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August 2003 Blackout Review
Brant Eldridge
Executive Manager - ECAR
Presentation Topics
ECAR Overview
Blackout Review
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Current ECAR Members (22)Allegheny PowerAmerican Electric PowerBig Rivers Electric CorporationCinergy CorporationConsumers EnergyDayton Power & Light CompanyDTE EnergyDuke Energy North AmericaDuquesne Light CompanyEast Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc.FirstEnergyGrid AmericaHoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.Indianapolis Power & Light CompanyInternational Transmission CompanyLGE EnergyMichigan Electric Transmission Company, LLCMidwest Independent System OperatorNorthern Indiana Public Service CompanyOhio Valley Electric CorporationPJM Interconnection LLCVectren Energy Delivery of Indiana
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Current Associate Members (16) American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc. Buckeye Power, Inc. Municipal Cooperative Coordinated Pool Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc. Indiana Municipal Power Agency Independent Electricity Market Operator Commonwealth Edison Tennessee Valley Authority Cargill Power Markets, LLC Mirant Americas, LLP Constellation Power Source, Inc. Conective Energy Supply, Inc. FirstEnergy Solutions, Inc. CMS Energy Resource Management Company Edison Mission Marketing and Trading PSEG Power, LLC
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Blackout Review
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Previous Major Outages
November 9, 1965 30 Million People Affected 20,800 MW Load Dropped 13 Hours to Restore New York, New England, Pennsylvania, Ontario
July 13, 1977 9 Million People 6,000 MW 26 Hours New York City
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Previous Major Outages
August 10, 1996 7.5 Million People 28,000 MW 9 Hours 12 Western States
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July 2, 19962 Million People11,850 MWSeveral Hours14 Western States, 2 Canadian Provinces, Baja
Mexico
August 14, 2003 Outage
Largest Cascading Blackout Ever 50 Million People 61,800 MW 45 Hours Ohio, Michigan, Ontario, Quebec, Northern
New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York City
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4:13 PM – Cascading sequence essentially complete
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Principal Investigations of August 14, 2003 Blackout
U. S – Canada Power System Outage Task Force Interim Report issued November 2003 Final Report issued April 2004
North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Provided significant technical input to U.S. –
Canada investigation Initial Report issued February 2004 Final Report issued July 2004
ECAR Two Reports issued February 2004 “Technical Report” and “Recommendations
Report”11
Key Findings U.S. – Canada Task Force Investigation
Initiation of blackout occurred in FirstEnergy’s system in northern OhioBlackout could have been preventedBlackout caused by deficiencies in specific practices, equipment, and human decisions by various organizationsFour basic causes of blackout Inadequate system understanding Inadequate situational awareness Inadequate tree trimming Inadequate Reliability Coordinator diagnostic
supportFinal Report available on DOE and NERC websites
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Key Findings NERC Investigation
Violations of existing NERC reliability standards contributed to blackout
FE’s system in northeast Ohio was being operated with insufficient reactive margins
Relay protection and controls could be used more effectively to slow or minimize spread of a cascading outage
Key contributing factors from previous blackouts were repeated “Three T’s”
Final Report available on NERC website13
Common Elements Of Major Outages
Trees Vegetation Management
Tools For system operators to monitor and assess wide area
to evaluate what actions are needed to arrest a potential major outage
Training Simulators, structured programs, drills to assure that
operators are prepared to take appropriate actions
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“Three T’s”
Key Findings ECAR Investigation
Two primary factors led to the disturbance Tripping of lines below their emergency ratings Insufficient intervention to relieve line overloads
Absence of either primary factor would probably have avoided the disturbance becoming a cascading blackout
Secondary factor that caused system conditions to be worse than otherwise as outages occurred was shortage of reactive resources in initiating area But this factor did not initiate the disturbance
Final Reports available on ECAR website15
Examples of Blackout Investigation Recommendations
U. S. – Canada Task Force Need for Congress to pass reliability legislation that would
make compliance with reliability standards mandatory and enforceable with penalties for non-compliance
Development of regulator-approved funding mechanism for NERC/RRCs to ensure independence from parties they oversee
Evaluate and develop appropriate modifications to existing institutional framework for reliability management
Examine and clarify future role of RRCs with focus on mandate, scope, governance, responsibilities, resource requirements, geographical boundaries
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Examples of Blackout Investigation Recommendations
Remedial actions by FE, MISO, and PJM by June 30, 2004 to address causes of August 14, 2003 blackout
Strengthen and implement communication protocols between Reliability Coordinators, Control Areas, and RTOs
Review, update, and train on contingency plans for loss of monitoring and control systems
Review, update, and train on emergency plans Confirm that transmission line ROWs are clear of
obstructions Readiness audits of Control Areas and Reliability
Coordinators Re-evaluate system design, planning, and operating criteria Develop standard for vegetation management
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NERC
Examples of Blackout Investigation Recommendations
Take action regarding violations of NERC standards on August 14, 2003
Conduct “peer review” of ECAR member companies seasonal and long-term transmission assessments
Audit existing vegetation management plans and adherence to the plans
Confirm that ECAR RCs have authority to order CAs to drop firm load if deemed necessary to prevent a cascading outage, and that CAs will do so if ordered
Review reactive and voltage practices of ECAR members Revise existing ECAR Documents/develop new ones, as
needed, to address blackout investigation recommendations
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ECAR
Closing Observations
Since August 2003 blackout, considerable progress has been made to minimize likelihood of another blackout
Demand for electricity (load) continues to grow As does generation capacity to serve the load
In last two decades, relatively little new transmission infrastructure has been built
Interconnected transmission system is now being used in ways for which it wasn’t designed Long distance transfers of large amounts of power
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Closing Observations
Until transmission system gets enhanced/improved, system operators have to be even more vigilant than normal and ready to deal with problem situations to avoid potential major outages
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Transmission system is operating with less overall margin than in past Operating closer to limits more of the time More vulnerable to something going wrong
Closing Observations
Enactment of reliability legislation to make compliance with reliability standards mandatory and enforceable
Enactment of broad policies that foster a healthier grid investment climate New transmission lines are needed in some areas Also need to utilize new technologies to enable existing lines
to carry more capacity reliably
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Two key things need to happen to improve the current situation
QUESTIONS ?
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