
kilometers, which constitute a very low population mass of 18.8 persons per square
kilometer. Small population which is broadly scattered with a rural nature and style of
life and poverty, are the major obstructions in the economic development of
Balochistan.
The economic development of Balochistan highly requires the enormous investment
to develop basic infrastructure and provide basic facilities of education, source of
income and health to the Baloch people to lift and improve their living standards. The
process of economic development in Balochistan has been going on a very slow
pace because of the low population density, lack of basic facilities and the absence
of proper infrastructure. Balochistan is a richest land in terms of natural resources
yet the poorest province of Pakistan. The natural resources of the province have
been under developed and remained idle for a long time. These numerous natural
resources of the land which include not only mineral deposits of precious stones and
metals like iron, copper and uranium but also valuable and vast energy sources such
as gas, oil and coal, can be utilized to gain the highest economic development. The
proper utilization of these natural resources can turn Balochistan into one of the
229
richest regions of the world. The coastal areas of Balochistan have also been
remained underdeveloped inspite of their strategic importance and economic
potential. Balochistan has always been least developed and behind in terms of
economic and social development as compared to the other provinces of Pakistan.
Since Balochistan has been given the status of the fourth province of Pakistan in
1972, the economy of Balochistan has prolonged 2.7 times by the year 2005 which
is the smallest long-term growth in all the other provinces during the same time
period. During the last decade, Balochistan‟s contribution to Pakistan‟s GDP has
remained about only 4 percent. (Gazdar, 2007:3)
2. Population Density in Balochistan According to the Census 1998, the population of Balochistan was estimated at 6.6
million, about 5 percent of the total population of Pakistan. Using the inter-censal
growth rate per district, the current population is close to 8.8 million. And according
to Government statistics, this is estimated as 8.5 million in 2014. In urban areas,
houses and other buildings are generally made of cemented material. But the
informal settlements in the poor urban residential areas, houses are also built of mud
and concrete mix. In rural regions, residential and other structures are often made of
mud. There are about 9,000 rural settlements meagerly spread across the province.
(„‟Balochistan Profile‟‟, 2012, Apr.11) The urban growth rate is about 4.5% per
annum. There is also a tendency of migration from rural to urban areas due to the
facilities of electricity, water and gas supply which is causing a negative effect on the
rural economy byputting pressure on the urban infrastructure and services.
Quetta was found the highly populated district with about 750,000 people in the
Census of 1998. Jafferabad and Turbat got second highest rate of over 400,000
populations. The average rate for Balochistan was about 2.5 percent, districts of
Awaran, Kalat, Turbat and Sherani had growth rates of less than one percent.
(UNDP, 2011:.3). in Quetta, Jafferabad and Qila Abdullah, it exceeded 100 persons
per sq. km. Density was as low as 4 persons per sq. km. in the southern districts of
230
Awaran and Kharan. Overall, the population density in Balochistan was just below
19 persons per sq. km., compared to an average of 166.3 persons per sq. km. for
Pakistan as a whole. (UNDP, 2011:.3)
Table No. 6.1. Demography of Balochistan
Population Census 1998 6.5 million/5 % of total population of
Pakistan
Current Estimated Population
(2014)
8.5 million
Rural Population 76.1%
Urban Population 23.9%
Growth Rate 2.36%
Population Density 23 persons per km
Total Fertility Rate 4.08%
Population Doubling Estimated
Time
30 years
Net Addition in 1 Year 176000
Source: Population Welfare Department, Government of Balochistan, retrieved from http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1271&Itemid=100430 on 1 June, 2015
Table No. 6.2. District wise Statistics on Population and Land Mass
District Annual Growth Rate
Population 1998
Projected Population 2010
Area Sq.Km
Population Density
Urban Proportion
Awaran 0.40 118,173 123,972 29,510 4.00 -----
Barkhan 3.09 103,545 149,186 3,514 29.50 7.4
Bolan 1.15 288,056 330,421 7,499 38.40 13.7
Chaghi 2.95 104,534 148,175 50,545 4.00 17.7
Dera Bugti 3.33 181,310 268,620 10,160 17.80 8.5
Gwadar 2.99 185,498 264,168 12,637 14.70 5.4
Jafferabad 2.92 432,817 611,367 2,445 177.00 19.8
Jhal Magsi 2.86 109,941 154,212 3,615 30.40 7.4
Kalat 0.76 237,834 260,454 6,622 35.90 14.2
231
Kharan 3.11 116,541 168,302 48,051 4.30 13.4
Khuzdar 2.45 417,466 558,168 35,380 11.80 28.3
Kohlu 2.00 99,846 126,629 7,610 13.10 9.7
Lasbela 3.03 312,695 447,389 15,153 20.60 36.9
Loralai 1.40 297,555 351,579 9,830 30.30 11.8
Mastung 1.31 164,645 192,476 5,896 27.90 14.7
Musakhel 2.29 134,056 175,908 5,728 23.40 8.6
Naseerabad
3.86 245,894 387,372 3,387 72.60 15.6
Panjgur 2.23 234,051 304,966 16,891 13.90 9.1
Pishin 3.57 367,183 559,359 7,819 47.00 6.3
Q.Abdullah 4.46 370,269 625,054 3,293 112.40 15.3
Q.Saifullah 1.58 193,553 233,614 6,831 28.30 13.1
Quetta 4.13 759,941 1,235,066 2,653 286.40 74.4
Sibi 3.43 103,746 155,500 7,796 23.10 32.1
Turbat 0.50 413,204 438,690 22,539 18.30 16.6
Zhob 1.81 193,458 239,923 20,297 13.60 15.9
Ziarat 0.21 33,340 34,190 1,489 22.40 1.9
Nushki 3.27 98,030 144,228 ------ ------ -----
Harnai 3.90 76,652 121,314 ------ ------ -----
Sherani 0.22 81,684 83,867 ------ ------ -----
Washuk 3.05 90,368 129,596 ------- ------- -------
Total Balochistan
2.47 6,565,885 8,799,421 347,190
18.9 23.9
Source: Population Census 1998, Population Census Organization, Government of Pakistan.
3. Economic Strength of Balochistan There are many factors that can be counted as growth pillars for the economic
structure of Balochistan. There are much dissimilarities between Balochistan and the
other provinces in terms of potential sectors of economic growth. The other three
provinces of Pakistan have comparatively more population than that of Balochistan
so these provinces enjoy a labor-abundant economy with potential growth in
agricultural industrial, manufacturing and other service sectors, Balochistan is
comparatively behind in terms of human resources, agricultural growth and industrial
investment due to the small population. The service sector of Balochistan is the only
sector which has growth potential and is closely connected with the national and
other regional economies. The following table shows the economic contribution and
232
activities going on in different districts of Balochistan as the major source of
livelihood of the population of these areas:
Table No. 6.3. Economic Figures of Districts of Balochistan
Sr. No.
District Economic Activity
1 Dera Bugti Sui Gas Plants and Wells
2 Awaran Live Stock and Agriculture
3 Barkhan Live Stock and Agriculture
4 Kachchi Live Stock and Agriculture
5 Chaghi Agriculture and Copper Mining
6 Gwadar Gwadar Sea Port, Fisheries, Live Stock and Gas Pipelines
7 Jaffar Abad Live Stock and Agriculture
8 Jhal Magsi Live Stock and Agriculture
9 Kalat Live Stock, Agriculture, Oil and Gas.
10 Kech Live Stock and Agriculture
11 Kharan Live Stock and Agriculture
12 Kohlu Oil, Gas Live Stock and Agriculture
13 Zhob Live Stock and Agriculture
14 Khuzdar Live Stock and Agriculture
15 Killa Abdullah Live Stock and Agriculture
16 Killa Saifullah Live Stock and Agriculture
17 Lasbela Oil, Gas, Livestock and Dadr Zinc Project
18 Loralai Live Stock and Agriculture
19 Mastung Live Stock and Agriculture
20 Musakhel Live Stock and Agriculture
21 Naseerabad Live Stock and Agriculture
22 Panjgur Oil, Gas, Live Stock and Agriculture
23 Pishin Live Stock and Agriculture
24 Quetta Agriculture and Business
25 Sibi Livestock
26 Ziarat Tourism, Live Stock and Agriculture
27 Washik Agriculture
28 Nushki Live Stock and Agriculture
29 Harnai Live Stock Source: Majeed, Gulshan, (2011). National Integration of Pakistan: A Socio-Political Analysis of Balochistan, (1972-2005), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore. pp. 88-90
It is evident from the above table that the economy of Balochistan revolves around
the following sectors and these are the growth pillars of Balochistan:
233
Agriculture
Livestock
Fisheries
Mining and Energy Resources
Development Projects of Infrastructure
4. Agriculture and the Economic Development
The contribution of agriculture to the economy of a region or state is very much
significant. Agriculture and related occupations are helpful in reducing
unemployment and in making the people as well as the region, self-sufficient and
independent in terms of food and money. Agriculture sector of Balochistan
contributes almost 52pc to Balochistan‟s GDP and can be called the backbone of the
rural economy where it is the main source of income for the majority of Baloch
people. (The Dawn, 2015, Apr. 16). Like other parts of Pakistan, the people and
economy of Balochistan also depends much on agriculture, but since Balochistan is
mostly a dry and barren land with constant water shortage and continual droughts,
agriculture in Balochistan depends on non-staple high-value products. The high
altitude northern areas are focused mainly on horticulture, while field crops are
cultivated in the irrigated northeast regions that are close to the Indus Basin.
Agriculture sector contributes one-third of the provincial GDP and is a main source
of income for more than 40 percent of the labor force, and provides a livelihood to
more than half of the Baloch population. („‟Balochistan Economy, 2014, April.28) The
agricultural crops contribute about three-fifths of Balochistan's agricultural value-
added. In the rural arrears of Balochistan, almost one out of two families is involved
in agricultural activities as crop farmers or agricultural laborer. Crop production is an
essential factor in raising rural incomes and reducing poverty. The crop cultivation
sector has been going through various ups and downs for the last many years. The
value of production experienced a rapid increase during the decade of 1900s, but
later on, the severe and constant droughts during 1999 and then in 2002-03 caused
a remarkable decline in the production volume by about 7 percent. So, Balochistan
234
had to shift its agricultural production from food crops to higher value crops like
vegetables and fruits and this step compensated for the decline in the value of
production. Water supply is a major required restriction on the development of
cultivated land, that‟s why only about 6 percent of Balochistan's area is under
cultivation and the fluctuations in crop production and the area under crops are
generally related to the availability of water. There has been some increase in
productivity per hectare, especially for wheat, but yields for most crops remain lower
than in other provinces. Being the largest province of Pakistan, Balochistan has
gifted with a high potential to cultivate and produce wheat and other crops in huge
and remarkable quantity that are directly helpful in the development of economic
condition of the province and of Pakistan too. On the basis of different ecological
factors, Balochistan is divided into five ecological zones where more than 65 crops
are cultivated during Rabi and Kharif seasons.(Majeed, 2011:80). The area of
Chaghi, about 4.5 million hectares is considered most suitable for wheat cultivation.
Due to its location in an arid zone, only 2.6 million acres of the total land of
Balochistan is under cultivation.
I. Production of Food Crops
Food crops which are grown in Balochistan include wheat, maize, rice, jowar, barley
and bajra. The regions of their cultivation have been explained in chapter one. Any
other detail in this regard will be a repetition. Now the following tables illustrate the
area under cultivation and production rate of different food crops in Balochistan.
Table No. 6.4. Under Cultivation Area of Food Crops in Balochistan
Area in ‘’000’’ Hectares
Year Wheat Rice Maize Jowar Bajra Barley Total
2000-01 324.4 142.9 2.5 19.2 0.6 20.8 510.4
2001-02 333.6 116.5 2.7 17.5 0.5 21.2 492.0
2002-03 340.8 163.6 2.9 21.3 0.4 21.1 550.1
2003-04 340.9 159.8 5.2 23.8 0.3 20.8 550.8
2004-05 343.1 161.5 5.2 21.8 0.6 17.5 549.7
2005-06 310.0 206.4 5.5 34.8 1.1 15.8 573.6
2006-07 408.9 193.9 5.9 37.2 1.3 17.2 664.4
2007-08 410.5 136.2 5.4 28.2 3.8 17.6 601.7
235
2008-09 408.9 190.1 5.5 29.7 3.4 15.8 653.5 Source: Crops Area and Production (By Districts) (1981-82 to 2008-09), Government of Pakistan, Statistic Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics (Economic Wing) Vol. 1. page.5
Table no. 6.5. Production of Food Crops in Balochistan
Production in "000" Tonnes
Year Wheat Rice Maize Jowar Bajra Barley Total
2000-01 614.2 412.1 2.5 17.3 0.4 24.3 1070.8
2001-02 640.6 335.2 2.9 16.0 0.3 25.0 1020.0
2002-03 654.7 467.4 3.1 18.8 0.2 24.8 1169.0
2003-04 663.4 412.6 5.2 20.7 0.2 24.5 1126.6
2004-05 637.6 421.6 5.3 19.0 0.5 20.4 1104.4
2005-06 649.9 529.1 6.2 29.0 0.8 19.1 1234.1
2006-07 872.1 478.2 6.5 30.8 0.9 21.2 1409.7
2007-08 868.6 331.4 5.0 21.2 2.2 22.2 1250.6
2008-09 868.2 643.7 6.2 25.1 2.1 20.0 1565.2
Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistic Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics (Economic Wing) Crops Area and Production (By Districts) (1981-82 to 2008-09), Vol. 1. page.5
II. Production of Cash Crops
The cash crop of Balochistan includes cotton, sugar cane, tobacco and guar seed.
The following tables illustrate the details about the regions on cultivation and
production statistics.
Table No. 6.6. Regions of Cultivation of Cash Crops
Cash Crop Regions of Cultivation Cotton Chagai, Loralai, Musa Khail, Barkhan, Kohlu, Kachhi, Sibi, Dera
Bugti, Nasirabad, Jafferabad, Bolan, Khuzdar, Awaran, Kharan, Lasbela, Jhal Magsi
Sugarcane Sibi, Musa Khail, Nasirabad, Jafferabad, Tomboo, Kachchi, Lasbela.
Guar Seed Sibi, Kachchi, Nasirabad, Jafferabad, Tomboo, Bolan, Khuzdar, Kharan, Lasbela, Turbat, Gwadar, Jhal Magsi
Tobacco Pishin, Killa Abdullah, Loralai, Musa Khail, Barkhan, Zhob, Killa Saifullah, Kohlu, Jhal Magsi
Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistic Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics (Economic Wing) Crops Area and Production (By Districts) (1981-82 to 2008-09), Vol. 1. P 120- 204
236
The details of statistics on area and production are as under:
Table No.6.7 Under Cultivation Area of Cash Crops in Balochistan
Area in Hectares
Year Cotton Tobacco Sugarcane Guarseed Total
2001-02 40400.0 1045.0 700.0 2137.0 44282.0
2002-03 40800.0 1335.0 800.0 1606.0 44541.0
2003-04 39100.0 1412.0 800.0 1951.0 43263.0
2004-05 37100.0 1633.0 400.0 2071.0 41204.0
2005-06 37800.0 2083.0 300.0 3239.0 43422.0
2006-07 41600.0 2368.0 500.0 6997.0 51465.0
2007-08 21900.0 1794.0 500.0 6931.0 31125.0
2008-09 34550.0 1883.0 770.0 8594.0 45797.0 Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistic Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics (Economic Wing) Crops Area and Production (By Districts) (1981-82 to 2008-09), Vol. 1. p. 106
The Following table shows the average production of each cash crop:
Table. No. 6.8 Production of Cash Crops in Balochistan
Production in Tones
Year Cotton Tobacco Sugarcane Guarseed Total
2001-02 20292.6 1519.0 35000.0 1433.0 58244.6
2002-03 22146.6 1933.0 40600.0 1046.0 65725.6
2003-04 16652.5 2039.0 38600.0 1141.0 58432.5
2004-05 16040.1 2361.0 22500.0 1228.0 42129.1
2005-06 16618.5 2973.0 14500.0 1925.0 36016.5
2006-07 18268.4 3357.0 25300.0 4543.0 51468.4
2007-08 9593.5 2586.0 28100.0 3820.0 44099.5
2008-09 15167.5 2717.0 37870.0 5223.0 60977.5 Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistic Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics (Economic
Wing) Crops Area and Production (By Districts) (1981-82 to 2008-09), Vol. 1. p 106
III. Fruit Production
Balochistan produces various varieties of fruits. The details about areas of cultivation
and quantity of production are as under:
237
Table No. 6.9. Area under Fruit Production
Area in Hectares
Fruit 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Citrus 1338 1339 1340 1340 1418
Mango 1409 1403 1403 1518 1535
Banana 1470 386 388 388 525
Apple 101948 102273 102802 103279 102951
Grapes 12768 12886 13631 15080 15118
Pomegranates 10723 10726 11013 11026 11022
Guava 591 596 598 600 575
Dates 48126 48136 48152 50766 50862
Apricot 26496 26596 26908 28901 28710
Peach 9469 9514 9616 9499 9500
Pear 97 97 147 147 149
Plum 3867 3893 3960 3968 3839
Almond 9923 10006 10470 10717 10659
Fig 115 115 82 85 85
Loquat 51 51 51 51 51
Chikoo 540 591 596 596 610
Coconut 1122 1122 1123 1123 1124
Cherry 1173 1181 978 1003 995
Pistachio 171 201 185 189 190
Papaya 812 837 838 840 849
Melons 12015 12278 11887 12565 12260
Others 1371 1414 1249 1496 1668
Total 245595 245641 247417 255177 254695 Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Economic Wing), Fruits,
Vegetables & Condiments Statistics of Pakistan, 2008-09, Islamabad. pp. 9-10
Table No. 6.10. Production of Fruits
Production in Tones
Fruit 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Citrus 6035 6120 5805 8419 8407
Mango 6469 6479 5818 8523 8541
Banana 2931 3631 190 7291 5726
Apple 220280 220896 219535 313605 306534
Grapes 47701 47449 45229 74009 74758
Pomegranate 31619 31661 29835 39468 43604
Guava 2578 2845 2587 3765 3718
Dates 252161 252317 172131 249694 248594
Apricot 187167 178694 158338 220276 218601
238
Peach 18149 18233 17734 25333 25362
Pear 431 431 455 659 673
Plum 26338 26454 26333 37345 35128
Almond 21667 21883 21944 25710 25588
Fig 171 182 149 217 217
Loquat 192 192 192 279 279
Chikoo 3282 3277 1933 2798 3131
Coconut 7075 7075 7094 10286 10286
Cherry 2017 2080 1629 2321 2314
Pistachio 597 632 536 773 773
Papaya 4528 4475 3599 5218 5166
Melons 137513 140923 137285 79842 142072
Others 4171 4240 3083 6214 6265
Total 983072 980169 861434 1122045 1175737 Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Economic Wing), Fruits,
Vegetables & Condiments Statistics of Pakistan, 2008-09, Islamabad. pp. 10
IV. Vegetables Cultivation
The vegetables of Balochistan are grown both in Kharif and Rabi season. The
details about vegetables and production are as under:
Table No. 6.11. Area under Vegetable Cultivation (Hectares)
Vegetable 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Kharif Season Vegetables
Lady Finger 2882 2877 2868 2737 2748
Squash 722 765 550 526 442
Brinjal 1075 1131 1187 1580 1130
Bitter Gourd 463 582 524 483 458
Bottle Gourd 379 426 486 438 462
Pumpkin 1145 1214 891 868 819
Lufa 396 418 276 213 132
Cucumber 470 605 631 772 741
Tomato 4762 5196 5604 9069 8014
Others 659 606 380 401 398
Total 12953 13820 13397 17087 15344
Rabi Season Vegetables
Radish 1188 1668 1632 1719 1536
Turnip 1334 1378 1248 1523 1298
Carrot 3329 3445 2934 2952 3100
Spinach 1298 1251 891 939 1812
239
Cauliflower 1212 1430 1703 2104 2665
Cabbage 415 494 605 621 651
Peas 770 743 907 1283 1298
Sugar Beet 306 306 109 2 2
Tomato 9596 10179 11412 11468 10954
Beans 622 608 631 610 622
Others 445 525 478 607 642
Total 20515 22027 22550 23828 24580
G. Total 33468 35847 35947 40915 39924
Potatoes 3268 2796 2815 3140 2302 Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Economic Wing), Fruits,
Vegetables & Condiments Statistics of Pakistan, 2008-09, Islamabad. P. 19
Table No. 6.12. Production of Vegetables in Tones
Vegetable 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Kharif Season Vegetables
Lady Finger 17064 17138 17162 6822 16710
Squash 4526 4850 3594 2305 2864
Brinjal 7920 8342 8759 7745 8348
Bitter Gourd 3922 5098 4597 1998 3761
Bottle Gourd 3120 3390 3505 2380 3605
Pumpkin 10031 10790 8042 4364 7419
Lufa 2571 2731 1799 570 859
Cucumber 3462 4452 4655 3550 5415
Tomato 38411 42325 46065 41065 62365
Others 3703 3479 2348 696 2427
Total 94730 102595 100526 71495 113773
Rabi Season Vegetables
Radish 20043 28320 27705 29228 26269
Turnip 21078 21908 19586 24076 20758
Carrot 57823 59620 51199 51644 54431
Spinach 22048 21267 15646 16486 32208
Cauliflower 19798 23704 27760 33822 44083
Cabbage 6486 7690 9426 9670 10154
Peas 8749 8445 10367 14531 14701
Sugar Beet 6732 6732 2349 43 43
Tomato 143249 151308 170099 171281 164302
Beans 5857 5717 5938 5778 5879
Others 5792 6914 6307 8046 8431
Total 317655 341625 346382 364605 381259
G. Total 412385 444220 446908 436100 495032
Potatoes 47463 41478 41830 31711 34608 Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Economic Wing), Fruits, Vegetables & Condiments Statistics of Pakistan, 2008-09, Islamabad. P. 20
240
V. Condiments of Balochistan
The following table shows the production and areas of the cultivation of condiments.
Table No. 6.13. Production and Areas of Condiments of Balochistan
Condiments 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Area in Hectares
Onion 31422 38077 38185 46044 32533
Garlic 251 273 214 166 686
Chilies 2333 2582 2868 4207 4230
Coriander 3035 2877 3054 2982 2630
Production in Tones
Onion 578697 699209 701620 742605 607015
Garlic 2183 2365 1676 1384 5995
Chilies 3372 3797 4199 2994 6179
Coriander 1613 1512 1606 1571 1423 Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Economic Wing),
Fruits, Vegetables & Condiments Statistics of Pakistan, 2008-09, Islamabad. (December, 2009) P. 22
4.1. Major Challenges in the Development of Agriculture Sector The agriculture sector in Balochistan is facing a number of problems that are
creating obstacles in the development of agriculture. Due to these challenges, the
agriculture in Balochistan is hardly able to play a vital role in the economic
development of the province. The most important challenges can be identified as
follows.
I. Lack of Proper Water Sources
In Balochistan, the usual and regular sources of water like canals, tube wells and
others ways of irrigation are mostly out of the reach of the farmers and the majority
of people have to rely upon rainfall or flood water. The water gained from rainfall is
not always sufficient for a proper growth as the most land areas are located in the
barren and dry zone. In years of low rainfall or low flood water, the production from
these farms decreases significantly. This factor has a direct affect on the income of
many farmers too.
241
II. Dominance of Small Farms The Baloch farmers have mostly small agricultural holdings, the majority has an area
of less than ten hectares for cultivation and there are other farmers in large number
who possess an area of less than only two hectares. (World Bank Report, 2013:51).
This small size of land for cultivation is not suitable for the use of heavy agricultural
machinery, these limitations result in less productivity and does not meet the
requirements of the market. With the result, the small farmers can not earn sufficient
amount. Their low income makes it difficult for them to use more advanced methods
of production.
III. Limited Job Creation
Due to the small size of farms, there is no opportunity of employment from out side
the family. About 96 percent of farmers do no hire labor and all the matters are
looked after only by the family members of the farmers. Among farms of less than 10
hectares, only 2 percent of the farmers employ permanently hired labor. (World
Bank Report, 2013:52)
IV. Lack of Quality Inputs
The majority of farmers in Balochistan are not able to utilize quality seeds and
proper fertilizer. Most of the seed dealers are located in central Balochistan and due
to the long distances between markets and small farms; the distribution of seeds is a
difficult task for the private sector. Therefore, the unavailability of proper seeds and
fertilizers results in lower yield and the agriculture productivity has to suffer a lot.
V. Inadequate Allocations for Development Although, the agriculture sector including livestock is the main source of livelihood
for majority of the Baloch population, but the Annual Development Plans of
government have not been appropriately designed to fulfill all the requirements of
this significant sector. According to the World Bank report, ‗‘It received only 3.5
percent share of the provincial Annual Development Plan in 2004-05. Moreover, the
242
share decreased from 7.6 percent in 2002-03. Even including water, the share of
development funding declined from 42 percent in 2002-03 to less than 15 percent in
2004-05.‘‘ (World Bank Report, 2013:52)
VI. Disorganized Policies For Water Use
The agriculture sector is facing great injustice in the distribution of public-sector
support to rural population since it has not been provided any aid from the
Government of Balochistan in the form of subsidizing electricity for tube wells use.
This negligence results in the waste of both water and electricity. The over pumping
of water has seriously lowered the water table in numerous districts of Balochistan
and has led to the pulling out of groundwater. In districts with a large population, the
level of underground water has decreased so low that the electric tube wells are
bored to a depth of more than 1000 feet to reach the water. The reason behind this
imbalance is the huge subsidy which is provided to only about 2.5 percent of the
crop farmers of Balochistan and the majority of farmers are neglected. Moreover, the
farmers using electric tube wells for water supply and irrigation are generally richer
than those using diesel operated tube wells, or those relying on Sailaba or
Khushkaba.
VII. Improper Access to Markets and Poor Information Systems In Balochistan, the agricultural marketing system is full of flaws and weak. The
clearance of the profitable produce is totally dependent upon consumer markets
which are located in distant areas of the country. This inadequate system restricts
the direct contact of farmers and growers to the agricultural markets and marketing
information. So they have to be totally dependent on contractors or middlemen for
the sale of their production. It causes a lot of financial loss to the farmers. Moreover,
there are no proper storage facilities available to the farmers. The deficiency of
refrigerated transport for fruits and vegetables, and the lack of processing and
packaging facilities further deteriorate the marketing system of agricultural products.
243
VIII. Lack of Proper Financial Policies Recently, the agriculture in Balochistan is progressing with improvement in farm
growth and the production of cotton, apples, vegetables and rice has been claimed
to have increased but the agriculture in the province is still overwhelmed by
numerous multifaceted problems. Small-scale Baloch farmers are not able to invest
in their land to grow more crops due to severe financial restriction and poverty.
Although, the farmers are given the option to take loans from banks under
exploitative and manipulative terms and conditions, but these loans do not contribute
much in the development of poor farmers as the terms and conditions of the banks
and the amount of interest further compress the farmers financially. Thus they are
never unable to come out of poverty. In addition, the rise and fall in the price of
agricultural productions really destroys the economic conditions of the farmers.
Moreover there are no proper and adequate policy formulations by the Government
on provincial level. The farmers are neither provided with modern agricultural
training nor are they equipped with new and advanced crop technologies. This type
of negligence and lack of beneficial plans and policies is a big constraint in the
development of agriculture sector and the improvement of crop yield. No
comprehensive survey has been carried out by the Provincial Government of
Balochistan to determine the problems and difficulties of farmers. (The Dawn, 2015,
April. 16)
4.2. Provincial Government Plans for the Development of
Agriculture
The agriculture sector of Balochistan is of major economic significance as it has the
potential to make the province self-reliance for food and can give greatest
employment prospects to the Baloch people. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the
government to utilize maximum potential of the agriculture sector by introducing
latest modern techniques and advanced trainings about traditional and cash crops to
the farmers. A Model Floriculture Farms project in collaboration with Balochistan
Floriculture Association is being launched by the Balochistan Horticulture
244
Cooperative Society. The objective of the project is to introduce floriculture business
as a potential source of earnings for the farmers of the province with a
corresponding grant support of Agribusiness Support Fund (ASF). The project also
includes the development of floriculture industry through education and training to
the farmers. In this regard, the government of Balochistan is putting efforts for the
establishment of markets, cold storage facilities and Information Technology
Infrastructure. The project is designed into two phases. Firstly, eight model
floriculture farms have been established in different areas of Balochistan while in the
second phase, a Flower Market is planned to be established in Quetta. Another plan
of developing information technology infrastructure to provide online information to
the farmers regarding trading and the market rates of their commodity is also in
progress. (Ahad, 2012, Dec.6). The present chief minister of Balochistan, Dr. Abdul
Malik Baloch has announced the year of 2015 as the year of growers, livestock
farmers and fishermen. (The Daily Times, 2015, Apr. 8). The government of
Balochistan is fully aware of the fact that the development of agriculture, livestock
and fisheries sectors, and latest training to growers, cattle farmers and fishermen
would add a lot to eliminate the backwardness and poverty in the province. As
agriculture in Balochistan is facing the very serious matter of reduction of water
table, it is the biggest need of the time that farmers should be imparted latest
scientific training and education which would facilitate them in the cultivation of such
crops and fruits which require less water. A large portion of Baloch population
depends on livestock and the government should take solid steps to provide
guidance and support to livestock farmers to increase cattle breeding. Through the
modern techniques Balochistan can become self-sufficient in the production of fruits,
crops, agri commodities and meat. In addition, the development of agriculture sector
would bring huge foreign exchange through export of these products. “The provincial
government would soon organize a convention of experts in Quetta in order to
create awareness among the people associated with agriculture, livestock and
fisheries, while also inviting progressive farmers from all the districts to the event,
The government is serious to focus on imparting training to fishermen, ensuring
international stranded packing for fish products and seeking a better market for fish.‖
245
(The Daily Times, 2015, Apr. 8). The chief minister has also announced two projects
of cutting wool and qualitative processing and packing with the cooperation of
Australia in Balochistan. The government of Balochistan is determined to revitalize
natural pastures too. (The Daily Times, 2015, Apr. 8).
5. Live stock/Dairy Sector in the Economic Development The people of Balochistan have been involved in livestock rising throughout the
centuries. It is the oldest occupation of the Baloch people. And it still has the status
of the major occupation where 73 percent of the total Baloch population is relying on
it as a source of their livelihood. It is a fact that almost 93 percent of Balochistan is
considered rangeland and the problems of overgrazing, water shortages, and
droughts have led to a major loss of natural meadows and at present only 33
percent of the total land is practically available as grazing land. Livestock rearing is
found mostly in the central and western districts. („‟Balochistan Economy‟‟,2014,
April.28). Livestock in Balochistan is a major sector housing about 20 percent of the
national stock. In-spite of ecological limitations and being arid and semi-arid
province, live stock sector contributed 8 percent to the total GDP of Balochistan in
2010 at present the Livestock contributes 55 percent of Agriculture value added,
11.4 percent of National GDP of Pakistan and more than 47 percent in the economy
of Balochistan. (Govt. of Balochistan, Web Document, 2015: 4) At present only 28
percent rangelands are considered fair to good for livestock production. Hence,
except for some areas of upper and lower highlands in North Eastern part of
Balochistan having best ranges of the province which support 76 percent of the
livestock, the southern plains with big land mass have the poorest ranges support
only 24 percent of the livestock population. Livestock has always been a part of the
socio-cultural and socioeconomic life of Baloch people.
The animal resources play very fundamental role in the economy of Balochistan and
have a socioeconomic importance in poverty reduction and food security. The
population of small ruminant in Balochistan has a considerable portion of the total
246
population. The sheep population is about of about 48 percent and goats population
constitutes 22 percent of Pakistan where sheep are 46 percent in the entire sheep
population of the country.
Table No. 6.14. Live stock Population Census Balochistan 2014
Sr. No Live Stock Estimated Population
1 Cattles 3,802,156
2 Buffaloes 679,276
3 Sheep 14,748,207
4 Goats 14,438,994
5 Camels 428,034
6 Horses 83,555
7 Mules 13,973
8 Asses 570,875
9 Poultry 6,885,238 Source. Live Stock & Dairy Development Department, Balochistan, Web Document,
January 2015. p 11 retrieved from www.balochistan.gov.pk
5.1. Major Problems of Livestock Sector In Balochistan, there are numerous factors which restrict and affect the output of
animals and the development of live stock sector. These factors include animal
diseases, shortage of vegetation on ranges and reduced marketing facilities. The
policies relating to livestock agriculture are not always friendly. Unfortunately, there
is no government for the livestock farmers for live stock education and training
according to the modern techniques. (Govt. Web Document, 2015:4). The land of
Balochistan has always been a victim of constant droughts and is again passing
through another phase of drought these days. Droughts badly affect the survival of
livestock and agriculture which are the foundations of economy of Balochistan. It is
reported that about 20 to 25 percent livestock are damaged by drought and perished
only in Naushki district. The situation is serious in Khuzdar, Kharan and other
districts due to delay in providing them any relief by the government. Droughts
always result in the lack of drinking water and vegetation and this deficiency directly
247
harm the livestock sector as the milk production declines due to the shortage of
fodder and water. This situation causes nutritional and income problems for the
farmers. Moreover, droughts cause reduction of water reservoirs and damage to
different crops that would lead to a rise in food prices. Insufficient food intake causes
malnutrition and different diseases both in animals and farmers. According to
Provincial Disaster Management Authority, 29 out of 32 districts were affected by the
drought. (The Daily Times, 2015, Mar.17)
5.2. Economic Contribution of Live Stock The livestock not only a great source of food production but they also are used in
different products which can generate profit to support the economy of a region and
a state as well.
I. Meat
Live stock is the only source to provide meat as a major food item.
II. Milk
Mammalian livestock such as buffaloes, goats, camels and sheep are a source of
milk. Moreover the milk gained from these animals is further used in the making of
other dairy products like yogurt, cheese and butter.
II. Fiber
Livestock produce a range of fiber and textiles. High quality of wool is collected
through Sheep and goats. In addition, the skin of cows and sheep are processed to
get leather. Bones, hooves and horns of livestock are also used in different products.
IV. Fertilizers
Manure of live stock is used as a natural fertilizer on fields to increase crop yields. In
the rural areas, the manure is also used in house building as plaster for walls and
floors. It is also used as a fuel in stoves. The blood and bone of animals are also
used in making different products like fertilizers and other chemicals.
248
V. Labor and Transport
Animals such as horses and donkey have always been used as a mode of transport
throughout the centuries and in the present time they can be used for mechanical
energy as well. In ancient times, livestock were the only available source of non-
human labor and they still are serving the same purpose in the agricultural activities
like ploughing the fields and transporting goods.
VI. Land management
The grazing of sheep and goats is very helpful in controlling the growth of wild plants
on the cultivation lands. There are many areas which are prone to wild fires de to
severe dryness, goats and sheep are set to graze on these dry lands where they
remove the flammable material and reduce the risk of fires.
Table No. 6.15. Economic Worth of Live Stock
Sr. No
Item Quantity Worth in Billion Rupees
1 Milk 2.95 Billion Liters 206.56
2 Beef 89.83 Million Kgs 26.95
3 Mutton 81.82 Million Kgs 40.91
4 Poultry Meat 8.69 Million Kgs 2.61
5 Poultry Eggs 476.00 Millions No
3.32
6 Poultry Feathers 0.72 Million Kgs 0.01
7 Hides 0.90 Million Nos. 1.08
8 Skins 10.23 Million No 2.05
9 Wool (000.M.Ton) 14.77 Million Kgs 1.18
10 Hair (000.M.Ton) 8.67 Million Kgs 0.65
11 Edible Offal (000 Tones) 89.00 Million Kgs 0.62
12 Fats (000.M.Tones) 83.44 Million Kgs 2.50
13 Bones (000.M.Tones) 22.25 Million Kgs 1.11
14 Horns & Hoves (000.M.Tones)
13.47 Million Kgs 0.40
15 Guts & Casing (million no.) 22.25 Million No. 0.56
16 Blood (000 Tones) 27.80 Million liters
0.27
17 Trotters 40.91 Million No. 0.53
Total Worth: 291,31 Billion Rupees Source. Live Stock & Dairy Development Department, Balochistan, Web Document, January 2015. p 12 retrieved from www.balochistan.gov.pk on 30 May, 2015.
249
6. Fisheries in the Economic Development of Balochistan
Fishing is mostly the only major occupation of the people of many coastal areas of
Balochistan as there are no other opportunities for agricultural or industrial activities.
The fishing is the greatest source of direct employment to an estimated 400,000
people, which makes around 3 percent of the total population of Balochistan,
proportionately more in the coastal areas which is up to 70 percent and the
contributes less than 1 percent to Pakistan‟s GDP; in comparison to 8 percent
contribution to GDP from livestock. Fish product exports ranks fourth among other
export commodities from Pakistan which account for about 8 million US dollars.
(„‟Balochistan Needs Assessment‟‟, 2013:6-7). And the major and significant portion
of this fish export is generated from Balochistan. In addition, it provides a source of
livelihood and income to 400,000 people who are involved in auxiliary industries
such as boat repair and engine workshops, transport and net supply. At present all
these industries are working under private sector and provide employment to
inhabitants in the fish landing areas. Boatbuilding has been viewed as a potential
future major industry and Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority
(SMEDA) has acknowledged many areas in fisheries that could be developed as an
industry for boatbuilding. („‟Balochistan Needs Assessment‟‟, 2013:6-7). The
fisheries of Balochistan are divided into four main sub-sectors. These include:
Marine capture
Brackish coastal water (coastal aquaculture)
Inland open water capture
Inland closed water (freshwater aquaculture)
These all subcategories have been discussed earlier in Chapter One. The details
about the economic contributions of these categories will be discussed here
according to the requirement of this chapter.
250
I. Economic Significance of Marine Capture Marine capture is the largest source of fish catch in Balochistan and the majority of
the fish is produced by marine capture along the 1,130 kilometer long coastline from
Sindh in the East to Iran in the West. More than 135,000 Tones of fish was caught in
2011 by an estimated 52 thousand fishermen operating 7,186 boats. („‟Balochistan
Needs Assessment‟‟, 2013:1). Balochistan makes about a third of the total Pakistan
fish catch. The major species caught are sea catfish, hairtail, and sardines. There
have been substantial variations in catch of individual species groups every year,
though the total catch has not varied more than about 7 percent during the last
decade. The catch is worth more than 12,698 million Pakistani Rupees and
contributes less than 1 percent to Pakistan‟s Gross Domestic Product. It is estimated
that almost 300,000 people are directly or indirectly engaged in fish industry. In
Balochistan, there are about eight major sites for fishing along with another 30
smaller sites. Gwadar and Pasni are the most important fish catch sites.
II. Economic Significance of Coastline Aquaculture At present, there is no significance of coastal aquaculture due to the lack of proper
commercialization of this category but has a good potential to play an important role
in the economy of Balochistan if paid attention and managed in a suitable way. The
major positive advantage of aquaculture is the long coastline with suitable and
comparatively unpolluted clean water which provides vast opportunities for shrimp
farming. („‟Balochistan Needs Assessment‟‟, 2013:3). This is being done on a very
small scale and not has resulted in any significant commercial project. The Fisheries
Development Board (FDB) is putting efforts to categorize and discover pond sites
and establish a shrimp hatchery at Jiwani. Besides shrimps, there are many other
types of species that could likely be farmed in Balochistan.
III. Economic Significance of Inland Fisheries About 5.7 percent of all the fish production of Balochistan is produced by inland
fisheries which is completely a process of open-water fish catch where fish are
caught in small dams. This type of fishing works under a contract system and the
251
rights are auctioned off. The current system of auctioning the rights of fishing is not
based upon equity point of view so it also does not encourage investment by rights
holders to increase production.
Table No. 6.16. Total Fish Landing and its Value on Balochistan Coast in
2013
Commercial Total Quantity in M. Tons Total Value in Pak Rupees
Flatfish 2844.133
441,214,192
Sardine 11766.218
243,518,164
Other clupeiform 8432.155
196,013,223
Wolf herring 965.130
27,213,188
Spanish mackerel 5043.123
1,051,493,418
Mackerel 2031.103
711,354,193
Tuna 9430.174
621,425,100
Sea catfish 15513.381
354,819,418
Eel 2131.140
71,313,116
Barracuda 2432.110
191,865,183
Marline 1970.131
167,493,173
Mullet 2660.153
201,413,178
Threadfin fish 674.223
69,086,433
Large Grouper 3261.123
201,314,125
Small Grouper 4433.120
134,315,194
Cobia 2500.103
148,018,191
Scad 2331.174
107,018,914
Indian mackerel 10432.160
501,322,716
252
Queenfish 3618.218
801,413,155
Trevally 2164.520
435,764,100
Dolphin fish 1533.184
35,463,111
Grunter 2300.136
256,410,914
Large croaker 1981.338
921,117,163
small croaker 10963.000
801,223,570
Emperor 1683.113
218,058,528
King soldier (Sea Bream) 1474.127
929,376,034
Pomfret 3530.132
951,314,623
Hair tail 16436.188
751,319,234
Shark 3973.131
176,814,128
Ray 3681.001
601,928,625
Guitarfish 843.682
31,201,523
Shrimp 2845.131
612,894,188
kiddi 4630.500
101,560,556
Crab 1832.132
86,594,300
Ivory shell 480.138
18,617,816
Lobster 980.267
596,811,664
Cuttlefish 971.120
16,518,404
Jellyfish 383.199
17,446,414
Grand Total M. Tons. 155155.111 RS. 13,802,059,169 Source: Fisheries Data, 2103, Directorate of Balochistan, retrieved from http://balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=1304&Itemid=677 on 1 June, 2015
253
Table No. 6.17. Area Wise Quantity of Fish on Balochistan in 2013
Fish Jiwani Pishukan Gwadar Surbandar Pasni Ormara Damb Gaddani Total Qty in M.Tons
Flat Fish 120.200 44.983 64.137 133.299 1315.156 360.144 725.900 80.314 2844.133
Sardinals 295.200 346.805 1718.729 2813.680 928.231 600.303 4953.158 110.112 11766.218
Other cluieform
79.800 44.282 1368.130 1568.655 1410.184 613.553 2959.352 388.199 8432.155
Wolfhairring
124.194 38.282 490.166 36.064 200.562 40.184 0.710 35.771 965.130
Large makral
262.900 213.114 3051.555 359.240 342.859 368.900 31.677 413.232 5043.123
Small makral
63.600 78.153 942.832 323.184 280.664 135.330 84.230 123.110 2031.103
Tuna 1082.800 1436.154 5195.324 288.751 717.178 138.194 442.668 129.105 9430.174
Sea cat fish
1400.500 618.134 1935.183 45.080 2018.366 3380.180 5244.998 870.940 15513.381
Eels 105.300 399.256 452.120 144.814 537.603 331.114 71.654 88.122 2131.140
Barracuda 136.500 145.807 961.305 321.535 520.228 200.161 63.441 83.133 2432.110
Marlin 96.300 123.711 944.971 159.128 541.586 41.254 0.000 63.181 1970.131
Mullets 170.300 155.231 1068.955 70.895 424.106 680.425 35.118 55.123 2660.153
Thread finfish
67.400 6.480 194.322 30.165 163.163 68.184 35.105 109.404 674.223
Large grouper
44.800 149.897 822.345 127.850 1379.534 370.106 48.180 318.411 3261.123
Small grouper
48.400 158.120 1051.492 112.730 2033.318 484.118 188.709 356.233 4433.120
Cobias 35.900 173.506 518.855 226.915 527.406 518.113 118.290 381.118 2500.103
Scad 0.000 41.431 206.785 182.090 495.321 300.392 874.984 230.171 2331.174
Indian mekeral
1179.000 794.058 2859.435 1181.955 2034.295 1160.251 325.000 898.166 10432.160
Queen 1418.400 529.329 869.545 68.284 384.195 150.103 68.231 130.131 3618.218
254
fish
Travelly
322.400
239.566
562.243
22.480
474.437
188.132
132.111
223.151
2164.520
Dolphin fish
107.300 32.867 550.760 116.920 333.420 218.123 60.513 113.281 1533.184
Grunter 270.100 135.658 763.778 313.844 443.286 190.131 75.118 108.221 2300.136
Large croaker
501.500 220.793 455.154 147.200 242.396 230.126 70.001 114.168 1981.338
Small croaker
381.800 313.531 3301.095 451.095 3513.634 1188.113 1362.181 451.551 10963.000
Emperor 27.000 176.448 829.521 170.265 279.452 78.164 108.113 14.150 1683.113
King Soldier
(Sea Bream)
34.200 83.354 817.865 127.095 185.928 98.124 0.000 127.561 1474.127
Pomferets 640.600 528.919 697.865 358.365 579.901 523.153 78.108 123.221 3530.132
Hairtail fish
1271.972 455.430 5482.673 1090.074 2095.601 1318.164 3536.339 1185.935 16436.188
Sharks 1931.800 221.123 624.561 232.188 601.851 253.103 0.000 108.505 3973.131
Rays 324.628 297.084 1650.737 173.184 577.138 403.126 0.000 255.104 3681.001
Guitar fish 457.800 0.000 304.625 65.675 8.286 0.000 0.000 7.296 843.682
Shrimp 199.300 301.835 828.475 317.280 762.925 132.004 80.132 223.180 2845.131
Kiddi 0.000 148.179 287.720 113.160 732.114 174.132 1318.522 1856.673 4630.500
Crabs 88.100 105.623 389.720 102.188 597.157 177.230 100.000 272.114 1832.132
Ivory shel 91.200 31.032 0.000 0.000 171.575 104.218 0.000 82.113 480.138
Lobster 194.500 11.898 290.361 118.610 319.760 45.138 0.000 0.000 980.267
Cuttle fish 13.300 58.792 427.425 172.225 116.086 35.189 0.000 148.103 971.120
Jelly fish 65.300 0.000 104.599 18.183 134.599 18.183 0.000 42.335 383.199
G. Total 13654.294 8858.865 43085.363 12304.345 28423.501 15315.562 23192.543 10320.638 155155.11
1 Source: Fisheries Data, 2013, Directorate of Balochistan, retrieved from
http://balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=1304&Itemid=677 on 1 June, 2015
255
The information about the population involved in the fisheries sector to earn their
livelihood is as under:
Table No. 6.18. Fishermen Population in 2013
Category Jiwani
Pishukan
Gwadar
Surbandar
Pasni
Ormara
Damb
Gaddani
Total
Full Time Fishermen
3680 2664 6684 2758 6835 3811 4823
4220 35475
Part Time Fishermen
1214 1186 2530 1309 3414 1460 2618
1470 15201
sporadic Fishermen
680 614 1018 475 1318 1123 1290
783 7301
Total 5574 4464 10232
4542 11567
6394 8731
6473 57977
Source: Fisheries Data, 2013, Directorate of Balochistan, retrieved from http://balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=1304&Itemid=677 on 1 June, 2015
6.1. Provincial Government’s Plans for the Development of Fisheries. Like other sectors, fisheries sector also requires a lot of development strategies
and for a rapid progress. For this purpose, many programs for development have
been designed by the provincial government. The following table shows the status
of currently on going development programs and future plans for the development
of this significant sector.
Table No. 6.19. Government Plans for the Development of Fisheries Sector 2012-13
On Going Government Schemes
S.No Name of Scheme Cost in Million Rs.
1 Fisheries Infrastructure (Auction Hall, Certification Laboratory, Fiber Glass Boat Building Yard and Nets etc.
200.000
2 Development of Fishermen Colonies on Balochistan Coast
180.000
256
Future Plans
S.No Name of Proposed Scheme Estimated Cost in Million Rs.
1 Modification of boats and provision of insulted ice box, plastic crates, onboard flake ice plant & life jackets
372.127
2 Construction of jetty at Tak, Ormara 1400.000
3 Institutional strengthening and capacity building on concerned Government agencies and stake holders.
150.000
4 Up gradation of 100 fishing boats as per European Standard
250.000
5 Construction of 09 boat repairing workshops 20.000
6 Training programme for the capacity building of Fisheries Department
20.000
7 Development of fish hatchery at Sabakzai Dam at Zhob
60.000
8 Trout fish raceway system at Kalat, Ziarat and Rod Mulazai.
39.000
9 Fisheries Research Centre at Pasni 190.000
10 Inland Fisheries Training Centre at D.M Jamali 250.000
11 Fish Market at Quetta 120.000
12 Fisheries Offices & accommodation facilities on different stations
550.000
Source: Fisheries Department, Development Schemes 2012-13 retreived from http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81&Itemid=130 accessed on 1 June, 2015
7. Significance of Mining and Energy Resources in the
Economic Development of Balochistan
Balochistan is a rich land in terms of mineral and petroleum deposits. During the
last decade, Balochistan contributed one-fifth to Pakistan‟s mining GDP with 0.23
percent and the mineral mining in from Balochistan was generating Rs. 3.4 billion
in annual revenue. Coal production in the province exceeds 232 million metric tons,
while the production of shale gas is over 130 million metric tons. Other important
minerals are copper, iron ore, marble and limestone. Chaghi is the centre of the
greatest variety of minerals including copper mines. Coal production is mainly
attributed to Quetta and Loralai while Lasbela is producing high amount of
257
limestone and shale. Gas and Oil are more important amongst the mineral
resources of the province and are being consumed widely for domestic use and
export purposes. In 1952, the natural gas was first discovered in Balochistan, and
within a few decades Balochistan started producing almost 50 percent of the
country's natural gas by 1980. (World Bank Report, 2013: 12) presently the natural
gas and oil are being produced in the areas of Sui, Loti, Pir Koh and Uch. More gas
and oil reserves have been discovered at Khuzdar, Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Zarghun.
Natural gas and coal are the most significant mineral deposits in Balochistan. In
1995, Balochistan was producing about 56 percent of Pakistan‟s total production
but by the year of 2007, the percentage decreased to the level of 22.7 percent. At
present, Balochistan it is the second largest producer of natural gas of the country.
The total coal reserves of Balochistan are estimated about 459 million tones and
contribute more than 50 percent of Pakistan‟s total coal production. Uranium and
other precious metals such as copper, gold, silver and platinum are also found in
huge quantity. („‟Balochistan Economy‟‟,2014, April.28).
Sui gas generated from Bugti constitutes almost 45 percent of the country‟s total
gas production. There are more than 80 gas wells that are producing about 720-
750 million cubic feet of gas per day. The total gas reserved are said to be about
9.625 trillion cubic feet. It is estimated that The Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL)
is gaining natural gas from Balochistan of worth Rupees 85 billion but the federal
government pays only Rs. 7 billion to the province as gas royalty. The royalty fixed
for gas is about 12.5 percent which is much less than that of other provinces of
Pakistan. Sui Gas generated from Balochistan is highly demanded by the industrial
sector and is the only source of energy supply to different economic sectors such
as power generation, agriculture, commerce, fertilizer manufacturers and
chemicals and household use in the whole country. The worth of Balochistan‟s
minerals was estimated at about Rs. 38 million in 2005-06, out of the worth of
natural gas is about Rs. 31. („‟Balochistan Economic Report‟‟, 2008:52). Along with
gas and oil, coal has also been a traditionally important mineral resource and great
factor in the economic development of Balochistan. The coal production of around
two million tons forms the highest provincial share in the total coal production of
258
Pakistan. Coal reserves are found in the areas of Bolan, Sibi, Quetta and Lora Lai
Districts. There are six coal mining areas in Balochistan which include Khost–
Shahrig–Harnai, Duki, Sor Rang–Daghari, Pir Imail Ziarat, Mach and recently
mining was started in Chamalang. („‟Geological Survey of Pakistan‟‟, 2009).Total
estimated reserves of all the coal fields are about 217 million tons. („‟An Overview
of Mineral Potential, 2013:11). Balochistan has also possesses immense resources
of copper ore found in Chaghi, Khuzdar, Lasbela districts, in Chaghi at least 12
deposits are found which contain gold and silver in significant quantities. Two major
projects of mining copper gold are Sandak Copper-Gold and Reko Diq copper-Gold
deposits. The Sandak project was started in 1995 and is producing 15,672 tons of
copper blister, 51852 ounces of gold and 97356 ounces of silver are being
produced annually („‟An Overview of Mineral Potential, 2013:7). Reko Diq deposit
was discovered in 1978-79 in Chaghi as a joint venture between Balochistan,
Canada and Chile partnership. The mining of about two billion tons of copper and
20 million ounces of gold reserves and a large scale of silver deposit are estimated
in this project. The following table describes the worth and value of different
important minerals of Balochistan:
Table No. 6.20. Worth of Minerals of Balochistan and Employment Cost Statistics
Minerals Average daily employment (Nos)
Employment Cost (Rs.)
Gross Value (Rs.)
Intermediate Cost (Rs.)
Miscellaneous Cost (Rs.)
Gross Value Added (Rs.)
All Minerals
22,788 2,767,056 46,417,673 7,630,139 530,352 38,257,182
Antimony 42 1,512 2,002 100 40 1,862
Barite 465 27,592 174,404 9,086 568 164,751
Chromite 578 38,724 109,881 3,253 1,027 105,601
Coal 8,756 901,286 3,922,119 647,627 11,757 3,262,735
Copper 1,274 193,411 2,237,180 231,091 7,222 1,998,867
259
Crude Oil 35 4,145 39,473 6,072 118 33,282
Dolomite 4 56 80 5 2 73
Fluorite 13 477 3,237 160 50 3,027
Granite 48 2,658 3,655 412 11 3,232
Limestone 1,495 108,793 220,812 8,653 1,335 210,824
Megnesite 30 1,012 1,177 83 16 1,079
Marble 2,263 87,245 291,353 14,650 287 276,415
Natural Gas
6,148 1,267,598 38,912,537 6,683,592 506,993 31,721,952
Serpentine 42 3,754 5,790 449 18 5,323
Shale Clay 1,595 128,793 493,973 24,907 908 468,158
Source: United Nations Development Fund, Report 2011. p 6
8. Infrastructure Development Projects
The government of Balochistan and Federal Government of Pakistan have always
been striving for the betterment of the over all economic condition of the province.
Many programs for the development of different economic sectors have been
initiated and launched during last decade. These development plans are designed
to alleviate the basic socio economic problems in the province which are causing
obstacles in the economic growth and progress of the province. The education,
health, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, live stock and mining sectors along with
coastal development and infrastructure are the foundation of economy for any state
and region. In Balochistan, many development projects for all these sectors have
been planned in collaboration with other national and international organizations.
Apart from the projects for internal progress of the population of Balochistan, there
is a great need to improve the economic condition of Balochistan according to
international standards to fully utilize the potential of this most significant region of
Pakistan. For this purpose, construction of many large civil-engineering based
260
infrastructure projects such as highways, dams, canals and ports is most important
for overall economic development of Balochistan. The completion of such projects
will not only beneficial for the economy of Pakistan but also bring dynamic changes
in the province as the Baloch population will be provided with excellent job
opportunities and better income. The better economic and financial condition is
always helpful in alleviating the major socio economic problem of poverty and
consequently leads to the formation of an economically strong and healthy society
with a lot of chance of further improvement and progress. During his regime in
2001, President General Pervez Musharraf, launched many mega development
projects in Balochistan, which would believed to be the best solution to the
economic problems of Balochistan. Development projects like construction of
Mekran Coastal Highway, Gwadar deep sea port, Kachi and Miran Dam will
generally benefit the Baloch people. The Gwadar Sea Port, Makran Coastal
Highway and Kashghar-Gwadar Economic Corridor are the most important projects
but these have come under detailed discussion from every aspect and angle in the
Chapter 3 of this research. Any more detail in this regard would be a mere
repetition of words. There are other development project for the economic growth
and progress of Balochistan which need to be highlighted in this chapter. Those
projects include Federal Government‟s projects of high scale infrastructure that
include the construction of various dams, roads and other coastal development
plans as under:
8.1. Construction of 100 Dams in Balochistan
Droughts and floods have been a significant feature of Balochistan. the shortage of
water due to insufficient rain causes droughts and excessive rains cause floods.
Both are highly harmful to the economic growth and development. The construction
of various Dams is most important to cope with these issues:
a. Proper water supply to agricultural lands
b. Prevention of floods by containing excessive rain water
c. Supply of clean drinking water to the population.
261
d. Ground Water Recharge
e. Control of Soil Erosion
f. Poverty Alleviation
g. Unemployment Reduction
Realizing the need of time, the Federal Government of Pakistan decided to build
around 100 new dams in five packages. The package -1 includes the construction
of 20 dams and package II is designed for 26 dams. The Package III, IV and V are
for the construction of 50, 50 and 48 dams respectively. The package I of 20 dams
was launched in 2009 and is in its advanced stage of completion and is hoped to
be completed soon. Sixteen out of twenty dams have been completed. The
implementation of the construction of 26 more dams under package II is also in
progress and scheduled to be completed by the end of 2015. (http://100dams.org/)
Table No. 6.21 Construction Strategy for 100 Dams
Packages No. of Dams Time Zone Planning Status
Package-I 20 2008-09 to 2012-13 Substantially Completed
Package-II 26 2011-02 to 2013-14 Under Implementation
Package-III 50 2013-14 to 2018-19 Plan Prepared
Package-IV 50 2018-19 to 2023-24 Plan Prepared
Package-V 48 2023-24 to 2028-29 Plan Prepared
Source: http://100dams.org/scope.htm accessed on 10 June, 2015
The details about the location and construction of dams under package –I is as
under:
Table No. 6.22. Construction of 100 Dams, Package -I of 20 Dams
North Zone South Zone
Name of Dam District Name of Dam District
Spezendai Dam Ziarat Uthandaro Dam Lasbela
Surghund Dam Loralai Sasool Dam Khuzdar
Tor Khan Dam Q.Saifullah Sur-e-Aab Dam Panjgur
262
Bund Dam Musakhel Jodair Dam Awaran
Darmin Dam Chaghi Taigh Dam Khuzdar
Bostan Dam Pishin Chapchal Dam Kalat
Arambai Dam Q.Abdullah Chiltan Dam Mastung
Barak Dam Quetta Kashi Dam Khuzdar
Kumbri Dam Bolan Makola Dam Gwadar
Bahlol Dam (Project dropped) Zhob Darwar Dam(Suspended) Kech
-------- ------ Miskin Dam(Suspended) Gwadar
--------- ------- Shabok Dam (Dropped) Washuk
Source: http://100dams.org/list1.htm accessed on 10 June, 2015
Map No 6.1. Location of 100 Dams, Package-I of 20 Dams
Source: http://100dams.org/location.htm on 10 June, 2015
263
Table No. 6.23 Construction of 100 Dams, Package –II of 26 Dams
North Zone South Zone
Name of Dam Location Name of Dam Location
Nahar Kot Dam Barkhan Katki Khaisar Dam Kalat
Dhudar Dam Jhal Magsi Shashlok Dam Kalat
Mirdazai Dam Musakhel Thank Dam Kech
Makhal Dam Q.Abdullah Hushtri Dam Khuzdar
Malgagi Dam Q.Saifulla Lohi Dam Khuzdar
Murgha Dam Q.Saifullah Kukar Dam Lasbela
Dargai Dam Loralai Duley Kanak Dam Mastung
Kaluwaal Dam Nushki Asimabad Dam Mastung
Manzari Dam Pishin Marrave Dam Mastung
Tang Noshar Dam Quetta Romro Dam Gwadar
Murghabal Dam Shirani Nivano Dam Panjgur
Sharig Dam Sibi Harambo Dam Khuzdar
Dabar Dam Zhob Rakhsani Rai Dam Kalat
Zawa Dam Ziarat Mirap Anari Dam Kalat
Source: http://100dams.org/package2.htm accessed on 10 June, 2015
I. Economic Benefits of the Project
There are many benefits which are expected from the construction of these dams
as under:
a. Dams will contain water caused by heavy rains and therefore prevent floods,
therefore the majority of population, agricultural areas and infrastructure will
be secured from being damaged by floods.
b. The conserved water will be provided directly to the population for drinking
and irrigation. These dams have the capacity to irrigate about 25,850 acres
that constitute about 10, 466 hectares of cultivation lands.
264
c. The project will be helpful in providing good job opportunities to the major
portion of population during and after construction.
Map No.6.2 Location of 100 Dams, Package-II of 26 Dams
Source: http://100dams.org/location2.htm on 10 June, 2015
8.2 Current Plans for Economic Development
There are many schemes for Development of Balochistan which are being
executed by the Provincial Government through Public Sector Development
Program (PSDP). These schemes include the development of irrigation
infrastructure, education and health facilities, agriculture and industrial
265
development to enhance the socio-economic condition of the people and the
province.
8.3. Chief Minister’s Policy Reform Unit
The provincial government of Balochistan is fully aware of the fact that the rapid
progress and development of the province is the biggest need of the time. For this
purpose, the Chief Minister of Balochistan Dr Abdul Malik Baloch has established
the Chief Minister‟s Policy Reform Unit. This unit consists of competent economists
working in the leadership of Dr Kaiser Bengali, who is the Balochistan‟s
representative in the National Finance Commission. (Gondal, 2015: 8) the main
task and focus of this unit is the preparation of the development strategy for
Balochistan to change the economic geography of Balochistan as soon as
possible.
I. Employment Opportunities
The strategies are based on the fact that Balochistan is a rich province in the terms
of resources with a small population which can be managed very easily by
adopting appropriate economic strategies. The progress of economic sectors has a
potential to create about 1.5 million jobs which will definitely alleviate the ratio of
unemployment to less than 5 percent. The government of Balochistan is
committed to create an equal, progressive, educated and healthy society that
ensures full employment for the people of Balochistan. The better opportunities for
the employment will be created through systematic and proper utilization and
development of the natural resources to bring out Balochistan from a horticultural
and pastoral age to an economically advanced state. There has been no physical
and social infrastructure development for a long time in Balochistan. In most of the
areas, people are living without roads, electricity, education and health facilities,
water supply and employment opportunities.
266
II. Basic Infrastructure Development Strategy
The development strategy is designed for the development of basic infrastructure
and endorsement of primary sectors to create a strong foundation for advanced
expansion and development of secondary sectors. The basic infrastructure
includes water supply sources, means of communication like roads and rail
networks, development of energy sector, education and health. In the industrious
sectors, the major attention would be paid to the better production of fruits and
vegetables, improved conditions of livestock, fishing sector, forestry, mining and
other subsequent industries. The development strategy also acknowledges the
importance of economic corridors and corresponding growth expansion. Much
emphasis would be laid on the areas with important economic activities. Such
areas greatly require the facility of better connectivity on priority basis.
III. Economic Corridors Development Strategy
There are six Economic Corridors which are emphasized in the development
strategy to provide connectivity to and among following potential areas: (Gondal,
2015: 9-10).
Corridor 1 comprises of the north-east districts which are producing
non-staple high value products such as fruits, vegetables, wool and
minerals, including coal, and chromite.
Corridor 2 comprises of gas fields and canal irrigated agricultural
areas which are producing major food and cash crops.
Corridor 3 covers the trade route that connects the port city of
Karachi with Chamman on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border via
Khuzdar and Quetta.
Corridor 4 is a part of the Gwadar-Kashgar trade route and runs
along Turbat, Panjgur, Besima and Khuzdar.
Corridor 5 comprises the link between the copper belt in Chagai and
Gwadar via Mashkel and Buleda.
267
Corridor 6 is the coastal belt where the fishing industry is located.
IV. Development Strategy for Growth Centers
The growth nodes are areas defined as those areas where industrial and social
sector development can be concentrated on the basis of population, production
and availability of transportation network. The growth nodes are identified on the
basis of population density and potential for economic development. The growth
rate, agricultural and mineral production, live stock population, agricultural
production and means of communications are the major factors which play very
significant role in determining the future economic potential and importance of a
specific area.
The Chief Minister‟s Policy Reform Unit is working on a comprehensive analysis of
population, available infrastructure and natural resources and has discovered
about 14 growth centers which include Quetta, Chaman, Zhob, Loralai,
QilaSaifullah, SIbi, DeraAllahyar, Kharan, Khuzdar, Panjgur, Nokundi, Turbat,
Gwadar and Hub Chowki. These regions of Balochistan have been recognized as
growth centers which can become a good source for the formation of further growth
nodes by developing infrastructure between the existing growth centres.
V. Connectivity between Growth Centers and Economic Corridors
In order to connect the economic corridors and growth centres, an inclusive road-
rail alignment plan has been designed by the provincial government. The plan
includes economically strategic highway routes, national and provincial highways.
Most of the roads are in very poor condition in the growth centres and need to be
upgraded according to international standards. The valuable fruits, vegetables and
fish products are badly damaged while traveling through these broken roads and
result in a great loss to the producers and farmers. In this regard, the development
268
strategy has projected the reconstruction of several national highways. Major of
these are:
653 kilometers long highway starting from Gabd-Jiwani-Gwadar-Pasni-
Ormara-H ub Chowki-Karachi
790 km long highway from Chaman border to Quetta-Mastung-Khuzdar-
Hub Chowki to Karachi.
Kuchlaq (Quetta)-KilaSaifullah-Zhob-Danasar highway
VI. Reconstruction of Provincial Highways
The development unit has also anticipated reconstruction of nine provincial
highways, having total length of 2,933 kilometers (Gondal, 2015: 9-10). and
suggested four new alignments which are as under:
Nokundi-Mashkel-Turbat-Gwadar highway
Dalbandin/Noshki-Kharan-Besima highway
Grawag-Panjgur-Awaran-Bela highway
Highway from Hoshab to Bela.
After the completion of the above strategic road and rail networks, all the Economic
Corridors will be connected to each other as well as with the Growth Centers. This
construction would enable productive exploitation of the huge and varied resource
base and promote productivity, trade and development in a speedy and easy way.
VII. Development Strategy for Coastal Regions
Balochistan possesses more than 700 kilometers long coastline with 38 fishing
sites. There are three deltas in Balochistan which possess great potential for
outstanding and exceptional aqua-culture especially shrimp and oysters. these
sites include Jiwani, Kalmat and Miani Hor. the high quality coastal highway
269
connects all the sites from Jiwani in the west to Uthal in the east and onwards to
Karachi. On the basis of possibilities, almost ten fish landing sites have been
allocated for the further development including Gwadar and Pasni, which are
already working as major fish harbors.
9. Major Challenges in the Economic Development
The province of Balochistan has been facing a lot of socio economic problems
which are directly affecting the political as well as economic development of the
region. The issues of education, poverty, unemployment and natural calamities are
major of all which are definitely a big challenge to the progress and development of
this most important province of Pakistan. A brief analysis of these major challenges
is as under:
9.1. Poverty and Unemployment in Balochistan The term „Poverty‟ is usually attached with low and insufficient income, and it has
rather has many more dimensions. In fact there are many other significant factors
associated with the appropriate definition of poverty. These factors include lack of
health facilities, education and adequate source of income. And by any means,
Balochistan is the poorest province of Pakistan in every aspect despite the reality
of being the richest land in the terms of natural resources. It is reported that only 20
percent of the total population have the facility of clean drinking water, whereas the
rest of about 86 percent population do not have access to pure water. The
electricity supply in the villages and other rural areas of Balochistan is about 25
percent only as compared to other provinces of Pakistan. (Fazl-e-Haider, „‟Higher
Poverty‟‟). The number of total unemployed people in Pakistan is about 3.05 million
out of which about 0.06 million unemployed people belong to Balochistan which
constitute about 20 percent of total unemployed people of Pakistan. (PILDAT,
2012:7)
270
Table No. 6. 24 Unemployed Population of Balochistan
Area Male Female Total
Rural 0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
Urban 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
Balochistan 0.3 % 0.3% 0.6%
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11 from http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/12-Population.pdf accessed on 1 June 2015
Balochistan is a least developed region in terms of urbanization. Only 23.3 percent
population of Balochistan is urban while the rest of the population belongs to the
rural areas. (PILDAT, 2012:11). The discovery of Sui gas in Balochistan brought
significant development in overall industrial sector of Pakistan but unfortunately, no
industrial development has been established on the land of the producer,
Balochistan. The lack of industrial development has been the biggest cause of
unemployment in the province. Sui gas was discovered in 1956, but Balochistan
survived without gas facility till 1976 when the LPG (Liquid Petroleum Gas) was
introduced in the capital city; Quetta. It is a misery that the areas of Sui itself, are
not provided with gas pipe line connections as yet. In Ziarat district, majority of the
local population is still has to use wood as fuel and other household use. Despite
other problems and issues, poverty and unemployment have been the major and
most important problems in Balochistan since there is no noticeable effort by
government to reduce unemployment and alleviate the other reasons of poverty in
Balochistan. The negligence of the government can be blamed as the main cause
of poverty and unemployment in Balochistan. It is a fact that in past no proper and
adequate policies have been adopted by federal government towards Balochistan.
No serious efforts have been made by any government; whether it is military or
democratic government; for the betterment of common people of Balochistan. The
Baloch people always blame the Federal Government for a non serious attitude
towards job creation in private sector of Balochistan even when the situation was
peaceful. It is reported that during last five years, the government of Balochistan
271
has been provided with hundred of billion Rupees by Federal Government for the
development projects regarding poverty alleviation. In addition, after the approval
of 7th NFC award in 2010, Balochistan was given a remarkable increment in its
share of finances. (Aamir, 2014, Sep 1, „‟Rising Poverty‟‟). The large amounts
provided by federal government is sufficient enough for the initiation of useful
economic development projects but unfortunately, all the funds are totally at the
disposal of the politicians and bureaucrats of Balochistan who show least interest
in the development of this region. The unfavorable and selfish attitude of the ruling
class and government administration is the biggest cause of the plight of Baloch
people. These development funds should be spent to improve and develop the
Agriculture, irrigation, fisheries, mining, forestry and livestock sectors because the
majority of Baloch population is directly or indirectly reliant on these sectors for
their livelihood. A report about the economic conditions of Pakistan titled
„Clustered Deprivation‟ was prepared by the Sustainable Development Policy
Institute (SDPI) with the financial and technical assistance of United Nation
Development Program (UNDP) in 2013. According to the report ‗‘Balochistan
remains at the top of the poverty list with 45.68 percent of its population living
below the poverty line; followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with 41.71 percent; Sindh
with 36.27 percent and Punjab, showing the lowest figure, at 35 percent of its
population‘‘. (Shah, The News, 26 June, 2013)
The same was reported in 2014 as „‟The highest incidence of poverty prevails in
Balochistan with 52 per cent of the households living under the poverty line,
followed by 32 per cent, 33 per cent and 19 per cent respectively in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Punjab, said the report presented to all provincial
governments during the last month of 2013.‟‟ (Sumra, 25 Feb. 2014, The Express
Tribune). The surveys by SDPI are conducted on the basis of five dimensions to
asses and calculate the level of poverty. These dimensions include basic facilities
and progress rate of education, health, water supply and sanitation, household
assets/amenities and satisfaction to service delivery. Additionally, according to the
United Nations standard, if a person is taking less than 2,350 calories per day and
272
earning less than 1.25 dollar per day has also been regarded as living below the
poverty line. (Shah, The News, 26 June, 2013). In the budget for 2014-15,
Balochistan government has allocated development funds for different projects
which are said to be helpful for poverty alleviation but these projects are mostly
related to the construction of roads and other infrastructure which should not be the
first priority. Instead, the development funds should be spent to improve and
develop the Agriculture, irrigation, fisheries, mining, forestry and livestock sectors
because the majority of Baloch population is directly or indirectly reliant on these
sectors for their livelihood.
9.2. Illiteracy and Poor Condition of Education
The literacy rate in Balochistan has always been lowest as compared to the other
provinces of Pakistan. The Baloch society is tribal in nature and low level of
education is both a foundation and outcome of a constant underdevelopment and
underprivileged living standard and life style. For the economic development of
any state or region, high literacy ratio is highly desirable. The population is counted
as human resource, which is needed to be educated, trained and developed to
achieve the aims of faster growth and development in almost all the sectors of the
economy. This is a fact that development can never be achieved with under
developed and illiterate human resources. Balochistan has the lowest proportion of
literate adults in all Pakistan and the lowest estimated participation rate in primary
education. Due to the prolonged poverty, there are very limited people who can
bear the expenses of education, majority of people belong to lower class and do
not afford education both financially and in terms of physical access. The literacy
rate is higher among the middle and upper classes. In 1998, a mere 26.6 percent
of the total 6.5 million populations were found literate. The overall literacy rate in
Balochistan is 47.7 percent with marked difference in male and female literacy
rates that are 61.5 percent and 24.2 percent respectively. Male literacy rate is two
273
and a half times that of female literacy rate. The following table shows the
percentage of literacy among Baloch population:
Table No. 6. 25. Statistics on Literacy Rate Balochistan
Year Urban Rural Total
Men Wome
n
Total Men Wome
n
Total Men Wome
n
Total
1998 62.4
%
35.3% 50.3
%
27.8
%
8.8% 18.9
%
36.5
%
15.0% 26.6
%
Source: Population census organization 1989, 1999.
The data clearly indicates the poor education ratio in Balochistan especially in the
rural areas. The traditional tribal structure of the society in rural areas, do not
support or encourage the women population to get educated even on primary level.
So the ratio of literate women in tribal areas is extremely low. Balochistan‟s
education sector is characterized by low enrolment and high failure rates. Schools
are not available in every area and the overall condition of available schools is very
poor. Untrained teachers and poor quality teaching methods are among the key
problems in the education sector. The report of Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009-
10 shows Balochistan much behind in the literacy rate, which is 47.7 percent as
compared to 59 per cent in Punjab, 56 per cent Sindh and 49 per cent in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa. The Gender Parity Index (GPI) is the ratio of female enrolment to
the male enrolment. A GPI of more than one indicates that in proportion to every
male in the school, there is more than one female. The GPI index score for
Balochistan is 0.35 which is lower than Punjab (0.69), Sindh (0.61) and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (0.49). (Siddique, 2010, June.7) Majority, rather half of the total
population of Balochistan is uneducated. The literacy rate in some remote areas as
low as ten per cent. There were more than 22,000 settlements in Balochistan and
274
the number of government-run primary, middle and high schools was about 12,600.
(The Dawn, 2013, Dec.19). Poverty, poor health conditions, lack of basic
infrastructure and transport, worsening law and order situation, financial and social
limitations are major reasons which are responsible for the worst circumstances of
education in Balochistan. According to the National Economic Survey (NES)
Balochistan has the least number of educational institutions including both public
and private sector, the lowest literacy rate, the lowest ranking in the Gender Parity
Index (GPI). About 8.6 percent out of the 10,381 educational institution‟s buildings
are not in good condition. About 24.7 percent of these need major repairs while
36.6 percent require minor repairs. Only 30.2 percent are in satisfactory conditions.
About six percent of the schools in Balochistan are not set up in proper building,
nine percent do not have the facility of electricity, 12 percent institutions are without
clean drinking water and 11 percent are without toilet. Balochistan has the smallest
number of educational institutions that constitute 10,381 against the national
number of 216,490. (The Daily Times, 2012, Jun. 12)
I. Development Project for Education in Balochistan by Government
The Government of Balochistan is working on a project for the development of
education sector in assistance with National Commission for Human Development
(NCHD) and UNESCO. This plan is called EFA Plan (Education for All) designed to
improve the educational conditions to alleviate the level of poverty in Balochistan
with the help of quality education. EFA is started in all the thirty districts of
Balochistan. The process was started in April 2010 and the Provincial EFA Plan
spans the period from 2011 to 2015 to match with the (MDG) Millennium
Development Goals. (GoB, Education Deptt. 2011:6). The Balochistan EFA Plan
would emphasize on:
i. Early Childhood Education (ECE)
275
ii. Primary Education
iii. Adult Literacy
According to the report: ‗‘Currently the coverage of ECE in Balochistan is minimal.
Only 1.6% children in the ECE age group are enrolled in ECE classes being
managed in some districts in collaboration with UNICEF. Out of more than 1.195
million primary age children, the overall GER at primary level is 78.7%. Boys‘ GER
is 87.4% whereas girls‘ GER is only 68.6%. The overall literacy rate is 47.7%.
Overall NER at primary level at 44% with boys 51% and girls 36%. The targets set
under the EFA Plan 2011-15 are 50% coverage in ECE, 100% access to primary
and 64% literacy rate.‘‘ („‟Education for all‟‟. 2011:8). The establishment of about
9,726 ECE centers and 50 percent of child enrollment is targeted by the end of
2015. The goals and aims of this plan include activation of nonfunctional schools,
establishment of new primary schools, fulfilling the demand of all basic facilities in
schools, development of school libraries, covering teacher shortage in primary
schools and teacher training programs and up gradation of primary schools to the
middle level. Over 6,200 new primary schools are targeted to be established to
provide hundred percent access to primary students. Over 18,000 adult literacy
centers will be established to meet the target of 64 percent adult literacy in 2015.
The total budget for both public and private sectors for meeting the EFA targets is
Rs.122.805 billion (Equivalent to US 1.462 billion US dollars. („‟Education for All‟‟,
2011:6-9)
9.3. Lack of Proper Infrastructure
The road network and connectivity is not up to the standard and can be called
poorest in the country. Roads are available only in the areas where it is necessary
to connect farms to the local market. The length of the national highways in
Balochistan is about 2,300 km and no development has been made for a long time.
(„‟Balochistan Profile‟‟, 2012, April.11) Balochistan has the lowest density of roads
among all the provinces of Pakistan. This problem of unavailability of proper road
infrastructure is a major issue in the lives of population living in the rural areas. The
276
poorest quality and condition of existing roads and highways is not fit for fast,
comfortable and safe traveling as they are not capable of handling heavy traffic.
9.4. Natural Disasters and Hazards
Unfortunately, the land of Balochistan has always been a victim of natural
calamities and hazards which not only cause heavy damage to the natural and
human resources but also badly affect the process of economic development.
These natural calamities like floods, earthquakes, droughts, cyclones, tsunami and
land sliding frequently attack different regions of Balochistan and consequently
cause unbearable and irreparable loss especially to live stock, agricultural and
fisheries sectors. These calamities bring a lot of destruction to the economy and
are largely responsible for increasing the level of poverty in the province.
Balochistan has been facing a number of catastrophes over the last many years.
The cyclone Yemyin in 2007, Ziarat earthquake in 2008 and repeated flooding
since 2010 till 2014 have resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and vast
destruction of infrastructure. The province has a tendency of going through
different disasters almost throughout the year and the efforts for rehabilitation of
victims are always in process. This „‟all the time‟‟ situation is continuously hamper
the progress of economy of the province. Balochistan lacks the qualified and
experienced human and technical resources to deal with the constant damage
caused by natural hazards, moreover, the week financial condition is a big hurdle in
the rehabilitation of victimized population. The detail about these natural calamities
and their affect is as under:
I. Floods
Floods in Balochistan are caused by heavy rainfalls and dam bursts. These
types of floods are called flash floods. Balochistan witnessed major destruction
caused by the flash floods during the years from 2008 to 2013 and still is in the
process of rehabilitation.
277
The flood of 2010 hit about thirty villages in the northeastern parts of
Balochistan and created serious damage to human lives and
property. In the areas of Bolan, Naseerabad, Barkhan, Sibi and
Kohlu, almost 50,000 people were affected and some deaths were
also reported. („‟Balochistan Flood 2010‟‟, 2012, April.11)
The flood of 2011 was also caused by heavy rain, hailstorm and snow
fall which badly affected the areas of northern and central
Balochistan. Quetta, Ziarat, Loralai, Nushki, Chaghi and Mastung
were largely affected where many houses were destroyed and
washed away.
The flood of 2012 was also a result of heavy rain falls. That flood was
spread over three provinces, Sindh and Punjab were also got
affected. The districts of Jaffarabad. Naseerabad, Killa Saifullah, Jhal
Magsi and Loralai were largely damaged. („‟Seasonal Monsoon‟‟
2012, Sep.28) Due to very heavy rainfalls, a powerful burst led to the
flooding which caused significant damage and casualties in the
affected areas. Not only houses but other infrastructure including
transport links such as roads and bridges were destroyed. Moreover,
the rains and flood water washed away tens of thousands of acres of
crops along with livestock and poultry in many areas.
The year of 2013 also brought another disaster in the form of flood
caused by monsoon rains in the Koh-e-Suleman Range which lasted
for about 6 days at a stretch. The flood hit almost 342 villages of 13
districts out of which the districts of JhalMagsi, Jaffarabad, Sibi,
Loralai, Khuzdar and Lasbela were worst affected. („‟Damages of
Flood 2013‟‟, 2014, April 16) The flood resulted in the loss of about 21
lives. More than 3,000 houses were destroyed and a heavy loss was
caused to crops and livestock, 63969 hectares of crop land was badly
damaged.
Most recently in June 2015, unpredicted heavy rains in Shah Noorani
area of District Khuzdar have caused a heavy flood in the local rivers
278
and water straits. Sixteen casualties have been reported by now with
almost fifty houses are damaged. („‟Situation Bulletin-I‟‟, 2015,
June.5)
II. Earthquakes
Frequent earthquakes are also a prominent feature of Balochistan which have
been played havoc many times with the different regions of Balochistan during last
decade. Like floods, earthquakes also cause massive destruction to the
infrastructure and human lives. The most prominent earthquakes during last
decades occur in 2008 and 2013. In October 2008, an earthquake magnitude of
6.4, hit the Ziarat and Pishin districts. That earthquake was followed by a series of
tremors and affected the mountainous regins of Ziarat and Pishin. About 300
people were killed by landslides and by the collapsing other infrastructures. In the
Ziarat District the villages of Warchum, Wam, Kala China, Kawas, Ahmadun,
Gogai, Tangai, Spezanda were worst hit while in the Pishin District villages of
Khushab, Balozia, Khanozai, Rodh Malazia and in the Harnai District the area of
Zardalu suffered a lot in terms of casualties and destruction of infrastructure.
(„‟Ziarat Earthquake‟‟, 2012, April 16) During the year of 2013, an earthquake of
7.8-magnitude hit the border region of Iran and Pakistan in April and damaged the
areas of Mushkhel and many villages of Washuk districts. („‟Earthquake Washuk‟‟,
2013, May 10). The earthquake resulted in vast destruction of houses, shops,
government buildings and schools. Hundreds of houses were distorted and
thousands of people became shelter less. Almost ninety percent of area in
Mushkhel was totally destroyed. The earthquake also caused death to many
human lives and live stock. During the same year, the regions of Awaran, Kech,
Gwadar, Kharan and Panjgur witnessed two powerful earthquakes in a same week
of September, of 7.2 and 7.7 magnitudes respectively which resulted in about 399
human deaths and 599 people were seriously injured.
279
III. Land Sliding
Due to heavy rains in monsoon season, there is always a risk of flash flood and
consequently, land sliding is a common factor in many regions of Balochistan
especially the areas of southern part of Balochistan. Bolan is the only district which
frequently witness land sliding. The districts of Turbat and Gwadar experience the
accidental land sliding every year. The Shadikor dam is located near Pasni, which
over flows normally during heavy rains and causes floods and land sliding.
IV. Droughts
In Balochistan, droughts occur from a shortage of rain over an extended period of
time, the other reasons include floods and earthquakes which are equally
responsible for the loss of crops and destruction of pastures. Consequently,
humans and livestock have to face the problem of food and water shortage and
deficiency. Balochistan has always been passing through droughts. The districts
of Kalat, Chaghi, Naukundi and Zhob were severely affected by drought at many
times. The drought which prevailed in the province from 1997 to 2003 was by far
the longest dry spells The average rainfall in Balochistan is very low as compared
to other parts of the country. During the period from 1997 to 2003, a food crisis
developed due to lack of rain. The drought phase from 1997 to 2003 was one of
the worst in the history of Balochistan and is considered as the major cause behind
slow economic development. The growth rate came down to 2.6 percent and the
drought caused a loss of about 25 billion Pak Rs. to the national exchequer in the
year 2000-2002. („‟Droughts in Balochistan‟‟, 2012, April 11).
Table No. 6.26 Frequently Drought Affected Districts of Balochistan
Most Severely
Affected
Kharan, Washuk, Chaghi, Nushki, Panjgur, Kech,
Gwadar, Awaran, Jhal-Magsi, Bolan,
Dera-Bugti, Kohlu, Sherani
Severely Affected Sibi, Mastung, Kalat, Khuzdar, Lasbela, Musakhel,
Qilla Abdullah
280
Moderately Affected Qilla Saifullah, Barkhan, Ziarat
Source: Generated by the researcher during research
a. Affects of Droughts on Economic Progress
The affects of the long droughts on the economic growth and consequent socio
economic issues are as under:
Food items became very rare and expensive in the affected areas due to the
shortage in stock. The people already going through difficult time could not
afford to buy proper food.
Insufficient food in-take caused malnutrition and consequently different
diseases prevail in the affected areas.
Droughts caused fodder shortage which badly affected livestock-rearing,
which plays an important role in the rural economy. 80 percent of livestock
died in severely affected areas.
About 80 percent of apple trees and orchards were destroyed.
Large population migrated from drought affected areas to other safe regions
in search of food and water, it caused heavy load on the resources of other
regions.
The drought also contributed in increasing the rate of different diseases
such as Tuberculosis and Hepatitis which affected thousands of people
especially women and children because of insufficient and poor diet.
After the horrible and most damaging phase of drought from 1997 to 2003,
Balochistan is again passing through another dangerous stage of drought
developing conditions. The most important sectors of livestock, agriculture and
overall the economic scenario of the province is at great risk of damage once
again. („‟Balochistan Press Briefing‟‟, 2014, Oct.29)
281
V. Spread of Diseases and Poor Health Awareness
The problem of infectious diseases in majority of Baloch population is one of the
major socio economic issues that need great attention. Mostly the Baloch people
are living in poverty and their poor condition does not allow them to adopt a healthy
life style. Lack of basic facilities like clean drinking water and proper food is the
main cause behind different types of diseases. Moreover, due to illiteracy the
majority of people do not have awareness regarding hygiene. This type of non-
awareness has resulted in the devastating spread of communicable disease that
directly affects the economic development of a society. Control of infectious and
contagious diseases has been unsuccessful due to an overall weak system which
includes deficient training of human resource, and non-availability of the proper
health facilities. The common diseases which are badly affecting and upsetting
development activity in Balochistan include:
Malaria, Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI), Ringworm, Chicken Pox, Rubella,
Scabies, Measles and Tuberculosis. During the drought of 1999 to 2003, another
dangerous infection was noticed which is called Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic
Fever (CCHF) in Loralai district. („‟Communicable Diseases‟‟ 2012, April.11)
10. Impact of Baloch Nationalist Movement on the
Economic Development of Balochistan
The process of economic as well as political development in Balochistan had
remained stagnant over the last decade due to another phase of insurgency by
Baloch nationalists. Any conflict or crisis is always very harmful to the overall
progress of a region or state but this time, the movement and armed struggle of
Baloch militant insurgents spread almost over the whole province and badly
affected the social, economic and political conditions of Balochistan. Since January
2005, the resource-rich and strategically very important region, Balochistan, is
undergoing another phase of violent activities and militant attacks that has created
a real security threat to development projects by creating hurdles in undertaking
several mega development projects, most especially the construction of Gwadar
282
Port and infrastructure related to it. Additionally, the other sectors like education,
mining industries and fisheries have to suffer a lot and resulted in a weak economy.
Baloch people and nationalists don‟t have faith in federal government and all the
development projects as they view them as a great threat to their ethnic identity,
natural resources and their territory. Therefore, they have been trying their best to
damage the economy, development projects and infrastructure just to keep the
province in their own control. Keeping in view the destructive affects of the
insurgency, the military government of General Pervez Musharraf started counter-
insurgency operations soon after the death of Akbar Bugti. Counter-insurgency
strategy of Pervez Musharraf proved to be moderately successful in making the
Gwadar port partially operational, regardless of all the difficulties created by the
nationalist insurgents.
The fifth baloch insurgency started in 2005 in Balochistan, has not only been
responsible for a significant security threat but also became the root cause for
economic instability and decline as the construction of mega development projects
remained incomplete due to unfavorable and dangerous circumstances for foreign
workers. Due to constant attacks on installations and workers, Balochistan
remained the most unstable area. According to a report, almost 435 bomb blasts
by the Baloch insurgents were recorded from 2004 to 2008 and about 54 training
camps of Baloch militants had been established across Balochistan. (Iqbal, 2008:2)
Additionally, militant groups were also radically increased in number and strength.
It has been highlighted in previous chapters that there are many militant groups in
Balochistan, which are fighting against federal government. But Baloch Liberation
Army (BLA) is the most prominent amongst them that is using violent means for the
separation of Balochistan from Pakistan. The other militant organizations include
Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-
e-Balochistan and Jhalawan Baloch Tigers have been responsible for mass
destruction. These organizations were banned by Pervez Musharraf for being
involved in various attacks on gas pipelines, power transmission lines, power
pylons, security check posts, FC forts, security forces, railway tracks, oil tankers,
government offices, pro-government tribesmen, official residences, local civilians
283
and non Baloch outsiders. In Balochistan nationalist insurgent groups were also
threatening Punjabi and other non Baloch school teachers and educationalists. The
basic demand of the insurgents was the exclusion of the subject Pakistan Studies
from the school and other syllabus. They stopped hoist of Pakistani Flag and
National Anthem of Pakistan in the schools of Mastung, Noshki, Qalat, Gwadar,
Khuzdar and Quetta. (Human Rights Watch, 2010:2) Not only Baloch insurgents
but TTP also threatened to attack all private schools in Mastung district and warned
the administration to replace the western style of uniform with the local dress of
Shalwar Kameez. Female students were warned to be clad in full Islamic veil called
Hijab. (The Frontier Post, Peshawar, 2010, May.16)
The overall situation of security in Balochistan continued to be very uncertain
through out the last decade and got worse till 2010. It did not remain a simple
conflict between federal government and Baloch nationalists but took the form of a
serious and complicated combination of nationalist insurgency, militant attacks,
political and sectarian based target killing, Taliban presence in the northern part of
the province, attacks on educationists, NATO supplies, enforced disappearances
and illegal abductions. Frequent attacks on political leaders and security forces
personnel by Baloch insurgents were not only a strategic change but also
highlighted their transformation from an undeveloped group struggle to a more
organized rebellious movement. (PIPS, 2011:27). In the beginning years of the
construction of mega development projects in Balochistan, almost 737 attacks by
Baloch insurgents were recorded. (PIPS, 2011:2) these 737 attacks including 614
attacks by nationalist insurgents, 105 militant attacks, 12 sectarian attacks and two
were public in which at least 600 people including army officers, FC personnel,
civilians and policemen lost their lives, about 1,117 more people were got seriously
injured, among them 903 civilians, 123 FC personnel, 69 policemen, 17 soldiers
and five Levies personnel. Quetta was the worst-affected district whereas Khuzdar
district was the second most unstable region. (PIPS, 2011:7) The Baloch
insurgents attacked on power pylons, gas installations, railway tracks and basic
health units in Balochistan which not only destroyed the existing infrastructure but
also contributed a lot in the decline of economic condition and development of
284
Balochistan because the land of Balochistan turned into the most volatile and
unsafe region for foreign investors, especially for the Major sponsor of Gwadar
Project, China. Chinese engineers and other labor forces, appointed to work on
developing sites, faced life threatening situation and many of them were often
attacked and killed by Baloch insurgents. This situation not only created hurdles in
the construction of the Gwadar Port, but many other development projects such as
TAPI, IP Gas Pipeline Project and construction and development of Economic
Corridor had been ceased for a long time. As all these projects were sponsored
and financed by foreign countries, like China and Iran, the prevailing condition of
extreme unrest also played a great role in creating bitterness in the friendly
relations with these countries. Especially, the ongoing militant struggle by Baloch
nationalists became a root cause of tension between Pakistan and Iran.
285
References Aamir, Adnan (Sep. 1, 2014). Rising Poverty and unemployment in Balochistan,
retrieved from http://thebalochistanpoint.com/rising-poverty-and-unemployment-in-
balochistan/ on 31 May, 2015
Ahad, Abdul, (2012, Dec.6). Balochistan Government for Development of
Agriculture Sector, retreived from
http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/markets/94138-balochistan-govt-for-
development-of-agriculture-sector-.html on 22 May, 2015
An Overview of Mineral Potential of Pakistan, (2013). Government of Pakistan,
Natural Resources Wing, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources. Retrieved
from http://www.gsp.gov.pk/images/mineral-potential-of-pakistan.pdf on 28
January, 2015
Balochistan Profile, (2012, Apr.11) retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=39#more-39 on 21 June, 2015
Balochistan Economy, (2014, April. 28) retreived from
http://humshehri.org/place/balochistan-economy/ on 21 May, 2015
Balochistan Flood 2010, (2012, April.11) retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?cat=31 on7 June, 2015
Balochistan Earthquake Washuk (Mashkhel) 2013, (2013, May 10). Retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?cat=40 on 10 June, 2015
Communicable Diseases in Balochistan, (2012, April.11) retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=67#more-67 on 12 June, 2015
286
Damages of Flood 2013, (2014, April 16) an official letter from Office of the Releif
Commissioner, Balochistan, retrieved from
http://pdma.gob.pk/Publication/Disasters%20Data/Flood%202013/Damages%20De
tail%20New.pdf on 10 June, 2015
Droughts in Balochistan, (2012, April 11). Retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=54#more-54 on 10 June, 2015
Education for All Plan 2011-2015, (May, 2011). Directorate of Education,
Government of Balochistan, in collaboration with NCHD & UNESCO
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, Higher poverty in Balochistan, retrieved from http://pakistanyouthmovement.com/articles/162-higher-poverty-in-balochistan on 6
June, 2015
Fisheries Data, 2013, Directorate of Balochistan, retrieved from
http://balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=130
4&Itemid=677 on 1 June, 2015
Fisheries Department, Development Schemes 2012-13, retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81
&Itemid=130 accessed on 1 June, 2015
Government of Pakistan, Statistic Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics (Economic
Wing) Crops Area and Production (By Districts) (1981-82 to 2008-09), Vol. 1.
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Economic Wing), Fruits,
Vegetables & Condiments Statistics of Pakistan, 2008-09, (December, 2009)
Islamabad
287
Government of Balochistan, Live Stock & Dairy Development Department,
Balochistan, Web Document, January 2105. Retrieved from
www.balochistan.gov.pk on 26 May, 2015
Government of Balochistan/World Bank/Asian Development Bank.(2008).
Balochistan Economic Report.
Government of Pakistan, Natural Resources Wing, (2013). An Overview of Mineral
Potential of Pakistan, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources. Retrieved from
http://www.gsp.gov.pk/images/mineral-potential-of-pakistan.pdf on 28 January,
2015
Gazdar, Haris, (28, February,2007). Balochistan Economic Report Background
Paper on Social Structures and Migration, Collective for Social Science Research,
PECHS, Karachi: Pakistan. retrieved from
http://www.researchcollective.org/Documents/Balochistan_Economic_Report.pdf
on 31 May, 2015
Gondal, Sajid, (January, 2015). Balochistan Designs its Development Visions,
Monthly Economic Affairs, Vol. IV, Issue 1, Islamabad: Pakistan. pp. 8-10
Human Rights Watch Report, (December 2010). Their Future is at stake: Attacks
in Teachers and Schools in Pakistan‘s Balochistan Province,‖ New York
Honorable Chief Minister Balochishtan Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, Balochistan Press
Briefing, 2014, Oct.29) retrieved from http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=686#more-686
on 11 June, 2015
Iqbal, Khurram, (2008). Counter-Insurgency in Balochistan: Pakistan‘s Strategy,
Outcome and Future Implications. Political Violence and Terrorism, Islamabad:
Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies.
288
Majeed, Gulshan, (2011). National Integration of Pakistan: A Socio-Political
Analysis of Balochistan, (1972-2005), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science,
University of the Punjab, Lahore.
Mineral Profile of Balochistan, (December, 2009)., Government of Pakistan,
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Geological Survey of Pakistan,
retrieved from http://www.gsp.gov.pk/images/mineralprofileofbalochistan.pdf on 12
February, 2015
Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11, retrieved from
http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/12-Population.pdf on 1 June 2015
Pakistan Security Report 2010 (January, 2011) Pak Institute for Peace Studies
(PIPS), Islamabad
Population Welfare Department, Government of Balochistan, retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12
71&Itemid=100430 on 1 June, 2015
Population Census 1998, Population Census Organization, Government of
Pakistan
Siddique, Shahid, (2010,June.7). Education in Balochistan, retrieved from
http://shahidksiddiqui.blogspot.com/2010/06/education-in-balochistan.html on 7
June, 2015
Shah, Shahid, (June. 26, 2013). Balochistan tops poverty list: SPDC, The News.
Sumra, Anwar, (Feb. 25, 2014), SDPI report: 58.7m Pakistanis living below poverty
line. The Express Tribune.
289
Situation Bulletin-I, Flash Flood Kuzdar, (2015, June.5) official Document from
Provincial Disater Ris Management Authority, Balochistan, retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/wp-content/uploads/Situation-Report-1-Flash-Flood-
Khuzdar1.pdf on 8 June, 2015
Seasonal Monsoon Rainfalls across Balochistan, (2012, Sep.28) retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=277#more-277 on 7 June, 2015
United Nations Development Program Pakistan & Government of Balochistan.
(Report 2011). .Balochistan Millennium Development Goals.
World Bank Report, (2013). Balochistan: Development Issues and Prospects,
Islamabad: Multi Donor Trust Fund, Pakistan
CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion
291
Conclusion
This study has analyzed the historical background of Baloch nationalism and the
separatist movement in Balochistan which is based upon Baloch Nationalism and
their Ethnic Identity. The violent behavior of Baloch Nationalists has ambushed
badly the political and economic development of Balochistan while making the
province the most volatile region of Pakistan where the opportunities and chances
for further development are facing serious challenges.
Balochistan, the fourth province of Balochistan is the largest in terms of size,
smallest in terms of population and richest in terms of mineral deposits and energy
resources. But unfortunately, the most important region of Pakistan has always
been the most neglected province of Pakistan. Since the creation of Pakistan in
1947, the land of Balochistan has been going through various phases of violence
between baloch tribes and Central government of Pakistan. The issues are very
clear but there are many factors which never let this region be peaceful.
Since the inclusion of Balochistan into Pakistan, the Baloch nationalists have been
protesting against this inclusion through many armed campaigns against Central
Government to protect their economic, political and cultural rights. The armed
struggles have always been resulted in a battle between Government of Pakistan,
Pakistan Military and Baloch Nationalist Groups. These nationalist movements
have gained the status of insurgency by the time. There have been five incidents of
Baloch insurgencies in the history of Pakistan, in 1948, 1952, 1962, 1973 and then
in 2005, which is still going on and not only affecting the situation of law and
security but also creating major obstacles in the economic and political
development of Balochistan.
The rising of Baloch Nationalist sentiment is the result of several historical factors.
The Baloch people have always been standing as a ferocious independent nation
that strongly condemns and resists any external interference. Throughout their
292
history, many foreign invaders tried to conquer the Baloch people but none of them
could be able to subjugate them completely and permanently. Arabs, Mongols,
Mughals, Persians and even the British had not been able to maintain their rule
over Baloch Society forever.
The long lasting affects of British dominance and their policies; after 1947, the non-
cooperative and forceful attitude of Pakistani Army; mismanagement of Baloch
issue and problems by Pakistani democratic Governments led Baloch people
cultivate their historical grievances. The Baloch Tribal Sardars excellently utilized
the aggressive sentiments of their people and mobilized people‟s support for their
nationalist cause.
During last decade, with the announcement of Mega Development Projects;
especially Gwadar Port in Balochistan by Musharraf, put a drastic impact on the
strategic significance of Balochistan, the growing importance changed the Baloch-
Government relations completely and is the most particular cause of recent phase
of nationalist movement in Balochistan. Prior to Musharraf regime, the conflict in
Balochistan was viewed by external powers as an internal matter of Pakistan. But
the growing violence and continued instability in the wake of Gwadar and war
against Taliban, made this crisis worthy of world attention.
After independence, the Government of Pakistan has to face the challenge of
becoming a strong state by uniting many distinct ethnic groups to be identified as a
single nation. For this purpose, different strategies and policies were adopted by
many governments. But unfortunately, all the attempts to create a single national
identity were strongly opposed by the Baloch Nationalists. Therefore the policies
such as One Unit and Basic Democracies not only failed in achieving the goal but
also resulted in extreme discontent and feelings of alienation among Baloch
nationalists which was exposed through the 1973 insurgency. The following military
ruler General Zia ul Haq, adopted the policy of Non-Proactive Firmness and limited
the interference of Central Government into Balochistan to calm down baloch
293
insurgents. He was not intended to address baloch grievances instead he needed
peace in the region to provide safe passage to US forces to Afghanistan during
Russian invasion in 1979. It is said that he bribed most of the Baloch Sardars to
placate their men to stop violent protest against government. His policy not only
sowed the seed of corruption but also resulted in heavy influx of Afghan refugees
to Balochistan. The Afghan population in large number migrated from Afghanistan
and settled into many areas of Balochistan, which further gave rise to baloch
nationalist sentiments and later became the cause of conflict between Pakhtuns
and native Baloch population. Any ways, Zia was somehow successful in
maintaining peace in this region for a long time. His policy of non-provocative
firmness kept the violence at its minimum scale till the outbreak of baloch violence
in 2005.
Despite the other political policies adopted by democratic governments during
PML-N and PPP regime, many of the historical Baloch grievances that have led to
violence in the past remain energetic even today. In Musharraf regime, his decision
to invest millions in a deep-water port in Gwadar with Chinese help; the incident of
9/11; the consequent Global War on Terror and the other regional dynamics
amplified strategic significance of Balochistan, Zia‟s policy of non proactive
firmness was no longer applicable so under the new circumstances, the Musharraf
Government was compelled to modify its policy regarding Balochistan and that was
the paramount factor that led to the most recent turbulence. The chances of
development required more influence of Central Government into Balochistan
alongwith an increased presence of military for security reasons. The baloch
people have a historical grudge for army so they strongly and aggressively
opposed the development although Balochistan was given a huge increase in the
amount of money allocated for Balochistan‟s development.
In fact, the steps taken by Musharraf were not against Baloch people and the
objective was political and economic development of not only Balochistan but of
entire Pakistan. The motive behind his aim may not be wrong, intentions may not
be bad but the policies adopted by him in this regard were viewed with great doubt
294
and mistrust by Baloch nationalists. Consequently, there emerged the feelings of
exploitation, political marginalization, and ethnic dispossession among Baloch
Nationalist Tribal Sardars again and like always, they revolted in their own
historical violent manner and started armed struggle against Government and
Pakistan Army.
The political issues should never be addressed through militant protest, General
Pervez Musharraf was definitely aware of the fact that the solution to the problems
of Baloch Nationalists could not be provided through military actions. He tried a lot
to convince the Baloch leaders that the government‟s efforts for economic
development were in their best interest but he failed. The current insurgency in
Balochistan started from 2005 can not be called only the fault of the Musharraf
government. The revolt by Baloch nationalists is an outcome of about sixty years
of political mismanagement. Every Pakistani government has never been able to
understand Baloch problem and that‟s why no ruler could win the trust of Baloch
people to make them realize that they are a part of Pakistan and every step taken
towards their development is good for them.
On the other hand, the Baloch nationalist leaders were never prone to build their
confidence on Central Government. They were and still are not inclined towards
accepting the concept of one Pakistani nation, they always insist upon their unique
and distinct ethnic identity. They consider themselves as only Baloch, not
Pakistani. Until and unless, the government of Pakistan makes them realize that
they are as important as other Pakistani ethnic groups like Punjabi, Sindhi and
Pakhtuns, and they owe equal rights over Pakistan, the Baloch nationalists would
rise again and again to counter the dominance of other ethnic groups and to prove
their strength as a distinct nation. Instead of the peaceful negotiations and political
talks with Baloch leaders, the implication of forceful strategies by the Center is the
major cause of bitterness in Baloch nationalists which has played a great role in
turning them into a militant force rather than a political unit. The policies adopted
by the federal government towards Baloch problems have always been a crucial
295
factor in formation of Baloch nationalist movements. In all the conflicts, the Baloch
nationalists have blamed; most importantly; the arrogant policies of centre towards
Balochistan. Grievances of Baloch nationalists revolve around political and
economic deprivation, cultural identity, provincial autonomy, control over natural
resources, more representation in Central government, more and justified share
from gas revenues, abolition of military camps in Baloch region and limiting Army‟s
presence, abuse of human rights, lack of trust in the government, destruction of
Baloch identity through heavy invasion of non Baloch outsiders.
Although, the democratic governments of PML-N and PPP during 2008-2013 have
designed many strategies to address Baloch issues through proper political
dialogue, efforts and plans; such as Balochistan Package; 18th Constitutional
Amendment and NFC Award, but they all have failed to implicate those plans in a
proper way according to Baloch leadership. The historical overview of all the
baloch revolts against government makes it obvious that they never wanted to be a
part of Pakistan due to constant negligence of government towards their demands.
The baloch people are living in a very poor economic condition with no basic
facilities such as education, health and employment. Majority of tribal people, living
in remote areas of Balochistan, do not have access to even clean drinking water.
Tribal chiefs of Balochistan have always blamed the government of Pakistan for not
paying attention to their needs; on the other hand, the central government alleges
the tribal chiefs for the poorest economic and social condition of Balochistan as the
tribal chiefs do not let government to start any development activity in their region.
As the economic and political progress of Balochistan would be a great threat to
their centuries old control over Baloch land, people and natural resources.
The study shows that both the nationalist baloch leaders and government policies
are equally responsible for the plight of Balochistan and baloch population. Almost
all the prominent baloch leaders and tribal Sardars were highly qualified and have
always been enjoying very good life style with all the possible facilities. They have
constantly been demanding from the government of Pakistan to pay attention to the
296
poor economic condition of baloch population, but at the same time, they
unanimously reject all the efforts made by government in this regard, and demand
for complete autonomy. The construction of Mega Port at Gwadar and related
infrastructure was the most significant and beneficial step towards economic
progress of this region which would not only bring prosperity to Balochistan but
also would connect Balochistan and its people to international market. Almost all
the foreign and regional nations are fully aware of the strategic and economic
significance of this mega project which has high-lightened the baloch potential of
becoming the richest territory of Pakistan; and may be in future; of South Asia.
Politically and economically strong Balochistan is highly beneficial for the existence
of Pakistan but highly harmful to the existence of centuries old tribal system and
the ruling elite class.
The well educated, economically strong, sharp minded, influential and politically
alert baloch Sardars definitely understood and foresaw the strong and long lasting
impacts of all the development plans on their under rule baloch people. Economic
development would open the doors to education, socio-political awareness, better
life style and more income to the masses of Balochistan which would make people
less dependent on tribal Sardars. In the battle of Tribal Leaders and Government
of Pakistan, it is the poor population of Balochistan that has to suffer since the
constant and persistent chaos in the form of armed struggle between these two
forces has destroyed the peace of the region and is the root cause of social,
political and economic backwardness of Balochistan
There are many examples when democratic government of Pakistan tried to
address the baloch problem but every time the efforts were never welcomed by
baloch nationalists. In addition, the off and on switch to democratic government to
army dictatorship, played a great role in worsening the situation in Balochistan as
Pakistan army is not trustworthy to baloch people due to their past experiences.
The Baloch have been violently resisting against the Federal rule and
297
Government‟s efforts to establish the writ of law in Balochistan throughout their
history.
Balochistan as a tribal society has always been under the absolute influence and
rule of autocrat Sardars who have kept the people backward, illiterate and
underprivileged. The three major and most influential Sardars of Bugti, Marri and
Mengal tribes have been involved in motivating their people to revolt against the
Central Government in their own interests of maintaining their status and power by
obstructing the Government‟s efforts of development in the region as it would
empower the Centre in Balochistan and weaken the hold of Sardars. Although
most of the baloch Sardars have been designated in the Government and held
powerful positions as chief ministers of their province from time to time but they did
not do anything significant for the economic and social betterment of baloch people
and to maintain their authoritarian rule they decided to detach themselves from the
federation and political process.
In fact, during last decade, all the Governments emphasized only on strengthening
the Federal Government with a view that only a strong and powerful Center would
ensure the national integration and political stability in Pakistan, but all the policies
adopted in this regard, put a very negative impression on baloch nationalists and
enhanced their sense of alienation, consequently their nationalist sentiments
provoked them to protest in an extreme manner and their demand for provincial
and financial autonomy, turned into the demand for an Independent Balochistan.
This is an interesting thing that initially, all the baloch insurgent groups were not
operated by common Baloch people but they were headed by prominent Baloch
Sardars, who were trying to create instability in Balochistan just to oppose the
Center, and to create obstacles in the progress of development projects. Their acts
of terrorism brought great sense of insecurity in the foreign investors especially for
China. The Baloch Sardars did not want Chinese interference to prevent the full
potential of Gwadar from being realized. So they tried their best to stop
298
development works, created obstacles for the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline and other
mega infrastructure, and keep Balochistan economically deprived.
The insurgency initiated by Baloch Sardars during 2004-05, and the destruction
caused by this armed conflict, has taken the baloch people back to the age of
stones rather than to future development. In addition, the current insurgency has
become a matter of great interest for the foreign players and the burning
atmosphere provided a golden chance to the foreign nations to intrude into the
internal matter of Pakistan by supporting baloch rebels. Balochistan is an
important region for Pakistan which can play a major role in the economic
development of the whole country and thus can make Pakistan an economically
and politically strong country. The stability of Pakistan lies in the stability of
Balochistan which is never acceptable for many regional and international powers
especially for India and USA. The unstable Balochistan is highly beneficial for the
enemies of Pakistan. US and India have always been alleged by Government of
Pakistan for supporting Baloch militants by providing them financial aid and military
trainings. May be, it is the support of foreign nations that led Baloch Nationalists to
demand for a separate Balochistan.
In Pakistan, no government has been successful in establishing a strong
parliamentary democracy which resulted in an ever-changing political scenario and
the state institutions could not get enough strength. The weakness of state brought
political instability and leveled the grounds for consecutive military rules. Since
independence, Pakistan has had four martial laws and eleven heads of state.
During last sixty years, Pakistan witnessed dismissal of eight out of fifteen prime
ministers and termination of seven out of ten national assemblies. Unfortunately,
every government developed its own political strategy, regardless of the need of
the country. The independent political policies and agendas damaged the real soul
and purpose of political system and ultimately, destroyed the state institutions.
Political instability brought many other disorders in the political progress of state
institutions such as lack of transparency, corruption and mismanagement of funds
299
by non- eligible, non-serious and insincere political leaders and bureaucrats. A
non-composed political system, sporadic martial laws, dishonest and crooked
politicians, gave rise to the culture of conspiracy, corruption and greed, and all
these factors are main causes of the decay and decline of political system in
Pakistan. Not only Baloch people but every citizen of Pakistan has lost his faith in
the politicians and political system. The prevailing situation of distrust and
discontentment has led to the development of regionalism and provincialism. The
same is the case with Baloch nationalist movement and the major cause of their
demand for autonomy.
Not only political system but the overall situation of law and order has totally
declined for the last decade when Musharraf decided to interfere in FATA to
counter Taliban of Al-Qaeda. His decision was viewed with great concern and
strongly disliked by nationalist leaders of Balochistan. These concerns not only
created anxiety; unrest and apprehensions among Baloch nationalists but also
motivated the militant organizations to work on their agenda of creating a
hazardous situation for future stability, political and economic development.
The militant attacks by Baloch nationalists have worsen the condition of law and
order and have created barriers on the way to political and economic development
of Balochistan. Many projects including Gwadar Port, Economic Corridor, IP Gas
Pipeline Project, TAPI and construction of other infrastructure, has been ceased
due to security concerns. IP Gas Pipeline project is facing the problem of security
in Balochistan. The major portion of pipeline‟s length would be passing through
Balochistan and is at great risk due to major security threat by Baloch Nationalists.
The Baloch nationalists have been destroying such development projects with a
perception that their economic interests were being ignored. Balochistan has
gained the status of an internationally important region because the political
instability within Balochistan and the struggle for autonomy and independence from
Pakistan is putting prominent impacts on the security of surrounding regions also.
300
Many projects of Mega development have been delayed due to the unsure
circumstances and lack of peaceful environment. The on going nationalist
movement is not only putting restrictions on the opportunities of economic progress
but also playing a dominant and critical role in global politics. The Baloch
Nationalism has opened the doors to foreign players to play their own game on
Baloch land. Foreign powers are exploiting Baloch Nationalism to attain and
increase their own political and economic strength, which is an alarming situation
not only for Balochistan but also for entire Pakistan as this situation has brought
dramatic changes in the economic, political, and strategic landscape of South and
Southwest Asia while creating numerous other problems in Balochistan such as
social unrest, poverty, illiteracy, political instability and economic backwardness.
Balochistan is always an influential region on local, national, and international
politics due to its geo-strategic position. The present insurgency, based on Baloch
Nationalism, is the great hurdle in the social, political and economic development. It
has damaged the security of region as the Baloch nationalists are talking of
Greater Balochistan which would include the Baloch areas of Pakistan, Iran and
Afghanistan.
The Baloch have been struggling for the preservation of their ethnic identity and
freedom as an independent nation over the past decades in Baloch regions of
Pakistan and Iran, despite of their failure as yet, Baloch nationalist movements
have always been creating problems for both countries, that is why it is a source of
deep concern to the governments of these countries. Baloch nationalists had
actively started advocating the idea of the "Greater Balochistan" in early years of
20th century. The Greater Balochistan is supposed to cover an area equal to
present day Pakistan.
The condition of law and order in Balochistan is getting worse with the passage of
time and demands serious attention. The issue is not only between Center and
Baloch Nationalists anymore, the strong and irresistible sense of hatred among
301
various ethnic and linguistic groups of Balochistan has given rise to target killing.
This target killing, as an action and reaction is leading to high degree violence and
distraction in the province. The fear of being killed has compelled many skilled
professionals from different fields to leave Balochistan. This situation is badly
affecting the already insufficient political, economic, educational and other
institutions of Balochistan. Teachers, doctors and other people working on
administrative positions are migrating from Balochistan. Due to security threats the
officials from other provinces and federal government are unwilling to be appointed
there. This has also damaged the administrative machinery of the provincial
government too.
The Baloch Nationalism has created various serious challenges for Central
Government. The current Baloch uprising is difficult to control and getting longer
than any of the past movement, and has involved the armed struggle more widely
than ever. The movement based on Nationalism has spread over almost all
Balochistan from rural to urban areas. It is no more a conflict between the
Nationalist Sardars and Central Government, but has also involved Baloch women
and youth who fully support the struggle for an independent Balochistan. In the
past, the Baloch tribes and insurgents used to attack only army camps and
government infrastructure but now they are also attacking non-Baloch citizens and
other ethnic minorities to get rid of all the non-Baloch people to protect their distinct
ethnic identity. It is a reality that the land of Balochistan has often been misused
and ignored in the past. No one has ever seriously tried to understand the cause of
Baloch Nationalist Movement. Every attempt by Government was just to restore
peace in the region temporarily instead of finding out a permanent, long lasting
solution. This is also a big fact that it is very difficult to understand the Baloch
people and their issues. There has always been a clash between Tribal Chiefs and
Center on the issue of Gas revenues and royalty. The baloch leaders complaint
against economic oppression and financial injustice but whenever the Federal
Government take solid steps in this regard, they simply reject all the proposals and
suddenly jump to the issue of their Ethnic Identity and Provincial Autonomy and
302
demand for an independent Balochistan. It seems the Baloch leadership is itself
confused about its own demands, problems and their solutions.
The idea of Independent Balochistan may be a good source of motivation for the
youth of Balochistan regarding their struggle against Central Government but in
fact this idea is not applicable as an independent Balochistan would never be able
to survive without a strong central leadership which they are lacking. They want to
preserve their ethnic identity as a distinct nation, and their identity lies in their
traditional tribal system. Every tribe has its own chief; they would never be able to
choose a single chief as the head of the state. There would a great chance of inter-
tribal war-like conflicts which would definitely bring more violence instead of peace.
Moreover, the population is very small in number and majority is uneducated,
unhealthy, and unskilled thus is not in the condition to generate any profits to the
state. As far as the natural resources are concerned, their exploration and
exploitation requires highly qualified, skilled and experienced personnel, which
Balochistan lacks badly. So an Independent Balochistan would have no sources to
run its economy for the development of state and people. Agriculture is already
very limited in Balochistan. Political process would also be requiring qualified and
educated people to function properly which would never be feasible due to their
tribal structure. So, the Independent Balochistan would add into the miseries and
restlessness of Baloch population. They would soon have to rely upon some
foreign power for their survival.
The peaceful integration of the Balochistan into the nation of Pakistan is the most
imperative, sensitive and significant issue because there are many other domestic,
regional, and international factors involved which demand an urgent attention and
solution. Being a symbol of great economic development for Pakistan, Balochistan
is the only possible domestic source to overcome the current economic decline.
Pakistan would achieve great development through utilizing the rich mineral and
energy resources, establishing international oil and gas pipelines and completing
the construction and utilization of Gwadar seaport and Pak-China Economic
303
Corridor. Balochistan is a potential economic advantage to Pakistan and without
political stability and peace in this region; it is not possible to succeed at even one
of these mega projects. Additionally, a separatist movement by the Baloch
Nationalists is threatening even the existence of the Pakistani state as it could
motivate existing movements among the other ethnic groups such as Sindhi, Gilgit,
and Pakhtun, and could result in the collapse of Pakistan as a state.
The Baloch Nationalists should understand that the issue can not be resolved
through militant attacks and armed protest; it should be handled very carefully only
through political dialogue. It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to
make serious efforts to win the trust of Baloch rebels and the Baloch leaders
should play a positive role towards settlement by convincing Baloch people to
understand the horrible consequences of violence. Violence brings only political
and economic destruction, and destruction leads to no-where. So the Central
Government and Baloch Leaders; both should work together to rectify their past
mistakes, resolve their grievances against each other and should pay attention only
to the economic development of not only Balochistan but of entire Pakistan.
The Baloch leaders should try to resolve their tribal feuds to bring the scattered
baloch nationalists close to each other. As the tribal harmony is most significant
factor in reducing tension between tribes and Central Government. The Central
Government should play its role to promote inter-provincial harmony without being
partial to any ethnic group and should design a long-term strategy to deal with
ethnic problems. In this regard, the most necessary thing is the alleviation of the
forcful sentiments of nationalism among Baloch people. This can be done only by
restoring their trust and faith in Central Government and its policies towards
Balochistan. There is a great need of a proper negotiation between Baloch Tribes
and Central Government to find out a permanent solution to Balochistan crisis. As
the social structure of Balochistan has deep roots in tribal system which can never
be removed, so the Government should formulate certain policies for the welfare of
local people in collaboration with the tribal chiefs. The policies like Aghaz-e-Huquq-
304
e-Balochistan Package should be implemented in true sense to resolve all the
socio-economic problems such as poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and health
issues. Until and unless, the local population of Balochistan does not get a chance
to participate in the process of political and economic development, they will
always be used by internal and external powers to destabilize the progress of
Pakistan.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
306
Bibliography
Ahmad, Lt. Col., Syed Iqbal. (1992). Balochistan - Its Strategic Importance,
Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Anwar, Zahid, (2010). Gwadar Deep Sea Port‘s Emergence as Regional Trade and
Transportation Hub: Prospects and Problems, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 17,
Issue 2, pp 97-112
Ansaree, Air Cdre. (R) Naveed Khaliq, (Winter 2014), New Great Game and Limits
of American Power, IPRI Journal Vol. XIV, No. 1, pp 38-65
Afzal, Rafique, M.(2001). Pakistan: History and Politics 1947-1971, Karachi: Oxford
University Press.
Awan, A.B., (1985). Balochistan: Historical and Political Processes, London: New
Century Publishers.
Akbar, Malik Siraj, (2013,March.20) Will Balochistan Vote in Pakistan's Next
Elections? Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/will-
balochistan-vote-in-_b_2905256.html on 10 July, 2015
Akbar, Malik Siraj, (2014, Mar.11).The End of Pakistan‘s Baloch Insurgency?
Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malik-siraj-akbar/the-end-of-
pakistans balo_b_6090920.html on 15 April, 2015
Axmann, Martin (2008). Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis
of Baluch Nationalism 1915-1955. London: Oxford University Press.
Ahmad, Kazi, (1976). The Geography of Pakistan, Karachi.
307
Amin, Tahir, (1993). Ethno-Nationalist Movements of Pakistan, IPS, Islamabad.
Aazar, Tamana, (2010). US Pakistan Cooperation and Pakistan Security Post 9/11,
Ph.D Thesis, School of Social Sciences and Asian Languages, Curtin University of
Technology, Australia.
Ashraf, Sajjad, (2013, Mar. 29). The Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline: Pakistan‘s energy
life line, East Asia Forum, Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and
the Pacific, at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/27/the-iran-pakistan-gas-
pipeline-pakistans-energy-lifeline/ on 3 March, 2015
About Balochistan, (2013). Retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=37
&Itemid=783 on 21 January, 2015
Ahmed, Ishtiaq, (2010). Pakistan's Future Role as Regional Energy Corridor,
International Workshop on Pakistan-Russian Collaboration & the Afghan Crisis,
November 1, 2010, London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute.
Annual Report on Chagi Mining & Explorations, (2013), Lake Resources N.L.
Australia. Retrieved from http://www.infomine.com/index/pr/PB384905.PDF on 1
March, 2015
Ahmad, Aijaz, (1973). The National Question in Balochistan, Pakistan Forum, Vol.
3, No. 8/9, Middle East Research and Information Projects (MERIP)
Ahmed Feroz, (1998). Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University
Press
Ali, Imtiaz, (April, 2005). The Balochistan Problem, Pakistan Horizon Journal, Vol
58, No.2, Karachi: Pakistan Institute of National Affairs.
308
Andley, Priyashree. (2006). Balochistan: A Backgrounder. Special Report 32. New
Delhi, India: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
Aamir, Adnan (2014, Sep.1). Rising Poverty and unemployment in Balochistan,
retrieved from http://thebalochistanpoint.com/rising-poverty-and-unemployment-in-
balochistan/ on 31 May, 2015
Ahmad, S. (2005, Dec.20), Musharraf‘s Kohlu Visit, not a Wise Move. The Daily
Times
Almeida, Cyril, (2010, July.25) All Baloch should not be tarred with same brush,
The Dawn.
Ali, Ghulam, (2012). Federalism in Pakistan during Musharraf Regime, Macrothink
Institute, Journal of Public Administration and Governance, Vol. 2, No. 3. pp. 171-
188
Awan, Junaid Iqbal, (2013) Balochistan Insurgency, retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/5106344/Balochistan_Insurgency on 10 Dec, 2014
Ashraf, Maimuna, (2011,Jan.4) Hopes for Balochistan, retrieved from
http://defence.pk/threads/hopes-for-balochistan.87324/ on 18 March, 2015
Aziz, Sameera, (2009). Foreign Hand in Balochistan Chaos?, retrieved from
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=2009
041535146 on 16 April, 2015
Ahad, Abdul,(2012,Dec.6). Balochistan Government for Development of Agriculture
Sector, retreived from http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/markets/94138-
balochistan-govt-for-development-of-agriculture-sector-.html on 22 May, 2015
An Overview of Mineral Potential of Pakistan, (2013). Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Resources. Government of Pakistan, Natural Resources Wing, retrieved
309
from http://www.gsp.gov.pk/images/mineral-potential-of-pakistan.pdf on 28
January, 2015
Balochistan and its Strategic Importance Divide and Rule, (2008, June.2), at
http://balochis.blogspot.com/2009/03/balochistan-and-its-strategic.html on 19
Feb.2015
Brahamdagh Bugti says he will be killed if he returns to Pakistan, (2012, April.6),
The Dawn
Balochistan Flood 2010, (2012,April.11) retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?cat=31 on7 June, 2015
Baloch Militants killed 252 settlers in 2010. (2010, July.27). ARY News
Budhani, Azmat and Mallah, Hussain Bux, (2007). Mega Projects in Balochistan,
Research Paper, Karachi: Collective for Social Science Research,
http://www.researchcollective.org/Documents/Mega_Projects_in_Balochistan.pdf
on 23 February, 2015
Balochistan, Encyclopedia of Islam,(1936) VOL I,
Baloch, Ayoub, (Oct-2002). Sharing the vision, Directorate of Public Relations,
Government of Balochistan, Quetta-Pakistan.
Bansal, Alok. (2008). Factors Leading to Insurgency in Balochistan, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, June, Vol. 19, No.2
Bansal, Alok, (2010, Feb.1). Understanding the Baloch Insurgency, retrieved from
http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2010/02/understanding-the-baloch-insurgency/ on
March 28, 2015
310
Bansal, Alok (2010) Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroads, New Delhi:
Manas Publications.
Baloch, Sanaullah. (March 2007). The Baloch Conflict: Towards a Lasting Peace,
Pakistan Security Research Unit No. 7
Baloch, Mir Khuda Baksh Bijaranai Marri, (1974). Searchlight on Baloch and
Balochistan, Karachi: Royal Book Company
Baluch, Muhammad Sardar Khan. (1984). History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan
(Baloch Balochistan). Nisa Traders / Khair-un-Nisa.
Baluch, Muhammad Sardar Khan, (1977). Literary History of the Baluchis. Quetta:
Baluchi Academy
Baloch, M. Sardar Khan, (1958) History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan, Karachi:
Process Pakistan
Breseeg, Taj Muhammed. (2005).Baloch Nationalism - Its Origin and Development.
Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Bennett, Jones. (2003). Owen. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (2nd Revised ed.). Yale
University Press.
Basit, Abdul. (2012, Feb.12). Balochistan Conflict. Weekly PULSE. Retrieved from
http://www.weeklypulse.org
Baloch, Latif, (2002, Oct.18). Leadership vacuum in Balochistan, The Dawn
Baluch, Siddiq, (2002). Balochistan National Party, in ABS Jafri‟s, The Political
Parties of Pakistan, Karachi: Royal Book Company.
311
Baloch, Sardar Muhammad Khan, (1977). History of Baloch Race and Balochistan,
Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab
Baluch, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan,(1975). Inside Baluchistan, Karachi: Royal Book
Company.
Baloch, Inayatullah, (1983). The Baloch Question in Pakistan and the Right of Self-
Determination, Hamburg: Dentshes Orient Institute.
Baloch, Inayatullah, (1987). The Problem of Greater Balochistan; A study of
Baloch Nationalism, Stuttgart stmer verlag Wiesbaden.
Baloch, Salar, (2008, Oct.9). Instruments of Accession of Kalat State, retrieved
from http://balochistaninhistory.blogspot.com/ on 21 January, 2015
Baloch, Bari, (2015,Jan.25). Balochistan‘s shrinking forests, retrieved from
http://thenaturenews.com/2015/01/balochistans-shrinking-forests/ on 23 January,
2015
Balochistan: Civil-Military Relations, (March 2012). PILdAT Issue paper,
Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency.
Balochistan: Conflicts and Players (2009). Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace
Studies.
Barelvi, Mujahid (2012). Balochistan Masla Kya Hai?. Jumhoori Publications.
Balochistan through the Ages: Selection from Government Record. (1979).
Pakistan: Nisa Traders: Gosha-e-Adab.
Baloch, Habib Jalib. (2006). Balochistan: Statehood and Nationalism. J. Perekan
Academy of Social Sciences.
312
Balochistan: Development Issues and Prospects, (2013). Islamabad: Multi Donor
Trust Fund, World Bank, Pakistan
Brown, Michael; Dawod, Mohammad; Irantalab, Arash; and Naqi Mahmud, (2012).
Balochistan Case Study, retrieved from
http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1398.pdf on 12 April, 2015
Balochistan Problems and Solutions, (2011) retrieved from
http://www.thevision21.org/article-detail.php?cid=14&aid=31 on December 9, 2014
Balochistan: Iran to Establish Oil Refinery in Gwadar, (2013, March.7) retrieved
from http://www.unpo.org/article/15604 on 18 March, 2015
Balochistan Tribal System, (2011,July.7) retrieved from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/baloch-tribes.html on 20
March, 2015
Balochistan: Nawaz Shrif Looks to Form Coalition with Baluch Nationalists, (2013,
May. 15) retrieved from http://www.unpo.org/article/15908 on 16 July, 2015
Balochistan Earthquake Washuk (Mashkhel) 2013, (2013, May 10). Retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?cat=40 on 10 June, 2015
Brown, Michael; Dawod, Mohammad; Irantalab, Arash; and Naqi, Mahmud, (2012,
June 21) Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences and Management: Balochistan
Case Study, retrieved from http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1398.pdf on
10 April, 2015
Baloch Nationalist Parties Participation in the Election 2013, (2013, Apr.9) retrieved
from http://historypak.com/baloch-nationalist-parties-participation-in-the-election-
2013/ on 10 July, 2015
313
BLA declared terrorist organization, (2006, Apr.10), The Nation Balochistan Matters, (2012, October.28), The Dawn Balochistan Fisheries, (2003, March.17) The Dawn
Balochistan Profile, (2012, Apr.11) retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=39#more-39 on 21 June, 2015
Balochistan Economy, (2014, April.28) retreived from
http://humshehri.org/place/balochistan-economy/ on 21 May, 2015
Balochistan Economic Report, (2008). Government of Balochistan/World
Bank/Asian Development Bank
Chandran, Suba, (September, 2008) ―I have a dream for Pakistan‖ A Critique of
Zardari‘s Plan, Issue Brief No. 83, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New
Delhi. pp1-4
Carina, Jahani, Agnes Korn & Paul, Titus. (2012). The Baloch and Others:
Linguistic, Historical and Socio-Political Perspectives on Pluralism in Balochistan.
Dr Ludwig Reichert Verlag.
Canovan, Margaret, (1996). Nationhood and Political Theory, Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar
Crops Area and Production (By Districts) (1981-82 to 2008-09). Government of
Pakistan, Statistic Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics (Economic Wing)
Communicable Diseases in Balochistan, (2012, April.11) retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=67#more-67 on 12 June, 2015
314
Dashti, Naseer. (2012). The Baloch and Balochistan: A Historical Account from the
Beginning to the Fall of the Baloch State. USA: Trafford Publishing.
Dames, M. Longworth, (1907). Popular Poetry of the Baloches I-II, London: David
Nutt.
Dunne, Justin.S., (2006). Crisis in Baluchistan: A Historical Analysis of the Baluch
Nationalist Movements in Pakistan, Masters Thesis, California: Naval Post
Graduate School, Monterey.
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?,(2004, Mar.22), Islamabad:
International Crisis Group (ICG), Asia Report No.77.
Disarming of Militants needed for Peace: President Denies Army Action. (2006.
Feb.4) The Dawn, (Editorial). P.7
Damages of Flood 2013, (2014, April 16) an official letter from Office of the Relief
Commissioner, Balochistan, retrieved from
http://pdma.gob.pk/Publication/Disasters%20Data/Flood%202013/Damages%20De
tail%20New.pdf on 10 June, 2015
Droughts in Balochistan, (2012, April 11). Retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=54#more-54 on 10 June, 2015
Disaster Risk Management Plan District Gwadar, (November, 2008). Government
of Balochistan, District Disaster Management Authority Gwadar
Election Observer Group Reports (2006). Pakistan National and Provincial
Assembly Elections, 10 October 2002, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, pp.19-
45.
315
Elfenbein, Josef, (1989). Baluchistan III: Baluchi Language and Literature, In
Encyclopedia Iranica 3
Economic Gateway: Gwadar as Special Economic Zone, (2015, Jan.22) retrieved
from official website of Prime Minister‟s Office, Board of Investments, at
http://boi.gov.pk/ViewNews.aspx?NID=%20260 accessed on 22 February, 2015
Explore Balochistan, (2013) retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=38
&Itemid=784 on 22 January, 2015
Education for All Plan 2011-2015, (May, 2011). Directorate of Education,
Government of Balochistan, in collaboration with NCHD & UNESCO
Encyclopedia of Britannica, (1990) VOL 25.
Encyclopedia of Britannica, (1970). Vol. III,
Encyclopedia of Britannica, (1971). VOL III
Encyclopedia of Islam, (1936). London: Lucaza &Co.
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, Fruit production in Balochistan, retrieved from
http://pakissan.com/english/allabout/horticulture/fruit.production.in.balochistan.shtm
l on 28 January, 2015
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, (2006, Feb.6), Higher Poverty in Balochistan, The Dawn,
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, (2012, Aug.25), Balochistan‘s Duty, The Dawn
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed China digs Pakistan into a hole, retrieved from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ05Df01.html on 1 March, 2015
316
Fazl-e-Haider,Syed, Higher poverty in Balochistan, retrieved from
http://pakistanyouthmovement.com/articles/162-higher-poverty-in-balochistan on 6
June, 2015
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, (2013, Mar.7). Balochistan: Iran To Establish Oil Refinery In
Gwadar, at http://www.unpo.org/article/15604 accessed on 4 March, 2015
Fazl-e Haider, Syed, (2013, Jan.22). The Reko Dic Saga. The Dawn.
Foster, John, (2008). A Pipeline through a Troubled Land: Afghanistan, Canada
and a New Energy Game, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA),
Foreign Policy Series, Vol 3, No. 1.
Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, (2006, Oct.5) China digs Pakistan into a Hole, retrieved from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HJ05Df01.html on 21 March, 2015
Forbes, Shawn, Modern History of the Conflict in Balochistan, Balochi TV & Radio
Online Vancouver, Canada, retrieved from http://www.balochitvonline.com/modern-
history-of-conflict-in-balochistan.html on Dec 4, 2014
Forest Resource, (2015). Retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12
49&Itemid=100413 on 7 February, 2015
Fisheries Department ,(2013). Retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=
24&Itemid=191 on 25 February, 2015
Fisheries Data, 2013, Directorate of Balochistan, retrieved from
http://balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=130
4&Itemid=677 on 1 June, 2015
317
Fisheries Department, Development Schemes 2012-13, retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81
&Itemid=130 accessed on 1 June, 2015
Fruits, Vegetables & Condiments Statistics of Pakistan, 2008-09, (December,
2009) Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Economic Wing),
Islamabad
General Elections 2008, Report Volume II, Election Commission of Pakistan,
retrieved from www.ecp.gov.pk/Misc/ReportGeneralElection2008Vol-II.pdf on 13
July, 2015
Gazdar, Haris, (2007, Feb.28). Balochistan Economic Report Background Paper
on Social Structures and Migration, Collective for Social Science Research,
PECHS, Karachi: Pakistan. retrieved from
http://www.researchcollective.org/Documents/Balochistan_Economic_Report.pdf
on 31 May, 2015
Government of Balochistan, Population Welfare Department from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1271&Item
id=100430 accessed on 6 June, 2015
Grare, Fredric, (January, 2006). Pakistan: The resurgence of Baloch Nationalism,
Washington DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications:
South Asia Project. No. 65
Grare, Fredric, (April, 2013), Balochistan: The State Versus The Nation,
Washington DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications:
South Asia Project
Gankovsky, Y. V. (1973). The People of Pakistan, Lahore: Peoples Publishing
House.
318
Gondal, Sajid, (January, 2015). Balochistan Designs its Development Visions,
Monthly Economic Affairs, Vol. IV, Issue 1, Islamabad: Pakistan. pp. 8-10
Mineral Profile of Balochistan, (December, 2009)., Government of Pakistan,
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Geological Survey of Pakistan,
retrieved from http://www.gsp.gov.pk/images/mineralprofileofbalochistan.pdf on 12
February, 2015
Gwadar Port, retrieved from official website at
http://www.gwadarport.gov.pk/about%20us.html on 9 March 2015
Govt. to Give Proof of US, Indian Role in Balochistan Insurgency, (2012, Feb.19)
retrieved from http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/02/19/national/pakistan-to-
expose-us-indian-interference on April 14, 2015
Gazdar, Haris, (Sep. 30, 2006) Bugti and the Baloch Cause, Economic and
Political Weekly, pp. 4100-4101
Gilani, Ijaz Shafi, Dr. (May 2013). (May 2013). Electoral Data: Its Deconstruction
and Interpretation, Part Two from ‗‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan; A
Story of Pakistan‘s Transition From Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy
Under Rule of Law 1970-2013‘‘. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative
Development and Transparency. (PILDAT) pp. 39-76
Hamid, Shahid, (December, 2009). Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package An
Analysis, Background Paper, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Legislative
Development and Transparency , PILDAT.
Hamid, Shahid, (July, 2010), Impact of 18th Constitutional Amendment on
Federation-Provinces Relations, Briefing Paper, PILDAT.
319
Hussain, Dr. Nazir, (2015). Thaw in Iran-US Relations: Opening of Chahbahar
Trade Link and its Impact on Pakistan, Chapter 10 of the Book, „‟Pakistan„s
Strategic Environment Post-2014‟‟, Islamabad Policy Research Institute. pp 14-148
Hassan, Munawar, (2013, Sep.20) „‟Proposed Kashgar-Gwadar trade corridor‘‘,
The News.
Hassan, Lt Col. (R). Zaheerul, (2011, Mar.4). US Involvement in Balochistan,
Pakistan Observer.
Holdich, T. (1977). The Gates of India, Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab
Harrison, Selig S. (1981). In Afghanistan‘s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet
Temptations. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Harrison, Selig S. (1996). Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan: The Baluch Case, in
Hutchinson, John and Anthony Smith eds. Ethnicity Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Harrison, Selig S.,(1978). Nightmare in Baluchistan, Foreign Policy, Vol.32
Hughes, Albert William. (2007). The Country of Balochistan: Its Geography,
Topography, Ethnology, and History, London: Adamant Media Corporation.
Hughes, A.W. (1977). The Country of Baluchistan, Quetta.
Hasnat, Syed F. (2011). Global Security Watch—Pakistan (1st ed.). California:
Praeger
Hussain, Zahid. (Feb. 2005). ―Gathering Storm,‖ News line Magazine, PP.23-24.
Hussain, Zahid, (2013, May.6) Balochistan: A province divided, retrieved from
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/pakistanelections/2013/04/2013428135
533521674.html on 9 May, 2015
320
Honorable Chief Minister Balochistan Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, Balochistan Press
Briefing, (2014, Oct.29) retrieved from http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=686#more-686
on 11 June, 2015
Isa Qazi Faez, (2007). Balochistan: Case and Demand, PILdAT Briefing Paper
No.33, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and
Transparency.
Ismail, Muhammad, (2014). Geostrategic Importance of Balochistan: Baloch
Insurgency and the Global Politics of Energy Resources, Journal of Political
Studies, Vol. 21, Issue – 2, pp-181-201
Isa, Qazi Muhammad, (1944). Baluchistan, Case Gazette Press
Iqbal, Khurram, (2008). Counter Insurgency in Balochistan: Pakistan‘s Strategy,
Outcome and Future Implications, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Indian Independence Act, 1947, Constitutional Documents (Pakistan), Vol 111,
Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi
Imperial Gazetteer of India (Balochistan) Provincial Series (1984). Lahore: Sang-e-
Meel Publications
Imperial Gazetteer of India, Baluchistan, (1976). Vol. VI, Lahore
Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. VI (1908). Oxford: Claredon Press
International Crisis Group, (2006). Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in
Balochistan, Asia Report No 119.
Jones, Seth G., and C. Christine Fair. (2010), Counterinsurgency in Pakistan.
Washington, DC: Rand Publications.
321
Javaid Ijaz, Ahmad Shahid Dr. (2008). Water for Balochistan, Policy Briefings, Vol
(4), No (6), Government of Balochistan
Jetly, Rajsree. (2009). Resurgence of the Baluch Movement in Pakistan: Emerging
Perspectives and Challenges, in Jetly, Rajshree. ed. Pakistan in Regional and
Global Politics, New York: Routledge
Javaid, Umbreen, (Winter, 2010). Concerns of Balochistan: Effects and
Implications on Federation of Pakistan, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 17, Issue
2, pp.113-125
James, Paul (2006). Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In.
London: Sage Publications
Khan, Rehmat Ibad, (1996). Impact of political Culture on Political Development of
Balochistan, Ph.D Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of
Karachi
Khan, Kamran Aziz, (2011). 2002 Elections in Pakistan: A Reappraisal, Journal of
Political Studies, Vol. I8, Issue-1, Summer (2011), pp. 93-108
Khan, Muhammad Usman,Lt. Col., (1997). Tribal Politics in Balochistan 1947-
1990, PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Karachi.
Khan, Shabir Ahmad, Dr., (2015). Dynamics of Trade Corridors and Energy
Pipelines, Politics, Chapter 4 from ‗‘Pakistan‗s Strategic Environment Post-2014‘‘,
Islamabad Policy Research Institute, pp 71-90
Khan, Adeel, (2005). Politics of Identity, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
322
Khan, Zahid Ali, (2012).Balochistan Factor in Pak-Iran Relations: Opportunities and
Constraints, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp-121-
140
Khan, Zahid Ali, (2013).China‗s Gwadar and India‗s Chahbahar: An Analysis of
Sino-Indian Geostrategic and Economic Competition, Journal of Strategic Studies,
vol. XXXII & XXXIII, No.4 & 1
Khan, Adeel. (June, 2003). Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerilla
War to Nowhere, Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 4. No. 2.
Khan, Adeel. (2009), 'Renewed Ethno-nationalist Insurgency in Balochistan,
Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation', Asian
Survey, Vol. 49. No. 6, pp. 1071- 1091
Kech, Atif Abid, (2013, May.21) Baloch Nationalism, retrieved
from http://bolanvoice.com/2013/05/21/baloch-nationalism/ on 21 March, 2015
Khan, Ahmad Yar,(1975). Inside Baluchistan: A Political Autobiography of His
Highness Baiglar Baigi, Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Kakar, Hazrat Wali, (2012) Geo-Strategic importance of Balochistan, from
awamisoch.blogspot.com/2012/10/ on 25 December, 2014
Khokhar, Khalid, A. (2011,July.18). Diq project — exploiting own treasures, The
News.
Kataria, Riaz Jafar and Naveed, Anum, (2014). Pakistan-China Social and
Economic Relations, A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No.2,
July – December, pp. 395-410
323
Kiani, Khaliq, (2006, Sep. 20). Saindak project: excessive mining goes unchecked,
The Dawn.
Kundi, Dr. Mansoor Akbar, (2005). „‘Tribalism in Balochistan: A Comparative Study‖
in Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses, edited by Pervaiz Iqbal
Cheema and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research
Institute.
Kundi, Mansoor Akbar. (1994), Balochistan, a Socio-Cultural and Political Analysis.
Quetta: Qasim Printers.
Kundi, Mansoor Akbar.(2008). Sardari System in Balochistan in Dr. Riaz Ahmad
(ed), Balochistan Through History, Islamabad Chair on Quaid-i-Azam and Freedom
Movement Quaid-i-Azam University: Islamabad
Khetran, Mir Sherbaz. (2011). Crisis in Balochistan: The Way Forward, LAP
LAMBERT Academic Publishing.
Kakar, Farman, (2014,Dec.7). The Baloch Quagmire, retrieved from
http://tns.thenews.com.pk/the-baloch-quagmire/#.VRqRwCKUemq on 31 March,
2015
Kokaislova, Pavla and Kokaisl, Petr (2012), Ethnic Identity of the Baloch People,
Central Asia and the Caucasus, Volume 13, Issue 3, Journal of Social and Political
studies, Sweden: CA&CC, retrieved from
https://balochilinguist.wordpress.com/2013/12/27/ethnic-identity-of-the-baloch-
people/ on 22 January, 2015
Khan, Waheed, (2009, Nov.1). Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan, The
Time Magazine.
324
Kouzminov, Alexander. (2010). Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan At Crossroads.
Manas Publications.
Kupecz, Mickey, (Spring, 2012). Pakistan‘s Baloch Insurgency, History, Conflict
Drivers, and Regional Implications, International Affairs Review, Volume XX,
Number 3, pp, 95-111
Kaleem, Moosa, (October, 2008) No Place to Call Home, Herald, Karachi.
Kakar, Tariq, (2014, Sep.29) Origins of Baloch Insurgency, retrieved from
http://thebalochistanpoint.com/origins-of-baloch-insurgency/ on 22 March, 2015
Khan, Ehsan Mahmood, (January 2011). Internal Security Strategy for Pakistan,
SAN Analysis, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Laif, Muhammad Ijaz and Hamza, Muhammad Amir, (2009). Ethnic Nationalism in
Pakistan: A Case Study of Baloch Nationalism during Musharraf Regime, Pakistan
Vision, Vol. 10. No. 1, Journal of Pakistan Study Centre, Pakistan: University of the
Punjab, Lahore, pp. 49-81
Leason, Athanasiadis, (April 29, 2005). Stirring the Ethnic Pot, The Asia Times.
List of Banned Organizations in Pakistan, (2014, Oct.24) retrieved from
http://tribune.com.pk/story/456294/list-of-banned-organisations-in-pakistan/ on 10
April, 2015
Live Stock & Dairy Development Department, Balochistan, (January 2105), Web
Document, Government of Balochistan, Retrieved from www.balochistan.gov.pk
on 26 May, 2015
325
Mujahid, Abdul Basit, (2012). Balochistan and Eighteenth Amendment, Pakistan
Vision Vol. 13 No. 2, pp 145-159
Mahmand, Jan,(1989). Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan,
Emergence, Dimensions, Repercussions, Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab.
Mubarakpuri, Qazi Ather, (1987) Arab Rule in India, Sakkar: Fikr-o-Nazar
Publications.
Mateen Amir, (2010, July.27),Too many things going wrong simultaneously, The
News,
Mazhar, Muhammad Saleem, Javaid, Umbreen & Goraya, Naheed S. (2012).
Balochistan (From Strategic Significance to US Involvement. Journal of Political
Studies. Vol. 19 (1). University of the Punjab. pp
Majeed, Gulshan, (2011). National Integration in Pakistan: A Socio-Political
Analysis of Balochistan (1972-2005), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science,
University of the Punjab, Lahore.
Musharraf, Pervez. (2006). In the Line of Fire: A memoir. London: Simon &
Schuster.
Mehdi, Tahir, (2013, April.16). An overview of 2008 general elections, The Dawn
Mazari, Shireen, (2005,Feb.2). Balochistan and the Great Power Games, The
International News.
Munir, Muhammad; Ahsan, Muhammad and Zulfiqar, Saman, (2014, April. 4). Iran-
Pakistan Gas Pipeline: Cost-Benefit Analysis, retrieved from
http://www.ipripak.org/iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-cost-benefit-analysis/ on 28
February, 2015
326
Muller, Jerry. Z., (March/April 2008) Us and Them, The Enduring Power of Ethnic
Nationalism, retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2008-03-
02/us-and-them on 2014,Dec.8
Malik, Hasan Yaser, (2012). Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port, Journal of
Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 2, pp-57:69
Masooad Wajahat, (2006). The Murdere of Akbar Bugti, Monthly Nawa-e-Insan.
vol.7, September, .LRL No. 279,
Marri, Mir Khuda Bakhsh. (1974). Searchlights on Balochs and Balochistan.
Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Malik, Maria, (2013). Balochistan Conundrum-The Real Perspective, Islamabad:
Poorab Academy.
Motyl, Alexander, ed. (2001). Encyclopedia of Nationalism.1., San Diego:
Academic Press
Murtha, Jason R. (2011). The Strategic Importance of Balochistan, California:
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.
Maira, S., (2009, Nov.7). Mountain ranges of Baluchistan, retrieved from
http://pakistan360degrees.com/mountain-ranges-of-baluchistan/ on 10 February,
2015
Mineral Resources of Balochistan, (2013) retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=40
&Itemid=789 on 12 February, 2015
327
Mineral Reserves in Balochistan, (2013). Retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/images/minespdf/Mineral%20Reserves%20in%20Bl
n%20DGMM.pdf on 13 February, 2015
Naseem, Naheeda, (2014). Geopolitical Value of Gwadar for the Region (Mainly for
Pakistan, China and the Region), A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol.
29, No.2, July – December, pp. 519-530
Najmuddin, Dilshad. (1984). Threat of Insurgency; Consequences and Measures,
(Unpublished Research Paper). Rawalpindi: National Defence College.
Naseeb Ullah, (2014). Plight of Agriculture Sector in Balochistan, from
http://thebalochistanpoint.com/the-plight-of-agriculture-sector-in-balochistan/ on 25
January, 2015
NFC Award, National Finance Commission Award of Pakistan, (2010, July.9)
retrieved from http://www.einfopedia.com/nfc-award-national-finance-
commission-award-of-pakistan.php on 7 July, 2015
Nawaz Sharif Calls for Bringing Baloch Leaders into Mainstream, (2013, June.11)
retrieved from http://www.geo.tv/article-104773-Nawaz-Sahrif-calls-for-bringing-
Baloch-leaders-into-mainstream on 7 June, 2015
Nawaz Sharif‘s PML emerges as single largest party in Pak polls, (2013, May.14)
retrieved from http://zeenews.india.com/pakistan-elections-2013/nawaz-sharif-s-
pml-n-emerges-as-single-largest-party-in-pak-polls_848470.html on 12 July, 2015
Nationalism, (2015, Dec.14) Stanford Encyclopedia retrieved from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/#BasConNat on 20 March, 2015
328
Owtadolajam, Dr. Mohammad. (2006). The Hazara Tribe in Balochistan: (An
Analysis of Socio-Cultural Change). Hazaragi Academy.
Pipes, Gregory D.,(2010). Baloch-Islamabad Tensions: Problems of National
Integration, Masters Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School.
PIPS,(2009). Balochistan: Conflicts and Players. Islamabad: Pak Institute for
Peace Studies.
PIPS, (January 2010). Pakistan Security Report 2009, Pak Institute of Peace
Studies.
Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, (2006). International Crisis
Group, Asia Briefing No. 119
PIPS, (January, 2011). Pakistan Security Report 2010, Pak Institute of Peace
Studies.
PILDAT (March, 2012) Issue Paper. Balochistan: Civil-Military Relations,
Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency.
Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11, retrieved from
http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/12-Population.pdf on 1 June 2015
Party Position, Provincial Assemblies, retrieved from
http://ecp.gov.pk/overallpartypositionPA.pdf on 12 July, 2015
Pakistan Progressive, (1980). The Problem of Baluchistan, Vol. III, IV, New York.
Pasha, Aisha Ghous, (2011). Fiscal Implications of the 18th Amendment: The
Outlook for Provincial Finances, World Bank Policy Paper Series on Pakistan, PK
329
02/12, November 2011 retrieved from www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/ on 1 July, 2015
Productive Sectors, (2013), retreived from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83
7&Itemid=1087 on 22 February, 2015
Party Position National Assembly, (2012, Dec.18) retrieved from
http://ecp.gov.pk/Misc/PartyPosition/PAPosition.pdf on 14 July, 2015
Pakistan, 18th Amendment Bill, (2010, April.19) retrieved from
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/18th-amendment-bill-pakistan/p21953 and from
lgkp.gov.pk/.../2014/03/Full-text-of-18th-Amendment-Bill.pdf on 20 July, 2015
Party Position in Election 2013, retrieved form
http://electionpakistani.com/ge2013/party-postion.html on 12 July, 2015
Population Welfare Department, Government of Balochistan, retrieved from
http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12
71&Itemid=100430 on 1 June, 2015
Population Census 1998, Population Census Organization, Government of
Pakistan
Provincial Disaster Risk Management Plan, (2006). Government of Balochistan
Provincial Census Report of Balochistan, (2001), Statistic Division, Government of
Pakistan, Islamabad.
Quddus, Syed Abdul, (1990). The Tribal Baluchistan, Lahore: Feroz Sons
330
Qudrat Ullah, (2009, Dec.14), 7th NFC Award- a step towards fiscal federalism in
Pakistan, retrieved from http://www.pkhope.com/7th-nfc-award-a-step-towards-
fiscal-federalism-in-pakistan/ on 20 July, 2015
Rizvi, Hassan Askari, (May 2013). A Narrative of Pakistan‘s Nine Elections (1970-
2008), Part One of ‗‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan; A Story of
Pakistan‘s Transition From Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under
Rule of Law 1970-2013‘‘. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development
and Transparency. (PILDAT) pp.11-38
Rothi, Despina, (2005). National Attachment and Patriotism in a European Nation:
A British Study, Political Psychology, 26. pp 135-155
Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan,(2005) Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Islamabad.
Rana, Muhammed Amir, (2012, July.29).The Growing Nexus: Ethnic/Sectarian
Violence Is Expected to Continue to be a Long Term Challenge, The News.
Rizvi, Hasan Askari, (2000). Military State and Society in Pakistan, London:
Macmillan Press.
Roofi, Yasmin, (2013). Ethnic Nationalism and Political Development: A Case
Study of Pakistan, (1973-2000), PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science &
International Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan
Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan, (November 2005), Report
7, Senate of Pakistan, Islamabad: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
331
Sial, Safdar and Basit, Abdul, (Oct-Dec 2010). Conflict and Insecurity in
Balochistan: Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security, Conflict
and Peace Studies, Vol 3, Number 4, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Scholz, Fred. (2002). Nomadism and Colonialism: A Hundred Years of Baluchistan
(1872-1972). USA: Oxford University Press.
Siddiqi, Farhan Hanif. (2012). The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch,
Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements (Routledge Contemporary South Asia
Series). USA: Routledge.
Swidler, Nina (2014). Remotely Colonial: History and Politics in Balochistan. New
York: Oxford University Press
Shah, Mahmood Ali. (2008). Essays on Balochistan: Society, Polity and Tribal
Administration. Lahore: Idara-e-Tadrees.
Shah, Mehtab Ali, (1997). The Foreign Policy of Pakistan; Ethnic Impacts on
Diplomacy (1971-1994), London: I.B. Tauris and Company.
Sabir, Dr. Abdul Razzaq & Razzaq, Waheed, (2010). Multiculturalism: A Case
Study of Balochistan, Balochistan Review, Vol. XXIII No. 2, Balochistan Study
Centre, University of Balochistan, Pakistan. pp. 17-25
Shahid, Saleem, (2006, Dec.10), President offers amnesty to Baloch fighters:
Dialogue option kept open, The Dawn
Shahid, Saleem, (2007, May.20), Baloch leaders reject president‘s conditional
amnesty offer, The Dawn.
332
Shahid, Saleem. (2005, Dec.19) Troops move against Marris in Kohlu. The Dawn,
Karachi
Shahid, Saleem, (2013, June.3), Dr Malik Baloch — a profile, The Dawn.
Shahid, Saleem, (2002). Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, in ABS Jafri‟s, The
political parties of Pakistan, Karachi: Royal Book Company
Saeed, Rehana Hashmi, (2013) The Politics of Ethnicity: An Issue to National Integration
to Pakistan, PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore,
Chapter 3, Page no. not available, accessed from accessed from
www.eprints.hec.gov.pk/10860 on 30 June 2015
Sabir, Abdul Razzaq, (Jan-June,2007), Cultural Values and Traditional Treatment
System Among Brahui Nomads, IJDL KeralaS India:ISDL Therivenanthapuram.
Sayed, Javed Haider, Dr. (2008). Balochistan: The Land and the People, Journal of
South Asian Studies, VOL 23, No. 1., University of the Punjab.
Spooner, Brian, (1989). Baluchistan 1: Geography, History and Ethnography, In
Encyclopedia Iranica, III, Yarsheter Ehsan (ed.), London/New York: Mazda
Publishers
Safi, Ghulam Murtaza; Gadiwala, Muhammad Sohail; Burke, Farkhunda; Azam,
Muhammad; and Baqa, Muhammad Fahad (2014).Agricultural Productivity in
Balochistan Province of Pakistan, A Geographical Analysis, Journal of Basic &
Applied Sciences, Volume 10.
Shah, Abid Hussain, (2007). The Volatile Situation of Balochistan - Options to Bring
It Into Streamline, Masters Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey,
California.
333
Shah, Syed Fakharuddin and Khan, M. Zubair, (April, 2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s, Global Journal of Human
Social Science, Volume 12 Issue 7 Version 1. pp. 61-68
Siddiqi, Akhtar Husain, (1991). Baluchistan (Pakistan): Its Society, Resources and
Development, Lanham: University Press of America.
Siddique, Shoaib-ur-Rehman, (2011, Feb.18). The Reko Diq Project, retrieved from
http://www.brecorder.com/home/opinion/3409-the-reko-diq-project.pdf on 1 March,
2015
Siddique, Shahid, (2010,June.7). Education in Balochistan, retrieved from
http://shahidksiddiqui.blogspot.com/2010/06/education-in-balochistan.html on 7
June, 2015
Shah, Shahid, (2013, June.26). Balochistan tops poverty list: SPDC, The News. Sumra, Anwar, (2014, Feb. 25), SDPI report: 58.7m Pakistanis living below poverty
line. The Express Tribune
Seasonal Monsoon Rainfalls across Balochistan, (2012, Sep.28) retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/?p=277#more-277 on 7 June, 2015
Special Article on India-Afghanistan-Pakistan Triangle, (2013, April.12) retrieved
from http://ecurrentaffairs.in/blog/special-article-on-india-pakistan-afghanistan-
triangle/ on 12 March, 2015
Situation Bulletin-I, Flash Flood Kuzdar, (2015, June.5) official Document from
Provincial Disater Ris Management Authority, Balochistan, retrieved from
http://www.pdma.gob.pk/wp-content/uploads/Situation-Report-1-Flash-Flood-
Khuzdar1.pdf on 8 June, 2015
334
TAPI -Pipeline, or Pipe Dream? (2014, Sep.28) The Dawn, retrieved from
http://www.dawn.com/news/1134880 on 23 February, 2015
Titus, Paul and Swidler, Nina,(February, 2000). Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-
Nationalism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial Balochistan, International
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1.
Tareen, Mahmood, (March, 2015). Implementation of 18th Amendment Is Must for
Viability of Pakistan, from http://thebalochistanpoint.com/implementation-on-18th-
amendment-is-must-for-viability-of-pakistan/
Talbot, Ian, (2005). Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Talbot, Ian, (1990). Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement; the Growth of
the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47, Karachi: Oxford
University Press.
Tahir, Muhammad, (2008, April.4). The Players in the Balochistan Insurgency,
retrievedfromhttp://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/International_3/The_Players_in
_the_Balochistan_Insurgency_printer.shtml on 9 June, 2015
Too many things going wrong simultaneously, (2010, July. 27), The News The Growing Nexus, (2012, August.3), The Friday Times
The Asia Times, 2005, April.29
The Balochistan Express, 2007, Nov. 22
The Express Tribune, 2014, Dec.5
The Gulf News, 2013, Jul.13
The News, 2013, Sep.20
The Express Tribune, 2015, Jan.13
The Daily Times, 2014, Jul.10
335
The Daily Times, 2014, Jan.31
The Daily Times, 2015, Apr. 8
The Daily Times, 2012, Jun. 12
The Pakistan Observer, 2003, Jan.17
The Pakistan Times, 2010, January 21
The Dawn, 2010, Mar.23
The News, 2011, Jul.18
The News, 2010, July.27
The News, 2009, March .4
The Nation, 2010, May.29
The Nation, 2006, April.10
The Nation, 2013, Jun. 2
The Dawn, 2013, Jan.22
The Dawn, 2012, May.16
The Dawn, 2015, Apr. 16
The Dawn, 2003, Aug.5
The Express Tribune, 2011, May.17
The Dawn, 2013, May.20
The Dawn, 2013, Dec.19
The Dawn, 2008, Nov.2
The Dawn, 2002, Oct.18
The Dawn, 2004, Sep.22
The Dawn, 2015, June.24
The Dawn, 2006, Feb.4
The Dawn, 2010, Mar.28
The News, 2005, Feb. 2
The News, 2009, Dec. 8
The News, 2002, Jan. 13
The News, 2002, Jan.17
The News, 2005, Feb. 3
The News, 2009, Nov. 25
336
The Express Tribune, 2012, Dec 3
The Express Tribune, 2013, Feb. 9
The Express Tribune, 2013, Mar.27
The Express Tribune, 2013, May.12
The Daily Times, 2005, Jan. 29
The Daily Times, 2005, Feb.7
The Daily Times, 2005, Feb. 5
The Daily Times, 2005, Jan. 30
The Daily Times, 2012, Oct. 10
The Daily Times, 2007, April. 5
The Daily Times, 2015, Mar.17
The Friday Times, 2012, Aug. 3
The Frontier Post, Peshawar, 2010, May.16
Taheri, Muhammad Reza (2008) Tribal Politics in Balochistan 1947-1990. PhD
thesis, University of Sindh, Jamshoro.
The Juniper Forests, (2008). retrieved from
http://pakistanpaedia.com/jungles/juniper_forests.htm on 23 January, 2015
Tribal Analysis Centre, (Nov.2009) The Baloch and the Brahui and Their Rebillions,
retrieved from http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-
TAC/Baluch%20and%20the%20Brahui.pdf on 28 March, 2015
The Plight of the Baloch (2015, March) Briefing Note, retreived from
http://unpo.org/downloads/1288.pdf on 1 April, 2015
United Nations Development Program Pakistan & Government of Balochistan.
(Report 2011). .Balochistan Millennium Development Goals
337
Wrising, Robert.G., (2008). Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy
Resources: A Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan, retrieved from
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a480237.pdf on 2 April, 2015
Weaver, Mary Anne, (2002). Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan,
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux Press
World Bank Report, (2013). Balochistan: Development Issues and Prospects,
Islamabad: Multi Donor Trust Fund, Pakistan
Waheed, Hamid, (2011, Apr. 27). The Balochistan Dynamics, The Nation
Wasim, Muhammad Pervez, (2011), Trends, Growth and Variability of Major Fruit
Crops in Balochistan- Pakistan: 1989-2009, Research Report, ARPN Journal of
Agricultural and Biological Science, VOL. 6, NO. 12, Asian Research Publishing
Network
What are the Short Term Objectives of Baloch Insurgents?, (2012, Nov.5),
retrieved from http://pksecurity.blogspot.com/2012/11/what-are-short-term-
objectives-of.html on 3 April, 2015
Yousafzai, Rahimullah, (2009, March.4), And now there is Tehrik-e-Taliban
Balochistan, The News,
Zaheer, Captain K. Raffat, (2007). Pakistan‘s Ambitious Port Plans, Annual Review
2006-2007, International Federation of Shipmasters Associations (IFSMA), pp.24-
25, retrieved from
http://www.ifsma.org/tempannounce/aga33/IFSMAAnnualReview.pdf on 26
February, 2015
Zaidi, Mubashir. (February, 2005). ―State of Confusion,‖ The Herald, (pp.64-65)