BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DELIVERABLE … · bali airport development project deliverable 4: consolidated report draft final report

BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DELIVERABLE 4: CONSOLIDATED REPORT

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

March 2011

BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DELIVERABLE 4: CONSOLIDATED REPORT

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

INDONESIA INFRASTRUCTURE

INITIATIVE

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INDONESIA INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

This document has been published by the Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative (IndII), an Australian Government funded project designed to promote economic growth in Indonesia by enhancing the relevance, quality and quantum of infrastructure investment.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Indonesian Partnership or the Australian Government. Please direct any comments or questions to the IndII Director, tel. +62 (21) 230-6063, fax +62 (21) 3190-2994. Website: www.indii.co.id.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report has been prepared by LFV Aviation consultants Arne Karyd and Natanael Ljung, with invaluable assistance from Messrs. Isada, local consultant, and Emritzal from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). The LFV Team recognises a number of individuals and organisations having provided data and other information, see Chapter 21. Any errors of fact or interpretation rest solely with the authors.

A Draft Final version of Deliverable 2, the main report, dated 3 January, 2011 was presented to IndII and DGCA in Jakarta on 25 January, 2011. The ensuing comments are included in Chapter 18 with the reflections of the authors. A number of minor errors have been corrected. A major error concerned the separation of aircraft on approach, discussed in Section 14.1.2

All photos in this report are taken by the Team.

25 March, 2011 LFV AVIATION CONSULTING AB Arne Karyd and Natanael Ljung

© IndII 2011

All original intellectual property contained within this document is the property of the Indonesian Australia Infrastructure Initiative (IndII). It can be used freely without attribution by consultants and IndII partners in preparing IndII documents, reports designs and plans; it can also be used freely by other agencies or organisations, provided attribution is given.

Every attempt has been made to ensure that referenced documents within this publication have been correctly attributed. However, IndII would value being advised of any corrections required, or advice concerning source documents and/or updated data.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE CONSOLIDATED REPORT ............................................................. VII

CHAPTER 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................ 1

CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 4

CHAPTER 3: JICA AND PCI REPORTS ........................................................................ 6

3.1 1982 FEASIBILITY STUDY ................................................................. 6

3.2 1993 DRAWING OF BASIC DESIGN .................................................... 7

3.3 2004 MASTER PLAN STUDY ON THE STRATEGIC POLICY OF THE AIR

TRANSPORT SECTOR ....................................................................... 7

3.4 2008 FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION OF CNS/ATM . ........................................................................................ 10

CHAPTER 4: STUDI PENGEMBANGAN BANDAR UDARA NGURAH RAI 2006 ............ 12

CHAPTER 5: MASTER PLAN PHASE III, 1995 - 1997 ................................................ 13

CHAPTER 6: SAFETY ISSUES .................................................................................. 14

6.1 ICAO AUDITS ............................................................................. 14

6.2 ACCIDENT REPORTS ...................................................................... 14

CHAPTER 7: NGURAH RAI - AIRPORT BALI - GATEWAY TO PARADISE 2010............. 16

CHAPTER 8: THE NEW TERMINAL PROJECT ........................................................... 17

CHAPTER 9: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................... 19

9.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 19

9.2 MAJOR FINDINGS ........................................................................ 19

CHAPTER 10: HOW TO READ THIS DOCUMENT ....................................................... 21

CHAPTER 11: NGURAH RAI AIRPORT ...................................................................... 22

11.1 AIRPORT OBSTACLES .................................................................... 22

11.2 AIRSPACE, PROCEDURES AND LANDING AIDS ...................................... 22

11.3 RUNWAY, TAXIWAYS AND APRONS .................................................. 23

11.4 LANDSIDE ACCESS AND ROAD COMMUNICATION .................................. 25

11.5 PASSENGER TERMINALS ................................................................ 27

11.5.1 Domestic terminal............................................................. 27 11.5.2 International terminal, departures ................................... 28 11.5.3 International terminal, arrivals ......................................... 30

11.6 AIRPORT OPERATIONS .................................................................. 31

11.6.1 Ground handling and catering .......................................... 31 11.6.2 Fuelling .............................................................................. 32 11.6.3 Airport rescue and fire-fighting, hangars and airport

maintenance ..................................................................... 32

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11.7 CARGO TERMINAL ........................................................................ 33

11.8 GROUND TRANSPORT ................................................................... 33

11.9 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE .................................................... 34

11.9.1 Aircraft noise ..................................................................... 34 11.9.2 Drainage ............................................................................ 35 11.9.3 Energy and waste .............................................................. 36 11.9.4 Continuous descent (“green”) approaches ...................... 36 11.9.5 Alternative fuels ................................................................ 37

11.10 LAND UTILISATION ....................................................................... 38

11.11 PEAK LOAD PATTERN – MOVEMENTS ................................................ 38

11.12 PEAK LOAD PATTERN – PASSENGERS ................................................. 41

11.13 CONCLUSIONS ON TOTAL AIRPORT CAPACITY ...................................... 45

11.13.1 Movements ....................................................................... 45 11.13.2 From movements to passengers ...................................... 48

CHAPTER 12: TRAFFIC FORECASTS .......................................................................... 51

12.1 THE 2010 INDII FORECAST ............................................................ 51

12.2 ANGKASA PURA 1 AND MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT FORECASTS ................ 53

12.3 CARGO ..................................................................................... 54

CHAPTER 13: CURRENT SITUATION AND FACTORS MODIFYING THE FORECAST ....... 55

13.1 THE ROLE OF BALI IN INDONESIAN TOURISM ....................................... 55

13.2 BALI TOURISM IN A BROADER CONTEXT ............................................. 56

13.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AIRPORT CAPACITY ........................................... 56

13.3.1 Gateway to paradise ......................................................... 57 13.3.2 Rabies – a serious threat to tourism ................................. 58 13.3.3 Conclusions on future tourism.......................................... 59

13.4 FINDINGS FROM OTHER MAJOR TOURIST DESTINATIONS ........................ 60

13.4.1 Hawaii ............................................................................... 60 13.4.2 The Balearic Islands........................................................... 62 13.4.3 The Canary Islands ............................................................ 63

CHAPTER 14: FUTURE CHALLENGES ........................................................................ 65

14.1 CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS ................................................................ 65

14.1.1 Imminent ........................................................................... 65 14.1.2 Short- and medium-term .................................................. 65 14.1.3 Long-term ......................................................................... 66

14.2 THE NEW TERMINAL PROJECT ......................................................... 67

CHAPTER 15: RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CONSTRUCTION ........................... 69

15.1 AIRSPACE IMPROVEMENTS ............................................................. 69

15.2 RUNWAYS, TAXIWAYS AND APRON .................................................. 70

15.3 RUNWAY EXTENSION AND SECOND RUNWAY ...................................... 71

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15.3.1 Runway extension ............................................................. 71 15.3.2 Second runway.................................................................. 73 15.3.3 A second Bali Airport ........................................................ 74

CHAPTER 16: RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO TRAFFIC ....................................... 77

16.1 SLOT COORDINATION ................................................................... 77

16.2 RESTRUCTURED TRAFFIC ................................................................ 77

16.3 RESTRUCTURED CHARGES .............................................................. 78

16.4 RESTRUCTURED MODAL SPLIT ......................................................... 78

CHAPTER 17: OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................ 80

CHAPTER 18: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT FINAL VERSION ...................................... 82

CHAPTER 19: MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES ................................................................... 86

19.1 LABOUR MARKETS ....................................................................... 86

19.2 SECURITY................................................................................... 87

CHAPTER 20: ANNEXE 1: ACRONYMS ..................................................................... 89

CHAPTER 21: APPENDIX 2 RECORD OF MEETINGS ................................................... 90

CHAPTER 22: APPENDIX 3 PROSPECTS FOR PEAK-LOAD PRICING ............................. 91

22.1 PRESENT CHARGES ....................................................................... 91

22.2 PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF PEAK LOAD PRICING .......................... 92

CHAPTER 23: REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 95

CHAPTER 24: BACKGROUND .................................................................................. 99

CHAPTER 25: SUGGESTIONS EMERGING FROM DELIVERABLE 1 ............................. 101

25.1 DEVELOPMENT OF AN INVESTMENT ASSESSMENT METHOD .................. 101

25.2 SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF A GOVERNMENT-OWNED MONOPOLY ........... 102

25.3 IMPROVEMENT OF AVIATION FORECASTING METHODS ........................ 103

25.4 AIRPORTS AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL SHOWCASE ................................. 103

CHAPTER 26: OUTLINE SUGGESTIONS EMERGING FROM DELIVERABLE 2 .............. 104

26.1 THE LONG-TERM FUTURE OF BALI TOURISM ..................................... 104

26.2 A COMPREHENSIVE AND FLEXIBLE CHARGING SYSTEM ......................... 104

26.3 METHODS OF RESTRICTING GROUND HANDLING EQUIPMENT ................ 105

26.4 ADAPTATION OF EIA AND SEA TO INDONESIAN CONDITIONS ............... 106

26.5 EFFICIENT WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ....................................... 107

26.6 LOCAL INTRODUCTION OF “GREEN” APPROACHES .............................. 107

26.7 SIMULATION OF FLOWS IN THE NEW TERMINAL ................................. 108

CHAPTER 27: INDICATIONS ON PROJECT VOLUMES AND PRIORITIES ..................... 109

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Apron capacity ........................................................................................................................ 25 Table 2: IATA terminal service levels ............................................................................................... 27 Table 3: Estimated capacity, international passenger terminal .............................................. 30 Table 4: Peak hour movements ......................................................................................................... 39 Table 5: Peak day passengers ............................................................................................................. 41 Table 6: Peak hour domestic passengers ....................................................................................... 43 Table 7: Peak hour international passengers ................................................................................ 43 Table 8: capacity estimation ............................................................................................................... 47 Table 9: From peak hour movements to annual passengers ................................................... 49 Table 10: AP1 passenger forecast for Bali Phase III project ..................................................... 53 Table 11:: MoT passenger forecast for Bali Phase III project ................................................... 53 Table 12: World tourism 1980–2020 ............................................................................................... 56 Table 13: Ngurah Rai Airport charges 2010 and Airbus A340-300 example ....................... 91 Table 14: London/Stansted landing charges ................................................................................. 93

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Western part of apron with aircraft bridges ............................................................... 24

Figure 2: Eastern part of apron .......................................................................................................... 24

Figure 3: Airport entry toll gate ......................................................................................................... 26

Figure 4: Unused bus parking bays ................................................................................................... 26

Figure 5: Motorbike parking ............................................................................................................... 38

Figure 6: Monthly distribution of movements in 2009 .............................................................. 39

Figure 7: Monthly distribution of passengers in 2009................................................................ 41

Figure 8: Current (-2009) and forecast passengers ..................................................................... 51

Figure 9: Current (-2009) and forecast movements ................................................................... 52

Figure 10: Forecast peak day movements...................................................................................... 52

Figure 11: Forecast peak hour movements ................................................................................... 52

Figure 12: Foreign tourist arrivals in Indonesia and Bali share................................................ 55

Figure 13: Rabies risk levels in 2009 ................................................................................................. 58

Figure 14: Map of Hawaii ..................................................................................................................... 61

Figure 15: Passenger traffic at Honolulu Airport ......................................................................... 61

Figure 16: The Balearic Islands ........................................................................................................... 62

Figure 17 Passenger traffic at the Balearic Islands Airports ..................................................... 63

Figure 18: Canary Islands ..................................................................................................................... 64

Figure 19: Passenger traffic at the Canary Islands Airports ...................................................... 64

Figure 20: Aircraft bridge ..................................................................................................................... 71

Figure 21: Instances of pointless security ...................................................................................... 87

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PREFACE TO THE CONSOLIDATED REPORT

In this project, designated support for potential Bali Airport development/redevelopment (Ngurah Rai), the terms of reference (ToR) call for the following deliverables:

Deliverables 1-3 have been completed in the period from November 2010 to February 2011. This consolidated report has been prepared by merging these documents, removing recurrences resulting from the merger, inserting a contiguous table of contents and adjusting minor details. The only new information in this report is 15.3.3 A second Bali Airport, based on information furnished after completion of Deliverables 1-3.

Executive summaries of the respective partial reports have been retained and are found in the beginning of each report.

DELIVERABLE 1: FINDINGS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES

BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Deliverable 1: Findings from Previous Studies

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DELIVERABLE 4: CONSOLIDATED REPORT DRAFT FINAL REPORT

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CHAPTER 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


This report forms a part of the Bali Airport Development project, the main report of which is Deliverable 2 on airport capacity. Normally, the contents of this first report would have been included as a chapter or two in the second deliverable. The LFV Team has interpreted the requirement for a separate review of earlier work as an instruction to dig a bit deeper than usual into what has already been done. Repeating earlier work without introducing new data or approaches, as well as re-entering possible impasses of the past, should be avoided.

Some reports are from the early 1980’s, in one case referring to an ever-older master plan from 1975. The Team has not made any great efforts to find pre-1982 documents. Recommendations and conclusions in reports of that age have in all probability been followed, carried forward into later plans or rendered obsolete by subsequent development.

Compiling old reports turned out to be a more rewarding experience than originally expected by the Team. To the extent findings are pertinent to Deliverable 2 – the main report on Ngurah Rai – and fall within its ToR, they have been used as inputs and basis for the work, improving and refining the results of that report. Relevant findings falling outside the ToR for Deliverable 2 have been used in Deliverable 3, containing outline ToR for future work.

The Team wishes to underline that a year 2010 review of decade-old reports are made with a huge advantage of hindsight and may sound highly unfair to the then authors. Possible deficiencies in old reports, found in 2010, are normally revealed by the sheer lapse of time or by things developing in other ways than assumed at that time. In the case of issues not touched upon in earlier reports, this is doubtlessly ascribable to the issues having been intentionally left out in the then terms of reference. In no case are the findings of the Team to be perceived as indicating unprofessional performance by the authors of earlier reports. The approach is “what lessons can be learnt”, not “what could have been done better”.

Findings relevant for Deliverable 2 are as follows:

All previous reports are either assuming that traffic will grow continuously throughout the foreseeable future, or making forecasts to that effect. The question whether there are other limitations than airport capacity, like how many tourists Bali Island can accommodate, or to what level the Government of Indonesia should allow Bali tourism to grow when the cultural integrity of Bali is taken into account, appears never to have been posed.

A number of suggestions on how to increase capacity or improve airport operations are found in earlier reports. All suggestions not implemented already will be discussed in Deliverable 2.

2 BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

DELIVERABLE 4: CONSOLIDATED REPORT DRAFT FINAL REPORT

Invariably, past analyses originate in supply-side factors and recommendations remain within that realm. Demand-side issues like peak load pricing, design of airside user charges etc. Have, as far as the Team has found, not been analysed.

Most environmental issues have been treated in a “footnote” or en passant manner, probably reflecting the much lower weight of environmental considerations prevalent at the time.

Findings carried forward to outline ToR for a future project are as follows:

While the airport is owned by the Government of Indonesia, indirectly through PT Angkasa Pura, no general guidelines on how to prioritise between governmental investments have been found. Social cost-benefit analysis is the normal approach. This method is fairly universal and can be copied and adapted from abroad, but it requires national inputs like a common interest rate and assumed lifespan, monetary values set on time savings and risks, desirability of side effects like poverty alleviation, and so on.

PT Angkasa Pura is a corporation in charge of what is in essence a large natural monopoly in the form of Bali’s only airport. The performance of a corporation is measured mainly through its bottom-line result in the profit-and-loss account. A well-known conflict exists between this measurement and the optimal use and pricing of an infrastructure monopoly. It is not known to the Team whether this conflict has been addressed at all; no evidence in that direction has been found in the reports. Various methods, like balanced score card, owner directives, and “golden shares” are used elsewhere and should be surveyed.

Forecasting methods for aviation normally include gross domestic product (GDP) or its regional part (GDRP). Models based on these methods perform well for airports and air routes with a normal distribution between business travellers, leisure travellers and incoming tourists. For destinations like Bali, where traffic is heavily dominated by incoming tourism, traditional models do not work. GDP or GDRP in the tourists’ origin countries and not their destination determine the volume of tourism, and competition between tourist destinations determines its distribution. Forecasting methodology needs to be improved in general and special attention should be given to destinations where the passenger composition deviates from the average.

The non-dependent (explanatory) variables used in forecasting tend to be “recycled” for tourist destinations like Bali. Air traffic is forecast using the expected tourism growth, which in turn is forecast (by someone else) using expected air traffic as input. As a result, far-reaching conclusions are based on rather wobbly and narrow assumptions and estimations. Statisticians refer to this problem as multi-colinearity.

The environmental situation at Ngurah Rai Airport may not be 100 percent impeccable but it is vastly superior to the standard found in the surrounding


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community. Many other Indonesian airports may hold similar leading positions in their respective surroundings. Directorate General Civil Aviation (DGCA) and PT Angkasa Pura, operating a large number of airports, should survey the possibilities of turning every airport into a local environmental lodestar.



CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the ToR for this project, an initial study of previous findings is required. The following description of this task applies:

Review all existing documents relating to the potential development/redevelopment of Ngurah Rai airport, including:

1. Feasibility and pre-feasibility studies

2. Reports on earlier site visits

3. Any previous or draft Master Plans

4. Airline safety issues (particularly related to airport congestion): uniform standards, and measured safety performance in line with stakeholder expectations as stated in the Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Document 9426) ICAO - to be considered in the context of Indonesian aviation,

5. MoT, DGCA, and Bali regional government correspondence and reports

6. IndII Initial Activity Request (IAR)

7. Reports of other airport facilities managing similar developmental challenges

8. Reports of programs instigated or designed by other donors (including a JICA Study)

The Team has identified the following reports possibly relevant for items 1, 3, 5 and 8:

Reports from Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Pacific Consultants International (PCI):

o 1982 Feasibility Study

o 1993 Drawing of Basic Design

o 2004 Master Plan Study on the Strategic Policy of the Air Transport Sector

o 2008 Feasibility Study for Strategic Implementation of CNS/ATM 7

2006 Studi Pengembangan Bandar Udara Ngurah Rai

1995 – 1997 Master Plan Phase III

ICAO Safety Audits of various vintages

1974 and 1984 accident reports

2010 Ngurah Rai - Airport Bali - gateway to paradise

2010 Presentation of the new terminal project

No IndII IAR (item 6) is referred to in the ToR. As regards item 7, the challenges facing Ngurah Rai may not be unique in terms of size or degree of difficulty, but their character is definitely quite special. DGCA and Angkasa Pura 1 (AP1) contacts did not


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CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION

identify any other airport project with a useful similarity to Ngurah Rai. Finally, as regards item 4, the Team found an ICAO safety audit and an account of two accidents, one of which adding an unexpected lesson (see Section 6.2).



CHAPTER 3: JICA AND PCI REPORTS

JICA and PCI have been involved in Indonesian aviation and other industries for several decades. Four reports are considered relevant to this project.

3.1 1982 FEASIBILITY STUDY

This report summarises the role of Bali International Airport as follows:

A. “Eastern gateway of Indonesia for international air traffic, connecting with Japan, Australia, USA and South Pacific Islands.”

B. “The most advanced centre for establishing solidarity among the eastern islands of Indonesia to provide the basis for transferring and connecting domestic air routes, which will accelerate migration and economic exchange to both undeveloped and developing regions.”

The document makes some references to a Master Plan dated 1975. Four major problems were identified:

1. The width of the runway strip and the distance between centreline and parallel taxiway do not comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).

2. Runway length is not sufficient for long-haul aircraft.

3. Wide-bodied aircraft parked on the existing apron protrude the transitional surface.

4. Existing terminal systems and sizes are insufficient.

The first problem has been solved by the arrangement of a parking for E-class aircraft. In 1982, the runway was 2,700 metres but a subsequent extension has increased the length to 3,000 metres. As indicated in Deliverable 2, further extension is extremely complicated and costly while bringing negligible benefits.

In 1981, the airport had 870,000 passengers. After making a surprisingly accurate forecast, JICA arrived at the following conclusions:

a) Facilities required for 2010 can be developed within the existing area.

b) Required construction work is highly profitable when measured by social cost-benefit analysis.

c) Suggested improvements are “indispensable to eastern regional development and the unity of Indonesia”.

Additional conclusions were made regarding construction timing, etc.


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As regards conclusion a), the actual development has proven JICA’s findings to be true. Not all suggestions have been carried through but those left aside would probably not have been inconsistent with their view. On the other hand, further scrutiny of data and methods behind conclusion b) reveals some flaws, even if viewed in a year 1982 context.1 Finally, conclusion c) was probably correct, even if it now appears exaggerated, in the political context of those days. In a future seen from a 2010 outlook, it carries very little relevance. In the past 28 years, national cohesion has strengthened and the development of Eastern Indonesia is by now based on a number of airports in the region.

3.2 1993 DRAWING OF BASIC DESIGN

This report by PCI in association with Indonesian consultants PT Asana Wirasta Setia contains a large number of drawings describing the Phase II development project. Drawings pertain to general outline, civil works, building works, electrical works, mechanical works, public utilities, air navigation and fuel system. To the extent that projects have not yet been implemented, some of these may still be relevant although it is beyond the scope of this project to assess their actual viability. Drawings for building works are probably rendered obsolete by the current terminal project.

3.3 2004 MASTER PLAN STUDY ON THE STRATEGIC POLICY OF THE AIR TRANSPORT SECTOR

According to its outline, this study was intended to cover all aspects of civil aviation and this ambition appears, by and large, to have been fulfilled. In contrast to almost all other studies, it recognises the environmental effects of aviation and the establishment of an “environmental management system” is suggested:

”DGAC should create a legislative framework for an environmental management system at least for all NAS airports. Under this system, airport operators are required to provide an environmental management programme and conduct environmental practices, and DGAC will audit compliance of environmental practices, and if necessary, recommend and monitor corrective action by the airport operators.”

The interpretation of “environmental” in this report may however be a bit irregular, as countermeasures against bird hazards are found under this heading. In spite of its all-encompassing ambitions, the study does not deal with the question of how the DGAC and AP 1/2 should prioritise between a huge number of desired investments, the total costs of which by far exceeding the available resources.

1 Page 126 ff. in the Appendix.



Several recommendations pertaining to Bali are found in this report (verbatim quotations):

1. Jakarta and Bali will continue to handle a major part of international air traffic in and out of Indonesia. Adequate capacities at these airports should always be kept as high priority issues for Indonesia.

2. The air traffic forecasts indicate the saturation of runway capacities at Jakarta, Surabaya and Bali airports after 2025. Preparatory planning for the third runway at Jakarta, and the additional runway capacity for Bali and Surabaya areas should be commenced. (Page 19).

3. There is no clear picture at present for the future of Bali Airport. There is a strong objection for the development of a new terminal complex beyond Ngurah Rai Road. The provincial government has an unwritten policy to restrict the number of tourists to Bali Island, while it is probable that Bali would attract tourists from new markets, including mainland China. The JICA Study Team estimated that additional runway capacity would be needed for Bali Island after 2025. Under such circumstances, the recommendation for the central government and Bali provincial government is to provide a clear picture for AP1 by undertaking a tourism/regional master plan for Bali Island.

4. Despite the availability of 24 international airports in Indonesia, demands are concentrated at Jakarta and Bali followed by Surabaya and Medan. Other international airports generally are equipped with runways usable for DC-10 class aircraft, but its frequency is little.

5. Jakarta is the main hub for the domestic air routes, with Surabaya, Bali, Medan and Makassar as secondary hubs. This route structure will remain in the future.

6. Based on the above analysis, the JICA Study Team recommends the airport operator to adopt the following six basic policies for airport developments to support efficient air transport services.

o Efficient hub services at Jakarta, Surabaya, and Makasaar

o Enabling B737 class aircraft services for NAS airports

o Examining the necessity for new airport construction projects

o Ensuring adequate capacities for international air services at Jakarta and Bali

o Provision of international services at reasonable service level at other international airports

o Preparation for future additional runway capacities at Jakarta, Bali, and Surabaya

7. The second airport should be considered for Bali Island, as the runway capacity of the existing airport will saturate after 2025.

8. The air traffic forecasts indicate the saturation of runway capacities at Jakarta, Surabaya and Bali after 2025. Analysis of present runway capacities of three airports indicates that an additional runway is required after 2025. Preparatory


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planning for the third runway at Jakarta, and the additional runways for Bali and Surabaya should be commenced.

9. Tourist destinations to Bali Island are highly concentrated to southern Bali, such as Nusa Dua, Sanur, Jimbaran, Kuta, and Ubud. There is an opinion in the DGAC that the second airport for Bali would be in the north side of Bali Island to enhance tourism development in Northern Bali, where tourism attraction opportunities have not been explored. It was also added that further concentration of tourists in Southern Bali would degrade the tourism quality and destroy the Bali culture. Assuming that the provincial government does not impose restrictions on tourists, AP1 should study possible runway locations based on commercial management judgment, most probably in Southern Bali. The central government possibly with the provincial government can venture into Northern Bali airport development as a strategic airport development project to achieve the policy objectives – enhancement of tourism development in Northern Bali, protection of tourism quality and Bali culture.

10. Bali Airport Phase II development works were completed in 2001, and no large development will be required except minor expansion of airport parking aprons and other facilities in the short term. However, a more significant need in the short term is the future development plan of Bali Airport. Although the Study Team considers that the new terminal complex development beyond Ngurah Rai Road is the most practical solution to ensure long-term capacity of the airport, there is a strong objection to this plan from the viewpoint of environment preservation. In addition, the government policy on the future tourism development of Bali is also not clear. There is an unwritten policy of Bali provincial government to limit the number of tourists to protect the traditional culture of Bali Island. This situation embarrasses the management of AP1, in which Bali Airport is the main profit generator for 13 networked airports in East Indonesia. The Study Team recognises the need for an approach from tourism and regional development aspects to determine the future of Bali Airport. The recommendation for the central government and Bali provincial government is to provide a clear picture for AP1 by undertaking a tourism/regional Master Plan for Bali Island. The implementation of this study will require coordination between various organisations including Bali Provincial Government, tourism authority, environmental authority, local public works authority, DGAC, and AP1. Major study items of the tourism master plan would be as follows:

o Analysis on tourism potentiality

o Alternative tourism development strategies

o Prepare growth scenarios for tourists

o Estimate required for tourism facilities and related infrastructure including airports

o Establish evaluation criteria for tourism development strategy

o Impact analysis of increased capacities of tourism facilities and infrastructure development



o Selection of the most acceptable development strategy for Bali Island

o Airport master planning based on the selected tourism development strategy

The Team intends to apply the following approach to these findings:

As regards 1, 2, 6 and 8 on the need for adequate capacity, it is necessary to apply demand-side measures and explore the question of how much traffic should be allowed, and as hinted in 4 there is ample scope for redistribution of international traffic. As indicated by 5 no such redistribution has been discussed. A Master Plan for tourism is recommended in 3and 10 and the Team notes that the apprehensions about unrestricted tourism growth allegedly held by the local government appear well-founded. The second airport issue in 7 and 9 is referred to a separate project outside the present activity.

3.4 2008 FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION OF CNS/ATM

This massive JICA report deals with Communication Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) issues on a comprehensive level as well as in deep detail. Bali Airport is far from insignificant in this context due to its traffic volumes and 800 plus AP1 employees. The report also contains background information of interest for the IndII project, in particular as regards forecast input data. One apparent finding is that the development of income per capita in Indonesia has been, at best, lacklustre for a long period. Explanations are beyond the scope of the JICA report but are obviously attributable to population growth left unchecked, rapid urbanisation and the endemic poverty of major urban central and sprawl areas. The extent to which these factors are present in Bali will be discussed in the Deliverable 2 (main) report.

As regards other modes of transport, the JICA report briefly touches on rail and sea. The dismal state of the Javanese, narrow-gauge (1-metre) railway infrastructure and rolling stock trying to cater for 150-200 million annual passengers supplies airlines with a giant target market. This situation may not prevail in the long run as the situation belatedly has been recognised and actions are planned through, inter alia, the Revitalisasi Perkeretaaplan Nasional project. In the 2020’s, rail-and-ship travel from Java to Bali may be a more competitive alternative, in particular from Surabaya.

In Chapter 6, JICA reviewed the existing CNS/ATM systems. Ngurah Rai was not visited at the time but JICA reviewed current information about Bali in the Air Information Publication (AIP), finding what they called “serious errors”. As far as a few checks by the Team have ascertained, these errors appear to have been corrected. As regards equipment, the radar equipment at Bali was deemed “aged”, falling in the 15-20 years bracket and with no spare parts available. As a result, one controller station was cannibalised for spare parts in order to keep the remaining five operational.


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A considerable part of the JICA report deals with various aspects of a single Air Navigation Services (ANS) provider. This part has by now had its day, since the ANS provider issue is laid down in the new Aviation Law.

Chapter 15 discusses forecasting methods and results, at some length. The chosen model is a linear-log design based on national GDP. Test runs on past data, probably 1995-2006, showed its explanatory power to be modest. This may be due to severe oscillations of air traffic volume during the base period, 1996-2002. Either way, the similar model used in the IndII Report on Air Traffic Analysis of August, 2010 performs somewhat better.

The rest of the 2008 report deals with issues irrelevant for this or any other Bali-centred project, such as technical equipment at Jakarta airport, flight hazards in Papua, High Frequency (HF) communication procedures, weather radars, the feasibility of replacing ageing radars with Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS) systems, training issues, etc. However, parts of Chapter 22 Operation, Maintenance and Human Resource Development Plan may be relevant, in particular as regards air traffic management. The social cost-benefit method described in Chapter 23 appears a considerable improvement over the 1982 JICA method, while still far from complete. Inter alia, no environmental factors are included.



CHAPTER 4: STUDI PENGEMBANGAN BANDAR UDARA NGURAH RAI 2006

This report, authored by a team comprising members from AP1, the DGCA and management and engineering consultants PT Tridaya Pamurtuya, is available in Indonesian only. No English summary or presentation exist and the Team’s efforts to get a written excerpt of the relevant conclusions and/or to meet with someone in the DGCA having been involved in the work, have so far been without result. While preparing Deliverable 2, the main report, the Team will find out which parts of the 2006 report should be discussed further.


13

CHAPTER 5: MASTER PLAN PHASE III, 1995 - 1997

CHAPTER 5: MASTER PLAN PHASE III, 1995 - 1997

This Master Plan outlines a rather heavy investment programme, most of which has not been implemented. Shelved projects include an eastward expansion of the runway, adding 600 metres, and a second, 2,500-metre runway to the south.

The proposed runway extension comes at a very high cost due to requirement of reclaiming a vast area from the sea. In addition, the benefit side of such a project has subsided significantly since the mid-1990s as improved takeoff and landing performance of the average aircraft has diminished the required runway length.

As regards the second runway, the plan appears to be an indication of possible location and dimensions rather than an elaborated proposal. It is not clear what benefits, if any, a runway of that length would deliver to airport operations.

Finally, the plan is based on several assumptions that appear somewhat questionable in the hindsight of 13 years. Permission for the huge land reclamation project must be obtained; land east of the present runway must be transferred to the airport; airport operations and traffic on the road must be synchronised, etc. In addition, the second runway requires acquisition of almost inaccessible land. The extension, as well as the second runway, is discussed at some length in Deliverable 2.



CHAPTER 6: SAFETY ISSUES

To the extent that the Team can form an opinion after a visit at the airport, Ngurah Rai Airport meets the highest safety standards under the conditions set by its location. One of these is, of course, that runway 27 is followed by open sea after a short stopway and runway end safety area. ICAO has recently made a safety audit and two major accidents have occurred, both a long time ago.

6.1 ICAO AUDITS

According to an inventory performed by IndII, the following ICAO reports exist:

CASR Part 170 (Air Traffic Rules)

CASR Part 171 (Aeronautical Telecommunication Service & Radio navigation Service providers)

CASR Part 172 (Air Traffic Service Providers)

CASR Part 173 (Instrument Flight Procedure Design)

CASR Part 175 (Aeronautical Information Service)

CASR Part 143 (Certification & Operating Requirement for Air Traffic Services [ATS] Training Provider)

Out of these, only the one dealing with CASR Part 173, instrument flight procedure design, appeared to have any relevance for this project. Perusal of the report, obtained through IndII, revealed that it deals with education, certification and organisation of flight procedure designers, not the actual procedure designs.

6.2 ACCIDENT REPORTS

A Pan American Boeing 707-321B crashed on approach to Bali on 22 April, 1974, killing all 107 on board. The failure of one of the aircraft's automatic direction finder (ADF) receivers led the crew to begin a premature turn to the final approach fix. This accident involved a by now outmoded aircraft type and old navigation equipment, although most aircraft still carry an ADF and its ground component, the non-directional beacon (NDB), is still in use at Bali Airport and many others.2

2 Details of the 1974 accident are gleaned from www.airdisaster.com. The 1984 accident is for some reason not found in the database but an account is found in the Ngurah Rai 80-year anniversary book, see Error! Reference source not found.

http://www.airdisaster.com/


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CHAPTER 6: SAFETY ISSUES

Ten years later, on 30 December, 1984, a Garuda Indonesia DC-9 overshot landing at runway 27, crashed into the mangrove marsh east of the runway, broke into three parts and caught fire. Without belittling the swift action by the airport’s rescue and firefighting team, it is obvious that extreme luck was present behind the saving of all passengers. From one of the local authorities, the Team encountered the firm opinion that it was divine interference from the strong local Hindu religion, rather than luck that saved the passengers. The Team may not necessarily share this view but recognises the fact that many Balinese may do so and that local religion must be considered and respected in airport planning. As an example, confirmed by several officials, it is out of the question to construct an access road with flyover junctions, since bridges are accepted by orthodox Hindus only if they span water. Tunnels are ruled out entirely.



CHAPTER 7: NGURAH RAI - AIRPORT BALI - GATEWAY TO PARADISE 2010

This is a complimentary narrative over the past 80 years of airport operations at Ngurah Rai, prepared by a small group of authors under the auspices of AP1. Still, some lessons may be learnt from the history. The huge task of extending the runway westwards into the sea in the 1970s is described thoroughly, adding further grist to the Team’s mill as regards the dismissal of further extension in Deliverable 2. Another lesson is that the airport operator, i.e. AP1 and its predecessors, have succeeded very well in making operations run smoothly and solving day-to-day problems.


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CHAPTER 8: THE NEW TERMINAL PROJECT

CHAPTER 8: THE NEW TERMINAL PROJECT

The construction of a new terminal followed by the demolition of the existing domestic terminal has been decided upon, but some required permits are still pending. The Team has no intention of making a detailed survey but will comment on some interior design issues. AP1 has supplied a PowerPoint presentation, depicting a beautifully designed terminal and an equally appealing car park building. The total cost is estimated at Rp 2.386 trillion, at present around USD 300 million. It is also a well-known fact that terminal projects, being site-unique and with few standardised components, are extremely prone to cost overdraft.

All AP1, AP2 and DGCA airports are ultimately owned by the Indonesian Government. Hence the Government faces a huge number of investment projects in the aviation sector, all with their own proponents, while available resources will cover only a fraction. The Team would therefore expect to see the costs and benefits of the Bali terminal project analysed with some kind of method or scheme common for the entire aviation sector. This is, however, not the case.

In general, a terminal project will come out deep in the red when analysed with traditional cost-revenue methods. This is due to the elusive character of the revenue side – most of the benefits are non-financial and enjoyed by the passengers as smoother handling, shorter queues, a wider variety of shopping, services and other amenities. Straightforward financial revenues are normally found only as (increased) rent or provisions from commercial tenants in the terminal and decreased operational and maintenance costs. Capital costs (write-offs and interest in the terms of financial accounting) will by far outstrip the financial revenues. In contrast, social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) will include estimated values on the benefits enjoyed by the passengers.

In these circumstances, the Team admits its inability to comprehend the analysis method used by AP1 in this case. Calculations are based on cash flow, a much narrower concept than the bottom line financial result. While SCBA is insensitive to the chosen method of financing the project (lending, governmental appropriation, leasing arrangements, etc.), the cash flow will vary widely, making comparisons between projects with different financing impossible. Additional complications arise from the absence of a common, real (i.e. inflation-purged) interest rate, obvious from the fact that net present values are shown for four different interest rates ranging from 10 to 25 percent. These are obviously nominal (i.e. including inflation) and, while it is possible to use nominal interest rates in SCBA, future costs and benefits must be adjusted for the expected inflation. This appears not to be the case.

Development of a robust method for assessment of aviation investments is a prime subject for further studies. Brief outlined terms of reference for such a project is included in Deliverable 3.

DELIVERABLE 2: DIAGNOSTIC REPORT ON NGURAH RAI AIRPORT CAPACITY

BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT Deliverable 2: Diagnostic Report on

Ngurah Rai Airport Capacity


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The Republic of Indonesia is a huge archipelagic country in South-East Asia spreading more than 5,000 kilometres from west to east and more than 1,800 kilometres from north to south. With its around 17,000 islands out of which about 6,000 have resident population, Indonesia is dependent on a well-functioning air transport system to a much higher degree than most other countries.

9.1 BACKGROUND

The “aviation-intensity” of Indonesia is much higher than it would have been, had the nation been formed by one contiguous landmass, where surface transport would have played a much more salient role. Managing civil aviation under such circumstances is an extremely complicated task. The route network must be much more fine-meshed and the major prerequisite of the network is a huge number of airports, each one of which constitutes a management task of its own. Several projects have dealt with airport and air traffic management since the 1990s. In most cases, and as could be expected, airport and route load is dominated by domestic traffic. The most remarkable exception to this rule is Ngurah Rai Airport on the island of Bali, directly to the east of Java. Ngurah Rai is dominated by incoming tourists as Bali is the unrivalled tourist magnet of Indonesia, receiving one-third of all foreign tourists.

The overall goal of this project is stated in its terms of reference: “to identify the most appropriate future actions required to improve national and international air transportation to and from Bali”. However, aviation – and transport in general – has no value of its own. The demand for transport is entirely derived from other activities which, in the case of Ngurah Rai, are dominated by incoming tourism. Understanding the nature of air traffic demand, and its probable development in the future, is a necessary prerequisite in order to determine which improvements should be undertaken, put on hold or shelved.

9.2 MAJOR FINDINGS

In general, airport capacity has turned out not to be a major problem. Current runway capacity should be around 35 movements per hour, which is around 20–30 percent higher than present peak utilisation and far above the published capacity of 23 movements. There are good possibilities to increase the capacity beyond 35 at modest investment costs. An additional nine movements per hour can probably be obtained through improved efficiency in ATS routines, additional rapid exits and departure sequencing pads, bringing total capacity to about 44.



In addition, various managerial tools like restructured charges have a major potential to increase off-peak capacity utilisation.

The only imminent problem found in the study is the traffic situation on the road serving the airport. Frequent breakdowns occur due to a lack of public transport, forcing departing passengers to leave for the airport with an excessive time margin. Road construction will not be sufficient; traffic management is required. A rapid improvement in the share of public transport can be brought about by simply increasing parking and access fees. The increase should be substantial and rapid, but announced very well in advance to give the hotels and other stakeholders time to adapt their traffic policy.

At present, there is a substantial overload at the small domestic terminal but this problem is addressed by a construction project to be commenced shortly and to be completed in 2013.

The general environmental situation at the airport appears satisfactory, with room for marginal improvements regarding use of aircraft auxiliary power units, treatment of solid waste and sewerage. However, compared with nearby areas of southern Bali, the airport is so superior in terms of environmental performance that it could be used as a showcase.

Existing traffic forecasts hint at a passenger volume of 25–32 million in 2025, most of which being tourists. With minor improvements, the airport can handle at least 25 million. However, it is the firm opinion of the Team that Bali Island cannot possibly accommodate such a volume and that the increase will level off far below 25 million passengers.

As regards major construction projects, the new terminal is urgently required while there is no need for a runway extension. A second runway cannot be located within the existing airport area if it is to be of any use in terms of capacity, as it must be separated by at least 1,035 metres from the existing runway. The land required for a meaningful location, north of the terminals, cannot be acquired. It is, however, possible to handle future traffic on a single runway.

Summing up, the long-run capacity of Bali’s Ngurah Rai Airport is surprisingly much higher than could be expected from its single-runway configuration and seemingly limited expansion possibilities. The realisation of this capacity requires not only investments in infrastructure, but also some demand-side measures.


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APPENDICES CHAPTER 10: HOW TO READ THIS DOCUMENT

CHAPTER 10: HOW TO READ THIS DOCUMENT

A problem facing all authors of reports on civil aviation infrastructure and operations is to choose a suitable level of previous knowledge required by the reader. If the intended circle of readers is confined to civil aviation professionals, the text will be partly incomprehensible for most other readers, including some decision-makers with a professional skill in areas other than aviation. On the other hand, a more basic or instructive text will be perceived as boring and repetitive by the core aviation professionals.

The compromise chosen in this report is closer to the second alternative, implying that the text contains a lot of facts already known to the DGCA and Angkasa Pura professionals. Readers from these categories may skip, or only skim, the following sections:

3.1 Airport obstacles

3.2 Airspace, procedures, and landing aids

3.3 Runway, taxiways, and aprons

3.4 Landside access and road communication

3.5 Passenger terminals, except

3.5.3 International terminal, arrivals

3.9 Environmental performance, except

3.9.1 Aircraft noise

3.9.4 Waste

All major conclusions, found in Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found., will come out clear anyway.



CHAPTER 11: NGURAH RAI AIRPORT

A detailed review of the current airport is a crucial part of this assignment. The team has collected information from a number of sources including a five-day, high-intensive visit to the airport.

11.1 AIRPORT OBSTACLES

In general, the obstacle situation at Bali Airport appears quite good. Both runway ends are close to open sea areas and no major obstacles interfere with the conical or horizontal surfaces. The strip, 3,120 metres long and extending 150 metres on each side of the runway centreline, should be free from obstacles. This requirement is fulfilled, barring a small grove in the northwest part of the strip. The grove should be removed but if this is not possible¸ obstacle lightings in accordance with ICAO Annex 14 should be installed. As long as the grove still exists, data should be published in the Air Information Publication (AIP). Other obstacles on the strip are technical equipment necessary for the airport operations. This equipment should be fitted with obstacle lighting in accordance with ICAO Annex 14.

To keep track of the obstacle situation and to preserve the present, favourable situation a recommendation is to perform obstacle measurements and inspections on a regular basis. Inspections, performed visually from the ground, should be repeated at least once a year while obstacle measurement, which is an airborne inspection, should be carried out every second or third year.

11.2 AIRSPACE, PROCEDURES AND LANDING AIDS

Bali Control Zone (CTR) adjoins the CTR of nearby Mataram Airport. A large number of standard instrument arrival and departure routes (STAR and SID) connects the airport with nearby air routes. Traffic surveillance is performed by secondary surveillance radar (SSR) with a back-up primary surveillance radar (PSR). Declared coverage of these is 150 and 70 nautical miles (NM), respectively. Route navigation is based on a VHF omni-directional radio range (VOR) combined with a range-finder (distance measuring equipment, DME) and a non-directional beacon (NDB).

Landing on runway 09 (i.e. eastwards) is guided by a procedure using VOR and DME. Ideal performance of such a procedure (a “non-precision approach”) is to guide the aircraft to a height of 250 feet above the runway. In this case the minimum height is 454 feet to allow for some obstacles. In case of VOR or DME malfunction, a back-up procedure based on the NDB is available with the same performance. Runway 09 has no approach lights as the threshold is far out in the sea but a precision approach path indicator (PAPI) is installed.


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APPENDICES CHAPTER 11: NGURAH RAI AIRPORT

Runway 27 is equipped with a full instrument landing system (ILS) comprising standard localizer (LLZ) and glide-path (GP) components. The primary landing procedure is based on ILS and DME. Ideal performance in this case (a “precision approach”) is a height of 200 feet and the actual procedure is only marginally inferior with a declared performance of 233 feet. In case of GP malfunction, the procedure turns into an LLZ-based non-precision one with a performance of 348 feet. In case of complete ILS failure, a VOR-DME procedure is available with a performance of 358 feet. Runway 27 has no NDB-based procedure and the NDB is not a component of the ILS/DME and VOR/DME procedures. A vertical radio beacon (middle marker, MM) alerts the pilot at a distance of approximately 1,500 metres from the threshold. There are no outer markers (OM) as these would be located in the sea. Approach lighting system is installed as a high-intensity, 900-metre centerline, Barette-type. The final aid is a PAPI. Threshold lights, runway edge lights and runway end lights are installed on both runways.

11.3 RUNWAY, TAXIWAYS AND APRONS

The current runway is 3,000 metres long and 45 metres wide with the ICAO designation 09-27 meaning that it is oriented in an east-west direction. Aerodrome reference height is 14 feet above sea level. The runway is paved and supplied with 7.5-metre-wide shoulders on each side to fulfil code 4 E from ICAO Annex 14. This means that the runway can handle aircraft up to code F size or Airbus A380. At each end there is a 60-metre stopway followed by a runway end safety area (RESA) of 90 by 90 metres giving aircraft aborting takeoff an extra breaking margin. After the RESA there is open sea at the western end and a narrow strip of land followed by the sea at the eastern end. The strip is 300 by 3,120 metres (including stopways but not RESA).

The strength of the runway area equals code 83 FCXT from ICAO Annex 14 meaning that the heaviest of present-day aircraft can be accommodated.

Taxiway N7P is parallel to the runway, connecting the apron area with each runway end via connections N7 in the western end and N1 in the eastern end. In addition there are another five connections, N2 to N6, N4 and N5 being rapid exit taxiways (RET) allowing aircraft to vacate the runway at high speed, which will reduce runway occupancy time. All taxiways meet ICAO requirements for aircraft size up to Boeing 747, seating 428 passengers in its Garuda Indonesia version.



Figure 1: Western part of apron with aircraft bridges

Rolling aircraft is heading for take-off on runway 09.

The entire apron area comprises approximately 215,000m2. Within this area there are four sub-areas designated Apron A to D depending on location, type of traffic allowed and aircraft service capability. The whole apron system is built on concrete and has a bearing strength (PCN) accommodating all existing passenger aircraft. At Apron A, positioned far to the west, there are 18 remote parking positions for code C aircraft (e.g. Boeing 737, Airbus 320 and similar). These positions are used for domestic flights only. Apron B area, directly west of apron A, comprises four remote parking positions for aircraft sizes up to code E or B747. Alternatively, the area can offer five positions for aircraft code D (B767, A300 and similar). The apron is used for both domestic and international flights.

Figure 2: Eastern part of apron


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Apron C comprises five bridge-connected positions for aircraft code E and seven remote positions for aircraft code C. The area can alternatively be used for three code C and two code D aircraft. All positions can be used for both domestic and international flights. Finally, the Apron D area, west of the terminal building, comprises three bridge-connected positions for aircraft code E.

Table 1: Apron capacity

Apron Stands code E (up to B 747)

Stands code D (up to B767, A300 etc)

Stands code C (up to B737, A320 etc)

Total stands

A - - 18 18

B (4) 5 - 5 (4)

C 5 (5) (2) 7 (3) 12 (10)

D 3 - - 3

Sum 8 5 25 38

Source: 2006 Master Plan. Figures in brackets indicate alternative parking pattern.

There are five entrances between taxiway N7P and the apron system, but the actual choice depends on the runway in use and available parking positions. The flexibility of the apron is very good, as the five entrances allow ample possibilities to manage the traffic without conflicts or frequent needs for one aircraft to give way for another.

11.4 LANDSIDE ACCESS AND ROAD COMMUNICATION

Road access to the airport is bit stretched in so far as there is only one road, quite narrow and passing through a densely populated area. At the airport perimeter, four tollgates issue access tickets, predominantly through automatic ticket printers. After a sharp right turn, all vehicles pass through a security bridge, amply staffed while apparently no vehicles are actually stopped and checked. The security bridge is followed by a road leading to a huge number of parking positions and continuing to the domestic and international terminals.



Figure 3: Airport entry toll gate

The area closest to the international terminal has a separate lane with eight painted bus positions. Each position will accommodate a 10-metre bus but the entire lane has not been in use for some time and has been blocked with concrete barriers, allegedly for security reasons.

Figure 4: Unused bus parking bays

Exit from the airport is arranged through another set of four tollgates where parking fees are collected.

Taxi lanes for dropping off passengers are arranged alongside the terminal. The taxi service for arriving passengers is located in special areas of the car parking area. For the moment there seems to be no capacity shortage. There are approximately 500 parking places for cars including those dedicated for taxi cars. The total area is at least


27


50,000m2 out of which roughly 10,000m2 is reserved for motorbikes. The area is stretched along the south side of the terminal and is easily accessible from the entrance road.

11.5 PASSENGER TERMINALS

At present, two separate buildings are in use for international and domestic passengers. The international terminal has a total area of 63,400m2 while the domestic terminal comprises 10,500m2. Within the frames of this project it is not possible to evaluate all characteristics of terminal capacity at length, but an overview providing a fair hint of the capacity has been produced. For this purpose the International Air Transport Association (IATA) standard values for passenger service levels have been used. These values, ranging from A to F, represent the perceived passenger comfort level where A represents “Excellent” and F “System breakdown”. Service level C can be regarded as a good level which many airports aim at, with varying degrees of success.

The method uses available floor space as the main indicator for comfort level and this is also critical for the capacity. Using experience from similar airports, the team has taken into account the standard of working routines, flow patterns etc.

Table 2: IATA terminal service levels

Square metre per occupant

Service level A B C D E F

Label Excellent High Good Adequate Inadequate Unacceptable

Security queue, pre-check in 1.8 162 1.4 1.2 1.0 <1.0

Check in queue 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 <1.0

Documentation control 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 <0.6

Baggage reclaim 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 <1.2

Level F is leading to system breakdown. Source: IATA Airport Reference Manual. Figures adapted to local conditions.

11.5.1 Domestic terminal

A project to rebuild both terminals is just about to start, pending some final approvals. A completely new international terminal will be constructed. Furthermore the current international terminal will be converted into the domestic terminal while the current domestic terminal will be demolished. The project schedule aims at having both terminals operational in early 2013. Due to this project the capacity of the current



domestic terminal is of minor interest and a deeper evaluation has not been performed. However, a hint of the capacity is found in the fact that almost all domestic passengers travelling with Garuda Indonesia pass through the international terminal on arrival. This is a clear indication of the inadequate capacity of the existing domestic terminal.

11.5.2 International terminal, departures

Passengers enter the international terminal through automatic sliding doors, followed by four security lines with one common “snake” queue. The queuing area is roughly 12 by 30 metres or 360m2, allowing some 320 passengers to queue at service level C above. Some additional area is available, for example around pillars in the hall, mainly serving as an area for passengers preparing for the security check. Although not a queuing area, this will raise the capacity of the hall since it provides space for more passengers in the hall.

At the security check, hand baggage, hold baggage and passenger are checked by arc metal detectors for the passengers and screening machines for the baggage. At station number one, as seen to the left from the passengers’ point of view, there is also a state-of-the-art body scanner. Estimated average process time in the security control process is 20–30 seconds, measured for a number of passengers. This gives an average throughput of 120–180 passengers per hour, or 480–720 passengers through all four security lines.

From the security control, passengers enter the check-in area in the back end. There is a short walk to the check-in hall and the flow is logical with no constraints or crossing flows. Visibility towards the check-in area is good, giving passengers guidance of where to go. The check-in area is divided into a western part and an eastern part. The western part comprises 22 check-in counters in a 50-metre row and the eastern part has 40 counters in an approximately 90-metre-long row. The queue areas behind the counters are approximately 20–22 metres long going all the way parallel with the counters, meaning that there are some 1,000m2 available in the western part and some 1,800m2 in the eastern part. Common “snake queues” are used meaning that there is roughly room for 700 and 1,250 queuing passengers at standard level C, respectively. After check-in, passengers reach the departure floor, one level up, via a staircase or an escalator in the rear end of the check-in hall.

Check-in time is normally around two to three minutes per charter passenger, i.e. an hourly capacity of approximately 20–30 passengers per counter. With a common check-in, where all passengers regardless of airline can use all counters, the total capacity of the check-in counters would be some 1,200–1,800 passengers per hour if all counters were in use simultaneously.

The logistic flows of the terminal appear reasonably good. Entrance to the check-in hall is in the western part and there is good accessibility to the check-in queue area from the shopping street along the commercial areas in the rear end of the terminal.


29


However, after check-in passengers must move back through the check-in queue to reach the staircase/escalator to the departure floor. At peak hours this will create problems with the flow but it should be possible to handle with dedicated walking areas through the queue area. Special aids for disabled passengers have not been found.

Large commercial areas are located in the rear end of the check-in area and parallel with the check-in counters. These services can be used without conflicts with passengers checking in. Commercial areas are also found on the departure floor.

After check-in, passengers move one step up via escalator or staircase. Document control is performed at 11 positions with approximately 10–12 metres of queue to each. This process is fast, around 20 seconds per passenger, and there are no problems in handling the passengers coming up via the staircase/escalator. The overall capacity with all lines open is in the range of 1,800 passengers per hour, matching the capacity of the check-in counters.

Following the document control is the second security control, the purpose of which is somewhat unclear as the same check has already been performed prior to check-in. The check is done via double lines with a maximum queuing length of 10 metres. Equipment used is screening machines for the hand luggage and arc metal detectors for the passenger control. The estimated process time at this position is 15–20 seconds per passenger giving a total capacity of 360–480 passengers per hour. Compared to capacities above, this is an obvious bottleneck. A better solution is to move this second check to the first one, thereby increasing capacity.

No drawings of the areas have been found and the Team has not had the possibility to measure the different areas in the hall. The current capacity is therefore difficult to state but the Team has a feeling there is “quite a lot of space” and that no major constraints exist. Although not being able to present any figures for the capacity, the operations manager at the airport confirmed this impression.

Separate baggage handling systems are used for each of the two rows of check-in counters. Each system consists of a conveyor passing behind the counters, collecting bags that are fed to the subsequent conveyors in the system. The bags are transported to the loading positions where they end up on carousels before they are distributed to the correct baggage trolley. No automatic screening is carried out during transportation.

The belt speed in the system is 0.5 metres per second, meaning that 1,800 metres of band are transported each hour. The real capacity of the system depends on how densely it is possible to load the bags but, realistically, it should be possible to put at least one bag every second metre. This indicates a real capacity in excess of 900 bags per hour at each check-in row, giving a total capacity of at least 1,800 bags per hour.



11.5.3 International terminal, arrivals

The arrival flow at an airport is normally less complex and less critical to efficient terminal operations than the departure flow. At Ngurah Rai Airport three main processes compose the arrival flow: passport control, customs clearance and baggage reclaim. Passport control is a reasonably easily performed check and the available areas seem to be adequate. Although not having all data about the current arrival passport control, the Team strongly believes there are no major problems with the process.

Baggage reclaim is the next process. Once again, no detailed data over the areas are available and, once again, the feeling is that there is a lot of space in the baggage reclaim hall for the waiting passengers. Baggage is delivered by five carousels, each one exposing some 40 metres of belt to the passengers. In total there are approximately 200 metres of exposed belt for the passengers. Based on the assumption that four to five passengers can be handled per metre of belt there is capacity of 800–1,000 passengers per hour if the average stay-time for each passenger is one hour. A more realistic stay-time is 30 minutes meaning that the capacity of the baggage reclaim is in the range of 1,600–2,000 delivered bags per hour. This is valid for the exposed belt length of the carousels but it has not been checked with respect to available floor space. The opinion of the Team is that available floor space is not a bottleneck.

The final process in the arrival flow is the customs control. This process is stated as “no problem” and the Team has found no contradictory indications. The passenger flow appears to be logical and the available areas seem adequate. In addition, the process is reasonably fast and simple and the customs personnel can choose which passengers to investigate. Therefore, the conclusion is that no major capacity problems occur during customs control.

Table 3: Estimated capacity, international passenger terminal

Departure Dimension IATA Std area

for level C

Capacity per

hour Notes

Pre-check in security control

Queue area ≈360 m2

1.0 m2 480-720 pax

4 control lines

Check-in hall ≈2,800 m2 1.4m2 ≈1,950 pax 1 hour stay. 30 min stay = double capacity

Check in counters - - ≈1,200-1,800 pax

62 check-in counters

Check-in machines - - - Not in use.

Stairs/escalators to upper level

- - 1 staircase,

1 escalator


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Departure Dimension IATA Std area

for level C

Capacity per

hour Notes

Document control, departure

Queue area ≈120 m2

1.0 m2 Approx 1,800 pax

11 queues, each

10-12 metres long

Baggage handling system

- - ≈2x 900 bags

Arrival

Passport control - - - No data available

Baggage reclaim 1,6 m2

Exposed conveyor length

5 carousels 250 m total

- 1,000-1,250 pax 1 hour stay. 30 min stay = double capacity

Customs - - - No data available

11.6 AIRPORT OPERATIONS

In this project, airport operations have been reviewed from three different angles:

Ground handling and catering

Fuelling

Airport rescue and fire-fighting, hangars and airport maintenance.

11.6.1 Ground handling and catering

Ground handling of aircraft and passengers is performed via five sub-contractors:

PT Gapura Angkasa,

PT Jasa Angkasa Semesta,

PT Prathita Titian Nusantara,

PT Aero Bali Dirgantara and

PT Sari Rahayu Bimantara.

Total area available on airside for the service is 24,500m2. During the Team’s visit to Ngurah Rai Airport the impression was that there is a lot of space for ground support equipment and that no capacity constraints have been identified in this area. However, the airport management made the comment that five different handling agents are



somewhat too many for the available space, as all agents tend to bring their own equipment and vehicles. The Team recognises this problem – having five handling agents is rare even for airports handling twice the traffic of Ngurah Rai’s. While the number of agents in all probability cannot be reduced, it seems possible to restrict the total amount of equipment brought onto the apron, thereby forcing some cooperation.

Catering facilities are placed directly north of apron A and west of the fire station. The area for the service is split between two buildings comprising 5,720m2 and 3,040m2 respectively. The total available catering area is 8,760m2. The capacity in terms of plates per year is stated to be 3,650,000. This number seems quite low compared with other international airports of similar size where heuristics for the capacity hint approximately 700 plates per year and square metre. This indicates a capacity of more than 6 million plates per year within the current facilities as attainable.

In what way the catering demand will develop in the future is highly dependent on the airlines. Some airlines normally cater even for the return flight at their home base which reduces the required areas at the destination airport. If this is a widespread behaviour, the areas at Ngurah Rai Airport will be sufficient for many years to come. Conversely, if there is an increasing demand for catering in line with traffic growth, there are possibilities to meet the new requirements within the existing facilities.

11.6.2 Fuelling

Fuel is delivered from the company Pertamina, open 24 hours a day. This company is also in charge of the fuelling process which means that its personnel perform all aircraft refuelling. Refuelling trucks are mostly used for this purpose, but there is also a hydrant system, which apparently only serves parking position number 13. The total storage volume at the airport exceeds 20,000m3. This amount is divided between two tanks holding 6,481 and 13,528m3 respectively. No capacity constraints have been found in this aspect and the storage is expected to suffice for a long time. If necessary, the refuelling capacity can be increased by additional trucks and/or by an extension of the hydrant system. The latter should be preferred in the long run due to a high share of large aircraft holding large fuel volumes. A Boeing 747-400 has a total fuel capacity of up to 216m3. A hydrant system is more efficient in terms of refuelling time. The hydrant system is also a safer solution thanks to the reduced number of cars on the apron. Fuel storage capacity can easily be increased through additional tanks, should the need occur.

11.6.3 Airport rescue and fire-fighting, hangars and airport maintenance

The fire station is situated directly north of apron D with easy access to the apron system, taxiways and runway. Reaching each threshold within the stipulated maximum time of 180 seconds from alert is reported to be no problem. The rescue and fire-fighting service is performed with the airport’s own personnel and the main equipment


33


is three Panther fire-fighting trucks. In addition there is some older equipment available. The service fulfils all requirements for airports category 9, allowing aircraft sizes up to Boeing 747.

No hangars for airliners exist at the airport today.

Maintenance of the airport area is performed by subcontractors as well as own personnel. Main services include rubber removal from touchdown zones; painting of day-markings; maintenance of electrical fittings; wildlife hazard control; grass mowing on strips; maintenance of drainage systems, etc.

11.7 CARGO TERMINAL

In 2009, the airport handled 65,000 tons of cargo in total. The domestic share was 22,500 tons out of which 16,000 were inbound for Bali and 6,500 outbound. International cargo constitutes the remaining 42,500 tons where 14,000 were inbound and 28,500 were exported. All cargo is carried in the belly of passenger aircraft. There are no dedicated freighter airlines serving the airport although some parcel forwarders have done so previously. The present cargo terminal and facilities are situated north of apron D and comprise 3,708m2 for international cargo and 2,578m2 for domestic. These premises are sufficient for the current cargo handling and will be improved in connection with the new terminal building project.

11.8 GROUND TRANSPORT

Ground transport of passengers and cargo is not a responsibility of the airport operator. At airports handling traffic volumes of the size found at Ngurah Rai, one would expect a wide variety of public bus services. Considering the fact that Bali is very densely populated, one would expect even rail transport in spite of comparatively short distances. Surprisingly, the only public transport available is a few small buses, operated not by the local community but by the hotels. Passengers use either their own cars or motorbikes or take a taxi, in the latter case often creating two vehicle movements per passenger. The result, of course, is that the access road is frequently clogged and huge areas within the airport are occupied for parking, even though many passengers are incoming tourists without a car.

This situation is not sustainable but the Team found no actual plans for improvement at the local government. The situation is already untenable and within a few years, the road congestion will be severe enough to seriously damage not only Ngurah Rai’s reputation as an airport but Bali’s name as a tourist destination. As far as the Team can judge, the planned bridge spanning part of Benoa Bay close to the airport will not make much of a difference as the entire Kuta-Denpasar area is very congestion-prone. Fortunately, the airport possesses the means to improve the situation without itself having to engage in public transport, see recommendation 18.



11.9 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE

An environmental perspective can be applied on inter alia noise, air pollution, energy production and the use and management of solid and liquid waste. This section is somewhat superficial as the Team did not find any capacity restrictions in the airport´s present and future environmental situation. The airport prepares an annual environmental report, the latest version of which was promised to the Team but never materialised. In general, the environmental situation of the airport may not be flawless but it is vastly superior to the conditions in the surrounding area. It is worthwhile exploring whether the airport can be marketed as an environmental role model for Bali Island.

As regards future plans, there are principally two tools for assessing the environmental impact of projects and plans. While the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) deals with the effects of certain public or private projects on the environment, the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) deals with the effects of plans and programmes on the environment. EIA and SEA are potentially powerful tools for managing the environmental, health and social impact of individual projects or development plans, but they are efficient only when linked to regulatory permits and licences and legally enforceable.

11.9.1 Aircraft noise

Sound is generated by many different sources and can be perceived as a disturbance, i.e. noise, by humans in many different circumstances. Environmental noise is the sound generated by human activities (road, rail, sea and air traffic, industry, recreation, construction, etc.) when perceived in the domestic environment (e.g. in and near the home, in public parks, schools and hospitals).

Environmental noise has several effects on humans, but as to whether a person experiences such effects is strongly dependent on the individual sensitivity to noise. The most important effect, in terms of number of affected people, is “annoyance”, which can be determined from structured field surveys. Annoyance is strongly connected with specific effects such as the necessity to close windows in order to avoid sleep disturbance or interference with communication, television, radio or music. A number of serious medical effects, such as high blood pressure, mental stress, heart attacks and hearing damage, concern a smaller part of the population. Furthermore, there are negative effects on the learning capabilities of children. It is evident that people who report noise-induced annoyance experience a deteriorated quality of life.

Internationally, Lden and Lmax are two noise decibel indicators used in noise legislation, noise mapping and urban planning. The object of environmental noise legislation is to protect the public against unwanted noise in the domestic environment caused by e.g. air traffic. Lden and Lmax are defined by the International Standard Organization (ISO). Lden

is the day-evening-night level in decibels, which is the indicator for annoyance used for


35


large airports with night traffic. Lmax is the noise indicator in decibels and describes the maximum noise produced by an aircraft passage, which is often related to complaints.

As regards aircraft noise, there have been continuous improvements over the past decades. The first jet airliners were powered by pure turbojet or low-bypass engines and were extremely noisy even compared to noisy piston-engine predecessors. Engine noise has been reduced to such an extent that airframe noise has emerged as a major problem, in particular in a landing configuration where engine power is low while slats, flaps, airbrakes and landing gear disturb the airflow. Improved takeoff performance enables a steeper climb, making the noise footprint shorter but wider. This particular line of development is not favourable for Ngurah Rai, where a long and narrow noise footprint is preferable as such a shape will have a larger proportion striking the open sea. The footprint shape is impressionable by the airport through the introduction of noise abatement takeoff procedures, possibly including restrictions on applied climb power. Whether such procedures are justified is beyond the knowledge of the Team.

Noise from aircraft on the ground originates in engines on idle or low power during taxi and the use of auxiliary power units (APU) when on the apron. The first problem is very hard to address by other means than reducing queues, which is motivated also for other reasons. An APU is a small turbine (producing at best a few hundred kW) built into the aircraft to supply electricity and heating/cooling when engines are off. It is fuelled from the aircraft’s own tanks. APUs tend to be surprisingly noisy in relation to their limited output and a dozen aircraft using APUs on the apron creates a major noise problem and causes a far from insignificant air quality problem. Both problems can be remedied by supplying electricity and conditioned air at the aircraft stands. For remote stands, electricity should be supplied through mobile ground power units (GPU). The use of APUs should be prohibited at stands offering both electricity and conditioned air services but may have to be accepted at remote stands on hot days when cooling is required.

11.9.2 Drainage

Surface water drainage is particularly important for aircraft operations, as standing water on the runway decreases the friction value, increases braking distances and jeopardises safe takeoff and landing. Drainage systems around the runway include side ditches, open channels and culverts. Drainage water flows are channelled to the sea without any previous treatment.

The potentially most negative environmental impact caused by drainage to the recipient lies in the event of an accident with a large discharge of fuel or oil. Fuel and oil are toxic and persistent water and soil pollutants, and the drainage system appears to lack contention facilities for pollutants. There is a risk that pollutants may reach the sea, and after percolating into the soil it may reach the groundwater.



11.9.3 Energy and waste

It is obvious that energy use at an island airport close to the equator will be dominated by cooling and lighting and in all probability there is scope for improvement in both. As the present situation will be history in 2011, when the terminal construction and upgrading project starts, there is no point neither in going through current energy use nor suggesting improvements. Such a study should await completion of the new terminals.

Waste is generated from many different activities at an airport, e.g. catering activities, construction of airport facilities, ground handling of aircraft waste, etc. Due to the lack of the promised environmental report, the Team has no clear picture of the present waste management. It is however obvious that sorting and reclamation of solid waste can be improved. For sewage, there is local processing plant at the airport. Such a local solution appears expensive and possibly inefficient in the long run. A connection to a public sewerage system with an efficient treatment plant should be a better solution, once the imminent need for such a system has been satisfied.

11.9.4 Continuous descent (“green”) approaches

The most fuel-saving flight from cruising altitude to landing is to make an uninterrupted descent, using the aircraft’s potential and kinetic energy with a minimum of engine power. Such a continuous descent approach track (CDA) is marketed as “green”, due to reduced fuel consumption and thereby also reduced emissions, although the actual savings tend to be exaggerated. A CDA can easily be computed and displayed to the pilot by modern airliners’ flight management systems (FMS) and in most cases CDA can be applied at low-traffic airports. At high-traffic airports, the ATS frequently needs to adjust approaching aircraft positions relative to other aircraft by interrupting descent with one or more horizontal flight segments. This will increase the total fuel consumption. The application of CDA in high-traffic situations requires continuous access to aircraft speed and position, with a precision that cannot be offered by radar. Such information is provided by the global navigation satellite system found in all airliners and, with the emerging automatic dependent surveillance system (ADS), it is transmitted to the ATS. This is a necessary though not sufficient condition for the application of CDA. Sophisticated computation is required to allow several aircraft making simultaneous CDAs, as in the end they must be sufficiently spaced on final approach. Trials have been made at several airports. It appears to the Team that the relatively undisturbed airspace around the joint control zone of Ngurah Rai and Mataram offers a suitable area for introducing and testing CDA in Indonesia.


37


11.9.5 Alternative fuels

All jet and turboprop airliners all over the world use roughly the same fuel, based on kerosene or naphtha. In Europe it is labelled JET A1, in the United States and some other places JET A and in China Jet Fuel 3. These differ mainly in their sulphur content which is 200, 700 and 2,000 grams per ton, respectively. Its density is 0.8 kilogram per litre and the energy content is 9.6 kWh per litre. The fuel is not a chemical compound and hence it has no chemical formula. It is, however, a hydrocarbon with an “average molecule” roughly composed of nine carbon atoms and 20 hydrogen atoms, C9H20. Stoichiometric calculations, analysing the fuel’s combustion process, reveal that 1 kilogram of fuel will leave 3.1 kilograms of carbon dioxide (CO2) and 1.4 kilograms of water vapour (H2O) as residuals. The much higher weight of the residuals is due to their oxygen atoms, taken from the air.

Water vapour is normally harmless but turns into a greenhouse gas when emitted in the stratosphere, where jet aircraft cruise when on long-haul services. However, the major problem of today is carbon dioxide. Alternative fuels address this problem either by reducing the proportion of carbon in the fuel or by replacing fossil carbon with biological, based on biomass (plants, algae, forestry remains). In this case, the CO2

emissions will not be a net addition to the biosphere as the plants have taken their carbon contents from the air in the photosynthesis process. While in theory an appealing solution, the use of biofuels is restricted by the totally inadequate availability of biomass. This restriction will prevail for the foreseeable future and, in this situation, where biofuels will not come even close to covering the need for surface transport, it is not quite clear why it should be used in aviation where conditions are more complicated.

Not all alternative fuels represent environmental progress. One sidetrack is aviation fuel derived from pit coal or fossil (“natural”) gas through conversion via the Fischer-Tropsch conversion process.3 With coal as the base, total CO2 emissions of the resulting aircraft fuel will actually increase compared with standard fuel. Based on fossil gas, the main component of which is methane (CH4), there may be minor advantages. Another sidetrack is hydrogen, the potential of which incidentally has been analysed at length in other contexts by members of the Team. Hydrogen will not be available as a commercial fuel in the coming decades and due to its residuals (water vapour and nitrogen oxides) and general unwieldiness, it is highly unsuitable for aviation.

In general, the airport cannot do very much to promote the use of alternative fuels but the development in this field should be closely monitored.

3 This process was developed in fuel-starved wartime Germany and came to big-scale use in

South Africa during the decades of blockade.



11.10 LAND UTILISATION

All land inside the aerodrome fencing is government-owned while all land outside is private. While the total airport area is small compared with other airports handling the same traffic volume, it does not appear to be a restricting factor. Fully 51,000m2 are used for car and motorbike parking and an additional 50,000m2 for a golf driving range. The latter will be converted to a temporary parking space during construction of the new terminal, after which a multi-storey car park will be opened. Large areas close to the terminal lay waste for alleged security reasons but this will change with the new terminal. Other areas close to the terminal are occupied for taxi cars and commercial activities. Due to the lack of public ground transport, the taxi area is vastly oversized. In general, land utilisation is not stretched and the available area will be sufficient for the foreseeable future.

Figure 5: Motorbike parking

11.11 PEAK LOAD PATTERN – MOVEMENTS

In 2009, there were a total of 76,754 aircraft movements and the distribution between domestic, international and local flights was 44,670, 31,325 and 759 respectively. The monthly variation is shown in the following table:


39


Figure 6: Monthly distribution of movements in 2009

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

Mo

vem

en

ts Local

Total domestic

Total Int´l

Source: Compiled from data supplied by the airport.

The average load was 6,396 movements per month. In 2009, there was a “low season” from February until April with 88 percent of the average. February was the least congested month with 83 percent while July, the most congested, had 7,035 movements which is 10 percent above average and 33 percent above February. Domestic and international movements vary by and large in the same pattern. The difference is approximately 30–35 percent between high and low months. The Team does not know if 2009 deviates markedly from earlier years, but it seems that “low season” normally occurs February to March.

More important for the operation of the airport is the number of movements per hour. Calculating the peak hour movements for each month with a breakdown into aircraft categories gives the following results:

Table 4: Peak hour movements

Runway Month/date Movements Up to Code C Code D or E Peak hour

27 January/04 25 20 5 14-15

27 February/20 19 14 5 14-15

27

09

March/12

March/19

21

21

17

15

4

6

13-14

16-17

09 April/3 21 17 4 16-17

09 May/01 30 19 11 08-09



Runway Month/date Movements Up to Code C Code D or E Peak hour

09 June/19 24 20 4 16-17

09 July/11 26 21 5 16-17

09 August/25 24 18 6 16-17

09 September/07 25 23 2 13-14

09 October/04 21 20 1 12-13

09

09

27

November/03

November/15

November/30

22

22

22

18

14

20

4

8

2

13-14

16-17

13-14

09 December/27 24 21 3 13-14

Source: See Error! Reference source not found..

These figures are directly derived from the statistics supplied by Ngurah Rai Airport. Top score occurred on 1 May with 30 movements. The Team has no statistics of the second, third or fourth densest hour in May but it may be possible that the number of movements of these is in the same range. The peak hour in May is far above the peak hour in July, while the total number of movements is 9 percent lower in May. It may be the case that something special occurred on 1 May, 2009 and that the 30-movement hour was a one-time event. Another factor that substantiates this is the time for the peak hour. From March until August, the peak hours occur from 16:00–17:00, with the exception of May when it occurred from 08:00–09:00. The Team has some difficulties in understanding the reason for a traffic schedule that lasts for one month, where the peak time during the day differs completely from the scheduled traffic the months before and after. Normally, the airlines run their business according to one schedule for several months without major changes.

The apron peak load, in terms of occupied stands, is 33. With 38 stands available, and another 10 planned for construction in the near future, there is a good margin before available stands will become a bottleneck.

The load on the terminal from current traffic is a critical factor. Not only does the total amount of passengers affect the terminal; equally important is its distribution over the day. In a situation where a terminal reaches its maximum capacity during some periods of the day, it is still possible to increase traffic as long as it is done during less congested periods.


41


11.12 PEAK LOAD PATTERN – PASSENGERS

Out of the 9.6 million passengers in 2009, 4.5 million were domestic, fully 4.9 million were international and some 130,000 were transit passengers. Monthly and daily passenger loads in terms of departing international, departing domestic, arriving international and arriving domestic are shown in the table below.

Figure 7: Monthly distribution of passengers in 2009

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Paa

sen

gers

x 1

00

0

Transfer

International Departure

International Arrival

Domestic Departure

Domestic Arrival


As expected, the monthly distribution of passengers mirrors the distribution of movements but the passenger variation is more pronounced. The average is 826,800. February to April is 81 percent of the average (movements are 88 percent) while July is 14 percent above (movements are 10 percent).

Table 5: Peak day passengers

Month

Peak day/month, domestic Peak day/month, International

Arrival Departure Arrival Departure

Date Number Date Number Date Number Date Number

January 24 7,482 2 10,069 24 8,706 28 8,624

February 13 6,522 15 6,606 23 6,208 1 8,126

March 7 7,861 10 7,348 28 7,603 25 7,345

April 9 7,706 12 8,283 4 7,603 17 7,397

May 20 8,072 24 8,594 1 8,887 1 8,161



Month

Peak day/month, domestic Peak day/month, International

Arrival Departure Arrival Departure

Date Number Date Number Date Number Date Number

June 27 8,524 28 7,906 17 8,042 21 8,174

July 18 9,629 20 9,553 31 9,098 31 9,004

August 14 9,134 17 9,782 5 9,298 17 9,797

September 19 10,260 27 10,833 28 8,788 23 8,731

October 16 8,160 11 8,014 9 9,291 4 9,610

November 20;27 8,058 29 8,732 20 7,217 28 8,192

December 18 9,555 20 8,390 23,26 9,320 23 7,828


Taking a look into the variations in number of passengers over the year, it seems to correspond to the variations in number of passengers between each monthly peak day. A fairly clear dip in peak day volumes occurs during February, March and April. In May, traffic starts to increase to a high level, which remains until December/January. A rough estimate is that the number of passengers during the densest peak day is some 40–50 percent higher than the corresponding figures for the least busy peak day.

An interesting observation is that domestic passenger and international passenger volumes do not differ very much. The largest differences are found in April, August, September and October when international traffic exceeds domestic by some 15–20 percent while, on average over the year, the amount of domestic passengers was 92 percent of the international passengers.

Considering the available space in each terminal, this fact deserves a comment. As mentioned before, the international and domestic terminals comprise 63,400m2 and 10,500m2 respectively. This means that today almost as many passengers are processed in the domestic terminal as in the international, on a floor area merely 16 percent the size of the international terminal. To understand the reason behind this it is necessary to take a look into the number of peak hour passengers.


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Table 6: Peak hour domestic passengers

Month

Domestic

Arrival Departure

Date Peak hour Number Date Peak hour Number

January 29 22-23 931 2 13-14 1,531

February 12 17-18 839 1 12-13 739

March 6 16-17 1,049 10 17-18 1,051

April 9 22-23 1,053 12 15-16 1,296

May 15 14-15 1,114 5 08-09 1,245

June 28 16-17 1,179 30 16-17 1,139

July 3 22-23 1,113 20 18-19 1,595

August 15 22-23 1,328 17 18-19 1,315

September 20 17-18 1,281 26 18-19 1,477

October 2 16-17 979 29 18-19 1,131

November 26 17-18 1,066 21 18-19 1,384

December 20 17-18 1,313 10 16-17 1,080


Table 7: Peak hour international passengers

Month

International

Arrival Departure


January 27 23-24 1,333 31 00-01 1,453

February 16 17-18 990 20 00-01 1,488

March 27 21-22 1,087 22 00-01 1,471

April 10 14-15 2,142 24 00-01 1,391

May 31 06-07 1,622 8 16-17 1,910



Month

International

Arrival Departure


June 10 14-15 1,818 15 00-01 1,551

July 15 14-15 1,704 27 00-01 2,033

August 11 14-15 1,774 14 00-01 2,082

September 8 14-15 1,760 23 00-01 1,848

October 17 14-15 1,876 17 00-01 1,613

November 2 14-15 1,165 4 00-01 1,238

December 30 21-22 1,490 21 00-01 1,337


These numbers indicate that the average load for international passengers is denser than during domestic operations. Looking at the departure figures, by far the most demanding for the airport, and calculating a mean value over the 12 monthly peak hour values for both domestic and international departures, provides a hint of what is happening in the terminals.

Average peak hour load for domestic passengers is 1,248, with a top in July at 1,595 and a low in February at 739. For international passengers, the average peak hour load is 1,618, with a top in August at 2,082 and a low in November at 1,238. On average, the domestic passenger peak hour had 23 percent less load than the international passenger peak hour although domestic passengers in total are only 15 percent fewer. In addition, during the busiest days in terms of total processed passengers, domestic volume exceeds the international volume, in a much smaller area. The obvious conclusion is that the peak domestic period is wider and lower compared with the international one. Another conclusion already known is that the current domestic terminal must be completely crowded for hours in order to process this amount of passengers.

In the international terminal, 2,082 passengers departed during the peak hour in 2009. It seems to be far too many for some of the processes described in Section 11.5 but in reality it may work. The reason is found in the passengers’ arrival pattern compared with the aircraft boarding pattern. When boarding starts, almost all passengers are in place at the gate or arrive there within a reasonably short period of time. The boarding process then lasts for some 20 minutes up to an hour until the last passenger enters the aircraft. The actual time depends on several factors, such as the number of passengers, aircraft location (remotely parked or bridge-connected), security pre-


45


boarding or not, etc. When all passengers have boarded, they exert no load on the terminal and can be regarded as departed.

The same passengers have arrived at the airport earlier but that procedure is stretched over a much longer period of time. Normally for a charter flight the first passengers arrive three to four hours prior to scheduled departure. Remaining passengers arrive during the following two to three hours and, about one hour before departure, almost all passengers have arrived. Provided that the check-in, security control, etc. are opened and the passengers choose to use them, airside handling of passengers will be stretched compared with the time spent when boarding. The difference varies with a lot of factors, e.g. passenger type (charter, domestic, business, etc.), departure time, local conditions, etc. A rough estimate is that the number of departing passengers per hour is twice the number of checked-in passengers per hour. This means that the peak load pattern in the terminal is not as pronounced as the figures for departing passengers may indicate.

11.13 CONCLUSIONS ON TOTAL AIRPORT CAPACITY

Aircraft capacity is very sharply defined in terms of a number of weight limits, a given number of seats, cargo volume etc. In contrast, airport capacity is a vague concept that cannot be clearly defined and poses few, if any, sharp limits to airport activity. An apron can accommodate only a given number of aircraft at a time, but its capacity is determined also by the average occupancy time. In some aspects, the flexibility of the parking positions and the access to the apron also affect the capacity. Most other components of airport capacity are also determined by more than one variable, making every assessment of total airport capacity dependent on a given set of parameters.

In the views of DGCA and AP1, passenger capacity of Ngurah Rai is 17 million per year and cannot be increased beyond this point. Another airport has to be in place to cope with further growth. The calculations behind this figure have not been presented but its foundations have gradually dawned on the Team during the project. Seventeen million appears to be the limit provided that the present peak-load pattern and aircraft mix remain unchanged. As shown in chapter 0, the peak load pattern can be flattened and the aircraft mix can be pushed toward a substantially larger average. The end result is a capacity much higher than 17 million and in all probability exceeding even long-term demand.

11.13.1 Movements

As shown in section 11.2, capacity limits in the surrounding airspace pose no major problems, meaning that the first instance where a capacity discussion becomes interesting is the runway. It appears that neither DGCA nor AP1 have performed detailed capacity calculations pinpointing where the restrictions are. This is not as



strange as it may sound, as the explanation appears to be that even if the actual capacity is not exactly known, it exceeds present utilisation with a fair margin.

During this project, many different statements on runway capacity have been aired. At Ngurah Rai Airport, the general opinion seems to be that present capacity is 30 movements per hour or slightly less, although many of the technical aids are in place and the ATS routines seem to be reasonably efficient. However, local ATS staff appears to agree that the capacity is 28 movements per hour. The actual limitations behind this relatively small number of movements seem to be somewhat diffuse and the Team does not really understand the background of this opinion. In addition, and for reasons not clearly explained by anyone asked but probably related to safety, only 80 percent of the stated capacity is allowed to be utilised. This means that the allowed number of aircraft movements on the runway is 22 per hour which is half of the theoretical maximum. Still, Error! Reference source not found. indicates a number of instances where this figure has been exceeded.

Another approach is to make a theoretical calculation. Maximum runway capacity on a single runway configuration is somewhere around 44–45 movements per hour, depending on available technical aids, efficiency of Air Traffic Control (ATC) routines etc. and on the aircraft mix. Using accepted general methods from IATA for assessing runway capacity, the following arguments/discussion can be raised:

A baseline capacity for an aircraft mix comprising less than 20-25 percent heavy jets4, the full length of parallel taxiways, at least two right angled exits and ATC routines with five NM of radar separation between approaching aircraft is 30 movements per hour. These assumptions are fulfilled at Ngurah Rai Airport with the exception that eight NM separation is applied, although without notable effect on the capacity, see section 14.1.2.

If the presence of infrastructure constraints, for example shorter or no parallel taxiways or ATC constraints in terms of no radar or extended separation between approaching aircraft, the capacity will be further reduced. On the other hand, if there are capacity benefits in terms of ATC-routines using reduced approach separation, more than two 90-degree exits, rapid exits (around 30 degrees) allowing aircraft to vacate the runway at higher speed and a departure sequencing pad,5 the capacity will be increased to a maximum of 44 movements per hour.

The following table summarises the situation at Ngurah Rai relative to the movements per hour baseline capacity:

4 Heavy jet in this context means take-off weight exceeding 130 tons. Due to severe wing-tip

vortex, smaller aircraft following the heavy jet require more spacing which will reduce runway capacity.

5 A sequencing pad is a part of the taxiway sufficiently wide for one aircraft to overtake another.


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Table 8: capacity estimation

ATC FACTORS

Figures pertain to movements per hour

Effect from 30

Situation at Ngurah Rai

Possible increase over 30

Future potential over 35

Approach spacing >5 NM -16 (8 NM applied) No effect

Approach spacing =5 NM 0 Applied

Approach spacing 3 NM +5 Not applied, possible in the future

+5

No radar -20 Radar available

AIRPORT FACTORS

Taxiway full length 0 Available

Taxiway > half length -5 Not valid

Taxiway half length -10 Not valid

Taxiway < half length -20 Not valid

Runway exits 1or 2 0 Not valid

Runway exits > 2 +2 Available +2

Rapid exits 1 or 2 +3 Available +3

Rapid exits > 2

(increase over capacity with 1 or 2 rapid exits)

+2 Not available, possible in the future

+2

Departure sequencing pad +2 Not available +2

Estimated total capacity 35 44

Source: Compiled from IATA Airport Development Reference Manual.

The table indicates that the current capacity should be around 35 movements per hour (30 plus two for more than two runway exits and plus three for existing rapid exits). This is somewhere around 20–30 percent higher than present peak utilisation. It also indicates that there should be very good possibilities to increase the capacity beyond 35 without expensive infrastructure investments. An additional nine movements per hour can probably be obtained through improved efficiency in ATS routines, additional rapid exits and departure sequencing pads. However, in this case the present 8 NM



approach separation can hardly be maintained but a transfer to 5 NM can be achieved with present equipment.

11.13.2 From movements to passengers

A very interesting task, and of great value if successfully completed, is to translate the number of peak hour aircraft movements into number of annual passengers. A lot of factors needs to be taken into consideration and the circumstances during which the translation is done must be clearly stated. The result will be an indication of the airport capacity, not an exact answer.

The total number of seats flown in and out from an airport varies with a lot of factors, among others:

Aircraft mix

Traffic distribution during the day

Types of passengers (share of long haul tourists, share of domestic business travellers, etc.)

Cabin factor of each aircraft

Airport layout (rapid exits, apron layout, number of stands etc.)

Technical aids available

ATS routines

Consequently, estimating the passenger capacity cannot be an exact science and the resulting value will give a hint of the capacity during certain circumstances only.

In the 2009 statistics for Ngurah Rai Airport, the peak hour traffic structure comprised on average 20 percent wide-body aircraft with a seating capacity of approximately 275–375 passengers. The remainder was narrow body aircraft of B737 size or smaller seating roughly 100–150 passengers. Data clearly stated that the maximum hourly peak movements were 30 in May, with July in second place with 26. May appears to be an isolated case so the July value will be used for the capacity discussion. Since the data quote hourly peak load passengers divided into four separated parts (domestic, international, arriving and departing peak passengers) not occurring at the same time, the total number of hourly peak passenger is not known.

Going from movements to passengers requires a formula taking into account the above-mentioned parameters for Bali, or at least for Indonesia. In the prognosis work carried out in the Open Sky project, stage 1 part, the following equations were used:

PDM = AM / 340

and

PHM = PDM*(6.61/PDM+0.064)


49


where

PDM = Peak day movements

AM = Annual movements

PHM = Peak hour movement

Testing equation 1 with statistics from Bali (peak day movements were 243 in August and total annually movements 76,754) gives a result where the peak day value is overrated. By replacing 340 with 316, a correct result is obtained. In the same way, equation 2 is modified by replacing the constant 0.064 with 0.08 giving the correct values for 2009.

In order to estimate the annual capacity, it is necessary to go from peak hour movements to annual movements. This is done by the following operations, using the modified constants above:

Equation 2 is modified into: PDM = (PHM-6.61)/0.08

and

Equation 1 is modified into: AM = PDM*316

Using these equations and the above values for aircraft mix and seating capacity, the following table can be assembled:

Table 9: From peak hour movements to annual passengers

Peak hourly mvts

Peak day mvts

Annual mvts

Distribution Code C/D,E

Seating capacity code C

Seating capacity code D, E

Estimated capacity, million seats per year

26

243 76,754 80% C/

20% D,E

100 - 150 275 - 375 10.3 – 14.9

35

355 112,100 80% C/

20% D,E

100 - 150 275 - 375 15.1 – 21.8

44

467 147,625 80% C/

20% D,E

100 - 150 275 - 375 19.9 – 28.8

Note that the calculation ends with the annual number of seats, not passengers. It can reasonably be assumed that a utilisation (“cabin factor”) of 85 percent can be attained. Adding this prerequisite, the table should be interpreted as follows:

If

the present peak hour capacity is 26 (and not the actually attained 30)

20 percent of the aircraft is Code C or D and the remainder Code C



the average C aircraft seats 150 and the average D/E 375

o then the airport could handle almost 15 million seats and 13 million passengers per year.

If

the peak hour capacity can be increased to 35 in accordance with Error! Reference source not found.

all other prerequisites are retained


If

the peak hour capacity can be increased to 44 in accordance with Error! Reference source not found.

all other prerequisites are retained


These results are surprisingly high for a single-runway configuration but it should be noted that they pertain to runway capacity. At least in the case based on a peak hour capacity of 44 movements, massive investments in the terminals are required. On the other hand, the results do not include any of the potentials found in restructured traffic (Section 16.2) and peak spreading through restructured charges or other methods (Section 16.3). There is also some potential in increased cabin factors, i.e. fewer empty seats.


51

APPENDICES CHAPTER 12 : TRAFFIC FORECASTS

CHAPTER 12: TRAFFIC FORECASTS

Producing a traffic forecast is not a part of this project. The Team will base its analysis on the following sources:

Comprehensive traffic forecast in the IndII-founded Report on air traffic analysis of August, 2010;

Angkasa Pura 1 forecast for the Bali Development Project Phase III;

Ministry of Transport (MoT) 2010 forecast.6

The first forecast is of a general character, designed with the requirements for overall CNS/ATM capacity in the future, and does not include attention to specific conditions of each airport. For information on applied methodology, see Chapter 4 of the 2010 report. The methodology of the AP1 forecast is unknown, but of minor importance in this context. Neither forecast is accepted at face value as the result of the fact-finding process justifies major modifications.

12.1 THE 2010 INDII FORECAST

As hinted above, this is a top-down forecast where the result for each airport is derived by applying the same growth rate to all, regardless of local conditions and restrictions.

Figure 8: Current (-2009) and forecast passengers

This is the most “optimistic” forecast, ending with a good 30 million passengers in 2025. The movement forecast follows suit:

6 Keputusan Menteri Perhubungan 364/2010.

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Figure 10: Forecast peak day movements

Figure 11: Forecast peak hour movements

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53

APPENDICES CHAPTER 12 : TRAFFIC FORECASTS

Even in this upper-end forecast, the estimated runway peak hour capacity (35) will not be attained until 2017 and the estimated maximum single-runway capacity (44) not until 2024.

12.2 ANGKASA PURA 1 AND MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT FORECASTS

Ngurah Rai is operated by AP1. Its current forecast is somewhat lower than the one displayed in Error! Reference source not found.. In 2025, not fully 25 million passengers are expected.

Table 10: AP1 passenger forecast for Bali Phase III project

Pax (,000) 2010 2015 2020 2025

Int'l 4,398 6,378 9,250 13,415

Dom 4,435 5,921 7,904 10,551

Transit 220 320 466 678

Total 9,053 12,619 17,620 24,644

Source: PT AP1

The MoT made its own forecast for the Ngurah Rai Phase III extension project, most of which appears to be on hold. It is not quite clear which years the forecast contemplates. The end result is a bit higher than the AP1 forecast due to a higher number of international passengers.

Table 11:: MoT passenger forecast for Bali Phase III project

Pax (,000) Phase I Phase II Phase III

Int'l 5,660 7,720 16,240

Dom 4,880 6,030 10,750

Transit 140 200 420

Total 10,680 13,950 27,410

Source: See footnote 6.

Inter alia, the following factors will be the drivers and limitations of air transport:7

7 Points 1-6 taken from a recent paper by Mr. Tsuyoshi Isada and somewhat modified.



1. Rapid and continuous growth of Indonesia’s economy

2. A growing middle class with a high propensity to go by air

Factors 1 and 2 promote domestic aviation, domestic tourism, and outbound international tourism.

3. Rapid economic growth also in China and India, promoting inbound tourism

4. Growing low-cost carriers pushing airfares down, promoting mainly domestic aviation

5. Application of an FTA and EPA will commence in the early 2010’s

6. ASEAN unification will commence in 2015

Factors 5 and 6 will promote all aviation but the actual effect is hard to predict and may be less noteworthy. Phrased differently, it is not obvious that the present absence of an FTA, EPA and ASEAN unification really deters any air services or passengers and what the underlying mechanisms would be. On the other hand, some factors will work in the opposite direction:

7. The aviation industry will either voluntarily shoulder its environmental responsibility in terms of climate impact, or eventually be forced to do so. Either way, airfares will increase rapidly.

8. Real (i.e. inflation-purged) fuel prices will inevitably rise in the long run, outstripping the countervailing effect of increased aircraft fuel efficiency.

In the case of Bali, traffic distribution is heavily skewed toward inbound tourism. There is a limit to the capacity of Bali Island to cater for this activity and this limit may very well fall below the capacity of the airport. This issue is of crucial importance and elaborated in Error! Reference source not found..

12.3 CARGO

As mentioned in Section 11.7, the airport handled 65,000 tons of cargo in 2009, all of which was transported in passenger airliners. Traffic with dedicated freighters is not expected to return. If the passenger volume increases, be it through larger aircraft or more movements, cargo capacity increases in parallel. Hence the cargo part of airport activity will not encroach on airport capacity and it is not expected to outgrow the existing and planned premises. Against this background, the Team sees no point in making a cargo forecast or to dwell on cargo issues at all.


55

APPENDICES CHAPTER 13: CURRENT SITUATION AND FACTORS

MODIFYING THE FORECAST

CHAPTER 13: CURRENT SITUATION AND FACTORS MODIFYING THE FORECAST

Transport has no intrinsic value; the demand for transport is in its entirety derived from other activities in society. Civil aviation is no exception, in spite of numerous attempts from the aviation industry to reverse the connection. In the light of these facts, it is of crucial importance to explore the main drivers of air transport demand, and in Bali, the incoming tourism overshadows all others.

13.1 THE ROLE OF BALI IN INDONESIAN TOURISM

Error! Reference source not found. shows the development of foreign tourist arrivals in Indonesia, and the part coming to Bali, for the 41-year period 1969–2009.

Figure 12: Foreign tourist arrivals in Indonesia and Bali share

Source: Compiled from Bali Tourism Statistics 2009.

Total arrivals have increased 73-fold from 86,000 in 1969 to 6,324,000 in 2009. To Bali, arrivals have increased 198-fold from 11,000 in 1969 to 2,230,000 in 2009. This means that Bali’s share of the foreign tourism of Indonesia has increased from 13 percent to 35 percent over the past 41 years.

Considering the fact that Bali comprises around 0.25 percent of Indonesia’s land area and houses about 1.5 percent of its population, the island’s share of foreign tourists is out of all proportion. With a different measure, the average square kilometre of Indonesia in 2009 was populated by about 120 people and received 3.3 foreign tourists while the average square kilometre of Bali received 396 – on top of its resident

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population of almost 700 people. A third way of looking at the situation is extrapolation, a method less suitable for forecasting than to test the sustainability of current trends. If the 1969–2009 trends continue another 41 years, Indonesia will enjoy 575 million foreign tourists in the year 2051, all of which will go to Bali as the island’s share by then has attained 100 percent. Finally, the distribution of income from foreign tourists is extremely skewed. The average spending per foreign tourist can be assumed to be fairly even throughout all tourist destinations in Indonesia. If so, 1.5 percent of the population received about 35 percent of tourist revenues in 2009. Such an imbalance will not be tolerated by the other 98.5 percent in the long run.

13.2 BALI TOURISM IN A BROADER CONTEXT

Various events, such as the terrorist attack in New York in September 2001; the ensuing Afghanistan and Iraq wars; the SARS and Bird Flu epidemics; the 2004 tsunami and the Sumatra earthquake have stamped the first decade of the 21st century. Their effects on local and regional tourism may have been disastrous but on a global level, tourism continues to increase rapidly:

Table 12: World tourism 1980–2020

Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010* 2020*

Tourists (Million)

287 328 456 567 681 803 1,006 1,560

Annual growth (%)

- 2.71 6.81 4.45 3.73 3.35 4.61 4.48

Source: UNWTO 2009. Note*: UNWTO projection. Supplied by Mr. Tsuyoshi Isada.

Globalisation has put East Asia at its forefront. The prospect of rapid economic development in China, India and Indonesia for the next decade hints that world tourism could grow faster than above. Tourism development strategies and policies form a part of the national development strategies and policies of most countries in the world. Moreover, the future tourism industry must recognise the environmental challenges and continue to develop ecotourism, sustainable tourism, green tourism etc.

13.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AIRPORT CAPACITY

Bali is a very special tourist destination and it would be presumptuous of foreign aviation consultants trying to describe it. The following quotations paint the image of Bali with indigenous eloquence:


57



“Bali is genuinely attractive to its natural resources, the friendliness of the people and the consistency of the society top upkeep their intrinsic culture, coupled by the internationalized behaviour of one and all. To enjoy Bali, Bandar Udara Ngurah Rai plays an indispensible role at the main entry point into the island which is often called the Islands of the God and the Island of a Thousand Temples. In short, it can be said that Bandar Udara Ngurah Rai is the gateway to paradise.”8

“Why the Trunyanese are so defensive of their patch is an easy question to answer. The view across Lake Batur beats any northern Italian backdrop. The locals call their caldera’s lake ‘the sea’: at more than 1,500 metres above sea level, small, wind-whipped waves cut across the deeply turquoise water. Opposite the 1,000-year-old-plus village, pistes of dark-grey lava from previous eruptions – the last was in 2000 – drip down the slopes of still-active Mount Batur.”9

13.3.1 Gateway to paradise

The Trunyanese may be the most defensive group in Bali but their attitude (if correctly narrated) highlights a growing problem. Maintaining a position as a gateway to paradise entails a heavy responsibility. To preserve and develop the paradise to which the airport aspires to be the gate is an even heavier burden. It is only too obvious to any concerned visitor to Bali that the latter duty is the more demanding one and that paradise maintenance lags behind airport maintenance. In a real paradise there are no traffic jams, at least not those bordering on gridlock, nor widespread littering, open sewers, polluted rivers and conspicuous poverty, all of which meet the visitor within eyesight from the airport. The area from the airport over Kuta up to Denpasar bears every sign of massive overexploitation. Traffic congestion brings to mind peak-hour central Jakarta; local architecture and culture succumb to international chains or greedy property “developers”; litter is rife and rivers are clogged with garbage. Parts of Kuta Beach are extremely dirty and littered. From the residents’ perspective, the huge sums spent by tourists appear to disseminate very sluggishly down to the poor while shrinking into trickles on their way.

Growing mass tourism will aggravate rather than alleviate these problems. The dilapidated area around Kuta will deteriorate further and grow to the north, as planning permissions for various construction projects appear not to be based on proper overall plans. Traffic jams cannot be cured by road construction; efficient public transport is required but no such plans have been found. The Bali Government Tourist Office is well aware of the littering and solid waste problem, but has not managed to draw attention to this acute issue in spite of serious efforts. Local residents have also other reasons to regard mass tourism with a sceptical eye. Some big hotels situated close to the shore are effectively privatising parts of the beach (this is not formally the

8 Airport Bali – Gateway to paradise, 1930–2010. PT. Angkasa Pura 1. 2010.

9 Garuda Indonesia inflight magazine, October 2010, page 66.



case but they make every effort to make it look so). Security gates are found here and there in the Nusa Dua area, hassling locals while evaded without effort by those wishing to do so. The fact that poverty is prevailing in spite of a long period of bulging tourism revenue may be interpreted by locals as if the benefits end up in foreign or central Indonesian pockets while all the drawbacks stay with the Balinese.

13.3.2 Rabies – a serious threat to tourism

Finally, a factor that is not very known poses a serious threat to tourism in Bali. Rabies, a lethal viral disease, is endemic in Bali and in many other areas around the world. The main source of infection in Asia is dogs, where the virus can go from the coat to a small, open scar in humans. A bite is not necessary. According to the Bali Tourism Office, the island houses more than a million dogs. An unknown number of these are roaming and carrying the contagion.

Figure 13: Rabies risk levels in 2009

Source: WHO, http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/Files/Maps/Global_rabies_2009.png

http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/Files/Maps/Global_rabies_2009.png


59



Countries in white are entirely free of rabies, while countries in light grey have isolated cases but the risk of catching the infection is extremely small. Japan and New Zealand are rabies-free while Western and Central Europe, Australia and Malaysia all belong to the low-risk group and their governments will go to any length to keep their countries there. In 2009, Japan, Australia and Malaysia accounted for 40 percent of all tourist arrivals in Bali. If a tourist domiciled there should die from rabies caught in Bali, recommendations not to go to Bali will be issued swiftly by national health authorities and permeate the news media, possibly swaying a huge number of tourists to other destinations. A large part of tourist income may be lost practically overnight. Against this background, the local government of Bali would be expected to inform arriving tourists on how to minimise risks in the aircraft, or at the latest at the airport. This is not the case and the Team’s attention to the problem stems from an article in the Jakarta Globe10, claiming that 130 people die from rabies in Indonesia every year, mostly in Bali. It may be possible that warnings are found on the Bali Government or Tourist Office websites; the Team has not been able to find out as the first one lacks information in English and the latter has been inaccessible throughout the entire project.11 In favourable contrast, the Bali Hotels Association provides easily found, comprehensive and current information on rabies.12 By failing to prepare visitors for the substantial danger they meet, the local government is exposing tourists and the tourist industry to unacceptable risks.

13.3.3 Conclusions on future tourism

Realising the already existing and worsening clash between tourism and local Balinese culture, the Team has reviewed all forecasts analysed in Error! Reference source not found.. The somewhat uncomfortable conclusion of the Team is as follows:

Even if civil aviation in South-East Asia and Indonesia grows in line with the general view, air traffic in Bali will, in all probability, not follow the forecasts of Error! Reference source not found. Traffic volumes will grow, but at a significantly lower rate. The main reasons are that the physical, cultural and mental capacity of Bali, the Balinese and their culture to accommodate tourism is limited and cannot cope with 25 million passengers, or even 20 million.

The Team emphasises that there is very little correlation between the number of tourists and the size of tourist revenues. Bali could, and should, cater for the upper end of the tourist market. Tourists may be fewer than forecast, but their spending may very well follow or exceed the forecast.

There are several paths towards this future situation:

10

“Indonesia 5th for rabies in Asia, thanks to Bali deaths”, Jakarta Globe, 30/31October, 2010. 11

www.baliprov.go.id and www.tourism.baliprov.go.id. 12

www.balihotelsassociation.com/application/userfiles/data/files/rabiesv6.pdf

http://www.baliprov.go.id/

http://www.tourism.baliprov.go.id/

http://www.balihotelsassociation.com/application/userfiles/data/files/rabiesv6.pdf



a) The best solution is if the Government of Indonesia decides to distribute incoming tourism more evenly throughout the nation’s huge archipelago. Balinese culture may be quite special and attractive, but tourists only interested in having a party life on the beach could be redirected to places more hardwearing and resilient to this activity. Since the Government cannot directly control the air traffic (and the substantial ferry traffic in the case of Bali), financial means of control must be applied. A tool close at hand is to levy a tax on tourists and adapt its level to various destinations.

b) If this is not deemed feasible, the Bali Government could decide that future growth should apply to tourist revenues rather than tourist volumes. Construction planning can be used in addition to a local tourist tax to prevent the tourist industry taking over a growing part of the island. A drawback of local solutions, compared with national, is that tourists may be relocated to destinations abroad instead of in Indonesia.

c) The third path is the result of a laissez-faire or wait-and-see policy, i.e. doing nothing. In this situation, mass tourism will continue to displace the local culture, gradually turning more and more areas into dilapidated, littered abodes for the low-end tourists interested more in having a party than in its location. This will spur a rapidly growing resistance not only from the local Balinese but also from tourists and resident foreigners who are truly interested in the unique qualities of Bali. Tour operators will react to the growing resistance and turn their interest elsewhere. The end result will be the same as in the two intentional paths above, but parts of the Balinese culture will be irrevocably destroyed in the process. Posterity’s judgement will be harsh.

To illustrate this point, the Team has had a brief look at some other island resorts.

13.4 FINDINGS FROM OTHER MAJOR TOURIST DESTINATIONS

As input to a discussion whether tourist capacity rather than airport capacity is the limiting factor of passenger volume, the Team has had a brief look at three comparable island destinations. These studies indicate that there is a saturation level of tourism and the Team cannot possibly see any reason why this conclusion should not apply to Bali.

13.4.1 Hawaii

Hawaii is a group of six major islands and a number of smaller islands that formally became a state of the United States in 1959 after being under US influence since the late 19th century. Land area is 16,649km2 and the population is around 1.31 million.


61



Figure 14: Map of Hawaii

Source: www.nationalatlas.gov

Tourism dates back to before World War II. The gateway is Honolulu Airport, served by 18 international and two local airlines. Overseas passenger volume passed 1 million in 1962, 10 million in 1982, peaked at 14.65 million in 1996 and was 12.9 million in 2007. In essence, the total growth of overseas passengers has been zero over a 23-year period. The number of visitors arriving by air or cruise ship was 6.52 million in 2009. A modest growth to 7.68 million in 2013 is forecast but will only return the volume to its 2007 level.

Figure 15: Passenger traffic at Honolulu Airport

Source: Compiled from http://hawaii.gov/hnl/airport-information/hnl-passenger-statistics-1931-2007

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From the US west coast, flight time to Hawaii equals the time from southeast Australia to Bali. The tourism industry prospers not from the sheer quantity of tourists but on their spending. Compared to Bali, Hawaii, two-and-a-half times the land area, is less densely populated, much cleaner, much richer, almost as friendly but much more expensive. Its tourist capacity is many times higher than Bali’s.

13.4.2 The Balearic Islands

This Spanish archipelago in the northwest part of the Mediterranean Sea epitomises “charter tourism” for many people in Western Europe.

Figure 16: The Balearic Islands

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cc/Baleares-rotulado.png

Charter flights commenced in the early 1950s as the islands came within reach even for small airliners of that time, like the Douglas DC3 and the Curtiss C46. The land area is slightly smaller than Bali´s, 5,000km2, with 1 million inhabitants. Tourism has been the dominating source of income since the 1970s. There are three airports with international services, Menorca, Ibiza and Palma de Mallorca which receives about three-quarters of the total traffic. Since 1999, average traffic growth has been 0.9 percent per year:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cc/Baleares-rotulado.png


63



Figure 17 Passenger traffic at the Balearic Islands Airports

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Total traffic appears to level out slightly below 30 million passengers per year. In Europe, the Balearic Islands are perceived as a low-cost destination offering mainly beach activities and with few particular culture elements of their own. Compared with Bali, the archipelago is slightly smaller, less densely populated, somewhat cleaner and richer, maybe not as friendly and with roughly the same price level. Its tourist capacity is very far above that of Bali.

13.4.3 The Canary Islands

In wintertime, the northern part of the Mediterranean Sea that surrounds the Balearic Islands is not warm enough to entice swimmers and surfers. Another Spanish area, the Canary Islands off the coast of Morocco, offers a more even climate and bathing opportunities in the north hemisphere winter, being located close to the equator. The archipelago spans a landmass of 7,447km2 and is populated by around 2 million inhabitants.

http://www.aena.es/



Figure 18: Canary Islands

Source: http://www.resoteket.se/kanarie/49-infor-resan/84-karta-kanarieoearna

Airborne tourism started in 1957. There are eight airports on the seven major islands, none of which has the dominating role of Palma de Mallorca for the Balearics. Only Tenerife has two airports. The following graph summarises passenger traffic at all airports 1999–2010:

Figure 19: Passenger traffic at the Canary Islands Airports

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Source: See Figure 17.

Gran Canaria is the major destination, followed closely by Tenerife Sur and Lanzarote. The contribution of La Palma is marginal; El Hierro and La Gomera, which lack international traffic, are hardly visible. Total traffic has stabilised at a level of between 30 and 35 million passengers. Compared with Bali, the Canary Islands are a bit larger, less densely populated, somewhat cleaner and richer, not as friendly and a bit more expensive. Its tourist capacity is several times higher than that of Bali.

http://www.resoteket.se/kanarie/49-infor-resan/84-karta-kanarieoearna


65

APPENDICES CHAPTER 14: FUTURE CHALLENGES

CHAPTER 14: FUTURE CHALLENGES

This chapter summarises the Team’s opinion on the hurdles facing Ngurah Rai Airport in the future, bearing in mind the expected slowdown in annual traffic increase discussed above. In case this slowdown does not materialise, the airport will still face the same challenges but in a closer future.

14.1 CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

Capacity problems in airport operations may appear in the ATS, on the runway, on the apron and in the terminals. As indicated in Sections 11.2 and 11.13, no problems are expected regarding runway capacity even after a substantial traffic increase. The same goes for apron capacity, see Section 11.3.

14.1.1 Imminent

The only imminent capacity constraint within the airport is the domestic terminal and this problem will be solved in 2013 with the completion of the new terminals. A more acute problem is the periodic road traffic breakdowns on the access road, to which no solutions are in the pipeline. In order to reduce (or at least not aggravate) traffic constraints, local bus transportation between the airport and nearby hotels should be started. Most incoming international passengers are tourists and the majority of these are staying at hotels in areas close to the airport. Efficient bus connections reduce the number of vehicles on the roads and lay a foundation for future expansion of public transport. The airport must address this issue by using the traffic management tools at hand.

14.1.2 Short- and medium-term

In the Draft Final version of this report, Error! Reference source not found., was based on a minimum separation between approaching aircraft of 5 NM. This was in line with the top score of peak hour movements, which is 30. It was later discovered that the formal minimum is 8 NM, not 5, but the substantial capacity reduction, which the IATA standard attributes to a lack of 5 NM separation, is obviously not present at Ngurah Rai. The explanation appears to be that with an aircraft mix dominated by heavy jets, and with virtually no slow turboprops, the 8 NM separation is not an efficient



restriction.13 However, this situation is not sustainable in the medium term so 5 NM separation must be introduced. As the Team perceived the situation, this can be attained mainly through honing ATC procedures and with little or no requirements for upgraded equipment.

ATC routines can probably be further honed and made more efficient. Streamlining these routines is a prerequisite for utilising the inherent capacity of the existing runway. One example is the high-intensity runway operations (HIRO) concept, meaning that all aircraft entering the runway shall be prepared for immediate takeoff, i.e. all pre-flight preparations including copying of clearance shall be completed when lining up for takeoff. This will increase actual capacity utilisation beyond the reported 80 percent.

The attractiveness of off-peak flight operations can be increased by restructuring charges, see Section 16.3. If successful, the off-peak capacity offers a massive possible traffic increase within the existing facilities.

14.1.3 Long-term

Earlier master plans included two new rapid exit taxiways (RET) from the runway. These would increase peak hour capacity with three extra movements. As runway 09 is in use for about three-quarters of all movements, the eastern RET is more important than the western one.

It is worthwhile to investigate whether the radar separation of arriving and departing aircraft can be further reduced from 5 to 3 NM at acceptable investment costs. This would add five peak hour movements to the runway capacity.

The airport must be developed in cooperation with external stakeholders. Airport operations are a matter for the airport administration but the role of the airport in the region and the impact and needs emerging from airport activity must be handled in a broader perspective.

A long-term plan is required, not only for the airport but for Bali Island in its entirety. This plan should be developed in cooperation between local government agencies, DGCA, AP1 and the airport management, the Bali tourism agency etc., and should focus on future challenges in terms of creating sustainable tourism, creating efficient and capable infrastructure, the role of ferry traffic, an environmental development programme and possibilities of cooperation with, i.a. the island of Lombok.

13

With 30 movements per hour, even an hour heavily skewed toward landings will hardly comprise more than 20 landings, i.e. one every third minute. With an average approach speed of 160 knots, the distance between aircraft will be 8 NM anyway.


67

APPENDICES CHAPTER 14: FUTURE CHALLENGES

14.2 THE NEW TERMINAL PROJECT

A project to rebuild and renew the terminals at Ngurah Rai Airport is ready to start, pending only an approval from the environmental authority. It is scheduled to be carried through in 30 months, the new terminals to enter operations in mid-2013 to be ready for i.a., an ASEAN summit meeting. The project comprises an all-new international terminal of 129,000m2 while the existing international terminal will be renovated and adapted for domestic use and connected to the new international terminal. The existing domestic terminal will be demolished. In addition, existing infrastructure systems outside the terminals, like taxi and bus drop-off and parking areas, will be relocated.

The plan is to expand the terminal in one step, bringing the anticipated required area for 2025 into reality in 2013, if the time schedule will be met. In the traffic forecast, it is assumed that 10.5 million passengers will be domestic while 13.5 million are international travellers. Approximately 700,000 are assumed to be transfer passengers. This means that the number of domestic passengers is supposed to be doubled during the period and that these will be handled on an area of 63,000m2 instead of the 10,500m2 available today. There are two main conclusions: first, this part of the project is definitely necessary and second, there will be no capacity constraints in the “new” domestic terminal.

The new international terminal will be more than twice as big as the existing one, 129,000m2 compared with 63,000. If the traffic pattern in terms of passenger types, times of operation during the day, aircraft sizes etc. remains, the hourly peak load of passengers will grow reasonably in parallel with the overall traffic growth. During the maximum peak hour 2009, 2,033 passengers departed from the airport. With these assumptions, approximately 5,500 passengers will depart during maximum peak hour in 2025, (13.5/5x2,033≈5,500) if the forecast of Error! Reference source not found. becomes reality. This corresponds to an increase of 270 percent.

According to AP1, there are plans for 96 check-in counters and 16 security lines. Compared with the current terminal which has 62 check-in counters and four security lines, the increase is 154 and 400 percent, respectively. The number of counters may seem inadequate, but it must be remembered that the hourly departing passengers do not equal the hourly checked-in or the hourly security-controlled passengers. Probably, the check-in itself has taken more than two hours, which in reality gives a peak load in the check-in hall of less than half of the peak departing passengers. In addition, growing air traffic may entail different traffic patterns, e.g. flight operations spread more evenly over the day, other aircraft sizes, other types of passengers etc. The compound effect on peak load is difficult to forecast but as runway capacity is far from exhausted, the peak capacity can increase even further.

There will be 16 control lines available instead of four in the security process. This represents a welcome quantum leap in capacity. Since aviation authorities and the security industry are keen inventors of new methods and processes, not all of them representing security or capacity improvements, there will be future challenges in the



security process. In order to meet these challenges, extra capacity and space will be of major importance.

Regarding other processes in the new terminal, the Team has very little information but assumes the design has been carried out with the aim of balancing capacity between different processes. In general, to avoid unnecessary queuing, the capacity should increase the longer a passenger proceeds into the departure flow.

The conclusion is that the capacity of the new or renovated terminals will be no problem in the foreseeable future. Rather, the question should be raised if the planned capacity overshoots the need too much. Most probably, as discussed earlier in Section 13.3.3, there will be saturation in the traffic growth before 2025 and if so, 25 million annual passengers is not a probable volume in a foreseeable future. In that case the terminal may be unnecessarily big and the capacity too high.

Finally, a few recommendations:

Easy orientation reduces problems for passengers and speeds up the flow.

As far as possible, reduce distances on landside, for example walking distances from bus stops, taxi drop-offs etc.

To the extent possible, reduce the number of changes in level – where passengers have to move from one storey to another. When level change is a must, it shall be carried out as easily as possible.

Aircraft bridges should be of a multi-aircraft model to increase flexibility and utilisation of the bridge.

Remote parking stands are mostly good enough to start with. Bridge connections can be constructed at a later stage, spreading the investment costs over a longer period.


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APPENDICES CHAPTER 15: RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO

CONSTRUCTION

CHAPTER 15: RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CONSTRUCTION

In general, the need for construction projects at the airport is modest. Most future challenges can be met with minor improvements.

15.1 AIRSPACE IMPROVEMENTS

The surveys performed in this report have not revealed any noteworthy capacity constraints related to airspace design or navigational aids. While in Bali, the Team monitored about 20 hours of radio communication on all frequencies used at Ngurah Rai and found no indications of frequency congestion. In the long run, it is necessary to reduce the present 8 NM separation between aircraft on approach, notwithstanding the fact that the present minimum in essence is not an efficient restriction. It appears that only negligible investments are required for a reduction to 5 NM. Whether a further reduction to 3 NM, with the probably far-from-negligible investments required, is worthwhile should be further investigated if and when the need for such a reduction is visible.

1. Reduction of minimum separation from 8 to 5 NM should be prepared, and implemented when feasible. Further reduction to 3 NM should be investigated but will probably not be justified.

As regards navigation, it is however somewhat odd that runway 09 is used for around four-fifths of all movements while the approach procedure performance on this runway is clearly inferior to runway 27, see Section 11.2. This situation is a result of favourable weather conditions where the approach performance of runway 09 will suffice most of the time. According to air traffic controllers interviewed by the team, diversions to other airports due to adverse weather conditions in Bali are extremely rare. The opposite situation is slightly more common, i.e. aircraft destined for, i.a., Makassar and Mataram divert to Bali. Wind conditions may prevent the use of runway 27 in bad weather, and in that case, the inferior performance of the VOR/DME procedure to runway 09 may pose a problem.

2. Against this background, the Team recommends installation of an ILS also for runway 09, realising that the isolated benefits for Ngurah Rai will be insignificant but the total benefits may make such an investment worthwhile.

3. In contrast, the Team finds very little reason for retaining the NDB radio beacon. The system is outmoded, the beacon does not form part of any primary approach procedure, it does not contribute to safety and no airline nowadays relies on it for area navigation.



4. It may be justified to design overlay procedures based on satellite navigation but this issue is beyond the scope of this report, as such procedures will not affect airport capacity.

15.2 RUNWAYS, TAXIWAYS AND APRON

Today´s runway and taxiway system can handle all existing passenger aircraft, including Airbus A 380. Ordinary maintenance should, of course, be performed.

The capacity of the apron is enough to handle the current traffic without limitations. According to the airport management, a maximum of 33 stands are occupied simultaneously and 38 stands are available, which indicates no imminent capacity constraints. In addition, another 10 stands, intended for aircraft sizes including B 737 and Airbus A 320, will be constructed in the western parts of the apron. The conclusion must be that as long as the mix of aircraft at the airport does not change in a way where there will be a lack of stands for jumbo aircraft, there will be no need for further expansion.

5. In the future, and along with an expected traffic growth, the recommendation for runway improvement is to take measures in order to utilise 100 percent of the declared capacity instead of today´s 80 percent. This can probably be done with more efficient ATS routines and improved technical aids.

6. If these measures are combined with two extra rapid exits from the runway, the increase in capacity will handle the traffic situation for many years to come.

The capacity of the apron must follow an increase of runway capacity.

7. The recommendation is therefore to expand it with additional stands for jumbo aircraft on the A and B areas.

8. Today, these areas house stands for code C aircraft and an effective and flexible development would be to construct combined-type stands available for both narrow body and wide body aircraft.

9. A recommendation is also to take a deeper look into the possibilities of having code F aircraft (in the foreseeable future only Airbus 380) at the airport.

10. It may be wise to expand one or two code E stands to accommodate code F aircraft.

11. Although more intensive in terms of labour, remote stands with bus transportation of passengers are recommended since they requires much less investment.


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These recommendations follow the intentions from the comprehensive DGCA plan.14 To expand airside this way means that no extraordinary investments need to be carried through and the very good flexibility of the apron will be preserved.

Figure 20: Aircraft bridge

15.3 RUNWAY EXTENSION AND SECOND RUNWAY

JICA’s 1997 Master Plan contains a 600-metre runway extension to the east and also a second, 2,500-metre runway situated south of the present runway and with the same orientation. Neither of the proposals appears to have been analysed in more detail and the Team would assume that the terms of reference required only indicative descriptions of the projects. Both were included in a proposed Phase III which, according to some voices heard by the Team, is to be regarded as shelved. Still, both issues tend to surface frequently and the Team has also noted that the analysis has not progressed beyond the 1997 level. For this reason, some efforts have been spent in analysing the possible benefits of both projects. There is no data available for analysis of the costs.

15.3.1 Runway extension

A suitable starting point is the restriction on air traffic associated with the present runway. It is obvious that the runway width and the bearing strength pose no restrictions but the runway length, 3,000 metres, may do so by not allowing the use of

14

“Keputusan Menteri Perhubungan nomor 364 tahun 2010 tentang rencana induk banar udara internasional Ngurah Rai kabupaten badung provinsi Bali.”



maximum takeoff weight (MTOW). The Team has used performance data for the following Boeing models:15

747-400 with Rolls-Royce RB211-524G2 engines and optional stabiliser fuel tank, MTOW 377 tons;

747-400 ER (extended range) with Pratt & Whitney 4062 engines, MTOW 413 tons;

777-300 ER with General Electric GE90-115B1 engines, MTOW 352 tons.

Boeing 747-400 is a mid-1990s derivative of the original, four-engine twin-storey 747 which entered the market in 1969 and remained the biggest passenger airliner until the recent arrival of Airbus 380. Garuda Indonesia operates three 747-400s, seating 428 passengers in a two-class configuration. The twin-engine 777 started deliveries in 1995 and Boeing intends to continue production until the mid-2040s. Garuda has no 777s but Thai operates three 777-300ERs, seating 312 passengers in a three-class configuration. Both models come with a choice of engines, with minor differences in thrust and performance. The engines in the list above are those with the highest thrust. RB 211 produces 258 kN, P&W 4062 282 kN, and the GE90 a massive 514 kN.

Takeoff performance is far more demanding than landing. The Team used maximum takeoff weight as a starting point and used performance diagrams to estimate the reduction of takeoff weight required for accommodating takeoff on from Ngurah Rai’s 3,000-metre runway on a hot (more than 30 degrees Celcius) day. In all three cases, the reduction was found to be around 15 tons, e.g. the 777-300 can take off at a weight of 337 tons. The reduction must be taken from the fuel load, provided that maximum payload is attained. In this case, a reduction in range of about 1,000 kilometres is the result. In most cases though, this restriction is less binding or not at all effective:

If payload falls short of maximum, the 15-ton reduction is partly accommodated by empty seats. The 777 has a maximum payload of 70 tons which means (somewhat simplified) that when cabin factors fall below 75 percent, the entire reduction is accommodated by the payload.

Most destinations served from Bali in the foreseeable future are not distant enough to require use of maximum fuel capacity, i.e. the aircraft will start below MTOW anyway.

Runway length at Bali will not, in any case, restrict fuel load for incoming aircraft. The effective restriction in this case is maximum landing weight, which 100 tons below MTOW for the 777.

Another factor to consider is the technical problems with an eastward extension. A huge area must be reclaimed from the sea. As shown in Deliverable 1, the local religion will not accept the relocation of the Ngurah Rai Bypass road into a tunnel. Hence additional land must be reclaimed to accommodate the road between the runway

15

Data gleaned from the document “Aircraft Characteristics for Airport Planning”, available at www.boeing.com.

http://www.boeing.com/


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threshold and the sea, but the road cannot pass too close to the threshold. This is due to the huge jet blast from the engines during takeoff. Behind a Boeing 777, exhaust velocity will exceed 50 metres per second more than 150 metres behind the aircraft. Either additional land has to be reclaimed to accommodate the road with a sufficient margin to the threshold, or the road must be placed in a cutting to pass well below the runway level. As the runway is only 5 metres above sea level, this will create drainage problems in the cutting when the road is lowered below sea level. Other solutions exist but the Team finds no reason to further explore the matter.

The present runway will accommodate a Boeing 747 and even an Airbus 380, although this type may create problems at the apron and terminals. These problems are, of course, not remedied by a runway extension. It follows that a runway extension will not enable operations with larger aircraft and consequently, the extension will not bring about any increase at all in passenger capacity. It could also be the case that increased runway length will entice landing aircraft to reduce speed by more air-braking and less wheel-breaking (which is quite costly), thereby increasing the runway occupancy time.

Summing up, the present runway length is, in every respect, a marginal problem with little or no impact on airline operations. Its effect will diminish further with the lapse of time as aircraft performance tends to increase continuously, reducing the need for runway length.

12. The Team’s recommendation regarding runway extension is unambiguous: shelve the project until further notice. It is highly improbable that future development will ever justify this complicated, costly and only marginally beneficial project.

15.3.2 Second runway

The 1997 Master Plan indicates, as mentioned, a second runway, parallel to the existing one and 2,500 metres long. Such a project appears at first glance to bring about a quantum leap in airport capacity, but a closer scrutiny contradicts this conclusion entirely.

To bring about an increase in the number of movements per hour that the airport can accommodate, the second runway must be separated from the existing one by at least 1,035 metres. According to the master plan drawing, the distance is only a few hundred metres, which is far below the minimum distance for independent operations. This means that an approach to or a climb from the second runway must always be coordinated with movements on the first runway, effectively crowding out some of these movements. Furthermore, once an aircraft has landed on the second runway, it must taxi across the first runway in order to reach the terminals as these are situated on the north side. This taxi movement will block the first runway whenever it cannot be fitted into a space between the movements there. At the end of the day, peak hour capacity of Ngurah Rai will not increase at all and probably decrease significantly. A



second runway to the south of the present one is a completely meaningless project. Additional complications include the insurmountable economic, political and religious obstacles to an acquisition of the required land.

13. The Team’s recommendation regarding the second runway is even more straightforward: leave the project on the shelf, indefinitely. No foreseeable future change will justify this project.

15.3.3 A second Bali Airport

This issue is beyond the scope of all three reports but eventually, IndII and the Team noted that a local consultant – PT. Wiswakarma Consulindo – had been assigned the task of selecting a feasible site for a new airport. The Team has been invited by IndII to include Wiswakarma’s recommendations and assumes that brief comments would be appreciated.

The only information made available to the Team is Wiswakarma’s five conclusions and two recommendations, reprinted verbatim below.

Conclusion (1)

o Based on Government Regulation No. KM 11/ 2010 on National Airport Planning, the report of Pre Feasibility Study has not been able to be the guidance to determine the location for the development of new Airport in North Bali.

o This analysis of Pre feasibility study is based on the secondary data and gave an output/considerations on the needs to conduct a further study, called Feasibility Study in the points which so far are the alternative location for airport in North Bali.

CONCLUSION (2)

o Safety Area for Flight Operations (Kawasan Keselamatan Operasi Penerbangan/KKOP) is strictly limited by mountains lie athwart from West to East of Bali Island. Based on the Guidance of KKOP composition, Decree of Director General (MOT) No. SKEP/110/VI/2000, the Airport (Runway) gives 3 alternatives:

1. In the coast with transverse mountain which is flatted as a limit (maximum 150 m). This is impossible as it has function as conserved forest (Provincial Government Regulation No. 16 2009).

CONCLUSION (3)

2. Airport is planned to be located in the land with consequences that its elevation should be increased + 900 m from Mean Sea Level (MSL), so that there is Safety Area for Flight Operation in line with existing Guidance and Regulation. This is also difficult to be implemented and very costly.

3. Airport is planned to be located in offshore:


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1 Alternative -1 Sumber Kima : the distance from coast line is 11,76 Km with sea depth of 416 m on average

2 Alternative-2 Sangsit : the distance is 10,02 Km off the shore with sea depth of 981 m

3 Alternative-3 Kubutambahan : the distance is 10,68 Km from coast line with sea depth of 981 m on average

CONCLUSION (4)

o Based on analysis, Alternative-1 Sumberkima has Weight Point= 52,53% (the highest) with some advantages:

Sea depth is relatively shallowest,

existing area of + 600 ha,

communal housing is least,

the nature is relatively still pure,

the amount of residences to be moved is the least,

the community (3 villages) is ready to be moved for the development of new airport.

CONCLUSION (5)

o Airport is near to industrial zone Gerokgak and port Celukan Bawang, therefore, export activity is easily done.

o But, this airport development is potentially able to distract even stop the activity in Letkol Wisnu Airport, so that, it needs to be accommodated by new Airport.

o Further Feasibility Study can be conducted, but with a big fund since there is no primary data needed for the location point.

RECOMMENDATION (1)

o New airport development in North Bali is very critical (urgent)

o (with Planning stage-4 Ngurah Rai Airport):

o Parking problem has not been solved until now

o In 2016 the capacity of Runway in Ngurah Rai will reach 38 movement/hour

o In 2019 terminal capacity will exceed 25 million passengers per year

RECOMMENDATION (2)

o The development of Airport in North Bali is to be a multi airport system, therefore land network between 2 airport, Ngurah Rai and planned Airport in North Bali should be 1 development unity.

o Primary data such as air, sea depth, rainfall data etc are needed for accurate analysis in the selected airport locations.



The Team must admit to some difficulties when interpreting these findings, as no other information has been provided, and the following comments may include misunderstandings.

It is not quite clear why Conclusion 3:2 suggests locating the airport 900 metres above sea level. Actual elevation is determined by the elevation of the chosen site, give or take at best a metre or two.

In the Team’s firm opinion, all offshore locations – not only those in Conclusions 3.3 to 4 – can be ruled out due to prohibitive costs for bridges to Bali Island.

The Team cannot form an opinion on Conclusion 5 due to lack of information.

Regarding Recommendation 1, the Team cannot see a need for a new airport in the foreseeable future. Ngurah Rai has no parking problems, but a huge access problem threatening the airport’s future. Wiswakarma’s opinion on runway capacity in 2016 and terminal capacity in 2019 is more optimistic than the Team’s, hinting that Wiswakarma may be referring to traffic rather than capacity. As elaborated in Deliverable 2, the Team’s forecast is much lower.

Recommendation 2 assumes a multi-airport system. If planning for a new airport continues, the question whether it should be a complement or a replacement should be studied in depth.


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CHAPTER 16: RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO TRAFFIC

The previous chapter addresses limits to capacity but an equally important factor is to utilise existing and future capacity more efficiently. This calls for various traffic management measures.

16.1 SLOT COORDINATION

Big airports, normally those handling more than 4–5 million passengers annually, distribute their capacity by means of slots. A slot is a narrow time window for departure or arrival. Airlines distribute slots among themselves at annual slot conferences. Slots may be exchanged between airlines but not sold, although this restriction can be easily circumvented by making a parallel, under- or overpriced deal regarding something else, e.g. an aircraft, spare parts or maintenance.

According to the local ATS, Ngurah Rai is part of the slot coordination system although opinions differed somewhat regarding the formally declared capacity. Twenty-two to -three appeared to be the average consensus but, as shown in Error! Reference source not found., up to 30 movements per hour has been attained at several instances. If the declared capacity is 23 and the actual is (at least) 30, there is a 30 percent capacity margin which is presently not utilised.

14. The Team suggests that the declared capacity is increased, but slowly.

It is desirable to tap another source of increased capacity, an increase in the average aircraft size, and this development will be expedited if airlines perceive the slot allocation as somewhat scarce.

16.2 RESTRUCTURED TRAFFIC

A closer look at Error! Reference source not found. also reveals that aircraft up to class C make up more than three-quarters of the peak hour movements. The Team has not made an in-depth analysis of which aircraft types actually form the “up to class C” category at Ngurah Rai Airport, but normally the bulk of types within the class is made up by Boeing 737 and Airbus A320. The D and E category can be assumed to comprise mostly the Airbus A 330/340, B777 up to Boeing 747 types, seating around 350–450 passengers. Assume that the average “up to class C” carries 100 passengers less than the average D or E class, which is on the cautious side. Assume also that the declared capacity in a not-too-distant future will be 30 movements per hour, and that the peak hour distribution between class D or E and up to class C prevails. This means that around 22 peak hour movements would be up to class C and the remaining eight class D. If all movements were class D, then the peak hour capacity would increase by 2,200



passengers. As shown in Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found., the top domestic and international passenger peak hours in 2009 comprised 1,595 and 2,082 passengers. These top-notch hours did not occur simultaneously, but even if they did, the potential of restructured traffic – in this simplified example – is in the range of a 50 percent increase.

It may, however, not be desirable to increase what is, in essence, runway peak hour passenger capacity to the extent indicated above, as this may create problems at the apron and in the terminals. Another option is to increase the off-peak capacity utilisation, i.e. using existing or future capacity more efficiently. Restructuring user charges is the prime method.

16.3 RESTRUCTURED CHARGES

Almost invariably, airline fares for the same service vary widely with the time of day, the weekday, proximity to major holidays and high/low season of the year. Most airlines also have a choice of aircraft type to fly a particular service. Finding the optimal airfare structure, i.e. the one turning in the highest profit, is a very complicated problem that could only be solved with rule-of-thumb methods until the arrival of mainframe computers around 1970. Forty years later, most airports still apply flat user charges where the cost for the airline is the same, regardless of landing or takeoff time. There is ample scope for changing the peak load pattern by differentiated user charges. Experiences indicate, however, that a very pronounced differentiation is required to make airlines change their schedules. This is due to the fact that airport charges constitute a rather small proportion of an airline’s total cost.

Error! Reference source not found. shows a total number of movements of 77,000 in 2009 while Error! Reference source not found. shows peak hour movements around 25, with 30 as an exception in May. Assuming that it would be possible to accommodate 25 movements per hour for at least 6, 000 hours out of 8,760 in a year, the number would double to 150,000 within present peak capacity. This is only a theoretical exercise and would require a very extreme variation in user charges.

15. In the Team’s opinion, a capacity (utilisation) increase of around 20 percent can be attained through restructured user charges while still keeping the required charge variation acceptable to the airlines.

The peak load pricing issue is elaborated in 0 added to this final version.

16.4 RESTRUCTURED MODAL SPLIT

Modal split refers to the distribution of traffic between air and surface transport. In the case of Bali, a huge number of tourists arrive via the short Gilimanuk-Ketabang ferry


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connection. The number of passengers on this service has increased from 1.94 million in 2005 to 3.16 million in 2009. At present, this is the only ferry connection.

16. If the capacity situation at Ngurah Rai Airport – contrary to the findings of this report – turns into a problem in the long run, there is some scope for alleviating the situation by increasing the share of surface transport.

The capacity of the Gilimanuk-Ketabang service is not known to the Team but, in general, it is not a giant problem to increase port and ship capacity for ferry connections. A much more salient problem is land transport on Java. Massive investments in road and rail infrastructure is required before surface transport to Bali will attract foreign tourists, but these investments are justified anyway. Domestic tourists may be more willing to endure transport on existing roads.

17. Another option, although a bit more strained, is to use Mataram Airport on Lombok, forwarding tourists by ferry transport to Bali (business travellers will never choose this option).

In contrast to the short Gilimanuk-Ketabang service, the sea distance is considerable. This solution is complicated also by the poor safety record of SE Asian passenger boat services, not only in Indonesia but also in Malaysia and the Philippines. It will also be much more expensive than direct flights to Ngurah Rai. Nevertheless, the option exists, should the need ever arise, and its potential is in the range of several million passengers per year.



CHAPTER 17: OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

As indicated in Section 11.8, ground transport is totally dominated by private cars and motorbikes. Taxis and occasional hotel minibuses are the only signs of public transport. This situation has already entailed frequent and severe traffic congestion on the airport access road, creating huge problems for passengers. The primary solution is traffic management rather than road construction and, fortunately, efficient means are at the airport’s disposal as all road traffic is routed via entry and exit tollgates where the airport charges drivers for access and parking.

18. Car and motorbike parking and access charges should be increased very sharply, but the increase should be announced well in advance to allow hotels etc. to adapt their transport offers.

This will reduce congestion, entice hotels to offer bus services to a much larger extent than at present; reduce the propensity of passengers to park at the airport during their stay; make parking areas sufficient for a long time to come; and increase airport revenues.

19. The grove in the northwest part of the runway strip should be removed, but if this is not possible¸ obstacle lighting should be installed in accordance with ICAO Annex 14.

20. As long as the grove still exists, data should be published in the Air Information Publication (AIP).

21. Technical equipment on the strip, necessary for airport operations, should be fitted with obstacle lighting in accordance with ICAO Annex 14.

22. Obstacle measurements and inspections should be performed on a regular basis.

23. Inspections, performed visually from the ground, should be repeated at least once a year while obstacle measurement, which is an airborne inspection, should be carried out every second or third year.

24. The noise footprint shape is impressionable by the airport through the introduction of noise abatement takeoff procedures, possibly including restrictions on applied climb power. Whether such procedures are justified is beyond the knowledge of the Team.

25. Noise from airport operations can be remedied by supplying electricity and conditioned air at the aircraft stands.

a) For remote stands, electricity should be supplied through mobile ground power units (GPU).

b) The use of APUs should be prohibited at stands offering both electricity and conditioned air services but may have to be accepted at remote stands on hot days when cooling is required.


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APPENDICES CHAPTER 17: OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

26. It appears to the Team that the relatively undisturbed airspace around the joint control zone of Ngurah Rai and Mataram offers a suitable area for introducing and testing continuous descent (“green”) approaches in Indonesia.

27. As shown in Section 10, the obstacle situation is auspicious but some of the obstacles are reported to be growing trees to the east of the runway. To monitor the situation, periodic obstacle inspection must be performed. Trees should be preserved even if they constitute obstacles, but careful pruning must be performed.

28. After a meeting with the local authorities and organisations, the Team was left with the impression that local engagement in the airport’s operations and future plans could be better. A special but permanent cooperation committee may be a solution.

29. The planned number of check-in counters in the new terminal is 96. It may be worthwhile to reconsider this part of the design and determine whether the use of check-in machines, internet check-in etc. could reduce the number. Most tourists are accustomed to these machines and local passengers will be so in the near future.

30. Ground handling is deregulated in terms of operators but the airport should set a limit to the amount of ground support equipment allowed. This would render apron utilisation more efficient.

31. The airport should keep an annual record of the quantity of waste produced, its source, types and storage and disposal methods.

Rabies has the potential of halving the tourist revenues virtually overnight if not properly managed.

32. The rabies situation must be attended to at once by the local Balinese Government and the airport must make sure that arriving passengers are properly informed on how to minimise risk and deal with possible infection.



CHAPTER 18: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT FINAL VERSION

A Draft Final version of this report was presented to inter alia DGCA, AP1 and IndII at DGCA headquarters on 25 January, 2011. The following comments were assembled by IndII:


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APPENDICES CHAPTER 18: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT FINAL

VERSION

5. Pa k Bambang states that it is very difficult to utilise off peak time in order to i ncrease airport capacity, as it concerns the reorganising of airlines schedule s .

6. T he Navigation Directorate need s information concerning air traffic forecast and how to increase airspace capacity in Bali a rea.

7. T he A irport Directorate need s an opinion on the required facilities in the south airport area to help increase the airport capacity.

8. Pak Bambang also states that the consideration to build another airport in Bali should not only to increase capacity, but also to build new runway that may serve as a backup runway when an accident occurs.

Next Step : Consultant should provide a new report containing (1) more clear conclusion s and figures to explain the maximum capacity of the airp ort , (2) recommended action s to achieve the maximum capacity , (3) the conditions or the right time for Bali to build a new airport , taking into account the airspace analysis.

Meeting Record: Bali Airport Development : Draft Report

Presentation

Location: DGCA Meeting Room, 2 4 th Floor January 2 5 , 20 11 Participants : separate list Meeting points: 1. Pak Harjoso ( AP1) informs that the problem with the Bali airport lies at the

domestic terminal because at the moment it has exceeded its capacity . He also commented that this Bali Airport study may be a bit late considering the AP1 has planned and has begun the process of building a new terminal . It is unclear to him what the focus and purpose of this study are .

2. Dishub Bali comments that in developing Bali airport should consider air side and land side. The problem on the land side is traffic congestion. The consultant needs to consider the accessibility of the airport in addition t o the airport capacity.

3. Pak David Shelley asks the consultant to explore more detail s of their recommendation concerning flexible charging system, because this concept is important to be applied not only at Bali airport but also at other Indonesian airport s. AP1 also need s an example of the implementation of flexible charging sy stem in other countries.

4. Pak Bambang Tjahjono (DGCA Director of Airport ) needs to know what is the reason of the consultant put ting the chart mentioning that several airport s demand will be saturated and forecasted to decline . In Indo nesia , in fact, the growth of passenger is exceeding the forecast, for example at Padang and Jakarta airport s . F r o m this study, Pak Bambang needs the consultant to recommend a maximum passenger capacity f or Bali airport and when is the right time for Bali to build a new airport .



The Team gratefully acknowledges these comments and the text has been adjusted and amended where appropriate. In addition, the Team makes the following observations on the different items:

1) Regarding the timing of the project and its scope, the Team can only refer to the terms of reference. The view that the terminal is the most imminent problem is heavily supported in the report.

2) The Team shares the opinion that landside access is a crucial and acute problem, while outside the airport’s domain of influence. Section 11.4 and recommendation 18 deal with the possibilities of the airport management to indirectly force hotels and other associations to develop public transport. These possibilities appear quite promising.

3) This discussion has been supplemented in 0.

4) Hawaii, the Balearic and Canary Islands have not been chosen randomly. They are all archipelagos where air traffic is heavily dominated by incoming tourism. Their history as tourist magnets is longer than Bali’s, hinting that there are lessons to be learned as to whether tourism will level out and, if so, at what volume. All three cases indicate clearly that there is a saturation level. This conclusion is by no means contradicted by the present growth rate at Ngurah Rai. Rapid growth may very well continue for another decade, but it will come to an end. Furthermore, in order to preserve the precious cultural heritage of Bali for posterity, it is desirable that incoming tourism levels out far below a volume corresponding to 20 million annual air passengers and, in the opinion of the Team, it should be made to do so intentionally. As regards the proper time for construction of a new airport, it is the opinion of the Team that there will never be a right time. Capacity at Ngurah Rai will suffice for an acceptable tourism level and a new airport, whether replacement or complement, will entail an unacceptable encroachment into the landscape as well as the culture. A replacement airport should, in order to offer a quantum leap in capacity, have two independent, 3,000 by 45 metre runways with the terminals in the middle. Such a design will require an area of at least 1,500 hectares.

5) The Team would agree that under a flat charging regime, it is very difficult to restructure traffic, as the airlines have nothing to gain from utilising off-peak hours. With peak-load pricing, the situation changes. Off-peak hours offer a huge capacity reserve, indicated in Section 16.2 and 16.3.

6) Recent forecasts are discussed in Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found., but in the opinion of the Team, traffic volumes will level out far below the 200,000 movements forecast in Error! Reference source not found. for 2025. Airspace capacity can accommodate growing traffic with minor adjustments, as discussed in Section 15.

7) The Team must admit to having devoted very little thought to this issue, as none of our contacts indicated that the area south of the runway constitutes a problem. In this context, the only problem appeared to be the Hindu temple in the middle, severely restricting use of the area. However, for airport


85

APPENDICES CHAPTER 18: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT FINAL

VERSION

operations there seems to be very little scope for a meaningful use of this land and from a civil aviation point of view it can be regarded as next to barren land. Any aviation-related use would require vehicles or aircraft crossing the runway. It may be worthwhile for AP1 to investigate whether part of the area could be leased out for non-aviation usage, although these activities must be noise-insensitive. Another option could possibly be a land swap if the airport could acquire more useful land north of the runway in exchange.

8) With all due respect, the Team begs to disagree. The disaster-relief aspect adds virtually nothing to the benefit side of a new airport. Contingency plans for the extremely unlikely event of an accident blocking the present runway for more than a few hours should include buses via the Gilimanuk–Ketabang ferry, boat transport to Lombok and possibly helicopter evacuation.



CHAPTER 19: MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

This section debates some issues not directly covered by the terms of reference, but having indirect effects on the eight specific national air transport priorities.

19.1 LABOUR MARKETS

A “pilot shortage” was recently flashed on the front page of the Jakarta Globe,16, allegedly threatening the future growth of aviation in all of Asia. This kind of alarm reports occurs regularly but leaves little, if any, impact. European and North American airlines have lain off huge numbers of pilots in recent years, many of which would happily work for Asian airlines. Most unemployed pilots are not immediately available as their ratings rapidly “freeze” if not maintained. A first officer job requires a commercial pilot license (CPL) with instrument and multi-engine ratings, all being possible but expensive to maintain without being employed. A captain job requires an airline transport pilot license (ATPL) which is extremely expensive to maintain without employment as recurring proficiency tests in an airliner are required. However, frozen licenses can normally be thawed out within a month or two, unless they have been frozen for more than three years when the process is more complicated.

The Swedish CAA explored the “pilot shortage” issue at length in a year 2000 report, concluding that the pilot labour market is by no means more prone to shortages than the markets for any other comparable skill. Another finding was that “shortage” in an airline management sense sometimes referred to a situation where these were forced to offer even new, inexperienced first officers decent employment conditions.

Air traffic control operators (ATCO) are a related issue. While training time from scratch to a rated ATCO is about equal to the CPL above, the labour markets differ considerably. Training possibilities for commercial pilots are found at a huge number of locations, while ATCO training is normally provided only by the national civil aviation authorities, although signs of deregulation are visible. Still, the ATCO community constitutes one of the last remaining guilds, with the privileges for those within and the drawbacks for the customers normally associated with guilds. These privileges and drawbacks are the reason behind almost all other guilds (barring, i,a., trial lawyers) having been abolished many decades ago. There is even a worldwide organisation called the Guild of Air Traffic Controllers (GATCO) but at present, it is not represented in Indonesia.17 The rigid and somewhat archaic structure of the ATCO labour market will lead to a sluggish response to increased demand and the need for long-term supply planning by the DGCA. Details on the Indonesian ATCO situation are found in the IndII

16

“Shortage of pilots threatens to stall airline´s big plans”, Jakarta Globe, 24 October, 2010. 17

See www.gatco.org.

http://www.gatco.org/


87

APPENDICES CHAPTER 19: MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

“Report on Indonesian ATM Review” of August 2010, indicating a substantial training backlog.

Summing up, the Team cannot see that labour market issues will have other than short-term effects on Indonesian civil aviation.

19.2 SECURITY

Security refers to the protection of air transport against unlawful interference while flight safety refers to avoiding accidents. Flight safety has achieved continuous and very impressive improvements since the arrival of modern jet airliners in the late 1950s. In contrast, security is not characterised by the quest for efficiency inherent in most aviation activities. Some solutions and regulations appear surprisingly ineffective or even counterproductive, and are obviously being conceived without any reference to cost-benefit or cost-efficiency analysis. An infamous example is the European Union regulation on liquids, preventing the passenger from bringing water, soap, toothpaste, perfumes etc. through the security check in quantities exceeding 0.1 litre altogether. At most airports, these liquids can be bought in optional quantities and brought onboard the aircraft after the security check.18 Some airports force the passenger to spill water remaining in opened bottles, after which these can be replenished in the gate lavatory or onboard the aircraft. Liquids bought at the airport may be brought onboard if put into a sealed plastic bag with a printed ban on opening before reaching the destination. Why a prospective terrorist, intent on hijacking or blowing up the aircraft, should be deterred by such an admonition defies logic.

Another example is the suitcase strapping machines used at many airports, presumably preventing the traveller from opening the suitcase after the security check but allowing an entire tumbler to be inserted without breaking the strap.

Figure 21: Instances of pointless security

18

Regulations are found in the EU ordinance 185/2010.



The security industry has been very successful in marketing sophisticated and expensive equipment with questionable or no effect on the core objective of security, to prevent unlawful interference. British Airways chairman Martin Broughton put it this way at a recent conference: “We all know there’s quite a number of elements in the security programme which are completely redundant and they should be sorted out”.19

33. Within the limits given by international regulations, the approach toward airport security should be that it focuses on the probable rather than the possible. All equipment and other investments should be subject to meticulous analysis prior to decision, where the decisive question should be “is this a cost-efficient way to achieve our goals”.

19

Quoted in www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3e2166c4-e13f-11df-90b7-0144feabdc0.html; see also www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0b68d6be-4b20-11df-a7ff-00144feab49a.html for a warning example.


89

APPENDICES CHAPTER 20: ANNEXE 1: ACRONYMS

CHAPTER 20: ANNEXE 1: ACRONYMS

ADS Automatic dependent surveillance AIP Aeronautical information publication ANS Air Navigation Services AP1 PT Angkasa Pura 1 APU Auxiliary Power Unit ATC Air traffic control ATCO Air traffic control operator ATS Air traffic services CDA Continuous descent approach CNS Communications, navigation and surveillance CPL Commercial Pilot License CTR Control zone DGCA Directorate General Civil Aviation DME Distance measuring equipment FMS Flight management system GATCO Guild of Air Traffic Controllers GP Glide Path GPS Global positioning system GPU Ground Power Unit HIRO High Intensity Runway Operations IATA International Air Transport Association ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ILS Instrument landing system INDII Indonesia infrastructure initiative LLZ Localizer MM Middle Marker MoT Ministry of Transport NDB Non/directional beacon OM Outer Marker PAPI Precision Approach Path Indicator PCN Pavement Classification Number PSR Primary surveillance radar RESA Runway End Safety Area RET Rapid Exit Taxiway SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices SID Standard instrument departure SSR Secondary surveillance radar STAR Standard instrument arrival VHF Very high frequency VOR VHF omni-directional range



CHAPTER 21: APPENDIX 2 RECORD OF MEETINGS

In addition to several meetings with IndII and occasional meetings at DGCA head office where the Team had its premises, the Team has enjoyed meetings with the following officials:

2010

25 October Bambang Tjahjono, Director of Airports DGCA, with staff

26 October Suyono Dikun, Universitas Indonesia

1 November Budy Prasetyo, DGCA Ngurah Rai, with staff

Syahabuddin, Airport Operations Manager Ngurah Rai, with staff

2 November Wayan Kusumawathi, Head of Foreign Trade Division, Industry and Trade Office, with staff

IGA. Ambari, Executive Secretary, Bali Government Tourism Office, with staff

Ekapria Dharana K, Bappeda Provinsi Bali, with staff

3 November Syahabuddin, Airport Operations Manager Ngurah Rai, and a number of air traffic controllers

Heru Legowo, General Manager AP 1, Ngurah Rai

Gunung Banendro, Manager Teknik, AP 1, Ngurah Rai

Budi Prasetyo, Deputy of Administration, Ngurah Rai, with staff

4 November Bambang Tjahjono, Director of Airports DGCA

5 November Yudhaprano Sugarda, D.D. Teknik, AP 1, with staff

Suwardi B Hermanto, Head of Planning and MIS Bureau, AP I, with staff

2011

25 January Presentation at DGCA Head Office.


91

APPENDICES CHAPTER 22: APPENDIX 3 PROSPECTS FOR PEAK-

LOAD PRICING

CHAPTER 22: APPENDIX 3 PROSPECTS FOR PEAK-LOAD PRICING

This appendix has been added in response to comments on the Draft Final version, see Error! Reference source not found. The intention is to explain present charges and discuss the possibilities of applying a charging scheme adapted to load variations while the actual design of such a scheme must be referred to a separate project.

22.1 PRESENT CHARGES

In 2010, Ngurah Rai Airport levied the following charges on the airlines:

Table 13: Ngurah Rai Airport charges 2010 and Airbus A340-300 example

Airbus 340-300 example, int'l

Weight 275 tons

Seats 245

Occupancy 80% = 196

Charges in USD

Landing 1232

Pax service 3459

Parking 118

Parking surcharge 30

Enroute fee 1

Counter fee 108

Aviobridge 155

TOTAL 5103

= per passenger 26,0

Source: Compiled from Tarif Aeronautika PT Angkasa Pura1, January 2010. Landing charges are cumulative. The enroute fee applies per flight, in spite of its modest level. Parking up to two hours is free. Parking surcharge applies in the evening.

Ngurah Rai Airport charges 2010

Landing, per ton Domestic International

Up to 40 ton Rp 4,050 USD 4.18

40 to 100 ton Rp 5,385 USD 4.82

More than 100 ton Rp 6,285 USD 5.43

Pax service, per pax Rp 40,000 USD 17.65*

Parking, per ton Rp 945 USD 0.43

Parking surcharge/ton Rp 200 USD 0.11

Enroute fee Rp 1,000 USD 0.65

Counter fee, per pax Rp 1,100 USD 0.55

Aviobridge

Up to 100 ton Rp 37,000 USD 37

101 to 200 ton Rp 94,500 USD 93

201 to 300 ton Rp 157,500 USD 155

More than 300 ton Rp 175,000 USD 175

* Rp 150,000 in original document, converted

at 1 USD = Rp 8,500



Charges based on weight refer to maximum takeoff weight as the landing weight is never known. As an enroute fee of 65 US cents per flight appears meaningless but AP1 has confirmed that it applies per flight and not per ton, which appears more plausible. An Airbus A 340-300 will be charged a total of USD 5,103 or USD 26 per passenger at 80 percent occupancy. With all seats occupied, the charge will be USD 20.8 per passenger. All charges are flat, i.e. there is no variation over time or season except for the parking surcharge. As customary, charges for international flights are higher than for domestic flights, although in the case of Ngurah Rai the difference is extreme. At an exchange rate of Rp 8,500 per USD, the domestic landing charge is 48 US cents up to 40 ton. The international charge is USD 4.18, corresponding to an “international mark-up” of 8.8 times. It is a bit bewildering that this mark-up varies widely, from 8.8 down to 3.9 for the parking charge.

22.2 PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF PEAK LOAD PRICING20

The United Kingdom is surrounded by water, barring the short land-frontier to the Republic of Ireland. British Airport Authority, BAA, operates London airports Heathrow and Stansted, the airports in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Southampton plus Naples in Italy. Heathrow is the largest airline hub in Europe. In spite of its government-sounding name, BAA is nowadays owned by ADI Limited, a consortium led by Spanish Groupo Ferrovial. For the two London airports, BAA airport charges are regulated by the British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). This arrangement is a solution to the textbook problem that optimal pricing of an infrastructure monopoly is much higher seen from the owner’s point of view compared with the society’s point of view.

BAA has a long history in peak load pricing, its first attempts dating back to 1972 when BAA established a “runway movement charge” at the busiest time of day at Heathrow. Passenger peak charges were implemented in 1976. Peak surcharges and definition of peak periods have changed considerably over the years. A number of differentiations for peak landing fees have been tried but these were eventually succeeded by a uniform peak hour fee.

Peak load pricing of services is potentially desirable where demand varies by time. If prices are uniform over time irrespective of differences in willingness to pay and incremental costs of meeting demand in different periods, there will be excess demand in peak periods and subdued demand in off-peak periods. If the airport then aimed at accommodating all demand, including at the peak, it would require the installation of costly capacity which will be under-utilised in off-peak periods. Typically, airlines take this into account by charging fare premiums for seasonal, weekly or daily peaks. Airport peak load pricing tries to achieve the following main objectives:

20

Information for this section has been gleaned from various parts of BAA website www.baa.com, www.heathrowairport.com and CAA website www.caa.co.uk in February 2011.

http://www.baa.com/

http://www.heathrowairport.com/

http://www.caa.co.uk/


93

APPENDICES CHAPTER 22: APPENDIX 3 PROSPECTS FOR PEAK-

LOAD PRICING

Providing airlines and passengers with the incentives to shift demand to off-peak periods when there are airport facilities available at short run marginal costs which do not reflect new capacity requirements;

Possibly creating additional demand in off-peak periods through lower charges, thereby making better use of existing capacity;

Allocating the costs of expanding airport capacity only to those users who contribute to the need to increase capacity.

As regards Heathrow, its intricate charging structure is published on the web, http://www.heathrowairport.com/assets/Internet/Heathrow/Heathrow%20downloads/Static%20files/Conditions_of_Use.pdf. Due to the special conditions at this airport, its peak charge design may be less useful for more normal airports. One example is its charge for use of aerobridges (piers) which is GBP 7.08 plus 0.113 per metric tonne for every 15 minutes.21 The Airbus 340 in Error! Reference source not found. would pay about Rp 2.3 million per hour. The peak load surcharge is applicable from 07:00 to 12:29 hours and is 200 percent. Landing the 340 is GBP 776 (Rp 11.6 million) but a 150 percent surcharge is applied between 00:00 and 03:39 hours.

Stansted, while still very big, offers a somewhat more standard example of peak load pricing but the peak extends for five months:

Table 14: London/Stansted landing charges

Helicopters 94.00 93.70

Fixed wing aircraft not exceeding 16 metric tonnes

113.50 102.00

¨Ch 2 &

Non cert @Ch 3

High *Ch 3 Base

•Ch 4 & Ch 3

Minus

¨Ch 2 & Non

cert

@Ch 3 High

*Ch 3 Base

•Ch 4 & Ch 3 Minus

Fixed wing aircraft over 16 Metric tonnes not exceeding 55 metric tonnes

508.50 254.25 169.50 152.55 377.40 188.70 125.80 113.22

Fixed wing aircraft over 55 metric tonnes not exceeding 250 metric tonnes

831.60 415.80 277.20 249.48 468.00 234.00 156.00 140.40

Fixed wing aircraft over 250 metric tonnes

1,432.80 716.40 477.60 429.84 810.60 405.30 270.20 243.18

Source: www.stanstedairport.com/assets/Internet/Stansted/Stansted%20downloads/Static%20files/STN_Conditions_of_Use_2010-11.pdf.

21 At present, 1 GBP is about Rp 15,000.



The left column refers to peak and the right to off-peak. Landing the 340 will cost GBP 477.60 (Rp 7.2 million) in the peak period and GBP 270.20 (Rp 4.1 million) off-peak.

A huge number of documents on airport pricing is available from BAA and CAA and even though these refer to extremely big airports, it is obvious that general principles useful for Indonesia can be fished out.


95

APPENDICES CHAPTER 23: REFERENCES

CHAPTER 23: REFERENCES

Civil aviation planning documents

o Feasibility study for the International Airport Development. Japan International Cooperation Agency, June 1982.

o Bali International Airport Development Project Phase 2. Pacific Consultants International and PT Asiana Wirasta Setia, 1993.

o Master Plan and Feasibility Studies in the Area of Air Traffic Control. Soufréavia, 1994.

o Bali International Airport Development Project Phase 3. PT Asiana Wirasta Setia, 1997.

o Studi Pengembangan Bandar Udara Ngurah Rai Bali. PT. Tridaya Pamurtya, 2003.

o Studi Pengembangan Bandar Udara Ngurah Rai Bali. PT. Tridaya Pamurtya, 2006.

o Rencana induk Bandar Udara Soekarno-Hatta Tangerang propinsi Banten. Angkasa Pura 1, 2008.

o The feasibility study for the strategic implementation of CNS/ATM systems in the Republic of Indonesia. JICA, 2008.

o National Strategy for the Implementation of ASEAN Open Sky Policy. ASEAN, May 2010.

o Keptusan Menteri Perhubungan nomor 364 tahun 2010 tentang rencana induk Bandar Udara Internasional Ngurah Rai kabupaten Badung provinsi Bali. DGCA, 2010.

o Rencana induk Bandar Udara Internasional Ngurah Rai kabupaten Badung provinsi Bali. Angkasa Pura 1, 2010.

ICAO documents

o Performance Based Navigation. ICAO Doc 9613.

o Global Air Navigation Plan. ICAO Doc 9750.

o Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept. ICAO Doc 9854.

o ICAO Global Operational Data Link Document 1st Edition 14 June 2010.

o ICAO APAC Regional Report 2008.

Other printed documents

o Indonesian Air Information Publication.



o Report on Traffic Analysis. LFV Aviation Consulting, July 2010.

o Airport Bali – Gateway to paradise, 1930-2010. PT. Angkasa Pura 1, 2010.

o Garuda Indonesia inflight magazine, October 2010.

o “Indonesia 5th for rabies in Asia, thanks to Bali deaths”. Jakarta Globe, 30/31 October, 2010.

o “Shortage of pilots threatens to stall airline´s big plans”. Jakarta Globe, 24 October, 2010.

o Aircraft Characteristics for Airport Planning. www.boeing.com.

Websites

o National Atlas of the United States, www.nationalatlas.gov.

o World Health Organization, http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/Files/Maps/Global_rabies_2009.png.

o Bali Provincial Government, www.baliprov.go.id.

o Bali Tourism Agency, www.tourism.baliprov.go.id.

o Bali Hotels Association, www.balihotelsassociation.com/application/userfiles/data/files/rabiesv6.pdf.

o Hawaii Airport Statistics, http://hawaii.gov/hnl/airport-information/hnl-passenger-statistics-1931-2007

o Map of the Balearic Islands, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cc/Baleares-rotulado.png.

o Map of the Canary Islands, http://www.resoteket.se/kanarie/49-infor-resan/84-karta-kanarieoearna,

o Spanish Airport statistics, Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Españoles, www.aena.es.

o The Guild of Air Traffic Controllers, www.gatco.org.

o Garuda Indonesia Airways, www.garuda-indonesia.com.

o Thai Airways, www.thaiairways.com.

o British Airports Authority, www.baa.com.

o British Civil Aviation Authority, www.caa.co.uk.

o Heathrow Airport, www.heathrrowairport.com.

Other sources

o Various background reports prepared by Mr. Tsuyoshi Isada, local consultant.

http://www.nationalatlas.gov/

http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/Files/Maps/Global_rabies_2009.png

http://www.baliprov.go.id/

http://www.tourism.baliprov.go.id/

http://www.balihotelsassociation.com/application/userfiles/data/files/rabiesv6.pdf



http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cc/Baleares-rotulado.png



http://www.aena.es/

http://www.gatco.org/

http://www.garuda-indonesia.com/

http://www.thaiairways.com/

http://www.baa.com/

http://www.caa.co.uk/

http://www.heathrrowairport.com/


97

APPENDICES CHAPTER 23: REFERENCES

o Interviews with a number of representatives from DGCA, AP1 and Bali authorities.

o Airport statistics supplied by Ngurah Rai Airport.

o Tarif Aeronautika PT AP 1 Bandara Ngurah Rai, 17 January, 2010.

DELIVERABLE 3: OUTLINE TOR FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

DELIVERABLE 3: OUTLINE TOR FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES


99

APPENDICES CHAPTER 24: BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 24: BACKGROUND

The entire IndII project regarding Bali Airport development rests on the national air transport development priorities decided by the Government of Indonesia:

(a) Ensure aviation safety and security in line with international standards

(b) Increase airport services and capacity

(c) Achieve efficiency and sustainability of domestic, international and emerging air transport services

(d) Establish fair business competition within the Indonesian aviation industry

(e) Encourage the development of a sustainable national aviation industry

(f) Increase the skills and quality of aviation industry human resources

(g) Implement an international carrier rights scheme

(h) Increase private participation in the provision of airports

In accordance with the overall terms of reference (ToR), two previous reports have been produced: Deliverables 1 and 2. The first one is stocktaking of earlier reports while the second one is a detailed account of present airport capacity, the future need for capacity and feasible methods to increase capacity at the existing Ngurah Rai Airport. In terms of the priorities above, both reports address the infrastructure-related points (a) to (c).

This report, Deliverable 3, is based on fastidious ToR: “Outline preparatory document (draft ToR) for any possible next stage of this activity”. It is clearly stated that IndII will not fund any activities beyond those of Deliverables 1 to 3; hence it is assumed that there are no specific IndII guidelines to adhere to. On the other hand, it is assumed that a “next stage” in a project labelled Bali Airport Development should retain focus on Bali Island and, reasonably, on items (a) to (c) above.

The question as to whether another international airport is required on Bali Island is not treated in this report. At IndII’s request, LFV Aviation Consulting delivered a separate ToR document for such a study in September 2010. For some time it has been unclear as to whether a separate survey of the new airport issue was ongoing or planned by DGCA and AP1. DGCA has recently informed the Team that a small study of the subject is ongoing but no results or contacts have been made available to the Team.

Inputs to this report have been assembled during the work with Deliverables 1 to 2. The former report is a desktop study that revealed some deficiencies in the policy documents guiding infrastructure planning, mainly the lack of generally accepted and robust methods for social cost-benefit analysis and forecasting. Deliverable 2, a diagnostic and forward-looking field study on airport capacity, resulted in several questions suitable for further studies, while outside the ToR for that particular report.



Finally, some ideas have emerged after the completion of Deliverable 2 in early January 2011.


101

APPENDICES CHAPTER 25: SUGGESTIONS EMERGING FROM

DELIVERABLE 1

CHAPTER 25: SUGGESTIONS EMERGING FROM DELIVERABLE 1

Deliverable 1, labelled Findings from previous studies, reviewed the conclusions and recommendations found in a number of earlier reports with varying relevance for Bali. Applying the huge benefit of hindsight on these reports, the following topics were considered suitable for further studies:

25.1 DEVELOPMENT OF AN INVESTMENT ASSESSMENT METHOD

The achievement of priorities (a), (b) and (c) in Error! Reference source not found. bequeaths AP1 and 2 with a huge infrastructure capital. Maintenance and development of this airport infrastructure requires economic resources of a magnitude making efficiency in their use a crucial issue for the Government of Indonesia. A current example is the new terminal project at Bali Airport, where the investment will be several hundred million US dollars, and this is far from the biggest investment in recent years. It is a well-known fact that the desirability of infrastructure investment cannot be measured by traditional cost-revenue methods based on accounting data. Social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) is the standard method as it includes non-financial costs and benefits, like encroachment into greenfield areas and the value of time savings. In spite of this, the reports reviewed by the Team in Deliverable 1 contained only scant attempts to perform SCBA, none of them even remotely comprehensive and in some cases including clearly erroneous items. To the great credit of the authors, none of the reports contained traces of “economic impact analysis” and related approaches, all of which are outright useless and directly misleading.

A project in this realm should have the following basic design:

Objective: to develop a general, SCBA calculation method to be used for assessment and ranking of aviation investment projects22

Method:

o Survey SCBA systems applied by other sectors of the Indonesian Government and other countries

o Remove components irrelevant for the civil aviation sector or Indonesia in general and add indigenous components

o Discuss, and recommend, parameter values for inter alia

22

It would of course be better to develop a method sufficiently general and versatile to be used also by the Indonesian rail, road and harbour sectors but this ambition will make the task immensely more complicated. A method well adapted for the aviation sector could on the other hand be generalized for other sectors later on.



Lifespan

Real (inflation-purged) interest rate

Time savings/losses

Risks

Environmental effects

Side effects, like poverty alleviation and labour market effects.

Required core competence: An economist specialised in social cost-benefit analysis, not necessarily with an aviation background. Experience from public infrastructure assessments is a merit

Estimated workload: six to eight man-months, see Error! Reference source not found.

25.2 SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF A GOVERNMENT-OWNED MONOPOLY

PT Angkasa Pura 1 and 2 are basically corporations in charge of natural monopolies in the form of airports. The performance of a corporation is measured mainly via the bottom line of the profit and loss account. However, if this is the only measurement of success, the corporation will apply charges that are too high and the resulting production (e.g. airport movements) will be too low, compared with what is optimal for Indonesia and not only for Angkasa Pura.

This well-known conflict is normally addressed by applying other methods for corporate management, such as balanced scorecard, owner directives and “golden shares”. A balanced scorecard is, in essence, a checklist where the corporation’s performance in respects other than bottom-line results is included, assigned weights and added up to a general performance indicator. Owner directives may include restrictions or recommendations on user charges, etc. “Golden shares” normally denotes a share kept by the government in a semi-public corporation and sufficiently big to grant the user the balance of power.

Objective: to resolve the conflict between maximum profitability of the airport owner and maximum benefit of the owned airport to the Indonesian society

Method:

o Survey approaches currently in use, like balanced scorecard, owner directives and golden shares

o Choose the method or combination of methods with the best potential for Indonesia

o Develop and adapt this method for AP and DGCA


103

APPENDICES CHAPTER 25: SUGGESTIONS EMERGING FROM

DELIVERABLE 1

Required core competence: a background in business administration, certified public accountant or equivalent, with a thorough knowledge of alternative scoring methods

Estimated workload: four to six man-months, see Error! Reference source not found.

25.3 IMPROVEMENT OF AVIATION FORECASTING METHODS

Forecast methods for passenger traffic are normally based on income, driving demand for air travel, air fares as a countervailing factor and various minor components like time lags, etc. Such models perform well for airports and air routes with a standard distribution between business, leisure and tourists travellers. Bali is heavily dominated by incoming tourism and, in these cases, the traditional, income-based model does not work very well, since the relevant income is that of the countries where the tourists originate. Even if such data can be obtained and used in the model, the actual distribution of tourists between origin countries will be next to a random factor. Forecasting methods coping with this and other problems should be developed with particular attention to destinations with non-average passenger composition.

Objective: to develop a general forecasting method for the Indonesian civil aviation sector, and the parameter differences required for its application to airports with a non-standard passenger mix

Method:

o Survey standard forecasting methods

o Survey the availability of current and relevant input data

o Choose the method that makes the best use of the chosen data

o Hone this method for Indonesian conditions

Required core competence: a “hardcore” statistician specialised in forecasting models. Knowledge of the aviation sector is a merit


25.4 AIRPORTS AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL SHOWCASE

Ngurah Rai Airport has an environmental standard far above what is found in the surrounding community, and the same situation probably characterises many other Indonesian airports. DGCA and Angkasa Pura operate a large number of airports, some of which may be turned into local environmental lodestars. The objective and methods in this case will become clear in the project Adaptation of EIA and SEA to Indonesian conditions below, section 26.4. Estimated workload for the showcase part of the joint project is three months.




105

APPENDICES CHAPTER 26: OUTLINE SUGGESTIONS EMERGING

FROM DELIVERABLE 2

CHAPTER 26: OUTLINE SUGGESTIONS EMERGING FROM DELIVERABLE 2

Deliverable 2 in this project is centred around the future of Ngurah Rai Airport, based on an in-depth analysis of the current situation. The end result is fully 30 recommendations, some of which requiring further activities. Applying a comprehensive hold on the future of Bali tourism, based on the nation’s responsibility for preserving a culture qualifying as a universal heritage, is by far the most urgent – and also the most complicated – mission.

26.1 THE LONG-TERM FUTURE OF BALI TOURISM

This project is not about forecasting (estimating what the future development will be) but rather about deciding what the Indonesian nation, including the Balinese, wants the future to be. Once this issue is resolved, a policy to attain the chosen scenario should be developed.

Objective: to develop a number of scenarios for the future of Balinese tourism, to make an informed choice of one scenario over the others and to choose a set of instruments of control to get there

Method:

o Survey all aspects of the present situation

o Develop scenarios for, e.g., the year 2025

o Choose one of these as the most desirable

o Survey suitable instruments of control

o Develop a policy, based on these instruments of control, which will bring about the desired result

Required core competence: cannot be specified, since this project must be run by a group that includes various interested parties. Harbour and shipping sectors must also be included

Project details and design must be elaborated further before the workload can be estimated.

26.2 A COMPREHENSIVE AND FLEXIBLE CHARGING SYSTEM

As indicated in Deliverable 2, a system where airport charges vary with the time of day, weekday and possibly season, may reduce the peak load and spread traffic to off-peak



hours. The variation and design required in order to change airline behaviour is complicated to calculate, and so are the financial effects for the airport owner.

At present, AP1 applies charges for landing, passengers, parking, enroute, plus user charges for check-in counters and aerobridges. All charges are “flat” except the landing charge where aircraft weight is a factor. There is ample scope for peak load variation of charges.

A “wide-area” approach, aiming at developing a charging system applicable at all major airports, could have the following design:

Objective: to develop an airport (and possibly airspace) charging system where the cost for the airline varies with the traffic load in a way that reduces peak loads

Method:

o Survey the present charges and peak-load patterns

o Choose the components of the charge suitable for variation

o Estimate airline response to different charges

o Build a small simulation model

o Develop a new charging system and communicate this to the airlines

Required core competence: a business administration background, preferably from a major airline’s financial department


A “local-area” approach may very well have the same long-term objective as above, but rather than starting with collecting data from a number of airports, it could concentrate on Bali’s Ngurah Rai Airport. The method in this case would be to develop and implement a peak-spreading charging system adapted only to this airport. After a trial period, evaluation of results and the alterations necessary for adaptation to other airports can be performed in a separate project. The local-area approach would have the same objective as above, although confined to one airport. Components of the method would also be the same but a simulation model is in this case is a simple Excel spreadsheet. The required competence can be somewhat shifted toward familiarity with local conditions and knowledge about basic aviation economics, as the number of affected airlines is small. Estimated workload in this case would be two to three months. This does not include the required modifications of the computerised charging system but these can be handled by local staff.

26.3 METHODS OF RESTRICTING GROUND HANDLING EQUIPMENT

A problem briefly touched upon in Deliverable 2 is that when airport ground handling is deregulated, each handling agent will bring own equipment into the airport. The result


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is low utilisation and difficulties to accommodate the equipment on the apron. Possible remedies include limits on the total amount of equipment allowed on the apron or a “rental shop” where the airport owns the equipment and the agents pay rent for each use. Other solutions are possible.

Objective: to diminish the space used for storing ground handling equipment and to streamline the use of this equipment

Method:

o Identify all airports at which this problem is relevant

o Survey the present use and utilisation of equipment

o Survey the pros and cons of suitable methods

o Choose one method to be applied at all affected airports

Required core competence: a background in the management of a major ground handling company or a major airport. Legal problems may occur, which makes a familiarity with relevant regulations a merit

Estimated workload: two man-months, see Error! Reference source not found.

26.4 ADAPTATION OF EIA AND SEA TO INDONESIAN CONDITIONS

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) deals with the effects of projects on the environment while the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) deals with the effects of plans and programmes. None of these appear to be applied in the Indonesian civil aviation sector. Both are potentially powerful tools for managing the environmental impact of projects or plans, provided they are linked to regulatory permits.

Objective: to adapt EIA and SEA to Indonesian conditions and introduce both into the civil aviation sector

Method:

o Search for foreign airports or CAAs that already use these instruments

o Modify the instruments to fit Indonesian conditions

o Identify a few civil aviation projects suitable for EIA and SEA

o Apply and evaluate the methods on these projects

o Produce an EIA/SEA manual for the civil aviation sector

Required core competence: an environmental expert with thorough knowledge of EIA and SEA

Estimated workload: 3-4 man-months, see Error! Reference source not found.



26.5 EFFICIENT WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

An airport produces large amounts of solid and liquid waste from its own operations, mainly from the passenger flows in the terminal but also from operational activities. In addition, it has to receive and process large quantities of solid waste and sewage from arriving aircraft. Shouldering this responsibility in an environmentally acceptable way is a complicated task. As regards sewage, a treatment works is of course required, but efficient solutions are generally large-scale and not suitable for use only by an airport. A joint project with the city served by the airport is required. Solid waste must be sorted into different fractions (at least metal, plastic, glass and paper), which poses no problems for the airport’s own waste but is complicated for airline waste, as this frequently is not sorted at all. Charges should reflect the degree of sorting.

Objective: to develop state-of-the-art waste treatment systems for Ngurah Rai and other airports.

Method:

o Identify the problem in terms of volumes and fractions;

o Investigate whether the local community offers any viable solutions;

o Develop treatment processes that minimize residual volumes for the airport as well as its community.

Required core competence: A waste treatment and reclamation expert. The aviation-related content of the task is small.

Estimated workload: three to four man-months, see Error! Reference source not found.

26.6 LOCAL INTRODUCTION OF “GREEN” APPROACHES

Deliverable 2 highlights the suitability of Bali/Mataram airspace as a test area for continuous descent approaches (CDA or “green”). The arrival routes are widely spaced and most of them are not affected by other airports, which makes it easy to perform test and trials.

Objective: Introducing “green” approaches to Ngurah Rai airport, with the ambition to gain experiences useful in a full-scale introduction at all major airports

Method:

o Contact all airlines and form a group with all interested airlines

o Identify the needs for equipment and training

o Develop and implement a test programme

o In a later project:


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FROM DELIVERABLE 2

Evaluate tests and develop an implementation scheme for all airports

Required core competence: A certified instrument procedure designer in accordance with Civil Aviation Safety Regulations part 173 plus an expert on green approach implementation

Estimated workload: two to three man-months up to but not including evaluation, see Error! Reference source not found.

26.7 SIMULATION OF FLOWS IN THE NEW TERMINAL

Often there is a need of testing and verifying solutions before they have been implemented. This can be very difficult, or even impossible, if the suggested construction or area comprises complicated processes and flows that are mathematically difficult to calculate. One example is the flows within an airport terminal which, at a relatively busy airport, tend to be complicated and conflicting, besides containing some passenger processes. At the same time, since it is very costly and time-consuming to straighten out problems after construction, it gets more and more important to evaluate proposals in advance. Testing and verifying can be done by a simulation model. It requires good knowledge not only of programming but also of the flows and the processes in the tested area. With a carefully constructed simulation model and with relevant input in terms of process times, available areas, number of passengers, etc., the evaluation can provide very good answers on area demands, process times and speeds, queue lengths and bottlenecks, etc., within a proposed construction. Objectives, method and required competence cannot be detailed at this superficial level but in general, the objective is to identify future bottlenecks before they occur.



CHAPTER 27: INDICATIONS ON PROJECT VOLUMES AND PRIORITIES

This chapter contains estimations of the required work associated with the various projects above. All projects, barring development of green approaches which requires some heavy ATS investments, are labour-intensive. For obvious reasons, these estimates qualify as educated guesses at best.

Development of an investment assessment method and Large-scale introduction of “green” approaches are by far the most demanding tasks among those that can possibly be completed by a single expert. Both will require something like six to eight man-months. They are followed by Social management of a government-owned monopoly and Improvement of aviation forecasting methods, both requiring four to six months. Adaptation of EIA and SEA to Indonesian conditions can probably be completed in three to four months and the same goes for A comprehensive and flexible charging system as well as Efficient waste management systems. The latter project must precede Airports as an environmental showcase as it defines the prerequisites for this project which, in turn, probably requires three months. The smallest project is Methods of restricting ground handling equipment which should be completed in two months.

As regards The long-term future of Bali tourism, its scope cannot be easily defined as the project design should include a group of interested parties seeking consent on this somewhat flammable issue. Finally, Simulation of flows in the new terminal requires some preparatory work before its scope can be defined. Inter alia, the processes possibly motivating a simulation effort must be distinctly identified.

There is no inherent priority order in the project list of Error! Reference source not found. above but if the priority criterion is profitability in its social cost-benefit analysis sense where the most profitable projects are on top, the list would probably look as follows:

1)

2)

3)

4) Development of an investment assessment method

5) A comprehensive and flexible charging system

a. Local-area

b. Wide-area

6) Local introduction of “green” approaches

7) Social management of a government-owned monopoly

8) Methods of restricting ground handling equipment


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APPENDICES CHAPTER 27: INDICATIONS ON PROJECT VOLUMES

AND PRIORITIES

9)

10) The long-term future of Bali tourism

11) Improvement of aviation forecasting methods

12) Simulation of flows in the new terminal

13) Efficient waste management systems

14) Adaptation of EIA and SEA to Indonesian conditions

15) Airports as an environmental showcase

The Team has no opinion as to which projects to undertake in the short, medium and long run; this is a matter of available resources within the respective horizons.

Documents

BALI AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DELIVERABLE … · bali airport development project deliverable 4: consolidated report draft final report