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8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
1/35
9
Power
and
International
Relations
DAVID
A.
BALDWIN
Most definitions of politics involve power. Most international interactions are political or have rami
ficationsforpolitics.Thus,itisnotsurprisingthatpowerhasbeenprominentindiscussionsofinternational
interaction fromThucydides to thepresentday.The longhistoryofdiscussionsof the roleofpower in
internationalrelations,however,hasfailedtogeneratemuchagreement.Scholarsdisagreenotonlywith
respecttotheroleofpowerbutalsowithrespecttothenatureofpower.HansJ.Morgenthau(1964:27n)
suggeststhattheconceptofpoliticalpowerposesoneofthemostdifficultandcontroversialproblemsof
political science.KennethN.Waltz (1986:333)notes thatpower isakey concept in realist theoriesof
internationalpolitics,while conceding that 'itsproperdefinition remains amatterof controversy.And
RobertGilpindescribestheconceptofpoweras'oneofthemosttroublesomeinthefieldofinternational
relations'(1981:13)andsuggeststhatthe'numberandvarietyofdefinitionsshouldbeanembarrassment
topoliticalscientists' (1975:24).There is,however,widespreadconsensusamong internationalrelations
scholars on both the necessity of addressing the role of power in international interactions and the
unsatisfactorystateofknowledgeaboutthistopic(Guzzini,2000;BarnettandDuvall,2005;Berenskoetter
andWilliams,2007).
Although it is often useful to distinguish among such power terms as power, influence, control,
coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compellence, inducement and so on, it is possible to identify
commonelements
underlying
all
such
terms.
Robert
A.
Dahl
(1957)
has
suggested
that
underlying
most
suchtermsisthebasicintuitivenotionofAcausing(orhavingtheabilitytocause)Btodosomethingthat
B otherwisewould not do. (In the discussion that follows, 'A' refers to the actor having or exercising
influence; while 'B' refers to the actor being, or potentially being, influenced.) Although alternative
definitionsofpowerabound,nonerivalsthisone inwidespreadacceptability.Inthefollowingdiscussion,
the term 'power' will be used in a broad generic sense that is interchangeable with such terms as
'influence'or 'control'unlessotherwise indicated.Thisusage isnot intended todeny thevalidityor the
utilityofdistinguishingamongsuchtermsforotherpurposes.
POWER
AND
THE
STUDY
OF
INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS
Internationalpoliticshasbeendefinedintermsofinfluencing'majorgroupsintheworldsoastoadvance
thepurposesof some against theoppositionofothers' (Wright,1955:130).Although the term 'power
politics'hasunsavoryconnotations forsome,suchadefinition implies that the term is redundant (Carr,
[1939]1946;Morgenthau,[1948]1960;SproutandSprout,1945;Spykman,1942;Wright,1955).Fromthis
8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
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perspective,allpoliticsispowerpoliticsinthesensethatallpoliticsinvolvespower.Thisisnottosaythat
politicsisonlyaboutpower.
Traditionally,thestudyofinternationalpoliticsassumedtheexistenceofnationalstateswithconflicting
policies,placingahighvalueonmaintaining their independence,and relyingprimarilyonmilitary force.
Thestates
with
the
most
military
power
were
designated
'Great
Powers',
and
the
'game'
of
international
politicswas 'played' primarily by them (Spykman, 1942; Sprout and Sprout, 1945, 1962;Wight, 1946).
Notingthatonlyafewstatespossessedthemilitarycapabilitiestosupporttheirforeignpolicieseffectively,
an influential text in the 1930s averred that 'these alone constitute the Great Powers' (Simonds and
Emeny,1937:28.1
In the eighteenth century, 'the power of individual states was conceived to be susceptible of
measurementby certainwelldefined factors' (Gulick,1955:24), includingpopulation, territory,wealth,
armies and navies. In the ensuing years, this approach evolved into the 'elements of national power'
approachto
power
analysis
reflected
in
Hans
J.
Morgenthau's
influential
textbook
Politics
Among
Nations
([1948]1960seealsoSproutandSprout,1945).
Statesweredepictedasseekingtomaximizepowerrelativetoeachother,thusproducinga'balanceof
power'orasseekingtoproduceabalanceofpower(Claude,1962;Gulick,1955;Haas,1953;Morgenthau
[1948]1960).Eachversionofbalanceofpowertheorysharedtheassumptionthat itwaspossibletoadd
upthevariouselementsofnationalpower,sometimescalled'powerresources'or'capabilities',inorderto
calculatethepowerdistributionamongtheGreatPowers.Modernversionsofthisapproacharefound in
Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) and John J.Mearsheimers The Tragedy ofGreat Power
Politics(2001).
THEPOWERANALYSISREVOLUTION
The 'elementsofnationalpower' approachdepictedpower as apossessionorpropertyof states. This
approachwaschallengedduringthelasthalfofthetwentiethcenturybythe'relationalpower'approach,
developed by scholars working in several disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, sociology,
economicsandpolitical science (Baldwin,1989;Barry,1976;Cartwright,1965;Dahl,1957, [1963,1984]
1991;1968;
Frey,
1971,
1985,
1989;
Harsanyi,
1962;
Nagel,
1975;
Oppenheim,
1981;
Simon,
1957;
Tedeschi
and Bonoma, 1972). Somewould regard the publication of Power and Society byHarold Lasswell and
AbrahamKaplan (1950) as thewatershedbetween theold 'powerasresources' approachand thenew
'relationalpower'approach,whichdevelopedtheideaofpowerasatypeofcausation.Thiscausalnotion
conceivesofpowerasarelationship(actualorpotential)inwhichthebehaviorofactorAatleastpartially
causesachange inthebehaviorofactorB. 'Behavior' inthiscontextneednotbedefinednarrowly,but
maybeunderstoodbroadly to includebeliefs, attitudes,preferences, opinions, expectations, emotions
and/orpredispositions toact. In thisview,power isanactualorpotential relationshipbetween twoor
moreactors(persons,states,groups,etc.),ratherthanapropertyofanyoneofthem.
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The shift from a property concept of power to a relational one constituted a revolution in power
analysis.Despitetheancientoriginsofthestudyofpower,Dahlmaintainsthat 'thesystematicempirical
studyofpowerrelations isremarkablynew'(1968:414).Heattributesthe 'considerable improvement in
the clarity'ofpower concepts to the fact that 'the last severaldecadeshaveprobablywitnessedmore
systematiceffortstotiedowntheseconceptsthanhavethepreviousmillenniaofpoliticalthought'(Dahl,
[1963,1984]1991:27
8;
Dahl
and
Stinebrickner,
2003:
12).
DimensionsofPower
The relational power perspective views power as multidimensional rather than monolithic and
unidimensional. This allows for the possibility that power can increase on one dimension while
simultaneouslydecreasingonanother.Amongthemoreimportantdimensionsofpowerarethefollowing:
Scope ScopereferstotheaspectofB'sbehavioraffectedbyA.Thiscallsattentiontothepossibilitythat
anactor'spowermayvaryfromoneissuetoanother.Thus,acountrylikeJapanmayhavemoreinfluence
with respect toeconomic issues thanwith respect tomilitary issues;and the reversemaybe trueofa
countrylikeNorthKorea.
Domain Thedomainofanactor'spowerreferstothenumberofotheractorssubjecttoitsinfluence.In
otherwords,howbigisB;orhowmanyBsarethere?Thus,astatemayhaveagreatdealofinfluencein
one regionof theworld,whilehaving littleorno influence inotherpartsof theworld.Thedomainof
influenceofRussiatodayissmallerthanthatoftheformerSovietUnion.
Weight Theweightofanactor'spowerreferstotheprobabilitythatB'sbehaviorisorcouldbeaffected
byA(Dahl,1957;seealsoDeutsch,[1968]1988;LasswellandKaplan,1950).Thus,acountrythathasonlya
30percentchanceofachievingitsaimsintradenegotiationsislesspowerfulthanonewitha90percent
chance,ceterisparibus.Thisdimensioncouldalsobelabeledthe'reliability'ofA'sinfluence.
Costs Both thecosts toAand thecosts toBare relevant toassessing influence (Baldwin,1989;Barry,
1976;Dahl,1968;Harsanyi,1962;Schelling,1984:26890). Is itcostlyorcheapforAto influenceB?Is it
costlyor cheap forB to complywithA'sdemands? Somehave suggested thatmore power should be
attributed to an actor that can exercise influence cheaply than toone forwhom it is costly (Harsanyi,
1962). IfAcangetB todo something that iscostly forB, somewouldcontend that this is indicativeof
morepowerthanifAcanonlygetBtodothingsthatarecheapforB.EvenifAisunabletogetBtocomply
with itsdemands, itmaybeable to imposecostsonB fornoncompliance.Somehaveargued that this
shouldbeviewedasakindofpower(Baldwin,1985;Harsanyi,1962;Schelling,1984:26890).
Means There aremanymeansof exercising influence andmanyways to categorize suchmeans.One
scheme (Baldwin, 1985) for classifying the means of influence in international relations includes the
followingcategories:
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1. Symbolicmeans. Thiswouldincludeappealstonormativesymbolsaswellastheprovisionof
information. Thusonecountrymightinfluenceanothereitherbyremindingthemthatslavery
isbadorby informingthem thatAIDS iscausedbyHIV. Itwouldalso includewhatThomas
Risse(2000:33)hascalledcommunicativeactionarguinganddeliberatingabout identities,
interests,andthestateoftheworld. Discourses,propaganda,framing,andnarrativescould
alsobe
considered
symbolic
means
of
influence.
2. Economicmeans. Augmentingorreducingthegoodsorservicesavailabletoothercountries
hasalonghistoryinworldpolitics.
3. Militarymeans. Actual or threatenedmilitary force has receivedmore attention than any
othermeansininternationalrelations.
4. Diplomaticmeans. Diplomacyincludesawidearrayofpractices,includingrepresentationand
negotiation.
Whichdimensionsofpowershouldbespecified formeaningfulscholarlycommunication?There isno
singlerightanswertothisquestion.Thecausalconceptofpower,however,doesimplyaminimumsetof
specifications.ThepointiswellputbyJackNagel(1975:14):
Anyonewhoemploysacausalconceptofpowermustspecifydomainandscope.Tosay'Xhaspower'may
seemsensible,buttosay'Xcauses'or'Xcancause'isnonsense.CausationimpliesanXandaYacauseand
aneffect.Ifpoweriscausation,onemuststatetheoutcomecaused.Stipulatingdomainandscopeanswers
thequestion'Poweroverwhat?'
Theideathatameaningfulspecificationofapowerrelationshipmustincludescopeanddomainiswidely
sharedbypoweranalystscommittedtosocialscientific inquiry (Barry,1976;Dahl,1991,1968;Dahland
Stinebrickner,2003;Deutsch,[1968]1988;Frey,1971,1989;LasswellandKaplan,1950).
Themultidimensionalnatureofpowermakes itdifficulttoaddupthevariousdimensions inorder to
arriveatsomeoverallestimateofanactor'spower.Althoughtherearesomesimilaritiesbetweenpolitical
power and purchasing power (Baldwin, 1989), one important difference is the lack of a standardized
measuring rod for the former.Whereasmoney canbeused tomeasurepurchasingpower, there isno
comparablestandard
of
value
in
terms
of
which
to
add
up
the
various
dimensions
of
power
so
as
to
arrive
atanoveralltotal.Forthisreason,estimatesofanactors'overallpower'arelikelytobecontroversial.
FacesofPower
Oneofthemostfamousdebatesintheliteratureonpowerduringthelasthalfofthetwentiethcenturyis
knownasthe 'FacesofPower'debate(BachrachandBaratz,1962; Isaac,1987;Lukes,1974).Thedebate
8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
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was triggered by reactions to Dahls study of governance in New Haven, Connecticut (1961). The
methodologyadoptedforthestudy ofpowerinNewHavenidentifiedthreeissueareasandattemptedto
determinewhocouldsuccessfully initiatepolicyproposals indecisionmakingwithrespecttothese issue
areas.2BachrachandBaratz(1962;1963)arguedthatDahlsapproachneglectedasecondfaceofpower
representedbythesuppressionofsomeissues,thus,ineffect,keepingthemfrombeingconsidered.That
isto
say,
keeping
them
off
the
agenda
of
the
decision
makers.
A
decade
later,
Lukes
(1974)
introduced
the
ideaofyetanother faceofpowerthe third face. Hepointedout thatoneway forA togetB todo
somethingBwouldnototherwisedoistoaffectBspreferences,wants,orthoughts.
Eachofthesesocalledfacesofpowerhassomerelevanceforthestudyofinternationalrelations.
The first face, focusedondecisionmakingwithrespecttospecific issues, isonviewanytime the foreign
policymakersofone country try to influencedecisionmaking in another country.3 The second face is
illustrated whenever an agenda item is suppressed by some countries despite the desires of other
countries. Andanexampleofthethirdfacemightbethe(alleged)abilityoftheUnitedStatestogetother
countriestoembracetheWashingtonconsensusorneoliberaleconomicviews. Thisthirdfaceofpower
isclosely
related
to
Nyes
concept
of
soft
power
and
to
Antonio
Gramscis
idea
of
hegemony.
(Lukes,
2005,2007).
The significance of the threefaces debate is easily and often exaggerated. Contrary to the
understanding of many, the three faces do not imply a need for fundamental reconceptualization of
power. Lukes himself admits that the three views can be seen as alternative interpretations and
adaptations of one and the same underlying concept of power, in which B is affected by A (Lukes,
1974:27).4 TheonefundamentaldifferencebetweenDahlsconceptofpowerandthatofLukeswasthe
lattersinsistencethatpowerbedefinedasdetrimentaltotheinterestsofB. Inthesecondeditionofhis
book,however,Lukesadmitsthat thisviewwasamistakeandadoptsapositionclosertoDahls (Lukes,
2005:1213;2007).
INTERNATIONAL
POWER
ANALYSIS
Althoughmanypoliticalscientistshavecontributedtothepoweranalysisrevolutionduringthepastfifty
years,very fewhavebeenstudentsof internationalrelations (Baldwin,1971b;Singer,1963).Haroldand
Margaret Sprout,whohadbeenproponentsof theelementsofnationalpower approach in theirearly
work (SproutandSprout,1945), later repudiated thatapproachandwereamong the first international
relationsscholarstocallforincorporationoftherelationalpowerapproachintothestudyofinternational
politics(SproutandSprout,1956,1962,1965).DespitetheeffortsoftheSproutsandothers,however,the
elementsofnationalpowerapproachisstilldeeplyembeddedintheinternationalrelationsliterature(e.g.,
Mearsheimer,2001;Waltz,1979).Thissituationhasgivenrisetoseveralproblemsintheanalysisofpower
intheinternationalarena,someofwhicharediscussedbelow.
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ThePotentialPowerProblem
The elements of national power approach to power analysis is a variant of the powerasresources
approach. Inthisapproach,powerresourcesare treatedas iftheywerepower itself.Oneproblemwith
thisapproachisthatwhatfunctionsasapowerassetinonesituationmaybeapowerliabilityinadifferent
situation.Planes
loaded
with
nuclear
bombs
may
be
worse
than
useless
in
asituation
calling
for
planes
withconventionalweaponswith insufficient time tounload thenuclearweaponsand reload theplanes
withconventionalones.Andthesamestockpileofarmsthatisusefulfordeterringonecountrymaytrigger
anarmsracewithanother.Similarly,whatconstitutesa 'goodhand' incardgamesdependsonwhether
oneisplayingpokerorbridge.
Discussionsofthecapabilitiesofstatesthatfailtodesignateorimplyaframeworkofassumptionsabout
who istrying(ormighttry)togetwhomtodowhatarecomparabletodiscussionsofwhatconstitutesa
good hand in cards without specifying which game is to be played. The Sprouts called this set of
assumptionsa'policycontingencyframework'(1965,1971).Focusingonthecapabilitiesofstatesissimply
awayofdrawingattentiontotheirpotentialpower.Itmakesnomoresensetotalkaboutstatecapabilities
ingeneralthantotalkaboutstatepowerwithout(explicitlyor implicitly)specifyingscopeanddomain.If
onewantstoestimatethepotentialpowerofGuatemala, ithelpstoknow,nay, it is imperativetoknow
whetheritconcernsaborderdisputewithEISalvadororatradeagreementwiththeUnitedStates.
Althoughitissometimessuggestedthatinsistenceonspecificationofthescopeanddomainofpotential
power relationshipsmakes prediction and or generalization nearly impossible (Guzzini, 2000; Keohane,
1986), this isnot true. Specificationof scope anddomain (orpolicycontingency frameworks)neednot
implyatheoreticalempiricism.Policycontingencyframeworksmaybedefinedmoreorlessbroadlytosuit
thepurposeoftheanalyst.AsNagel(1975:14)observes,'domainandscopeneednotbeparticularisticor
unique.Dependingonone'spurposeandthe limits imposedbyreality,theoutcomeclassmaycontaina
fewsimilarmembersormanydiverseelements'.Itis,ofcourse,possibletomakepredictionsorgeneralize
about thepotentialpowerofGuatemala (or similar states)without reference toGuatemala'sgoalsand
withoutreferencetothegoalsorcapabilitiesofotherstates;butitisnotclearwhyonewouldwanttodo
so.
Powerresourcesaretherawmaterialsoutofwhichpowerrelationshipsareforged.Although itmight
seem that the predictive value of power resource inventories is impaired by insistence on prior
specificationof scope anddomain, theopposite is true. The accuracyofone'sestimateofwhether an
architect
has
adequate
raw
materials
to
complete
his
or
her
project
is
likely
to
improve
if
one
first
ascertainswhetherthearchitectplanstobuildabirdhouseoracathedral.
Although it iscommonpractice to refer to the power resourcesor capabilitiesofa stateas if
theywerepossessionsofthestate,thispracticecanbemisleading. Strictlyspeaking,thepowerresources
ofastatearenotattributesofthestateinthesamesensethatpopulationorterritoryareattributes. To
designatesomething(time,reputation,weaponry,money,oil,andsoon)asapowerresourceistoimply
somethingabout itsusefulness ingettingotherstochangetheirbehaviorandthusto implysomething
about the value system and capabilities of these others. (Threats do not work very well against
masochists.)
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TheFungibilityProblem
'Fungibility'referstotheeasewithwhichpowerresourcesuseful inone issueareacanbeused inother
issueareas.Money inamarketeconomy istheprototypicalfungibleresource.Indeed,fungibility(that is,
liquidity)isoneofthedefiningcharacteristicsofmoney.5Inamarketeconomyonedoesnotusuallyneed
tospecify
the
scope
or
domain
of
the
purchasing
power
of
money
because
the
same
euro
(yen,
dollar,
etc.)
canbeusedtobuyacar,ameal,ahaircut,orabook.
Itissometimessuggestedthatpowerplaysthesameroleininternationalpoliticsthatmoneydoesina
marketeconomy(Deutsch,[1968]1988;Mearsheimer,2001;Wolfers,1962).Politicalpowerresources,of
course,dovaryindegreeoffungibility.Money,timeandinformationtendtobemorefungiblethanmost
otherpowerresourcesinthattheyareuseful inmanydifferentsituations.Totheextentthatthepower
money analogy leads to ignoring the need to specify scope and domain, however, it can be quite
misleadingforthepoliticalpoweranalyst(Baldwin,1989).
Somescholarshavesuggestedthatthefungibilityofpowerresourcesincreasesastheamountincreases
(Art, 1996;Waltz, 2000). Thus, power is said to bemore fungible for powerful states than forweaker
states. It is not clearwhat thismeansorwhy itmight be true. It is, of course, true thatmore power
resources allowone todomore things, that is, influencemore actors and/ormore issues.This implies
nothing about the fungibilityofanyparticularpower resource. Fungibility refers to theusesof agiven
amountofapowerresource,nottotheusesofvaryingamounts.Intheeconomicrealm,richpeoplecan
buymore thingsthanpoorpeople;butthis isnotbecausearichperson'sdollar ismore fungiblethana
poor person's dollar. The contention that fungibility increaseswith the amount of power resources is
basedeitherona confused conceptof fungibilityorona logic thathasyet tobe spelledout (Baldwin,
1999;Guzzini,1998).
TheProblemofIntentions
MaxWeber(1947:152)definedpoweras'theprobabilitythatoneactorwithinasocialrelationshipwillin
aposition to carryouthisownwilldespite resistance, regardlessof thebasisonwhich thisprobability
rests'.Thisdefinitionclearlymakesthe intentionsofactorAan importantpartoftheconceptofpower.
Manyof themost interesting and important questions in international relations concern the ability or
inabilityofgovernmentstorealizetheirgoals.CantheAllieswintheSecondWorldWar?CantheUnited
StatesgetothercountriestojointheUnitedNations?CanJapangetthemembersoftheUnitedNationsto
letitjoin?CanRussiagettheapprovalofmembercountriestojointheWorldTradeOrganization?Canthe
poorcountriesgettradepreferences fromtherich?Allsuchquestions involvetheabilityofcountriesto
realizetheirgoals.
Butwhat about unintended effects?When theUnited States FederalReserve system raises interest
rates, it usually intends to affect the American domestic economy; but the actual effects are likely to
reverberatearoundtheworld.Thereisnoquestionabouttherealityorimportanceofunintendedeffects
in international politics (Guzzini, 2000; Jervis, 1997; Strange, 1988). The question is whether the
conventionalconceptofpowercanaccountforsuchphenomena.Althoughintentionsareoftenbuiltinto
8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
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thecausalconceptofpower,forexample,theWeberianversion,theyneednotbe.It isquitepossibleto
differentiatebetweensituationsinwhichAintentionallycausesachangeinB'sbehaviorandsituationsin
which A does so unintentionally (Baldwin, 1989; Frey, 1989). Relational power analysis is historically
indebted to theWeberian formulation,but it isnot logicallyboundby it. Thus, there isnoneed for a
fundamentalreformulationoftheconceptofpowerinordertoaccountforitsunintendedeffects.
Those who call for more attention to the unintended effects of power tend to imply that these
unintendedeffectsaredetrimental to the interestsof thoseaffected (BarnettandDuvall,2005;Guzzini,
2000; Strange, 1988). This is not necessarily so. The unintended effects can also be beneficial to the
interests of those affected.When theUnited States encourages tradewith other countries, it does so
primarilywith the intentionof improving itsowneconomicwelfare;but thismayhave theunintended
effectof improving thewelfareof its tradingpartnersalso.When theUnitedStates took steps todeter
Soviet nuclear attack onNorth America during the ColdWar, it did so primarilywith the intention of
providingforitsownsecurity;butthisactionhadtheunintendedeffectofprovidingforCanadiansecurity
also.6Whethertheunintendedeffectsoftheactions(orinactions)ofpowerfulstatestendstobebeneficial
ordetrimental
to
the
interests
of
those
affected
is
an
empirical
question.
It
should
be
answered
by
research,notbydefinitionorassertion.
TheMeasurementProblem
Before one canmeasure power, onemust first have a concept of power. In the field of international
relations,thedesiretomeasurepoweronasingledimensionthatwouldallowstatestoberankedoften
getsinthewayoforevenprecedesconceptualanalysis.Frey(1989)haspointedoutthatthedifficultyof
measuringpoweroften leads researchers to redefine it soas tomakeoperationalizationeasier. 'In this
fashion,power
has
frequently
been
defined
in
terms
of
supposed
resources
e.g.,
the
ability
to
mobilize
resources,possessionofresources,andother formsofwhatElster(I976:252)calls"generalizedfetichist
theories,"thatis,theoriesthatattempttoregardrelationsasproperties'(Frey,1989:78).Dahl(1984:21)
identifiesconfoundingpowerwithresourcesasafallacyinpoweranalysis,andanotherwriterlabelsitas
thevehiclefallacy(Morriss,2002:1819).
Asnotedabove,thereisnopoliticalcounterpartformoney.Thereisnostandardizedmeasurethat
facilitates reducing the various dimensions of power to a single dimension. Yet the desire tomeasure
powermakesthisaninconvenientfact:
Thesearchforanindexofnationalpowerhasbeenlargely,...basedontheassumptionthatitispossibleand
desirabletofindacurrencyofpolitics.Aseconomistsvieweconomictransactionsofallsortsandatalllevels
intermsofastandardizedunitofcurrency, ...so,theassumptionruns,mustthepoliticalscientistfindan
absolutescalealongwhichtoevaluatethe'power'ofnationstates.(MerrittandZinnes,1988:142)
It is thedesireof international relations scholars to rank theoverallpowerof states fromhighest to
lowest that generates the most difficult measurement problems. This requires comparing different
dimensionsofpowerrelationswithoutanyagreeduponwaytodothis.Somescholarscontendthatthe
questionof 'Who'snumberone?' isasuseful in international relationsas it is in sports (RayandVural,
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1986).Itisnotclear,however,thatitiseithermeaningfulorusefultoaskthisquestionevenintherealm
of sports. Assessing athletic abilitywithout reference to a specified set of athletic activities is akin to
assessingpowerwithoutreferencetoscopeanddomain.Howisonetocompareagolfer,aswimmer,an
archer,arunnerandaweightlifter?AsDahl([1963,1984J1991:27)haspointedout,'itisdifficultenough
toestimaterelative influencewithinaparticularscopeanddomain; it isbynomeansclearhowwecan
"addup"
influence
over
many
scopes
and
domains
in
order
to
arrive
at
total,
or
aggregate,
influence'.
This
isequallytrueofattemptsto'addup'andcompareathleticaccomplishmentsindifferentsports.
Most indicesofoverallnationalpower relyprimarilyonGNP,butare sometimes supplementedwith
demographicandmilitarymeasures(MerrittandZinnes,1988).Thebestknownoftheseisthatdeveloped
by the Correlates of War Project (Singer, 1988). Such measures can be useful if they are set in an
appropriatepolicycontingencyframework. WhatmakestheCorrelatesofWarpower indexmoreuseful
thanmost such indices is that itwasdeveloped andhasusuallybeen applied in amilitary context. It
shouldbenoted,however, thatevenmilitary capabilitiesmayvarygreatly fromonepolicycontingency
frameworktoanother. Nuclearweapons, forexample,maybeuseful fordeterringattackbutmayhave
littleor
no
relevance
to
prevailing
in
acounter
insurgency
situation.
Although resources should not be confounded with power, they can be useful in measuring it.
CountrieswithlargeGrossDomesticProducts,forexample,arelikelytobeabletoinfluencemorepeople
with respect tomore issues thancountrieswithsmallerGDPs (ceterisparibus). Othermeasures of the
power of A with respect to B (domain) andwith respect to C (scope) can bemade on the following
dimensions:(1)theprobabilityofB'scompliance;(2)thespeedwithwhichBcomplies;(3)thenumberof
issuesincludedinC;(4)themagnitudeofthepositiveornegativesanctionprovidedbyA;(5)thecoststo
A; (6) the costs to B; and (7) the number of options available to B (Dahl, 1968; Frey, 1985, 1989). If
international relations researcherswere togiveup the search forauniversallyvalidmeasureofoverall
nationalpower,muchuseful research couldbe focusedonmeasuring thedistributionofpowerwithin
specifiedscopesanddomains.
POWERININTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY
'Thepropositionthatthenatureof internationalpolitics isshapedbypowerrelations' isoften listedasa
'definingcharacteristicofRealism'(Wendt,1999:967).AsWendt(1999:97)pointsout,however,this is
notauniquecharacteristicofrealism.Neoliberals,Marxists,postmodernists,constructivists,dependency
theorists,globalistsand feministsall thinkpowermatters.Noattemptwillbemadehere to survey the
treatmentsofpowerrelationsinallofthesetheories.Thediscussionwillconfineitselftothreewellknown
andinfluentialtheoriesthebalanceofpower,neorealism,andoffensiverealism.
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ClassicBalanceofPowerTheory
The 'balanceofpower'wasusedbyThucydidestoexplaintheonsetof thePeloponnesianWar,wasthe
subjectof an essaybyDavidHume (1742) in theeighteenth century, and continues to fascinate inter
national relations theorists even today (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005; Claude, 1989; Guzzini, 2000;
Kaufman,Little,
and
Wohlforth,
2007;
Little,
2007;
Moul,
1989;
Nexon,
2009;
Paul,
Wirtz,
and
Fortmann,
2004;Schweller,2006;Walt,1987;Waltz,1979).Althoughmanydifferent theoriescarry the 'balanceof
power' label, the term itself, 'implies that changes in relative political power can be observed and
measured'(Wright,1965:743).
Thequestionofpreciselywhatisbeingobservedandmeasured,however,hasremainedelusive.Inthe
nineteenth century Richard Cobden argued that the term 'balance of power' could 'be discarded as
fallacious,sinceitgivesnodefinitionwhetherbybreadthofterritory,numberofinhabitants,orextentof
wealthaccordingtowhich,inbalancingtherespectivepowers,eachstateshallbeestimated'(quotedin
Gulick,1955:27).Pollard(1923:58)concludedthattheterm'maymeanalmostanything;anditisusednot
only indifferentsensesbydifferentpeople,or indifferentsensesbythesamepeopleatdifferenttimes,
but in different senses by the same person at the same time'.Morgenthau (1960: 167) discussed the
balanceofpoweratlength,butadmittedtousingthetermtomeanfourdifferentthings.Oneistempted
todespairwhenonewriterdismissesthetermasmeaningless(Guzzini,2000),whileanothercontendsthat
theproblem is 'not that ithasnomeaning,butthat ithas toomanymeanings' (Claude,1962:13;Haas,
1953).Itisbeyondthelimitsofthischaptertoattemptclarificationofthisconceptualmorass.
Nomatterwhichversionofbalanceofpower theoryoneconsiders, the ideaofpowerasaproperty
rather than a relation is firmlyembedded. It couldhardlybeotherwise, sinceany attempt to interpret
balance of power theory using the relational concept of power would immediately encounter the
difficultiesflowingfromthemultidimensionalityofpowerandthelackofastandardizedmeasureofvalue
in terms ofwhich these dimensions could be expressed. Suppose a country drains resources from its
domesticeconomyinordertoincreaseitsmilitarystrength,astheSovietUniondid.Itsmilitarypowermay
be increasing at the same time, and partly because, its economicpower isdecreasing.How is one to
calculatetheneteffectontheoverallbalanceofpower,giventhedifficultyofaddingupvariousscopes
anddomainsofpower? It isprecisely thesedifficulties that leadGuzzini (1998,2000) topronounce the
termmeaningless.
Totheextentthatbalanceofpowertheoryhasbeenmeaningful,ithasbeenbasedonaconceptionof
power
as
a
particular
type
of
power
resource
used
in
a
particular
policy
contingency
framework,
that
is,
military forceconceived in thecontextofwarwinningability (Claude,1962;Gulick,1955;Mearsheimer,
2001;Morgenthau,[1948]1960;Walt,1987;Waltz,1979;Wright,1965:743ff).Theanalyticalperspective
ofrelationalpowerpromptsonetoask,'Powertogetwhomtodowhat?'Oneofthebenefitsofbringing
thisperspectivetobearonbalanceofpowertheoriesisthatitbringstolighttheunderlyingassumptions
that:(1)militaryforceisthemeasureofpower;and(2)warwinningiswhatmattersmost.Onlyafterthese
assumptionshavebeenmadeexplicitcanfruitfuldebateastotheirwisdomoccur.
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Neorealism
The theory of neorealism (aka structural realism or defensive realism) developed by Waltz (I979)
dominateddiscussionsof international relationstheoryduringthe lastquarterof the twentiethcentury,
muchasMorgenthau's (1948)versionof the theoryof realismdominateddiscussionsduring theperiod
between1950
and
1975.
Overall
evaluation
of
neorealism
is
beyond
the
scope
of
this
chapter.
Instead,
the
focusisontheroleofpowerandcapabilitiesinthetheory.
Waltzadvancesa structural theoryof internationalpolitics.Oneof thedefiningcharacteristicsof the
structureof the international system is thedistributionof capabilities. Sincejudgmentsmustbemade
abouthowcapabilitiesaredistributed,Waltzmustconfrontthe issueofhowtomeasurethem.Realizing
that his theory requires the rank ordering of states according to their capabilities, he resists the
specificationofscopeanddomainnecessitatedbyarelationalnotionofpower.Rankingthecapabilitiesof
states ismuchharder ifpower(orcapability) isconceivedasmultidimensionaLThus,heassertsthat 'the
economic,military,andothercapabilitiesofnationscannotbesectoredand separatelyweighed' (1979:
131). He provides neither argument nor evidence to support the assertion that different kinds of
capabilities cannotbemeasured separately;he simply asserts it. Itmaybe thatWaltzhas inmind the
constraintsofhis theory in the sense thatpermitting capabilities tobeweighed separately couldmake
rankingstatesexcessivelydifficult.Waltzgoesontosaythat'statesarenotplacedinthetoprankbecause
theyexcelinonewayoranother.Theirrankdependsonhowtheyscoreonallofthefollowingitems:size
ofpopulationandterritory,resourceendowment,economiccapability,militarystrength,politicalstability
andcompetence.Statesspendalotoftimeestimatingoneanother'scapabilities,especiallytheirabilities
todoharm'(1979:131).Theuseoftheterm'score'isrevealing.Itimpliesameasuringrod,orstandard,in
termsofwhichthevariouselementsofnationalpowercanbeevaluated;butthereisnoindicationofwhat
thisstandard is.Theassertionthatstatesdevote'a lotoftimetoestimatingoneanother'scapabilities' is
unsupportedandcontestable.Thedefenseministriesofstatesformulatecontingencyplanswithrespectto
avarietyofpolicycontingencyframeworks,but it isunlikelythattheyspendmuchtimeestimatingeach
other's capabilities in general or without reference to actual or postulated situations. The idea that
AmericanpolicymakersspendalotoftimecalculatingthecapabilitiesofCanadaortheUnitedKingdomin
general, or in the abstract, seems rather farfetched. Still, these are empirical questions and are, in
principle,researchable.
Despite his admission that 'states have different combinations of capabilities which are difficult to
measure and compare' (1979: 131),Waltzproclaims that 'ranking states ...doesnot requirepredicting
their
success
in
war
or
in
other
endeavors.
We
need
only
rank
them
roughly
by
capability'.
This
assertion,
ofcourse,begsthequestionofhow'capabilities'aretobedefinedadefinitionthatWaltzneverprovides.
We are toldonly that capabilities are 'attributes of units' (1979: 98). Clearly, the relational concept of
powerorcapabilitiesisruledout,sincethatconceptofpowerdepictscapabilitiesaspotentialrelationships
ratherthanaspropertiesofasinglestate(orunit).Thequestionof'Capabilitytogetwhomtodowhat?'is
simplybegged;andthepowerasresourcesconceptunderlyingWaltz'stheorybecomesapparent.
At some level,however,most international relations theorists recognize thewisdomof the Sprouts
contention that 'without some setofgivenundertakings (strategies,policies),actualorpostulated,with
referencetosomeframeofoperationalcontingencies,actualorpostulated,therecanbenoestimationof
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politicalcapabilities' (1965:215). Inmost treatmentsof theelementsofnationalpower in international
politics an implicit set of policycontingency assumptions can be identified, usually having to do with
military power. Just as Morgenthau's discussion of the elements of national power implies that war
winning is thestandardofjudgment (Baldwin,1993:1718),carefulreadingofWaltzgeneratesastrong
suspicionthatwarwinningabilityistheunstatedstandardbywhichstatesarebeingranked.Morgenthau's
contentionthat
'nations
active
in
international
politics
are
continuously
preparing
for,
actively
involved
in,
or recovering fromorganizedviolence in the formofwar' ([1948]1960:38) is remarkably similar to the
outlookinWaltz'sTheoryofInternationalPolitics.'Thepossibilitythatforcewillbeusedbyoneoranother
ofthepartiesloomsalwaysasathreatinthebackground.Inpoliticsforceissaidtobetheultimaratio.In
internationalpolitics forceserves,notonlyastheultimaratio,but indeedasthe firstandconstantone'
(Waltz,1979:113). 'Thedailypresenceof forceand recurrent relianceon itmark theaffairsofnations.
SinceThucydidesinGreeceandKautilyainIndia,theuseofforceandthepossibilityofcontrollingithave
been thepreoccupationsof internationalpolitical studies' (Waltz,1979:186).Given theabsenceofany
explicitstandardfor'scoring'thecapabilitiesofstatesinWaltz'stext,thereismorethanalittlereasonto
suspectthatwarwinningistheimplicitstandardbeingapplied.
Althoughthebook isnearlydevoidofreferencestothescholarly literatureonrelationalpower,atthe
endofTheoryofInternationalPolitics(1979:1912),almostasanafterthought,Waltzlaunchesaconfusing
andconfusedattackontherelationalconceptofpower:'Wearemisledbythepragmaticallyformedand
technologically influenced American definition of powera definition that equates powerwith control.
Power isthenmeasuredby theabilitytogetpeopletodowhatonewantsthem todowhenotherwise
theywouldnotdo it.'This isapuzzlingandmisleadingcriticism.It isunclearwhyWaltzusesthephrases
'pragmatically formed,' 'technologically influenced,'or 'American'. The relational conceptofpowerwas
developedbynonAmericansaswellasAmericans(Barry,1976;GoldmannandSjstedt,1979;Hagstrm,
2005;Lukes,1974;Weber,1947)andhasnointrinsicallyethnocentricbiases.Andneitherthemeaningnor
thesignificanceofpragmatismandtechnologyisselfevidentorexplained.
Waltzgoesontoassertthat'thecommonrelationaldefinitionofpoweromitsconsiderationofhowacts
and relationsareaffectedby the structureofactionwhich isnotnecessarily true,and thatunintended
effectsareruledoutofconsideration,whichistrueofsomeversionsofrelationalpowerbutnotothersas
notedabove.
'According to the common American definition of power, a failure to get one's way is proof of
weakness.'Inasensethisistrue.Actorsthatconsistentlytryandfailtoinfluenceotheractorsareunlikely
tobeviewedaspowerful.Indeed,Waltzhimselfappearstobelievethis,sincehe laterobservesthat 'the
strongergettheirwaynotalways,butmoreoftenthantheweaker'(Waltz,1993).
Waltzthenasks: 'Whatthencanbesubstitutedforthepracticallyand logicallyuntenabledefinition? I
offertheoldandsimplenotionthatanagent ispowerfultotheextentthatheaffectsothersmorethan
theyaffecthim.'Thereare several remarkableaspectsof thisproposeddefinitionofpower.First,after
rejectingbothcausaland relationalconceptsofpower,heproposesadefinition that isbothcausaland
relational. Second, thenotionproposed is similar to thoseespousedbyDeutsch (1953,1963) and Frey
(1985),bothofwhom saw themselves as contributing to thedevelopmentof the relational conceptof
power.Third, it is inconsistentwith the statement in theverynextparagraph that 'theextentofone's
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powercannotbeinferredfromtheresultsonemayormaynotget'.Andfourth,theproposedconceptof
powerseemstohavelittleornothingtodowiththeconceptsofpowerandcapabilityusedthroughoutthe
earliersectionsofthebook.Ifcapabilityisdefinedasthepotentialpowertoaffectothersmorethanoneis
affectedbyothers,itisnolongerapropertyofasingleactor.
Eventhe
critics
of
neorealism
credit
it
with
having
enhanced
the
clarity
and
rigor
of
the
realist
theoretical tradition (Keohane, 1986).With respect to its treatment of power and capability,however,
Theory of International Politics seems to have introduced a considerable amount of confusion, and
contradiction.
OffensiveRealism
Offensiverealism(Mearsheimer,2001)differentiates itselffromboththerealismofMorgenthauandthe
neorealismofWaltz. AlthoughbothMorgenthauandMearsheimerdepictstatesasstrivingtomaximize
theirpower,7
the
former
attributes
this
to
alust
for
power,
while
the
latter
views
it
as
anecessary
consequenceof theanarchical international system. AndalthoughbothWaltzandMearsheimerderive
stategoalsfromthestructureoftheinternationalsystem,theformerviewsstatesaspursuingonlyenough
security to assure survival,while the latter depicts them as seeking all the power they can get with
hegemonyastheirultimategoal(Mearsheimer,2001:22).
ForMearsheimer, calculationsaboutpower lieattheheartofhowstatesthinkabouttheworld
aroundthem. Poweristhecurrencyofgreatpowerpolitics,andstatescompeteforitamongthemselves.
Whatmoney istoeconomics,power isto internationalrelations(2001:17). Likeotherrealists, including
MorgenthauandWaltz,Mearsheimerviewspower largely inmilitary terms. Unlike them,however,his
emphasis on military force is quite explicit: In international politics, . . . a states effective power is
ultimately a functionof itsmilitary forces . . . . The balance of power is largely synonymouswith the
balanceofmilitarypower. Idefinepower largely inmilitarytermsbecauseoffensiverealismemphasizes
that force is theultima ratioof internationalpolitics (Mearsheimer,2001:5556). It isnotjustmilitary
powerthatmattersforoffensiverealism,itislandpower. Armiesmattermorethannaviesorairforces
becauseoftheirsuperiorabilitytoconquerandcontrolland,whichisthesupremepoliticalobjectiveina
worldofterritorialstates(86).
Criticsofrealismoftenportray itasemphasizingthematerialbasesofnationalpower. Although
suchcharacterizationsaresomewhatunfairtoMorgenthauandWaltz,thisisnotthecasewithrespectto
offensive realism. ForMearsheimer, power represents nothingmore than specific assets ormaterial
resourcesthatareavailabletoastate(57).
LikeWaltz,MearsheimerconsidersandexplicitlyrejectsDahlsrelationalconceptofpower,which
heviewsasequatingpowerwithoutcomes. Accordingtothislogic,heasserts,powerexistsonlywhena
state exercises control or influence, and therefore it can be measured only after the outcome is
determined (p.57). This issimplywrong. Capabilityanalysismaybedifficult,but it isnot impossible
whichMearsheimer seems toadmitwhenhedescribesattempts todetermine thebalanceofpower in
advanceasalmostimpossible(60).
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Offensive realismhas little to sayabout statesability toachievegoalsother than survival. The
conceptofpowerembedded inthistheory iszerosumandbasedon thematerialresources relevantto
conquering and controlling land, which it considers the supreme political objective of states (86).
Regardlessofwhetheroneagreeswiththisviewornot,ithasthegreatmeritofmakingitspremisesand
muchof
its
logic
explicit.8
CURRENT
ISSUES
The studyofpower in international relationshas generatedanumberof issues. Among theseare the
following:polarityandbalancing,theroleofmilitaryforce,structuralpowerandconstructivism.
Polarityand
Balancing
TheendoftheColdWarandthedisintegrationofoneofthesuperpowers inabipolarworldtriggered
renewed interest inbalanceofpower theory. Could the theoryor somevariant thereofexplain the
abruptendof theColdWar? Wasbalanceofpower theory relevant toapost coldWarworld? Could
balanceofpowertheorypredictthefutureevolutionoftheinternationalsystem?
Somepredictedthatbalanceofpowerdynamicswould leadtoamultipolardistributionofpower
(Layne, 1993;Mearsheimer, 1990;Waltz, 1993),whileothersexpected the postColdWarworld tobe
characterizedbyunipolarism(Ikenberry,Mastanduno,andWohlforth,2009;Wohlforth,1999). Brooksand
Wohlforth(2008)
contend
that
the
disparity
in
power
between
the
United
States
and
other
countries
is
so
greatthattheworldisunipolarandlikelytoremainsoforalongtime.
Othershavearguedthatthepowerbalancingprocesscontinuestooperateusingmethodsother
thantraditionalmilitarycapabilityadjustments. Thissoftbalancingprovidesacheckonthepowerofthe
UnitedStates(Pape,2005;Paul,2005).
The renewedattention to thebalanceofpowerduring the last twentyyearshasnotgenerated
much consensus among scholars. Onewriterobserves that recentworkon the subject suggests that,
despitedecadesofattemptstogivegreateranalyticalprecisiontothephrasesbalancingandbalanceof
power,therehasnotbeenmuchprogress(Nexon,2009:334). Othersscholarsfindthatbothsystemic
outcomes and state behavior directly contradict the core balanceofpower hypothesis that balancing
behaviorpreventssystemichegemony(Wohlforthetal,2007). Eventhequestionofwhat ismeantbya
polehasbeencontested. AccordingtoWagner:
It is a remarkable fact that, in spite of all the discussion and debate about bipolarity and
multipolarity,nottomentionthepossibleconsequencesofunipolarity,sincetheendofthecold
war, neitherWaltz nor anyone else has ever specifiedwhat the polarity of an international
system refers to.And thereforenoonehaseverpresented a valid argument in supportof the
claimthatstatesbehavedifferentlyinsystemswithdifferentpolarities(Wagner,2007:21;1993).9
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MilitaryPower
Many writers have commented on the preoccupation with military force by students of international
politicsdown through the ages (Art andWaltz, [1971]1999;Baldwin,1989;Osgood andTucker, 1967;
Sproutand
Sprout,
1945,
1962,
1965;
Wagner,
2007;
Waltz,
1979;
Wright,
1955,
[1942]
1965).
Although
warisanimportantphenomenonthatinternationalrelationsscholarsregardastheirspecialprovince,the
fieldofinternationalrelationshaspaidapriceforitspreoccupationwithmilitaryforce.Theimportanceof
militaryforcehasbeenexaggerated;theroleofnonmilitaryformsofpowerhasbeenunderestimated;and
thefieldofinternationalrelationshasbeenimpoverishedbyitsinsulationfromstudiesofpowerinother
realms.
The privileged place of military power in the study of international politics is demonstrated and
reinforced by references to the 'centrality' of force to international politics (Art, 1996; Baldwin, 1999;
Wagner,2007);tothestudyofpoweras'astudyofthecapacitytowagewar'(Cline,[1975]1997);toforce
as'the
ultimate
form
of
power'
(Gilpin,
1975,
1981);
or
to
international
security
studies
as
'the
study
of
the
threat,use,andcontrolofmilitaryforce'(Walt,1991:212).EvenKeohaneandNye([1977]2001:15),who
have criticized the traditional emphasis on military force, depict force as dominating other means of
power.
Thetendencytosingleoutforceastheultimatemeasuringrodtowhichotherformsofpowershouldbe
compared is anathema to the approach advocated by LasswelI and Kaplan (1950: ix, 76, 85, 92, 94).
Althoughtheygave'specialconsiderationtotheroleofviolence',theyrepeatedlydeniedthatpowerrests
'always,orevengenerally,onviolence';andtheymaintained'thatpowermayrestonvariousbases';that
'noneoftheformsofpowerisbasictoalltheothers';andthat'politicalphenomenaareonlyobscuredby
thepseudosimplification
attained
with
any
unitary
conception
of
power
as
always
and
everywhere
the
same'.DespitethevigorouseffortsofLasswellandKaplanand the traditionofrelationalpoweranalysis
theyspawned,thecontemporary literatureon internationalrelationsoftenexhibitsthesametendencies
toexaggeratetheroleofmilitarypowerasdidearlierworks(Baldwin,1995;Mearsheimer,2001;Rayand
Vural,1986;Walt,1991;Waltz,1979).
Thepreoccupationwithmilitaryforceinthestudyofinternationalpoliticshasledtotheneglectofnon
militaryformsofpower,suchaseconomicstatecraft(Baldwin,1985).Inaddition, ithas ironically limited
understandingofmilitarystatecraft itself.Thequestionofwhenmilitaryforceshouldbeusedcannotbe
answeredwithoutconsiderationofalternativeinstrumentsofstatecraft(Baldwin,1995;1999/2000).Thus,
theneglect
of
non
military
forms
of
power
has
hampered
understanding
of
the
conditions
under
which
militaryforceshouldbeused.
Structuralvs.RelationalPower
Therelationalpowerapproachhasbeencriticizedbothforneglectingthestudyofstructuralpowerandfor
itsallegedinabilitytotakeaccountofstructuralpower(Guzzini,1993,2000;Strange,1988).Totheextent
thatstructuralpowerisviewedasunrelatedtohumanagencyorbasedonanoncausalnotionofpower,it
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would be fair to say that relational power and structural power represent fundamentally different
approachestothestudyofpower.Otherwise,therelationalconceptofpower isquitecapableoftaking
accountofpowerstructures.
If structural power refers to unintentional power or to power with respect to the creation and/or
controlof
structures
(Guzzini,
1993;
Krasner,
1985;
Strange,
1988),
there
is
no
need
to
seek
an
alternative
totherelationalconceptofpower.Thefirstmeaningcanbetakencareofbyexcludingintentionalityfrom
the concept of power, as noted above. And the second meaning of structural power can easily be
accounted forbyproperspecificationofscopeanddomain.Thecreationand/orcontrolof structures is
simplyaninstanceofinfluencewithaparticularscopeanddomain.
The study of power structures does present difficulties for the relational notion of power if such
structuresaredepictedasunidimensionalandmonolithicandunspecifiedastoscopeanddomain.Thus,
the idea of a single power structure dominating all issue areas and all domains to an equal degree is
difficulttoreconcilewiththerelationalpowerapproach.Somediscussionsof'hegemony' in international
relationsseem
to
imply
this
view.
There
is
no
reason,
however,
why
structures,
defined
as
persistent
patterns of power relationships in specified scopes and domains, cannot be usefully studied using the
relational conceptofpower (Frey, 1971). It isworthnoting that Lasswell and Kaplan (1950)devoted a
wholechapterto'structures'.
Constructivismvs.Rationalism
Howdoesthedebatebetweenconstructivismandrationalismintersectwithpoweranalysisinthestudyof
international relations? It depends onwhich of themany versions of constructivism one examines. If
constructivismis
viewed
as
rejecting
human
agency
and
causal
concepts
and
theories,
there
is
very
little
overlap. The postmodernist followers of Michel Foucault, for example, may find the relational power
approach of little interest. Subscribers toWendt's (1999) version of constructivism, however,will find
muchgristfortheirmillintherelationalpowerliterature.Wendt(1999:97)dividesinternationalrelations
theoriesintothosethatemphasize'brutematerialforces'asbasesofpowerandthosethatviewpoweras
'constitutedprimarilybyideasandculturalcontexts'.10
Fromitsinception,therelationalpowerapproachhasincludedbothmaterialandnonmaterialbasesof
power.LasswellandKaplan(1950:87)citedrespect,rectitude,affectionandenlightenmentasbasevalues
ofpowerandinfluence;andtheydevotedawholechapterto'symbols'.AndDahl([1963,1984J1991:35)
includesinformation,friendship,socialstandingandtherighttomakelawsinadditiontothreatsofforce
andmoneyinalistofpoliticalpowerresources.
Inaddition,norms,values,ideasandculturalcontextshavefiguredprominentlyintherelationalpower
approach.Amongthefactorsthatapoweranalystmightwanttoexamine inexplainingpowerrelations,
Dahl (1968: 412) included values, attitudes, expectations, decisionmaking rules, structures and
constitutions. No constructivist is more emphatic about the importance of cultural context in power
analysisthanareLasswellandKaplan(1950:85,94):
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Inparticular,itisofcrucialimportancetorecognizethatpowermayrestonvariousbases,differingnotonly
fromculturetoculture,butalsowithinaculturefromonepowerstructuretoanother.
Noneoftheformsofpowerisbasictoalltheothers. Aspatternsofvaluationinaculturearemodified,
andchangescomeaboutinthesocialorderandtechnology,nowoneformofpowerandnowanother,plays
afundamentalrole. Politicalanalysismustbecontextual,andtakeaccountofthepowerpracticesactually
manifested
in
the
concrete
political
situation.
Insum, far frombeingabattlegroundfor thedueling forcesofconstructivismandrationalism,power
analysismaybeapointofconvergenceforatleastsomemembersofeachcamp.
Noting that Wendt does not discuss the meaning of power, let alone provide a rival
conceptualization of it, Berenskoetter (2007:22n) concludes that Wendts promise to present an
alternative understanding of power constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts rather than
brutematerial forcesremainsunfulfilled. Guzzini (2007:23),however,statesthat constructivisimhas
putsomeorder into itsownpowerconcepts,whichusuallycomeasvariationson the themeofLukes
plus
Foucault.
He
cites
only
articles
by
himself
(1993)
and
by
Barnett
and
Duvall
(2005)
in
support
of
this
assertion.11
Barnett and Duvall (2005) contend that the discipline has shown conceptual favoritism by
conceivingofpowerastheabilityofoneactortogetanothertodosomethinghewouldotherwisenotdo.
Their characterization of this as a realist conception of power is puzzling since realism is usually
associatedwiththepowerasresourcesapproachratherthantherelationalpowerapproachandsincethe
twomostprominentrealists,WaltzandMearsheimer,bothexplicitlyrejectarelationalconceptofpower.
TheconceptofpowerproposedbyBarnettandDuvall(2005:42)isasfollows:
Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the
capacitiesofactorstodeterminetheircircumstancesandfate.
Theyconcedethatthisconceptisrestrictedincomparisonwithanalternativeviewthatseespowerasthe
productionofanyandalleffectsandthusasnearlysynonymouswithcausality. Whatdoesthisalternative
approach include thatBarnettandDuvall leaveout? It includes social relationsofjointaction through
mutualagreementandinteractionsinwhichoneactorisabletoconvinceanotheractortoaltervoluntarily
andfreelyitsbeliefs,interests,oraction. Theythusadmitthattheirproposedconceptofpowerexcludes
bothcooperationandpersuasion. Theyjustifythisexclusionbyassertingthatmostscholarsinterestedin
powerare
concerned
not
simply
with
how
effects
are
produced,
but
rather
with
how
these
effects
work
to
theadvantageofsomeandthedisadvantageofothers. Thisviewofpowerasworkingtotheadvantageof
AandthedisadvantageofB,ofcourse,isthesameasthatespousedbyLukesin1974andrepudiatedby
himin2005.
Although Barnett and Duvall depict their concept of power as broader than Dahls, it is actually
narrower in at least three respects: First, it excludes persuasion; whereas Dahls concept includes it.
Second,itexcludescooperationformutualgain,whichDahlsconceptdoesnot. Andthird,itexcludesall
powerrelationsinwhichAspowerbenefitstheinterestsofB.
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POWER
ANALYSIS
AND
POLICY
RELEVANCE
The twodominant traditions inpower analysis in international relationshavebeendescribed above in
termsof
the
elements
of
national
power
approach,
which
depicts
power
as
resources,
and
the
relational
powerapproach,whichdepictspowerasanactualorpotential relationship.Which ismore likely tobe
usefultopolicymakers?Nye(1990:26;2011:240)suggeststhattherelationalpowerapproachislikelyto
seem 'too ephemeral' to 'practical politicians and leaders'. The idea of power as the 'possession of
resources', he contends, holds more appeal for policymakers because it 'makes power appear more
concrete,measurable,andpredictable'thandoestherelationaldefinition.'Powerinthissense,'henotes,
'meansholdingthehighcardsintheinternationalpokergame.'
A case can be made, however, for the opposite conclusion. It is the elements of national power
approachthathasprovedusefulintheCorrelatesofWarProject.Variousstudiesbasedonthisprojectof
numerouswars
during
the
past
500
years
(Small
and
Singer,
1982;
Stam,
1996;
Wang
and
Ray,
1994)
have
producedusefulknowledgeaboutthecausesandoutcomesofwar.Policymakers,however,tendtohave
notoriouslyshorttimehorizons.Iftheyareconsideringgoingtowar,itisnotveryhelpfultopointoutthat
iftheyfightfiftywarsduringthenextcentury,theyare likelytowinmostofthem.Noraretheylikelyto
caremuchaboutwhat factorswere important inmostof thewars for thepast500years.Mostpolicy
makersarelikelytobeinvolvedinonlyonewar.Theywanttoknowwhethertheircountryislikelytowina
particular war, fought in a particular context, during a particular time period, against a particular
adversary. The gross inventory of American elements of national powerwas not only of little help in
predictingtheoutcomeoftheVietnamWar,itwasquitemisleading.TheUnitedStatesmayhavebeenthe
greatestpowerinthehistoryoftheworld,butitwasillequippedtofightaguerillawarinafarawayland
withlanguage,
culture
and
history
that
it
understood
poorly.
In
that
situation,
arelational
power
approach,
settingthecapabilityestimateinthecontextofarelevantpolicycontingencyframework,wouldprobably
havebeenmoreusefultoAmericanforeignpolicymakers.Contextmatters,andpolicymakers,aspractical
people,arelikelytounderstandthismorereadilythanacademics.Itispermissibletodepictthe elements
ofpowerasholdingthehighcardsinaninternationalcardgame,butitisimpermissibletoimplythatthere
isonlyonekindofcardgameininternationalpolitics.Ifthenameofthegameisbridge,thepersonwith
thegoodpokerhandmaybeinbigtrouble.Policymakersneedtoknowthenameofthegameinorderto
evaluatethestrengthoftheirhands.12
FUTURE
RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
Poweranalysisintersectswithalmosteverymajorresearchprogramininternationalrelations.Itwouldbe
impossibleto identifyallofthepromisingavenuesofresearchforthepoweranalystduringthenextten
yearsorso.Thosediscussedheredonotbegintoexhaustthepossibilitiesforfruitfulresearch.
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PowerRelationsasDependentVariables
Powermaybetreatedaseitheradependentoranindependentvariable(Dahl,1968).Dahl's(1961)classic
studyofcommunitypowerwasentitledWhoGoverns? Inthisstudy,powerwastreatedasadependent
variable.The studybegan, as the title implies,with theassumption thatpowerwasbeingexercisedby
thosewho
govern
and
proceeded
to
ask,
'By
whom?';
'On
what
issues?';
'How?';
and
so
on.
International
relations scholars may want to devote more attention to power as a dependent variable. Instead of
focusing on how a given power distribution affects regime formation or war initiation, international
relations scholarscoulddevotemoreattention toquestions like 'Whohaspowerwith respect towhich
otheractors,onwhichissues?''Bywhatmeansisthispowerexercised?'And'Whatresourcesallowstates
toexercise thispower?'Agoodexampleof thiskindof research isCoxand Jacobson's (1973) studyof
influence in internationalorganizations.Theyfocusonthedistributionof influence,different issueareas,
and different time periods. They also examine the bases of power of various actors. Students of
internationalrelationsneedtodevotemoreattentiontotreatingpowerasadependentvariableandless
totreatingitasanindependentvariable(cf.CaporasoandHaggard,1989).
FormsofPower
Preoccupationwithmilitarypowerhas led studentsof international relations toneglectother formsof
power.
Softpower The term 'softpower'was introduced byNye (1990) andhas been popularized byhim in
ensuingyears(2004;2007;2011).Heusedittocallattentiontotheabilitytoget'otherstowantwhatyou
want'(Nye,1990:312).Notingthatthisabilitytoaffectthepreferencesofothers'tendstobeassociated
with intangiblepowerresourcessuchasculture, ideology,and institutions',hedistinguished it from 'the
hardcommandpowerusuallyassociatedwithtangibleresourceslikemilitaryandeconomicstrength.
Inlaterwritingsonsoftpower,Nyeemphasizedattraction:What issoftpower? Itistheability
togetwhatyouwant throughattraction rather thancoercionorpayments (2004:x). InTheFutureof
Power Nye(2011:2021)offered alonger,moreformaldefinitionoftheconcept:
Fullydefined,softpoweristheabilitytoaffectothersthroughthecooptivemeansofframingthe
agenda,persuading,andelicitingpositiveattractioninordertoobtainpreferredoutcomes.
Apparently,thetangibilityofresourcesisnotanessentialdefiningcharacteristicofsoftpower,but
ratheranempiricalassociation. Militaryforce,whichmanyunderstandtobetheprototypicalexampleof
hardpower,onlyappearstobeadefiningcharacteristicofhardpower(Nye,2007:167),sinceitcanalso
beused toproduce softpower. This amalgamationof thediscussionofdefining characteristicsof soft
powerwithempiricalobservationsabout ithasgeneratedneedlessconfusion.13 Futureresearchonsoft
powershouldclearlydistinguishbetweendefinitionalmattersandempiricalones.
AlthoughNyesometimesreferstohimselfashavingcoinedthetermsoftpower,atothertimes
heclaimstohaveintroducedtheconcept(2007;2004;2011). Theformerassertion istrue,the latteris
8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
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not. Thereisadifferencebetweencoiningaphraseand inventingaconcept. Theconceptofinfluencing
someonebyshapingthatpersonspreferencesgettingthemtowantwhatyouwanthasdeephistorical
roots,whichhavebeenexploredbyGallarotti(2010b).
Nye (2004:150)suggeststhatthe idea buildsonwhatPeterBachrachandMortonBaratzcalled
thesecond
face
of
power.
(Bachrach
and
Baratz,
1963:
632
42).
Those
familiar
with
the
faces
of
power
debate,however,willrecognizethattheconceptofsoftpowerisclosertoLukesthirdfaceofpowerthan
tothesecond.
Furtherresearchwouldalsobehelpedbyrecognitionthatthere is littlenew inthe ideaofsoftpower
fromthestandpointoftheliteratureonrelationalpower.AlloftheformsofsoftpowerdiscussedbyNye
arefamiliartorelationalpoweranalysts.Furtherresearchonsoftpowershouldbemorefirmlyrooted in
thatliterature.
Positivesanctions Positivesanctionsareactualorpromisedrewards.Mostoftheresearchonpower in
internationalrelations
focuses
on
negative
sanctions,
i.e.,
actual
or
threatened
punishments
(Baldwin,
1971a).Despite anumberof recentworkson the roleofpositive sanctions (Cartwright,1997;Crumm,
1995;J.Davis,2000;P.Davis,1999;KahlerandKastner,2006;Long,1996;Newnham,2000;Nincic,2010;
Solingen,2011),theopportunitiesforfurtherresearchareenormous.
Comparative influence techniques The instruments of statecraftdiplomatic, economic, military and
symbolictendtobestudiedseparately.Thisisahindrancefromthestandpointofboththeoryandpolicy
relevance.Without comparative researchon techniquesof statecraft, theorists can say little about the
utilityofvariouspolicyinstruments.Ifthesuccessrateofeconomicsanctionsisestimatedat34percent,
shouldoneconcludethatpolicymakersarefoolsforusinganinstrumentwithsuchalowrateofsuccess?
Oristhisaboutthebestthatcanbeexpectedofanyinstrumentofstatecraft?Thereislittleornoreliable
dataoncomparativesuccessratesofinstrumentsofstatecraft.
Policymakershave littleuseforresearchfindingsregardingonetechniqueofstatecraft.Policymakers
need informationthatwillhelp themchooseamongalternativepolicyoptions.Thus,what theywantto
knowis:Howsuccessfulisagivenpolicyinstrumentlikelytobe,withrespecttowhichgoalsandtargets,at
whatcost,andincomparisonwithwhichpolicyalternatives?Withoutcomparativestudiesoftechniquesof
statecraft,itishardtoanswersuchquestions(Baldwin,1999/2000).
Militaryforce Despitetheemphasisonmilitaryforceintheliteratureoninternationalpolitics,muchwork
remains tobedone.Threeproblemsareespeciallydeservingof further research.First, thequestionof
whether theutilityofmilitary force isdecliningneedsattention.The groundwork for this researchwas
providedby Knorr (1966:5) long ago.Thebasicquestions tobe askedwere identified as follows: 'How
muchhasit[i.e.,force]lostinutility,iftherehasbeenanylossatall?Andutilityforwhatpurpose?Andto
whom? And under what, if not all, circumstances? And military power in all its forms and modes of
employment,oronlyinsome?'UtilityfortheeconomistKnorr,naturally,wasafunctionofbothcostsand
benefits.Recentstudiesthatpurporttosaysomethingabouttheutilityofmilitarypowerwhiledevoting
littleornoattention to thecostsofusing forcecanbequitemisleading (e.g.,Art,1996;ArtandWaltz,
8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
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[1971]1999;Pape,1996).ThebookonthecostsofthewarinIraq byJosephE.StiglitzandLindaJ.Bilmes
(2008)entitledTheThreeTrillionDollarWarconstitutesamajorstepintherightdirection.
Second,thefungibilityofmilitaryforceneedsfurtherstudy.Towhatextentcanmilitaryforcebeusedto
exercise influence inwhich situations?Although it is usually assumed that force is quite fungiblewith
respectto
military
issues
and
conflicts,
this
assumption
needs
to
be
questioned.
Wars
and
militarized
conflicts come inavarietyof sizesand shapesguerillawar, civilwar, limited conventionalwar, limited
nuclearwar,chemicalandbiologicalwarfare,largescalenuclearwarfare,deterrentsituations,etc.Itisnot
clearthatthemilitarypowerresourcesusefulinonetypeofwarcaneasilybetransferredtoanothertype.
Thus, more studies of the use of particular types of military power in different policycontingency
frameworksareneeded(BymanandWaxman,2002).
The third problem concerns the question of how to define andmeasuremilitary success (Baldwin,
1999/2000;BymanandWaxman,2002;JohnsonandTierney,2006).Despitethevoluminousliteratureon
war,verylittleattentionhasbeendevotedtoexplicatingtheconceptofsuccess.Theideathat'everywar
hasawinner'
is
deeply
embedded
in
the
literature
on
military
force.
The
persistence
of
the
zero
sum
conceptofmilitaryconflictistroublesomesinceitisincompatiblewithmanyofthetopicsdominatingthe
scholarlyresearchagendaduringthepastfiftyyears.AsSchelling(1984:269)notes:Deterrence...
ismeaninglessinazerosumcontext.Soissurrender;soaremostlimitedwarstrategies;andsoarenotions
likeaccidentalwar,escalation,preemptivewar,andbrinkmanship.Andofcoursesoarenearlyallalliance
relationships,armsracephenomena,andarmscontrol.Thefactthatwarhurtsthatnotalllossesofwarare
recoverablemakeswaritselfadramatically nonzerosumactivity.
Institutions
and
Power
Powercanbeexercisedintheformationandmaintenanceofinstitutions,throughinstitutions,withinand
amonginstitutions.Institutionsmayreflectpowerrelations,constrainthem,orprovidethebasisfortheir
existence.TowhatextentdotheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFundserveasinstrumentsof
American foreignpolicy?TowhatextentdoestheUnitedNationsenhancethepowerofsomecountries
and constrain the power of others? To what extent does the World TradeOrganization constrain US
power?TowhatextentdoesitstrengthenUSpower?HowispowerdistributedwithintheEuropeanUnion
(GarrettandTsebelis,1999;HollerandWidgren,1999;SteunenbergetaI.,1999)?Towhatextentdointer
national institutionsexercisepowerratherthanmerelyreflecting it(Mearsheimer,1994/95)?Allofthese
questionsprovide
arich
research
agenda
for
the
study
of
institutions
and
power
relations
(Martin
and
Simmons,1998).
DomesticPolitics
Howdoesdomesticpoliticsaffectnationalpower?Evenclassicelementsofnationalpowerapproaches
included national morale, quality of government, public support and political stability among the
8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
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determinantsofacountry'spower(Morgenthau,[1948]1960).Doesregimetypematter?Aredemocracies
atadisadvantage in internationalbargaining?How, ifatall,doesdividedgovernmentaffectacountry's
internationalbargainingposition?Although the conventional realistwisdomhasdepicteddemocracy as
hampering theefficientconductof foreignpolicy,recentstudieshavecalledthisview intoquestionand
opened new lines of research on the relationship between domestic politics and the exercise of
internationalpower
(Fearon,
1994,
1998;
Lake,
1992;
Mansfield
et
aI.,
2000;
Martin,
2000;
Miiner,
1997,
1998;MilnerandRosendorff,1996;Mo,1995).
StrategicInteractionandBargaining
Thebarebonesspecificationofpower intermsofAcausingachange inB'sbehavior iscompatiblewith
strategic interaction, but it neither calls attention to strategic interaction nor requires taking it into
account. This is unfortunate, since most of what interests students of international politics involves
strategic interaction.Oneofthemost importantresearchneeds is linkingtherelationalpower literature
withresearch
on
international
strategic
interaction
(e.g.,
Martin,
2000;
Milner,
1997,
1998;
Mo,
1995;
Powell,1999;2004).14
This isnottosuggest,however,thatgametheory istheonlywaytoanalyzestrategic interaction.The
workofJervis(1997),LakeandPowell(1999),Larson(1998),Schelling(1984)andothershasdemonstrated
the value of nonmathematical approaches to strategic interaction. Game theory is a useful tool for
analyzingstrategicinteraction,buttheanalysisofinternationalstrategicinteractionistooimportanttobe
left togame theoristsalone.AsLakeandPowellobserve: 'The strategicchoiceapproach is theoretically
inclusive....[It]providesafoundationforintegratingandsynthesizingmanyotherwisecompetingtheories
ofinternationalrelations'(1999:6).
DistributionofPower
Thequestionofhowpower isdistributedneeds tobestudiedusingthe relationalpowerapproach.The
work of Frey (1971, 1985, 1989) is especially relevant to this line of research. Rather than striving to
produceyetanotherglobalrankingofthesocalled'overallpower'ofeverycountryintheworld,scholars
needtofocusonpowerdistributionswithinspecifiedissueareasandperhapswithinspecifiedregions.To
theextentthatpersistentpatternsarefound,issuerelevantstructuresofpowermaybeidentified.Rather
than trying to identify a single overall international power structure, scholars should strive to identify
multiple structuresofpower indifferent issueareas.15
Admittedly, such researchwillnot try toprovide
answerstothequestionof'Who'snumberoneinthegameofinternationalpoker?'Butsimplyredirecting
attention away from that kind of questionwould, in itself, constitute progress in international power
analysis.
8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
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CONCLUSION
Power has figured importantly in discussions of international interaction since the time of Thucydides.
Despitethelongtraditionofpoweranalysisininternationalpolitics,scholarlyagreementonthenatureof
powerand itsrole in internationalrelations is lacking.Thetwoprincipalapproachestopoweranalysis in
internationalinteraction
have
been
the
'power
as
resources'
(or
'elements
of
national
power')
approach
andthe'relationalpower'approach.Thelatterwasdevelopedduringthelasthalfofthetwentiethcentury
by scholars in philosophy and a variety of social science disciplines. Both approaches are evident in
contemporaryinternationalrelationsscholarship.
Althoughpowerisanancientfocusinthestudyofinternationalrelations,therearemanyopportunities
for furtherresearch.These include (I) the treatmentofpowerasadependentvariable; (2)the formsof
power;(3)institutionsandpower;(4)domesticpoliticsandpower;(5)strategicinteraction;and(6)power
distributionsindifferentissueareas.
Althoughscholarlyagreementonthenatureandroleofpowerininternationalinteractionisunlikelyin
thenear future, research along the lines suggested abovemayneverthelessenhanceunderstandingof
importantdimensionsofinternationalbehavior.
8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations
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