B - ToURINHO,E.(2004) - Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior

7/28/2019 B - ToURINHO,E.(2004) - Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior

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EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS NUMBER 1 (SUMMER 2004)2004,5, 15 - 27

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Behaviorist tradition in dealing withpsychological problems embodies a varietyof ideas and research programs which aresometimes closely interrelated in various aspectsor, ocasionnaly, conflicting. This paper consistsof an effort to move forward in defining theboundaries of behavior analysis, a system based

in the works by B. F. Skinner, while identifyingsome similarities and conflicts between Skinners

version of behaviorism and J. R. Kantorsinterbehaviorism. (The expression behavioranalysis is used here to refer to the Skinnerian

system; the group of philosophical/conceptual,empirical and applied work which constitutesthe field of a science of behavior; respectively,radical behaviorism, the experimental analysis ofbehavior, and applied behavior analysis).

Skinnerian behaviorism and interbehaviorismshare fundamental view points about the features

of a behavioral science (cf. Moore, 1987; Morris,1984), but they differ with respect to somephilosophical, conceptual and methodologicalissues (cf. Hayes, 1994; Kantor, 1970; Morris,1984). According to Morris, the two approachesrepresent well-reasoned and forceful argumentsfor a natural science of behavior a naturalismthat stands in contrast to alternative systems ofpsychology (p. 197). But, according to Kantor(1970), research (experimental, with infra-human

organisms, in controlled situations) developed byexperimental behavior analysts is too restrictedto meet the requirements of a natural science of

Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries

of a Science of Behavior1

Emmanuel Zagury TourinhoUniversidade Federal do Par, Brazil

As Kantor emphasized, the significantaspect of our science is found not inmethod, but in our conceptualizationsof behavior (Marr, 1984)

In the history of behaviorist psychology, one controversial issue has been the independence of abehavioral science, and in particular its relation to biological sciences. In this article, the boundaries of ascience of behavior are discussed in the light of B. F. Skinners and J. R. Kantors works, including somepropositions concerning subjective or private experience. Important similarities in the two approaches arepointed out, especially with regard to their commitment to a relational (non-reductionist) view of behavioralphenomena. The possibility of behavior analysis treating privacy in a more consistent manner is alsoproposed, using Kantors conclusions on this issue. Lastly, it is suggested that Kantors work, carried outin the 1920s, predates important positions that tend to affirm the independence of a behavioral science,and that taking such positions into consideration could be relevant to understanding the criticisms directedat experimental analysis of behavior almost 50 years later.

Descriptors: Radical behaviorism, interbehaviorism, physiology of behavior.

1 The writing of this paper was supported by grants (#520062/98-1and #477298/2001-0) from the Conselho Nacional de De-senvolvimento Cientfico e Tecnolgico, CNPq, Brazil (a Braziliangovernmental agency for the advancement of science and tech-nology). Parts of the paper were presented at the XXXII AnnualMeeting of the Sociedade Brasileira de Psicologia [Brazilian Societyof Psychology], October 2002. The author would like to thank the

reviewers for their comments and suggestions on a previous versionof the paper.Correspondence may be sent to: Rua Aristides Lobo,884, Apt. 100. Reduto. 66.053-020, Belm, Par, Brazil. E-mail:[email protected]


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behavior. In some measure, these two observationsreflect what has been taken as a markeddifference between the two behaviorist systems:interbehaviorism evolved strongly in the directionof a comprehensive philosophical and conceptual

approach to psychological phenomena; behavioranalysis (though encompassing philosophical,conceptual, and applied work) is most frequentlyrecognized as an empirical behavioral science,developing methods and carrying out controlledinvestigations on basic behavioral processes.Marr (1984) illustrates this point by arguing thatKantor developed his views primarily throughboth broad and deep historical and philosophicalscholarship (p.189), while Skinner...was first and

foremost a laboratory worker (p. 189). Morris(1984) recommended integration between the twobehaviorist emphases and suggested that Kantorsinterbehaviorism could fill a void that resulted inerroneous interpretations by the media and othersectors of society and thereby compromised theacceptance of behavior analysis. Morris adds:Interbehavioral psychology is quite explicit andsophisticated about metatheoretical assumptions.

These need to be integrated with the empiricaland conceptual strengths of radical behaviorismto improve the acceptability of a natural scienceof behavior (p. 202). In accepting that Kantorsinterbehaviorism offers relevant metatheoreticalreferences to a behavioral science, we are notignoring Skinners important philosophicaland conceptual works that ground behavioranalysis, but simply agreeing with Morriss callfor an integration of the contributions of thetwo behaviorist systems.

One similarity in the two systems is insistence

on an independentbehavioral science, one that isclearly distinguished from physiology, andbiology. The present paper deals with this theme

with the objectives of (a) outlining Skinners viewson the boundaries between behavior analysis and(neuro)physiology; (b) identifying Kantors viewson the same topic and delineating their similarityto the Skinnerian approach; (c) summarizingthe views of several authors who show thatbehavior analysis has gained from contributions

(e.g., Moore, 1984) or influences (e.g., Morris,Higgins & Bickel, 1982) of Kantors work and(d) arguing that Kantors approach contributes to

a metatheoretical treatment of independence andcomplementarity between the science of behaviorand physiology. The motivation for this analysisarises largely from an interest in the topic ofprivate events, which requires a clear demarcation

of the boundaries of behavioral phenomena. Forthis reason, the privacy theme will be emphasizedin the following sections.

Skinner and the Boundaries of a Science ofBehavior

Skinner, throughout his work, elaborated abehavior-analytic view of the independence andcomplementarity between a science of behavior

and (neuro)physiology (e.g., Skinner, 1938, 1953/1965, 1990), which has been critically examinedin behavior-analytic literature (e.g., Baer, 1996;Bullock, 1996; Donahoe, 1996; Donahoe &Palmer, 1994; Moore, 1997; Morris, 1988; Poling& Byrne, 1996; Reese, 1996a, 1996b). The presentsection summarizes two aspects of Skinnerspropositions: on the one hand, a relational (nonreductionist) definition of behavior as a subjectmatter is central to establishing the boundaries ofa science of behavior. On the other hand, Skinnersformulation allows a consistent interpretationof private events concerning references tophysiological components (conditions) of thosephenomena, as long as private is not identified

with internal. (Some other aspects of Skinnersapproach to the boundaries of behavior analysisand physiology will be mentioned in the nextsection, in contrast to Kantors positions).

In the 1930s, when Skinner began to elaboratehis explanatory system, he suggested that spurious

reference to the central nervous system inpsychology functioned to divert attention awayfrom behavior as a subject matter (Skinner, 1938,p. 4). His view was that a science of behaviorshould avoid references to the nervous system,as well as to mental fictions, and take behavioras a subject matter in itself. Skinner understoodbehavior as that part of the functioning ofan organism which is engaged in acting uponor having commerce with the outside world

(Skinner, 1938, p.6). Fuller (1973) has stated thatthis Skinnerian definition sounds somewhat in-terbehavioral, since commerce implies a two-way

Emmanuel Zagury Tourinho


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interaction () (p. 319). Approaching behavioras a relationship of the organism as a whole withthe outside world is in the origin of Skinnerssystem. The reflex was firstly defined as anobserved correlationof two events, a stimulus and

a response (Skinner, 1931/1961, p. 337, italicsadded). Skinner (1931/1961) also noted that inthe description of behavior we are interested inthe relationshipswithin a regressive series of eventsextending from the behavior itself to those energychanges at the periphery which we designate asstimuli (p. 338, italics added). Such a view ofbehavior avoids reductionist intepretations, assome comments on the topic in behavior-ana-lytic literature illustrate. Roche and Barnes (1997)

argue thatAlthough organismic activity may bereduced to its physiological components,this activity should not be mistaken for thesubject matter of behavior analysis. Activi-ties of organisms become interesting tothe behavior analyst only when they havebeen conceptualized as historical acts in con-text... Thus, the subject matter of behavioranalysis is action, rather than movement (p.606, italics added).

In a presentation of contextualism as theworld view of behavior analysis, Morris (1988)also refers Skinners relational definition andargues that

behavior is a dynamic, synergistic, andactive interrelation, not a thing, in which aresponse is but one component. The unitof behavior includes not only responses,but more importantly the functions ofthose responses, along with their inter-

related stimulus functions in current andhistorical context (p. 300).

Even when one considers only the responsecomponent of a behavior, in a behavior-analytic

view it will be the response of the organism as awhole. It is the organism as a wholethat behaves(Skinner, 1975, p.44); it is the behavior of theorganism as a whole (Skinner, 1990, p. 1206)that is the product of processes of variationand selection. This is in accordance with Hayess

(1994) discussion of psychological acts, which isbased in Kantors works:from a psychological perspective, parts

of the organism, considered separately fromthe whole, do not participate in psychologi-calevents. Rather, they participate in theevents isolated by other sciences, namelybiology or physiology. In other words, the

spleen and the liver and the stomach andthe lungs do not engage inpsychologicalacts

and neither does the brain. It is not theeyes that see, the ears that hear, the legsthat walk, the brain that thinks it is ratherthe whole organism who engages in theseacts (p.151).

In later texts, Skinner reiterates the definitionof behavior presented in 1931, and introducesnew ideas about the (neuro)physiological basis of

behavioral phenomena. For instance, in 1953 heaffirms that there is still a measure of circularityin much physiological explanation, even in the

wrintings of specialists (Skinner, 1953/1965, p.28), and adds that the causes to be sought in thenervous system are ... of limited usefulness in theprediction and control of specific behavior (pp.28-29). A more consistent reference to physiologyappears in Skinners (1990) presentation of theprinciple of selection by consequences, within

which a psychological science of behavior isencompassed. According to Skinner (1990),physiology studies the product of which thesciences of variation and selection study theproduction (p. 1208). Finally, in commenting ona chapter of his 1938 book, Skinner (1988/1989a)affirms that it was a declaration of independencefrom physiology (p. 129). Based on Skinners

writings, such independence may be formulatedin the analysis of private events.

The Skinnerian interpretation of privacy is

supported in the idea that biological variablesare conditions for, but do not define behavioralphenomena. Biological variables are conditionsin the sense that they are required for behavioralphenomena; they are not included in the defintionof behavior (cf. Roche & Barnes, 1997). Of course

we may maintain the idea of a private universe(cf. Skinner, 1953/1965), which suggests thatphysiological events may take part in behavioralrelations. However, when one considers the

processes through which physiological eventsacquire behavioral functions, one recognizes thatthose events in turn depend on events outside

Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior


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the skin for their acquisition (cf. Skinner, 1945,1953/1965, 1963/1969, 1974/1993). Thus theultimate explanation will always point to anextra-organism variable.

The identification ofprivatewith internalleads

to a set of problems in Skinners work (cf. Hayes,1994; Ribes, 1982; Tourinho, 1997). On one hand,because some events described by Skinner (1945,1963/1969, 1968, 1974/1993,) as private (e.g.,covert responses) are events of the organismas a whole (and as such they are not internal orexternal to the organism). On the other, becausethe proposition of private events as internalevents may result in a type of reductionism(for instance, when an ache is interpreted as a

physiological change, instead of being interpretedas a response to physiological conditions whichacquired stimulus functions). These problems,however, can be avoided considering that thenature of privacy is summed up in the fact thatcertain events may affect an individual in the formof interoceptive or proprioceptive stimulation,

whereas those events may affect others (whenthey do) merely in the form of exteroceptivestimulation. According to Skinner (1953/1965),a private event may be distinguished by its limitedaccessibility but not, so far as we know, by anyspecial structure or nature (p. 257). A toothcheis a private event not because of its localization,but due to the fact that the individuals responseto an inflamed tooth ... is unlike the response

which anyone else can make to that particulartooth, since no one else can establish the samekind of contact with it (Skinner, 1953/1965, p.257). Additionally, Skinners (e.g., 1968) analysisof covert responses, as responses of the organism

as a whole, does not require the reference toany particular organic system involved in theirproduction. Covert responses are viewed simplyas responses emitted on such a reduced scalethat [they] cannot be observed by others - at least

without instrumentation (Skinner, 1953/1965,p. 263).

Skinners remarks have been pointed assomewhat inconsistent about the relationbetween psychology and physiology (Reese,

1996a, p. 65), but it has also been acknowlegedthat his usual position was that reductionismis not useful (Reese, p.65). In most of his

references to the problem, Skinner presentsbehavior analysis as a discipline independent ofand complementary to physiology. Specificallyin the case of private stimulation, we maycontinue to view behavior as a relationship (cf.

Skinner, 1938), in which physiological events mayparticipate with stimulus functions (based on anassociation with public events), but do not definethat particular relationship.

Kantor and the Boundaries of a Science ofBehavior

Consistent with his argument that psychologyis the natural science of behavior, Kantor claims

on various occasions that psychologys referencesto physiological knowledge, and especially to thepossibility of physiological reductionism, movepsychology away from the study of organism-environment interactions. Beginning in 1922,Kantor (e.g., 1922, 1923, 1947) has pointed outthat psychology used the nervous system as adescriptive fact, or as an explanatory instru-ment. In either case this led to problems. Onthe one hand, it reproduced mistaken concep-tions about the nervous system2; on the other, itestablished a barrier to psychologys developmentas a science.

Using physiology in certain descriptions ofreflexes ignored not only other systems (muscu-lar, glandular, etc.) involved in responding butalso events having the function of stimuli. FromKantors perspective, that use ignores that theevent explained in its essence is an interaction ofa complete response with the specific stimulus(Kantor, 1922, p. 39). Reference to the nervous

system as a form of explanation sustains theoriesunsupported by behavioral observation and pro-motes mentalism, leading to such an aberrationin our vision of physiological facts as to preventus from describing human behavior as it occursand interpreting it in factual terms (Kantor, p.41). In the following paragraphs, some centralpoints of Kantors analysis are taken into account.Similarities with Skinners views, and Kantors

2 Given the penetration of physiology in psychological dis-

cussions of the period, Kantor (1922) proposed in this article toinvestigate the neural conceptions prevalent in psychology withthe hope that we can thereby suggest what is factual and what isfictitious in these conceptions (p. 38).



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contibutions to an approach of the boundariesof a science of behavior are highlighted. Theanalysis may also contribute to an understandingof Kantors (1970) critical view of the experimen-tal analysis of behavior.

The independence of a science of behavior

Like Skinner (1938), Kantor (1922) believedthat psychology should be emancipated fromphysiology (p. 42). In a debate in 1923, someconsequences of this position were made explicit.First, psychological science should work with aclear definition of its subject matter, which forKantor (1923) consisted of interactions of or-ganisms and stimuli objects (p.688). A response

is always seen as the response of an organism as awhole, as a total unitary biological happening(p.689), a unit of action (p.686), where the groupof systems that constitute the organism partici-pate. The neural, muscular, glandular, affective,perceptive or discriminative factors are all com-ponent functions, each constituting a member ofa large unified activity (p. 686). From this pointof view, the nervous system appears simply as acomponent of a more complex event (response);it is part of the response, but does not define it,much less should be interpreted as its cause.

To reject any reference to the nervous systemin the description or explanation of behavior re-sults from the understanding that it is not onlynot an adequate or a relevant cause but no causeat all (Kantor, 1923, p. 686); to fall back on thenervous system consists of a violation of scien-tific methodology (namely, to seek the cause of aphenomenon in a part of itself) (Kantor, 1922,p. 43). In view of the fact that the neurophysi-

ological event is merely a component of a moreinclusive event, the response (which in turn ismerely part of a psychological phenomenon, theinteraction between organism and environment),to refer to it as a possible cause or correlate ofbehavior is to ignore the nature and complexityof the behavioral phenomenon. However, whatseems to minimize the importance of the nervoussystem, for Kantor represents the possibility ofrestoring its role in regulating organism-environ-

ment relationships. Once the nervous system isproperly considered as a condition for (but notcause of) behavioral relations, its importance will

be more clearly recognized. In Kantors (1923)words,

not until we study the neural functionsas factors in the complex or unit of action(response) in which they operate, will we

understand them and their importance.Never can we understand neural mecha-nisms by making them into surrogatesfor, or aspects of, psychic or mentaloccurrences or events (p. 689).

A similar statement was made by Skinner(1977) in a critical discussion of cognitivism: Therespective sciences of behavior and physiology

will move forward most rapidly if their domainsare correctly defined and analyzed (p.10). That

is, the progress of both the science of behaviorand physiology requires the preliminary step ofcorrectly defining the features of their subjetctmatter, and the types of explanations that re-spect those features (preventing, for example,from reductionism). This is basic to achievingsound explanations of human behavior by thecooperative action of ethology, brain science andbehavior analysis (Skinner, 1989b, p. 18).

Psychologys independence from neighbor-ing sciences is announced by Kantor (1966) as ametapostulate or basic assumption of the sci-ence of behavior. This independence also prom-ises the possibility of dialogue and cooperation

with other sciences: Such relative independencein no [way] precludes the necessary and most use-ful cooperation of related sciences in the workof ascertaining the existence of certain kinds ofevents and their characteristics (Kantor, 1966, p.382). This idea reflects some of Kantors earliestcomments on the topic: any particular scientist

interested in psychological organisms, in order tounderstand most thoroughly and most broadlythe common phenomena, must get the results ofhis scientific colleagues, but this never means thatone type of fact is more fundamental or basic(Kantor, 1923, p. 690).

Similar to physiological appeals, mentalisttheories run counter to a scientific interpreta-tion of behavior. Consequently, the affirmationof psychologys independence as a science, whose

subject matter consists of organism-environmentinteractions, also serves to reject mentalism (Kan-tor, 1966). According to Kantor (1966), mentalist



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psychologists attribute alien qualities and proper-ties upon the behavior of persons (p. 379); butwhenever we study psychological events ourobservations concern concrete activities of or-ganisms as they interbehave with stimulus objects,

which may be other organisms (Kantor, 1966,p. 379). The definition of psychologys subjectmatter works, therefore, not to define conditionsof complementarity between mentalist and be-haviorist perspectives, but to refute an incoherentmentalist approach to behavior.

In many aspects, Skinners (1938) criticismof physiological explanations for behavior coin-cides with Kantors. As mentioned above, Skinner(1938) approached behavior as acting upon or

having commerce with the outside world (p. 6);Kantor (1923) was interested in the interactionof the organism as a whole with the environ-ment, one total unitary biological happening(p. 689). Skinner critized the circularity in muchphysiological explanation (1953/1965, p. 28)and argued that a conceptual nervous systemcannot ... be used to explain the behavior from

which it is inferred (1974/1993, p.235); Kantor(1922, 1923, 1978) considered that appeals tothe nervous system functioned, like mentalistideas, to deprive psychological analysis of its

very subject matter. In Skinners (1990) view,psychology is interested in the behavior of thebody-cum-brain, and the more we knowabout the body-cum-brain as a biochemicalmachine, the less interesting it becomes in itsbearing on behavior (p. 1208); Kantor (1922,1923, 1947) emphasized the relational characterof the psychological phenomenon (organism-environment interactions) and, consequently,

the inconsistencies of explanations that refer tophysiological events as causes or correlates ofbehavior. Further, Skinners (1938) discussionof physiology is later refered to as a declarationof independence (Skinner, 1988/1989a p. 129);for Kantor (1966), a principle of independenceof psychology is basic to the constitution of thescience of behavior and regulates its relationships

with other fields of knowledge.

Physiological reductionism supporting mentalismPhysiological reductionism is viewed byKantor as an attempt to justify mentalist con-

ceptions, probably the most confusing and futileprocedure for ameliorating the deficiencies of thementalistic tradition (Kantor, 1978, p. 338). Itis in hopes of conferring a scientific character tomentalism, postulating an empirical counterpart

to hypothetical processes, that the appeal to neu-rophysiology breaks into 20th century psychol-ogy. In 1923, Kantor (1923) affirmed that neuralevents are considered causal and determiningonly because they are regarded as mentalities (p.692). Prior to this, he had already affirmed thatthe neural mechanisms are used to uphold somesort of mentalism (Kantor, 1922, p. 40).

Contrary to the argument that there is alwaysa neurophysiological precedent for a response,

Kantor (1923) alleges that the demand to specifythat precedent would only make sense in thelight of the supposition that the physiology ofone psychological phenomenon is an event exter-nal to the phenomenon itself; this is pertinent onlyfor mentalist psychologies, it is only for them thatthe need exist to commit the methodological er-ror of reducing psychological data to some otherkind (p. 690). Once again, Kantor is rejectingboth physiological reductionism and mentalism,

which are inter-related (physiological reduction-ism works to justify mentalism, and mentalismprovides a room for physiological reductionismin a psychological science), and are obstacles tothe development of a science of behavior. Faced

with mind-body dualism, Kantor (1966) rejectedthe two substances and arrived at one moremetapostulate in which the science of behaviorresides: non-reductionism.

In Kantors (e.g., 1978, 1979) view, the sur-vival of reductionist perspectives in psycho-

logical discourse, even with the development of(inter)behavioral investigation, means that thementalist systems in place at the beginning ofthe 20thcenturyare maintained in the cognitiv-ism of the latter half of the that century. Theyillustrate the same problem pointed out in the1920s, even when the brain is substituted for themind as the faculties of the soul [are] made intocenters of the brain (Kantor, 1978, p. 338). Ac-cording to Kantor, for cognitivists, psychology

can be scientific by equating pure phantasms ofthe soul with functions of a tangible organ. Ofcourse the entire identification is purely verbal



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and involves spurious interpretations of an im-portant organ (p. 338). As the result of errors ofthis type, cognitivism becomes the antithesis ofscience (Kantor, 1979, p. 158), contributing toreducing all the complex behavior of the cogni-

tive type into mystical and specious brain actionand consciousness (Kantor, 1979, p. 158)3.

In the works by Kantor considered in thispaper, explanations presented as psychological,but that promote a physiological reductionism,are viewed in the final analysis as attempts torestore the principles of a mentalist tradition inpsychology. Therefore, an interbehavioral solu-tion to these efforts consists not of eliminatingthe reference to the mental component from

these positionsadmitting only the body com-ponentbut completely rejecting the preoccupa-tion with body events, focusing the relationships

which define the subject matter of psychology.The relationshiops of the 20th century cog-

nitivism and physiological reductionism are alsoidentified by Skinner (1977, 1985, 1989b): cogni-tive psychologists have ... turned to brain scienceand computer science for confirmation of theirtheories (Skinner, 1989b, p. 18), but no accountof what is happening inside the human body, nomatter how complete, will explain the origins ofhuman behavior (Skinner, 1989b, p. 18). Themetaphor of storage according to which con-tingencies of reinforcement are stored as repre-sentations and rules (Skinner, 1985, p. 294) is aninstance of spurious interpretation of the brain,

which should not be viewed as an encyclopaedia,library or museum (Skinner, 1985, p. 300). Evenif the brain were proved to store information,that would not suffice as psychological explana-

tion. Behavior analysis turns to contingencies ofreinforcement to explain behavioral change andleaves it to brain science the investigation of whatis going inside the organism. Cognitive science,however, cannot leave [what is happening inside]to neurology because processing information ispart of the story they want to tell (Skinner, 1985,p. 295).

Physiology and (in) sufficiency of the reflex concept

When behavioral psychology was still en-gaged in investigations based on the principlesof reflexes, Kantor (1922) identified a tendencyto consider complex human behavior as the sum

of reflex relations. Kantor considered that ten-dency as a product of the reductionist culturethat persisted in psychological thought. This topicmerits separate consideration to emphasize thatKantor, in the behaviorist tradition, foresaw theneed for behavioral principles beyond thosepertinent to the investigation and explanationof reflex behavior.

The passage in which Kantor (1922) deals withthe problem begins with a proposal to emanci-

pate psychology from physiology. Next, Kantorattributes to the neural theory an erroneousinterpretation of behavior by psychologiststhemselves: even when psychologists considerthat they are studying responses to stimuli theneural prejudice influences them to consider allpsychological behavior as merely the integrationof reflexes (p. 42). Kantor raises two objec-tions to the notion of reflex integration. First,reflex acts belong to the permanent behaviorequipment of the individual and are not capableof integration (p. 42). In other words, reflexesconstitute a phylogenetic product with respectto which it is not possible to produce originalcombinations (but only condition new stimulicapable of eliciting them). Second, to think ofall of our behavior as reflexes or combinations ofreflexes means to overlook the great variety andcomplexity of our actual behavior (p. 42). Theinsufficiency of the concept of reflex is especiallyevident when considering relationships in which

cultural variables participate, such as complexsocial, esthetic, and moral adaptations to our hu-man surroundings (p. 42).

Because the reflex relationship is not enoughto account for complex human phenomena, toadopt it as an explanation implies an appeal tounobserved fictional properties that suggest fun-damental processes occurring in other domains.In other words, it is inevitable when we makereflexes the basis of every reaction that we intro-

duce surreptitiously and ad hocqualities and condi-tions which really are not there (Kantor, 1922,p. 42). It was only in 1937, fifteen years later, that

3

The extent to which Kantors (1978, 1979) characterization ofcognitivism is appropriate to all contemporary versions of cognitivepsychology may be disputable, but an analysis of the issue is beyondthe scope of this article.



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Skinner (1937) recognized the insufficiency of thereflex in explaining the behavioral relations he

was investigating (cf. Coleman, 1984). Skinner wasnot partisan to neural or mentalist explanationsfor behavior (the arguments in his 1938 book are

consistent with Kantors criticisms of those doc-trines). But Skinners use of the drive conceptin the elaboration of his explanatory system canbe taken as a consequence of the type of problempointed out by Kantor (invention of fictions).Kantor criticized this Skinnerian concept (cf.

Verplanck, 1995), calling it a spook. As Morriset al. (1982) pointed out, Skinner credited Kan-tor with convincing him of the dangers inherentin the concept of drive (p. 160).

In light of Kantors view on the scope of apsychology strictly based on the study of reflex,one has a clearer understanding of the criticismhe makes of experimental analysis of behavior ina 1970 conference (Kantor, 1970) given to Divi-sion 25 (Experimental Analysis of Behavior) ofthe American Psychological Association, which

would result in a wider schism between Skinner-ians and Kantorians (cf. Verplanck, 1995). On thatoccasion, Kantor addressed what he saw as meritsand limitations of the experimental analysis ofbehavior. Among the limitations, he mentionedthe narrowness of the research program derivedfrom reflex investigation. Kantor did not inter-pret the approach to behavior, with conceptualinstruments derived from reflex research, as beinginfluenced by neural theories, but pointed out thatone may have a correlate result when physiologicalexplanations are avoided and the investigation islimited to conditioning: when human behavioris considered it is either fitted into a reflex frame-

work or inadequately treated (p. 108). That is, thevariability and complexity of human behavior isnot adequately considered.

In that examination of experimental analysisof behavior, Kantor (1970) discusses the conceptsof experimentation, analysis and behavioras used in behavior-analytic literature. Regardingexperimentation, he points out that it is regulatedby reflex and operant paradigms. Limiting experi-mentation to conditioning processes leads to two

problems in behavior analysis: (1) the simplifica-tion of all behavior, and (2) the inclination towardspecialized patterns of research (Kantor, p. 102).

Consequently, one fails to investigate behavioralprocesses or relationships that do not conformto conditioning procedures and one reduces therange of the behavioral phenomena investigated.Regardless of the fact that the investigation con-

ducted by behavior analysts is relevant and meritsrecognition, conditioning should not be viewedas anything more than one way of working witha certain kind of behavior performed by certainkinds of organisms. We may not regard condition-ing or any other single kind as the necessary andsufficient way to deal with all behavior (Kantor,p. 102). Also, in discussing the need to expandthe scope of behavior analysis, Kantor implicatesreflex research with the disciplines limitations.

To him, TEAB [The Experimental Analysis ofBehavior] ... should be fully alert against build-ing up conditioning tactics into strategies, andparticular strategies into psychological principles,and in this way creating a general bias for a re-flex-generated interpretation of all psychologicalevents (Kantor, pp. 104-105). In discussing theterm behavior, Kantor suggested alternativesets of investigation to correct the fact that onthe whole, TEAB is much more inclined towardthe analysis of responses than behavioral fields,a circumstance influenced by the partial reflex-conditioning origin of the movement (Kantor,p. 105).

Behavior analysts evidently do not agree withKantors (1970) diagnosis of the experimentalanalysis of behavior. In favor of their emphasison experimental research based on the principlesof conditioning, behavior analysts respect the factthat the structuring of a community of research-ers around well defined research programs was a

positive thing for their survival and expansion, incontrast to the decline in the number of behaviorresearchers who present themselves as Kantorians(although the survival and influence of Kantorsthinking can be evaluated through other means

cf. Morris et al., 1982). Also, Kantors analysiscan foster a productive reflection on the scopeand the limits of a science of behavior, but his ap-praisal of the experimental analysis of behaviorignored that sound philosophical, conceptual, and

applied works are also encompassed in behavioranalysis (cf. Hawkins & Anderson, 2002; Moore& Cooper, 2003; Tourinho, 1999), extending the



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field of the discipline.In 1922, when Kantor pointed out the limita-

tions of explanatory systems that restricted them-selves to reflex conditioning, the Skinnerian pro-gram had not yet been started. Kantor had already

noted that investigation of reflexes, if psychologywere to be limited to it, would restrict the scopeof psychological science, or bring it back againto mentalism. His later criticism of experimentalanalysis of behavior (Kantor, 1970) is consistent

with that point of view. Regardless of the factthat the advent of the operant concept (Skinner,1937) and the investigation derived therefrommade it possible to expand the scope of behavioranalysis, it was not this step that caused behavior

analysis to completely embrace the variability andcomplexity of human behavioral phenomena. Forexample, Skinner (1945) proposed interpretationas a method to open new areas of investigationand broaden the scope of the field. In Skinners(1984a) view private events might be interpreted

with the concepts of a science of behavior: toextend the terms and principles found effective[in laboratory analyses] to the interpretation ofbehavior where laboratory conditions are impos-sible is feasible and useful (p.578). However,private events were not included among theinvestigative interests of behavior analysts atthe time of Skinners (1945) first discussion ofinterpretation.

In another article in which he discussed therelationships between interbehaviorism and ex-perimental analysis of behavior, Kantor (1974)concluded that there are great differences be-tween the two approaches, if the latter were tobe considered sufficient as a psychological system.

However, if experimental analysis of behaviorwere approached as a unique specialized move-ment within the general field of psychology,one may well assign it an important place in thenaturalistic sciences of interbehavioral psychol-ogy (p. 5). Again, one finds in Kantors criticismno reference to the distinction between the ex-perimental analysis of behavior (whose scope andlimits are to be established) and the field of be-havior analysis (which encompasses conceptual,

philosophical, empirical and applied work - cf.Hawkins & Anderson, 2002; Moore & Cooper,2003; Tourinho, 1999).

Psychological phenomena as historical organism-environment

relationships and the interbehavioral approach to subjective

phenomena

Psychology has as its subject matter the

interactions of organisms and stimuli objects(Kantor, 1923, p. 688), but an appropriate de-scription (which specifies functions of stimuli andresponses) of these relationships takes historicalaspects into account. Psychological processesare adaptive in the face of stimuli-objects, butthe stimulating situations are not the exclusiveconditions for the building up of particular reac-tions. Another very important set of conditionsis found in the previous psychological develop-

ment of the organism (Kantor, 1922, p. 47). ForKantor, therefore, ontogenesis limits the field ofinteractions with objects of the organisms cur-rent environment.

Behavioral relations are also limited by thephylogenetic biological apparatus. Thus, Kan-tor (1973) also mentions a basic postulate ofthe interbehavioral system, according to whichpsychological events are evolved from biologicalbehavior (Kantor, p. 458). Kantors approachto phylogenesis and ontogenesis of behavioris in accordance with Skinners causal mode ofselection by consequences. According to Skinner(1981/1984b) human behavior is a product of:(i) the contingencies of survival responsible forthe natural selection of the species and (ii) thecontingencies of reinforcement responsible forthe repertoires acquired by its members, includ-ing (iii) the special contingencies maintained byand evolved social environment (p. 478). That is,phylogenesis, ontogenesis and culture are three

levels of variation and selection (Skinner, 1981/1984b, p. 478) that explain human behavior. Upto this point, we find in Kantor ideas that ap-proximate those of Skinner (1981/1984b) withregards to phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels ofdetermination. What Skinner defines as culturallevel is also found in the Kantorian analysis whenhe deals with the theme of privacy.

When we start to examine private events, weare still dealing with historical relationships. In the

case of affective behaviors, according to Kan-tor (1966), it is possible to distinguish betweenidiosyncratic relations, with respect to which the



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stimulus and response functions are coordinatedin the individuals exclusive contacts with things(p. 395); and cultural relations, built up in con-nection with other persons in specific groups

with which the individual is identified in various

ways (p. 395). In any case, what defines an eventas being pertinent to the field of subjectivity orprivacy is its uniqueness (Observer, 1973, p.84) or specificity (Observer, 1981, p. 228).Imagination serves as an example. Imaginationcan be considered a type of implicit behavior,a relation that involves a response partially underthe control of something that is absent, or theinteraction of a person with a stimulus object

which is not present (Kantor, 1978, p. 340).

Before Kantor, such a type of behavior receivedconsistent treatement by Skinner (1953/1965),in a discussion about seeing in the absence ofthings seen. Skinners and Kantors analysis ofthe problem are compatible, though conceptu-ally diverse.

The observability of stimuli and responsesconstitutes, for Kantor, a relevant aspect ofbehavioral relations in the field of privacy. Thisaspect can be dealt with by referring to stimuliand responses as apparent or non-apparent(cf. Hayes, 1994). The partially non-apparentcharacter of a response results from the factof its being subtle, since it is emitted withreduced participation of the motor apparatus.For example, many affective responses andacts like dreaming, planning, and rememberinginvolve reaction systems that are subtle in theiroperation (Kantor & Smith, 1975, p. 55). Im-portantly, Kantor maintains that it is always theorganism as a whole that behaves; the activity

of the organism is a single unitary act (Kantor& Smith, 1975, pp. 51). Insofar as the activity ofthe organism as a whole exists, a response willnever be entirely unobservable; its observability

will be partly a result of the observers familiar-ity with the observed organism. When implicitinteractions are subtle, they are very difficult toobserve ... Only when we know a man thoroughly,are acquainted with his interbehavioral historyand behavior equipment, can we know the nature

of his implicit action (Kantor & Smith, 1975, p.200). No specification of anatomical-physiologi-cal components is required for describing a be-

havioral relationship as subjective or private;no information in this domain will be valid as adescription of behavior.

According to Kantor (1966), since the unique-ness of privacy results from the implicit character

of certain relationships, or from the subtle formof certain responses, we can point to the elimi-nation of traditional ideas of inner and privateprocesses which require expression in order tobe publicly known and approached (Kantor,1966, pp. 403-404). The fact that two individualsmay not establish the same contact with a givenstimulus is not viewed by Kantor as a feature ofprivacy. If we understand privacy as specificity,this property can be pointed out in any relation-

ship. According to Kantor (Observer, 1981) in aworld where every event is private, that is unique,there is no problem of privacy (p. 230). Kan-tor speaks of specificity to reply to Skinner,or rather, to question the characterization thatSkinner makes of a private stimulation as uniquefor the individual. Kantor replies to this affirmingthat every relationship is unique.

An interesting attitude is assumed bya behaviorist not completely emancipatedfrom a dualistic background and who usesthe term private in its popular connota-tion when he asserts that the individualsresponse to an inflamed tooth, for example,is unlike the response which anyone elsecan make to that particular tooth (Skin-ner, 1953, p. 257). What the behavioristoverlooks is that the same statement canbe made of any stimulus object (Observer,1981, p. 230).

Skinners statement concerning the different

type of contact involved in private stimulationmay be interpreted as compatible with therecognition of the idiosyncratic characterof every behavioral relation. Even thoughall behavioral relations are idiosyncratic fromthe standpoint of stimulus control, the typeofcontact that can be established with privatestimuli is unique. With respect to what occursin the individuals body, only the individual canbe affected by interoceptive or proprioceptive

stimulations. These are not specially acessibleto the individual, for they depend on relationswith exteroceptive stiumuli to acquire behavioral



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functions, but the different type of contact shouldnot be neglected. Skinner was perspicacious inrealizing the importance this would acquire inmodern western culture, especially with thepractices that promote self-observation and

self-control. Kantor, in turn, argues consistentlyagainst the idea that privacy establishes somekind of problem for psychology. With regard toprivacy, one can speak of a variation in complexityof what needs to be explained, but not simply ofa problem of inaccessibility.

ConclusionLimited to the objectives enumerated in the

beginning paragraphs, the present paper discussesonly a few aspects of Skinners and Kantorsprojects for a psychological science, their critical

view of the disciplines historical developmentand their solutions for establishing that sciencesboundaries. In the works examined, Kantorscriticisms regarding the adoption of physiologicalreferences to explain behavior can be pointedout throughout his work as developments ofthe restriction he presented in 1922 on the useof the nervous system as a descriptive fact(when only one component of the responseelementis considered) and as an explanatoryinstrument (when the appeal to physiologyserves the mentalist cause); such restrictions areextensively reviewed and discussed in Kantors(1947) book on physiological psychology. Kantor(1947) concluded that there is an authenticphysiological psychology only when the organismas a whole is the object of the analysis.

Contemporary developments in neurosciences

have provoked a greater interest in integrationbetween behavior analysis and (neuro)physiology,but a consensual formulation of complementarityin the two sciences is lacking (cf. Baer, 1996;Bullock, 1996; Donahoe, 1996; Donahoe &Palmer, 1994; Moore, 1997; Poling & Byrne,1996; Reese, 1996a, 1996b). A productivediscussion on the matter might consider to whatextent integrating solutions solve the problemspointed out by Kantor (1922) and Skinner (1938).

In other words, to what extent do we continuewith a non-reductionist description ofpsychologicalphenomena, from a non-mentalist perspective,

when we incorporate in our explanat ionsreferences to the (neuro)physiology of thebehavioral phenomena (cf. Donahoe & Palmer,1994; Morris, 1988; Hayes, 1994; Reese, 1996a,1996b).

The behavior analysis mentioned above is notcovered by the restrictive description that Kantor(1970, 1974) provided of the experimental analysisof behavior. It is a cultural system (Glenn, 1993,2001) or a field of knowledge that articulatesconceptual, empirical and applied contents andthat can avail itself of Kantors formulationsabout psychology as a science of behavior.

According to Glenn (2001), i f behavioranalysis is to have a future, it must function as

a cohesive whole in the culture at large and berecognized as a discipline in its own right (p.128). The functioning of behavior analysis aspostulated by Glenn (2001) perhaps dependsas much on dialogue with other disciplinesas well as other versions of behaviorism; forexample, Kantors interbehaviorism. Onecannot say that this interpretation of behavioranalysis is widely promoted, or that it prevails inbehavior-analytic literature. That may pertain toa problem in behavior analytic production similarto that pointed out by Machado, Loureno, andSilva (2000) in a discussion of psychologicalsystems: a pattern of unhealthy growth dueto a disproportionate emphasis on factualinvestigations at the expense of theoretical andconceptual investigations, particularly the latter(p. 2). Morris et al. (1982) affirmed the need forintegrating the contributions of Skinnerian andKantorian behaviorisms and we agree this wouldbe an excellent way to alter that pattern.

In dealing with the problem of privacy,Kantors rejection of the internal-externaldichotomy and the emphasis on interactionsavoid problems that are not entirely solved inthe Skinnerian approach. Specifically, by not

working with the inside world category, Kantorcan continue to approach interactions pertinent tothe theme of subjectivity without identifying itssubject matter with that of physiology, a positionthat Skinners relational view also recommends,

but which is difficult to reconcile with the conceptof inside world and with the reference to theskin as a boundary. In addition, Kantors approach



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to the problem of observability constitutes aconsistent interpretation, since it continues withthe organism as a whole and places in the field ofinterpersonal relationships all that is idiosyncraticin the interactions that concern subjectivity. It is

with Skinners approach, however, that we areled to become aware of aspects of the subjectiveexperience which make it original in modern

western culture; aspects related to (anatomo-physiological) events which take on an importantrole in this culture and with which the contactof individuals (in the form of interoceptive orproprioceptive stimulation) is differentiated.

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B - ToURINHO,E.(2004) - Behaviorism, Interbehaviorism and the Boundaries of a Science of Behavior