Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled Independence

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Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia's Troubled IndependenceAuthor(s): Paolo TripodiSource: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2/3 (1999), pp.359-380Published by: Boston University African Studies CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/220346 .

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The International Jownal of African Ifistoiical Stdies, Vol. 32, No. 2-3 (1999) 359

BACK TO THE HORN: ITALIAN ADMINISTRATION

AND SOMALIA'S TROUBLED INDEPENDENCE

By Paolo Tripodi

Somalia today offers a scene of self-destruction almost beyond description. Somali society has torn itself in pieces, not only because the institutions set in place in 1960 gave play to the rivalries of clan-structured society but, worse, impelled these rivalries with new methods and resources. So that within a few years of independence, this Somalia claimed to possess no fewer than sixty parliamentary parties, none of which was or in reality could become more than a mask for clientelist rivalries.1

Basil Davidson identifies the cause of the Somali collapse as the inadequacy of the institutions that the Somali Republic put in place in 1960. These institutions and the entire creation of the Republic were the product of the Italian Trusteeship Admini- stration in Somalia-the Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia, or AFIS- from 1950 to 1960. When Somalia proclaimed its independence in 1960, it had a form of state inspired by the Italian model. Its poor economy was the result of a seven-year development plan launched in 1954 by administrator Enrico Martino and the higher education system was created during the mandate, with considerable involvement by Italian academics.

This article, based on documents from the AFIS archive, provides an analysis of the first five years of the Italian administration, considering this period as most influential in setting the foundations of a truly independent state. It argues that Italy's task of leading Somalia to independence was too great a commitment. Somalia needed to be economically independent but Italy did not possess the necessary financial resources. Finally, it also evaluates the impact that the democratization process, inspired by a Western model, had on Somali society. Most AFIS officers did not understand that transposing a Western political model could have serious consequences on Somali society. The adoption of a centralized state system, based on the Italian experience of the second half of the 1940s, proved to be unsatisfactory in laying the foundations that Somalia would need to begin a proper process of democratization. In 1955, halfway through the mandate, very little had been achieved and the economy, which it was hoped would pave the way for political independence in 1960, was still in a state of disarray.

In 1950, after a five-year period of strained diplomacy, Italy returned to the African continent.2 Italy's new mission in Somalia was to guide the country to independence. Of aRl Italian demands for Trusteeship administration in its former

I Basil Davidson, The Search for Africa (London, 1994), 284-85. 2 Italian diplomatic commitment to retaining its colonies has been deeply analyzed by Gian

Luigi Rossi in L'Africa italiana verso l'indipendenza (1941-1949) (Varese, 1980).



360 PAOLO TRIPODI

African colonies, Somalia was the only one accepted by the United Nations.3 Although Italy obtained only limited success with the UN, it gained the full support of the Italian public, which showed strong interest in the destiny of its colonies. The main Italian political parties, even those on the left, supported the campaign to establish Trusteeship administrations in Africa. On 1 October 1949, Italian Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza stressed Italy's ability to merge its cultural, economic, and historical background with those of its former colonies. He stated that "Democratic Italy has always considered its colonies, not only as Italian interests, but mainly as Italian aspects of the world's interests."4 In the same speech he underlined that many other states favored an Italian Trusteeship administration in Somalia: "many countries agree with us that Italy still has many important tasks in Somalia. Somalia's economic and social development still needs a hard Italian commitment. This commitment cannot be interrupted or changed without dangerous consequences in the process of Somali civilisation."5

On 21 November 1949, the settlement of Italian colonies was arranged by UN Resolution Number 289, which not only determiined the territorial future of the colonies, but also gave a guideline for the trusteeship agreement and established that "Italian Somalia has to be recognised as an independent state in ten years from the adoption of a trusteeship agreement by the UN General Assembly."6 The Italian Trusteeship administration in Somalia began officially on 1 April 1950 and the Trusteeship agreement was promulgated on 7 December 1951. AFIS was responsi- ble to the UN for the public order and the administration of the country, leaving Italy precise guidelines to follow. Article 3 of the Trusteeship agreement stated that the authority charged with the administration of the territory had to "encourage the development of free political institutions promoting the evolution of the Somali population towards independence."7 Italy had to improve Somalia's economic con- dition through a better harnessing of natural resources and through creating agricultural, industrial, and trade infrastructures. The administration had to protect the fundamental freedoms of the population without any distinction of sex, race, relig- ion, and policy,8 and the agreement put special emphasis on the education system, which was considered "the best instrument for promoting the social, economic, political and moral progress of the population of the territory."9

3 The Italian position towards its colonies was stated by Giuliano Cora in a presentation on "II Problema Coloniale Italiano" on 1 September 1945. Cora argued that "there is no doubt that the solution Italy should pursue for its colonies is to get them back in full sovereignty." G. Cora, "II Problema Coloniale Italiano," Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali (January-December 1945), 3-20. For the British position on this issue, see S. H. Longrigg, "Disposal of Italian Africa," International Affairs (January 1945), 363-69.

4 C. Sforza, Cinque anni a palazzo Chigi (Rome, 1952), 173. 5 Ibid, 180. 6 UN Resolution 289, 21 November 1949. 7 Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, Anno 92, N 282, 7 December 1951, Art. 3. 8 Ibid.

9 Ibid, Art. 4.



BACK TO THE HORN 361

The situation in the former Italian colony was complicated by the existence of a complex system of clans and sub-clans,10 among which there was often tension over water and grazing rights, and which occasionally erupted in violent conflicts.11 Joan Lewis indicated two main collateral ancestors in the Somali population: Somali and Sab. Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, and Darod belong to the Somali group, while Digil and Rahanwin are Sab. Hawiye settled in Mogadishu and for this reason were historically close to the Italians, supporting the Trusteeship administration. Darod were the backbone of the Somali Youth League (SYL), the anti-Italian and pan- Somali movement created in 1943, as a club during the British military administration. Digil and Rahanwin had trading interests and gave their support to the foreign power, in this case to Italy and to the Hawiye, while Isaaq remained outside the main events at the beginning of AFIS.12

Clan division appears to be the most evident and major partition of Somali society, yet there are other lines of cleavage that divide the Somali population- differences of occupation, class, physical type, and dialect. These, Lee Cassanelli maintained, "are as deeply rooted historically as those of clan identity, even if they are not as frequently invoked by Somalis in their political discourse."13 In addition, other divisions were created by the Italian administration of the colonial period ignoring the complexity of the Somali system.14 Previously the clan system had not represented an issue for people such as Cesare Maria De Vecchi, who governed Somalia from 1923 to 1928. He had adopted a fascist-based system15 and then everything was possible for Italian colonialists, but this was the past and the current Italian administration now faced a difficult task.

10 See Abdalla Omar Mansur's detailed description of the clan system in "The Nature of Somali Clan System," in Abu Jimale Ahmed, ed., The Invention of Somalia (Lawrenceville, 1994), 117-34.

11 The main sources of clan conflicts within the Somali context are analyzed by Hussein M. Adam, "Clan Conflicts and Democratisation in Somalia," in Harvey Glickman, ed., Ethnic Conflict and Democratisation in Africa (Atlanta, 1995), 197-226.

12 I. M. Lewis, "Nationalism and Particularism in Somalia," in P. H. Gulliver, ed., Tradition and Transition in East Africa (London, 1969), 342-44.

13 Catherine Besteman and Lee V. Cassanelli, The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia" (Boulder, Colo., 1996), 14.

14 D. D. Laitin and Said S. Samatar explain that "the colonising countries drew up boundary lines that mutilated kinship units into bewildered fragments, and when colonial administrations attempted to turn their boundaries into blockades ... this cut off entire clans from their traditional sources of water and/or pasture for their herds." Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, Colo., 1987), 61.

15 The period of colonial administration had been investigated in R. Hess's study Italian Colonialism in Somalia (Chicago, 1966). For a more detailed analysis of the fascist colonial policy see Luigi Goglia's "L'Imperialismo coloniale fascista", published in a co-authored book with Fabio Grassi, 11 colonialismo italiano da Adua all'lmpero (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1993), and from the same author, "Sulla politica coloniale fascista," Storia Contemporanea 19, 1 (February 1988).



362 PAOLO TRIPODI

The First to Arrive in Somalia: The Italian Troops

On 25 November 1949, a few days after the UN approved Resolution 289, Giuseppe Brusasca, the foreign minister's undersecretary, Brigadier Arturo Ferrara, commander of the Corpo di Sicurezza, and Colonel Musco attended a meeting to organize the contingent of the army to be sent to Somalia. Although they agreed that 4,500 soldiers would be enough, as a result of British pressure on the Italian government some 6,500 troops were despatched.16 The number of Italian troops in Somalia was determined by Plan Caesar, which required that Italians replace the existing British troops while maintaining the same contingent. Public order had weakened and the clashes of January 1948 in Mogadishu, which saw fifty-two Italians killed, were still a recent memory.17 Furthermore, the situation along the Ethiopian-Somali borderline remained a concern. Neither Resolution 289 nor the Trusteeship agreement solved the border dispute between these two countries; 18 there was no diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and Italy and Ethiopia was troubled by the presence of the former colonial power on its border.

The transfer of the Corpo di Sicurezza to Somalia took two months, from 2 February to 2 April 1950. The only episode of hostility against the Italian troops was on 14 March, when a Carabinieri battalion arriving in Benadir Cassim (1,500 kilometers from Mogadishu) had serious problems with disembarkation. Dockers linked to the SYL went on strike, forcing Italian troops to unload all materials by themselves.'9 The presence of the Carabinieri in Somalia was particularly delicate; they had played a significant role in East Africa during the Second World War and during the colonial occupation of Somalia, the Italian army had established the Zaptie', special troops formed by Somalis. Together with the AFIS, Carabinieri were also in charge of organizing the Somali police force; the commander of the Carabinieri Group (which had twenty-six officers, 154 noncomrnissioned officers, and 341 soldiers) was also the police force chief.20 A significant number of Somalis served in the Zaptie', but the Commission for Paying Off the Arrears of Somali Soldiers (or CLAMS) estimated that until 1941 nearly 6,000 Somalis had served as both civil servants and soldiers in the AOI (Africa Orientale Italiana) Italian East Africa.21 Lewis maintained that "to Somalis the strong military forces which were

16 A. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientale. Nostalgia delle colonie (Milan, 1992), 55. 17 For a more detailed account of the 1948 incidents in Mogadishu, see G. Calchi Novati,

"Gli incidenti di Mogadiscio del gennaio 1948: Rapporti italo inglesi e nazionalismo somalo," Africa (Rome) 35 (1980), 327-56, and E. De Leone, "Qualche precisazione su gli incidenti di Mogadiscio del 1948," Africa (Rome) 36 (1981), 143-45.

18 In 1950, Great Britain was still administering Haud and Ogaden, which both belonged to Ethiopia, even if they had large Somali communities. In 1935-1936, when Italy invaded Ethiopia they became part of the Italian empire. In 1941, after the defeat of the Italian troops, they remained under British administration.

19 A. Arnera, "I carabinieri in Somalia durante l'amministrazione fiduciaria italiana," II Carabiniere 5 (1980), 46.

20 Ibid., 46-47.

21 ASMAE Archivio Storico del Ministero Affari Esteri, AFIS Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia, CLAMS Commissione per la Liquidazione degli Arretrati ai Militari Somali, Box 2, File 7.




dispatched to support the establishment of the new administration, gave the handover much the character of a military occupation."22 Indeed, Italy tried in all possible ways to reduce the number of troops in Somalia, as it was too expensive to maintain the force of 6,500 soldiers requested in Plan Caesar.23 Before the beginning of the operation in Somalia, in fact, two battalions of Carabinieri were left behind in reserve. At the end of the movement of troops, the Corpo di Sicurezza numbered 5,791, yet, by the end of June 1951 there were only 2,250, less than 50 percent of that number. During 1952 the number was again reduced to 740. These significant reductions, in such a short space of time, were necessary because of the stretched AFIS budget, but they were also made possible by increasing the number of Somalis who joined the Corpo di Sicurezza. In 1952 there were more than 2,400 Somalis in the Corpo di Sicurezza.24

The Beginning of the Mandate

The first administrator of AFIS was Ambassador Giovanni Fornari and at the same time that the administration began, an Advisory Council was established in Moga- dishu. The Council included three members-an Egyptian, a Colombian, and a Filipino-and was in charge of providing suggestions to the administration on the economic, political, social security, and education spheres. Most important were the trusteeship administration's dispositions about: (1) the creation and development of a regional government organization, (2) economic and financial development, (3) improvement in education, (4) social progress and welfare, and (5) the shifting of power from the administration to local government.25

Although the Advisory Council had only consultative powers, it represented a guarantee- for the Somali people. This organization was in charge of making recommendations and reports on the progress of development promoted by AFIS, but also provided "tangible evidence of United Nations' responsibility and concern."26 The relationship between the AFIS and the Advisory Council remained good for the entire decade and only occasionally did differences emerge between the Egyptian member of the Advisory Council and the administration. The Egyptian government had ambitions to be at the head of the African Islamic nations and to have shown a positive attitude towards Italy would have hurt Egypt's image on the continent.27

22 J. M. Lewis, The Modem History of Somaliland (London, 1965), 140. 23 Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 209. 24 Stato Maggiore Esercito, Ufficio Storico, Somalia 2 (Rome, 1960), 257-86. 25 ASMAE, AFIS, Rapport sur la Somalie sous Administration Italienne, 3 June-24 July

1952, New York, Box 1, File 4 [hereafter, Rapport sur la Somalie ], pp. 6-9. 26 Lewis, Modern History, 139. 27 ASMAE, AFIS, Secret Memorandum, Box 2, File 3. Egypt provided a base for SYL anti-

Italian propaganda. The Italian Embassy in Cairo followed SYL activity carefully, with a particular interest in its president Hagi Mohamed Hussein, who was the most radical SYL leader. On 25 June 1950, Al Mistri, an Egyptian wafdist newspaper, published Hagi Mohamed Hussein's correspondence from Mogadishu. In the article, Hussein protested the Italians' bad treatment of



364 PAOLO TRIPODI

Immediately after the beginning of the mandate, on 25 May 1950, Giuseppe Brusasca visited Somalia. He was in Mogadishu to address the political tensions and the anti-Italian activity of the Somali Youth League. The attitude of the SYL towards the Italian presence in Somalia emerged during a meeting Brusasca had in Mogadishu with Aden Abdulla Osman, an influential leader of the SYL; in that discussion Brusasca underlined what Italy had achieved in Somalia as a colonial power in the first half of the century: "hospitals, public services, water installations, practically everything." Aden Abdulla Osman answered: "This is true, but the Brit- ish who followed you gave us something much more important, they gave us the freedom to express our opinion, to create parties and to work for the future of our country."28 A stronger position was expressed by Hagi Mohamed Hussein in a letter addressed to Brusasca, which stressed the complete opposition of the Somali population to Italy's presence. He wrote that "the Italian administration caused serious moral and material damage to the country."29

Another position in favor of Great Britain and against Italy was expressed by Abdullahi Issa, the principal leader of the SYL. On 14 October 1952, Brigadier Ferrara reported secretly to Fornari about Abdullahi Issa's opinions, which he had expressed before leaving for the United States.

It is true that English are colonialists, he said, and for this reason they are worse than Italians, but for the SYL they are preferable because they let us work freely. During the ten years of British administration they gave us many responsibilities in the government of the country. With Italians the situation is completely different. They employ silly and incompetent people of inferior clans. In order to keep the situation under control, AFIS bribes clan leaders. SYL members are outside the administration because we opposed the return of Italians. This is, in any case, consistent with our ideas, and is confirmed by the scarce results AFIS is producing in Somalia.30

Abdullahi Issa, comparing AFIS to the British Military Administration, had emphasized that Italian officials had been in Somalia for only a few years and never really succeeded in treating Somali problems, while the British employed only competent officials, who remained in Somalia as long as possible.31 Mohamed Aden Sheikh stated that in the Italian bureaucratic organization, it was probable that very few officials had a concrete knowledge of Somalia. Many Italian officials employed in Somalia worked for the former Ministry of the Colonies and still had a colonial attitude.32

Somalis and charged the administration with spreading discord. In ASMAE, AFIS, Report from the Italian embassy in Cairo, Box 2, File 21.

28 Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 224. 29 ASMAE, AFIS, Report from the Italian Embassy in Cairo, Box 2, File 21. 30 ASMAE, AFIS, Secret Documents of Mr. Spinelli, Secret Report, 14 October 1952, Box

2, File 3. 31 Ibid. 32 Mohamed Aden Sheikh, Arrivederci a Mogadiscio (Rome, 1991), 24.




Somalia's Political Situation

Somali society was "quintessentially" stateless, but this was to change first with the establishment of a colonial state and then with independence. During the precolonial period Somali people managed their political life through kinship associations, conjoined with religious law;33 the organization of political parties occurred recently. In September 1951 there were eight national parties in Somalia and several others with a regional dimension based mainly in Mogadishu.34 The political situation of the parties was complicated, however, because there were no elections until 1951. Real power was unknown and this created confusion. The "Rapport sur la Somalie sous administration Italienne" stated that:

Certain parties pretend to have a composition of thousands of members and an influence spread all over the country. Others claim an influence exclu- sively in the main cities or in the rural villages, a few others claim an influence just over small groups of people. Then there are parties created exclu- sively among tribes or small groups of tribes to oppose the influence of metropolitan parties.35

According to the SYL, when Italy began its mandate in Somalia the League had 150,000 members, composed mainly of Darod based in Migiurtina, Lower Jubba, and Ogaden. In contrast, the administration stated that the League probably had no more than 12,000 members in 1951.36 The SYL was strongly anti-Italian and it accused AFIS of not applying the trusteeship agreement. It also refused application of the Italian legal code until it had been seriously modified.37

Hisbia Digil-Mirifle (HDM) party members came mainly from Digil and Mirifle people who were from the regions between the Shabelle and Jubba Rivers. This party was created to push the administration for Somalia independence and, according to the administration, it had forty-five sections in the country. The aims of Hisbia Digil-Mirifle were both political and economic. It supported the creation of a federal state and demanded equal treatment for Somali civil servants and soldiers. 38 The main difference between the SYL and the 11DM was their membership. The former had a large pan-Somali base and the latter was a regional party. Although 50 percent of SYL's membership were Darods, 30 percent were Hawiye and 10 percent Digil Mirifle. The HDM membership was mainly Digil and Rahan- win clan families. This party expressed the sense of independence and identity of these two clans with a commitment to the creation, in southern Somalia, of a sepa- rate and autonomous Digil Mirifle state.39

33 Ahmed I. Samatar, The Somali Challenge (Boulder, 1994), 109.

34Rapport sur la Somalie, p. 13. 35 Ibid, 13. 36 Ibid, 14.

37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.

39 I. M. Lewis, "Modern Political Movements in Somaliland," Africa (Paris) 28, 3, 244-61.



366 PAOLO TRIPODI

The Lega Progressista Somalia (Somali Progressive League) had fourteen local branches and supported the administration. This party wanted to preserve clan organization and was opposed to SYL because of its strong anti-Italian attitude. The Unione Africani Somalia (Somali African Union) supported the Lega Progressista Somalia position. In fact, the main point of its program was cooperation with the administration, and the party secretary stated that Italy was making a significant contribution to economic development. Afterwards, he maintained that the SYL adopted an overly nationalist political line.40 Also, the Unione Africani Somalia was in favor of preserving the clan system that was, according to the party, the principal structure and best system of organization of Somali society.41 The remaining parties had less influence because of their low membership.42 The existence of such a large number of political formations became a constant feature of Somali political life from the 1954 administrative election, through independence, and until Siad Barre's coup in 1969.43 The SYL, the strongest declared pan-Somali movement in this period, had political supremacy but did not manage to eliminate clanism from political competition. Following independence it failed to promote a process of real democratization and the search for power, a traditional feature of clanism, eventu- ally involved the government and the chamber of deputies. The degeneration of the political system coupled with widespread corruption paved the way for Siad Barre's military dictatorship.

On 8 June 1950, Fomari introduced an amnesty for all offenses committed before the beginning of the administration. This was an attempt to improve AFIS's relationship with the Somali population, but it did not soften hostility. The SYL continued its accusations that the Italian admninistration wanted to destroy it, and that AFIS increased clan divisions, trying to suffocate Somali nationalism and employ- ing officials with a fascist background.44 In a report that Giacomo Bona, secretary of the Christian Democrats in Mogadishu, sent to party headquarters in Italy on 15 June 1950, he underlined that there had been a revival of fascism since the creation of AFIS. According to Bona, the new AFIS officers not only were undemocratic in their approach to their work, but they also criticized the Italian government.45 In a

40 Rapport sur la Somalie, 15. 41 Ibid.

42 These were: Unione Nazionale Somala (Somali National Union), Unione Maniferro Somalia (Somali Maniferro Union), Hidaiet Islam Schidle et Mobilen, Lega Mussulmana della Somalia (Somali Muslim League), Unione Difesa della Somali (Union for Protection of Somalia), Associazione Gioventu' Benadir (Benadir Youth Organisation) and Unione Giovani Benadir (Benadir Youth Union).

43 More than twenty groups participated in the 1954 administrative elections. In the 1956 general elections there was a reduction in number to four parties and six ethnic coalitions. The situation definitely worsened after independence; eighteen parties took part in the 1964 general elections and sixty parties in 1969.

44 Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 226-27. Del Boca also holds that the presence of a conspicuous community of fascists in Somalia was a matter of concern. In Mogadishu MSI had 260 members and Somalia was considered a safe territory for the fascists who had fled Italy's severe anti-fascist laws. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 229.

45 Ibid., 228.




letter to the foreign ministry undersecretary of 13 January 1951, Bona stated that AFIS's bureaucratic structure consisted of officers of low quality, and that some were completely unskilled. He also lamented the increase of fascist publications received from Italy.46

The overall situation was particularly difficult for AFIS. Fornari had to begin the process of democratization in a hostile environment. Somalia was divided into six regions: Benadir, Migiurtina, Mudug, Higher Jubba, Webi Shebelli, and Lower Jubba, which were further divided into twenty-eight districts. The commander of the Corpo di Sicurezza, an officer with the rank of brigadier, depended on an administrator who had full legislative powers. The administrator organized AFIS into seventeen administrative departments and this structure was the base for future ministries.47 Before the end of 1950, on 30 December, Fornari gave impetus to the process of Somalization with the creation of the Territorial Council. This represented, for the first time in Somalia, an opportunity for the population to be involved in the country's administration.

The Territorial Council was formed of thirty-five councilors, of whom twenty- eight were Somali. It was a consultative and representative central body with responsibility for all government activities, with the exception of foreign policy and defense. At the very beginning of its existence the council was committed to preparing an internal statute and to providing suggestions about the creation of municipal councils covering all Somalia. The council had to make recommendations about the adoption of an official language for education and about company regula- tions.48 According to Mario D'Antonio, all the different clans, traditions, and classes were represented in the council.49 Until October 1951, council members were appointed by the administrator, but after that time they were elected. It was only on 31 March 1955 that a proper electoral process was adopted for the Territo- rial Council; it was stipulated that the Council be elected by universal suffrage of the male population. Those living outside the municipal districts were represented by an indirect electoral system, expressing their choice through the shir (councils summoned to debate the policy of a lineage group).50

The Territorial Council held its meetings three times a year. During the period between meetings, the council elected a committee in charge of preparing the meetings and monitoring political, economic, and social progress in Somalia. Like the Council, the committee was composed of representatives of the main political movements, even though the percentage of political members in the committee did not accurately represent the political spectrum in Somalia. There were four delegates

46 Ibid, 228-29. In a letter to Brusasca, Fornari argued that "the worries about MSI and its development are just exaggerated." ASMAE, AFIS, Letter from Mr. Fornari to Mr. Brusasca, 7 April 1951, Box 2, File 3.

47 M. D'Antonio, Italia e Somalia dieci anni di collaborazione (Rome, 1962), 56. 48 Rapport sur la Somalie, 11-12. 49 D'Antonio, Italia e Somalia, 51. 50 ASMAE, AFIS, Ordinanza of the 31 March 1955, Box 2, File 10.



from the Conferenza della Somalia (the pro-Italian coalition), 51 one from the SYL, three from the clans, one Arab, and one Italian; the Italian member of the committee was Bona.52 Fomari warned Brusasca that the creation of the new institution would create tension between Somali and the Italian community. The administrator explained that "whenever the Committee and the Council treat problems concerning the relationships with foreigners, Italians included, there will be not one Somali, even those on good terms with us, so brave to defend openly our interests, if the protection of our interests is against Somali interests."53

Fomari's main worry was that the Italians in Somalia were not aware of the international duties that Italy assumed with the Trusteeship Administration. AFIS adopted a progressive policy aimed at involving Somalis more and more in the administration of the country, but the Italian community had serious difficulty in understanding the importance of AFIS's tasks-"they do not want to accept that they are not the masters any longer."54 According to Fornari, the protection of Ital- ian interests could only be achieved by encouraging Somalia to adopt a political constitution which, after the end of the mandate, would not be against Italian activities. To reinforce this point he emphasized that, in a frame of collaboration, the Territorial Council had decided to adopt both Arabic and Italian as official languages for education.55

On 20 September 1950, the School of Political and Administrative Preparation was set up, offering a three-year course with modules in administration, law, history of civilization, Islam, international law, UN organization, economy, geog- raphy, and the international statute for the organization of Somalia. The activity of the school was particularly important, both for its political impact and for the training of the officials of the Somali state. Many of the students, in fact, were members of SYL; after attending courses at the school and sometimes going on to Italy for further education, many softened their attitude towards the administration. These students attended specific courses organized at Perugia University and were offered the opportunity to stay on in Italy for a short time, to allow them to acquire a knowledge of local culture.56 The establishment of the Institute of Social Science, Law, and Economics in 1953 (with courses beginning in the 1954-55 academic year) paved the way for the creation of the University Institute of Somalia. The new

51 Boca explains that the pro-Italian movements and the Conferenza della Somalia were created towards the end of 1947. Vincenzo Calzia, a former executive official of the Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, organized and financed those movements. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 172- 73.

52 ASMAE, AFIS, Letter from Mr. Fornari to Mr. Brusasca, 16 February 1951, Box 2, File 3.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid. 56 ASMAE, AFIS, Box 1, File 1.




institution was mostly run by Italian lecturers with limited participation from Soma- lis.57

A Difficult Beginning

The economic situation in Somalia was affected by Italian domestic problems, a weak Italian economy, and a weak AFIS.58 Post-war Italy began its reconstruction with support from the Marshall Plan and received $1,469 million worth of financial aid in 1952.59 The period from 1945 to 1950 was particularly delicate from a political perspective, as Italy was building a democratic state and adopting a new constitution that united all the political forces against fascism.60 Italian difficulties in setting up AFIS were related to Italian political and economic conditions and Pietro Petrucci has stated that "no one has ever provided an explanation of what overpow- ering national interest pushed Italy to come back to Somalia in 1950."61

With a poor budget, the administrator hastened the process of Somalization. Although problems of public order still remained, Fomari promoted a further reduction of the military budget, with the aim of increasing investment for the creation of political and economic institutions. This led to the organization of the first training school for policemen, in collaboration with the School of Political and

57 G. A. Costanzo, "L'Educazione chiave dello sviluppo della Somalia," Affrica 15, 3 (1960), 139-45. On 21 January 1970, the technical cooperation between Italy and Somalia established the National University of Somalia. Giampaolo Calchi Novati explained that Italy, administering the university, had a strong influence on the Somali intelligentsia. Il Como d'Africa nella storia e nella politica (Turin, 1994), 261. The quality of the education offered by the university remained so poor that the ambassador in charge of the Co-operation for Development until 1985, Giorgio Giacomelli, admitted that the preparation of Somali students after they received a university degree was closer to an Italian secondary school than to a university.

Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta sull'attuazione della politica di cooperazione con i paesi in via di sviluppo. 90 Resoconto Stenografico, Seduta di giovedi' 27 aprile 1995, p. 15. (Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry into Co-operation for Development with Developing Countries, 9th session, Thursday, 27 April 1995.)

58 The Italian economy had collapsed following the Second World War and it was still weak in the early 1950s. Traveling from southern Italy to the northern regions, it was possible to see that the ruins of the war crossed the country. The overall situation was so bad that in November 1946, the Italian prime minister, Alcide De Gasperi, urged Enrico de Nicola, the Italian president, to ask President Truman for economic aid. De Gasperi stated that Italy needed at least 240,000 tons of wheat within the first months of 1947. Without this aid the individual ration of bread (200,225 grams) would have been further reduced. Adstants, Alcide De Gaspeti nella politica estera Italiana (1943-1953) (Verona, 1953), 81.

59 Ibid, 111. 60 In the years after the end of the war, a considerable number of secessionist movements

developed. These movements flourished in VaIle d'Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino-alto Adige, and in Sicily. In the latter region the state fought a crude war against the Sicilian secessionists up to 1950. C. M. Santoro, La politica estera di una media potenza (Bologna, 1991), 185.

61 P. Petrucci, Mogadiscio (Turin, 1993), 94.



370 PAOLO TRIPODI

Administrative Preparation. Here, AFIS looked both to increase the number of Somali policemen and to repatriate more Italians.62

The main problems for Fornari began in 1951, when the Italian government cut the AFIS budget by one-quarter; for the years 1951-1952 it was cut from 8,000 million lire to 6,000 million. Fornari reacted immediately to the government's decision, claiming that "a reduction of a quarter of the AFIS budget is too much. I believe that with only six thousand million lire AFIS won't be able to cope with routine expenses; for these AFIS needs at least 6,500 million lire, but the administration needs between 7,500 and 8,000 million lire to obtain any improvement in economic and social fields."63 Fornari upheld that consistent savings could be obtained with a further reduction in military expenses, but the new budget cuts could stop many of the activities arranged under the Trusteeship agreement. He asked Brusasca to describe this situation to the prime minister Alcide De Gasperi and to the foreign minister, Carlo Sforza. Such was the situation that he was ready to resign as administrator after 30 June 1951, if AFIS had only the task and funds to solve administrative problems. In the same letter Fomari raised the problem of AFIS dependence on the Ministry of Italian Africa,64 an institution he described as "disintegrating."65

In spite of all these difficulties Fomari carried on. A School for Health Inspectors was established on 14 September 1951, followed by a Secondary School of Agriculture on 29 May 1952. A further step towards Somalization was the creation of the Somali Economic Council. Fomari appointed an Italian engineer, Anteo Mortara, as chairman, but the majority of members were indigenous. Since 1952, the Somali Economic Council had representatives of all social classes, as well as artisans, and a group of experts in the different economic fields from private and public companies. 66

In September 1951, the UN Trusteeship Council sent a mission to East Africa to report about the situation in Rwanda and Somalia. It first visited Rwanda and then arrived in Somalia. In eighteen days the four members of the mission- Enrique de Marchena from the Dominican Republic, William Crago from the United States, George Lacking from New Zealand, and Mao Chao Dilakrit Kridakon from Thailand-visited Mogadishu, Merca, Brava, Kismayu, Baidoa, Belet Weyn, and Bander Cassim. At the conclusion of its visit, the mission drafted a report that highlighted the political tension caused by the high number of parties in Somalia, that were divided between those in favor of or against AFIS.67

62 Arnera, "I carabinieri," 46-47. 63 ASMAE, AFIS, Letter from Mr. Fornari to Mr. Brusasca, 7 April 1951, Box 2, File 3. 64 Although AFIS depended formally on the foreign ministry, the Ministry of Italian Afiica

still existed in Italy and the AFIS officials sent to Somali belonged to it. Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 222.

65 ASMAE, AFIS, Letter from Mr. Fornari to Mr. Brusasca, 7 April 1951, Box 2, File 3. 66 ASMAE, AFIS, Box 2, File 14. 67 Rapport sur la Somalie, 13-17.




During a demonstration against the local authority on 1 August 1952, the protesters attacked a Carabinieri patrol and a sergeant, a soldier of the Carabinieri, and a Somali inspector were stoned to death. The tension in the region and' in Somalia had reached a dangerous level, although, according to Colonel Alfredo Amera, the majority of Somali public opinion condemned the killings.68 The events of Kismayu were the worst since AFIS began its intemational mandate, but were also the last clash between the Somalis and the Italian administration.

A New Administrator for Somalia

At the beginning of 1953, Fornari relinquished his position to the new administrator, Enrico Martino. With the conclusion of Fornari's term of office, the most difficult period of the Italian administration in Somalia ended.

When Martino left Italy to assume his new appointment in Somalia, the undersecretary of the foreign ministry gave him four main directives. Martino had to govern Somalia, following the Trusteeship Agreement carefully, with two aims: respecting the mandate deadline and preparing Somalia for independence. He had to develop a policy to attract the Somali Youth League towards cooperating with AFIS, as it was impossible at that stage to think of suppressing the most active, widespread and possibly representative political movement in the country. Further- more, relations between Italy and Somalia after 1960 would be influenced by the relationship between SYL and AFIS. Martino had to start a process of easing tension between the Italian community and Somalis. He was also in charge of improving the economic situation, exploiting the limited Somali resources in the best way.69

Martino expressed a positive assessment of Fornari's administration and in his concluding report, he stated that "I continued exactly the work my predecessor began, not only because I think it was correct, but also because I believe that, considering the short time of the Mandate, I could not introduce any radical change."70

Martino initiated action to improve relations between AFIS and the SYL, supporting the moderate wing of the party represented by Aden Abdulla Osman. Spinelli and Luigi Gasbarri, two high-ranking AFIS officials, increased their contacts with SYL members and slowly SYL's attitude towards Italy began to change. According to Martino, the creation of the Credito Somalo and the setting up of the Institute of Social Science, Law, and Economics made a significant contribution to improving the relationship between the administration and SYL.71

Martino emphasized the changes in the SYL's attitude toward AFIS. First SYL had not petitioned against Italy for some time at the UN. Second, after the March

68 Arnera, "I carabinieri," 38. 69 ASMAE, AFIS, Report Top Secret from Mr. Martino to Foreign Minister M.P. Gaetano

Martino, 9 April 1955, Box 2, File 3. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid.



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1954 administrative election, both Aden Abdulla Osman and Abdullahi Issa, believing that Italy might leave Somalia before 1960, asked the administration to stay until the end of the mandate. Martino reported that Aden Abdulla Osman more than once requested that Italy continue assisting Somalia even after 1960. Third, in 1954 SYL members of the Territorial Council voted in favor of a motion to protect foreign investments in Somalia after 1960.72

These improvements in the relationship between the administration and SYL were also a consequence of the setback in relations between the League and the British, caused by the British treaty with Ethiopia in 1954, which gave the territory of Ogaden and Haud to Ethiopia. The origin of the Somali-Ethiopian dispute over Ogaden dates back to 1897, when the frontier between Italian Somaliland and the Ethiopian empire was traced on two different maps by Major Nerazzini and King Menelik. John Drysdale reports that "Neither map could subsequently be found and no living person can testify to the exact nature of the agreement."73 A new conven- tion between Italy and Ethiopia in 1908 attempted to fix the border between the two territories, but "it was never implemented because it incorporated the 1897 agreement which had vanished."74 Following the Italian fascist invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the Ogaden became part of Italian East Africa and in 1941, after the defeat of Italian troops, Great Britain annexed Italian Somaliland, including Ogaden and Haud, under the British military administration. When the UN Trusteeship Council decided to give administration of Somalia to Italy, Haud and Ogaden remained annexed to British Somaliland. At the very beginning of British administration in Somalia, Lancaster House showed a positive attitude towards the creation of a Greater Somalia including Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District (NFD). There was a similarity between the Bevin plan and SYL's aims, yet Bevin's plan for the creation of a Greater Somalia was not successful. After the 1954 treaty, British influence on the SYL diminished remarkably.75 The first point of the SYL program was the reunion of all Somali people; the extreme importance of this point for the League was emphasized by Abdullahi Issa representing the SYL program.76

Preparing for Elections

From February 1953, Martino prepared Somalia for its first democratic elections and he ordered the administration to prepare a census of thirty-five towns and villages in the territory. This work was difficult but necessary. Martino felt it was extremely important to create a body of representative institutions in Somalia, but time was running out and a period of five or six years was very short to test the

72 Ibid.

73 John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London, 1964), 88.

74 W. M. Reisman, "Somali Self Determination in the Horn: Legal Perspectives and Implications for Social and Political Engineering," in I. M. Lewis, ed., Nationalism and Self Determination in the Horn of Africa (London, 1983), 156.

75 ASMAE, AFIS, Report Top Secret from Mr. Martino to the Foreign Minister MP Gaetano Martino, 9 April 1955, Box 2, File 3.

76 G. Calchi Novati, l Corno D'Africa nella storia e nella politica (Torino, 1994), 96.




efficiency of Somali democratization. In his intervention at the XIV session of the UN Trusteeship Council on 4 June 1954, Martino stressed that "the most educated Somalis, of whatever political party, agree that the training of cadres must neces- sarily precede the 'Somalisation,' so to speak, and that it would be dangerous and unjust to entrust to unprepared personnel, positions of responsibility which must be reserved for those groups of people which are ready and prepared to fulfil their tasks with devotion." He also underlined that only a small number of Somalis had a good level of education at the beginning of the mandate; there were 3,000 students trained in thirty-seven primary classes and in specialized courses in 1954.77

Although the process of Somalization in the administrative department achieved results, economic progress was slow. Martino explained that there were several reasons for poor Somali economic performance. The main factor was the uncer- tainty about Italian and international economic aid flowing into the Somali economy. At the same time Somalis were unwilling to pay taxes, while Italians also felt they did not have to pay any taxes for their economic activities in Somalia. Conse- quently, Martino, following Fomari's guideline, continued reducing everyday expenditures and investing in economic and social development.78

In order to meet the new expenditure [Martino stated in front of the UN Trusteeship Council] the Administration has made a considerable effort to achieve savings in the administrative field. Last year, the Italian staff, civil and military, was reduced by 273 units. Gradually, it will be further reduced.79

On the same occasion, Martino presented the development plans that had been submitted to the Territorial Council and a brief description of the efforts planned from 1954 until the end of the mandate. In the agricultural field, the main aim was to develop cereal production to reach self-sufficiency through the modemization of farming methods. In middle and lower Shabelle the creation of irrigation canals was planned in order to ensure the regularity and the continuity of irrigation for some 30,000 hectares of land. For middle and lower Jubba an improvement in the irrigation system through building dams and dikes was planned to prevent flooding.

The most ambitious aim was to relocate between the two rivers the nomadic population who were, in the main, working in the pastoral economy. This part of the plan had to be achieved through the creation of 240 reservoirs for rain water and the installation of silos on each farm. The budget forecast for this 1954-1960 agricultural development involved 20,844,000 somalos, about $3,000,000. By 1960, about 74,000 hectares of land, involving some 200,000 farmers, would be under cultivation, substantially increasing production.80 Through the application of the

77 ASMAE, AFIS, Speech of Mr. Martino at the XIV Session of the Trusteeship Council, Box 1, File 3.

78 ASMAE, AFIS, Report Top Secret from Mr. Martino to the Foreign Minister M.P. Gaetano Martino, 9 April 1955, Box 2, File 3.

79 ASMAE, AFIS, Speech of Mr. Martino at the XIV Session of the Trusteeship Council, Box 1, File 3.

80 Ibid.



374 PAOLO TRIPODI

development plans, AFIS hoped to reduce nomadism, a phenomenon related to cattle raising. The administrator stated that "in the field of cattle raising the Admini- stration intends to check the phenomenon of nomadism, which is bound up with the well known lack of water supplies for watering cattle. The administration also proposes to transform cattle raising into a stable activity."'81

The 1954 Administrative Elections: A New Role for SYL

The 1954 elections represented the first truly significant event in the relationship between the Italian administration and Somali political parties. A high percentage of voters participated as a result of the strong campaign that AFIS and all political parties conducted (more than 75 percent of those registered actually voted-38,119 out of 50,720). The electoral results were quite surprising; although it had been predicted that the SYL would do well, the League achieved a decisive victory, receiving 47.7 percent of all votes cast and gaining 141 seats out of a possible 281. The Hisbia Digil and Mirifle achieved 8,198 votes and received 57 seats. The remaining seats were divided among the considerable number of existing political formations. Fomari and Martino had predicted that SYL would play a significant role in the future of Somalia and now their predictions were confirmed.

As a consequence of the elections the administration had to change its attitude towards SYL. From the elections the attitude of Somalis towards the Italian presence in their country was made clear. The SYL extremist wing increased its power inside the party, although Abdullahi Issa, the leader of the anti-Italian faction, softened his position towards the administration. Talking to other SYL leaders who were planning to ask for an American, British, or Egyptian involvement in Somalia, Abdullahi Issa claimed that all govemments were selfish and become involved only to protect their national interests. He held that the American govemment was the most colonialist of all because it maintained a situation of racial discrimination. Furthermore, according to Abdullahi Issa, the U.S. government exploited any place where they intervened. Even though the Americans were investing a considerable amount of capital abroad, it was said that "they know how to take care of their interests, they do not aim at a military conquest of a foreign country but an economic one." To demonstrate the negative British attitude towards Africans, Abdullahi Issa emphasized the British treatment of Mau Mau in Kenya. In conclusion, the SYL leader considered Egypt but concluded, "it is not a rich country and it could give Somalia only moral aid, but in a very opportunistic way. It is preferable having the present situation, with Italy as administrator. It is one of the few honest and generous nations."82

In his analysis of the relationship between AFIS and the SYL, Abdullahi Issa argued that the continued presence of old Italian colonialists was one of the main problems for democratic and peaceful development. They still had prominent positions inside the Italian community and were able to influence the administration. He

81 Ibid.

82 ASMAE, AFIS, Report of the Corpo di Sicurezza Intelligence Department, April 1954, Box 2, File 30.




felt the Somali politicians close to AFIS were also a detrimental feature of Somali political life because they often acted with little regard for the real needs of the Somali population.83 Abdullahi Issa had been one of Martino's main worries, yet the new positions he expressed gave considerable support to the process of detente between AFIS and the SYL. Angelo Del Boca, in Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale, observed that after the March 1954 elections "SYL gave up its distrustful and intractable position towards AFIS, although the administration was still far from recognizing the aspirations of the Somali population ... [and] decided to cooperate with AFIS to reach a working independence for Somalia."'84

Hagi Farah Ali, SYL deputy president, said during a religious ceremony that the SYL accepted AFIS rule; they wanted to remain on good terms with Italy even after 1960, establishing solid relationships of assistance and collaboration. He underlined that his movement did not want any other foreigners to interfere in Somali life after 1960.85 In the conclusion of a secret report he prepared for the foreign ministry in 1955, Martino wrote that "Aden Abdulla Osman and Abdullahi Issa ... told me that they wanted Italy to stay in Somalia until the conclusion of its mandate, and Aden Abdulla Osman said that he hoped that Italy would continue assisting Somalia even after that date."86

In May 1954, the Corpo di Sicurezza Intelligence Department reported that among the Somali perception of the political situation was improving, with an unusual tendency towards moderation. The report states that this situation was generated by the positive impact of the students of the School of Political and Administrative Preparation coming back from Italy. Although they were mainly SYL members, and some in the extreme wing, their ideological radicalism had weakened during their residence in Italy.87 At this time, despite the improved relationship with the SYL, AFIS was committed to reinforcing the smaller pro-Italian political parties. The administration was trying to force these parties into a coalition that could compete with SYL; at the very beginning the strong clan divisions among the pro-Italian movements were the toughest obstacles to overcome. After the heavy defeat of the pro-Italian parties at the first Somali elections, AFIS attempts to realize a better coalition were successful because, according to the report, "everybody agrees about the need to create a democratic political formation to oppose SYL and its further development that could bring the country to a totalitarian regime."88

The most effective parties were the Hisbia Digil-Mirifle and the Gioventu' del Benadir; in particular, the HDM was strongly opposed to the SYL. In May 1953,

83 Ibid.

84 Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 242. 85 ASMAE, AFIS, Report of the Corpo di Sicurezza Intelligence Department, April 1954,

Box 2, File 30. 86 ASMAE, AFIS, Report Top Secret from Mr. Martino to the Foreign Minister MP

Gaetano Martino, 9 April 1955, Box 2, File 3. 87 ASMAE, AFIS, Report of the Corpo di Sicurezza Intelligence Department, May 1954,

Box 2, File 30. 88 Ibid.



376 PAOLO TRIPODI

members of the SYL extreme wing killed Osman Mohamed Hussein, an influential leader of the HDM and a member of the Territorial Council. After that, the relationships between the two movements changed through different stages of tension, although very occasionally the two did cooperate. In this respect, it is particularly significant to note the speech of Abdulkadir Mohamed Aden, an HDM leader, in commemoration of Osman Mohamed Hussein. He said that HDM had to reply against SYL terrorists adopting the same tools "because the best way for fighting against violence is to assure respect for everybody's life."89

The anti-SYL coalition was established in July 1954 as the Gruppo Demo- cratico Somalo (or Somali Democratic Group,the GDS). After some initial doubts, even the Unione Africani Somalia joined the Group. GDS respresented the coalition of the Unione Africani Somalia, Lega Progressista Somala, Unione Nazionale Somala, Unione Patriottica Somala, Partito Scidle e Mobilen, and Associazione Gioventu Abgal. Abdullahi Hagi Insania, a young primary school teacher, who had recently retumed from Italy, was leader of the new coalition. This coalition created concerns for the SYL, since it could increase political support for Italy and for AFIS. The administration never sought to confront SYL directly, but always tried to back the pro-Italian formations and the moderate faction within the SYL. According to Martino, Aden Abdulla Osman was elected SYL president for more than two years as a consequence of AFIS support.90

In 1954 the two antagonists realized that they needed each other. AFIS needed SYL support to govern the country peacefully and the League still needed to be on good terms with the administration to strengthen its position. Del Boca stated that this easing of tension was only superficial and neither of the two contenders had really altered its position.91

After the elections, and after Martino's presentation of the development plan, the Trusteeship Council decided to send a new mission to Somalia, with the task of evaluating the country's economic improvement. In a letter to Spinelli, Martino expressed his concems regarding this assessment. He saw the mission as denying the credibility of the plan for economic development that had been presented a few months earlier.92 However, while Martino was trying to provide a positive inter- pretation, in reality the Somali political situation was worsening. Even the conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the Italian govemment for economic cooperation and technical assistance in Somalia did not help.

The problems of the Somali economy were caused by three main factors. The first was the significant reduction of the AFIS budget from 9,000 million lire in 1950 to 5,500 million lire in 1954-1955. It is significant at this point to recall

89 ASMAE, AFIS, Report of the Corpo di Sicurezza Intelligence Department, July 1954, Box 2, File 30.


91 Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 243. 92 ASMAE, AFIS, Letter from Mr. Martino to Mr. Spinelli, 19 October 1954, Box 2, File

27.




Fornari's concerns when the AFIS budget was reduced to 6,000 million lire in 1951-1952. Year by year the process of Somalization was spreading and Italian officers were being repatriated, however, the Somali economy needed more than ordinary administration. In 1951 Fomari had argued that AFIS needed a yearly budget of 8,000 million lire to promote economic and social development.93 Second, there was a complete lack of credit institutions in Somalia, and local and private enterprise was paralyzed as a consequence. This was demonstrated by the significant development of banana plantations, which were monopolized by Italian tradesmen.94 In his study of Italy and the Somali economy during the mandate, Umberto Triulzi emphasized that the AFIS decision to enlarge banana production had an adverse effect on three other important areas of the Somali economy: cotton, salt, and leather. Although export volumes in the period 1950-1959 increased from 23,200,000 somalos to 103,700,000, this consisted almost entirely of bananas. According to Triulzi, the administration wasted the opportunity to exploit the land that had been leveled, reclaimed, and watered for the banana crop to plant other fruits that could be more competitive on the foreign market.95

At the conclusion of his report to the foreign mninister, Martino listed with pride a number of initiatives AFIS had taken to protect or increase Italian economic activities in Somalia. The main companies involved were AGIP, Coniel, and Ital- cable. AGIP was charged with rebuilding the gas storage facilities under special conditions. The company in fact did not have to pay any tax on its income for a ten- year period; moreover, it did not have to pay any taxes on imported materials. Ital- cable was contracted to organize all the telecommunications services in Somalia and Coniel was charged with administering electricity. Beside these companies, the Fatebenefratelli was awarded a ten-year contract for the management of the Kismayu Hospital. "Many measures," Martino claimed, "have been adopted in favour of Italian companies. The main act was to extend until December 1955 the exemption from taxes of all machinery used by industries and farms." 96

This initiative met opposition from the Territorial Council and the UN Advi- sory Council. As a consequence of this tax exemption, AFIS lost approximately 100 mnillion lire. Furthermore, after a fall in the cotton prices in 1953, the administration helped all the companies in economic trouble (Gatti, Boero, Della Nave, Codeco, and Societa Agricola Italo-Somala or SAIS), an intervention that cost AFIS approximately 16 million lire. With the single aim of aiding Italian soap factories, the tax on soap imports was considerably increased, while taxes on the raw materials for producing soap were reduced. SAIS, one of the greatest and oldest

93 ASMAE, AFIS, Letter from Mr. Fornari to Mr. Brusasca, 7 April 1951, Box 2, File 3.

94 Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa, 247-48. 95 U. Triulzi, "L'Italia e l'economia somala dal 1950 a oggi," Africa (Rome) 26, 4 (1971),

443-61. The author clearly explained that due to the adverse environmental conditions, the cost of packing and transporting Somali's banana production was not competitive with production from countries such as the Canary Islands. From the 1930s, Somali banana exports were favored by a preferential and protected Italian market, but this situation was not ideal for Somali development.




378 PAOLO TRIPODI

farm organizations in Somalia, was given considerable assistance. The administration also adopted a protectionist policy over sugar imports, as sugar was SAIS's main product. Protection was realized both through the prohibition on sugar imports and through the imposition of taxes for any quantity that had to be imported to satisfy Somali needs, and SAIS was authorized to amortise expenses for the new factories by 1960.

The administration granted a considerable amount of land, at a very low cost, to the Cotoniere d'Africa. Moreover, to protect Cotoniere d'Africa products, AFIS reduced the level of cotton imports from sterling areas. With this initiative the Cotoniere d'Africa could sell all its produce and while imported cotton met taxes of 35 percent of its value, the Cotoniere d'Africa paid no excise tax. In the agricultural field the administration organized drainage in the area of Shebelli and Lower Jubba. In that region there were a conspicuous number of Italian farmers and Villabruzzi (SAIS). All this information was provided by Martino in his secret report to the foreign ministry.97

The Somali flag, a five-pointed star on a blue background, was introduced and presented to the UN mission in Somalia in September 1954. The five points symbolized the five territories of Greater Somalia: forner Italian Somalia, British Somaliland, French Somalia, Ogaden, and the NFD. This flag, adopted via a decree of the Italian president, was the strongest expression so far of ambitious Somali nationalism, and it also represented the only mutual agreement between SYL and AFIS. The last task Martino undertook before leaving office in Somalia was to plan the 1956 general election. The Territorial Council was to be transformed into an elective organ with growing importance in Somali political life. Martino could conclude his appointment stating that there was in Somalia a new era of collaboration between AFIS and the members of the Territorial Council and all political parties.98

Conclusion

In Italian Colonialism in Somalia, Robert Hess maintained that "after the assump- tion of the trusteeship administration, Italy turned to the development of the territory along lines drastically different from those of the pre-war period. Italy chose to demonstrate through its administration its good faith in training an ex-colony for independence."99 Joan Lewis offered a dissenting opinion in The Modem History of Somaliland where he argued that, "While in education, the Italian Trust Admini- stration built essentially upon the efforts of their immediate British predecessors, in economics the groundwork went directly back to the fascist period."100 In 1955, halfway through the mandate period, the economic development of Somalia did not mirror the fascist model. During the first years of AFIS the lack of resources in Somalia and of the lack of an economic development plan showed more evidence of

97 Ibid. 98 Ibid.

99 Hess, Italian Colonialism, 192.

100 Lewis, Modern History, 142.




confusion and improvisation than a strategy aimed at restoring the pre-war situation. The support for banana production came as a result of the desire to protect Italian interests but also reflected the fact that bananas were already the main export crop. The repeated complaints from Fomari about budget reductions are evidence that the plan for economic improvement was destined to fail. In economic terms, the first four years of the administration's efforts were wasted. In addition, the launch of a Seven-Year Development Plan in 1954 was of little help in establishing a solid foundation for an independent economy in Somalia. 101

It was in the political field that AFIS's performance was poorest, however, because of the administration's misguided attitude towards Somali society. Italian officials tried to introduce a political system based on a Westem model, specifically an Italian one: the organization of municipal districts, the establishment of a Legis- lative Assembly in 1956, and a constitution, adopted in 1961, copied from the Italian political model. The Italian political structure could not manage the dynamics of the clan system effectively and Italians viewed the Somali social structure as archaic. The main aim of the Italian administration was to identify the strongest political formation and establish links with it that could remain strong even after the end of the mandate. As a result, AFIS gave up supporting the Southern regional political parties in favor of rapprochement with the SYL.102 With this attitude, which was not respectful of the Somali traditional structure, Italy promoted the adoption of a form of state inappropriate to the Somali people. Terence Lyons and Ahmad Samatar maintain that "the process of decolonisation created an independent state that remained aloof from society."103 In fact, the new state organization became just an instrument in the hands of predominant clans, who administered power according to their own interests. In the long term this created a new source of clan conflict.

The problem of border demarcation between Somalia and Ethiopia was still unresolved in 1955, although the UN urged the Italian and Ethiopian governments to solve this problem quickly. Drysdale points out that "it was not, however, until 1955 that a real start to negotiations between Italy and Ethiopia began, but the impetus soon flagged when the Ethiopian government declined to permit Somalis to join the Italian delegation as experts."'04

101 L. Bruno in his study La Somalia alla vigilia della sua indipendenza (Milan, 1959), 9, stated that the experts who visited Somalia agreed that, despite the investments made by the administration and by private companies, the territory would only be able to have an autonomous economy after a period of 15-20 years following the end of the Mandate. Triulzi in "L'Italia e l'economia" (p. 461) argues that "the sum we [Italy] spent, in the end, was too little if the aims that we wanted to reach with the administration of Somalia were truly those of improving the economic and social conditions, and too much if the reasons that pushed us to go back in the forner colony were political and of national prestige."

102 Lee V. Cassanelli, "Somali Land Resource Issues in Historical Perspective," in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia (Boulder, Colo., 1997), 70.

103 T. Lyons and A. I. Samatar, Somalia (Washington, D.C., 1995), 8. 04 Drysdale, The Somali Dispute, 89.



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At the end of the first five years of the administration, probably the most significant period for the preparation of independence in Somalia, the main issues were still unresolved. The economy, which was vital in order to guarantee Soma- lia's financial autonomy, was in an infant stage and destined to rely on massive foreign aid after 1960. On the political side, the administration did not even consider what impact a Westem political model would have on Somali society. The main Italian concern was to establish links with the dominant political force in place after independence, even if this happened to be the SYL, the traditional enemy of their administration.

Despite pressure from the UN, Italy continued to postpone the demarcation of the border between Somalia and Ethiopia, as it did not want to jeopardize new political links. Brusasca had visited the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie, in September 1951 and the diplomatic relationship between the two countries had improved significantly. To serve the aim of its foreign policy Italy concluded the mandate leaving the issue of the Ethiopian-Somali border an open wound that would lead to the 1978 Ogaden war.

