Australian Army Journal Summer edition 2013 · The Passion of Bradley Manning: The Story Behind the Wikileaks Whistleblower ... warfare advocacy, raising the level of professional

Australian Army Journal Volume X, Number 4

Summer edition 2013

• TheFutilityofCapabilityArgumentsandtheArmyApproachtothe2014ForceStructureReview

• ResettingLandForcesforContingency

• PlanBeersheba:TheCombinedArmsImperativeBehindtheReorganisationoftheArmy

• ShapingtheFutureBattlespace:OffensiveCyberWarfareToolsforthePlanner

• TheValueofGenericCulturalTraining

• TimorTimur:TheUntoldStorybyLieutenantGeneralKikiSyahnakri(retd),IndonesianArmedForces

AustralianArmyJournalSummeredition2013,VolumeX,Number4

The Australian Army Journal is published by authority of the Chief of Army

The Australian Army Journal is sponsored by Director, Land Warfare Studies Centre

© Commonwealth of Australia 2013Thisjournaliscopyright.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofstudy,research,criticismorreview(aspermittedundertheCopyrightAct1968),andwithstandardsourcecreditincluded,nopartmaybereproducedbyanyprocesswithoutwrittenpermission.InquiriesshouldbedirectedtoDirector,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,GeddesBuilding,IanCampbellRoad,Duntroon,ACT2600.

Contributorsareurgedtoensuretheaccuracyoftheinformationcontainedintheirarticles;theEditorialAdvisoryBoardacceptsnoresponsibilityforerrorsoffact.PermissiontoreprintAustralianArmyJournalarticleswillgenerallybegivenbytheEditorafterconsultationwiththeauthor(s).Anyreproducedarticlesmustbearanacknowledgmentofsource.

TheviewsexpressedintheAustralianArmyJournalarethecontributors’andnotnecessarilythoseoftheAustralianArmyortheDepartmentofDefence.TheCommonwealthofAustraliawillnotbelegallyresponsibleincontract,tortorotherwiseforanystatementmadeinthisjournal.

ISSN 1448-2843

Editorial Advisory Board

LTGENPeterLeahy,AC(Retd) MAJGENJimMolan,AO,DSC(Retd)ProfJeffreyGrey DrJohnBlaxlandMAJGENElizabethCosson,AM,CSC MAJGENMichaelSmith,AO(Retd)DrAlbertPalazzo MrsCatherineMcCullaghMAJGENIanGordon,AO(Retd) BRIGJustinKelly,AM(Retd)DrCorinneManning MrRogerLee

Managing Editor: COL Rodger Shanahan


CONTENTS

EDITORIAL...........................................................................................................5

CAPABILITY

TheFutilityofCapabilityArgumentsandtheArmyApproachtothe2014ForceStructureReview................................................................................8Lieutenant Colonel Martin White

ResettingLandForcesforContingency...............................................................27Colonel Tim Law (British Army)

PlanBeersheba:TheCombinedArmsImperativeBehindthReorganisationoftheArmy..................................................................................38Colonel Craig Bickell

CONCEPTS

ShapingtheFutureBattlespace:OffensiveCyberWarfareToolsforthePlanner.....................................................................................................55Major Nicholas Rose

CULTURE

TheValueofGenericCulturalTraining..................................................................71Major Matthew Carr

REVIEW ESSAY

TIMORTIMUR:TheUntoldStorybyLieutenantGeneralKikiSyahnakri(retd),IndonesianArmedForces....................................................................................86Bob Lowry

CONTENTS


BOOK REVIEWS

Climate Change and Displacement Reader by ScottLeckie,EzekielSimperinghamandJordanBakker(eds).........................98Reviewed by Chris Baker

The Changi Camera: A Unique Record of Changi and the Thai-Burma Railway byTimBowden.................................................................................................102Reviewed by Dr Janda Gooding

The Passion of Bradley Manning: The Story Behind the Wikileaks Whistleblower byChaseMadar................................................................................................105Reviewed by Steven L. Jones

Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps by AaronB.O’Connell.......................................................................................108Reviewed by Tristan Moss

Bill the Bastard byRolandPerry.................................................................................................111Reviewed by Margaret Palazzo

Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War byZachariahCherionMampilly..........................................................................113Reviewed by Lieutenant Alexander Ryrie

One False Move, Bravest of the Brave: The Australian Mine Defusers in World War Two by RobertMacklin.............................................................................................115Reviewed by Warrant Officer Class One Wayne Schoer

Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Building for the Second World War byJean-LouisCohen........................................................................................118Reviewed by Professor Peter Stanley

TITLES TO NOTE ............................................................................................121

CHAUVEL PRIZE ............................................................................................127

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS .......................................................................128


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EDITORIAL

TherearefivearticlesthatIcommendtoyouinthislastAustralian Army Journal editionfor2013.TheLandWarfareStudiesCentre(LWSC)startedanembryonicrelationshipwithourBritishcounterpartto‘swap’articlesandthefirstoftheseappearsfromColonelTimLaw,discussingthewayinwhichtheBritishArmyisgrapplingwiththesamepracticalandtheoreticalissuesasourarmyinthepost-Afghanistanworld.Thestructural(re)adjustmentthemeiscarriedonintwogoodarticles.Thefirst,pennedbyLieutenantColonelMartinWhitearguesforagreaterfocusonstrategiclogicinDefenceplanningwhileColonelCraigBickelloutlinesthecombinedarmsimperativeshebelievesarebehindtheneedforPlanBeersheba.AverygoodattemptatdemystifyingtheworldofcyberwarfareforneophyteslikemyselfismadebyMajorNickRose.AndanargumentforhowtheAustralianArmyshouldlookatculturaltrainingandwhyisconvincinglymadebyLWSC’sownMajorMattCarr.Lastly,wedon’toftenpublishlengthyreviewsofbooks;howeverwehavemadeanexceptioninthecaseofBobLowry’soutstandingtreatmentofLieutenant-GeneralKikiSyahnakri’sbookTimor Timur.Bobuseshisvoluminousknowledgeofthesubjectmattertoputboththebookandthetopicintocontext.

Sadly,thiseditionoftheJournalalsorepresentsthelasttimethatLWSCwillberesponsibleforitsproduction.ThatisbecauseLWSCistobedisestablishedwitheffect31December2013.TheCentrewasestablishedin1997withtheaim(inpart)‘…toinfluencetheprofessional,academic,andcommunitydiscussionofdefencepolicy,landpowerdevelopment,andrelatedissues.’TheinnovationthatthosewhosupportedtheconceptwishedtoengenderintheuniqueorganizationwasevidentintheDCA’s2005DirectivethatchargedLWSCwithprovidingland


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warfareadvocacy,raisingthelevelofprofessionalandintellectualdebatewithinArmyandpromotingandconductingappliedresearch‘…freeoftheconstraintsinherentinnormalstaffprocesses.’Itwasachallengethatmanytookupwithgustothroughoutitshistory,butthereremainedagreatdealofunrealizedpotentialintheconcept.

FuturelandwarfareresearchandadvocacyisnowtobecomeastafffunctionwithinArmyHQ.Someresearchtaskswillbecontractedout.Ican’thelpbutthinkthatjustastheArmyneedsinnovativethinking,engagementandadvocacytotakeusthroughthechallengesofapost-operationalenvironment,weappeartohavewithdrawnfromtheintellectualfieldofbattleandmadeadvocacyandresearchjustanotherArmyHQstafffunction,subjecttothenormalvagariesofpostingplotsandsubsequentstaffchurn.

Itishardtoimaginewherepotentiallyinnovativemilitarythinkerswillbeallowedtoexploreanddevelopideasamongstagroupofpeoplewithrelativelydiverseskillsetsandexperience,andadvocateforthembasedonhowwelldevelopedandarguedtheyare,ratherthanwhatthenextmostseniorpersonthinksofthem.Trueindependenceofthoughtbecomesconstrainedthemomentitbecomesastafffunction.Thethen-DCAacknowledgedasmuchinhis2005Directive.IfArmywantstoencourageinnovativeandindependentthinkingthenLWSCisthesortofinstitutionthatyouwouldneedtoinventifitdidn’texist,andyetArmyisgoingtheotherway.InotethattheRAAFhasmaintainedtheAirPowerStudiesCentreandtheRANtheSeaPowerCentre,whileArmyhasdisbandeditsCentreandreplaceditwithanArmyHQDirectorate.

Ithasbeeninteresting,asareservistDirectorofLWSCwhowasnotresidentinCanberratoseehowArmyencouragesandencouragesitsmemberstothink.AsanarmyIbelievethatweplacemorevalueonthedoersratherthanthethinkers,andalacrityasastaffofficerisprizedmorethanthewayinwhichanofficercandevelop,articulateandadvocateanidea.Asaprofessionwearetaughtthevalueofstructureandhowtowritetoinformeachother,ratherthanthevalueofpassionandinnovationandhowtoargueapointinthebroadercommunity.Staffbranchesdemandandthereforeencouragetheformer,whileasmallorganizationsuchasLWSCwasdesignedtofacilitatethelatter.IntheabsenceofLWSCitwillbeinterestingtoseehowweasanArmyprovideaninstitutional‘home’forpeoplewhowanttobeintellectuallycuriousandinnovativebutnotastaffofficer,wanttoengagewithacademiaanddefence-relatedinterestgroupsandadvocateforArmy.Iamnotsurethatsubsumingfunctionsintothestaffsystem,contractingthemouttoacademiaorfarmingthemouttoDefencetraininginstitutionsistheanswer.

EDITORIAL


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EDITORIAL

Still,adecisionhasbeenmadeandthatistheendofthediscussion.IhopethatpeopleenjoyedreadingtheCentre’spublications,followingourtweets,attendingourseminarsatRussellandourroundtablesatDuntroon,andlisteningtoourstaffspeaktovariouscareercoursesoninnovativethinkingoratvariousconferencesonissuesvarious.Iamsurethesamepeoplewouldhaveenjoyedourfutureplannedbutnever-to-berealisedfutureinnovations.

ItwouldberemissofmenottopersonallythankallofthecurrentstaffatLWSCfortheirgeneroussupportformyeffortstohavetheCentrepursueitsprogramofresearch,collaborationandoutreachwiththeoccasionaltiltatwindmills.Mostsucceeded,somedidn’tandsomeofthepotentiallymostfruitfulwereworksinprogressbutwillnowdieonthevine.ThestaffwecurrentlyhaveareverytalentedandIhopeArmyisabletomakeuseoftheirintellectwithintheorganizationforaslongaspossible.ItisalsochallengingforthetwoDeputyDirectorswhoworkedformeduringmytimeasDirectortohaveabosswhoisbothAResandinSydney.MyCanberraradarwasneverswitchedonwhichallowedmedealwithissuesonwhatIconsideredtobetheirmerit,whiletheyconstantlyhadtodealwithARAsuperiorswhoseCanberraradarswereneverswitchedoff.Itcan’thavebeeneasyforthem.Finally,thanksshouldalsogotothepastDirectorsofLWSCwhobothbuiltitandmaintaineditwhenitwasdifficulttoconvincepeoplethatsuchaninstitutionwasrequiredintheArmy.The16yearsthatLWSCexistedforistestimonytotheirdoggednessanddetermination.

ForallofitsfrustrationsIhavethoroughlyenjoyedmytimeinLWSCanddealingwiththeJournalandotherpublications.ForallmycomplaintsofArmyofficers’lackofwritingskillsandintellectualrigourIhavebeenfortunatetoberemindedoftheirprofessionalismandcamaraderieeverytimeIhavehadtogotoCanberra.WhenIwastoldthatLWSCwastobedisbanded,Iwrotetoafriendtellinghimthat‘theVisigothshavebreachedthewalls’–theremarkwasmademostlyinjestbutnotentirely.Armyneedsofficerswhoarequestioningandbothintellectuallycuriousandrigorous;theywillbesorelyneededintheyearsahead.Yetneitherthestaffnorthemilitaryeducationsystemsaresetuptodevelopeither.WithoutLWSCasasmallbeaconofintellectualdiversitywithinArmy,theorganizationrunstheriskofseeingthinkingpurelyasanotherstafffunctionwithalltheinherentlimitsthatthisimposes.Butthatisnowforotherpeopletothinkabout.Totherestofyou,thanksfortheopportunitytoserveandgoodsoldiering.


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CAPABILITY

TheFutilityofCapabilityArgumentsandtheArmyApproachtothe2014ForceStructureReviewLieutenantColonelMartinWhite

ABSTRACT

ThetraditionalArmycapability-basedapproachtothe2014ForceStructureReview(FSR),nomatterhowcoherent,islikelytocontinuetoseeArmyascomparativelyworseoffthantheotherServices.Forgreatersuccess,Armyrequiresalong-termstrategy,overanumberofyears,tobreakdowndecadesofstrategiccultureanddefencepolicytrends.Mostimportantly,Armyneedstoredefinethecurrent(albeitundeclared)defencepolicypriorityofprovidingnichecombatforcestoUnitedStates-ledexpeditionaryoperations,basedontheperceivedNorthAsianrisk,toanear-regionfocus.


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CAPABILITY

In2011MajorGeneralCaligaripursuedwhathereferredtoasthe‘goldenthreadoflogic’indevelopingArmy’sforcestructure.1Indoingso,hewasoneofmanywhosoughttojustifyArmy’sforcestructureprimarilythroughlogicalcapability-basedarguments,particularlythroughtheForceStructureReview(FSR)process.However,strategiclogichasnotalwaysbeenamajortrendinAustraliandefencepolicy,andArmy’sattemptstoworkwithinFSRframeworkshaveresultedinpoorresourceallocationtoachievedeclaredtaskingpriorities,particularlywhencomparedwiththeotherservices.

ThisarticlecontendsthatArmyshouldprioritiseits2014FSRefforttowardsestablishingacrediblebasisofnear-regionthreatandriskratherthanfocusingoncapabilityarguments.Thiswillproduceamorebalanceddefenceforcestructurebasedondeclaredpriorities.Thisisnotrivialtask,andachangetoriskandthreatperceptionwouldrepresentadramaticbreakindecadesofdefencepolicycontinuityandambiguity.SignificantchangewillnotbeachievedinasingleFSR,andArmy’sapproachwouldneedtobepartofalong-termstrategy.ThisarticlewillhighlightthehistoryofsignificantdepartmentalimpetustomaintainforcestructuresprimarilytoallownichecombatcontributionstoUnitedStates(US)-ledexpeditionaryoperations,afeatureofdefencepolicyidentifiedconsistentlyovertimebynumerouscommentators.2Armyfacesthepossibilityofbeingunder-resourced(comparedwithAirForceandNavy)fordeclaredtasksifitcontinuestofocusonthestandardcapability-basedFSRinput.

Tobreakthislongstandingcontinuityindefencepolicy,Armyshouldconsiderdevelopingalong-term‘strategy’forFSR2014andbeyond,withprimacyofeffortplacedonredefiningthethreatratherthanjustifyingcapability.SuchastrategyshouldseektomovethefocusawayfromnichecombatcapabilitiesalignedtoUS-ledoperationalscenarios,andmayincludegainingexternalassessmentsofthecontemporarythreat,developingmeasuresofeffectiveness,influencingclassifiedcontextscenarios,highlightingtheinconsistencieswithinthecurrentdeclaredmaritimestrategy,addingathreatcomponenttoArmyCapabilityNeedsDocuments(ACND),andlearninglessonsfrompreviousattemptstoredefinethethreatassumptionsunderlyingdefencepolicy.

TheFutilityofCapabilityArgumentsandtheArmyApproachtothe2014ForceStructureReview


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Army’s disadvantage in the FSR process

FSRshaveperiodicallybeenundertakentoprovideforcestructureoptionstotheAustraliangovernment.Forexample,theaimofthe2012FSR,ledbyMajorGeneralCrane,wastoestablishcostedforcestructurerequirementsintheperioduntil2035.3FSRsarenottheonlytoolusedtodeterminedefenceforcestructure—defencepolicyformulationisacomplexprocessinvolvingabroadmixofstakeholders.Inthepast,FSRshavebeenprimarilyfocusedon‘capability-basedplanning’ratherthanrespondingtospecificthreatsandhavegeneratedinputstoWhitePapers.

FSRsoftenrepresentedacontinuationofpreviouspolicyandhaverarelybeena‘revolutionary’activity.MajorGeneralCraneacknowledgedthatthe2012FSRwasnota‘cleansheet’reviewgivenitsfocuson‘refining’existingpolicy,andwasheavilyinfluencedbythe2009WhitePaper.4Indeed,singleFSRsareunlikelytobeabletomakesignificantchangestoexistingmajorprocurementplans.Itispossible,however,thatsignificantchangescouldbemadeacrossanumberofFSRs,althoughthatwouldrequireaconsistentapproachovertime.

Comparative disadvantage

FSRshavetraditionallybeenrivenbyinter-servicerivalry.Givencontemporarybudgetpressures,thereareindicationsthatsuchrivalrywillagainfeaturein2014FSRdiscussions.5ThisaugursbadlyforArmy,whichhashistoricallysufferedacomparativedisadvantagecomparedtotheotherserviceswhenprocurementdecisionsweremade.PolicydocumentshaveconsistentlyrelegatedArmycapabilitytoalevelbelowthatoftheothertwoservices.Forexample,theChiefoftheDefenceForceandSecretaryintroductoryletterfromthe1991FSRstated:‘weproposealongtermrestructuringprogram[toconvert]somecombatcapabilities–particularlyinArmy,totheReserves’.6The1986DibbReviewsimilarlysoughttoreduceArmycapability,prioritisingairstrike,anti-submarinewarfareandmaritimesurfaceforcesasheadlinecapabilities.Inthe‘incredibleevent’ofarmedincursionintoAustralia,Armywouldneedtosecurevitalassetstoallowairandmaritimeprojection.7Theseprioritiesandtasksweregenerallyreconfirmedin1991.8

Theheadlinecombatcapabilitiesforeshadowedinthe2013WhitePaperagainhighlightthiscomparativedisadvantage—JointStrikeFighter(JSF),AirWarfareDestroyers,submarines,amphibiousships,strikecapabilityandairborneelectronicattack.ThemajorArmy-specificinitiativeshighlightedinthisWhitePapercomprisedapartiallycompletedrestructuringofthebrigadesandvehiclefleetreplacementwithreferencetotheenhancementofArmy’sforceprojectionthroughNavy’s


CAPABILITY


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amphibiousvessels.9Plannedacquisitionsidentifiedinthe2013WhitePaperwereheavilyskewedtowardsmaritimeandaircapabilities,oftenwithtenuouslinkstodeclaredpriorities.10Forexample,theGrowler,optimisedforelectronicsuppressionofairdefences,isonlylikelytobeemployedtomaximumcapacityasanichecontributiontoUS-ledhighintensityoperations.SuchexpensiveandarguablyunnecessaryhardwareinvolvesanopportunitycostforbothArmyandDefence.11Theexpenditurerequiredforadvancedtechnologyhashistoricallyledpolicymakerstocutbackinotherareas.12WhilethelikelihoodofArmy’ssufferingsomedisadvantageinthe2014FSRhasnotbeenforeshadowedasclearlyasitwasin1991,theintentiontoseekpreferredresourcingofAirForceandNavyisalreadyapparent.

SeniorArmyofficershavealsoidentifiedtherisktoArmy.LieutenantGeneralMorrisonhasarguedthat,‘peacedividendsseldomaccrue’andwarnedofthe‘seriousdeficiencies’inlandforcesexposedduringINTERFETafterpreviousdownsizing.FormerChiefofArmy,LieutenantGeneralLeahy,assertsthatwithdrawalfromAfghanistanshouldnotresultinadoptionof‘anarrowviewofArmy’sfuture’oraviewofArmyasa‘strategicafterthought’.13MarkThomson,along-timecommentatorontheDefencebudget,commentsthat‘onethingissure;[government]willhavetofaceuptotheperennialquestionofAustraliandefenceplanning:thebalancebetweentheArmy…andhigh-techairandmaritimeplatforms.WiththeArmyreturninghometobarracks,thenaturaltendencywillbetorepeat1991andshiftresourcestoinvestmentfortheNavyandAirForce.’Thomsonhasrepeatedlyhighlightedthelargegapbetweenplansandfunding,andifmajorprojectssuchas100JSFand12submarinesareconsideredimmutable,Armywillundoubtedlybeaffected.14Thereisaclearriskthat,throughthe2014FSR,Armywillbeunder-resourcedtoachieveland-centrictaskssimilartoTimorLesteorSolomonIslandsinthenearregion.

Taiwan verses Timor as the primary force structure determinant

DespiteconsistentpolicydeclarationsthatDefenceisstructuredprimarilyfornear-regionresponses,operationalactionsandprocurementdecisionsdemonstrateotherwise.Manycommentatorshavesuggestedthatstrategiclogichasnotdrivendefenceforcestructure,andthatpolicymakershaveprimarilysoughtcapabilitiesthatareon,orinteroperablewith,theUSinventory.Suchdecisionsweredrivenbyservicemotivation,militarygroup-think,agovernmentresponsibilitytomerely‘endorse’ratherthan‘examine’capabilityrequirements,andahistoryofbuyingequipmentthatresidedonUSinventories.15


CAPABILITY


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Policy ambiguity

Defencepolicyhasbeencharacterisedbylongstandingambiguity.Cheesemanhasbeenvocalonthisissueoverseveraldecades,declaringthat:

Australia appeared to have two defence policies in place: a secret one … preparing the ADF for war on the Korean Peninsula or in the South China Sea, and a sanitised version which was for … defence of Australia and its interests.16

Thedeclarednear-regionprioritywouldappeartoplaceahighpriorityonArmyforcestructure,includingcapabilitiessuchaslandlogistics.However,anundeclaredUSsupportprovisionpriorityisdisadvantageoustoArmyandtotheprimarydeclaredtasks.CommentatorssuchasStonehaveidentifiedthefrequentdivergenceofbroaderpublicpolicyfrompractice,andasimilartrendindefencepolicyhasbeendetrimentaltoArmycapability.17Armyisencouragedtoconformtoadeclaredgeographicallysituated‘maritimestrategy’,butAustralia’sactualapproachisan‘alliancestrategy’predicatedontheprovisionofnichecombatforcesforexpeditionaryoperations.TheChiefofArmyrecentlydescribedtheextensiveArmyroleinamaritimestrategy—Armyindeedhasaroleinamaritimestrategy,butsuchastrategyhasnotbeenenacted.18

Themostimportantdivergencebetweendefencepolicyandpracticehasgenerallyconcernedgeography.TheimportanceofgeographyindefenceplanninghasrarelybeenapparentinAustralianmilitarycommitments,althoughpolicymakersconsistentlyassertedthatgeographywasadefiningfeatureofsecurity.19Whileclearlyavariable,policywasneverfully(orevenmostly)determinedbygeography,andUS-ledoperationalscenarios(suchasoperationsinNorthAsia)havehistoricallydominateddefencepolicythinking.

The new justification to maintain force structure inertia

ThepolicyapproachtoChina’sgrowthinmilitarycapabilityisacontemporaryexampleoftheenduringdefencepolicyduality,andhighlightswhyFSRspresentsuchdifficultiesforArmy.DeclaredpolicyunderbothLiberalandLaborgovernmentswarnedoftheeconomicandmilitaryriseofChina,subtlyreinforcing,butnotexplicitlylabellingChinaasatwenty-firstcenturythreattoAustralia.20However,thereiscompellingevidencethatanabilitytocontributenichecombatcapabilitiestoUS-ledexpeditionaryoperationsinNorthAsiahasprimacyforpolicymakers.

Priortothe2009WhitePaperrelease,amedialeakhighlightedadisagreementbetweenpolicymakerssuchasPrimeMinisterRuddandtheWhitePaperteam,whoconsideredChinaapotentialthreatofthefuture,andAustralianintelligence

CAPABILITYTheFutilityofCapabilityArgumentsandthe

ArmyApproachtothe2014ForceStructureReview


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communityleaderswhoregardedChinaaspresentinglessrisk.21Afterthereleaseofthe2009WhitePaper,aclassifieddiplomaticcablepublishedbyWikileaksalsoidentifiedPrimeMinisterRudd’sconcernsoverChina,allegingthathehadencouragedtheUStobepreparedtouseforceagainstChina.22Otheractions,suchastherecurringrefusaltoallowmajorChineseinvestmentinAustralia’senergy,telecommunicationsandagriculturalmarkets,alsoimpliedthatChinawasasecurityproblem.

SomecommentatorsfoundAustralia’sapproachtoChina’sdevelopmentalarmist.23Inthe2009WhitePapertheRuddgovernmentannounceditsintentiontoincreasesophisticatedweaponrywhichwaslesssuitedtodeclaredpriorities.24The2013WhitePapermaintainedtheintenttodevelop12submarineswithanabilitytoreachNorthAsia,ratherthanseekoff-the-shelfsubmarineswithreducedrange.25Withoutbeingforeshadowedinthe2009WhitePaper,theGillardgovernmentagreedtotheestablishmentofaUSMarineCorpspresenceinDarwin.Theseacquisitionsanddecisionswereostensiblybasedonnospecificthreat,butratherbroadersecurityconcernsandtheUS‘pivot’.The2013WhitePaperdescribedthisUSbasingas‘anaturaldevelopmentinourbilateralrelationship’.26Heighteningthreatperception,the2013WhitePaperreferredtothe‘challenging’natureofa140%increaseinChinesedefencespending,butreassuredthattheUSstillmaintained41%ofglobaldefencespending.Furthermore,whileanyAustralianconcernoverChina’smilitaryexpansionwasleftundeclared,Japan’salarmatthisexpansionwashighlighted.27

PerceptionofChinesethreatisnotnewindefencepolicy.The1953StrategicBasisdeclaredthat‘TherapidriseofCommunistChina…anditsdevelopmentintoapotentiallypowerfulmilitarypower’wasamatterforforcestructureconsideration.28The1994WhitePaperexpresseditsconcernthatpolicymakersdidnotunderstandtheeffectofChina’sdevelopmentonglobalsecurity.29O’Keefededucedfromthe2000WhitePaperandprocurementdecisionsthattheHowardgovernmentwasplanningforthepossibilityofmilitarycontainmentofChina,inalliancewiththeUS,butbecausesuchapolicywasundiplomatic,presenteditambiguously.30

ThereiscertainlyevidenceofChineseactiontorapidlymilitarisewithambiguousmotives,andtheenormousimprovementinChinesemilitarycapabilityhasbeenregularlyhighlighted.HoweversomeestimatesassessthattheofficialChinesemilitarybudgetistwotothreetimessmallerthantheactualfigureduetosecrecyandmilitaryincomeaccrualfromcommercialventures.AggressivecyberactionbyChinaisregardedasfurtherevidenceofabelligerentapproach.


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WhileanyperceivedmilitarythreatfromChina(likeassessedthreatsfromJapan,Indonesia,VietnamesecommunismandtheSovietUnioninthepast)isnotindependentlydefendable,thereisnocredibleevidencethatChinahasanyadversemilitaryintentionstowardsAustraliaorthenearregion.GiventraditionalanimositybetweenChinaanditscloserneighbours,andwithevolvingstrategicrivalry,aconflictscenariowouldalmostcertainlybebasedonAustralia’sbeingledintosuperpowercompetition.Withoutdoubt,theriseofChinachallengescountriestoformulatepolitical,economicandsecurityresponses.ThehistoricalresponseofAustralianpolicymakershasbeenrecurrent,withChinesedevelopmentpromptingconcernandjustifyingasubsequentdefencepolicyresponse—analliancefocusthatwasnotalignedtodeclaredpriorities.IndeedBabbagepredictedthatthedefenceforcestructureresponsetotheemergenceofChinawouldsimplybeacontinuationoflongstandingdefencepolicydueto‘institutionalinertia’.31

Basedonsignificantevidence,itisreasonabletoconcludethatpolicymakershaveplacedmostweightontheperceivedthreatfromChinaandmaintenanceoftheUSalliancewhenconsideringforcestructure.ThisfocusonperceivedthreatsoutsidethenearregionplacesArmyinapositionofentrenchedstrategicdisadvantageduringFSRnegotiationsand,moreimportantly,limitsthecapabilitymostappropriatetoconductsustainednear-regionoperations.SeniorArmyofficershaveregularlyarguedthatArmysuffersbecauseairandmaritimeplatformgapscanbesimplyarticulated,whereasthemanycomponentsofabrigadecannot.WhilethedifficultyindescribingArmygapsisclear,thisisnotArmy’smainproblem.IfpolicymakerswerepreparedtoincreaseArmyresourcing,theperceiveddifficultyofcapabilitygaparticulationwouldnotbeanimpediment.Whetheritisadeclaredoranundeclaredscenario,afocusontheUSallianceandNorthAsianconflictastheprimaryforcestructuredeterminantwillalwaysleadtotechnologicallysophisticated(andhighlyexpensive)airandmaritimeplatformprioritisation.

A force structure for all contingencies

SinceWorldWarII,Australianpolicymakershavemaintainedcontinuityinmilitaryforcestructureprioritisation.Stonehasidentifiedatrendinpublicpolicyinwhichpolicymakersdevelopasolutionfirstandthenformulateaproblemthatrequiresthatsolution.32Whilepolicymakersmayhaveconsidereddegreesofself-reliancefollowingtheVietnamWar,theinevitablesolutionsinceWorldWarII,despiteavarietyofassessedthreats,wasmaintenanceofANZUSandasupportingforcestructure.


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TherehavebeenmanyinstancesofperceivedordeclaredthreatstoAustraliasinceWorldWarII,justifyingcloseUSties.PrimeMinisterCurtindeviatedfromtheintelligenceassessmentwhenpresentingthethreattoAustraliafromJapanduringWorldWarII,andtheinabilityofAustraliatoindependentlyrespondtothisparticularthreatcreatedanenduringsenseofvulnerabilityandneedforalliance.33TheCabinet-endorsed1946StrategicBasisidentifiedtheSovietUnionasa‘potentialenemyofthefuture’.34TheemergingnationalisminIndonesiainthe1960swasviewedwithconcern,withtheproposedmitigationcloserUSties.35PrimeMinisterMenziesvolunteeredAustralianmilitaryinvolvementinVietnamduetothedeclaredriskofthespreadofcommunism.36ThepolicymakerresponsetodifferentthreatswasaconsistentforcestructurewithnichecombatcapabilitiesabletooperatewithUSforces.

BurkewritesextensivelyontheroleoffearinAustraliandefencepolicyandstrategicculture,andassertsthatexaggeratedfearwasatleastpartlyresponsibleforidentificationof(andresponseto)differentperceivedthreats.37BallarguesthatAustralianshavebeenhistoricallymuchmorefearfulofattackthanobjectiveanalysiswarranted.38ThisdeepculturalandhistoricaltrendpresentsaproblemforArmyasitseeksthenecessaryresourcesfromthe2014FSR.

The immutable alliance

Despitethepost-Vietnamrecognitionofthemeritsofgreateroperationalindependence,AustralianpolicymakershaveconsistentlyemphasisedANZUSastheguaranteeofsecurity.Thecostassociatedwithmaintainingoperationalindependence(particularlyforlogisticsupportandtechnologytransfer)wastraditionallydeemedprohibitivelyhigh.39Militaryhardwareprocurements,justifiedpubliclyascapabilitiessuitabletomitigatearangeofuncertainthreats,wereoftenunderwrittenbyanexpectationofUSsupportinUS-ledmissions.40Forexample,thecommitmenttopurchaseupto100JSFaircrafthaslong-termforcestructureimplications,butlowpriorityhasbeenassignedtoprojectingandbasingtheseplatformsindependently(withoutUSsupport)inthenearregion,andthereisextensiverelianceonUSglobalsustainment.41Ifahigherlevelofindependenceinthenearregionisthemainpriority,thenthissupportarrangementisquestionable.HowevergivenanticipatedoperationalscenariosinsupportofANZUS,thislackofabilitytoforceprojectposeslittlerisk.

ChallengestotheUSwereoftenassociatedwithchallengestoAustralia,andANZUSbecamedeeplyembeddedinstrategicculture.Forexample,Burkearguesthat,atonepoint,PrimeMinisterHowardlinkedsupportforANZUStopatriotism.42


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FormerSecretaryofDefenceTangeobservedthatbureaucratsinthe1950scouldnotquestionthecertaintyofUSsupport.43DemonstrativeofthedeepcommitmenttotheUS,Defenceacknowledgedtheexistenceof‘severalhundredcommitteesandworkinggroups’conductinginteroperability-relatedactivities.44

HoweversupporttotheUSwasnotnecessarilyprovidedbecauseAustralianpolicymakersfeltasenseofobligation.Forexample,PrimeMinisterMenzies’anti-communistandforwarddefencestanceandhisvisionofstrategicculturesawAustraliabecomeactivelyinvolvedintheVietnamWar,despitethefactthattheArmyhadrecentlysubstantiallyreduceditsinventory.45AustralianpolicymakerswerenotreluctantparticipantswiththeUS,indicatingtheconsciouslong-standingdecisionofprioritisingUSinteroperabilityovernear-regionindependence.46PriorityforANZUSwascalculated,predicatedontheperceivedthreatoftheday.

ThepotentialbenefitsofANZUSweresufficienttoensurethat,inrecenttimes,noAustralianpolicymakerraisedanydoubtoverthecontinuationofthisclosealliance.Thisisadeeplyembeddedfactorthat,ifunchallenged,islikelytodisadvantageArmyinthe2014FSR.Such‘alliancedues’havehistoricallyseenresourcesassignedtoairandmaritimehardwareinordertoachieveUSinteroperability.

Fighting the trends in defence policy

FurtherpolicychallengescompoundtheFSRproblemforArmy.Analteredthreatassessmentfocuswouldconflictwithenduringpolicyproceduresandtrends.Thisarticlewillarguethattwokeytrends,oftenidentifiedbycommentators,reinforcedefencepolicyinertiaandgiveprioritytocapabilitiesthatcanbeofferedtoaUS-ledcoalition.AnArmyFSRstrategyshouldunderstandtheselimitations.

Transition from specific to generalised policy

First,defencepolicyhastransitionedfromspecificbutclassifiedinformationtobroad,ambiguousandpubliclyavailableinformation.Fruhlingcommentsthat‘Inthelate1960s[StrategicBasisPapers]becamemorecomprehensive…andsignificantlylonger.’47TherehasbeenaproliferationofpolicydocumentsfromasingleStrategicBasisPaperpriorto1976totensofpublicationsinthecurrentera.

SinceWorldWarII,defencepolicyhasbeenarticulatedinseveraldifferentformats.StrategicBasisPaperscomprisedaclassifiedreviewofstrategiccircumstancesbytheDefenceCommitteefocusingonessentialelementsofdefencepolicy.Theclassificationofferedprotectionforforthrightdefenceassessments.


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Peripheralaspectsofpolicysuchassupportingconceptswererarelymentioned.WhitePaperswereinitiatedin1976asagovernmentstatementtothepublic,alliesandpotentialadversaries.Thesewereheavilysanitisedandevolvedtohighlightabroadrangeofnon-coreissues(suchaspersonnelmanagementinitiatives).Thereisnowadetailedhierarchyofclassifiedandunclassifiedpolicyandcapabilitydevelopmentdocuments.48

Thenumberofdefencepolicydocumentshasincreasedmarkedlyovertimeand,whileitisimportantforpolicymakerstocodifypolicies,therearerisksandadvantagesfromproducingmultiplepolicydocuments.Theambiguitycreatedbythismethodofpolicyarticulationhascontributedtoinertiaindefencepolicyandofferedpolicymakerstheabilitytoobscureorjustifyarangeofdifferentdecisions.

Thetransitionfromspecifictogeneralisedpolicyhasallowedjustificationofarangeofdifferentcapabilityprocurements,offeringflexibilitytopolicymakers.WhilethiscouldbeseenasanopportunityforArmy,therealityisthatithashistoricallyworkedinfavourofNavyandAirForce.Therewillbesignificantpressuretomaintainlongstandingforcestructuresduringthe2014FSR.

Justification of existing policy and hardware

Second,asStoneargueswascommoninbroaderpublicpolicy,defencepolicyregularlyjustifiedpreviousactionsanddecisions,particularlyforforcestructure.49Thiswasduetofactorssuchasserviceinfluence,strategicculture,longequipmentprocurementperiods,andtheinvolvementofbothmajorpartiesinforcestructuredecisions.50Inaddition,institutionaldesign,withministersappointedtoportfolioswithoutspecificexpertise,potentiallycompelstheirfocusonthemostimportantandpressingissuesandlimitstheirdesiretosignificantlychangeprocurementprograms.

Thepoliticaldesiretojustifypreviouspolicy,particularlyexpenditureonmajormilitaryhardware,contributestoinertiaandisanother2014FSRchallengeforArmy,evenwithchanginggeostrategiccircumstances.Militaryhardwareacquisitionswithlonglife-cyclesareadisincentivetochange.Forexample,the2013WhitePaperhighlightedthat200milliondollarshadalreadybeeninvestedinanalysingoptionsforthenewsubmarineprojectwhichwasnotduefordeliveryuntilafter2031.51ThesubmarineprojectmaybeevenmoredifficulttochangegivenitslinkagetoAustralianemployment.Withhistoricalbipartisansupportformilitaryhardwareprocurement,majorpoliticalpartiesgenerallysupportedtheprocurementofcombathardware.TheF-111strategicstrikeaircraftisanhistoricalexampleofbipartisansupportovermanydecades,andbothpartieshaveflaggedtheirsupportfortheJSF.




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Newdeclaredthreatsjustifiedongoingexpensesandthecontinuationofexistingacquisitionplans.Despitebeingpresentedwitharangeofdifferentgeostrategicscenariosandassessedthreats,continuitywashistoricallythekeyfeatureofdefencepolicy.Forexample,theearlyreleaseofthe2013WhitePaperwaspredicatedonthedeclaredneedtoaddress‘significantinternationalanddomesticdevelopments’suchasthe‘militaryshifttotheIndo-Pacific’,52butwithfewchangestoplannedhardwareacquisitionexceptforthedeferralofsomeprojectsduetobudgetreductions.53

Previous threat redefinition

IfArmyisseriousinseekingtoreframetheargumentawayfromNorthAsia,thenthereisvalueinexaminingpreviousattemptstochangeunderlyingthreatassumptionsindefencepolicy.The1986DibbReviewwastheonlypreviouspublicexampleinwhichafundamentalreappraisalofthebasisfordefenceforcestructurewassought,andthisreviewhasbeenanalysedindepth.

Relevanttothisarticle,theDibbReviewwasusedtoinformorjustifythe1987WhitePaper,butwasneverfullyenacted,54inpartduetoitsfailuretogainthefullsupportofdefencepolicymakersandsomecommentators.55DefenceoftenarguedagainstthelimitationsimposedunderaDefenceofAustralia(DoA)policy,andthatforcestructurewasnotaligned,withDefence‘allowedandindeedencouragedtopreparetodefendAustraliaanditsinterestsontoomanyfronts.’56Defenceprocurementdidnotfollowthedeclaredpriorities.DoAprovedunpopularinDefencebecauseitdidnotconformtodeeplyheldviewsofAustralia’sstrategiccultureandexpeditionaryhistory.Furthermore,theHawkegovernmentappliednoformalmeasureofeffectivenesstodeterminethesuccessofDoAimplementation.

However,DoAconceptswerecentraltoallWhitePapersbecausetheprincipleofprioritisingsecurityinterestsgeographicallywaseitherpoliticallyattractiveornecessary.Indeed,the1994WhitePaperwasarguedtobeacontinuationofDoA.57ThegeographicalbasisofDoAremainedclearlyidentifiableinthe2009and2013WhitePapers.58However,throughreinterpretationinvariousWhitePapersandsignificantcommentary,themeaningofDoAbecameblurred,59

withcommentatorssuchasBabbageapplyingtheirowninterpretationtoDibb’soriginalconcept.60SuchreinterpretationofapoliticallypopularconceptmaypresentanopportunityforArmy,whichhasstrongjustificationforcontinuedhardening.61


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Therisksofthreatredefinitionareclear.Forlandforcestobecomeahigherpriority,areviewasfundamentalasDibb’smaybenecessaryand,eventhen,implementationoftherecommendationsmaybechallenged.Ifpolicymakersdeclareanewthreatbutdonotactonit,policyambiguityremains,andsophisticatedandinteroperableairandmaritimehardwarewillretainpriority.TheremayalsobearisktothebroaderDefencebudgetifthemostchallengingassessmentofthethreat(combatcontributionstoUS-ledexpeditionarytheatres)isnotmaintained,andthismaymeetwithoppositionfromotherservices.IfArmyseeksachangedthreatassessment,thepowerofinertiaandjustificationofexistingandplannedcapabilitywillbecomeapparent.

Seek to modify, or work within existing structures?

Armyhashistoricallyworkedwithinpresentedriskprofiles,oftenwithpoorresourcingoutcomes,althoughwithpossibleavoidanceoftraditionalservicerivalry.62TheoptionforArmydescribedinthisarticleistopursuechangetothreatandriskperceptionsovertime.Perceptionsandscenarioswillbedifficulttochange,butfailuretochangethemwillalmostcertainlyseearepetitionofthehistoricallylowemphasisplacedonArmyatatimewhentherearenomajoroperationsbeingundertaken.Aconsistent,long-termArmystrategyisnecessarytochangeentrenchedpolicytrends.

First,asapriority,Armymayseektodeveloporcontributetothedevelopmentofcrediblenear-regionthreatscenarios,bothpublicandclassified,againstwhicheachserviceshouldjustifyitsforcestructure.TheprocessofFSRscenarioandthreatdevelopmentcanbenegotiated,butthisnegotiationmustoccuratthebeginningoftheFSR,andmayrequireministerialsupport.AcceptingadiscussionofNorthAsianriskandUS-ledcontributionsasaprimaryorunstatedinfluenceontheFSRislikelytobetoArmy’sdetriment.Despitethedeclaredcapability-basedapproachtothedevelopmentofdefenceforcestructure,therepresentationofthethreatisfarmoreinfluentialinFSRoutcomesthancapability-basedargumentswithinthestandardframework.Armywillundoubtedlypresentacoherentcapabilityplan;however,ArmyisdestinedfordisappointmentifpolicymakersmaintaintheircurrentviewofthethreattoAustralia.

In1986,Dibbgainedsupportinpartbecausehewasanexternalagentcontractedtoprovideabasisforpolicy.SourcingexternalsupporttodevelopthreatscenariosmaybeanoptionforArmy.Internally,theintelligencecommunityhasalsohistoricallybeenmorelikelytopresentnear-regionthreatsasthemostimportantfactorforforcestructure.




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TheopportunitiesforArmymaylieinitsabilitytoreinterpretconceptsthatalreadyexistwithinpolicyinordertoadvancelandforcearguments.TheblurreddefinitionofDoAmaybeagoodmodel.Forexample,with(agenuine)near-regionprioritisationdeclaredinallWhitePapers,forcestructuredecisionsforsomeofDefence’smostexpensivecombatairandmaritimeplatformsmayseemquestionable.Conversely,conceptssuchasthe‘HardenedandNetworkedArmy’remainvalidbasedontheeasewithwhichthemostunsophisticatedthreatforcescouldquicklydeveloplethalcapabilitiessuchasimprovisedexplosivedevicesinthenearregion.Armycanuseexternalandinternalthreatassessmentstoreinterpretexistingconceptsbutmayhavetobeforcefulininfluencingpolicymakers’understandingofnear-regionprioritisation.

Thisrelatestothesecondrecommendation.ArmymayseektheimplementationofpublicMeasuresofEffectiveness(MOE)forcurrentcapabilitiesagainstdeclareddefencepolicypriorities.TheimportantlessonfromtheDibbreviewwasthathisassessmentwasnotfullyenacted,andArmymayneedameanstoensurethateachservicecomplieswithanagreedunderstandingofthethreat.ThemosttechnologicallysophisticatedAirForceandNavyplatformshaveconsistentlybeenrelatedtonear-regionthreats,evenwherethereisminimalapplicability.Forexample,aDefencestatementontheacquisitionoftheGrowlerelectronicwarfareaircraftexplainedthatthecapability‘willbeabletosupportthefullrangeofDefencetasksfromevacuationstomajorconflicts.’63PublicMOEwouldatleastmaintainattentionondeclareddefenceprioritiesallowinganassessmentoftherelativeutilityofdifferentplatforms.Inthatcontext,Growlermaybeviewedasa1.5billiondollarsolutionlookingforanear-regionproblem.Conversely,capabilitiessuchaslandlogistics,tenuousduringINTERFETanderodedfurthersincethenmaybecomeahigherpriority.64

Third,internally,ACNDscouldbealteredtoensurethatthe‘need’isnotjustacapabilitydesiredbyArmy,butratherwillmitigateanear-regionriskorthreat.PromptingArmyplannerstoconsiderthethreatwheneveranACNDisdeveloped,canaddmoredisciplinetothegapidentificationprocess.SupportforthisprocessmayrequiretheengagementofseniorintelligencestaffinvariousArmyheadquarters.

Finally,asobservedduringtheDibbreview,evenifArmyweretobesubstantiallysuccessfulinreframingthethreat,thismaynotbringthedesiredresult.PartialfocusonNorthAsiaandtheneedtocontributetotheUSalliancewillstillbeinfluential.Theenduringnatureofdefencepolicyambiguityandtheinfluenceofeachservicewillprovidetheimpetustouseanyjustificationtomaintainexistingforcestructures.ThetimehorizonsforprocurementswillalsoworkagainstArmy.Genuineadherencetonear-regionforcestructuredeterminantswillcreatedifferentwinnersandlosersamongtheservices.




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TheappointmentofanewDefenceMinistermaypresenttheopportunitytoreviewprocurementplans.Asidentifiedearlier,thiswillbedifficultassomeoftheplansintroducedinthe2009WhitePaperhavenotbeenfullyenactedorincludedinthebudget.Achangeingovernmentmaypresentanopportunitytoreconsiderthebasisforcertainprocurements.However,thisisnotashort-termproposition,anda2014FSRstrategymustseekchangesovertime.

Thepathtoamoresustainablelandforceforthemostlikelyoperationalscenariosisadifficultone.However,therisktoArmy(andtoAustralia’snationalsecurity)ofnottakingthispathappearsmuchgreater.Themaintenanceofindependentserviceforcestructureaimsfromthe1960sand1970sisstillapparentandthisremainsariskforAustraliansecurity.65

Conclusion

Whilestructureschangeovertimeandshouldnotbeviewedasimmutable,Australiandefencepolicyhasproventobedurableovermanydecades.AclearArmystrategyforthe2014FSRandbeyondappearsnecessarytoallowDefencetoachieveitsdeclaredprioritytasks.AconsistentArmystrategyoveranumberofyearsisnecessarytoinfluenceorchangedeeplyembeddedstrategicculture,enduringpolicytrends,andprocurementdecisionsthatcanspandecades.

ThemajorcomponentofanArmystrategyshouldbeanattempttochangetheperceptionoftheriskandthreatthatunderscoresdefencepolicy.Thismayrequireanexternalpointofviewtobepresented.Intheonlyexamplefromthelast30yearsofanattempttochangethethreatperception,theDibbReviewwasusedtojustifypolicy,butwasneverfullyimplementedandpolicyambiguityremained.

Policyambiguityhaspositiveandnegativeaspects.Importantlyforpolicymakers,themethodofdefencepolicyarticulationhasallowedflexibility,offeringanabilitytodeclarethepoliticallyacceptablenear-regionprioritisationwhilepursuinghardwaretocontributetoUS-ledexpeditionaryoperationsasapriority.Armyhashistoricallyhadstrongjustificationforgreaterinvestment,butairandmaritimeplatformshavebeenprioritised.

Servicerivalryappearstobearealityofthefutureasthedefencebudgetcontracts.Withrecent2013WhitePaperannouncements,along-termFSRstrategymaybethemethodtoensurethatArmyiswell-placedintheemergingfight.




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THE AUTHOR

LieutenantColonelMartinWhiteisaservingAustralianArmyofficer.HehasundertakennumerousmilitarydeploymentstoTimorLeste,Iraq,andAfghanistan.HeiscurrentlycompletingaPhDthroughLaTrobeUniversity,focusedonAustraliandefencepolicy.

ENDNOTES1 J.Caligari,‘TheAdaptiveArmyPostAfghanistan’,Security Challenges,Vol.7,No.2,2011,pp.1–2.

2 Forexample,G.Cheeseman,Over-Reach in Australia’s Regional Military Policy,PeaceResearchCentre,WorkingPaperNo.71,ANU,August1989,p.2.

3 M.Crane,‘ForceStructureReview2012’,AddresstoRoyalUnitedServicesInstitute,WesternAustralia,8March2012

4 Ibid.

5 Forexample,seeN.Stuart,‘Inter-servicerivalryandDefencecutswillmeanfireworks’,The Canberra Times,9June2012.

6 Defence,ForceStructureReview1991,lettertoMinister.

7 P.Dibb,Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities,AustralianGovernmentPublishingService,Canberra,1986,pp.7–10.

8 Defence,ForceStructureReview1991,pp.2–3.

9 DepartmentofDefence,Defence White Paper 2013,CommonwealthofAustralia,2013,pp.75–87.

10 DepartmentofDefence,Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century,p.65,stated,‘TheGovernmentdoesnotintendtopurpose-designtheADFforthosecircumstancesinwhichitmightchoosetomaketailoredcontributionstomilitarycoalitionsinsupportofourwiderstrategicinterests.’

11 P.Dibb,Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea,StrategicandDefenceStudiesCentre,ANU,2006,p.248,arguedthatsingleservicesbidforexpensiveplatformswithnostrategicnecessity.

12 Cheeseman,Over-Reach in Australia’s Regional Military Policy,p.8.

13 P.Leahy,‘TheArmyafterAfghanistan’,Security Challenges,Vol.7,No.2,2011,p.7.

14 M.Thomson,‘TheCostofDefence’,AustralianStrategicPolicyInstituteDefenceBudgetBrief2013–2014,p.viii.

15 Forexample,A.Davies,‘Let’sTestthatIdea:TheContestabilityofAdviceintheDepartmentofDefence’,Australian Strategic Policy Institute,No.54,2010,p.3.

16 G.Cheeseman,‘TheHowardGovernment’sDefenceWhitePaper’,The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs,Vol.2,No.1,July2001,p.13.

17 D.Stone,Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making,NortonandCompany,US,2002,p.11.




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18 D.Morrison,‘AppliedStrategyfromtheAustralianPerspective’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.X,No.1,2013,p.27.

19 Forexample,Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Centurystatedthatgeographyisanimportantelementofstrategybecauseitiseasiertoactmilitarilyatdistancesclosertohome(p.45).

20 DepartmentofDefence,Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005,Canberra,p.6,warnedChinatolimitanystrategicmisunderstandingcausedbyapoorlyexplainedornon-transparentmilitarybuild-up.

21 G.Sheridan,‘DefenceForceDyingforCure’,The Australian,18April2009.

22 Wikileaks,SecretaryClinton’sMarch24,2009,publishedat:http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09STATE30049.html,para8.

23 A.Behm,‘AustralianStrategicPolicyandtheAgeofUncertainty’,Security Challenges,Vol.5,No.1,Canberra,2009,p.15,notedthatthewordingoftheWhitePapersectiononChinawaspoor,andappearedtoechoasuperficialandalarmistviewofChina’smilitarygrowth.

24 Defence,Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century,pp.70–81.

25 Thomson,‘TheCostofDefence’,p.viii.

26 Defence,Defence White Paper 2013,p.10.

27 Ibid.,pp.9,12.

28 DefenceCommittee,The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,Canberra,1953,partII,para14.

29 DepartmentofDefence,Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994,Canberra,pp.9–13.

30 M.O’Keefe,‘EnduringTensionsinthe2000DefenceWhitePaper’,Australian Journal of Politics and History,Vol.49,No.4,2003,p.527.

31 R.Babbage,‘LearningtoWalkAmongstGiants:TheNewDefenceWhitePaper’,Security Challenges,Vol.4,No.1,Autumn2008,pp.13–15.

32 Stone,Policy Paradox,p.12.

33 A.Burke,Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety,CambridgeUniversityPress,2008,p.73,arguesthatPrimeMinisterCurtinemphasisedthe‘imminentperil’ofthethreatfromJapanwhilestrategicassessmentsdownplayedthepossibilityoffull-scaleinvasion.

34 DefenceCommittee,An Appreciation of the Strategical Position of Australia February 1946,CommonwealthofAustralia,partI,p.5.

35 P.Keating,Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia Pacific,Macmillan,Sydney,2000,pp.123–27.

36 Defence,The Strategic Basis of Australia Defence Policy 1956,paras8–15,emphasisedtheimportanceofanti-communisteffortsinSouthVietnam.

37 Burke,Fear of Security,pp.1–23.

38 D.Ball,The US-Australia Alliance: History and Prospects,WorkingPaperNo.30,StrategicandDefenceStudiesCentre,Canberra,1999,p.19.

39 Defence,Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century,p.48.

40 G.Cheeseman,Alternative Defence Strategies and Australia’s Defence,PeaceResearchCentre,WorkingPaperNo.51,ANU,September1988,pp.4–6.

41 Defence,Defence Capability Plan 2010-2020,Canberra,pp.58–60.

42 A.Burke,‘AustraliaParanoid:SecurityPoliticsandIdentityPolicy’inA.BurkeandM.McDonald(eds),Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific,ManchesterUniversityPress,UK,2007,p.130.


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http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09STATE30049.html

http://blogs.hbr.org/hbr/hewlett/2012/05/attract_and_keep_a-players_wit.html

http://blogs.hbr.org/hbr/hewlett/2012/05/attract_and_keep_a-players_wit.html


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43 A.Tange,Defence Policy Making: A Close-Up View 1950-1980,StrategicandDefenceStudiesCentre,WorkingPaperNo.19,ANU,2008,p.11.

44 DepartmentofDefence,Australia-United States Capability Development Liaison Handbook,InterimEdition,2006–07,p.3.

45 S.Brodie,Tilting at Dominoes,ChildandAssociatesPublishing,Sydney,1987,p.20,discussestheidealisedmemoriesofAustralianmilitaryservice.

46 G.Sheridan,The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance Under Bush and Howard,UniversityofNewSouthWalesPress,Sydney,2006,p.12,arguesthat‘theidea…thatintheAustralian-USalliancetheAmericanssaywhattheywantandtheAustraliansfollowsuitisabsurdlymistaken.’

47 S.Fruhling,A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945,CommonwealthofAustralia,2008,p.2.

48 ContemporaryclassifieddocumentsincludeDefencePlanningGuidance,Australia’sMilitaryStrategy,theFutureJointOperationalConcept,theDefenceInternationalEngagementStrategicPlanandtheQuarterlyStrategicReview.PubliclyreleasedunclassifieddocumentsincludeWhitePapers,theFoundationsofAustralianMilitaryDoctrine,andtheDefence 2030 Strategy Planning Framework Handbook.TherearealsonumerousCapabilityPlansandsubordinateroadmaps.

49 Stone,Policy Paradox,p.12.

50 D.Kilcullen,‘AustralianStatecraft:TheChallengeofAligningPolicywithStrategicCulture’,Security Challenges,Vol.3,No.4,November2007,pp.46–47,arguedthatstrategicculturewasonereasonthatdefencepolicyremainedconsistentinAustralia,asconsciousandobservabledecisionsformedonlyasmallpartofdefencepolicy,andunobservablecharacteristicssuchashistoryandcultureweremoreinfluential.

51 Defence,Defence White Paper 2013,p.83.

52 Ibid.,p.ix.

53 Thomson,‘TheCostofDefence’,p.vi.

54 R.Babbage,‘Australia’snewdefencedirection’,The Pacific Review,Vol.1,No.1,1988,pp.92–96,highlightsthefactthatDibb’sreviewdidnotrepresentgovernmentpolicy,althoughDefenceMinisterBeazleytabledthereportinParliamenttofacilitatepreparationoftheWhitePaper.

55 M.Evans,The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War 1991-2005,StudyPaperNo.306,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,2005,p.69,arguesthatDibbavoidedtherealitythatdeploymentsweremostlybasedonstrategiccultureandgeopolitics.

56 R.HuiskenandM.Thatcher(eds),History of Australian Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy,WorkingPaperNo.399,StrategicandDefenceStudiesCentre,ANU,2007,p.3.

57 ParliamentaryResearchService,Defending Australia: Issues in Australia’s Post-Cold War Defence Policy,ResearchPaperNo.19,1994/95,p.1,arguesthat,‘Inmanyways,thereiscontinuitybetweenthenewWhitePaperandits1987counterpart.’

58 R.LyonandA.Davies,Assessing the Defence White Paper 2009,AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute,7May2009,p.2,arguedthatthereasoningbehindthe2009WhitePaperwasverysimilartoDoA.

59 bid.,p.4.LyonandDaviesarguedthatDoAwasa‘spectrumofdifferentdoctrines’.

60 R.Babbage,Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030,KokodaPaperNo.15,February2011,p.66.

61 Morrison,‘AppliedStrategyfromtheAustralianPerspective’p.31.


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62 Babbage,The Pacific Review,p.92,highlightstheconsistentrivalrybetweentheservices,whichwerepreparingfor‘differentwarsindifferentlocationsandatdifferenttimes’.

63 DepartmentofDefence,Defence to acquire Growler electronic attack capability,MediaRelease,23August2012.

64 Smith,S.,A Handmaiden’s Tale: An Alternative View of Logistic Lessons Learned from INTERFET,AustralianDefenceStudiesCentre,WorkingPaperNumber65,April2001,pp.6–8.

65 Fruhling,A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945,p.33.


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ResettingLandForcesforContingencyColonelTimLaw(BritishArmy)

ABSTRACT

TheconclusionofcombatoperationsinAfghanistanopensthedebateoverhowlandforcescanbebeststructured,equippedandmannedforfuturetasks.InconditionsofsubstantialuncertaintyroughlyequivalenttothosethatprevailedintheleeoftheColdWar,theBritishArmymustshapethebroaderdefencedebateifitwishestoremainrelevant.Whilethiswillpresentachallengegivencurrentresourceconstraints,thisarticleoffersapotentialroadmapforthejourneyahead,buildingontheArmy’sstrengthandpurpose,andmitigatingitsweaknesses.ManyoftheideasexpressedarecontainedwithintheBritishArmy’sconceptualdevelopmentagendaandcouldwellbecomepartofitsfuturestrategyasweapproachaStrategicDefenceandSecurityReview.


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Introduction

DuringtheColdWar,thearmedforcesoftheUnitedKingdom(UK)focusedtheirattentiononacontinentallandwaragainstapeeradversarythatcompensatedforitsrelativelackoftechnologicalprowesswithoverwhelmingmassandacomprehensivenucleararsenal.WiththeSovietUnion’sdemise,theUKlostthe‘benefit’ofaknownadversary.Andwiththepotentialfora‘peacedividend’forinvestmentelsewhere,articulatinganewroleforDefencepresentedanumberofchallenges.Intheevent,civilconflictintheBalkansservedasatimelymeanstodevelopnewrolesinpeacekeeping,peaceenforcementandpeacesupportoperations.Fromaforcedevelopmentperspective,therapiddrawdownofourpredominantlyGermany-basedarmyledtolandforcesshiftingtheirfocus,adaptingequipmentandstructurespreviouslygearedtowardsmajorcombatoperationstosomethingaltogetherdifferent.Indoingso,lessonslearnedagainstanirregularadversaryinNorthernIrelandwereincorporatedintodoctrinehastilyrewrittentomeettherequirement.

Wehavenowreachedasimilarhiatusandneedtoconsiderhowbesttoadaptourorganisations,equipmentandpersonneltoaperiodofstrategicuncertainty.Thisisataskfarlesseasythanitsounds.Forastart,recentcampaigns,howeversuccessfulatthetacticallevel,haveingrainedcertaincharacteristicsintothemilitarynotnecessarilysuitedtounpredictablestrategicenvironments.Evidencefromcollectivetraining,forexample,suggeststhatmanysoldiersarecognitivelylesswellequippedforlongperiodsofausteritywithoutrecoursetosecuretacticalbasing.Attitudestocasualties,ImprovisedExplosiveDevices(IEDs)andRulesofEngagement(ROE)havealsodevelopedintountenablearticlesoffaithforfuturecontingencyoperations.

Althoughtheimmediatefuturehasoftenbeentermeda‘returntocontingency’withintheBritishArmy,thereisnoreturntothesortofrelativelyheavycombinedarmsmanoeuvreprevalentasadoctrinepriortotheUK’scommitmenttoOperationsTelic,Jacana,FingalandHerrick.1Thereasonsforthisaremanifold:

• ThereislittletosuggestthatourcontingencyreadinesspriortoOperationTelic(Iraq)in2002hadgearedlandforceseffectivelyfortheprotractedtasktheywereabouttoundertake;weshouldnotthereforebetooreadytore-adoptthesameprofile.Arguably,wehadnotentirelyidentifiedhowthecharacterofconflictmightevolveandwerethereforerelativelyill-preparedforstabilisationtasksin‘warsamongstthepeople’.

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• Ourfocusontheenemyandgroundcreatedthecapacityforrapidtacticalmanoeuvreathightempo,butdidnotforcecommanderstoconsidertheimpactoftheiroperationsonthemindsetofthepeopleamongstwhomandwithwhomtheyoperated.

• Duringthatperiodwehaddifferentequipment,someofwhichhassincegoneoutofservice.Wenowhavenewequipment,muchofwhichwasacquiredprimarilyforstabilisationoperationsandhasnotbeentestedinenvironmentsgearedtothehigh-temporequirementsofmajorcombatoperations.

• Wehaveawholegenerationofofficersandsoldierswhoseonlyexperiencehasbeeninconductingcounter-insurgencyandstabilisationoperations,largelyexecutedatsub-unitlevelandbelow.Whiletheirskillinintegratingjointenablersandlandcapabilitiesisgenerallyfargreaterthanthatoftheirpredecessors,thecurrentgenerationlacksexperienceinhigh-tempointegratedbattlegroupoperations.

• Internationalnormsandexpectations—thereadinessofpolicy-makerstoauthorisetheuseofforcewhereciviliancasualtiesmightresult,forexample—havedevelopedthroughtheinternationalcommunity’sinvolvementinandobservationofconflictsinIraqandAfghanistan.

• Wedonothavetheresourcesinourcoreprogramtoprepareforcontingencytothesamedegreewehadinthepast.

• Lessonsfromotheroperations(forexample,inMaliandLibya)havebeenintroducedintoourlexicon.Inparticular,thespeedofresponse(strategicandoperationalmobility)bytheFrenchinMalisuggeststhat‘fastpower’mayformanelementofwhatisrequiredinthefuture.2

Forthefuture,theBritishArmy(andlandforcesingeneral)mustmovefromitsfamiliar,heavilyorchestratedtask-specific‘readiness’toaperiodoflesspredictable‘constantreadiness’.Putsimply,itmustprepareforabroadrangeofoperationsacrossthemosaicofconflict.Toberelevant,landforcesmustbeabletocopewithboththeenduringnatureandchangingcharacterofconflict,andadoptprofilesofreadinessforarangeofscenariosthatcannotyetbeenvisaged.Theydonotnecessarilyrequirenewequipmenttodothis;inpost-ColdWaroperations‘newuses[were]foundforoldweaponsandorganisations’.3Institutionallearningandadaptation,however,mustbeincorporatedintoourpsyche,andlessonsmustbegearedtowardstheproductionofnewconcepts.4

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Wedonotknowwhetherfutureconflictwillbe‘conventional’or‘unconventional’,orindeedwhetherthesetermswillhaveanyrealrelevance.Wecannotguaranteethatcampaignswillfollowaparticularpath,thatthegovernmentwillseektoconstrainourexpeditionaryambitiontoaparticulargeographicalzone,orthatwewillbecomeenvironmentspecific.Althoughrecentpublicationsofferconsolidatedthoughtsonthethreatandoperationalenvironmentsinwhichlandforceswillneedtobecapableofconductingoperations,theyservemainlytounderlinetheuncertaintyofitall.Insuchcircumstances,therequirementisforrapidagility—bothinthephysicalandcognitivedomains.Thiswillaskagreatdealofourpeople.

Therearethingsweusedtodotowhichweneedtoreturn,andtherearethingswedonowthatwemaydowelltostop.ButtherearealsomanythingswehavelearnedfromourexperienceinAfghanistanandIraqthatwillserveuswell.

Thelikelyfuturecharacterofconflicthasbeenwellarticulated,andtheendorsedview(‘TheFutureCharacterofConflict’,dueshortlytoberevisedbytheUK’sDevelopment,ConceptsandDoctrineCentre)remainsvalidasabaseline.Landforceswillberequiredtooperatewithinanenvironmentthatis—atthesametime—congested,cluttered,contested,connected,constrainedandcoalitioninnature.Manyofthesefactorswillbefamiliarfromrecentexperience.Whathaschanged,however,isourdegreeofunderstandingconcerningthethreatenvironmentsinwhichlandforcesmaydeploy.AfteryearsofgearingtacticalactionstothestrategicobjectivesofNATO(andtheUK)inAfghanistan,asimilarenvironmentshouldbeenvisaged,butwithnewendstates,newadversariesanddifferentdynamicsingeneral.Moreover,whileAfghanistanmaywellrepresentafairreflectionofthesortofphysicalandhumanterrainintowhichlandforcesmaybepropelled,boththreatandtaskcoulddiffersubstantially.

Thefuturewillalmostcertainlybemulti-polarandinvolveapolicyenvironmentdictatedbythegovernment’skeyobjectivesofensuringasecureandresilientUKandshapingastableworld.5Thestatewillalmostcertainlyremainthedefiningactoroftheinternationalsystem,althoughitsrelevancemaybedilutedbythecontinuedeffectsofglobalisationandbysupraandsub-nationalorganisationsandmovements.Theincreasingworldpopulationwilldriveandconcentratethedemandforresources(water,foodandenergyinparticular),particularlyinthedevelopingworld.

InorderforlandforcestocontributetotheUK’scapacitytowield‘soft’power,whetherthroughDefenceengagementorbyothermeans,thereisanuncompromisingrequirementforthemtoexcelatwarfighting.6



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Shoulddeterrencefail,landforcesmustbeabletointerveneandapplydecisivelethalforcetodefeatadaptive,hybrid—potentiallypeer—adversarieswithinthelandenvironment.Buttheymustalsohavethecapacitytoconduct—simultaneouslyifnecessary—lesslethaloperationsdesignedtostabiliseorprovidehumanitariansuccour.Theprincipaldifficultywilllieinpreparingthem,bothinaphysicalandcognitivesense,foralleventualities.

Inordertodothis,landforceswillneedtocalibratetheirapproachsuchthattheycanapplycombinedarmsmanoeuvreinlinewiththeprinciplesofwar,usingamanoeuvristapproachandwithmissioncommandacentraltenetoftheirphilosophy.Theymustalsoinvestsubstantially—moresothantheydoatpresent—inthe‘centralityofinfluence’inachievingtheirobjectives,notingthatthisrequiresahigherdegreeofunderstandingthanhaspreviouslybeenthecase.7So,whilepre-Teliclandforceswerebroadlycapableofmanoeuvreinthephysicaldomain,post-Herricklandforcesmustalsobecapableofmanoeuvreinthecognitive(human)andvirtual(information)domains.

TheUKremainslikelytodeployforcesacrosstheworldtosecureresources,ensurestability,ortosupportinternationaldisasterreliefefforts.Suchdeploymentsmaybringusintoconflictwithavarietyofadversariesandrivals.Thesemayrangefrompeerarmies,formallypartofafunctioningstate,throughtostate-sponsoredorstate-supportedgroups,andgroupsnotformallyrepresentinganypolity.Combinationsthereofrepresentwhatmanyhavetermeda‘hybridthreat’.Wearealmostcertaintobedeployedintosituationsofpoorgovernance,economicdeprivationandinequality,inwhichthecivilauthoritiesarebeingoverwhelmedorignoringtheplightofthepopulation.Thesocietiesinwhichwewilloperatewillalmostcertainlybeculturallyandlinguisticallydifferenttoours.8Wewillberequiredtooperatewithinlimitsdefinedbyamandateandbyourpoliticalleaders.Withareductionintimefromconcepttodelivery,hightechnologyitemswillbewidelyavailableandwidelyused.Thisproliferationoftechnologymeansthatwewillalmostcertainlyhavelostthebroadtechnologicaledgethathastraditionallyoffsetourlackofnumbers.Inaddition,lowergovernanceoverheadsinlessdevelopednationscouldwellcontributetoamorerapidacquisitionoftechnologiesinfuture.

Ourmostlikelyadversariesandrivals(aswellassomeofourpartners)willcomefrom,orresemble,thelocalsociety.Theyarelikelytobeamorphous,changeableandagileratherthanhierarchical.Itislikelythattheywill,attheveryleast,haveaccesstosomeoftheleversofpowertraditionallywieldedbyastate.Assuch,weshouldfocusonachievingouroutcomesandnotonouradversariesandrivals,lestwesurrendertheinitiative.LikeFabiusMaximus,9ouradversaries



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willseektoavoidourstrengths;itisalmostcertainthattheywillchoosetofightwhereourcapabilitiesareill-suitedandouractionsmostconstrained.NotingDavidKilcullen’smostrecentthoughts,thiswillalmostcertainlybepopulatedurbanterrain,witharealisticprobabilityofbeinglocatedinthelittoral.Wecannot,however,ruleouttherequirementtooperateindensevegetationandinthedesert.Norcanweignorethepossiblerequirementtodefeatapeerenemy.Ifwedoso,wewillsurrenderthehardpowerthatunderpinstheUK’ssoftpoweranddeterrence,andunderminecredibilitywithouralliesandotherprospectivepartners.

Ourmostlikelyadversarieswillhaveincreasingaccesstotechnologyatalevelcomparabletoours,andwillgenerallybeattractedtothosecapabilitiesthataresimpletooperateandrequirelittlemaintenanceorsupport.TheyarelikelytoseekaChemical,Biological,RadiologicalandNuclear(CBRN)capability,andwillemployanti-accessandareadenialsystems.Theircapabilitiesmaybemodified,gearedtothesituationathand,andusedinnovelways.

Thetempoofoperationswillaccelerate.Wewillcontinuetobeheavilyreliantonthevirtual(information)domain,andouradversariesandrivalsarealmostcertaintoexploitthisinordertooperateflexiblyandtofightthebattleofthenarratives.Giventhatmilitaryinterventionwillseektosetconditionsratherthansecureoutcomes,theopinionsofthepeople(local,regional,homeandglobal)willbecrucialtosuccess.Wemust,therefore,regardinfluenceasanoutcomeandnotanactivity;thiswillbedifficultinaworldinwhichsocialmediaandcitizenjournalismmaysettheinformationagenda.

Wewillcontinuetobereliantonexistinginfrastructureandciviliancapabilitiestodeploy,sustainandrecovertheforce.Thisisavulnerabilitythatouradversariesarelikelytotarget.WewillnotbeabletoachieveourobjectivesandthoseofthegovernmentunlessweoperatecomprehensivelywithJIIM(joint,interagency,intergovernmental,multinational)partnersandusuallyinasupportingrole.

Finally,despitethedesireofthegovernmenttoavoidprotractedoperationsofprolongedduration,weshouldalsonotethatthelengthoftimecommittedtooperationshashistoricallybeenlongerthanfirstanticipated.10

NotingtheUK’scompetitiveadvantage,landforcesshouldaimtodeveloptheirstrengthsinsuchareasas:

• theintellectualcapacityoftheofficercorpstocombineagooddegreeofsituationalawarenesswithculturalknowledgebasedoneducationanddevelopafundamentalunderstandingofthesituation;11



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• thecapacitytoexploitrelationshipsandlinkagesbetweenallies,thehostnationandinter-agencypartnerstogenerateunderstandingandleverageresourcesthatsupportouroperationaldesign;

• thecapacitytodeliverprecisionlethaleffect,throughliaisonandinteractionwithSpecialForcesaswellasthedeliveryofwell-targetedjointfires;

• theabilitytointegratejointeffectsusingadevelopingtargetingprocessattheheartofouroperationaldesigntoapplyarangeofmeansbothagainstouradversariesandthepeopleamongstwhomweoperate;12

• thegenerationofmulti-dimensionalmanoeuvre,onland,intheair,13intime,andinthevirtualdomain–improvingourcapacitytodeliveroffensiveactioninsupportofinformationandcyberoperations;14

• thedecisiveapplicationofintegratedcombatpoweratthepointofdecision;and

• thecapacitytomanageconsequences,therebyshapingandmanagingthebattlespacetoachievesuccess.15

Atthesametime,wemustmitigateourweaknesses:

• ourlackofmass,mitigatedthroughouralliancesandtheuseofproxyindigenousforces(whereachievable).Concentrationofphysicalandcognitiveforceatthedecisivepoint,however,isasimportantaseconomyofeffortelsewhere;

• ourinitiallackofunderstanding,mitigatedbyrapiddeploymentofjointstrategicintelligenceenablersandaugmentedbyourcapacitytointegrateISTARfortactical‘find’;

• ourability—incomplexterrain—tofindandengagetheenemywithkineticandnon-kineticeffects,mitigatedbymaintainingHUMINTcapabilityandmannedreconnaissance,aswellasmaintainingaroleforsuppressionwhereappropriate;

• ourneedtoprotecttheforce,mitigatedbyprofessionalcompetenceinforceprotectionTTPs,equipment,deceptionandconcealment.Landforceswillneedtobecomemoreusedtobreakingcoveronlywhenrequired,withheadquartersdevelopingthemeanstodeliveramorestaccatoapplicationofforceattimesandplacesofourchoosing;and

• ourlackofsustainabilityinthefield,whichwemitigatebytrainingtoimproveourcapacitytooperateinausterefieldconditions,awayfromtacticalbasing,andouruseofcommercialpartneringtodelivercontractorsolutions.



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Innovationrequiresimaginationtoexplorethepossibilitiesandpotentialtochangeandawillingnesstodoso.Thisinitselfrequiresanorganisationalculturethatencouragestheupwardflowofideasandperceptions,aswellasdirectionfromabove.

FortheBritishArmy,thesituationhasfundamentallychangedandwemustchangewithitifwewishtoremainrelevantinanuncertainworld.Whilethefundamentalnatureofwarremainsunchanging(fornow,atleast),itscharactercouldevolveinanynumberofdirections.Constrainedbyresources,theUKislikelytoremainkeentoleadtheEuropeanelementofNATOinitscapacitytodeployandconducteventhemostcomplexofoperations.Butitcannotdothiswithlimitedmassandadecliningtechnologicaledge.Instead,itshouldseekthesynergiesthatarisefromwell-craftedemploymentofjointcapabilitiesinanagileandscaleableforcepackagethatistargetedwithanappropriatedegreeofunderstanding.

Theroleoflandforceswithinthispackageisvitaltoitssuccess.Ourlackofmasswillneedtoberesolvedthroughexpertiseincraftinghighlyeffectiveshapingoperations—blendinglethalandnon-lethalcapabilitiesforpreciseapplicationwhererequired—andcommittingcombatforceelementstoexploit(ratherthandecide)thesituation;inshort,combinedarmseffect.Thisplacesrenewedemphasisontheimportanceofhigherheadquartersinshapingthesituation,freeinglowerheadquarterstoconcentrateonthetacticalbattleand,atthesametime,allocatingISTAR,firesandinformationoperationscapabilitiestothepointofneed.Whilethisiscomplex,everyeffortshouldbemadetocreatesimpleplanswithmessagingattheirheart.

Dispersion,concealmentandgoodfieldcraftwillbecomethenorm,withtacticalbasinglikelytopersistonlyduringthelatterstagesofstabilisationoperations.Forceelementsmustthereforebecomemorecomfortablewithoperationalsecurityanddeception,concealingtheirwhereabouts,communicationsandintentions,andcommittingfromdispersedlocationsonlywhennecessarytoachievedecisiveeffect.Trainingforunpredictabilitymustbecomethenorm,andofficersandsoldiersatalllevelsmustbecomfortablewiththis.Landforcesneedtobeadaptable,versatileandscaleable.

WehaveanopportunitytoshapethewayweoperationalisethestructureswehavebeengivenunderA2020.Itisnowtimetoresetforcontingencyinamannerdesignedtowinthewarsofthefuture,takingaccountofourexperiencesinthewarsoftodaywithoutslavishadherencetothese.Toachievethebestthatwecanrequiresourofficersandsoldierstoassistinconceptualdevelopment;abottom-uplearningcultureshouldbeencouraged,andthosewiththebestideasrewardedfortheirefforts.Journalssuchasthisremainanexcellentreceptaclefordebate.



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THE AUTHOR

ColonelLaw’sappointmentisequivalenttoDirectorDARA(nowDFLW)intheAustralianArmy,althoughtheviewsexpressedwithinthisarticlearelargelyhisownanddonotreflectofficialBritishArmyforcemodernisationobjectives.Heis,however,theleadauthoroftheUK’sFutureLandOperatingConceptDevelopmentAgenda,asubstantialworkthatsetsthecontextfortheBritishArmy’sLandEnvironmentCapabilityManagementStrategy.Anartilleryofficerbytrade,ColonelLawhasservedfor20yearsandhasseenactiveserviceintheBalkans,NorthernIreland,IraqandAfghanistan.Mostrecently,hecommandedaclosesupportartilleryregimentinHelmandProvince,actingastheChiefofTargetingandJointFires.HispastservicehasalsoincludedtwospellsasamemberoftheDirectingStaffattheBritishStaffCollegeandtimeintheMOD’sOperationsDirectorate.HerecentlyledtheBritishArmydelegationtoArmy-to-ArmyStaffTalksinCanberraandhasestablishedmoreeffectivelinksbetweentheBritishandAustralianforcedevelopmentorganisations

ENDNOTES1 TheBritishMinistryofDefencecodenamesforthevariousoperationsconductedinIraqand

Afghanistan.

2 DrJohnChipman,Director-GeneralIISS,‘TheAgeofFastPower’at:http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2013/02/04/the-age-of-fast-power,accessed5March2013.

3 GeneralSirRupertSmith,The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World,AllenLane,UK,2005.

4 B.Barry,‘AdaptinginWar’,Survival,Vol.54,No.6,December2012–January2013,pp.171–82.

5 Source:TheNationalSecurityStrategy.

6 Thisdecisivewarfightingeffectalsoengendersthecredibilityrequiredtooperatealongside,andattimestocommand,alliesandpartners.

7 UnderstandingisacommandissueandnotafunctionofISTAR.Itinvolvesacombinationofculturalandsituationalawareness,andrequiresofficerswithaninquisitivenature—encouragedandrewardedfortheirattentiontodetailinlearningthephysical,humanandhistoricalgeographiesoftheregiontowhichtheyaretodeploy.

8 Positiveeffortstorequire—andpotentiallyreward—theacquisitionoflanguageskillsmustbemadeasamatterofpriority.

9 FabiusMaximus,‘FabiustheDelayer’,earnedhissoubriquetinthe2ndPunicWarwhenheadoptedaseriesofdelayingtacticsagainstHannibal’ssuperiorCarthaginianarmy.Althoughatfirstderided,Romandefeats—includingthatatCannae—ledtoabroadadoptionofhisphilosophyinavoidingtheenemy’sstrengthwhileplayingfortimeanddenyingsuppliesasameanstocausewidespreadattrition.


http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2013/02/04/the-age-of-fast-power

http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2013/02/04/the-age-of-fast-power


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10 A2011studybytheDirectorateofForceDevelopment(equivalenttoDARA)concludedthat,excludingOpBanner,themeandurationofBritishinterventionssinceWorldWarIIis48months,andthemedian33.SincetheendoftheColdWar(1990),themeandurationhasbeen67months,withthemedian79.

11 Whilelanguageskillsareaweaknessatpresent,andculturalawarenessnotagiven,recentcampaignshavedemonstratedtheimportanceofdevelopingahighlevelofunderstandingpriortoembarkingonacampaign.

12 Thereissomeworkstilltobedonetoembedmessagingattheheartofourdecision-making,andcultural,organisationalanddoctrinalchangesmayberequired.TheDirectorateofForceDevelopmentproposesexperimentalworktodeterminewhetheranewestimateprocesswiththe‘message’atitsheartwillsimplifyoperationalplanningandprovideamorerelevantapproachforthefuture.

13 Theexactdegreeofairmechanisationandairmanoeuvreavailabletolandforceswillbedictatedintrainingbylimitedavailabilityofairframes,butthereisarequirementtomaintainabaselineunderstandingofairmechanisedoperationswithwhichlandforceshavebecomefamiliaronOperationHerrick.HowthisisachievedisanissuefortheUK’sDirectorateofTraining(Army)anditsJointHelicopterCommand.

14 Notingthatmoreworkneedstobedoneininstitutionalisingthelatterintothelandenvironmentbeyondspecialistdomains.

15 Thismayrequireformalisationoftheconsequencemanagementroleinformationandunitheadquarters.



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PlanBeersheba:TheCombinedArmsImperativebehindtheReorganisationoftheArmyColonelCraigBickell

ABSTRACT

ThisarticleexaminesthecombinedarmsimperativedrivingPlanBeersheba.ItbeginsbydescribingthemajororganisationalchangesoccurringintheregularmanoeuvreformationsofForcesCommandasbackgroundtodiscussionofthecombinedarmsimperativebehindtheseorganisationalchanges.EvidenceofthisimperativeissupportedbyhistoricalanalysisofcombinedarmswarfareduringthetwentiethcenturyandtheAustralianArmy’sexperienceofemployingtanksinVietnam.ThemorerecentexperienceofouralliesinoperationsintheMiddleEast,ourexperienceinmission-specificandfoundationwarfightingcollectivetrainingexercisesandlessonsfromtheRestructuringtheArmytrialsof1998–99willaddamoremodernedgetothisanalysis.


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The organisation which assures unity of combatants should be better throughout and more rational … soldiers no matter how well drilled, who are assembled haphazardly into companies and battalions will never have, never have had, that entire unity which is borne of mutual acquaintanceship.

ColonelArdantduPicq

Introduction

HadColonelArdantduPicqbeengiventheopportunitytoobservetheAustralianArmy’straditionalmethodsoftemporarilytask-organisingintobattlegroupsforcombinedarmstrainingactivitieshemaywellhavecriticiseditas‘haphazard’.ForExerciseTalismanSabre(Hamel)inlateJuly2013,anarmouredcavalryregiment(ACR),atask-organisedbattlegroupformedaroundthe1stArmouredRegimentwithattachmentsfromothermechanisedunitsoftheDarwin-based1stBrigade,wasattachedtothe3rdBrigade.ExerciseHamelhasbeenconductedeveryyearsince2010andtheseexercises,alongwiththerespectivebrigades’annualCombinedArmsTrainingActivity(CATA)whichpre-datesExerciseHamel,haveprovidedthemanoeuvrebrigadesoftheAustralianArmytheopportunitytocollectivelytrainincombinedarms.PriortoeachHamelandCATA,thearmouredandmechanisedunitsofthe1stBrigadearetemporarilytask-organisedforthesetrainingactivities,oftendetachedfromthe1stBrigadetothe3rdBrigade,andthenembarkonalengthyandexpensivetransittoandfromtrainingareasincentralQueensland.Heretheyperformsomehastyre-familiarisationbetweentank,infantryandartilleryandtheirsupportingarmsandservices,conductthetrainingactivityand,onitsconclusion,makethelengthytrektoreturntotheirgarrisonlocations.Havingobservedthistrainingmodel,whileacknowledgingthatitssoldierswereindividuallywelltrained,duPicqwouldprobablyconcludethattheAustralianArmy’scombinedarmsbattlegroupsandbrigades(whenformed)haveneverhadandcouldneverhavethatentireunitywhichheregardedasbornof‘mutualacquaintanceship’.Thisisbecause,untilPlanBeersheba,theAustralianArmy’sorganisationandthetemporarynatureofitsapproachtocombiningarmshasprecluded‘mutualacquaintanceship’andthusconstraineditscombinedarmscapability.Now,forthefirsttime,insteadofreorganisingintoitsparentunitorganisations,the1stACRwillretainasfaraspossibleitsExerciseHamelACRorganisationandpreparetotransitiontoitsnewPlanBeershebaestablishmentinJanuary2014.1Thisnewstructurewillseetanks,infantryandartillerypermanentlyorganisedineachMultiroleCombatBrigade(MCB).

PlanBeersheba:TheCombinedArmsImperativeBehindtheReorganisationoftheArmy


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ThisarticlewillexaminethecombinedarmsimperativeunderpinninganddrivingthemostsignificantreorganisationoftheArmyindecades.ItwillbeginbydescribingthemajororganisationalchangesoccurringintheregularmanoeuvreformationsofForcesCommandbeforeoutliningthecombinedarmsimperativedrivingtheseorganisationalchanges.ThediscussionwillfocusontheargumentthattheorganisationalchangesenvisagedunderPlanBeershebareflectnotonlytheprofessionaljudgementsofArmy’sseniorleadershipandthinkers,butalsodrawonlessonsfromcombinedarmswarfareduringthetwentiethcenturyandtheAustralianArmy’sexperienceofemployingtanksinVietnam.Morerecentexperiencewillalsobeexamined,specificallythatofouralliesinoperationsintheMiddleEast,ourexperienceinmission-specificandfoundationwarfightingcollectivetrainingexercisesandlessonsfromtheRestructuringtheArmytrial(RTA)conductedin1998–99.

Plan Beersheba

The2013DefenceWhitePaperreaffirmedthegovernment’scommitmenttoArmy’sreorganisationunderPlanBeersheba.PlanBeershebawillreorganisetheAustralianArmyfromthethreespecialisedbrigadesintothree‘like’MCBsbasedinDarwin,TownsvilleandBrisbanethatwillhavefundamentallycommonstructurescontainingallelementsofthecombinedarmsteam.2Eachbrigadewillcomprisetwostandardinfantrybattalions(SIBs)togetherwithanACRthatincludesatanksquadron,anartilleryregiment,combatsignalsregiment(CSR),combatengineerregiment(CER),andcombatservicesupportbattalion(CSSB).3ThestructureofeachlikebrigadeisillustratedinFigure1:

Figure 1: Organisation of the MCB


CSS

X

MCB

ACRREGTARTY CER CSR SIB SIB CSSB

II II II II II II II


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ThemostsignificantchangewillinvolvereorganisingthetanksandAPCscurrentlycentralisedinthearmoured,cavalryandmechanisedunitsoftheDarwinandAdelaide-based1stBrigadeintoACRsbasedineachbrigade’slocation.ThestructureofeachACRisillustratedinFigure2:

InlaunchingPlanBeershebainDecember2011,theMinisterforDefencepointedtotheneedtointegrateskills,atranslationof‘combinedarms’moreeasilyunderstoodbyapublicunfamiliarwiththeoriginalmeaning:

What we’ve learned from that experience is that Army is better placed if its skills are integrated. So we’re moving to three Brigades which will comprise and contain all of Army’s key skills – armour, infantry, communications, logistics and the like. This will enable flexibility – speedy response – but also make Army more efficient, and more effective.4

AtthesameconferencetheChiefofArmy(CA),LieutenantGeneralMorrison,elaboratedontheMinister’sexplanation:

We need to have forces that are going to operate in barracks together, so that they can train together, as much as we can and clearly we will remain in Darwin and we’ll remain in Townsville, we’ll remain in Brisbane, we’ll remain in the various locations that Army occupies now in Australia. But we need to group assets together in a way that enables them to train as they would fight or operate at short notice. Without going into the specifics, what we will try and do is make our Brigades more like each other.5

ThesestatementsrevealthecombinedarmsrationalebehindPlanBeersheba.

Figure 2: Organisation of the ACR


ACR

II

TK

I I I I

CSSCAV APC


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Sowhatdoestheterm‘combinedarms’actuallymean?WhileadefinitionofcombinedarmshasbeenlostfromAustraliandoctrine,6thepre-eminenthistorianofcombinedarms,JonathanHouse,providesaconciseexplanation:

… the combined arms concept is the basic idea that different combat arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to maximise the survival and combat effectiveness of the others. The strengths of one system must be used to compensate for the weaknesses of others.7

Yet,inmostexplanationsofthelogicbehindthePlanBeershebareorganisation,thecombinedarmsimperativedrivingthechangesisindangeroflosingitsprominence.Mostofficialstatementsandcommentaryrefertothebenefitsofgeneratingforcesforsustainedoperationsthatthereorganisationwillbring.TheAustralianArmy’swebsitenotesthattheArmy’smanoeuvrebrigadeswill‘containallelementsofthecombinedarmsteam’andreferstotheneedto‘providethewidestrangeofsustainedandeffectivelandforcespossibletomeetfuturestrategiccircumstances’andto‘generateoptimalcapabilitytoconformtostrategicguidanceandmeetthechallengeofcontemporarywarfare.Itincorporateslessonslearnedoveradecadeofcontinuousoperations,andmaximisescapabilitythroughtheapplicationofArmy’sForceGenerationCycle.’8Ina2012speechtheCAexplainedthat:

… for too long we maintained single capabilities within brigades with deleterious effects on our force generation and career planning cycles. This was inefficient and probably harmed retention as well … The development of the standard multi-role brigade will enable Army to reach the objective set in the 2000 White Paper for us to be capable of providing a brigade for sustained operations within our primary operating environment. It also allows us to develop forces of a combat weight commensurate with the level of threat in the modern battlespace. The force generation implications of this are profound and will ensure that we meet our obligation to the Government, and the remainder of the ADF, to be able to undertake sustained joint operations both in the littoral approaches to Australia and throughout the immediate neighbourhood.9

HowevermediareportingwhichfollowedtheofficialannouncementofPlanBeershebainDecember2011failedtoexplicitlyreportthecombinedarmsimperativethatdrovethechanges.The Sydney Morning Herald,forexample,reportedthat‘theAustralianArmywillberadicallyreshapedtoprepareitbetterforlongcampaignssuchasthedecade-longwarinAfghanistan’.10



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ThecombinedarmsimperativesocriticaltounderstandingthepurposeanddirectionofPlanBeershebaandyetsoneglectedinmediacommentaryformsthesubjectofthenextsectionofthisarticle.

The Combined Arms Imperative

FormanyyearsprofessionaldiscoursewithintheAustralianArmyhasidentifiedtheneedforacombinedarmscapability.FewmilitaryprofessionalswithanunderstandingoftheingredientsofsuccessinmodernwarfarewoulddisputethelogicofacombinedarmscapabilityasthecentrepieceoftheAustralianArmy’sfoundationwarfightingtasks,althoughbizarrely,thisviewisnotprominentinArmy’scurrentdoctrine.11Inhishistoricalanalysisofdevelopmentsincombinedarmswarfareoverthreecenturies,MichaelEvansconcludesthat:

from Brietenfeld in 1631 to Baghdad in 2003, the ability to combine fire, protection and movement by different arms has been the key to success in close combat and represents an important measure of an army’s professional effectiveness. In close combat, no single arm or weapons system can succeed alone: infantry must be teamed with tanks and both must be linked to artillery.12

AcasestudyofAustraliancombinedarmsassaultoperationsinVietnambetween1966and1971demonstratesthatacombinationofinfantryandarmourremainsvitaltotacticalsuccess.13Havingexaminedmorerecenthistoricalexamplesofcombinedarmscooperationintheassault,includingIraq,AlanRyanconcludedthat‘fortheforeseeablefuture,theAustralianArmywillberequiredtomaintainandcontinuetodevelopabalancedandlethalcombinedarmscapabilityifitistobeabletofulfilitsmissionoffightingandwinningthelandbattle.’14

LieutenantColonelDavidKilcullen’sreviewofthediscussionduringthe2003InfantryCorpsConferenceandofcontemporaryIsraeliandBritishexperiencesincombatintheMiddleEastledhimtotheconclusionthat‘AustralianArmyforceelementsmustoperateascombinedarmsteams’.KilcullenrecommendedthattheArmy‘trainandrehearseasweintendtofightinsmall,semi-autonomouscombinedarmsteams’,addingthat‘theprinciplesofbattlegroupingandtaskorganisationtocreatecombinedarmsteamsneedtobeappliedatamuchlowertacticallevelinthefuture…possiblyatintra-platoonorevenintra-sectionlevel.’15



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AustralianofficerswithcombinedarmsexperiencehavealsoidentifiedtheorganisationalimpedimentstoatruecombinedarmscapabilityinherentintheAustralianArmy.Onepractitionerarguescompellinglythatthe‘organisationofourBrigades16hasresultedinourtanksandmechanisedinfantryhavingahabitualrelationship,oftenattheexpenseoftheremainderofourarmy,whichhaslimitedopportunitytotrainwith,orexperiencethepracticalemploymentoftanks’.17

Kilcullen’sdeductionthattheprinciplesofbattlegroupingandtaskorganisationtocreatecombinedarmsteamsneedtobeappliedatamuchlowertacticallevelinthefutureledhimtotheviewthat‘suchanorganisationalshiftmaydemandthecreationofmoremodularstructuresthatcanbe“slicedanddiced”indifferentwaysinordertoenablerapidandflexibleregroupingofforcesforanygivenmission’.18Abalanceneedstobestruckhowever:

As the Israelis found in Jenin, the need for unit cohesion is the Achilles heel of the small fire team. When troops have not trained together, or are unused to rapid reorganisation, battle grouping at too low tactical level may simply damage unit cohesion and general morale. For these reasons there needs to be a focus on habitual training relationships.

KilcullenconcludedthattheAustralianArmyneedsto‘focusintellectualandprofessionalmilitaryeffortonmasteringcombinedarmsoperationsinurbanisedandcomplexterrain’.19PlanBeershebaincorporatessuchobjectivesbutthroughreorganisationinordertofacilitatemasteryofcombinedarmstacticstoadegreethatourcurrentorganisationhasinhibited.

Lessons from combined arms warfare in the twentieth century

Thehistoryofcombinedarmsinthetwentiethcenturyisrepletewithevidencethatpointstotheimportanceofeffectivelyorganisingcombinedarms.JonathanHouseconcludedthat‘tobeeffectivethedifferentarmsandservicesmusttraintogetheratalltimes,changingtaskorganisationfrequently.’Thepre-PlanBeershebaArmysufferedfromanotherofHouse’sobservationsfromhistory:‘confusionanddelaymayoccuruntiltheadditionsadjusttotheirnewcommandrelationshipsandthegainingheadquarterslearnsthecapabilities,limitationsandpersonalitiesoftheseattachments.’Housearguesthattaskorganisationismoreeffectivewhenitcommenceswithalargecombinedarmsformation,suchasabrigade,andelementsfromitareselectedtoformaspecifictaskforce,ratherthanstartingwithasmallerunitandattachingelementstoit.‘Thisensuresthatallelementsofthetaskforceareaccustomedtoworkingtogetherandhaveacommonsenseofidentitythatcanovercomemanymisunderstandings.’20PlanBeersheba’s



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organisationalchangesimplicitlyacknowledgethislesson,itsreorganisationallowingthe‘ready’brigadecommandertoselecttank,infantry,engineerandartilleryelementsfromhisorherbrigadeandtask-organisethem.Atthispoint,theexperienceofsharedcombinedarmstrainingduringthe‘readying’phasewillhaveprovidedtheopportunityforthesetaskforceelementstohavetrainedtogetheranddevelopedthecommonsenseofidentitysoessentialtoeffectivecombinedarms.21Thiswillensurethatperiodsofconfusionanddelaycausedbytheattachmentofarmouredandmechanisedelementsfromthemechanised1stBrigadetothe3rdor7thBrigadeswillbeminimisedinthePlanBeershebaArmy.

AnanalysisoftheAustralianexperienceoftheraising,traininganddisbandingofthe1stArmouredDivisionduringtheSecondWorldWaralsosupportstheneedforeffectiveorganisationofcombinedarms.TheAustralian1stArmouredDivisionwasformedforserviceintheMiddleEastandthedefenceofAustraliaduringtheSecondWorldWar.UniquelyintheAustralianexperienceofarmour,thedivisionenvisagedusingtanksnotinaninfantrysupportrole,butinoperationsindependentofinfantry.Itwaseventuallydisbandedwithoutseeingcombat,althoughseveralofitsregimentsfoughtintheSouthWestPacificArea.Animportantlessonfromthe1stArmouredDivisionexperienceisthat‘whenunitsareequippeddifferentlyandtrainedseparately,theycannotoperateeffectivelytogether,evenincontrolledexercisesituations’.Assuch,‘frequentintimatecollectivetrainingbetweentheLand400LVCS[LandVehicleCombatSystem]andinfantrybattalionsorembeddingofthesevehicleswillbeessentialtotheeffectiveuseofthesystem.Thiswillresultinhigherrequiredmanningandmaintenanceliabilityduetothediffusedforcestructure,butisessentialtoforceeffectivenessonoperations.’22

Lessons from Vietnam

Theexperienceofthe1RARBattleGroup’spreparationforandoperationalserviceinVietnamin1965warnsagainstrelyingsolelyonpre-deploymenttrainingandadhoctask-organisedcollectivetrainingforcombinedarms.The1RARBattleGroupthatdeployedtoVietnamin1965aspartoftheUnitedStates(US)173rdAirborneBrigadehadtobecompletelyreorganisedfromitspentropicorganisation.23Combinedarmstrainingwasnotprominentinitspre-deploymentpreparationandtraining.Asaresult,shortlyafteritsarrivalintheatre,the1RARBattleGroupfacedarapidlearningcurveonlarge-scalecommand,controlandcommunications,artilleryandcloseairsupport,armoured,armouredpersonnelcarriers(APC)andinfantryoperations,rapid‘onthemarch’ordersandhelicopterresupply.24



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In1973,attheendofalmosteightyearsofunitandtaskforcelevelexperienceinVietnam,theAustralianArmypublishedTrainingInformationBulletin(TIB)Number21–TheRAACRegimentamendingTheDivisioninBattlePamphlet#4–Armour.TheRoyalAustralianArmouredCorps(RAAC)wasreorganisedindoctrinefromseparatearmoured,cavalry,APCandanti-tankregimentsintoRAACregiments.Withinadivisionalstructure,theroleoftheRAACwastoprovidesupportfortheinfantry,tooperateinthemobilerolewhethersupportedby,orinsupportof,otherarms,andtoprovidelong-rangeanti-tankdefence.Thepublicationacknowledgedthatthetank’sprincipaltaskintheSouth-EastAsianenvironmentwastoprovideintimateclosesupportforinfantry.TheArmy’sexperiencedemonstratedthatfivetypesofsub-unitwererequiredwithinaRAACregiment:cavalry,tank,armouredpersonnelcarrier(APC),anti-tank(forlimitedwaronly)andforwarddelivery(orcombatservicesupportincontemporaryterminology).

AcomparisonbetweenthisstructureandtheACRdepictedinFigure2showsthesimilarities,withonlyananti-tanksub-unitabsentfromthePlanBeershebaACRstructure.TIB21statedthat,duringcounter-insurgencyoperationswhenthearmouredsquadronsarecollocatedwiththetaskforce,itwouldbenormaltotask-organisethethreesquadronsasanRAACRegiment.Itidentifiedtheadvantagesofthisorganisationas:theavailabilityofoneseniorexperiencedarmouradvisortothetaskforcecommanderinsteadofthreesquadroncommanders;betterallocationofarmouredresources;centralisedandsimplifiedadministrationandmanagementoflogisticresources;andtheflexibilitytodeployindependentsquadronsasnecessary.ThiswasessentiallytheorganisationthatArmyacknowledgedasoptimalforoperationsinvolvingarmourinSouth-EastAsia.Duetothecomparativecostsofhavingtanksinseparategeographiclocalities,thesupportrequirementsoftheCenturionandafocusawayfromcounterinsurgencytoconventionaloperations,thestructurewasonlypartiallyadopted.Whilethe2ndCavalryRegimentfromtheHolsworthy-based1stTaskForceandthe4thCavalryRegimentofthe6thTaskForceinEnoggerawerereorganisedwithASquadronReconnaissanceandBSquadronAPC,theCenturiontanksremainedcentralisedwiththe1stArmouredRegimentinPuckapunyalandCSquadron’stankswereneverattachedtothecavalryregiments.TheRAACregimentconceptwasovertakenbyTIB28,TheInfantryDivision,in1975,andtheArmyreturnedtofocusingonconventionaloperationsandgroupingseparatetanks,APCandreconnaissanceregiments.25



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Lessons from allies

AcombinedarmsimperativewastheimpetusfortheUSArmy’sreorganisationintopermanentcombinedarmsbattalionsandbrigades.Inthelate1980stheUSArmyexperimentedbyorganisingthreecombinedarmsmanoeuvrebattalions(CAMB).Thisorganisationalstructurehadasitsobjective‘organisingbattalionstotrainastheywillfight’.Theintendedbenefitsofthisreorganisationweretoimproveleaders’proficiencyinintegratingtanksandmechanisedinfantry,facilitatetaskorganisationandsustainmentandcapitaliseontheeffectsofconstantassociation.Thereorganisationwasalsoexpectedtoreaplong-termprofessionaldevelopmentbenefitsbyexposingleaderstocombinedarms.26ThelogicdrivingtheUSArmy’sCAMBreorganisationsawgreaterbenefitfrompermanentlyorganisingascombinedarmsthancontinuingtoliveas‘pure’mechanisedinfantryandtankunitsthatonlycross-attachandtask-organiseoccasionally.27Oneofitsgoalswastostrengthenarmoured-infantryteamworkbyenablingunitstoliveandworktogether.TheUSexperiencealsoaddressedthecounter-argumenttopermanentreorganisation.USproponentsoftheCAMBhighlightedtheinefficienciescreatedbysuchprovisionaltask-organisationincludingthecreationofadditionalandunfamiliaradministrative,technicalandgovernancerequirements.InstitutionalisingcombinedarmsthroughtheCAMBreorganisationremovedthisproblem.28FollowingthisexperimenttheCAMBmodelwasimplementedduringthe2004transformationoftheUSArmy.29CombinedarmsbattalionsandbrigadecombatteamsarenowthemainorganisationalstructuresoftheUSArmyandpointtotheadvantagesofpermanentlyorganisingcombinedarmsatbrigadelevel.WhilethePlanBeershebareorganisationisdifferenttothatoftheUSArmyatbattalionandbrigadelevel,itisdrivenbythesamevalidcombinedarmsimperative.

Lessons from collective training activities

Lessonsfrommission-specificpre-deploymenttrainingalsosupporttheargumentforpermanentlytask-organisingforcombinedarms.Ajuniornon-commissionedofficerwhoservedwithSecurityDetachment(SECDET)IIIinIraqin2004–05notedinaninterviewthatanincreasedlevelofinteroperabilitybetweenallforceelementsmustbeachievedpriortodeployment:‘Havingopportunitiestoworkwiththemilitarypolice,cavalrypersonnelandtheirvehicles,andotherelementsareessentialtominimiseinteroperabilityissues.’HesuggestedthattheArmy‘shouldn’twaituntil[unitsare]deployedtodiscoverthattherearen’tcommonTTPorSOP.’30AnASLAVcrewmanfromtheAfghanistan-boundReconstructionTaskForce(RTF)2in2007recalledthatthefirsttimeheexperiencedcombinedarmstrainingwasduringtheMissionRehearsalExercise(MRE).Whileheconsidered



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thathisunitwasproficientbytheendoftraining,hecommentedthat,ideally,theunitshouldhavehadmoreregularexposuretothistrainingbeforehand.31WhileSECDETandRTFwereunique,highlytask-organisedteamscreatedforverynarrowlydefinedmissions,andtheArmy’sfuturecombinedarmsmustbekeptmorebroadandgenericthantheseexamples,theyneverthelessdemonstratetheexistingcombinedarmsdeficiencieswithintheAustralianArmy.

Inpost-deploymentdebriefingsasmallgroupofartilleryofficerswhohadre-roledasinfantryanddeployedonOperationANODEin2007alsoarguedtheimportanceofconductingcombinedarmstrainingasaregularactivity.Theybelievedthatitwasimportantforallforceelementstodevelopteamworkandawarenessofoneanother’scapabilitiesinordertoensurethattheyworkedtogethereffectivelywhileonoperations.Allstatedthattheyhadundertakenverylittlecombinedarmstrainingoutsidemission-specifictraining(MST)andCombatTrainingCentreMREs.TheysuggestedthatbattlegroupingshouldbecomearegularfeatureofArmy’sbusiness—theyclearlysawsomevalueinassemblingregularbattlegroupsinbarracksaswellasonoperations.Theofficersinterviewedhadbeenintheirunitforatleasttwoyearsandcouldnotremembereverhavingundertakenanyformofcombinedarmstraining.32Thesecontemporaryobservationsontheneedfor‘mutualacquaintanceship’closelymirrorthoseofColonelArdantduPicqwhosecommentswerereflectiveofnineteenth-centuryreality.

OneclearadvantageofthePlanBeershebareorganisationistheincreasedflexibilityenjoyedbythebrigadecommanderandanobviousboostinresourcing.Previously,whenthe3rdor7thBrigadewantedtoconductcombinedarmstrainingwiththetanksorAPCsofthe1stBrigade,itwouldrequireHQFORCOMDinvolvementtofacilitatethearrangement.UnderPlanBeersheba,whenthe‘readying’or‘ready’MCBwantstoconductcombinedarmstraining,thetank(underonemodelbeingconsidered),APCorcavalrysub-unitisreadilyavailableinthebrigade’scollocatedandintegralACR.ShouldthismodeleventuallybeadoptedtherewouldbeasignificantreductionintheenormouscostsassociatedwiththetransportationoftankstoeasternQueensland.33

Lessons from previous trials

LessonsfromtheRestructuringtheArmyforthe21stCentury(RTA/A21)trialincludeanumberthatarerelevanttoPlanBeersheba.InabrieftotheMinisterinMay2000,thetrialsdirector,thenColonelJustinKelly,explainedoneofthemainfindingsofthetrial:



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Army 21 sought to achieve combined arms effects by creating units which contained small numbers of the principal arms – tanks, artillery, infantry and engineers. What we found was that these permanent groupings offered no advantages over temporary groupings created for a specific task and were in fact less flexible. The embedded units were also difficult to train and administer and undermined the culture of excellence that has traditionally given us the edge at the tactical level. On the whole, the A21 approach to combined arms proved to be a more expensive way to achieve a lesser outcome. The trial reinforced that the brigade level was the most efficient and effective means of generating combined arms effects because of its command and logistics capabilities. We decided that embedding should occur at that level rather than at the unit or sub-unit level [author’semphasis].’34

TheRTAtrialconfirmedwhatmanyRAACofficershaddeducedfromprofessionalexperienceandhadwarnedagainstasthetrialapproached:thatembeddingatroopoftanksatsubunitlevelinareconnaissancesquadronwastoolowalevelofcombinedarmsintegration.35Disadvantagesincludedthelossofflexibilityandabilitytomasscombatpower,theinabilitytoconcentratefire,theconstraintsimposedbydissimilartrackedandwheeledvehiclecapabilities,andthedifficultyinsupportingandsustainingtheembeddedtanksingeographicallydispersedlocations.Oneexperiencedtankcommanderconcludedthat‘aTankSquadronoffersgreaterflexibilityandimpactthanthesinglediscretetroopembeddedwithinthereconnaissancesquadron.’36Anotherarguedthat‘theissueisnotwhetherweshouldembedorgroupbutratheratwhatlevelweshouldembed.’37Thetrial‘confirmedthatartillery,tanksandinfantrycontinuetobeatthecoreofthecombinedarmsbattle…withoutartillery,companyattacksagainstadversaryplatoonsinvariablyfailed’and‘thepresenceofasingletroopofthreetanksinaninfantrycompanyattacktypicallyreducedcasualtiesbytwo-thirds.’38

PlanBeershebaandtheRTAtrialbothaimedtoachieveanimprovedcombinedarmseffect.TheRTAtrialmethodwasanorganisationalrestructureofunitstoembedarmourandartilleryatunitlevel.ThePlanBeershebamethodis,amongotherthings,anorganisationalrestructuretoensurethatallarms,includingtanks,arepermanentlyrepresentedwithineachbrigade.ThismethodisconsistentwiththeconclusionfromtheRTAtrialthatembeddingcombinedarmseffectsshouldoccuratbrigadelevel.RAACofficersshouldbeencouragedthat,onthisoccasion,Army’smethodreflectsthelessonslearnedfromprevioustrialsthatembeddedtanksandfromtheadviceofferedbyprofessionalpractitioners.Interestingly,theArmyhadnotactedonthatkeyfindinguntilPlanBeersheba,possiblyreflectingthedemandsofsustainedoperationsfromlate1999tothepresent.


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Acknowledging the challenges and risks

AstheRTAtrialdirectorconcludedin2000,‘achievingtherightbalancebetweenbreadth,depthandresourcesisthecorechallengeofArmydevelopment’.39ThisobservationremainstrueforPlanBeersheba.TherearemanyrisksandobstaclesassociatedwiththedisaggregationofarmouredunitsintomixedRAACgroupingsandtheserisksandobstaclesapparentlypreventedtherealisationofthereorganised1973RAACRegimentsthattheArmyenvisagedfollowingitsVietnamexperience.Onesignificantconcernremainswiththemodelthatseesthedisaggregationoftanksintothreegeographiclocations.Thisconcernisthat,havingatanksquadronineachgeographiclocationrisksneveractuallyseeingafullsquadronfieldedduetomaintenanceandserviceabilityconstraints.Itisaregimentaleffortforthe1stArmouredRegimenttoputatanksquadroninthefield.Similarly,thereisariskofdegradationofcoreskillssuchasgunneryasaconsequenceofadoptingthemodelthatseesthedisaggregationoftanks.InordertoensurethatPlanBeershebadoesnotsufferthesamefateasthepost-VietnamRAACregiment,theserisksandobstaclesneedtobeadequatelyaddressedthroughsimulationsystems,heavytanktransporters,recoveryvariantsandthroughlifesupportcontractarrangements.MaintainingmainbattletanksinonelocationandASLAVsintwocurrentlypresentsasignificantchallengeand,underonePlanBeershebamodelthatwillbeconsidered,Armywillneedtosupportandsustaintheseplatformsacrossthreeorfourlocations.40Army’sseniorleadershipiswellawareoftheserisksandobstaclesandArmy’splannersareworkinghardtoaddressthemasimplementationplansandmodelsaredrafted.Nothinghasyetbeenidentifiedhowever,thattrumpsthecombinedarmsimperativethatisdrivingtheneedforchange.

Conclusion

In1993,havinganalysedthehistoricalimperativeforthecombinedarmsteamandexaminedthestructureoftheUSArmouredCavalryRegiment,ayoungAustralianRAACofficerwrotethattheAustralianArmywasgoodat‘espousingthebenefitsofallarmstrainingatRMCandJSCandonformationlevelexercises,butnotintheday-to-dayconductoftraining.’41PerhapsconstrainedbyhisrankandexperiencehedidnotthenadvocatetheformationofarmouredcavalryregimentsintheAustralianArmybutsawthe1stBrigadeasprovidingthebasisforanumberofall-armsteamswiththecapabilityandflexibilityofanarmouredcavalryunit.PlanBeershebatakesthewell-foundedandprescientobservationsofthisyoungofficerbeyondthe1stBrigadeinwhichheservedandintoalltheregularmanoeuvrebrigadesoftheAustralianArmy.Whilenodoubtthereareefficiencies


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AustralianArmyJournalSummeredition2013,VolumeX,Number4 Page49

andadvantagesinsustainingoperations,thecombinedarmsimperativeisthepre-eminentrationaleforPlanBeersheba.ThispreeminencereflectstheprofessionaljudgementofArmy’sseniorleadershipandthinkers,anddrawsonlessonsidentifiedinanhistoricalanalysisofcombinedarmswarfareduringthetwentiethcentury.SuchlessonsincludethosefromtheAustralianArmy’sexperienceofemployingtanksinVietnam,theexperienceofouralliesinrecentoperationsintheMiddleEast,ourexperienceincollectivetrainingexercisesandlessonsfromRTA/A21conductedin1998–99.WhileconceptualisingPlanBeershebahasbroughtitsownchallenges,thesewillbeovershadowedbythechallengesinherentinimplementingthereorganisationoverthenexttenyears.Afterthat,perhapsthenextchallengeandthefocusofcontemporaryexperimentationmaylieingenerating‘mutualacquaintanceship’betweentheMCBsandthesupportingarmsandservicesthatcurrentlyresideinthe6th,16thand17thBrigades.


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AustralianArmyJournalSummeredition2013,VolumeX,Number4 Page50

THE AUTHOR

ColonelCraigBickell,CSM,iscurrentlyG5/ColonelPlansatHeadquartersForcesCommand.HeholdsthedegreesofBachelorofArts(Honours)andMasterofDefenceStudies,bothfromUNSW.

ENDNOTES1 ThismaynotbethefinalunitnameoftheDarwin(orAdelaide)-basedACR,asthatdecisionwill

bemadebyCAontheadviceoftheRAACHeadofCorps.

2 DefenceWhitePaper2013,p.86andat:http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Plan-BEERSHEBA

3 J.Kerr,‘BeershebaPlansforwhentheTroopscomehome’,The Weekend Australian,27October2012.

4 MinisterforDefence,TranscriptofPressConferenceof12December2011announcingPlanBeershebaat:http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/12/13/minister-for-defence-press-conference/

5 Ibid.

6 InLWD3-0OperationsandLWD3-0-3LandTacticscombinedarmsteamsaredefinedas‘acase-by-casemixofcombat,combatsupport,CSSandcommandsupportFEs,selectedonthebasisofaspecificcombinationoftask,terrainandthreat.’Theconceptofcombinedarmsitselfisnotexplained.

7 J.House,Combined Arms warfare in the Twentieth Century,UniversityPressofKansas,2001,p.4.

8 Ibid.,p.282.

9 ChiefofArmy,LieutenantGeneralDavidMorrison,AO,addresstotheRoyalAustralianNavyMaritimeConference,Sydney,31January2012.

10 D.Oakes,‘ArmyShapesupfortheLongHaul’,TheSydney Morning Herald,13December2011.

11 ForoneperspectiveseeLieutenantColonelM.Krause,‘LestweForget–CombinedArmsAssaultinComplexTerrain’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.I,No.1,pp.41–46.

12 M.Evans,‘GeneralMonash’sOrchestra–ReaffirmingCombinedArmsWarfare’inMichaelEvansandAlanRyan(eds),From Brietenfeld to Baghdad – Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare,LandWarfareStudiesCentre,WorkingPaperNo.122,July2003.

13 R.HallandA.Ross,‘LessonsfromVietnam–CombinedArmsAssaultagainstPreparedDefences’,inEvansandRyan(eds),From Brietenfeld to Baghdad – Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare.

14 A.Ryan,‘CombinedArmsCooperationintheAssault–HistoricalandContemporaryPerspectives’inEvansandRyan(eds),From Brietenfeld to Baghdad – Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare,p.58.

15 LieutenantColonelDavidKilcullen,‘TheEssentialdebate–CombinedArmsandtheCloseBattleinComplexTerrain’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.I,No.2,pp.77–78.

CAPABILITYPlanBeersheba:TheCombinedArmsImperative

BehindtheReorganisationoftheArmy

http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Plan-BEERSHEBA

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/12/13/minister-for-defence-press-conference/

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/12/13/minister-for-defence-press-conference/


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16 Since1980theAustralianArmyhadbeenorganisedondistinctivespecialisedbrigadescanteredaroundmobile/mechanisedcapabilities,light,air-portablecapabilities,andstandardinfantry/motorisedcapabilities.LieutenantGeneralDunstan,thenChiefoftheGeneralStaff,proposedthefollowingspecialisationsforthetaskforcesofthe1stDivision:1stTaskForcewastofocusonmobileoperationsandpreparefortasksinconjunctionwiththe1stArmouredRegiment;3rdTaskForcewastobereorganisedontolightscales,anditwastoconcentrateitstrainingonair-portableandair-mobileoperationsaswellaswarfareintropicalareas;6thTaskForcewastoremainastandardinfantrytaskforce,focusingitstrainingonconventionaloperationsinopencountry.Dunstan’slogicwasthat,inanorganisationassmallastheARA,itwasaliabilitytohavethreetaskforceswithidenticalorganisationsandroles,asthislimitedtheArmy’sabilitytodevelopthefullrangeofskillsitmightrequireforexpansion.SeeDrAlbertPalazzo,The Australian Army – A History of its Organisation 1901 2001,OxfordUniversityPress,Melbourne,2001,p.328.

17 CaptainM.Shea,‘Infantry/tankcooperationincomplexterrain’,Australian Infantry Magazine: Magazine of the Royal Australian Infantry Corps,October2002,pp.48–51.

18 Kilcullen,‘TheEssentialdebate’,p.79.

19 Ibid.p.80.

20 House,Combined Arms warfare in the Twentieth Century,p.282.

21 ForcesCommandgeneratesfoundationwarfightingcapabilitiesusingaforcegenerationcycleinwhichagivenbrigadewillbeinthe‘ready’phasefromwhichforcesaredrawnforcurrentoperationsandcontingencies,anotherbrigadewillbeinthe‘readying’phaseorconductingcollectivetraininginfoundationwarfightingtoprepareforcurrentorcontingencyoperations,andafurtherbrigadewillbeinthe‘reset’phaseinwhichthefocuswillbeonindividualtrainingandmodernisation.

22 LieutenantZachLambert,‘TheBirth,LifeandDeathofthe1stAustralianArmouredDivision’,Australian Army Journal,Vol.IX,No.95,p.100.

23 ThepentropicbattalionorganisationhadfiveriflecompaniesandanAdministrativeandSupportCompany.FiveinfantrybattalionswithsupportingarmsandservicesmadeupthePentropicDivisions.SeePalazzo,The Australian Army,pp.249–50.

24 B.Breen,First to Fight,Allen&Unwin,NorthSydney,1998,p.34citedinLieutenantJasonNovella,‘TheEffectivenessofthe1stBattalion’sCombinedArmsoperationsDuringitsFirstTourofVietnam’,Australian Infantry Magazine,October2005,pp.28–30.

25 E-mailcorrespondencebetweenMrBillHouston,ArmyHistoryUnit,andBrigadierChrisField,ChiefofStaff,HQFORCOMDof11July13madeavailabletotheauthor.

26 LieutenantColonelR.G.Bernier,‘TheCombinedArmsManoeuvreBattalion–ArmourandInfantryBuildaNewRelationshipinFortHoodExperiment’,Armor,January–February1998,p.14.

27 Ibid.,p.15.

28 Ibid.,p.16.

29 E-mailfromHQFORCOMDDirectorGeneralTrainingBrigadierPrictorof7August2013.BrigadierPrictorhashadexchangeandprofessionalmilitaryeducationpostingswiththeUSArmy.

30 OBS000001591,ALOKnowledgeWarehouse.Allfootnoteswithanumberprefixedby‘OBS’areobservationsdrawnfromtheAustralianArmyCentreforArmyLessons,ArmylearningOrganisation(ALO)KnowledgeWarehouse.

31 OBS00000621.

32 OBS000005854.


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33 ThiswasalsoanidentifiedbenefitoftheUSArmy’sCAMBorganisationalexperiment.SeeBernier,‘TheCombinedArmsManoeuvreBattalion–ArmourandInfantryBuildaNewRelationshipinFortHoodExperiment’,Armor,p.18.

34 ColonelJustinKelly,PresentationdeliveredtotheMinisterofDefenceonRTATrialsReport,24May2000accessedatALOKnowledgeWarehouseon25July2013.

35 See1ArmouredRegimentprofessionaljournalThe Paratus Papersfrom1997and1998fortheargumentsoftankofficersforandagainstembeddingtanks.

36 MajorD.M.Cantwell,‘TanksintheReconnaissanceBattalion–Grouping,TasksandTactics’,Paratus Papers,1997.

37 MajorN.Pollock,‘Tanks–EmbeddedorGrouped?’,Paratus Papers,1997.

38 Kelly,presentationonRTATrialsReport,24May2000.

39 Ibid.

40 IamgratefulforthecommentsofLieutenantColonelS.Winter,CO1ArmouredRegimentandCOoftheACRduringExHamel2013ontheneedtohighlighttheseidentifiedrisksandobstacles.IamgratefulalsotoMajorC.Morrison,HQFORCOMD,forhiscommentsrelatingtotheneedforaregiment-sizedarmouredorganisationtodeployasquadron.

41 CaptainJasonThomas,‘TheArmouredCavalryRegimentasaModelfortheAllArmsTeam’,Combined Arms Journal,Issue2/93,p.31.


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CONCEPTS

ShapingtheFutureBattlespace:OffensiveCyberWarfareToolsforthePlanner1MajorNicholasRose

ABSTRACT

ThisarticleiswrittenasanelementoffuturewaranalysisconductedattheUSMarineCorpsSchoolofAdvancedWarfightingandusesprimarilyUSdoctrineandconceptsrelatingtocyberspace.SuchconceptsmaynotcorrelatespecificallytothoseusedbytheAustralianDefenceForce(ADF)orAustralianArmyasopensourceUSmilitaryperspectivesoncyberspaceconsiderbothdefensiveandoffensiveaspects,whileAustraliagenerallyprovidesonlyadefensiveview.Howeverthisarticleaimstoprovideabaselineperspectiveonoffensivecyberspaceforallplannersandcommanders,largelydrawnfromUSresearch,butwithapplicationfortheconductoffuturelandandjointwarfareacrosstheglobe.


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Rarely has something been so important and so talked about with less clarity and less apparent understanding than this phenomenon. 2

GeneralHaydenDirectorUSNationalSecurityAgency

andCommanderUSCyberCommandspeakingoncyberwardevelopmentin2011

Introduction

Whatdoescyberspaceofferstrategistsintheconductoffuturewar?Thisisacriticalquestionthatrequiresanequallycriticalanswer.Alltoooftenplannersandcommandersbecomeentangledwiththetacticaldetailsofcyber—the‘onesandzeros’—withoutconsideringmoreenduringconceptsforoperationalemployment.Cyberspacealsoposesmanylegalandpolicydilemmasformilitarycommanders,particularlyinrelationtooffensiveemployment.Suchdilemmasinthecontextoflandwarfaremaypreventfullemploymentofallavailablecapabilitiesbycommandersandthereforeriskthelossoftacticaloroperationaladvantageinwar.

Thecharacteristicsoffuturecyberspaceoperationsarelikelytoprovidemilitaryplannerswithuniquebattlespace-shapingtoolsincludingcyber-reconnaissance,cyber-isolationandcyber-strike.Ifthesetoolsareemployedinconjunctionwithotherwarfightingfunctions,alignedwithappropriatestrategyanddevelopedbyplannersandcyberspecialistsworkingtogether,theconductoffuturecampaignswillbesignificantlyenhanced.

Thisarticledescribestheuniquecharacteristicsofcyberspaceoperationsthathavebeenexploitedinrecentyearsandthathaveprovenhighlyrelevanttoplanners,includingattribution,time,speed,risk,andprecision.Examplescitedinsupportofthisdiscussionwillhighlighttheemergingoperationalshapingtoolsofcyber-reconnaissance,isolationandstrike,allofwhichhaveclearfutureapplication.Finally,planningconsiderationswillbeproposedfortheemploymentofthesetoolsatthestrategicandoperationallevelsofwar.

ShapingtheFutureBattlespace:OffensiveCyberWarfareToolsforthePlanner

CONCEPTS


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CONCEPTSShapingtheFutureBattlespace:

OffensiveCyberWarfareToolsforthePlanner

Current understanding of cyberspace

TheUnitedStates(US)governmenthasemphasisedtheroleofcyberspaceasadomainofwarfighting,highlightingthecriticalnatureofcyberspaceformilitaryoperations.3

USmilitarydoctrinedefinescyberspaceas:

A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.4

Threats

Cyberthreatsarepresentlycategorisedasthoseoriginatingfromnon-nationstategroups;thosefromnationstates;andphysicalthreatstonetworks.5AccordingtotheUSDirectorofNationalIntelligence,cyberthreatsbroadlyconsistofcyber-espionage(accessingsensitiveinformation)andcyber-attack(anon-kineticoffensiveoperationintendedtocreatephysicaleffectsortomanipulate,disruptordeletedata).6

Conceptual

Theconceptualunderstandingofcyberspaceiscurrentlyprogressingalongtwobroadlines—defensiveandoffensivecyber.Defensivecyberisaimedatdisruptingcyberattacksfocusedongainingaccesstoinformationandfriendlysystemsandreceivesconsiderableattention.TheemploymentofdefensivecyberhasbeentheimpetusforestablishingorganisationssuchasUSCyberCommandandtheAustralianCyberSecurityCentre.7Offensivecyber,whilelessdeveloped,hastwobroadaims:responsetocyberattacksandtheconductofproactivevirtualactivitiestoenablemilitaryoperations.8

TheUSdefinesoffensivecyberoperationsas:

… the creation of various enabling and attack effects in cyberspace, to meet or support national and combatant commanders’ objectives and to actively defend DOD or other information networks, as directed.9

Basedonthisdefinitionoffensivecyberoperationscanbe‘activedefence’and/or‘enablingandattackeffects’.‘Activedefence’isalreadywelldevelopedgivenitsclosealignmenttodefensivecyber.Thesamecannotbesaidfor‘enablingandattackeffects’inoffensivecyber.Detailsofthisaspectofoffensivecyberarecloselyguardedintermsofclassification,sensitivityandauthorisationforuse.


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Offensivecyberrequiressignificantreconnaissance,resourcesandskilledpersonneltocraftweaponstoexploitanenemysystem’sweaknesses.Yetenablingandattackeffectscouldbeextremelyusefulformilitaryplannersifsuitablecybertoolswereavailable.

Observations on recent cyber operations

Reconnaissance

In2003securityforcesaroundtheworlddetectedthetheftofinformationfromarangeoftargetednations,allegedlybytheChinese,underthecodenamesofTITANRAINandNIGHTDRAGON.10Itwasunclearatthetimehowthestoleninformationwouldbeusedandwhetherithadbeenstoredforuseatalaterstage.Whatwasclear,however,isthatthiswasanunmistakableexampleofreconnaissanceconductedintherealmofcyberspace.

Theconductofgeneralreconnaissanceisnecessarytounderstandanadversary.11

Theconductofcyber-reconnaissanceisnecessarytoassessanadversary’snetworkorsystem,thesystem’sweaknesses,itsdefencemechanismandwhoisoperatinginthesystem.Fortheoperationalplanner,knowingwhatisoccurringinsidetheenemy’scomputersystemsisavitalenablerthatshouldbeexploited.

TheactivitiesallegedlyconductedbytheChineseandothernationstateshavebeenlabelled‘advancedpersistentthreats’(APT)bysecurityorganisations.12

APTdescribeshigh-endstate-sponsoredcyberattacksthataretheproductofmanymonthsoryearsofcyber-reconnaissance.Recentsecurityanalysisofattacktrendssuggeststhatthesesystemsaredesignedtogainandmaintainaccesstotargetedsystemstostealinformationandusethatinformationfornationalobjectives.13Oneparticularcharacteristicofthesesystemsistheabilityoforganisationstomaintainaccesstothetargetedsystemsoastoreturnatalaterdatetoobtainadditionaldata—andtodothiswhileremainingundetectedbythetarget.14Suchreconnaissancehasusuallyinvolvedagrouporanindividualgainingaccesstoprotectedinformation.Theapplicationofcyber-reconnaissanceinamilitarycontextthereforehasgreatvalueinassessingthevulnerabilitiesinanadversaryuseofcomputersbothduringpeaceandintimesofwar.

Theconductofcyber-reconnaissanceofSyriannetworks,asacomponentofthe2007IsraeliDefenseForces(IDF)OperationOrchard(bombingofasuspectednuclearsite),identifiedanumberofexploitableweaknesses.Identificationof


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theseweaknessesenabledtheallegedemploymentbytheIDFofasophisticatedcomputercodetocontroladversaryairdefencesystems,deceivingradaroperatorsastothetrueairthreatpicture.Theactionenabledbythiscyber-reconnaissanceeffectivelyneutralisedtheSyrianairdefence,allowingthesafepassageofIDFstrikeaircraft.15TheemploymentofdeceptionandinformationalterationwithintheadversarysystemshapedOperationOrchardandprovidesanexcellentexampleofsuccessfulcyber-reconnaissance.

TheallegedactivitiesofChinaandIsraelillustratethefivecharacteristicsofcyber-reconnaissance.Thefirstcharacteristicisthatthenatureofcyber-reconnaissanceissubtlydifferentfromtraditionalreconnaissance:

… the nature of the reconnaissance is not simply to observe and report. The real purpose of cyberspace reconnaissance has a more scientific bent — to examine a logical structure and determine its flaws, either by observation or by experimentation.16

Second,itisextremelydifficulttodeterminewhoisconductingcyber-reconnaissanceandthereforewhoisapotentialadversary.AttributionofAPTtonationssuchasChinacannotbeconclusivelyprovenduetointernetrouting,employmentofmultipleserversaroundtheglobeandtheabsenceofanyofficialclaimofresponsibility.17Third,accessingatargetsystemthoughcyber-reconnaissancetakestimetodevelopandgainingaccessrequiresspecialisedskill-sets.Fourth,cyber-reconnaissancecanprovideuniqueinsightintoanadversarythatmaybecheaper,lessriskyandunobtainablefromotherintelligencesources.

Usinginformationgleanedthroughcyber-reconnaissance,however,isadouble-edgedsword;ifyouactontheinformationcollectedyoumayloseaccesstothesystemsyouinvestedtimeandresourcestoinfiltrate.TheuseofULTRAcommunicationinterceptsduringWorldWarIIrepresentsoneexampleofweighingthecostsagainstthebenefitsofactingoninformationsourcedduringcyber-likereconnaissance.18TheAlliedabilitytoreadcodedGermancommunicationduringthewarwasofimmensevaluetoplannersandcommanders,butdecisionshadtobemadeonhowbesttoemploythatknowledgewithoutcompromisingitssource.ULTRAprovidedsignificantsupporttodeceptionoperations,detailedawarenessofGermanordersofbattleandintentions(resultinginaccurateassessmentsofcapabilities),andhadaprofoundinfluenceonAlliedstrategy.Howeverthatinformationwasnotalwayscomplete,asenemyactionsdemonstrated,necessitatingsupplementationbyotherformsofintelligence.19Cyber-reconnaissanceislikelytoprovidesimilarfunctionstofutureplanners.


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Fifthandfinally,theconstantandincreasinguseofcybersystemsbymilitariesandcommunitiesprovidesmoreopportunitiesforinformationexploitationthroughthegatheringofcyberintelligencethatcanshapeandinfluencetheconductofoperations.20Militaryplannersofthefuturemustconsidertheuseofcyber-reconnaissanceasatoolthatwillcomplementtheshapingofamilitaryoperation.

Isolation

ThreeweekspriortotheRussianincursionintoGeorgiainAugust2008pro-Russiancyber-hackersallegedlyoverloadedtheGeorgianinternetserviceproviders,defacedGeorgiangovernmentwebsiteswithanti-Georgianpropagandaandconducteddistributeddenialofserviceattacksongovernmentandmediawebsites.21Georgia’s‘cyber’utilitieswerebeingisolatedandtargetedinpreparationforwhatwastocomeaspartoftheFiveDayWar.AtthecommencementofRussianlandoperationsinGeorgia,hackingcontinuedwiththelistoftargetsincreasingtoincludefinancial,business,educationalandwesternmediaoutlets.Russianhackersreportedlyisolatedmediaandgovernmentcommunicationsitesinthespecificareasinwhichmilitaryattacksweretotakeplace.22AtthesametimecyberattacksoninfrastructurethatwouldhavecausedinjuryormasschaosinGeorgiawererestricted.TheeffectoftheseactionswastoisolateboththeGeorgiangovernmentandpeoplefrominternalandexternalcommunication.23

Byexploitingthisisolation,theRussiangovernmentwasabletosignificantlydegradetheGeorgiangovernment’scredibilitywithitspeopleandtheoutsideworld.24Ultimately,RussiancyberoperationsassistedtheRussianmilitarytoachieveitsstrategicgoalsinGeorgia.

AccordingtoHollis,theFiveDayWarrepresentsthefirstcaseofcyberattackcoordinatedwithothermilitaryoperations.25Reviewingtheconductofcybermanoeuvresduringthiswarprovidesusefulinsightintofutureapplications.

Thefirststepmaycomprisetheisolationincyberspaceofamilitaryobjectiveoroperatingareaasapreliminarytolandoperations.Suchisolationcanincludethedenialofofficialinternetservices,disruptionofcybersystemsinanadversarynetwork,andthedenialofinternetcommunicationtooutsidethirdparties.Cyber-isolationwouldbeparticularlyusefulduringthedecisivephasesofanoperationinwhichlimitingordisruptingenemycommunicationnetworksdomesticallyandinternationallymaycontributetoachievingmilitaryobjectives.A‘comparativeinconvenience’(isolation)wascreatedthroughthedisruptionofbankingsystems,mobiletelephonecommunicationandinternetaccessinGeorgia.Inaddition,suchisolationcouldalterandevendamagestrategicalliances.


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Giventheinterconnectednatureofcyberspace,theelectronicisolationofanentirenationorevenasignificantportionofanation,couldcreatesecondandthirdordereffectsinothernationsdrawingotherunwantedcombatantsintotheconflict.Additionalfollow-oneffectsrelatingtocyberisolationmayincludethedisseminationofcyberweaponsoutsidethecontroloftheowner,particularlygiventhepervasivenessoftheinternet,andleadtopotentiallyundesiredescalation.Identityobscurationofthecyber-attackermayalsocauseunintendedintensificationoftheconflict.26Alternatively,thesameisolationcouldfractureanalliancebeforecombatoperationscommenced,thecyberattackactingasausefulshapingactionfortheadversary.

Second,narrativemanipulationevidentthroughthedisruptionofmediacommunicationcaninfluencetheinternationalcommunity’sattitudetotheconflict.Manymediaoutletsuseglobalhubsfordisseminationofmaterialthroughsystemsusingnodesexploitablethroughtheinternet.Relianceonsuchcommunicationsystems,evensatellites,isopentodisruptionanddenialandcouldofferanopportunityformanipulationofthenarrativeofaconflict.Suchmanipulationcouldbeswayedtowardsparticularstrategicmessagesthatsupporttheattainmentoffriendlyoradversarygoals.AnexampleofthistypeofactivityistheconductofcyberactionsduringtheconflictbetweenHezbollahandIsraelfrom2006.Bothsidesoftheconflictconductedaggressivemanipulationofsocialmediasites,publicgeospatialapplications(suchasGoogleEarth)andwebsitestoinfluenceinternationalanddomesticopinionandattitudes.27

Manipulationofthenarrativesurroundingaconflictcanbeeffectedthroughexploitationofsocialmedia,onlinecontentandavailablemediawebsites.Thisispotentiallyaverypowerfulcyber-shapingactivityinvolvingthefullrangeofinformationoperationsandcybercapabilitiestoweakenordisruptsocialunderstandingofaconflict.Plannerscouldthendesigndirectedmessagingtolocalinhabitantswithoutenemycommandinfluence.Thiselementislikelytodevelopasatrendinfutureconflictgiventheincreasinglynumerouspersonaldigitaldevicesconnectedtotheinternet.28

Third,cyber-blockadescouldcontributetothedisruptionoftheeconomicinfrastructureofanobjectivearea.Suchblockadescouldbedesignedakintonavalblockadesbutfocusontheneutralisationofadversaryfinancialconduitsacrosscyberspace,economictradeacrosstheinternetanddenialofthoseservicesthatuseelectronicsystems.WhilethisoccurredforashortperiodoftimeduringtheFiveDayWar,itcouldbedesignedbyplannerstolastforalongerperiodandbeusedinconjunctionwithphysicalblockadesoflandandseaentrypoints.




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Howeversuchactionswouldrequiresignificantresourcestobeeffectiveandwouldhavemanyfollow-oneffectsacrosstheglobe.Effectscouldincludemistrustofglobalfinancialsystemscausingeconomicdisruptionoutsidetheconflictzone,andretaliatorycyber-attacksagainstoffenders.

Tosupportcyber-blockades,physicalattackoninternetconduitscouldalsobeundertaken.Therearecurrentlyanumberofdigital‘chokepoints’forthetransferofinternetcommunicationthroughunderseacable,stillthedominantmediumforinternettrafficglobally.29Thesedigitalchokepointscouldbecomethefocusofphysicalattacksordisruptionbyadeterminedadversary.Effortstophysicallydisruptdigitalchokepointshaveoccurredasrecentlyasearly2013.EgyptianauthoritiesinMarch2013detainedanumberofsaboteursattemptingtocuttheunderseainternetcableatAlexandriaconnectingNorthAfrica–AsiatoEurope.30

Finally,inconjunctionwithcyber-reconnaissance,adversarycybersystemscanbeisolatedtodisruptandcorruptthedecision-makingprocess.Degradingormodifyinginformationthatenemydecision-makersrelyoncanultimatelyreducetheintegrityofthesystemsandeitherimpedeoperationsorforcetheadversarytousemuchslowerformsofcommandandcontrol.

Precededbyandusedinconjunctionwithcyber-reconnaissance,cyber-isolation,synchronisedwithothermilitaryoperations,couldbeapowerfultoolforfuturemilitaryplanners.Likewise,theconductofcyber-enabledstrikesthatcausephysicaldamageoffersmuchpotentialforfutureplanners.

Strike

Accordingtosomeanalysts,theStuxnetattackof2010wasa‘gamechanger’intherealmofcyberoperations.StuxnetwasasophisticatedcomputervirusallegedlycreatedbyeithertheUSorIsraeltoattackIraniannuclearfacilities.31Specificallytheworm,discoveredinJune2010,wasdesignedtosurveyandthensubvertveryspecificindustrialcontrolsrelatingtosupervisorycontrolanddataacquisition(SCADA)systemsthatmonitoredindustrialnuclearprocesses.Acyber-strikewasconductedthroughapreciseinsertionofthevirus.

TheaimofStuxnetwastodestroycentrifugesusedinIran’snuclearprogrambydisruptingtheSCADAsystemthatcontrolsandmonitorsthedelicateprocesseswithinuraniumenrichmentmachines.32Essentially,theviruswasdesignedtocausecentrifugestospinoutofcontrol,causingdamagethatdisruptedtheenrichmentofuranium.33SignificantlywithStuxnet,theviruswasdesignedasmalwaretoachieveareal-worldoutcome—physicaldestruction.Thisphysicaldestructionhasneverpreviouslyappearedasafeatureofacomputervirusattack.34




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Theviruswasalsoabletocircumventwhatisknownasaclosednetworkthroughitsabilitytospreadviaperipheraldevices.Aclosednetworkincyberspacetermsisasystemnotusuallyconnectedtotheinternetandonethatisoftenprotectedbyvariousphysicalsecuritymeasuressuchaspersonnelaccesscontrols,guardsandphysicalbarriers.ExamplesofclosednetworksincludehighlyclassifiedmilitarynetworkssuchasthoseusedbyAustralia,particularlyrelevantformilitaryplannerswhenconsideringadversarycybersystems.

TheStuxnetcasestudyprovidesfourlearningpointsconcerningtheactofcyber-strike.First,avirustobeusedincyber-strikeneedstobesophisticatedandprecise.TheStuxnetcodewasintricateandcouldselectivelyattackveryspecificindustrialsystems.Apreciseviruscanonlybedevelopedthroughextensivecyber-reconnaissanceofthetargetsystempriortolaunchingtheattack.PrecisionvirusessuchasStuxnetsuggesttoplannersanabilitytoconducttargetedstrikesagainstenemyfacilitiesthatmaybemorereadilyavailableinthefuture.Alternatively,plannerscouldemployfocusedattacksagainstenemycommandandcontrolnodesoragainstotherelectronicsystemsthatmanagelogistics,fueloroperationsinsupportofothertraditionalmilitaryactions.

Second,Stuxnetwasassessedasrequiringsignificanttimetodesignandbuild.35Lead-timeindevelopmentisanimportantfactortoconsiderintheuseofcyberweapons,specificallyinrelationtoknowledgeofadversarycomputeranddefencesystems.Suchknowledgecomesnotonlyfromcyber-reconnaissancebutalsofromtraditionalintelligencecollectionandanalysis.

Athirdlessonisthataclosednetworkisneverreally‘closed’.Stuxnet’sabilitytostrikeaclosednetworkunderminedalong-heldassumptionthatclosednetworksweregenerallymoresecurethanopenonesconnectedtotheinternet.IneffectStuxnet,throughitsdesignandemployment,wasabletocircumventsomeofthephysicalsecuritybarriersputinplacetoprotectthetargetedsystems.Stuxnet’sdesignersexploitedthefactthateventuallyaclosedsystemhastobemanagedbyhumansandconnectedtoadevice(suchasalaptopcomputer)thathasmostlikelyhadcontactwiththeinternet.Despitesecurityproceduresinplace,evenhighlyclassifiedmilitarysystemsoftenexhibitsuchvulnerabilitiesandarethereforeopentoexploitation.36OnereactiontovirusessuchasStuxnetistosignificantlyrestrictandsecurethevulnerabilitiestheyexploited,limitingfutureuse.

TheUSmilitary,however,continuestoexperimentwithdevelopingameanstoreplicatevirusessuchasStuxnetthatoperatewithoutphysicalconnectionstotheclosedsystem.TheUSNavyisreportedlydevelopingairborneelectronicwarfare




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systemsthatwillbeableto‘fire’maliciouscodesintoclosedadversarynetworksfromupto200milesaway.37InasimilarfashiontheUSArmyisreportedlyexperimentingwithtechniquestoinsertandextractdatafromsealedorwirednetworksfromastand-offdistance.Suchtechnologyhasbeentermed‘electronicwarfare-enabledcyber’andattemptstotransmitcodeviaradiosignalsintotargetedcomputersystems.38ThepotentialforsuchweaponsystemstobeusedinfutureconflicttobuildonthecapabilitiesdemonstratedbyStuxnetandwiththecapacitytoenablestand-offdisruptiontoenemynetworksissignificant.Ineffect,Stuxnetderivativefutureweaponsarelikelytonegatespecificmodernphysicaldefensivesystemsandsecuritymeasures.

ThefinallearningpointobservedintheStuxnetcasestudyfocusesonthetimingofcyber-strike.Inmostcases,cyber-strikeweaponswillbea‘one-shot’capability.Giventhatmaliciouscodeorvirusesaredevelopedbasedonthetargetingofvulnerabilitiesinthesystem(eithervirtualorphysical),oncetheweaponisemployed,thesamevulnerabilitieswillberealisedandsecured,probablypreventingthecyberweapon’sfutureuse.Thiscontrastswiththeemploymentofmoretraditionalweaponsystemsthatoftenretaintheirutilitythroughoutacampaign.39Ofcourse,ifthecyber-strikeistimedforspecificeffects,onestrikemaybeallthatisrequired.Intheuseoftheseweapons,timinginemploymentiseverything.WeaponssuchasStuxnetorsimilarcapabilitiesasillustratedinOperationOrchardhavea‘silverbullet’capability—limitedinapplication,buthighlydevastatingagainsttherighttarget.Employmentofawarfightingtoolinthismannerwillrequirefocusedanalysisofadversaryreactionsandhighlevelsofsynchronisationwithotherwarfightingfunctions.

Thisbriefanalysisofrecentcasestudieshasprovidedstrongindicationsthatcyber-reconnaissance,cyber-isolationandcyber-strikewillemergeasfutureshapingtoolsforplanners.

Considerations for the planner in the use of future cyber tools

Cyber-reconnaissance

Decidingonwhethertoexploittheadvantagegainedthroughcyber-reconnaissanceisakeyconsiderationformilitaryplanners.Shouldtheknowledgesourcedthroughreconnaissancesupportthelaunchingofaspectacularsurpriseattack,orapre-emptivedisruptionofanopponent’scybersystem(s)?Orwillthelossofaccesstotheopponent’ssystemwiththeemploymentofcountermeasuresbetoocostlytofuturemilitaryplans?Militaryplannersmustdecideifandwhentostrikeandbe




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preparedtoacceptapotentiallossincapabilityoraccesstotheadversarycybersystem.Suchdecisionsshouldbebasedonstrategicguidancethatincludescalculationofrisk.Guidancethatinformsplannersshoulddeterminewhetheranoffensiveordefensivestrategyisrequired—eachofthesewillhavedifferentimplicationsforcyberwarfare.

Strategicoffenseshouldrapidlygainsurpriseandoverwhelmanadversary,butstrategicdefencemayaffordearlywarningthroughtheprovisionofintelligencegainedthroughanalysingtheeffectsofanadversaryattackonfriendlysystems.Ingeneralterms,retainingtheadvantagegeneratedbycyber-reconnaissancefavoursthestrategicdefence.Adefensivestrategygenerallyprovidesadecision-makerwiththeabilitytodetectanadversary’sactionsandrespondaccordingly,assumingthatsufficientintelligenceisavailable.Suchastrategyisparticularlyusefulduringthepreliminarystagesofconflict.Howevertheconductofoffensivecyberactionswithinadefensivestrategy,encapsulatedintheideaofacounter-attack,shouldbeakeycomponentofanystrategicdefensivestrategythatemployscyberspacecapabilities.

Theuseofotherintelligencedisciplines,maintenanceofstrictoperationalsecurityandappropriatecyberandphysicaldefensivesystemswillassistindeterminingwhentoemploycyber-reconnaissance.Assessingwhichoptiontoselectandwhetherariskisworthtakingbasedoncyber-reconnaissanceeffectsisabasiccostbenefitorintelligenceloss-gainequation.

Cyber-isolation

Followingadequatecyber-reconnaissance,isolationofanobjectivebyplannersmayalsobeanoperationalgoal.Thedecisiontoconductcyber-isolationcanbetakenfortacticalorstrategicreasons.Tacticallyisolatinganobjectivemayinvolvethelocaldisruptionofinternetaccessorspecificdenialofservicestocybersystemsforashortperiodoftime.Plannerscouldaskforspecificeffects,suchas‘turningthelightsoffinaparticularcityat0321hours’andspecialistscoulddesigncyberweaponstoachievesuchaneffect.Theactionsoftheadversaryinresponsetotheisolationcanhighlightothervulnerabilitiesthatplannersshouldanticipateandexploit.

Atthestrategicandoperationallevel,isolationislikelytoinvolvethestranglingofanarea,stateororganisationforalongerperiodoftime.Isolationcouldbefocusedonaffectingthenatureofacybersystem,butitismostlikelythatisolationwillbepartofasynchronisednationalpowercampaignwhichincludesothertraditional




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warfightingfunctions,diplomaticactivities,economicactionsandparticularlyinformationcapabilities.Conflictsinvolvinggraduatedescalationofforcetocoerceanopponentcouldusecyber-isolationtechniquessuchascyber-blockades,denialofservices,andnarrativemanipulation.

Cyber-isolationcouldalsobeusedeffectivelytodisruptadversaryalliances.Alliancescanenhancethestrengthofapotentialadversary,oftencreatingmultiplefrontsofconflict.Cyber-isolationemployedagainstoneallycoulddissuadeitfromparticipatinginafutureconflictorduringthepreliminarystagesofwar,thusreducingthenumberoffronts.Thisisparticularlyrelevantwheninternationalorregionalconsensusisrequiredtosupportaconflictorwhenasmalleradversaryrequirestheassistanceofalargerally.Cyber-isolationcouldfractureanalliancebygeneratinghigherthananticipatedcoststoapartnerthroughimpactoncommunication,economicorphysicalinfrastructures.

Isolationofanallycombinedwithdeceptionactionsthroughcybercouldalsoproveausefulcomponentinfuturecampaigns.Cyber-isolationcouldachievealevelofsurpriseintermsofstrategicattacktimingsandlocations.Inaddition,theconductofdeceptionand,importantly,measuringdeceptioneffects—oftenobservedthroughenemycommandandcontrolreactions—couldbesignificantlyenhancedwiththeuseofsynchronisedcyberoperations.

Cyber-strike

Cyber-strikeshouldbeemployedsparinglygiventhetimeittakestodevelopavirusthatisprecise,guidedandsophisticated.Insomecasesthecostofdevelopingandemployingacyber-strikeweaponmaynotbeworththeoutlayoftimeandresources.Inothercasescyber-reconnaissancemayrevealthattherearefewervulnerabilitiestoexploitusingcyberthanplannersanticipated.Adversarycounter-actioncapabilitiesandintentionsmustalsofactorinanydecisiontoemploycyber-strikeweapons,asshouldpotentialfollow-oneffects.

Significantriskassessmentisalsorequiredpriortocyber-strikeemployment,notunlikethatforkineticstrikeoperations.Riskassessmentisrequiredtojudgecollateraldamage,secondandthirdordereffectsandlikelyadversaryreactions.Cyber-strikecanandshouldbeemployedtoachieveinitialoffensiveadvantagetodisruptcommand,controlandintelligencesystemsduringtheopeningstagesofanoffensive,ortoconfuseandmisdirectanopponent’sreactionsaspartofadeceptionplan.Anadversary’scriticalinfrastructurecouldalsobetargetedusingcyber-striketodisruptessentialservicestociviliansanddenysupportingassetstomilitariesinconjunctionwithothermilitaryactions.




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Planners and specialists

Theemploymentofthethreecyber-shapingtoolsinamilitaryoperationwillprovideanedgeoverpotentialadversaries.Tomaximisetheseeffects,plannersandcyber-specialists,boththosedesigningandcraftingthecyberweaponsandtheirmanagers,needtomaintainconstantdialogue.Thisdialogueisvitaltoreachasharedunderstandingoftheproblemandlikelysolutions,andisbestachievedthroughthepresenceofcyberspecialistswithinplanningteamsanddeployedheadquarters.Guidedbythissharedunderstanding,cyberspecialistscanthenprovideoptimumsupporttoplannersandensurethattheyareinapositiontoleveragethemostfromwhatcyberspacecanofferthewarfighter.

Conclusion

Asmilitaryforcesacrosstheglobewrestlewiththeimpactofcyberspaceandavastlymoredigitallyconnectedbattlespace,plannersofthefuturewillrequireasoundunderstandingofcyberspaceandwhatitcanoffercommanderstosupportmilitarysuccess.Successforplannersattheoperationallevelwillinvolvethearticulationandexecutionofoperationsandcampaignsthatachievethegoalsandpoliticalobjectivessetforthem.Currentandfuturedevelopmentsincyberspaceofferplannersanumberoftoolstoassistinthecraftingofsuccessfuldesignsthroughshapingofthebattlespace.Thecyber-shapingtoolsdescribedinthisarticleprovideabroadapproachtomaximisingtheuniquecharacteristicsofcyberspace.Asfutureadversariescontinuetoexploremoretechnicalanddigitallyconnectedmeans,thedemonstratedcharacteristicsofcyberspaceoperationswillprovidemilitaryplannerswithuniquebattlespace-shapingtools,includingcyber-reconnaissance,isolationandstrikethatcansignificantlyenhancethefutureconductofwarfighting.




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THE AUTHOR

MajorNicholasRosehasservedinArmyandJointIntelligencepostingswithintheAustralianDefenceForce.HehasdeployedonarangeofdomesticandoverseasoperationswiththeADF.HeisagraduateoftheUSMarineCorpsCommandandStaffCollegeandUSMarineCorpsSchoolofAdvancedWarfighting.HeiscurrentlyaplansstaffofficerwithintheDeployableJointForceHeadquarters.

ENDNOTES1 Thisarticleisbasedonafuturewarpapersubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirements

forthedegreeofMasterofOperationalStudiesfromtheUSMarineCorpsSchoolofAdvancedWarfighting,andispublishedwithpermissionoftheUSMarineCorpsUniversity.

2 M.V.Hayden,‘TheFutureofThings“Cyber”’,Strategic Studies Quarterly,Vol.5,No.1,Spring2011,p.3.

3 UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,DepartmentofDefense,WashingtonDC,July2011,p.5.

4 UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,Joint Publication 1-02 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,DepartmentofDefense,WashingtonDC,15May2011,p.93.

5 UnitedStatesCyberCommand,Tri-fold Information Booklet Version 13,USDoDCybersecurityWebsite,October2010,at:http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/(accessed5January2013).

6 J.R.Clapper,‘WorldwideThreatAssessmentoftheUSIntelligenceCommunity,’Statement for the Record to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,12March2013,p.1.

7 USCyberCommandwasestablishedatfulloperatingcapabilityinOctober2010.UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,‘DefenseDepartmentCyberEfforts–MoreDetailedGuidanceNeededtoEnsureMilitaryServicesDevelopAppropriateCyberspaceCapabilities’,GAO-11-421 Report to Congressional Requesters,May2011,p.5;DefenceNews,‘Australiancybersecuritycentretobeestablished’,AustralianDefenceForceWebsite,24January2013at:http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/stories/2013/jan/0124.htm(accessed1August2013).

8 Onereasonforalackofclarityonthislineofdiscussionisthepaceofdevelopmentofthreatsandcountermeasuresincyberspace,coupledwiththehighlyclassifiedandsensitivenatureofoffensivecyberspacecapabilities.Author’sownassessmentbasedoninterviewswithUSCYBERCOMDpersonnel,November2012.

9 UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,p.5.

10 McAfee,‘GlobalEnergyCyberattacks:“NightDragon”’,White Paper,McAfeeFoundstoneProfessionalServicesandMcAfeeLabs,10February2011,p.4;NathanThornburgh,‘InvasionoftheChineseCyberspies’,Time Magazine,29August2005,pp.2–5,at:http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961-4,00.html(accessed1April2013).ThelaterarticlediscussesTITANRAINoperationsindetail,includingthequantityandtypeofinformationobtainedthroughcyber-espionage.

11 UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,Joint Publication 1-02,p.305.

ShapingtheFutureBattlespace:OffensiveCyberWarfareToolsforthePlanner

CONCEPTS

http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/

http://www.defence.gov.au/defencenews/stories/2013/jan/0124.htm

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961-4,00.html

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961-4,00.html


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12 B.Krekel,‘CapabilityofthePeople’sRepublicofChinatoConductCyberWarfareandComputerNetworkExploitation’,US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,NorthropGrummanCorporation,Mclean,VA,9October2009;M.Mandiant,‘TrendsReport:TheAdvancedPersistentThreat’(January2010),at:http://www.mandiant.com/(accessed20February2013).

13 P.Singer,‘TheFutureofNationalSecurity,BytheNumbers’,BrookingsInstitutearticle,May2011,at:http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/05/national-security-singer(accessed20February2013).

14 Mandiant,‘APT1–ExposingOneofChina’sCyberEspionageUnits’(February2013),at:http://www.mandiant.com/(accessed20February2013).SecurityanalysisofAPTreconnaissanceandattacksprovideamodelofthecyber-reconnaissanceandattack.Thismodelinmanyrespectsmirrorsthatofenduringnationalintelligencetargetingmodelsthataimtogainandmaintainaccesstoasourceofintelligence(author’sownassessment).

15 J.A.Lewis,‘Cybersecurity:AssessingtheImmediateThreattotheUnitedStates’,Statement before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee,CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,25May2011,p.1,at:http://csis.org/files/ts110525_lewis.pdf(accessed2December2012);JohnA.Tirpak,‘TheSyriaQuestion’,Air Force Magazine,Vol.96,No.3,March2013,p.30.

16 M.C.Libicki,‘CyberWarisNotaWarfightingDomain’,A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society,Vol.8,No.2,Fall2012,p.330.

17 R.DeibertandR.Rohozinski,‘TrackingGhostNet–InvestigatingaCyberEspionageNetwork’,Information Warfare Monitor,29March2009,p.4,at:http://infowar-monitor-net/ghostnet(accessed18January2013).

18 AbriefbutusefuloverviewonthebackgroundandemploymentofULTRAandotherAlliedsignalsintelligenceduringWorldWarIIisprovidedinJeffreyT.Richelson,A Century of Spies – Intelligence in the Twentieth Century,OxfordUniversityPress,UK,1995,pp.173–97.

19 H.C.Deutsch,‘TheInfluenceofULTRAonWorldWarII’,Parameters,JournalofUSArmyWarCollege,Vol.3,No.5,December1978,p.10.

20 M.Zappa,‘EnvisioningTechnologyfor2012andBeyond’,Infographic,EnvisionTechnology,25February2012,p.1.

21 P.Shakarian,‘The2008RussianCyberCampaignAgainstGeorgia’,Military Review,November-December2011,p.64.

22 J.BumgarnerandS.Borg,‘OverviewbytheUS-CCUoftheCyberCampaignagainstGeorgiainAugustof2008’,US Cyber Consequences Unit Special Report,WashingtonDC,August2009,pp.5–7.

23 R.M.Crowell,War in the Information Age: A Primer for Cyberspace Operations in 21st Century Warfare,NavalWarCollegeAcademicPaper,Newport,RI,2010,p.14.

24 D.Hollis,‘CyberwarCaseStudy:Georgia2008,’Small Wars Journal,6January2011,p.2.

25 Ibid.

26 D.Betz,‘”CyberWar”IsNotComing,’Infinity Journal,IssueNo.3,Summer2011,p.23.

27 H.M.Al-Rizzo,‘TheUndeclaredCyberspaceWarBetweenHezbollahandIsrael’,Contemporary Arab Affairs,Vol.1,No.3,July2008,p.400.

28 M.Zappa,‘EnvisioningTechnologyfor2012andBeyond’,p.1.

29 SubmarineCableMap2012,at:http://submarine-cable-map-2012.telegeography.com/(accessed28December2012);Franz-StefanGady,‘UnderseaCables:TheAchillesHeelofourEconomies’,Huffington Post,21December2010,at:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franzstefan-gady/undersea-cables-the-achil_b_799808.html(accessed30December2012).

http://www.mandiant.com/

http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/05/national-security-singer

http://csis.org/files/ts110525_lewis.pdf

http://infowar-monitor-net/ghostnet

http://submarine-cable-map-2012.telegeography.com/

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franzstefan-gady/undersea-cables-the-achil_b_799808.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franzstefan-gady/undersea-cables-the-achil_b_799808.html


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30 L.Mirani,‘ForgetabouttheCyberBunkerattack–here’showtotakeanentirecontinentoffline’,Quartz Online,28March2013,at:http://qz.com/68115/forget-about-the-cyberbunker-attack-heres-how-to-take-an-entire-continent-offline/(accessed3April2013);EgyptianNavyFacebookSite,at:https://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Navy(accessed3April2013).

31 TheStuxnetattackwasreportedlyknownasOperationOlympicGames.DavidE.Sanger,Confront and Conceal – Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power,RandomHouse,NewYork,NY,2012,p.188.

32 S.CollinsandS.McCombie,‘Stuxnet:theEmergenceofaNewCyberWeaponanditsImplications’,Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism,Vol.7,No.1,April2012,p.84.

33 Ibid.,p.86.

34 Ibid.,p.87.

35 Ibid.,p.86.

36 N.Shachtman,‘InsidersDoubt2008PentagonHackwasForeignSpyAttack’(updated),Wired MagazineDangerRoom,24August2010,at:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/insiders-doubt-2008-pentagon-hack-was-foreign-spy-attack/#more-29819(accessed25February2013).

37 D.A.Fulghum,‘USNavyWantstoFieldCyber-AttackSystem’,Military.com,31March2010,at:http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,212940,00.html(accessed3January2013).

38 Z.Fryer-Biggs,‘Cyberwar’sHolyGrail’,C4ISR Journal,January/February2013,pp.26–27.

39 Libicki,‘CyberWarisNotaWarfightingDomain’,p.331.

http://qz.com/68115/forget-about-the-cyberbunker-attack-heres-how-to-take-an-entire-continent-offline/

http://qz.com/68115/forget-about-the-cyberbunker-attack-heres-how-to-take-an-entire-continent-offline/

https://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Navy.I

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/insiders-doubt-2008-pentagon-hack-was-foreign-spy-attack/#more-29819



http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,212940,00.html


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CULTURE

TheValueofGenericCulturalTrainingMajorMatthewCarr

ABSTRACT

Militaryorganisationsstrugglewithdefiningculture,aproblemexacerbatedbythelackofagreementonwhenculturaltrainingshouldoccurandwhatitshouldconsistof.IntheAustralianArmyculturaltrainingistypicallydeliveredtopersonnelduringoperationalforcepreparation.Thispaperarguesthatculturalskillsneedtobedevelopedmuchearlier,preferableatpointsthroughoutasoldier’sentirecareer.Thispaperusestheseeminglyunrelatedissuesofmentalhealth,insiderthreatandgenderequalitytoarguefortherelevanceofongoinggenericculturaltraining.AfteroutliningtheArmy’scurrentculturaltrainingprocessthepaperexplainshowatailoredgenericculturaltrainingcanovercomeitsexistingshortfallsandbecomeaviabletrainingmethodology-ifplacedearlyinboththesoldierandofficertrainingcontinuum.GenericculturaltrainingcanthereforeaddressanumberofkeyissuesfacingthearmyaswellasenhancingtheArmy’sabilitytoadaptacrossabroadspectrumofoperations.


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The more one is capable of experiencing new and different dimensions of human diversity, the more one learns of oneself. Such learning takes place when a person transcends the boundaries of ego, culture and thinking.1

PeterS.Adler,1975

Introduction

TheAustralianArmy’sexperienceinIraqandAfghanistanhasclearlyshownthatalackofculturalunderstandingcanhavetacticalandstrategiceffects.Onetragicexampleoccurredon30August2012whenAustraliansoldierswerekilledbyamemberoftheAfghanNationalArmy—aresultofculturalinsensitivityratherthandirectenemyaction.2Closertohome,inappropriatebehaviourandsexualharassmentincidentshaveseentheArmy’sorganisationalculturesubjectedtointensescrutiny.3Whiletheseinstancesaresignificantlydifferent—theformeratacticalfailureandthelatteraninternalorganisationalproblem—theybothshareacommonthreadofculturalrelevance.Thisraisesthequestionofwhethersomeformofgenericculturaltrainingcouldprovideamechanismforaddressingbothtacticalandstrategicobjectives.

Armyhasboththemeansandtheopportunitytoimprovethewayitdeliversitsculturaltraining.Suchanimprovementwouldnotonlyreducetheriskofcultural‘incidents’atboththetacticalandstrategiclevel,butalsoincreasethecapacityforitspeopletounderstandanddealwithchange.Thisarticlewillarguethatamoreeffective‘generic’cross-culturalpackagecanbetailoredtomeettheneedsuniquetoArmythanthatpresentedbythecurrentculturaltrainingregime.Suchtraining,however,willneedtobeanelementofthegeneralsoldier/officertrainingcontinuumasopposedtothemission-specificforcepreparationcyclewhereitcurrentlyresides.

ThereisnodenyingthatculturaltrainingisimportanttoArmyinboththeoperationalandorganisationalenvironment.Howeverthistrainingcanbesignificantlyimproved.ThisarticlewillbeginbyexaminingArmy’scurrentculturaltrainingpracticesandthestrengthsandweaknessesofthisapproach.Second,theostensiblyunrelatedtopicsofinsiderthreat,mentalhealthandgenderrelationshipswillbeexplored.Commonculturallinkswillbeexposedthathighlighttheapplicabilityofgenericculturaltrainingasatrainingconcept.Finally,arecommendedpathwayforwardwillbeproposed.Forthepurposesofthisarticle,genericculturaltrainingisdefinedastheprocessofenhancingpersonalself-awarenessandinterpersonalrelationshipskills

TheValueofGenericCulturalTrainingCULTURE


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TheValueofGenericCulturalTrainingCULTURE

byusingcultureasafocalpointofdifference.Withinthisdefinition,culturaltrainingbecomeslessaboutthespecificcultureofaregionorethnicity,andmoreaboutculturaleffectsontheindividual.

Understanding Army’s current cultural training

TheArmy’scurrentdeliveryofculturaltrainingisconcentratedinthemission-specificforcepreparationphase.Forcepreparationisfocusedonpreparingpersonnel(eitherasteamsorindividuals)forthespecificoperationforwhichtheyaredeployingandtypicallylastsbetweenoneandthreeweeks.PriortoforcepreparationitisassumedthatfoundationmilitaryskillshavealreadybeendeliveredthroughtheArmy’sgenerictrainingcontinuum.Asthereisnosystematicculturaltrainingdeliveredwithinthegenerictrainingcontinuum,theculturaltrainingdeliveredduringforcepreparationoftenrepresentsthefirstoccasiononwhichpersonnelareexposedtothisareaandthusthetrainingattemptstocoverabroadrangeofculturaltopics(forexample,history,religion,language,dressandbehaviour,attitudesandbeliefs,greetingsandlifestyle).AsthereisnoidentifiedunitwithintheADFthatistherepositoryofculturalexpertiseortrainingcapacity,thesetopicsaregenerallydeliveredbyculturalexpertssourcedfromoutsidethemilitaryorganisation.

Theculturaltrainingpackagecurrentlydeliveredbycontractorsisbasedontwomethodologiesdrawnfromtheculturaltrainingsector:Hofstede’s‘DimensionsofCulturalDifference’(alsomentionedintheArmy’sleadershippamphlet),andCulturalIntelligence(CQ).4Hofstede’s‘DimensionsofCulturalDifference’wasdevelopedfollowingresearchinvolvingover100,000IBMemployeesfromover70countriesinthe1970s.5Hofstede’sdimensionscomprise:individualismversuscollectivism;powerdistance;uncertaintyavoidance;masculinityversusfemininity;andlong-termversusshort-termorientation.Thestrengthofthisframeworkliesinthedepthofcross-countrycomparisonthathasbeenappliedtoitand,suchisitsappeal,thatotherculturaltrainingexpertssuchasAndyMolinskyhavesinceemulatedthisdimensionalapproach.6Understandingculturaldimensionsassistspersonneltomapdifferencesinbehaviourandattitudeswithotherculturesacrossabasic‘likeorunlike’comparison.Critically,however,Hofstede’sresearchfocusesonaninternationalITcompany(IBM)andthusdoesnotappropriatelyrepresentattitudesandbehavioursuniquetothecurrentAustralianArmy.Forexample,thedimensionofpowerdistancewithintheArmyissignificantlydifferenttothatofmainstreamAustraliansocietyandmayneedstrongerfocus.Further,theapplicationofthesedimensionsistime-sensitive.Forexample,the


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CULTURE TheValueofGenericCulturalTraining

dimensionofmasculinityversusfemininityfailstoacknowledgetheconsiderableculturalshiftsintermsofgenderrelationshipsthathaveoccurredrecentlyandwhichwillbefurtherdiscussedbelow.

Thesecondmethodology—culturalintelligence(CQ)—promotestheapplicationofmotivationalandbehaviouraltrainingtoaknowledge-basedcurriculum.Inrecentyears,CQhasreceivedsignificantresearchattentionformilitaryapplicationasitprogressesfromknowledgethroughtomotivationalandbehaviouraltraining.7UsingtheCQmodelpresentstwochallengesforArmy.First,effectivelyincorporatingCQintotrainingisacomplexandtime-consumingprocess.Researchersnotethatcross-culturalskillscannotbedevelopedovernightorinshortpre-deploymenttrainingcourses.8CreatingtimeforeffectiveculturaltrainingbecomesproblematicwhencompetingwithotherprioritiesoutlinedinconceptssuchastheArmy’sAdaptiveCampaigningplan.9Culturalcompetencebecomesjustanothertopicunderthehumandimensionchapteralongwithhumanterrainanalysis;physical,psychologicalandnutritioncomponents;complexdecision-makingandhumannetworking.Incorporatingthesetopicsintotrainingbecomesdifficultwhensoldiersarerequiredtomaintainamultitudeofspecialisedwarfightingskillsinordertoachieveeffectivenessandsurvivabilityonoperations.TherealityoflimitedtimeandtrainingresourceshasbecomeasignificantinfluencethatwouldmostlikelyprecludethedeliveryofCQwithoutafocusedpriority.LikeHofstede’sframework,CQalsolacksconcentratedattentiontoandunderstandingofArmy’suniqueneeds.

Inanattempttodelivera‘best-practice’culturalframeworkdesignedformilitaryrequirements,theMultinationalInteroperabilityCouncilconvenedaconceptdevelopmentandexperimentationworkinggroupintocrosscultural-training.Theresultwasanapproachtitled‘CrossCulturalAwarenessandCompetence(CCAC)’.10CCACisacombinationofvariousapproachesadoptedbycoalitionforcesincludingtheUnitedStates(US),UnitedKingdom(UK),Germany,France,CanadaandAustralia.TheframeworkisconsistentwiththeAustralianArmy’sPlanningGuidanceforCulturalTraininginadvocatingtheprovisionofgenericculturaltrainingfollowedbyspecificcultureandlanguagetraining.11BoththeplanningguidanceandtheCCAC,however,failtoprovideanyfurtherdetailconcerningwhattoincludewithineitherthegenericorspecifictrainingphases.


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TheAustralianArmy’sPlanningGuidanceforCulturalTraining,however,providesaworkingdefinitionforcross-culturaltraining:

The capacity for active study and understanding of human and cultural influences affecting all decision-making and actions in the operating environment, in order to optimise one’s own decision superiority through empathy. These factors include: behavioural considerations and drivers; power and influence sources; government, political and social grouping structures; tribal/ethnic dispositions; and spiritual, economic and geo-social factors.12

WhilethisdefinitionprovidesscopetoallowArmytoconfigurethevariousdimensionsofcultureintheoperatingenvironment,itfailstoacknowledgetwoimportantconsiderations.Thefirstoftheseistheinfluenceofone’sowncultureonthebehaviouralanddecision-makingprocess.Anthropologistsandlinguistsalikeagreethatculturalinfluencesactmoreasa‘lens’thattheobserverusestoviewtheworldratherthanthebehaviourofforeigners.13Agarexplainsthattheunderstandingofcultureisatranslationofdifferentpracticesthatisrelationaltotheaudienceexperiencingthedifference,aviewthatissupportedbythelinguistspecialistDeutscher.14InanydeliveryofculturaltraininginArmy,establishingidentityandself-awarenesswithinsoldiersandofficersisanimportantfirststeptotryingtoexplainthecultureofanothergroupofpeople.Second,thedefinitionfailstoacknowledgethenumerousandcompetingcultures(eachofthemuniqueandcomplex)influencingtheoperatingenvironmentatanygiventime.Thediscoursesurrounding‘humansecurity’andinternationalrelationsidentifiesthatagrowingfactorinthecomplexityofhumanitarianinterventionistherequirementforholisticapproachestopeaceenforcement/keeping.15Thisresultsinanincreasedlevelofinvolvementbythesovereignstate,foreignstateandNGOorganisationseachwithcompetingmotivationsandoperatingprocesses,allofwhicharecommunicatedthroughuniqueculturalpractices.Itissimplyimpracticaltodeliverculturaltrainingthatfocusesonallofthesevariousfactions.

LackingfromboththeArmy’splanningguidanceandtheCACCisdetailregardingatwhichpointinthesoldier/officertrainingcontinuumthepackageshouldbedelivered.Thisisimportantasliteraturecriticalofculturaltrainingmodelsquestionstheplausibilityofshort-termtrainingconsistentwiththeArmy’sforcepreparationcourseswhichdevoteonlyasmallportionoftimetogenericandspecificculturaltraining.16Abbearguesconvincinglythattrainingthatexpectspersonneltoabsorbculturalunderstandingtoolsinashorttime-frameandthenapplythemacrossabroadrangeofcross-culturalsituationsisunrealistic.Theproblembecomescompounded


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giventhephysicalandmentalstressexperiencedwhileonoperations.Inordertobeeffective,anyculturaltrainingpackagewillrequirelong-term,gradualandprogressiveimplementationoutsidetheforcepreparationphase.17

IfculturaltrainingistobeeffectivelyutilisedbyArmy,itneedstobetailoredtofocusonanAustralianArmyaudience.Inaddition,trainingoutcomesmustbesynchronisedwiththechallengesfacedbytheorganisation.Thiswillallowpersonneltoabsorbthesenewskillsintotheirpersonalattitudesandbeliefs.

Tailoring cultural training to Army’s needs

Aneffectiveculturaltrainingpackagewillneedtofocusonself-awarenessasmuchasonthehumandifferencesfacedonoperations.ThisrequirementforinternalculturalreflectionisidentifiedintheADF’sculturalchangepolicy:

We cannot be entirely satisfied with all aspects of our current culture; there are parts that serve us poorly, limit our performance, hurt our people and damage our reputation.18

ThustheADFimplicitlyacknowledgesthat,aswellastherequirementforculturalunderstandingwithintheoperatingenvironment,culturalself-awarenessisalsoanecessity.

Culturaltrainingmodelscommonlyregardinterpersonalconflictasameasureoffailure.19Insimpletermsthismeansthatifsoldiersandofficersareunabletostrikearapportwithhostnationalsthentheyareculturallyincompetent.Militarypersonnelareregularlyplacedinhighlystressful,conflict/disastersituationsinwhichacceptanceand/orpopularitymaynotbepossible.AneffectivegenericculturaltrainingpackageforArmywillneedtofacilitatecross-culturalcommunicationduringdeploymentwhilealsomeetingthechallengesoforganisationalchange.InordertonavigatethesechallengesandproduceaneffectiveculturaltrainingcapabilitywithinArmy,atailoredtrainingpackageneedstobedevelopedthatcatersforthesecomplexitiesandbalancespracticalindividualskillswithdesirableoutcomesfortheorganisation.

Inreality,allmilitarycultureencouragesethnocentricbehaviouroratendencytoviewone’sowncultureassuperior.20TheArmy,aspartoftheAustralianDefenceForce(ADF)identifiesitselfashavingastrongemphasisonteamcohesion,loyaltytotheservice,competitiveness,prideanddiscipline/behaviouralstandardswellabovethoseofthecivilianpopulation.21Thisviewofmilitarycultureasdistinctfrommainstreamsocietyhasbeenexplainedasaconsequenceoftheenforcement


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ofhierarchy,inequalityandconformity,andtheproductionofthemilitary’sowndistinctlanguagepracticesor‘jargon’.22CulturallydefiningtheArmyiscomplicatedbythefactthattheorganisationisnothomogenous.Instead,itconsistsofmanyuniqueandidentifiablesub-culturesthatmayhaveastrongorweakinfluenceontheindividualdependingontrade,rank,experience,education,genderortraining.Culturalidentityintheworkplaceisinfluencedbyanumberofdifferentdimensionsthatarepresentedandreinforcedthroughthebehaviourandbeliefsofitspersonnel.Groupculturehasbeenproventobecomestrongerandmoretight-knitwhenthegroupissubjecttosufferingandhardship.WithintheArmycontextthisisoftendevelopedthroughcollectivemilitarytrainingandoperationalexperiences.23Whileethnocentricitycanbebeneficialtoamilitarywhendevelopingteamcohesionandloyalty,itcanrestrictpeople’sabilitytoobjectivelyviewculturalbehavioursandbeliefsthataredifferenttotheirownandcanoftenleadtoresentment.24CulturaltrainingfortheArmythusneedstobebasedonthisrealityandtailoredtoaddressparticularethnocentricchallengesthataredetrimentaltotheorganisation.25

Mental health

Armypersonnelunabletorationaliseculturalbehavioursorviewsinconsistentwiththeirownoftenbecomemoresusceptibletoadversementalhealthconditions.Whilepost-traumaticstress(PTS)hastraditionallybeenassociatedwithexposuretoacutetraumaticorstressfulexperiences,recentresearchhasassociateditwiththechroniceffectsofongoingexposuretostressfulandviolentsituationsexperiencedbypersonneldeployedtoconflictzones.26Researchfocusingonthechroniceffectsofongoingexposuretostressfulandviolentsituationshastermedthisconceptinthemilitarycontext‘moralinjury’.27Moralinjurycanotherwisebeexplainedasanindividual’sinabilitytosuccessfullyassimilatemorallychallengingexperiencesintopersonalself-knowledgeandworldview.28Astudyof‘sufferinginjustice’promotesthisconceptofmoralinjurybypresentingmentalhealthasculturallyinfluenced.Theculturallinkestablishedinsuchstudiesisachievedbyconnectinganindividual’ssenseofwhatisnormaltowhatthatindividualisthenexposedtoonoperations.29Thesocialnetworkandexperiencesthatconstructanindividual’sworldviewcreateabase-lineofnormalcythatissignificantlychallengedbytheoperationalenvironment.Withouttheappropriatementalresiliencepreparationpriortotheshockofdeployingonoperations,theleapbetweenwhatisnewandwhatwasnormalmaybetoogreattoallowsomeindividualstoadjust.

WhiletheArmyandmainstreamsocietycanbeidentifiedasculturallydifferent,theyarealsointricatelylinked.ArmypersonnelaredrawnfromandlivewithinAustraliansociety.PracticesandbehaviourwithintheArmyarejudgedand



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shapedbypublicperception.Whenpersonnelaredeployedoverseasintoconflictanddisastersituationstheyareexposedtoviolence,death,stressandsufferingthatisinconsistentwithAustraliansociety’sworldview.OngoingexposuretoexperiencesoutsidetheAustralianculturalnormbecomesatraumaticeventthatcanbedamagingtoasoldier’smentalhealth.Insum,whenasoldier’sworldviewisconstructedwithinaparticularculture(Australia)andisreinforcedandstrengthenedthroughanethnocentricorganisation(Army),exposuretodifferentculturalpracticesandextremeviolentbehaviourthroughoperationaldeploymentbecomesatraumaticevent.Giventhisrationale,thedevelopmentofPTS/moralinjurycanbeexplainedthroughthe‘cultureshock’thatoccurswhenasoldier’smindhasnotbeenpreparedtorationalisewhatisdifferent.30

Insider threat

Symptomsconsistentwithcultureshockincludefrustration,angeranddistrustofoutsiders.31Whendeployedoverseasonoperationssuchasacounterinsurgency,these‘outsiders’quicklycometoincludethelocalorforeignnationalswhoareworkingwithoralongsideAustralianforces.CoalitionforcesinAfghanistanhavebeensubjectedtorepeatedincidentsofinsiderattackswhichhavenotbeenrestrictedtotheadversaryforce.IncertainreportedcasescoalitionsoldiershavebeenshotatbyAfghanpersonnelwhowereattemptingtoregain‘face’afterbeingoffended.32Thebreakdownincommunicationthatcanleadtoinsiderthreathasbeendescribedastheextremeoutcomeofculturalgapsorflashpoints—pointsatwhichtwodifferentculturescollidethroughconflictingbeliefsorpractices.33AccordingtoHofstede’sDimensionsofCulturalDifferences,Australianspreferdirectcommunication.ToAustraliansthereisnothingwrongwithoneindividualaddressinganotherdirectlywhenexpressingdissatisfactionortryingtoresolveconflict.Incontrast,theAfghanmethodofcommunicationismorepassiveandindirect,with‘face’andpublicimageconsideredveryimportant.34NegativepublicfeedbackbyanAustralianmentorcancauseanAfghantofeeldishonourandshameperhapseventriggeringaviolentreactionatalaterpointasretribution.Theviolentventingoffrustrationoftenexperiencedbymilitarypersonnelpossiblygeneratedthroughalackofculturalunderstandingshouldnotberegardedasathreatpresentedonlybyhostnationals.InMarch2012,aUSsergeantkilled16Afghanciviliansaftersufferingamentalbreakdown.35Thisincidenthighlightsthefactthatbothmentalhealthandinsiderthreatchallengescanoccurwithinanymilitaryorganisation,regardlessofnationality.



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Gender

WithintheArmyorganisation,certainculturalattitudescanpreventpersonnelcopingwithchange.ThedimensionsandcharacteristicsofArmy’sculturecreateadistinct‘usversusthem’competitivementalitythatstrugglestoembracedifferenceparticularlyamongpeople.36ThedimensionsofdifferencedescribedbyVodjikincluderace,religionandsexualityandareapparentincertainincidentsthathaveoccurredrecentlywithinArmy.37In2011,womencomprised14.5%oftheADF,signallinggenderasanobviouspointofdifference.38Understandinggenderasadimensionofculturaldifferenceacknowledgesthatwomenandotherminoritygroupssuchashomosexuals,ethnicandreligiousminorities,struggletogainacceptanceinmilitaryorganisations.AstudybyBelkinandEvansrevealedthat,withintheUSmilitary,womenhavebecometheprimarytargetofdiscrimination,allowingracialissueswithAfrican-Americanmentosubside.39Thisobservationraisesanimportantquestion:whydofemalesinthemilitaryfindithardertogainacceptancethanmenofethnicorreligiousdifference?Answeringthisquestionisbeyondthescopeofthispaper,butitisworthyoffurtherinvestigationinthedevelopmentofArmy’sgenderequalitypolicy.

GenderasaninfluencingdimensionofArmycultureisestablishedwithinindividualswellbeforerecruitmentintothemilitary.Gender-typingisatermthathasbeenusedtoexplainthesocietalprocessofconditioningpeoplefromchildhoodtoacceptandperformcertaingender-specificroles.40Thebeliefsconstructedduringchildhoodofwhatareacceptablemasculineandfeminineprofessionsreflectedthroughboys’andgirls’toysarereinforcedwithintheethnocentricconfinesofthemilitary.Thepresentationoftoysoldiersasgenderedmaleisanexampleofsuchgender-typing.Indeedamongmostnationalities,soldieringistraditionallyseenasamale-orientedroleandthishasbeenisreinforcedthroughgender-typingfromanearlyage.

In2012,theMinisterforDefenceannouncedtheremovalofexistinggenderrestrictionsfromcombatroles.41WhilethisannouncementisrepresentativeofongoingculturalchangeoccurringwithintheADF,andtheremovalofgenderdiscriminationhascertainlyoccurredatthepolicylevel,theleadauthorofthereviewintowomenintheADFstatedonthedocument’sreleasethat:‘Ouroverallfindingisthat,despiteprogressoverthelasttwodecades,Iamnotconfidentthat,inallthevariedworkplacesthatcomprisetheADFtoday,womancanandwillflourish.’42ErodinggenderconditioninginsocietyandintheArmywillrequireconcentratedandongoingculturalawarenessandbehaviouraltrainingthatwillneedtobeimplementedattheearlieststagesofamilitarycareer.



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A new pathway to Army’s cultural training

Thedifferencebetweengenericculturaltrainingandspecificculturaltrainingissignificant.Molinskyexplainsthisasthedifferencebetweenknowingacultureandknowingaboutculture.43Studiesintoeffectivecross-culturaltrainingformilitaryorganisationshavecontinuedtoidentifythedistinctionbetweenthetwo.44Thebenefitsofgenericculturaltrainingincludeitsabilitytocovercertainpsychological,anthropologicalandcommunicationsubjectsthatbenefitbothpersonnelandtheorganisationwithoutbeinglimitedtoanyoneparticularculture.45JaneBoucheridentifiesfivekeybarrierstocommunication:culturalbiases,lackofawarenessofculturaldifferences,languagedifferences,ethnocentrismandinactivelistening.46Ofthefive,twocanbelinkedtospecificculturaltraining(lackofawarenessofculturaldifferenceandlanguagedifferences),whiletheremainingthreearelinkedtogenericculturaltraining.Genericculturaltrainingistheprimarymechanismforpromotingself-awareness,interpersonalrelationshipsandeffectivecommunicationwithbroadapplicabilitytoarangeofsituationsandenvironments.

TheframeworkforthedeliveryofculturaltrainingneedstoaddressthoserequirementsuniquetotheArmycontext.Beyondaddressingthosetopicsdiscussedinthefirstpartofthisarticle,Army’sculturaltrainingalsoneedstobesufficientlyflexibletoaccommodateacomplexworkingenvironmentthatincludesmultipleregions,variouscombatantsandallies,and‘wholeofgovernment’taskforcesrequiringinteragencycooperation.In1999,AustralialedtheUnitedNations-(UN)mandatedsecurityforceintoEastTimor(INTERFET)thatultimatelyinvolvedatotalof22nations.47TheUNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsreportsthatcurrentlyeightofthetop20troopcontributionsmadetoUNpeaceoperationsarefromAfricannationsandfivearefromtheIndiansub-continent.48ThemultinationalcharacterofUNoperationsdrivestherequirementforArmytofocusondevelopinggenericcross-culturalskillsinitssoldierswellinadvanceofanyculture-specificorlanguagetraining.Inthefuture,thegreatestchallengetoArmywillbeitsabilitytointeract,communicateandoperateeffectivelywithabroadspectrumofstakeholdersratherthananyoneparticularnationality.

Withthesefactorsinmind,whatArmy’scurrentculturaltrainingregimerequiresisnotsomuchanoverhaulasatargetedmodificationandaplanforitsearlierinception(priortotheforcepreparationphase).BoththeHofstedeandCQmethodologiespromoteafocusongenericculturaltrainingasopposedtoconcentratingonaspecificregion’scultureorlanguage.HoweverneitherhasbeentailoredtosuitArmy’sspecificrequirementsintermsofprioritisingdimensions



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tobecovered.TheemploymentofadimensionalconceptentailsdecidingwhatcomponentsofArmyculturearebestsuitedtoaccurateself-analysis.Throughthisself-analysisabenchmarkcanbesettoactasthebasisforcomparisonwithothercultures(findingsimilaritiesanddifferences).Inadditiontounderstandinghowculturewillaffectinterpersonalcommunicationandworkingrelations,dimensionalculturaltrainingcanalsoassistindividualsinunderstandingtheirowndecision-makingprocess.

Asidentifiedabove,aneducativeprocessaloneisinsufficientwithouttheopportunityforindividualsto‘testandadjust’thisknowledgeintheirownworldviewandtheworkingenvironment.Aneffectivegenericculturaltrainingpackagewouldbebestplacedprogressivelythroughouttheprofessionaltrainingcontinuum.TrainingcentressuchasKapooka,theAustralianDefenceForceAcademyandDuntroonarewellsituatedtodeliverintroductoryculturaltrainingwithafocusonpromotingawarenessofthoseculturaldimensionsprominentinArmylife.Promotioncoursesoradedicatedculturalcompetencecoursecouldthenbeutilisedtostrengthentheculturalknowledgebaseofindividualsofallranksandspecialties.Ultimately,thisnewpathwaytocreatingaculturallycompetentArmyrequirestheremovalofgenericculturaltrainingfromtheforcepreparationphaseanditsincorporationinthegeneraltrainingcontinuum.

Conclusion

Themilitaryapplicationofculturalskillsisnotanewconcept.CommentatorssuchasDavidKilcullenadvocatetheimportanceofculturaltrainingforthosewhoaretobedeployedtonationsdrivenbyaninherentpoliticalstruggleandwherethesupportofthelocalpopulationbecomesameasureofsuccessduringinsurgency-relatedconflicts.49

Uncertaintyinplanningforfutureoperationsmeansthatspecificculturaltrainingcanonlyoccuronceoperationalplanninghascommenced,andthistrainingwillneedtobelocatedwithintheforcepreparationphase.GenericculturaltrainingcanprepareArmypersonneltoworkwithothernationalitiesandorganisationsevenbeforeitiscleartowhichoperationalenvironmenttheArmywilldeploy.Further,genericculturaltraininghasbeendemonstratedtohaveapplicationinfacilitatingstrategicandorganisationalchangethatwillnaturallyoccurwithsocietalchangessuchasremovinggenderrestrictionsincombatroles.50Tailoredculturaltrainingwithanemphasisongenericculturalskillscanprovideanavenueforbuildingmentalresilience,expectationmanagementandcross-culturalcommunicationskillsthatcanthenbeappliedtospecificobjectivessuchasthereductionofinsiderthreatcasualtiesandtheimprovedmentalhealthofpersonnel.



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TheArmy’srequirementforculturaltrainingisuniqueinthatabalanceneedstobeachievedbetweenpreparationtodeployatshortnoticeandunderthreatofviolence,andcooperationininternationalandinter-organisationalsettings.ContinuedorganisationalandsocietalchangealsodemandsthatArmy’speoplearetrainedtounderstandtheeffectsofculturalinfluencesontheirpersonalthoughts,opinionsandbehaviour.Thisnecessitatespracticalstepstodevelopanindividual’smentalresilienceandabilitytoaccommodatechange.ThetwomodelscurrentlyusedwithintheArmy’sculturaltrainingpackageareflawed:theyprovidealimitedframeworkforculturalunderstandingandneitherspecificallyaddressestheArmy’suniqueneeds.GenericculturaltrainingdeliveredprogressivelythroughoutamilitarycareerwouldprovideamoreefficientandeffectivemechanismforArmytoattainmaximumadaptabilityandachieveitsculturalchangegoals.



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THE AUTHOR

MajorMatthewCarrenteredtheAustralianArmyin1996whenhewasacceptedintotheAustralianDefenceForceAcademy.AftercompletinghisstudiesattheRoyalMilitaryCollege,Duntroon,hewasallocatedtotheRoyalAustralianArmouredCorpsandpostedtothe2ndCavalryRegiment.FollowonpostingsincludeRecruitPlatoonLeader(ArmyRecruitTrainingCentre),TacticalAssaultGroupLiaisonOfficer(JointOperationsSupportSection–NSW),StaffOfficerCoordinationandPersonnel(HeadquartersJointOperationsCommand)andOfficerinCommandofForcePreparationCompany(39PersonnelSupportBattalion).In2007MajorCarrdeployedonoperationsastheStaffOfficertotheCommanderofJointTaskForce633inIraq/Afghanistan.Uponcompletionofhissub-unitcommandtimeat39PSBin2012,MajorCarrwasawardedtheChiefofArmyScholarshiptocommenceafull-timeMastersdegreeinAppliedAnthropologyandParticipatoryDevelopment.TheintentbehindthisresearchwastofurtherdevelopcrossculturalknowledgeandtrainingskillsfortheAustralianArmy.

ENDNOTES1 P.Adler,‘TheTransitionalExperience:AnAlternativeViewofCultureShock’,Journal of

Humanistic Psychology,15(4),1975,pp.13-24.

2 M.DoddandB.Nicholson,‘FiveAustraliansoldiersdieona“Terribleday”inAfghanistan’,The Australian,30August2012.

3 M.Dodd,‘ArmychiefbacksMinisteronacademy’s“abhorrent”sexfilmscandal’,The Australian,15April2011;P.LionandJ.Marszalek,‘Angeranddisgustatarmysexscandalas“Jedicouncil”emerges’,News Limited Network,14June2013.

4 LWD0-2,Leadership,LandWarfareDevelopmentCentre,Puckapunyal,2002.

5 GeertHofstedeandGertJanHofstede,Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (revisedandexpanded2nded.),McGraw-Hill,NewYork,2005.

6 A.Molinsky,Global Dexterity,HarvardBusinessReviewPress,2013.

7 KokYeeNgandR.Ramaya,‘CulturalIntelligence:ItsPotentialforMilitaryLeadershipDevelopment’,47th Annual Conference,InternationalMilitaryTestingAssociation,2005,http://www.internationalmta.org/Documents/2005/2005033P.pdf;K.S.GrovesandA.E.Feyerherm,‘LeaderCulturalIntelligenceinContextTestingtheModerateEffectsofTeamCulturalDiversityonLeaderandTeamPerformance’,Group & Organisational Management,36(5),2011,pp.535–66.

8 Ibid.

9 ‘LearningforAdaptiveCampaigning:ATrainingNeedsAnalysis’,HQFORCOMD,October2010.

10 Cross Cultural Awareness and Competence: A Guide to Best Practices,MultinationalInteroperabilityCouncil,2011.


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11 Planning Guidance for Development of a Cultural Understanding Capability in the Australian Army,19November2007.

12 Ibid.

13 G.Deutscher,Through the Language Glass,ScientificAmerican,2010;M.Agar,‘Culture:Canyoutakeitanywhere?’,International Journal of Qualitative Methods,5(2),June2006.

14 Agar,‘Culture:Canyoutakeitanywhere?’

15 N.ThomasandT.William,‘TheUtilityofHumanSecurity:SovereignandHumanitarianIntervention’,Security Dialogue,33(2),2002,pp.177–92.

16 M.Blasco,L.E.FeldtandM.Jakobsen,‘IfOnlyCulturalChameleonsCouldFlyToo:ACriticalDiscussionoftheConceptofCulturalIntelligence’,International Journal of Cross Cultural Management,12(1),2012.

17 A.Abbe,Building Cultural Capability for Full-Spectrum Operations,UnitedStatesArmyResearchInstitutefortheBehaviouralandSocialSciences,January2008;R.A.Crooks,Cultivating a Cross-Cultural Disposition,USArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,FortLeavenworth,2007.

18 TheDefenceCommittee,Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture,DepartmentofDefence(ADF),2012.

19 Blascoetal.,‘IfOnlyCulturalChameleonsCouldFlyToo’,p.234.

20 W.G.Sumner,Folkways,Ginn,NewYork,1906.

21 Defence,Pathway to Change.

22 D.Halbe,‘LanguageintheMilitaryWorkplace–BetweenHierarchyandPoliteness’,Text & Talk: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language, Discourse and Communication Studies,31(3),1988,pp.315–34;A.Jaffe,‘SalutinginSocialContext’,The Journal of Applied Behavioural Sciences,24(3),pp.263–75.

23 M.Weber,The Methodology of the Social Sciences,translatedandeditedbyEdwardA.ShilsandHenryA.Finch,FreePress,1949.

24 Molinsky,Global Dexterity.

25 S.Russell-Farnham,‘EmpathyasaCombatCapability’,Security Challenges,5(1),2009,pp.1–13.

26 S.JosephandA.P.Linley,‘PositivePsychologicalPerspectivesonPost-traumaticStress:AnIntegrativePsychosocialFramework’,Trauma, Recovery, and Growth: Positive psychological perspectives on posttraumatic stress,JohnWiley&Sons,2008,pp.3–20

27 B.T.Litzetal.,‘MoralInjuryandMoralRepairinWarVeterans:APreliminaryModelandInterventionStrategy’,Clinical Psychology Review,29,2009,pp.695–706.

28 Ibid.,p.696.

29 J.M.Bernstein,‘SufferingInjustice:MisrecognitionasMoralInjuryinCriticalTheory’,International Journal of Philosophical Studies,13(3),2006,pp.303–24.

30 P.S.Adler,‘TheTransitionalExperience:AnAlternateViewofCultureShock’,Journal of Humanistic Psychology,15,1975,pp.13–23.

31 Working Amongst Different Cultures,OperationalHandbook,CommonwealthofAustralia,2011.

32 HeadquartersAlliedJointForceCommand,Insider Threat Mitigation Techniques Vignettes,Brunssum,8November2012.

33 Agar,‘Culture:CanyoutakeitAnywhere?’.



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34 G.Hofstede,‘DimensionsofCulturalDifferences’inD.L.NelsonandJ.Quick,Organisational Behaviour(3rded.),South-WesternThompsonLearning,2000.

35 B.StebnerandT.Durante,‘TalibanvowsrevengeafterUSSergeantonSEALteam“shootsdeadninesleepingAfghanchildrenbeforeburningtheirbodies”indeadlyrampagethatkills16’,Mail Online,2012,www.dailymail.co.uk.

36 V.Vodjik,‘InvisibilityofGenderinWar’,The Duke Journal of Gender, Law and Policy,9,2002,p.261.

37 Ibid.

38 D.Watt,‘NewClaimsofInappropriateBehaviourattheAustralianDefenceForceAcademy’,Parliament Flagpost,8April2011,www.flagpost.blogspot.com.au.

39 A.BelkinandR.L.Evans,The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the British Armed Forces: Appraising the Evidence,TheCentrefortheStudyofSexualMinoritiesintheMilitary,UniversityofCaliforniaatSantaBarbara,2000.

40 C.EtaughandM.B.Liss,‘Home,School,andPlayroom:TrainingGroundsforAdultGenderRoles’,Sex Roles,26(3–4),1992,pp.129–47.

41 AnnouncementanddetailsaspublishedontheofficialADFwebsite:www.defencejobs.gov.au,30May2013.

42 E.Broderick,Review into the treatment of women in the Australian Defence Force (Phase two Report),AustralianHumanRightsCommission,2012.

43 Molinsky,Global Dexterity.

44 Abbe,Building Cultural Capability for Full Spectrum Operations;A.Abbe,L.GulickandJ.Herman,Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation,USArmyResearchInstitute,2007;Planning Guidance for Development of a Cultural Understanding Capability in the Australian Army;Cross Cultural Awareness and Competence: A Guide to Best Practices.

45 Abbe,Building Cultural Capability for Full Spectrum Operations.

46 G.C.Meyer,Comprehensive Regional Expertise in the US Army,UnitedStatesArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,2007.

47 M.Dee,‘CoalitionsoftheWillingandHumanitarianIntervention:Australia’sInvolvementwithINTERFET’,International Peacekeeping,8(3),2001,pp.1–20.

48 NgandRamaya,‘CulturalIntelligence’;GrovesandFeyerherm,‘LeaderCulturalIntelligence’,pp.535–66.

49 D.Kilcullen,‘ThreePillarsofCounterinsurgency’,speechdeliveredtotheUSgovernmentCounterinsurgencyConference,WashingtonDC,28September2006;J.Kipp,L.Grau,K.Prinslow,D.Smith,The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,ForeignMilitaryStudiesOffice(Army),FortLeavenworth,2006.

50 M.Wilkinson,M.FogartyandD.Melville,‘OrganisationalCultureChangethroughTrainingandCulturalImmersion’,Journal of Organisational Change Management,9(4),1996,pp.69–81.


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REVIEW ESSAY

Timor Timur:TheUntoldStorybyLieutenantGeneralKikiSyahnakri(retd),IndonesianArmedForcesBobLowry

Timor TimurisamemoirbyLieutenantGeneralKikiSyahnakri(retd)whowaspluckedfromrelativeobscuritytorestoreadegreeoforderinEastTimorandhandresponsibilitytotheInternationalForceEastTimor(INTERFET)whicharrivedinSeptember1999.1

IntotalKikispent11years(onethirdofhismilitarycareer)inTimor,commencingasaplatooncommanderinaterritorialbattalionandthenascommanderofasmallregionalmilitarycommand(KORAMILAtapupu)ontheWestTimorborderwithEastTimorin1975.2InthatcapacityheopenedthebordertothefleeingTimoreseDemocraticUnion(UDT)forcesandfiredthefirstIndonesianmortarroundsintoEastTimortowardoffthepursuingRevolutionaryFrontforanIndependentEastTimor(FRETILIN)troops.Hewas,asthememoirrecords,themanwhoopenedandclosedthegateonIndonesia’sannexationofEastTimor.


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Heishighlyoffendedatbeingbrandedoneofthe‘MastersofTerror’duringtheoccupationand,givenBishopCarlosF.X.Belo’spostscripttothebook,hassomejustificationforhisindignation.3BishopBelolistsKikiamongasmallbandofIndonesianmilitaryofficersandofficialswhospokethelanguage,understoodthecultureandtriedtowintheheartsandmindsoftheTimoreseratherthanterrorisethem.However,asBelonoted,alltoofrequentlysuchpeoplehadtheirtenureinTimorcutshortbythosewithotherinterests.

Foranalyticalpurposes,thebookcanbedividedintofourparts.First,ithasaforewordbytheauthor,threeprologues,andendswithtwoepilogues.Second,thememoircovershispre-1999serviceinEastTimorwithinfantrybattalionsandasmilitarycommanderinDiliendinginApril1995.Third,hedescribeshisserviceasmartiallawadministratorduringtheperiod10–27September1999,followedbycommandoftheregionalmilitarycommand(KODAMIX),includingtheborderwithEastTimor.InthefourthandfinalparthereflectsonhisserviceinTimor.

PartIisdesignedtomaximisemarketpotentialandenhancethecredibilityoftheauthor.ThefirstprologueisbyLieutenantGeneralSayidimanSuryohadiprojo(retd),whowasneverdirectlyinvolvedinTimor;thesecondisbyGeneralWiranto(retd)whowasCommander-in-Chief(C-in-C)oftheIndonesianArmedForces(TNI)in1998–99;andthethirdbyF.X.LopesdaCruz,aUDTCentralCommitteememberandleadingproponentofintegrationwithIndonesia.Unfortunately,Sayidiman’sdescriptionandanalysisofhowIndonesiacametoinvadeEastTimorin1975isanecdotalandmisleading.ReaderswouldbebetteradvisedtoreadBobElson’sbiographyofSuhartoandJusufWanandi’smemoironthistopic.4

Wiranto’sprologuefocusesontheperiodoftheplebiscitewhenhewasC-in-CTNI.Wirantolamentsthatnoneofthehonestexplanations,testimony,orevidencepresentedtothevariousreviewsandcourtshasclearedthereputationofTNIandpoliceofficerswhoservedinEastTimor.Thisisareputation,accordingtoWiranto,thatwascreatedbyinvisiblehandswithstrongandpervasivenetworks.AreadingofformerBishopBelo’sremarksattheendofthebook,andtheReportoftheCommissionofTruthandFriendshipcommissionedbythegovernmentsofIndonesiaandTimor-Leste,explainswhyWiranto’slamentislikelytoretainitscurrency.5LopezdaCruz’sprologueisunexceptional,focusingonhisconnectionstoKikiandcommentingonhisfluentTetunandundisputedloveofTimor.

TheepiloguesarebyformerpresidentandcurrentPrimeMinister‘Xanana’GusmaoandBishopBelo.PrimeMinisterXananavouchedforKiki’sopenness,cooperation,andintegrityasmartiallawadministratorandasCommanderKODAMIX,

REVIEWESSAYTimorTimur:TheUntoldStoryby

LieutenantGeneralKikiSyahnakri(retd)


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andrepeatedhisstandardlinethat‘wedonothidethetruth,butchoosereconciliation’.BelogaveKiki(aMuslim)aglowingreferenceasonewhotrulyunderstoodthetraditionsandcultureofeasternIndonesia,includingTimor,spokethelanguage(Tetun)fluentlyandmarriedaCatholicgirlfromSumbaIsland.HealsoappreciatedhiscooperationinfacilitatingtherepatriationofEastTimoresefromWestTimorafterindependence,andhisdisarmingofthemilitia.

PartIIcoversKiki’spre-1999serviceontheborder(1972–77)—withinfantrybattalionsassecond-in-commandandcommander(1981–83and1987–88)—andasdeputycommanderandthenmilitarycommanderinEastTimor(1993–95).AsajuniorofficerhehadnoroleinthepoliticsofIndonesia’sengagementinEastTimoruntilhereturnedin1993–95.EventhenhisoperationalrolewasconfinedbynationalpolicyandthenatureoftheSuhartoregime.

KikiwasborninWestJavain1947,theonlychildofaricefarmer.Hisfatherdiedin1963andhismotherdiedonlyfiveyearslater.Hegraduatedfromthemilitaryacademy(AKABRI)on8December1971andwaspostedtoaterritorialinfantrybattalion(743)inKupang,WestTimor,andSumbaIslandthereafteruntil,muchtohischagrin,hewaspostedtothedistrictmilitarycommand(KODIM)inAtambuainDecember1974.Therehecollectedbasicmilitaryintelligence,includingonthePortuguesemilitarypostsdottedalongtheborder,andbeganlearningTetun,oneofthekeystohisfuturesuccess.HealsoattendedperiodicborderliaisonmeetingswiththePortugueseandfacilitatedcovertIndonesianforcesoperatinginEastTimorpriortotheinvasioninDecember1975.

DancesthatoftenlasteduntildawnwereoneofthefewsocialoutletsinAtambuaanditwasherethatKikimethisfuturewife,KasperinaRatnaningsih,thedaughterofapublicservantfromSumbaIslandandherselfacivilservantstudyingatNusaCendanaUniversityinKupang.TheymarriedinBaliafterKikiwaspostedthereasacompanycommandertotheterritorialinfantrybattalion(741)inDecember1977.TheywouldhavethreechildrenandRatnaandthefamilywouldaccompanyhimonsomeofhispostingstoTimor.

InAugust1981KikiwaspostedasdeputycommandertooneofthetwoTimoreseinfantrybattalions(744)basedinDili,occasionallyexercisingcommand.HearrivedinthemiddleofOperationKikisIIinwhichtheguerrillabaseareaaroundMtAitanowassurroundedandmanyguerrillaswhohadsurvivedpreviousoperationswerekilledorcaptured.Duringthisoperation,awell-conceivedandexecutedmanoeuvreby744andWiranto’sbattalion,manyguerrillaswerekilledandcaptured,withXananaGusmaohimselfonlynarrowlyescapingcapture.




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Therehasbeenmuchcriticismoftheuseofciviliansintheseoperationstoflushouttheguerrillas.Althoughtheiruseismentioned,thereisnodiscussionofhowtheywereemployedandsustained.However,Kiki’sprideandrespectforhisTimoresesoldiersshinesthrough.Hefoundthemtobefirst-classnavigators,welldisciplined,veryfitandunflinchinglyloyal.Healsosucceededin‘turning’manyofthecapturedguerrillasbytreatingthemhumanelyandbuildingtrustsothattheywouldparticipateinoperationsagainsttheirformercomrades.PriortohisarrivalthebattalionhadalsoformedaspecialteamofTimorese,includingex-FALINTILfighters(TeamSomodok)thatbecameexpertatscoutingandseekingoutguerrillabasesandunits.6

WiththesuccessofKikisIIandfollow-onoperations,thearmyinitiatedtalkswithXananainearly1983andtrooplevelswerecutbacktofivebattalionsandaSpecialForcesteamplustheterritorialcommand.However,thetalksfellapartafteradeadlyFALINTILattackinAugustandreciprocalmilitarymassacresinSeptemberaroundCararas.WithGeneralL.B.Murdaninowcommandingthearmedforces,anothermajoroffensivewaslaunchedtodealwiththerebelsonceandforall.Beforethenewoffensivewaslaunched,KikiwassentfortrainingandpostingswiththeArmyStrategicCommand(KOSTRAD)incentralJavabeforeattendingtheNavalStaffCollege(SESKOAL)in1986–87.

Kikiwasthengivencommandofthe514thInfantryBattalion(KOSTRAD)whichwasoneofsevenbattalionssenttoTimorinlate1987torotatewithunitsreturninghome.Kiki’sbattalionwasstationedinSame,inthecentral-westernregion,andoperatedalongthesouthernsideofthecentralmountainrangeasfarasViquequeuntilDecember1988whentheunitreturnedtoJava.Althoughengagedinanumberofminorclashes,thebattalionexperiencednolarge-scalecontactsduringthetourasFALINTILhadbeenreducedtoarumpoverthepreviousyears.Hehadalsohandedovernine‘turned’FALINTILprisonerstotheincomingbattalionledbyPrabowoSubianto.7

Thereafter,KikiservedwithKOSTRADincentralJava,eventuallybecomingCommander6thBrigadeinSolobeforereturningtoDiliasdeputycommanderunderColonelJohnyLumintanginJune1993.ThiswaslessthantwoyearsaftertheNovember1991‘DiliMassacre’andIndonesiawasgrapplingwiththenewhumanrightsagenda,increasinginternationalattentionfollowingtheendoftheColdWar,andattemptstointroducemoreeffectivecommunitydevelopmentprogramstomeettheneedsoftheburgeoningandlargelyunemployedyouthpopulation.




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DespitethebesteffortsofLumintangandKiki,incidentsofabusebytheirtroopscontinued.AsKikirecords,afteronesuchincidentBelocametoseehimtocomplainaboutcontinuingincidentsofassault.KikiaskedhimnottoblameABRIasitwasonlytheactionsofafewmisfitsbutBelotellinglyrespondedthatitseemedthatABRIwassendingbattalionsofmisfitstoTimor.8BeloofcoursewaspointingtotheinstitutionalnatureofaproblemstretchingbacktothecharacteristicsoftheSuhartoregime—aproblemthatcouldnotbesolvedbylocalcommanders,nomatterhowwellintentioned.

InAugust1994KikiassumedthereinsofCommanderMilitaryResortCommand(KOREM)fromLumintang.DuringhistenureattemptsweremadeinternationallytorestartthedialogueonEastTimorand,withinTimor,therewasdiscussionofsomeformofspecialregionalautonomythatseemedtobegainingsomesupport.Beforeitcouldtakeamoresubstantialform,however,KikiandGovernorAbilioSoareswerecalledtoJakartawhereSuhartotoldthempersonallythatspecialarrangementsforEastTimorwerenotacceptableandthathewouldbetellingPresidentClintonthisattheupcomingAPECtalksinBogor.

ThisdecisionwasnotwellreceivedinDiliwhereprotestscontinuedandadvancesinmediatechnologywerebringingincreasinginternationalattentiontotheprotester’sdemands.ThiswaswhenColonelPrabowo,DeputyCommanderoftheArmySpecialForcesCommand(KOPASSUS)andson-in-lawofSuharto,appearedandsuggested,aspartofabroaderoperation,thatthecovertSpecialForcesdetachmentestablish‘competingmasses’(MassaTandingan)inDilitoconfrontthepro-independencerallies.KikiopposedthisonthegroundsthatABRIwouldbeblamedfortheexcessesthatwouldinevitablyfollowandspreadbeyondDili.ItwouldalsounderminetheargumentthatIndonesiahadusedtojustifytheinitialinvasion,i.e.,tostopthecivilwarbetweentheUDTandFRETILIN.

WithoutKiki’sconsent(andnotrecordedbyhiminhismemoir),theSpecialForcestheninstitutedasmaller,morecovertversionofthistacticusinggangsofwhatbecameknownas‘Ninjas’tointimidatetheprotesters.WhetherbecauseofhisdisputewithPrabowo,orhisbeingheldresponsibleforthekillingoffour(sixaccordingtoothersources)prisonersontheordersofajuniorofficer,afteronlyeightmonthsinthejob,KikiwasontheplanebacktoJavaandwasreplacedbytheKOPASSUSchiefofintelligence,ColonelMahidinSimbolon.Thedownwardspiraltowardsthe1999denouementwasbecomingunstoppable.




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PartIIIisaboutKiki’s1999post-ballotservice.WhateverthereasonsforhisearlyreliefofcommandinDili,Kiki’scareerwasnotover.HefilledseveralstaffandtrainingappointmentsbeforebeingappointedDeputyChiefofOperationsinArmyHeadquartersinJuly1997.HewasthenpromotedmajorgeneralandChiefofOperationsinMay1998justbeforethefallofSuharto.

AlthoughArmyHeadquarterssuppliedtroopsforoperationaldeployments,itdidnotcommandoperations.ThatwasthetaskoftheArmedForcesHeadquartersunderGeneralWiranto.Nevertheless,KikiwasinagoodpositiontowitnesstheintriguesurroundingthefallofSuharto,thestruggleforpowerwithinthearmythereafter,andthemayhemthatengulfedthearchipelagoasoldscoresweresettledandlong-suppressedinsurrectionswerereinvigorated,includinginEastTimor.

Unfortunately,thebookgivesusfewinsightsintoanyofthisbecauseitisamemoirofKiki’sserviceinTimor.SothereisasubstantialjumpfromhistruncatedserviceinEastTimorinearly1995tohissuddenappointmentasMartialLawAdministratortakingeffecton10September1999,10daysaftertheballotandTimor’sfinaldescentintoanorgyofviolence,arson,lootingandforceddisplacementoftensofthousandsofpeople.9

KikiisconflictedinthispartofthebookbetweenhisdesiretopreservetheTNImyththatIndonesiawasrobbedofEastTimorbytheperfidyoftheinternationalcommunity,especiallytheUnitedNationsAssistanceMissioninEastTimor(UNAMET),andtheduplicityinherentinIndonesia’sinterpretationofitscommitmentstotheUnitedNations(UN)inthe5May1999agreement,andhisdesiretoanalyseIndonesia’sfailingsduringtheoccupationtoensurethatthelessonsareappliedtoPapua.

ThereisalsoalingeringconcerntoavoidthepossibilityoftheprosecutionforcrimesagainsthumanityeventhoughIndonesia’sstrategicimportancemakesthishighlyunlikely.DomesticconcernsrelatingtothepreservationoftheTNI’snationalstandingandcontrolofthemilitaryreformagendaarealsofactors.

Consequently,itisnotsurprisingthatheregretsthatthenPresidentB.J.HabibieopenedthedoortoareferenduminEastTimorwhenallsideshadagreedonlimitedautonomy.HoweverhedoesnotmentionthatHabibie’sdecisionwasnotopposedbyhisfellowgeneralsinthecabinet.HeabsolvestheTNIofresponsibilityfortheviolenceandblamesthepolicefortheirincompetenceinmaintainingandrestoringorder.The2008reportoftheCommissiononTruthandFriendshipleavesnodoubtthattheviolencewassystematicandinstitutionalised,butthereportcouldnotauthoritativelytracethelinesofcommandbeyondTimorbecauseofthelackofcooperationfromtheTNI.




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However,itisknownthattheCoordinatingMinisterforDefenceandSecurity,GeneralFeisalTanjung,contrarytothe5May1999agreementwiththeUN,decidedthathismissionwasnotonlytosecuretheballotbutalsotowinitforIndonesia.10ThemoneyandinstructionsforcovertoperationsinsupportofautonomyfloweddownthrougharangeofgovernmentdepartmentsandvariousTNIlinkages.

Kikirecordsthat,inanticipationofapossibleviolentreactionfollowingtheballot,thearmyhadpreparedeightinfantrybattalionstorestoreorderifrequired.11Whytheywerenotdeployedbeforeorthedayaftertheballotwecanonlyspeculate.TheywentinwithKikitoreplace‘contaminated’unitsthathadbeenonthegroundduringtheballot.ItisalsonoteworthythatKikitookashisdeputyBrigadierGeneralAmirulIsnaini,theDeputyChiefofSecurity(intelligence)fromArmyHeadquarters,becauseofhis‘accesstoandhisgoodandextensiverelationswiththepro-integrationists,especiallythepro-integrationmilitias’(PPI).

BeforedescribinghisfinalexperiencesinEastTimor,KikitakesaswipeatthesupposedbiasofIanMartin,SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralandHeadofUNAMET,andUNAMETgenerally,citingthediscreditedaccusationsofZackyAnwarMakarim,theseniormilitaryofficerintheIndonesiaTaskForceinEastTimortooverseetheballot.12ThereisnoneedtorecitetheseallegationshereastheyhavebeenansweredbyIanMartinandIndonesia’sacceptanceoftheresultsoftheballot.13TheallegationsarosenaturallyfromthetensionsinherentinIndonesia’sdualroleassecurityguarantorandcovertsupporterofintegrationinoppositiontoUNAMET’schartertoallowequalopportunityforbothTimoresefactionstoparticipateintheballot.

KikialsoaccusesIanMartinofspreading‘unfair,tendentious,andfilthylies’tojustifytheinterventionofforeigntroops.MartinconcedesthathetoldtheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)missionon11SeptemberthatthedestructionofDiliporthadoccurredafterthedeclarationofmartiallawbutlaterinformedthemthathehadbeenmistaken.14Thismistakewasofminorimporthowever,asHabibiehadsentGeneralWirantotoDiliwiththeUNSCmissiontoreviewthesituationwithMartinanditwasWirantowhoadvisedPresidentHabibieon12September,inviewofthebreakdownoflocalgovernmentandthecontinuingmayhem,toaccepttheinternationalofferofpeacekeepersratherthanusingIndonesiantroopstomaintaincontroluntiltheUNcouldestablishamission.15

HethenconcludesthatHabibiemadethreemajorerrors:first,agreeingtohaveareferendum,second,takingresponsibilityforsecuringtheballot,andthird,fordeclaringmartiallawon7SeptemberwhentheTNIwasunderattackfromallquartersathomeandabroadthusgivingKikia‘missionimpossible’.Thesewereall,ofcourse,self-inflictedwounds,withwhichhismilitarysuperiorshadagreed.




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AftertakingcommandinEastTimoron10September,KikiquicklyestablishedadegreeofcontrolaroundcriticalareasofDili,includingtheUNcompound.HealsofacilitatedtheevacuationofUNstafftoDarwin.Butthearson,looting,murderanddisplacementofpeopleacrossEastTimorcontinued.

TheAustralianArmyattaché,ColonelKenBrownrigg,hadbeenlocatedattheConsulateinDilisince23AugustandhaddiscussedthesituationinDiliwithKikionseveraloccasionsinJakartaandimmediatelyestablishedcontactwithhimonarrivalinDili.BrownriggwasthusinagoodpositiontoadviseandcoordinatethetransitiontoINTERFETthatfollowedHabibie’sdecisionof12September.

AsKikirecords,Brownriggtoldhimofhisconcernthat,unlessthemilitiawasbroughtundercontrol,therewouldbecasualtieswhenINTERFETarrived.Revealingly,Kikirespondedthat,astheyhadworkedcontinuouslywiththesepeopleforthelast23years,theycouldnotjustgooutand‘shootorwipethemout’,soheproposedsolvingtheproblembymovingthemtoWestTimorwithallitsrisksandconsequences.

BrownriggwasalsoabletoadviseontheadjustmentofINTERFET’sdeploymentplanstoreducethechancesofunnecessaryfrictionbetweenthetwoforces.Asaconsequenceofthisearlypreparation,butwithsomepotentiallyfatalearlyexceptions,cooperationbetweenKikiandtheINTERFETcommander,MajorGeneralPeterCosgrove,ransmoothly—althoughKikinotedthat,whileCosgrovetriedtoobserveJavanesemannersandsensibilities,onseveraloccasionsheforgotandrevertedtohisAustralianways.

Kikirecitesthechallengesandincidentsthatconfrontedthemduringtheweek-longhandoverperiodbetweenthetwoforcesandhissadnessatleavinginsuchcircumstanceshavingspent11yearsofhismilitarycareerinTimor(EastandWest).HehandedoverresponsibilityforthesecurityofEastTimortoINTERFETon27September1999buthisconnectioncontinuedthroughhisappointmentastheCommanderKODAMIXbasedinBali,includingresponsibilityforbordersecuritywithEastTimor.InthatcapacityhehadtodealwithEastTimoreserefugeeswhocamebothpriortoandaftertheballot,andthemilitiathataccompaniedthem,andmaintaincooperativelinkageswithINTERFETandsuccessormissions.

KikidescribesanencounterwithRichardHolbrooke,theUSAmbassadortotheUN,whovisitedWestTimorandbecamefrustratedthathecouldnotgainconfirmationfromanyoftherefugeesthattheyhadbeenforciblyremovedfromEastTimor.RefugeesendedupinWestTimorforvaryingreasonsbut,asthereportoftheCommissiononTruthandFriendshipfound,thereisnodenyingthatmanywerethereagainsttheirwill.




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However,theencountershowsadegreeofnaivetyonbothsides.ImaginearefugeeinWestTimorinahighlyuncertainsecurityenvironmentbeingaskedbyatransientAmericaninthepresenceoftheTNI,police,andpossiblymilitiamembersorsympathiserswhetherheorshehadbeenforcedintomovingtoWestTimor.ForHolbrooketothinkhecouldgetanhonestanswerinsuchcircumstancesisasnaïveasKikibelievingthatthenegativeanswersprovedthatnorefugeeshadbeenforcedovertheborder.

Nevertheless,Kiki’sknowledgeofthesensibilitiesoftheTimoresecomesthroughinhisdescriptionofthecomplexityinvolvedindisarmingthemilitia.Despitetheheightenedemotionsandprevailingself-interest,heeventuallysucceededindisarmingthemwithoutincitingmoreviolence.HealsogivesanaccountofthekillingoftheNewZealandsoldier,PrivateManning,neartheborderon24July2000whichdiffersfromtheofficialNewZealandreport.HerefutesclaimsthattheTNIormilitiawasinvolvedintheseizureoftwoweaponsfromAustraliantroopsandthedeathoftwoGurkhasoldiersaroundthistime.HeprovidesanaccountofthemurderofthreeUnitedNationsHighCommissionforRefugees(UNHCR)workersbythemilitiainAtambuaon6September2000which,althoughitshowedthefailureofsecurityarrangementsinAtambuaovertheprecedingmonths,demonstrateshisdecisivehands-onstyleofleadership.HeflewtoAtambuathatnightonVicePresidentMegawati’splaneandimmediatelymadecontactwiththeUNmissiontoarrangetheevacuationofallUNstafffromAtambua.

Healsopointstoseveralincidentsofmisinformationaroundthesetimes.OneoccurredduringtheAtambuaincidentwhenhewasinformedbytheUNthat100trucksloadedwithmilitiawereheadingtowardsAtambua.Kikiregardedthisasimpossible,butsentahelicoptertocheck,althoughnosignofthetruckloadsofmilitiawasfound.Consequently,whentheCoordinatingMinisterforDefenceandSecurityinJakartarangafewminuteslaterwithaclaimthattherewerenow150trucksheadingforAtambua,Kikiwasabletoassurehimthattherewasnosubstancetothereport.AsKikiimplies,itwouldbeinterestingtoknowtheoriginofthesereports.

AnotherincidentoccurredjustpriortotheAtambuaincidentwhenmediareportsallegedthattheTNIwastraining15,000militiaaroundAtambuatocausehavocinEastTimor.AtameetingwiththeUNmissionKikirefutedthereportsand,aftertheUNrejectedhissuggestionofjointpatrolstocheck,hewasabletopersuadetheAustralianandNewZealandmilitaryattachéstoverifythattheycouldfindnoevidenceofsucharrangements.




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KikialsoreportsonvariousdisputeswithSergioVieiradeMello,headoftheUnitedNationsTemporaryAdministrationEastTimor(UNTAET),andRobertGelbard,theUSAmbassadortoIndonesia,andmorefriendlymeetingswithXananaGusmaoandTaurMatanRuak,theEastTimorDefenceForce/FALINTILcommander.

AfterabusyyearinBali,KikiwaspromotedtoLieutenantGeneralandDeputyChiefofArmyStaffinNovember2000andretiredinMaythefollowingyear.

ThefinalpartofthebookisaseriesofreflectionsonhisexperiencesinTimor.HeattributesIndonesia’sfailuresinTimortoadherencetoinappropriateandoutdatedUSmilitarydoctrine;afailuretoapplytheprinciplesofcounter-guerillawarfare,includingthealienationofthepopulationthroughmisconductandtheshootingofunarmedcivilians;thefailuretomakeuseoftraditionalstructuresofpower,includingtheRomanCatholicChurch;theover-centralisationofauthorityinJakarta;thefailuretointegratemilitaryoperationsandcommunitydevelopment;thearroganceofmanyTNIandpolicewhoservedinTimorandthepresenceofwidespreadcorruption;andthefailureofmediarelations.Perhapsthemostsignificantcommentinthispartishispleathat‘[we]needtobeawarealsothatmilitaryoperationswillnotsucceedifthepeoplearestillmiredinpoverty,astheyarenowinPapua.’

Manyofthesereflectionswillgiverisetodebateandthatistobeencouraged.ThisalsodemonstratesthattheTNIhasyettocometotermswithitsownhistory,althoughhopefullythisbookwillpromptmoreintrospectionaspartofcomingtotermswiththebroaderhistoryoftheNewOrderandtheTNI’scentralroleinit.

Forthisreviewer,thegreattragedyforIndonesiaandEastTimoristhatGeneralFeisalTanjungandhiscolleaguesdidnothonourtheobligationsIndonesiahadacceptedunderthe5May1999agreementwiththeUnitedNations,andthattheydidnotputsomeoneofKiki’sstanding,knowledge,andcompetenceonthegroundtoadministerandenforcetheagreement.ThebookiseasytoreadandthoughtprovokingandishighlyrecommendedtoanyoneinterestedinIndonesia’sengagementwithEastTimor,thehistoryofIndonesiaitself,andthereflectedlightitcastsoncontemporarychallengesincontinuingmilitaryreformandmanagingtensionsinPapua.

Timor Timur: The Untold Story,Kompas,Jakarta,2013,ISBN9879797096830,435pages,currentlyonlyavailableinBahasaIndonesia.




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THE AUTHOR

BobLowryistheauthorofanumberofbooksincludingTheArmedForcesofIndonesia(Allen&Unwin,StLeonards,1996);FortressFiji:HoldingtheLineinthePacificWar,1939-45(self-published,Sutton,2006);andTheLastKnight:abiographyofGeneralSirPhillipBennettAC,KBE,DSO(BigSkyPublishing,Newport,2011).

ENDNOTES1 KikiSyahnakri,Timor Timur: The Untold Story,Kompas,Jakarta,2012.Currentlyonlyavailable

inIndonesian.

2 Unsurprisingly,Kiki’soperationalservicewasrestrictedtoTimor.

3 H.McDonaldet.al.,Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999,Rowman&Littlefield,Oxford,2006.

4 R.E.Elson,Suharto: A Political Biography,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2001;JusufWanandi,Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965-1998,Equinox,Jakarta,2012.

5 Per Memoriam Ad Spem: Final Report of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) Indonesia-Timor-Leste,2008.Thisisanobjectivealbeitincompletereportontheeventsof1999.

6 FALINTILwasthemilitaryarmofFRETILIN.

7 Laterpromotedlieutenantgeneralandcurrentlypresidentialaspirantforthe2014elections.

8 WhenthepolicewereseparatedfromtheArmedForcesofIndonesia(AngkatanBersenjataIndonesia–ABRI)on1April1999thearmedforcesrevertedtotheirprevioustitleofTentaraNasionalIndonesia–TNI.

9 SeetheFinalReportoftheCommissionofTruthandFriendship.MartialLawwasdeclaredon7September.

10 Solemanto,et.al.,Feisal Tanjung: Terbaik Untuk Rakyat Terbaik Bagi ABRI,Dharmapena,Jakarta,1999,p.722.

11 Therewereatleast8000troopsinTimoralongwithanequalnumberofpolicepriortotheballot.

12 Z.A.Makarim,etal,Hari-hari Terakhir Timor Timur,SebuahKesaksian,Jakarta,2002.

13 I.Martin,Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention,InternationalPeaceAcademyOccasionalPapersSeries,LynneRienner,Boulder,2001,p.40.

14 EmailtoauthorfromIanMartinof28October2013.Healsonoted,‘IneverhadanyreasontoagreewiththosewholistedKikiamongthereallybadguys’.

15 Solemanto,Feisal Tanjung,p.743.




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BOOK REVIEW

Climate Change and Displacement Reader

ScottLeckie,EzekielSimperinghamandJordanBakker(eds),

Earthscan(Routledge),2012,ISBN9780415691345,512pp,RRP£29.99

ReviewedbyChrisBaker

Climatechangecontinuestosimmerasanissueforsecurityanalyststheworldover.Ofdeepconcerntomanyistheideathathundredsofmillions—accordingtosomeassessments—ofclimatechangerefugeesmaybeonthemoveincomingdecadesduetoclimatedisasters.Thisunderstandablycreatesasenseofangstamongstpolicymakersanddefenceplannerswhoarealreadyjugglingdomesticissuesofirregularmigrationandrefugeeswiththeassociatedrealorperceivedsecurityissues.

TheClimate Change and Displacement Readergoesalongwaytodemystifyingthishighlycomplexandoftencontroversialissue.Itisanexcellentsourcefortheoristsandpractitionersalike,asitprovidesacomprehensiveoverviewoftheissuesastheycurrentlystand,introducingthereadertotheleadingresearchanddiscourseonclimatechangedisplacement.Thestructureofthebookfacilitatesanefficientreadingexperience,withfiveseparatesectionscoveringdifferentthemes.


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Thereisastronglegalandnormativethemeflowingthroughoutthebookandsectionstwotofiveplacehumanrightsatthecentreofthedebatewithsectionsfourandfivelookingmorespecificallyatthesocial(Section5)andpolitical(Section4)aspects.Sectionfive,‘CommunityandNGOresponsesandproposedsolutions’,isamicroanalysisofthewaysthatlocalcommunitieshaveadapted,orareplanningtoadapttoclimatechange.ItincludesachapteronclimatejusticebytheGlobalHumanitarianForum(Chapter49,pp.478–87)thatchallengesusto‘thinkmoredeeplyaboutourconceptionsofobligationandresponsibility’(p.479)andthereforewhoshouldberesponsiblefortheimpactofcarbonpollutionontheworld’spoor.Sectionfour,‘Affectedcountries’,takesamorepoliticalapproachtohumanrightsandclimatedisplacement.ItisdividedintoAsiaandthePacific,andthemajorityofchaptersaregovernmentalpapersorthosefocusedonpoliticalactionandadaptationstrategies.OfparticularinteresttoAustralianreadersmaybetheLaborPolicyDiscussionpaperbyAnthonyAlbaneseandBobSercombewhilstinoppositionin2006(Chapter30).

Anyonewishingtocomprehendthecomplexitiesandcontroversiesofclimatechangedisplacementmustunderstandthelegalminefieldthatactsasabarriertothosedisplacedbyclimatechangeseekingrefuge.Sectionstwoandthreeprovideasolidintroductioninthese.Althoughjournalistsandpoliticianscontinuetoreferto‘climaterefugees’,theacademicandlegalcommunityis,forthemostpart,attemptingtocometotermswiththeuncertaininternationallegalstatusofthosewhoaredisplacedbyclimatechange.ThishasledtosuchnotionsasInternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs),StatelessPerson,EnvironmentallyForcedMigrantandthelike.Sectiontwo,‘Internationallegalandinstitutionalframework’,providesimportantliteratureonthesubjectfromUNHCR,theUNSecurityCouncilandtheUNGeneralAssemblyamongothers.Sectionthree,‘Proposednewlegalstandards’,suggestssomepossiblesolutionstotheproblemincludingtheinitiationofanewinternationalconventiononClimateChangeDisplacedPersons(CCDPs).

Currently,theUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)hasthemonopolyovertheterminologyoftheconditionsthatleadto‘genuine’refugeestatus.Theideathatarefugeeis‘oneseekingrefuge’hasledtotermssuchas‘EnvironmentalRefugee’and‘ClimateChangeRefugee’.TheUNHCRmaintainsthat‘(t)hesetermshavenobasisininternationalrefugeelaw’duetothefactthat‘refugee’isalegalterm(p.149),althoughthereisanacknowledgementthatrefugeemovementswillbeincreasingly‘provokedbyarmedconflictrootedinenvironmentalfactors’(p.147).The1951RefugeeConventionprovidesaveryspecificsetofguidelinesthatclassifiesarefugeeassomeonewhois‘outside

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thecountryofhisnationality’andhasa‘well-foundedfearofbeingpersecutedforreasonsofrace,religion,nationality,membershipofaparticularsocialgrouporpoliticalopinion’(p.174).Essentially,apersonmaybegrantedrefugeestatusforstrictlypoliticalreasonsonly.GiventhattherearealreadyovertenmillionrefugeesofconcerntotheUNHCR,halfoftheseinAsia,itisunderstandableandforeseeablethattheUNHCRandtheinternationalcommunityingeneralhavestrongreservationsaboutallowingawholenewclassofrefugeetoappearatthestrokeofapen—especiallyforsomethingastechnicallyvagueasa‘climatechangerefugee’.

Itisthefirstsection,‘Therealityofclimatedisplacement’,oftheClimate Change and Displacement Readerthatislikelytoofferthemostvaluetopolicymakersanddefenceplanners,however.Thissectionprovidesanoverviewoftheimportanttheoreticaldiscourseaswellasthecurrentenvironmentalsituation.Asiaishighlightedasoneofthemostvulnerableregionstoclimatechangedisasters,particularlytheAsianmega-deltas(p.38)andadifferentiationismadebetweensudden-onsetdisasters(suchasstormsandfloods)withtheaccompanyingshort-liveddisplacement,andslow-onsetdisasters(suchassea-levelrise)withtheslowbutpresumablypermanentdisplacementthatresults(p.37).Childrenandtheelderly,particularlythoseindevelopingcountries,areidentifiedasthemostvulnerabletoclimatechangedisplacement(p.b18).Povertyalsoplaysasignificantrole—andthereforepeoplearemorelikelytobeinternallydisplaced(withinthebordersoftheirownnation)giventhehighcostsassociatedwithinternationalmigration(p.69).Astowhereclimate-displacedpersonsmightattempttomigratetoiftheydochoosetocrossinternationalboundaries,OliBrownsuggeststhatmostpeoplewould‘tendtoseekrefugeinplaceswheretheyhaveexistingculturalandethnicties’(p.79),forexample,AustraliaandNewZealandwouldbeadestinationofchoiceforthoseintheSouthPacific.HedoesnotmentionAustralia’slongstandingculturalandfamilialtieswithpartsofSouth-EastandEastAsia.

Inaddition,SteveLonergan’schapter(Chapter4)scrutinisessomeofthenumericallyveryhighpredictionsofexpected‘wavesofrefugees’causedbyclimatechange,challengingthe‘uncriticalacceptanceofadirectcausallinkbetweenenvironmentaldegradationandpopulationdisplacement’(pp.59–60).Hedoesnotsuggestthattherearenolinks,butcautionsinsteadagainstfear-drivenpolicyandmilitaryreactionstopredictionssuchasMyer’s(1992)assessmentthattherewillbeupwardsof150millionenvironmentalrefugees.Thisisimportanttounderstand—particularlyinrelationtoslow-onsetdisasterssuchassea-levelrise—asdifferentiatingbetweentheenvironmentalcausesand



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theeconomic,socialandpoliticalcontributingfactorsisdifficult,ifnotimpossible.GiventhecurrentpoliticalenvironmentinAustraliainwhichthegovernmentisseekingtomakeacaseagainstasylumseekersonthegroundsoftheirbeing‘economicmigrants’,thisisasalientpoint.

TheClimate Change and Displacement Readerisanimportanttextforanywhoareseekingtounderstandthelinksbetweenclimatechangeandhumanmigration.Thispolicy-orientedtextprovidesreadersasolidtheoreticalandempiricalfoundationontheissueandinformationandevidencetomaketheirownjudgementsonthehumanandlegaldimensions.Forsecurityanddefenceanalysts,thisreviewerwouldsuggestreadingitinconjunctionwithDupontandPearman’sHeating up the Planet(2006)andPalazzo’sThe Future of War Debate in Australia(2012).Thereislittledoubtthattheissueofclimatechangeandhumanmigrationwillcontinuetogrowinimportanceovercomingdecadesforpolicymakersanddefenceanalysts,whethertheyplanforitornot.



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BOOK REVIEW

The Changi Camera: A Unique Record of Changi and the Thai-Burma Railway

TimBowden,HachetteAustralia,Sydney,2012,ISBN9780733629624,

242pp,RRPAUD$35.00

ReviewedbyDrJandaGooding,HeadofPhotographs,Film,SoundandMultimedia,AustralianWarMemorial

The Changi CameraisthesecondbookbyTimBowdenthatutilisestherecollectionsofGeorgeAspinallwhobecameanAustralianprisonerofwar(POW)whenSingaporewastakenbytheJapaneseinFebruary1942.Thefirstbookwasoriginallypublishedin1984asChangi Photographer: George Aspinall’s Record of Captivity.ThenewbookhasbeenexpandedtoincludeasectionwrittenbyTimBowdenprovidinganoverviewoftheAustralianPOWexperience.Thisprovidesmuch-neededhistoricalcontextforAspinall’srecollectionsthataredrawnfromaseriesoforalhistoriesconductedbyBowdenin1982and1983aspartoftheAustraliansUnderNipponABCradiodocumentary.The2012bookalsoomitsAspinall’snamefromthetitle.ThisisanunfortunatedecisionconsideringthatAspinall’swordsandimagesstillformthelargerpartofthebook.


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GeorgeAspinallofthe2/30thBattaliontookonlyaround100photographswhenhewasaprisoneroftheJapaneseinSingaporeandThailand.Riskingexecutioniffoundwithacamera,AspinallsecretlyusedhissmallfoldingKodakNumber2cameraafterhiscaptureinSingaporeinFebruary1942anddocumentedlifeatChangiPrison.Whenassignedtomovenorthwith‘F’ForcetohelpconstructtheBurma-Thailandrailway,hetookhiscameraandmanagedtotakeabout20morephotographs.Aspinallwascarefultonotarousesuspicionwhenhetookthephotographs.Hethencrudelydevelopedthenegativestohelppreventthemdeterioratingintheextremeconditions.Fearingthathisluckwouldrunoutandhewouldbediscovered,inlate1943hebrokeupthecameraandhidthenegativesinanefforttoevadetheregularbodysearchesperformedbyJapaneseguards.Towardstheendofthewar,hisnegativeswereputinasealedcontaineralongwithotherphotographsandpreciousdocumentscollectedbythecommandersoftheAustralianforcesandburiedinalatrinebore-hole.Thecontainerwasrecoveredafterthewarandthecontentsusedasevidenceinwarcrimestrials.

Approximately60originalnegativessurvivedandarenowpreservedattheAustralianWarMemorialtogetherwiththeoralhistoriesrecordedwithAspinall.Manyofthenegativesarebadlydamagedbyenvironmentalconditionsandasaresultoftherough-and-readytechniquesandmaterialsusedbythephotographer.ThemajorityofthephotographsareofAustralianprisonersatChangiandincludeseveraltakenduringtheSelarangBarracksincidentwhenPOWswereherdedintothebarrackssquareandkeptthereforfourdaysinanattempttoforcethemtosignanagreementthattheywouldnotescape.Whiletheseareanimportantvisualrecordofasignificantevent,itisAspinall’sfewimagesofthetreatmentofAustralianprisonerswhileworkingontheBurma-Thailandrailwayforwhichheshouldberemembered.InjustahandfulofphotographsAspinalldocumentedthedeclineofmenfromdiseaseandstarvation.OnephotographshowsthreeAustralianmenfromShimoSonkuraiNo1Camp.ThesemenweredeemedbytheJapaneseguardsasfittoworkontherailway.Theirbodies—barelycoveredbythinandwornshorts—arewastedfrommalnutrition,dysenteryandberiberi.

AspinallwasnottheonlyAustralianprisonertocarryacamerabuthisisoneofthebetterdocumentedstories.InThe Changi CamerahisaccountofsurvivalasaPOWismadefarmorepowerfulbytheinclusionofthephotographs.Aswestudythoseimageswecanonlytrytoimaginethementaltraumaanddistressofmenundersuchpressure.Aspinallsaidseveraltimesthat,initially,hedidnotintendtocompileadocumentaryrecordofhowprisonersweretreated;hiscameraworkwasmoreameanstokeephismindoccupiedanddosomethingdifferentfrom

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ChangiandtheThai-BurmaRailway


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theeverydaytasksofcamplife.ButattheendofthewaritwasclearthatanyphotographstakenbyprisonerswouldbevitalevidenceintheforthcomingwarcrimestrialstosubstantiateallegationsofJapaneseatrocities.GeorgeAspinall’sphotographs,thenandnow,providetheproofofsomethingthathappenedthatwemayfindtooawfultobelievebasedonwordsalone.TheybearwitnesstothesufferingexperiencedbyAustraliansandothersontheBurma-Thailandrailwayandremindusthatboththebest,andtheworstofmen,canbeexposedintimeofwar.

BOOKREVIEWTheChangiCamera:AUniqueRecordof

ChangiandtheThai-BurmaRailway


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BOOK REVIEW

The Passion of Bradley Manning: The Story Behind the Wikileaks Whistleblower

ChaseMadarVerso,London&NewYork,2012,ISBN9781781680698,

188pp,RRPUS$14.95

ReviewedbyStevenL.Jones

The Passion of Bradley Manningwasalwaysgoingtobeapolemicbook.WhileManning’sreleaseofconfidentialinformationtoWikileaksistakenasfact,opinionisdividedastothemoralnatureofhisactions.Forhisdetractors,heisadangeroustraitorofthehighestorderanddeservingsummaryexecutionforunderminingnationalsecurityandprovidingsupporttotheenemiesoffreedomandjustice.Forhissupporters,heisamartyrofthehighestvirtue.Whilethetruthisobviouslysomewhereinbetween,Madar’sbooksitsfirmlyinthelattercategory.WhilethebookdealswithmattersspecifictoAmericanpoliticsandoperations,itposesuniversalquestionsandoffersacasestudyrelevanttotheAustralianDefenceForce(ADF).

Madar’sbookcertainlyhasmanyfaults.Whileastronglypartisanbookisnotinherentlybad,thisoneischaracterisedmorebyrhetoricthananalysis,andthereisverylittleoriginalresearch.ThisisessentiallynotabookaboutManning,


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butaboutthepoliticalandmilitarysystemwhichManningsupportedbutthenrejected.Thepurposeofthebookistodirectthespotlightfromthecriminalandpersonalspecificsofthecasetothebroaderpoliticalandmoralaspects.

Althoughtherehasbeenagreatdealofliteraturedealingwithpublicaccountabilityandthedifferencebetweendeclaredvaluesandoperationalpracticeinthe‘LongWar’,Madar’sbookdoesoffersomenewinsights.OfparticularnotearethelaxinformationsecurityarrangementswhichallowedManningtoeasilycollectandtransferconfidentialinformation,andthedescriptionofamilitaryundersuchmanpowerpressurethatManningwasdeployedinahighsecurityroledespitethenumerouswarningsigns.

Inbasictraining,withrecruitmentnumbersattheirnadir,ManningwasassignedtotheDischargeUnit,butwas‘recycled’foractiveservice.At5’2”and115pounds,Manningwashardlyidealarmymaterialphysically,nottomentionbehaviouralandpsychologicalissues,whichlaterbecameevident.AsanintelligenceanalystatFortDruminNewYork,Manning‘didn’tgetalongwithhisroommates’,was‘writtenuptossingchairsaroundinafitofrage[and]foryellingatsuperiors’,was‘mildlyreprimanded’forbroadcastinginformationaboutthebaseonYouTube,protestedagainstDon’tAskDon’tTell,andwasrequiredtoreceivementalhealthcounselling.WhilehissuperiorsdiscussedleavingManningbehindwhentheunitwasdeployedtoIraq,theneedforcomputersavvyanalystsoverrodetheirconcerns,andhewasdeployedtoFOBHammerinIraqin2009.

WhileitistemptingtolinkManning’smentalandgenderissuestohisactions,designatingtheleakingofinformationastheactionsofasocialmisfit,MadariskeentodefineManning’sactionsasadeliberatepoliticalact.Thevaluablecoreofthisbookisanaccountofmoralitytestedinanoperationalenvironment,ofastrongpersonallyderivedmoralityinconflictwithanexternallyimposedinstitutionalethic.Madar’scharacterisationofManning,onewhichissupportedbythechatlogs,isthatofanidealist.ManningbelievedinAmericaastheexemplarofvirtue;hebelievedintheAmericanvaluesoflibertyanddemocracyandbelievedinAmerica’smissionofbringingthemtoIraq.MadarpositionsManningasapatriot,supportingthispositionwithdeclarationsfromtheFoundingFathersandothergreatAmericanleaderswhoarticulatedtheneedfortransparencyingovernment.

Ultimately,ManningisunabletoreconcilethedifferencesbetweenthedeclaredvaluesandidealsofAmericaandthepracticalethicsofoperationalnecessity.ThefinalstrawisacaseinwhichManning’sunitisinvolvedinthearrestofciviliansbytheIraqiFederalPoliceforproducingapamphletcriticalofcorruptioninthe

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TheStoryBehindtheWikileaksWhistleblower


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newregime.RealisingtheessentiallydemocraticactionsofthearrestedIraqisandthelikelihoodofabuseatthehandsofthelocalauthorities,Manningtakesthisinformationtothissuperiorbutistoldto‘shutupandhelpfindmoredetainees’.Afterthisevent,Manningseesthingsdifferently,realisingthatheisapartofsomethinghedoesn’tbelievein,somethingwhichactsagainsthisownandAmerica’svalues.BelievingthatAmericanswouldnotsupportthewariftheyknewwhatwashappening,thedetailsandtheuglytruths,hedecidedtotakeamoralstandandrevealconfidentialinformationtotheworldtopromoteopennessanddebate.

WithfuturewarslikelytoreplicatethemoralquagmireofIraqandAfghanistan,thedifferencesbetweenmilitaryethicsandoperationalnecessityononehandandnationalvaluesandcivilianmoralityontheotherisanissuerequiringseriousconsideration.AclearunderstandingofManning’smotiveswillhavetowaitforamoredetailedbiography,butthereissufficientinthisbooktowarrantitscarefulstudy.

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TheStoryBehindtheWikileaksWhistleblower


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BOOK REVIEW

Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps

AaronB.O’Connell,HarvardUniversityPress,2012,

ISBN9780674058279,400pp,RRPUS$29.95

ReviewedbyTristanMoss

TheUnitedStates(US)MarineCorpsoccupiesanexaltedplaceinAmericansociety,asthevastarrayofpopularfilms,booksandtelevisionseriesattests.Asthefightingarmofthe‘lightonthehill’,theMarineCorpspromotesUSvaluesasmuchastheMarinehimselfembodiesthem.SuchisthepoweroftheCorpsthatitiseasytoassumethatthishasalwaysbeenthecase.Inhisculturalhistory,Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps,AaronB.O’ConnellexploresthetransformationoftheMarineCorpsfroma‘tiny,unpopularandinstitutionallydisadvantaged’serviceintoaparagonoffightingpowerandmoralstrength.ThebookcoverstheperiodbetweentheUSentryintotheSecondWorldWarandtheWarinVietnam;itwasduringthistimethattheMarinesbuilttheirpublicimage,defendedtheirveryexistenceandfinallypositionedthemselvesasanindispensible‘firebrigade’forUSintereststhroughouttheworld.


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TheperiodinquestionsawtheMarineCorpsperfectasystemofpublicrelationsandlobbyingthatwastheenvyoftheotherservices.O’ConnellarguesthatthissystemofengagementwiththepublicandwithlawmakerswastheproductofasiegementalityamongMarines,whofeltthattheirservicewasperpetuallyunderthreatofdisbandment.Consequently,theMarinesactivelyconstructedadualimagebasedontraditionandvalues.OntheonehandtheCorpspresenteditselfasembodyingaggressivemasculinity,typifiedbyitsmotto‘firsttofight’.AstheColdWarbeganinearnest,theCorpsalsorejectedthemoretechnologicalfocusoftheotherservices,preferringtoemphasiseamoreromanticimageofthefightingmanandhisrifle.Atthesametime,theMarineCorpssolditselfdirectlytoAmericanhomes,positioningtheindividualMarineasahusband,fatherorbrother.ReinforcedandrefinedastheColdWarprogressed,thisdualimagecontributedtotheculturalpoweroftheCorpsbyallowingittonotonlypresentitselfasthedefenderofAmericaasanation,butalsoasanupholderofAmericanvalues.

Underdogsisadetailedandprobingbook,anddoesnotholdbackfromexaminingthedarkersideofthehard-fightingMarineCorpsidentity.Thechapteronalcoholism,domesticviolenceandtheabuseofnewrecruitsduringtrainingiswovenintothestoryalongsidethemoreromanticimagesoftheCorps.ThewayinwhichtheCorpsdealtwiththeseproblems,whileatthesametimeseekingtoaffirmitsplaceastheupholderofUSmartialspiritinthefaceoffearsthatthecountrywasbecoming‘soft’atacrucialstageintheColdWar,isafascinatinginsightintothecompetingpressuresofasocietyfacingbothanexistentialthreatandinthethroesofmodernisation.

AlongsidetheCorps’engagementwiththepublic,Underdogsexploresthemorestoriedhistoryofcivil-militaryrelationsinvolvingtheMarines.Inparticular,O’Connellprovidesaverydetaileddissectionoftheoften-underhandedMarineCorpsfightagainstmilitaryreorganisationduringthe1950sandthelobbyingofCongressbytheso-called‘ChowderSociety’ofMarineofficersinWashington.ThecreationofaninformalnetworkofcongressmenthatcrossedpartisanlinestosupporttheMarinecausewastestamenttothegrowingpoweroftheCorps.Thewillingnessoftheservicetoprovidepost-retirementpromotionstoformerMarines(JoeMcCarthywentfromcaptaintolieutenantcolonelafterleavingtheCorps)isalsoproofofthelengthstowhichtheCorpswaspreparedtogotocourtfavour.

AttimesO’Connellbecomesboggeddowninnarrativedetail.Moreover,despitebeingastudythatreststoagreatextentonacomparisonwiththeotherservices,toooftenthiscomparisonisnotfullyexplored.O’Connelltendsperhapstogive

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TheMakingoftheModernMarineCorps


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theMarinestoomuchcreditwithoutexploringtheirplaceasthesmallestservice,buyingintothe‘narrativeofMarineexceptionalism’alittletoomuch.ThediscussionoftheCorps’embracingofexpeditionarywarfareduringthe1960s,forinstance,ispresentedasanexampleoftheforwardplanningandanunfetteredMarinethinkinginthefaceoftheotherservices’obsessionwithhighendandnuclearwarfare.ThedegreetowhichtheMarinessoughttoprepareforandengageinthistypeofwarfare,butcouldnot,isnotdiscussedbyO’Connell,noristhepossibilitythattheMarineshadthefreedomtoexplorenichecapabilitiespreciselybecausetheotherserviceshadensuredUSproficiencyinnuclearandhigh-intensitywarfare.

Overall,Underdogsisamodelforotherstudiesexploringhowandwhyservicesconstructtheirownimage.O’Connell,paraphrasingMaryA.RendaandEdwardSaid,notesthat‘successfulmilitaryinstitutions“requirestoriesaswellasguns”’.UnderdogsisadetailedandimportantaccountoftheconstructionoftheUSMarineCorpsstory.

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TheMakingoftheModernMarineCorps


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BOOK REVIEW

Bill the Bastard

RolandPerry,Allen&Unwin,2012,ISBN9781743312629,288pp,

RRPAUD$27.99

ReviewedbyMargaretPalazzo,HawkerCollege,Canberra

RolandPerry’sBill the BastardisastoryofAustralianservicemen,inparticularthemenoftheLightHorse,andtheirmountsduringtheGallipoliandPalestinecampaignsoftheFirstWorldWar.Thebookfocusesonitsnamesake,theinfamousandlateradoredWaler,Bill‘theBastard’,andhistrooperMajorMichaelShanahan,althoughthisbookisultimatelynotacelebrationofjustonecourageoussoldierandhishorse,butoftheentireLightHorse.ItfollowsBillandShanahanthroughGallipoliandPalestine,andintotheirpost-warlife,whenageandinjuryfinallywithdrewthembothfromservice.Withtheendofthewar,ShanahanreturnedtoAustraliawithhiswifeCharlotte,withwhomhehadsixchildrenandtowhomhewasmarriedfor28years.Hecontinuedtorideuntiltheageof85,andlivedonforafurthertenyears.AsforBill,itisbelievedthatheescapedtheknackeryorthehardlifeofCairothatwasthefateofmostwarhorses,andwasgiven,unofficiallythatis,toanelderofavillagenearSuvlaBay.Today,alife-sizedbronzestatuestandsinMurrumburrah,depictingBillcarryingShanahanandfourothermentosafetyduringtheBattleofRomani.


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Onthewhole,Bill the Bastardisafairlylightheartedstory,consideringtheoftenbloodysubjectmatteritdealswith,asitistoldwithhumourratherthanbeingadryandpurelyfactualhistory.Incorporatedintothenarrativeareoccasionalstoriesofindividualmenandwomenthat,whilenotstrictlyrelevant,addinsightintolifeasanAustraliansoldier.Manyreadersmayhavesomereservationsaboutthismixingoffactsandfigureswithpersonalstories,butitdoesprovidearealisticideaofwhatthoseservingactuallyexperienced.Onedoesbegintowonder,however,howmanyofthesesnippetsarefictitious,inthisnon-fictionwork.Thataside,suchadditionscertainlyhelptoelevatethebook,makingitamoreintricate,personalstory,accessibletoawideraudienceandprovidinginsightsthatwouldnotbeavailableinmoreacademic-stylehistories.

Perry’sbookisfilledwithentertaining,genuineandlikeableAustralianservicemenandwomenwhooftenstrivetomakethemoralbestofadifficultsituation,endearingthereadertothesoldiersthatthisbooksosuccessfullycelebrates.Alongsidethem,PerryrecognisestheroleofAustralianhorses,theWalers,whichwerecrucialtothesuccessoftheLightHorse.Itistouchingtoreadoftherelationshipbetweenthosehorsemenwhobecamesoldiersandtheirmountsinwar,andpleasingtoseeabookthatacknowledgesjusthowcrucialhorsesweretothewareffort.TheAustraliansarepaintedastheheroesofthecampaign,displayingfiercecourage,moralityandskillassoldiers,aswellasbeingunparalleledhorsemenridingunparalleledhorses.Thebookthusservesasaninterestingreminderofanagelost,astyleofwarnowforgottenandthemateshipthatonceexistedbetweensoldierandhorse.

Despiteitscompellingnarrative,Bill the Bastardattimessitsawkwardlyinanoddmiddleground.ItisnotpurehistorythatprovidesadetailedandaccurateaccountoftheAnzacwarefforts.Norisitlighthistoricalfictionthattellsthestoryofmenatwar.Fortunately,thisisamiddlegroundthatwillundoubtedlysuitmanyreaderswell,particularlythoselookingforastory-liketributetotheAnzacsthatalsoprovidesaccuratenamesanddates.Forservingprofessionalmilitaryofficers,thisbookmayappeartoofferlittleofrelevance.Yetthisisonlypartiallytrueforitalsohighlightstheenduringidealsofbravery,moralityandpersonaltriumphthatareintegraltotheAustralianmilitaryethic,nomattertheage.Whilenotexceptional,thisisafinecontributiontotheAnzaclegendandmanywillnodoubtfindBill the Bastardaworthwhileread.

BOOKREVIEW BilltheBastard


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BOOK REVIEW

Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War

ZachariahCherionMampilly,CornellUniversityPress,Ithacaand

London,2011,ISBN9780801449130,320pp,RRPUS$45.00

ReviewedbyLieutenantAlexanderRyrie,AustralianArmy

Thisisanambitiousbookwhichaimstoshedlightonthepoorlyresearchedsubjectofinsurgentgovernanceduringtimeofwar.Thecentralargumentofthebookisthatinsurgentgovernmentsshouldberecognisedbytheinternationalcommunitylestthemanycivilianswhoaresubjecttothisgovernmentwillbeneglectedbythatsameinternationalcommunityinwhatmaybeatimeofdireneed.Mampillyargueshiscasethroughtheanalysisofthreeinsurgencies:SriLanka’sLiberationTigersofTamilElam(LTTE),theSudanPeople’sLiberationMovement/Army(SPLM/A),andtheRassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma(RCD-Goma).ThroughoutthebookMampillyinvestigatesthenatureandfeaturesofinsurgentgovernance.Hisfieldworkandresearchdescribehowcontemporaryinsurgencieshavecontrolledlargeterritoriesforextendedperiodsoftime,establishingextensivegovernmentalstructuresandpracticesthroughwhichtheyhaveruledmajorportionsofthecivilianpopulation.


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ThroughhisexaminationofeachinsurgencyMampillyidentifiesthedifferencesinthegovernancesystemsdeveloped,andtheuniquefactorsthatshapedthegovernancestructureswithineachconflict.

Mampilly’scentralargumentisthatregionsthatareunderthecontrolofinsurgentgovernmentsarenotnecessarilyanarchicbadlands,andthattoensurethewelfareofthecivilianslivingwithintheseareastheinternationalcommunityneedstorecognisethegovernancestructuresandorganisationsestablishedbytheinsurgentgroups:

By denying the existence of political order within rebel-held areas and refusing to offer a meaningful pathway to recognition based on civilian treatment, the international community is taking a position that essentially abandons large areas of the map, too often to the detriment of civilians living within.

Theauthorgoestogreatlengthstodescribethegovernancestructuresestablishedbytheinsurgentsinallthreeconflictareas;howeverhespendslittletimesuggestingwhattheinternationalcommunityshoulddoonceitrecognisestheinsurgentgovernment.Thislackofanalysisofhowinternationalrecognitionwouldimprovethelotoftheaveragecivilianlivinginaninsurgent-controlledareais,Ibelieve,amajorflawinthisbook.Mampillyuseshisbooktodescribeaproblembutfailstosuggestasolution.

Whilethisworkisclearlyaimedatgovernmentpolicydevelopersandacademics,certainchapterswouldclearlybeofinteresttothemilitarycommander.Itiswidelyacceptedthatthepopulationshouldbethefocusofanycounterinsurgencycampaign.ThroughunderstandinghowthesevariousinsurgenciesinteractedwiththelocalpopulationsmanylessonscanbelearntwhichcouldbeputtouseinfuturecampaignsthatexhibitsimilarcharacteristicstothoseMampillyanalyses.Theauthor’smostimportantfindingisthateachinsurgencyisuniqueandshapedbyindividualexternalandinternalfactorswhichmustbeunderstoodwithinthecontextoftheconflict.

Overall,thisbookishardworkfortheamountofknowledgethatitimpartstothereader.Writteninveryacademicprose,itishardlyaleisurelyreadand,asareferenceguide,itisnotoverlyusefulasthestructureisattimeschaotic.Insayingthisitremainsaninterestingworkwhichisworthreadingforthelightitshedsonanimportantsubjectthatisyettobeadequatelyexplored.

BOOKREVIEWRebelRulers:

InsurgentGovernanceandCivilianLifeDuringWar


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BOOK REVIEW

One False Move, Bravest of the Brave: The Australian Mine Defusers in World War Two

RobertMacklin,Hachette,2012,ISBN9780733627941,384pp,

RRPAUD$35.00

ReviewedbyWarrantOfficerClassOneWayneSchoer,AustralianArmy

Asalong-servingmemberoftheExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal(EOD)communityandastudentofourhistory,Iwasanticipatingagoodreadandthepossibilityoffillingsomegapsinmyknowledgeoftherootsofthetrade.TheopeningchaptersofOne False Movedealwithsomebackgrounddetailsonthemainplayers,whattheyweredoingwhenWorldWarIIwasdeclaredandtheiractionstoenlistsoonafter.ItwasinterestingtonotethatallofthesemendisplayedsomelevelofmechanicalaptitudefromanearlyageandthisisstillacommonthreadamongmembersoftheEODcommunitytoday.

Itdoesn’ttakelongtogettothenubofthisstory.Workingwithabsolutelyminimaltraining,basicequipment,mostofwhichwasfashionedonthespotforspecifictasks,andinitiallynoreferencematerial,themenusedtheirnewlydevelopedskillstorendersafeallmannerofexplosivedevicedeployedinandaroundtheBritishmainlandandseachannels.


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Initiallyworkinginisolationandwithonlyadrivertoassistwithnote-taking,thementravelledaroundBritainrespondingtoreportsofthediscoveryofunexplodedordnance.Manypaidtheultimatesacrificeandlosttheirlivesattemptingtorendersafenewlydevelopedandhighlysophisticateddevicesofwhichtheyhadnopriorexperience.Thedetailednotestakendescribingeverystepoftheprocedureprovidedtheonlyguidetothenexteagervolunteertodealwiththattypeofdevice.

Oftenthesenewdeviceswere‘boobytrapped’withanti-withdrawalmechanismsfittedintheminewhichcausedtheordnancetodetonateonanyattempttoremovethefuse.Theminesbelongedtoabroadvariety,rangingfrommagneticinfluence,timedelayandacousticinitiation,andeachtyperequiredspecificproceduresandtoolstorenderitsafe.AsthewarprogressedGermany’stopscientistscontinuedtoimprovethedesignsforbothminesandfusesandthusitwasvitallyimportanttorecordeverystepofaprocedureonnewtypesofordnancethatwerediscovered.Animportantaspectoftheworkofthesemenwastorecoverthesenewformsofordnancesothattechnicalexpertscouldprisethemapart,learnhowtheyworkedanddeviseprocedurestodealwithspecificdevices.

ThemenworkedondrylandandinshallowwaterthroughtheearlyyearsbutsoonrealisedthatthethreatofmineswasjustassignificantintheshippinglanesthatsurroundedEngland.Accompanyingthisrealisationwastheneednotonlytolearntodive,butalsotodevelopasoundunderstandingofdivingmedicineandanextensiveknowledgeofdivingequipmentandprocedures.

Thetaskofbombdisposalisextremelyarduousonland—theaddedcomplicationspresentedbytidesanddeepwatercompoundedtheirtaskandaddedexponentiallytothelevelofrisk.Oftenthewaterwasmurkywithlittlevisibilityandthedangeroftidalspeedsanddiving-relatedmedicalproblemsremaineduppermostintheirminds.

Themurkywatereffectivelyremovedthemajorsenseusedbybombdisposalpersonnel—eyesight.Thisforcedthesebravementoperformtheirtasksbyfeelalone.Imaginebeingintenmetresofmurkywaterwithabsolutelynovisibilityandhavingtodealwitha1500-kganti-shipminebytouchalone!

TwelvemonthsaftertheDDaylandingsthatdrovetheGermansfromthechannelportstheteamsmovedacrosstothecontinentwheretheycommencedtheclearanceofthevitalportfacilitiesrequiredbytheAllies.InitiallytheyhadtofightwiththehierarchywhohadgiventheportclearancetasksinFrancetotheUnitedStates(US)Navyteams.Aftersomeingeniousintelligence-gatheringfromtheAussies,gleanedmainlyfromadrunkenGermanofficerwho,asitturnedout,hadbeeninvolvedintheminingoftheharbours,theboysbeganworklocating,identifyinganddisposingofthedangerousexplosivedevices.

BOOKREVIEWOneFalseMove,BravestoftheBrave:

TheAustralianMineDefusersinWorldWarTwo


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InitiallytheyclearedCherbourgandtheNormandycoastline,eventuallyclearingotherplaceswithveryfamiliarnamessuchasAntwerp,Calais,DieppeandBoulogne.AtthesametimeotherAussieswereoperatinginIndia,whiletheUSNavyhadalsorequestedtwomemberstoassistwithclearanceoperationsintheSouthWestPacificAreasupportingtheUSmilitaryisland-hoppingcampaigntowardstheirultimatetarget—Japan.

Manyofthemenweredemobilisedduringlate1945andbegangoingtheirseparateways.MostreturnedtoAustraliawithinmonthsofthewar’sendbutsomelingeredinEuropecontinuingtheclearanceoperations.

Whiletheinitialfourremainedincontactthroughthepost-waryearstheyrarelymetuntiltheQueen’sCoronationin1953when,havingbeenawardedGeorgeCrossfortheirbravery,theyinvitedtoLondonaspartofthecelebrations.ThiswasthefirsttimethatthefourmenhadbeentogethersincetheearlydaysofthewarandtheywereregaledbytheestablishmentthatwasHMSVernon,thehomeoftheMineBusters.

Thesecourageousmenalldiedofnaturalcausesthrougharangeofillnessesuntilthelastofthisuniquegrouppassedawayin1994andwasaccordedfullmilitaryhonoursathiscremation.ThesefourweretheonlyAustraliansatthetimetoreceivetheGeorgeCross,secondonlytotheVictoriaCrossinrecognisingextraordinarycourage.WartimesecrecymeantthattheirdeedswerenotwidelyknownoutsidethemilitaryEODcommunitythatfollowedintheirfootstepsandthisbookjustlypraisesthesefourpathfindersandtheirexploitsthroughaturbulenttimeinworldhistory.

Ihighlyrecommendthisbooktoallservingandex-servingmembersoftheBombDisposalandEODcommunitiesandtoallwhovaluethelessonsofhistoryandthestoriesofbravebutverymodestmen.

BOOKREVIEWOneFalseMove,BravestoftheBrave:

TheAustralianMineDefusersinWorldWarTwo


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BOOK REVIEW

Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Building for the Second World War

Jean-LouisCohen,CanadianCentreforArchitectureinassociation

withYaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,2011,ISBN9782754105309,

447pp,RRPUS$50.00

ReviewedbyProfessorPeterStanley,UniversityofNewSouthWales,Canberra

DesigndefinesmuchoftheessenceoftheSecondWorldWar.ThedistinctiveappearanceofLancasters,Ju88sorMustangs;ofPanthers,ShermansandJeeps;ofthehelmetsofthecombatantnations,German,AmericanorSoviet,expresstheessenceofthewarasweknowiffromphotographs,filmsandmuseumcollections.Thisbookexaminessomeofitsdesignsandthosewhocreatedthem,givingtheSecondWorldWaritslook.Itspecificallyexploresthebuildingsandotherobjectscreatedbyarchitectswhoseappearanceisintegraltothewayweunderstandthewar—V1rockets,Flaktowers,NissenandQuonsetthuts;thehugebunkersoftheAtlanticwall.FrencharchitecturalhistorianJean-LouisCohencreatedanexhibitionattheCanadianCentreforArchitecture,Montreal,in2011.This,thevastlyenlargedbookoftheexhibition,providesanilluminatingexaminationoftheroleandsignificanceofabroadrangeofthearchitecturalanddesignprofessionsinwartimeEurope,NorthAmericaandJapan.


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Cohenarguesthat,aswellasdestroyinggreatswathesofEuropeandAsia,theSecondWorldWarprovidedanopportunityforthedevelopmentofnewarchitecturalideas,materialsandtechniquesonanunprecedentedscale.Hedemonstrateshowmanyofthecombatantnationsemployedarchitectsascentralproducersofwareconomiesandefforts.Whiletheweaponsmadeintheirfactoriesbombedenemycities,architectsplannednewcities,fromthevastgreen-fieldsiteofOakRidge,Tennessee(homeofpartoftheManhattanProject)toidealisticurbanrenewalinBritaintothevastnewGermancitiesplannedbyAlbertSpeer.InBritainandtheUnitedStates(US)especiallytheneedfornewhousingstimulatedarchitectstoexperimentwithmodular,pre-fabricatedormobilehousing,developingapproachesthatdecisivelychangedurbanarchitecturepost-war.

Cohen’srangeisexemplary,takinginwartimecamouflageandairraidshelters,thecreationoffactories(undergroundandoverground)flaktowers,wartimeexhibitiondesignandinformationpresentation;eventhedesignofconcentrationandexterminationcamps.Heshowshowthestressofwarstimulatedagreatfertilityofcreativeandtechnicalexpertiseinwhichdesignersandarchitectsintroducednewforms,materialsandmethods,oftenworkingunderextremestress.Thescaleoftheirenterpriseisastonishing.IntheUSespecially,thecreationofhugemanufacturingplants(somethesizeofsmallcitiesinthemselves)demandedthedevelopmentandintroductionofmaterialsandmethodsimpossibleadecadeearlier.Oneoftheseplants—thePentagon—remainsatthecoreoftheUS’military-industrialcomplex.Inallthisarchitectswerecentral.Allthecombatantpowersemployedthem—intheUSNavy’sSeebees(CBs—ConstructionBattalions)therewereoverathousand,andtheytookfulladvantageoftheopportunitiesthewarbroughttomakeaswellasbreakthematerialworld.

Thebook’sfocusisthematic,enablingCohentomakecomparisonsbetweennationalapproachestocommonproblemsandneeds—comparisonsoffactoriesintheUSandGermanyandwarmemorialsinseveralbelligerentnationsareparticularlyilluminating.ButtheapproachlimitsCohen’sabilitytoexplorethedistinctivenationalapproaches.ItremainsasourceofwonderwhyGermany,arguablythemostrestrictednationintellectually,producedperhapsthemostinnovativeandattractivedesignsofaircraft,vehiclesandweaponssuchastheV1.

WhileCohen’sscopeappearsuneven—hedealswiththeBaileybridgebutnotthevehiclesthatusedit;withaerodromesandanti-aircraftemplacementsbutnotaircraft—Architecture in Uniformremainsahighlyinformativeandoftenstrikingbook.Someofhissubjectsstrainthetheme:forexample,afascinatingsection

BOOKREVIEWArchitectureinUniform:

DesigningandBuildingfortheSecondWorldWar


Page117

dealswithNormanBelGeddes’svastcollectionofsilverminiatureships,enablinghimtorecreatethebattleofMidwayforLife Magazine,thoughwhatthisaddstotheunderstandingofwartimedesignisunclear.Otherseeminglyirrelevantsubjectsturnouttobehighlypertinent.ThecelebratedcourtatNuremberg,forinstance,wasnotfittedouthaphazardly,butwascarefullydesignedbyanarchitect(admittedly,alandscapearchitect)assistedbynofewerthan30designers,creatingthesceneofoneofthewar’smostprofoundlegaldramas.

Arisingfromanexhibition,Architecture in Uniform reflectsitsoriginsinbothitsnumerousshortsections,highlyreadablethoughprecludingmuchdetail,anditsmanyhighqualityimages,oftenofactualobjects.Despiteitssometimesesotericproseandscreedsofclose-setreferences,ArchitectureinUniformisanabsorbingbookwhichcanbeappreciatedatseverallevels.Therangeandqualityofitshundredsofillustrations,manyincolour,alonemakeitarewardingbook.Indetail,itraisesquestionsabouthowaprofessionwasused,butalsohowitusedthewartoadvanceitsimaginationanditsproduction.CohenmakesnoreferencetoAustralia:whateffectdidAustralianarchitectshaveonitswareffort,andhowdidthewarenablethemtoimagineandcreate?

BOOKREVIEWArchitectureinUniform:

DesigningandBuildingfortheSecondWorldWar


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TITLES TO NOTE

Humanism & Religion: A Call for the Renewal of Western Culture

JensZimmermann,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2012,

ISBN9780199697755,392pp,RRPUS$150.00

Thequestionofwho‘we’areandwhatvisionofhumanity‘we’assumeinWesterncultureliesattheheartofhotlydebatedtopicsontheroleofreligionineducation,politicsandcultureingeneral.TheWest’sculturalrootlessnessandlackofculturalidentityarealsorevealedbythefailureofmulticulturalismtointegratereligiouslyvibrantimmigrantcultures.JensZimmermanncontendsthatthemaincauseoftheWest’sculturalmalaiseisthelong-standingseparationofreasonandfaith.Humanism & Religion suggeststhattheWestcanre-articulateitsidentityandrenewitsculturalpurposebyrecoveringthehumanisticethosthatoriginallyshapedWesternculture.Humanism & ReligiontracesthereligiousrootsofhumanismfrompatristictheologythroughtheRenaissanceandintomodernphilosophy,examiningtheoriginalcorrelationofreasonandfaith.Zimmermanncombineshumanism,religionandhermeneuticphilosophytore-imaginehumanismforourcurrentculturalandintellectualclimate.Zimmermannhasundertakenthisinvestigationinthehopethatitwillencourage,onceagain,thecorrelationofreasonandfaithinordertoovercomecurrentculturalimpasses.


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Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies

SamTangredi,NavalInstitutePress,Annapolis,2013,

ISBN9781612511863,320pp,RRPUS$47.95

Anti-Access Warfareisthefirstbooktoexaminetheconceptofanti-accessandarea-denialwarfare.Tangredihasapproachedthisconcept,oftenreferredtobyitsacronym,A2/ADwarfare,fromitsnavalrootsinawaylargelyignoredbytheevenmostinfluentialcommentators.Tangrediarguesthat,whiletheUShasidentifiedA2/ADasthestrategyofchoiceforitsenemiesintothefuture,theconceptitselfispoorlyunderstood.Whileostensiblyapost-ColdWareratechnology-drivenphenomenon,TangreditracesthehistoricalrootsofA2/ADwarfaretorevealitstruenatureasaroutineelementofthegrandstrategyofweakerpowersagainststrongerones.Ratherthanarguingagainstarelianceonmaritimeforceslikemanycommentators,presumablybecausetheseforcesarenolongerregardedassurvivableintheeraofadvancedstand-offdefences,Tangrediuseshistoricalanalysistopresentmaritimeforcesasakeyto‘breakingtheGreatWalls’ofnationssuchasIranandChina.

Shadows of ANZAC: An Intimate History of Gallipoli

DavidCameron,BigSkyPublishing,Newport,2013,

ISBN9781922132185,352pp,RRPAUD$29.99

Shadows of ANZACpresentsauniqueinternationalperspectiveoftheANZACexperienceatGallipoli.ThestoriesthatcomprisethishandsomeandvariedcollectionaretoldbyprotagonistsbothfromtheAlliednations—Australian,NewZealand,British,Indian—andfromtheranksoftheTurkswhoweredefendingtheirhomeland.DavidCameronachievesaholisticrepresentationoftheconflictthroughtheuseofprimaryandsecondarysourcesandtheexperiencesofcombatantsandciviliansalike.Anintenselypersonalcollection,Shadows of ANZACpaintsavividpictureofthedailystruggleonthepeninsula,highlightingthe

absurdity,monotonyandhumourthatsatalongsidethehorrorofthecampaign.

TITLESTONOTE


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War From The Ground Up

EmileSimpson,Scribe,Melbourne,2013,ISBN9780231704069,

256pp,RRPAUD$55.95

Drawingonpersonalexperienceandacollectionoflittle-knowncasestudiesrangingfromNepaltoBorneo,WarFromTheGroundUpoffersadistinctivetakeoncontemporaryarmedconflict.Whilemostaccountsofwarpeerdownatthebattlefieldfromanacademicperspective,oracrossitthroughpersonalnarrative,Simpsonlooksoutfromthebattlefieldtoconsidertheconceptsthatledtotheconflictandhowtheyplayedoutontheground.Theauthorarguesthat,incontemporaryconflicts,liberalpowersandtheirarmedforceshaveblurredthelinebetweenmilitaryandpoliticalactivity.Theyhavechallengedthedistinctionbetweenwarandpeace.Simpsoncontendsthatthislossofclarityismorearesponsetotheconditionsofcombatintheearlytwenty-firstcentury,particularlythatofglobalisation,thanadeliberatechoice.TheissueisthereforenotwhethertheWestshouldengageinsuchpractices,buthowtomanage,gainadvantagefrom,andmitigatetherisksofthisevolutioninwarfare.WarFromTheGroundUpdrawsheavilyonpersonalanecdotesfromthefrontline,relatedtohistoricalcontextandstrategicthought,tore-evaluatetheconceptofwarincontemporaryconflict.

Broken Nation: Australians in the Great War

JoanBeaumont,Allen&Unwin,Sydney,2013,ISBN9781741751383,

656pp,RRPAUD$55.00

Broken NationskilfullyblendsallfacetsoftheFirstWorldWarintoasinglestory.CombiningtheplightofthefightingsoldierwiththeimpactofthewarontheAustralianhomefront,JoanBeaumontpaintsthebroadcanvasofAustralianlifeduringthewarthatmanybelievedefinedthenation.StoriesoffamousbattlessuchasGallipoliandtheSommesitalongsidethoseoflesserknowbattlesinbothEuropeandtheMiddleEastandtheimpactofthesecampaignsreverberatesagainsttheAustralianbackdropwithitsconscriptiondebateandthefirstsignsoftheSpanishflubroughthomebyreturningservicemen.Beaumontdescribesthefearandcourage,bothathomeandinthetheatreofconflict,engenderedinthepeopleofthefledglingAustraliannationbytheimmensetragedythatwastheFirstWorldWar.

TITLESTONOTE


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SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security

StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI),Oxford

UniversityPress,Oxford,2013,ISBN9780199678433,584pp,RRP£100

TheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI)isanindependentinternationalinstitutededicatedtoresearchintoconflict,armaments,armscontrolanddisarmament.SIPRIprovidesdata,analysisandrecommendationsbasedonopensourcestopolicymakers,researchers,mediaandtheinterestedpublic.The44theditionoftheSIPRI Yearbookanalysesdevelopmentsin2012intheareasofsecurityandconflict,militaryspendingandarmaments,non-proliferation,armscontrolanddisarmament.Inadditiontoanalysisfromitscontributingresearchers,theSIPRI Yearbook alsocontainsextensiveannexesontheimplementationofarmscontrolanddisarmamentagreementsandachronologyofeventsduringtheyearintheareaofsecurityandarmscontrol.PurchasersoftheprinteditionwillalsobeabletoaccesstheYearbookonline.

Investment in Blood: The True Cost of Britain’s War in Afghanistan

FrankLedwidge,YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,2013,

ISBN9780300190625,270pp,RRPUS$54.95

Inhisfollow-uptoLosing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan,FrankLedwidgearguesthatBritainhaspaidaheavypriceinfinancialandhumantermsforitsinvolvementinthewarinAfghanistan.Basedoninterviews,rigorousonsiteresearch,andofficialinformationobtainedthroughtheFreedomofInformationAct,LedwidgeexaminesthepricepaidbyBritishsoldiersandtheirfamilies,taxpayersintheUKandAfghancitizens,highlightingthethousandsofdeathsandinjuries,andtheenormousamountofmoneyspentbolsteringtheAfghangovernment.Healsoinvestigatesthelong-termdamagetotheBritishmilitary’sinternationalreputation,yetanothercostoftheprotractedcampaign.

TITLESTONOTE


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Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheiks, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda

BillArdolino,NavalInstitutePress,Annapolis,2013,

ISBN9781612511283,320pp,RRPUS$36.95

Basedonmorethan120interviewswithIraqisandUSMarines,ArdolinodescribeshowacompanyofMarinereservists,inanunlikelyalliancewithlocaltriballeaders,succeededwherepreviouseffortshadstalledandhelpedtosecureFallujahagainstthereinvigoratedinsurgencyduringtheriseinAlQaeda-ledviolencein2006.Anexhaustiveuseofdocumentation,completewithmapsandphotographs,allowsFallujah Awakenstoenhancethereader’sunderstandingofthestruggleforthisiconiccity.

Carrier Attack Darwin 1942: The Complete Guide to Australia’s own Pearl Harbour

TomLewis&PeterIngham,AvonmoreBooks,KentTown,2013,

ISBN9780987151933,368pp,RRPAUD$49.95

WhenthePacificWarerupted,fewcouldhavepredictedtheextraordinaryscaleandferocityofthe19February1942raidonDarwin.Amassivestrikeforce,bloodedatPearlHarborjustweeksbefore,hitDarwininthebiggestJapaneseairattackeverlaunchedintheSouthPacific.Sincethen,generationsofAustralianshavebeendrawntothestoriesandfolkloreoftheDarwinaction.Butfactshaveblurredandmythologyhasthrived.Carrier AttacktestsmanyDarwinmythsandrevealsnewinformation:anothershipsunk;theactualintentandnatureoftheattack;thepreciseextentoftheJapaneselosses.TheDarwinraidisusuallyportrayedasawholesaledisasterfortheAllies,andadaymarkedbymilitaryineptitude.Carrier Attackshowsthatthedefenderswerealertandfoughtwithpurpose.ArguablyitwastheJapanesewhowastedmuchoftheirattackingstrength,allowingtheDarwindefenderstoavertamuchlargercatastrophe.Carrier AttackprovidesatimelyandfreshanalysisoftheraiddrawingonbothAlliedand,importantly,specificallytranslatedJapanesesources.

TITLESTONOTE


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Digger’s Story: Surviving the Japanese POW Camps was Just the Beginning

DavidBarrett&BrianRobertson,FiveMilePress,Scoresby,2012,

ISBN9781743007426,254pp,RRPAUD$32.95

Digger’s Storyisanever-before-toldaccountofayoungmedicalorderlytakenprisonerbytheJapaneseinMalayaandsenttoChangiprison.Digger’s Story isanaccountbothoflifeasaprisoneroftheJapaneseduringWorldWarIIandasanex-prisonerofwarfollowingliberation.ThestorybeginswithadescriptionofthehorrorsoftheThai-Burmarailwayincludingtheneedforamedicalorderlytostepforwardandtakeontheresponsibilitiesofasurgeontoensurehismate’ssurvival.ThestorymovestotheprogressofAustralianpost-warracerelations,thecataloguingofAlliedgravesontheThai-BurmarailwayfortheWarGravesCommissionandthestoryoftheAustralianReparationsCommittee.Digger’s Story providesanewperspectiveonthelivesandstrugglesofAustralianprisonersoftheJapanese,bothduringandafterWorldWarII.

Hell on Earth: Sandakan – Australia’s Greatest War Tragedy

MicheleCunningham,Hachette,Sydney,2013,ISBN9780733629891,

352pp,RRPAUD$35.00

SandakanisacknowledgedasoneofthegreatestmilitarytragediesinAustralia’shistory.FollowingthefallofSingaporealmost3000Alliedprisonersofwar,including1500Australians,weretakenfromChangitoSandakanPrisonCamp.MicheleCunninghamhasutilisedarchivalresearchinAustraliaandBritainandinterviewswithsurvivorsoftheBorneocampaign,aswellasaccesstopreviouslyoverlookedJapanesesources,topresentabroadviewoftheeventsatSandakanPrisonCampandthesubsequent‘deathmarches’topreventtheprisoners’liberationbyadvancingAlliedforces.Hell on Earthisastoryofbravery,brutalityandsurvival,whichdescribesinsomedetailtheeventssurroundingthiswartime

tragedy.

TITLESTONOTE


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The Unknown ANZACS: The Real Stories of our National Legend

MichaelCaulfield,Hachette,Sydney,2013,ISBN9780733629327,

320pp,RRPAUD$50.00

Atimelypublicationasweapproachthe100thanniversaryoftheFirstWorldWar,The Unknown ANZACSaimstopresentanauthenticportraitofAustraliansfightingandlivingthroughthebloodiestconflictsofthewar.UsingexcerptsfromdiariesthathadbeencollectedattheMitchellLibraryinSydneysince1918,MichaelCaulfieldhascreatedapreviouslyuntoldaccountofayoungcountryatwar.Hisbookcoversallthemajortheatresofthewarandthestoriesaretoldinthewordsofthemenandwomenwhoexperiencedthem.The Unknown ANZACsbreathesnewlifeintothestoriesofAustraliansfightingintheFirstWorldWarpresentingthemtoawholenewgenerationforwhomtheyarethestuffoflegend.

TITLESTONOTE

Awardedto

Captain Mark Bali

‘Niche Threat? Organic Peroxides as Terrorist Explosives’

LieutenantGeneralDavidMorrison,AOChiefofArmy

For the contribution to the understanding of land warfare

Australian Army Journal Chauvel Essay Prize 2012-13


Page126

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

TheeditorsoftheAustralian Army Journalwelcomesubmissionsfromanysource.Twoprimecriteriaforpublicationareanarticle’sstandardofwrittenEnglishexpressionanditsrelevancetotheAustralianprofessionofarms.Thejournalwillacceptletters,featurearticles,andreviewessays.Asageneralguideonlength,lettersshouldnotexceed500words;andarticlesandreviewessaysshouldbebetween3000and6000words.Readersshouldnotethatarticleswritteninserviceessayformatarediscouraged,sincetheyarenotgenerallysuitableforpublication.

EachmanuscriptshouldbesubmittedtotheAustralian Army Journalemailaddress,dflw.publications@defence.gov.au.Formoreinformationseewww.army.gov.au/Our-future

Pleasemakesureyoursubmissionincludesthefollowingdetails:

• Author’sfullname

• Currentposting,positionorinstitutionalaffiliation

• Fullmailingaddress

• Contactdetailsincludingphonenumber(s)andemailaddress(es)

Pleasealsoincludethefollowingfieldsinyoursubmission:

• 100-wordarticleabstract(pleaseseethefollowingabstractguidelines)

• 100-wordauthorbiography(pleaseseethefollowingbiographyguidelines)

• Acronym/abbreviationslist

mailto:dflw.publications%40defence.gov.au?subject=Australian%20Army%20Journal%20Submission

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Thearticlemustbepresentedinthefollowingformat/style:

• MicrosoftWord(.doc)orRichTextFormat(.rtf)

• 1.5linespacing

• 12-pointTimesNewRoman

• 2.5cmmarginonallsides

• Automaticwordprocessedendnotes

General style

Allsourcescitedasevidenceshouldbefullyandaccuratelyreferencedinendnotes(notfootnotes).Bookscitedshouldcontaintheauthor’sname,thetitle,thepublisher,theplaceofpublication,theyearandthepagereference.Thisissueofthejournalcontainsexamplesoftheappropriatestyleforreferencing.Whenusingquotations,thepunctuation,capitalisationandspellingofthesourcedocumentshouldbefollowed.Singlequotationmarksshouldbeused,withdoublequotationmarksonlyforquotationswithinquotations.Quotationsofthirtywordsormoreshouldbeindentedasaseparateblockoftextwithoutquotationmarks.Quotationsshouldbecitedinsupportofanargument,notasauthoritativestatements.Numbersshouldbespeltoutuptoninety-nine,exceptinthecaseofpercentages,whereArabicnumeralsshouldbeused(andpercentshouldalwaysbespeltout).Allmanuscriptsshouldbepaginated,andtheuseofabbreviations,acronymsandjargonkepttoaminimum.AustralianEnglishistobeused.

Abstracts

Themostimmediatefunctionofanabstractistosummarisethemajoraspectsofapaper.Butanexcellentabstractgoesfurther;itwillalsotoencourageareadertoreadtheentirearticle.Forthisreasonitshouldbeanengaginglywrittenpieceofprosethatisnotsimplyarewriteoftheintroductioninshorterform.Itshouldinclude:

• Purposeofthepaper

• Issuesorquestionsthatmayhavearisenduringyourresearch/discussion

• Conclusionsthatyouhavereached,andifrelevant,anyrecommendations.

Biographies

Yourbiographyshouldbeabrief,conciseparagraph,whoselengthshouldnotexceedeightlines.Thebiographyistoincludethecontributor’sfullnameandtitle,abriefsummaryofcurrentorpreviousservicehistory(ifapplicable)anddetailsof

NOTESFORCONTRIBUTORS


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educationalqualifications.Contributorsoutsidetheservicesshouldidentifytheinstitutiontheyrepresent.Anyotherinformationconsideredrelevant—forexample,sourcedocumentationforthosearticlesreprintedfromanotherpublication—shouldalsobeincluded.

NOTESFORCONTRIBUTORS