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Following the political events in Libya and in the framework of its Mediterranean Program, the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) dedicates the entire July issue of its monthly publication Atlantic Voices to the future of Libya from a security angle. The article by Samir Battiss examines the current political, economic and security situation in Libya and draws several scenarios for future security governance. He thereby especially looks at the role NATO and EU could play.
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ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 1
Volume 2 - Issue 7, July 2012
C ivil wars usually create a profound schism among populations. In the case
of the Libyan civil war, the upshot of the conflict goes beyond the provin-
cial and tribal divisions since the influx of conventional weapons sparked a
new security concern: weapons trafficking. The extent of post-conflict efforts to be made
could be surely compared to the Afghanistan case given that the challenges ahead for the
transitional authorities are substantial. The non-Arab countries, whose help was welcomed
by the Qaddafi opposition, should act very carefully in the aftermath in order not to repeat
mistakes made in the past. Certainly, they possess many national and institutional tools
which could end up being useful. Likewise, Arab countries could also play a significant role
in re-building the country. However, it is up to the current and future Libyan representa-
tives to ask for help should they need it.
The development of the relationship between the West and the southern part of the
Mediterranean area has never really given satisfaction to any of the protagonists, though this
was punctuated by positive outcomes over an extended period. Several reminiscent issues
LIBYA, THE DAY AFTER Future political and security developments and Euro-Atlantic security
July 7th 2012 marks an important date for the
people of Libya. They were called to elect their
General National Council (GNC). The GNC will
now appoint a Prime Minister and cabinet for the
country. This means that the country has started
its long and winding transition path towards de-
mocracy.
The post-Qaddafi transition must ensure an
effective rule of law which translates, among oth-
ers, into democratic security governance. For this
difficult undertaking, however, Libya will need
help from the outside in order to cover the full
picture of security challenges when building up
security authorities. How can Western institu-
tions, above all NATO, EU and OSCE, provide
appropriate support?
Following the political events in Libya and in
the framework of its Mediterranean Program, the
Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) dedicates the
entire July issue of its monthly publication Atlantic
Voices to the future of Libya from a security angle.
The article by Samir Battiss examines the current
political, economic and security situation in Libya
and draws several scenarios for future security
governance. He thereby especially looks at the
role NATO and EU could play.
Florian Bauernfeind
What future for the Libyan security sector after the end of the Qaddafi regime?
IS
SN
2294-1
274
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 2
sustain. From the perspective of the south rim, the interference
of western countries and to some extent the attitude of superior-
ity often displayed by some can rather be perceived as paternalis-
tic. Consequences of such behavior often undermine cooperation
in many areas including democratization, liberalization of the
economy, and effective protection of human rights. A truth to be
told, the western countries have lost their dominant influence in
international affairs, especially over the last two decades, by
being constantly challenged by other actors. Yet it would be
presumptuous to categorize the challengers as a homogenous
group of countries or a whole. Besides, it would be premature to
consider the “emerged powers” as able or as prone to fill in the
vacuum caused by the progressive withdrawal or inability of the
western countries when coping with crises.
The perception of Libya’s security challenges
Political and economic developments
The future political system of Libya remains uncertain because of
diverging views on several aspects. However, the different Lib-
yan groups unanimously recognize that political reforms must
not be “remote-controlled” from outside. Secondly, the future
political system will enshrine the tenants of a traditionalist, fun-
damentally Muslim country, where “lay extremists” (lay progres-
sives) have no real power
even if they are motivated
and strive to be present on
the international media
stage. The Islamist move-
ment is today dominated
by the Libyan equivalent of
the Muslim Brotherhood.
The victory of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, the
Ennahda party in Tunisia
and the PJD in Morocco
could have represented a trend for what could happen in the
elections in July 2012 initially aiming at setting up a body to
draft a constitution and oversee a referendum on the draft. But
pre-election tensions led the National Transitional Council
(NTC) to rule that the constitutional panel would be elected by
late spring 2013 (election of a Prime Minister and appointment
of a legitimately elected representative government). In the long
run, the traditionalists could feel themselves strengthened and
more influential than local politicians if the legitimate govern-
ment fails to give the Libyans their lost dignity. It certainly took
several decades for the previously named political parties to take
office in their related country because they first had to protect
themselves from autocratic regimes or to be strictly screened.
But politics in old as in new democracies is based on the relation-
ship between the leaders and the people yet the basic democra-
cies imply coalitions, disagreement among political allies, and
sooner or later the possibility to opt for a change in power. The
Muslim nationalists are also influential. The Salaafists remain a
minority and should not be compared to the “Al Qaeda in Islamic
Maghreb” (AQIM). The influence of Abdelhakim Belhadj, ini-
tially supported by Qatar, and commanding about 300 men
(“defenders of the faith”) has been greatly overestimated by Al-
Jazeera as well as in the western media because he met Osama
Bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
In addition to the religions and tribal factors, it should be
remembered that the cities historically played a role in political
life in Libya by contributing to the self-identification of the peo-
ple. According to Libya experts this factor is decisive and will
have the strongest influence on the future of the country. The
western analysts often seek a transferable “model” but Libya is
neither Iraq, nor Afghanistan, nor Somalia even if we can find
some similarities. Unlike the previous examples, the country has
no problem of religious
sectarianism. The role of
the cities could be more
influential than the com-
monly shared perception
by western media accord-
ing to which the Libyan
political life is only domi-
nated by the tribes. Geo-
graphical data will play a
major for the next stage of
evolution of Libya. As the
recent political declarations show, the division between Tripoli-
tania and Cyrenaica is still very clear and transcends the tribal
sphere of influence.
Political developments are tightly linked to the following
issue: Which groups will control the economic leverage, i.e. oil
and natural resources’ revenues and financial assets abroad?
Libya’s average oil estimates are about twenty years of oil re-
serves (43 billion barrels) and foreign banks hold around $150 bn
of Libyan assets. To date, the NTC has recovered $21 bn from
Libyans celebrating the end of the Qaddafi regime at Martyrs Square in Tripoli
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 3
As far as the political system
is concerned, the confederalist con-
stitutional model (Canadian or
Swiss), often discussed within acade-
mia, could provide a starting point
but could not be an end per se. No
western model could ever entirely
catch the local characteristics and
balance of powers. But western mod-
els could provide a basic framework
for equal entitlement to revenues
from natural wealth among different
areas. Meanwhile, they enable the country to embrace the reality
on the ground. At the end, only the Libyans can choose the path
they want to follow. But without a proactive policy approach of
this kind among the allies, rivalry to control oil revenues and
assets will inevitably lead to renewed violence and to the estab-
lishment of a political system different from the one initially
“promised” by the NTC1.
Security developments
The border question
Today, the transitional Libyan central authorities have the sup-
port of the neighboring countries in democracy development.
Foreign troops also take part in this challenge, not directly but
through the training of forces. Well before Operation Unified
Protector, the border between Tripolitania and Tunisia has been
subject to countless crossings by legal and illegal migrants. No
real natural frontier has marked the border, and the ethnic com-
position, language, value systems, and traditions of the two peo-
ples are close. It should be noted that the political relations with
Tunisia remain excellent. It is the only country that Libya has no
visa requirements with. The Cyrenaica
region is contiguous with Egypt, and
here, too, the border is not naturally
defined. Illegal as well as legal crossings
are frequent. Political relations with
Egypt have always been complex but
important and “manageable”. As the Muslim Brotherhood came
to power in Egypt, relations with Libya could become easier
than expected. By contrast, Fezzan's borders with Algeria, Ni-
ger, and Chad are rarely crossed because of the almost total
emptiness of the desert countryside. The control of the border
was de facto delegated to the Tuareg in the southwest and the
the council's sanctions committee, and the UN Security Council
lifted sanctions on Libya's central bank and its offshore subsidiary
bank. Later, the US Treasury Department said it had unblocked
more than $30 bn in Libyan government assets. This was to face
growing demands for wages, medication and reconstruction as
well as inflation. Despite the current difficulties, this country
will remain a robust rentier state in the foreseeable future. Ac-
cording to the expectations of the NATO/European allies of a
democratic regime (regime change was the final end state), the
questions remain whether the revenue will be fairly redistributed
among the population and if some mechanisms will ensure an
appropriate use.
Economically, Libya will face several challenges to overcome
the problems well known by rentier states, namely economic
diversification. As far as the financial assets held by foreign banks
are concerned, there are some risks of political confrontations/
competition within the country – between those who will claim
to be its representatives, and between the financial industries and
the allies. The second spectrum of challenges could be more
difficult for the allies. In accordance with the values they militar-
ily defended, western allies will push for
starting a “democratic” political reform
and for signing the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. On the other hand,
Libya could be a very profitable market
for their security/military industries.
Too aggressive an attitude could push the Libyan leaders to seek
new providers of modern technologies (nuclear power stations,
sophisticated weapons); a more “understanding” behavior which
would take local characteristics into consideration might allow
them to compete for major contracts (oil, arms, civilian tech-
nologies).
Political relations with Egypt have always been complex but important
and “manageable”.
Rocket-propelled grenade heads held at National Transitional Council HQ in Abu Sleen
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 4
Tubu in the southeast. Border control and keeping the traditional
forms of land tenure were part of the deal with the previous
regime in the 1980s to achieve a fully unified Libya. After the
military operation and the collapse of Col. Qaddafi’s regime, the
control over the borders is more important because of the com-
bination of several factors. First, the disappearance of thousands
of small arms and light weapons – caches in the south were dis-
covered by the transitional authorities. Moreover, there is the
political-diplomatic aspect, mainly regarding the attitude of Al-
geria during the operation and its reluctance to recognize the
NTC as representative of the Libyan people. The Algerian au-
thorities were opposed to the intervention close to their terri-
tory and are suspected to still host Qaddafi’s family members. In
the south, Mali and Niger periodically face Tuareg rebellions.
The question of border control is, however, directly linked
to the state of the security sector in the aftermath of the civil
war.
The (re)-construction of the security sector
Since the army no longer exists, there is a risk that the new Lib-
yan authorities will limit their security activities to law and or-
der, the control of the coastal area, the cities and the oil fields.
Even if the transitional leaders seem determined to fight AQIM
and the “foreign” incursions, the lack of security instruments
would in practice mean abandoning a part of the deep South to
the Tuareg and AQIM.
The former Libyan rebels – lately
renamed the ‘National Liberation Army’
by the NTC (May 2011) – consisted of
roughly 17,000 troops. They used to
consist of two groups: defectors from the
Libyan armed forces and volunteers with no military experience.
It is hard to know exactly how many of these groups have spon-
taneously disbanded after the conflict and returned home.
Islamist fighters, while present to a very small extent (and
needed for their military skills), did not play a significant role.
Current transitional authorities face substantial challenges in
trying to provide a secured environment necessary for recon-
struction and political reform. A quick look at the previous cases
in Africa or elsewhere teaches us that post-conflict security is
invariably a much more complex undertaking than security re-
form in relative peace. It depends on many factors like the to-
pography, geography and the size of the population. The agreed
upon ration for security provisions is around 13 troops per 1,000
inhabitants. As far as the Libyan situation is concerned, there are
two opposing views whose posture depends on the nature of the
threat. On the one hand, to physically monitor the country’s
borders as a whole in order to counter threats from outside, an
oversized army is required. First estimates would lead to the
recruitment and training of 100,000 military personnel. First of
all, this would mean absorbing as many fighters as possible from
the militia forces, at the risk of creating an ineffective military
and endangering the stability of the government authorities. The
second scenario takes into consideration an environment where
Libya is not facing any outside danger and is unable to keep effec-
tive control over its around 4,500 km land borders and the
1,770 km coastline. In this context, some would argue in favor
of maintaining small but well trained armed forces (25,000 to
50,000 men). Moreover, close cooperation with local internal
security forces would also allow to fulfill the law and order mis-
sions and to protect the oil fields and the strategic facilities and
infrastructures.
But the Libyan army of tomorrow is far from being created
in the current élite offices in Tripoli and in western capitals. The
new elected government of the post-Qaddafi Libya will have no
choice but to build an entirely new military force. Rather than
simply merging rebel and regime forces, a third way should be
explored. A Demobilization-Disarmament-Reintegration (DDR)
program takes several months or years to be negotiated and to be
implemented, and decades to achieve its
goal. Demobilization alone without assis-
tance in financial or educational terms
and without the creation of alternatives
on the labor market has proven to be a
recipe for disaster.
NATO and European nations as “hammer” to fix the security “nail”?
Threats and risks are commonly perceived according to a na-
tion’s background. As Abraham Maslow stated: “If you only have
a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.” For multilat-
eral institutions such as NATO, combating global security
threats will continue to be the rationale behind their actions. The
lessons learned from previous interventions have suggested that
building a comprehensive security system is vital. NATO’s assis-
tance in creating sound armed forces seems to be appropriate
given the organization purpose and the onward challenges. Nev-
ertheless, a positive outcome will depend on close cooperation
Post-conflict security is invariably a much more complex undertaking than
security reform in relative peace.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 5
tent, with partners in Africa in general.
European countries could also mobilize two additional secu-
rity tools: the Civilian Response Team (CRT) and the European
Gendarmerie Force (EGF). The CRT concept has been devel-
oped under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 in order to enhance
the EU’s rapidly deployable capability for civilian crisis manage-
ment.2 The idea of
a CRT refers to
the readiness for
d e p l o y m e n t
within five days
on request of the
Secretary Gen-
eral/High Repre-
sentative, the
Political and Secu-
rity Committee or
the Council and to
a stay in the field
for up to three
months. Acting as a bridging mechanism in the first phase of a
mission, its objectives include: assessment and fact-finding mis-
sions; the rapid establishment of an initial presence in the field
after a Joint Action and support of the deployment of a civilian
crisis management operation; reinforcement of existing EU
mechanisms for crisis management, notably in assistance of an
EU Special Representative; and finally, logistical support. Fol-
lowing the approval of the CRT concept document by the Coun-
cil on 18 July 2005, further work was undertaken in order for
the recommendations to materialize. Such a civilian crisis man-
agement rapid reaction capability consists of troops flexible in
terms of both size and structure, made-up of national experts pre
-selected through national timetables in accordance with agreed
criteria and procedures. Completed by
2007, the pool of 100 European experts
brings an added value through the CRTs’
potential to offer reliable, trained exper-
tise that can be mobilized at very short
notice. Although such a new tool should
not be seen as an end or ‘definitive solution’ to the EU’s capaci-
ties gap in civilian crisis management, civilian response teams
aim to increase the rapid reaction capacity, and they also contrib-
ute to the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU’s crisis response,
as well as to its coherence with other actors. The objectives of
with the next legitimate Libyan representatives.
Short term objective: Set up new Libyan security forces
The newly elected representatives should initially be the sole
decision-makers for setting up security forces. This implies to
disbanding militias and an effective DDR process. The recruit-
ment should in-
clude all factions
including the for-
mer Qaddafi-
supporters as part
of the reconcilia-
tion process. As a
series of gradual
changes, the mili-
t a r y se rv i ce s
should be the first
to go through this
process which
ultimately could
be a stepping stone in achieving peace among civilians later on.
Efforts may be reinforced through the assistance of NATO mem-
ber states which could provide technical services. NATO mem-
bers have gained experience in military training drawn from the
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the prospective
Operational Mentor and Liaison Team-Libya, a NATO initiative,
could respond timely to the local needs after careful appreciation
of Libya’s own set of security issues and cultural differences.
Such a group of instructors could consist of experienced person-
nel, not only from NATO Allies but also from the partner coun-
tries which could be selected on cultural and reputation basis. In
reference to Libyan needs and aspirations, some Arab nations
participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue (Algeria, Egypt,
Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tuni-
sia) and in the Istanbul Cooperation Ini-
tiative (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the
United Arab Emirates) could join the
multinational effort by providing instruc-
tors. The newly trained armed forces
would be responsible not only for the protection of Libya from
internal and external threats but also of its people. From a re-
gional point of view, the allies’ participation could be directed
toward reaching a consensus on a more global strategy with re-
gard to relations with neighboring countries, and, to some ex-
NATO members have gained experience in military training drawn from the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Revolutionary soldiers
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 6
the CRT capacity include a wide range of missions. They should
allow the EU to perform assessment and fact-finding missions in
a crisis or impending crisis situation and, when appropriate,
provide input for the development of a
crisis management concept before the
adoption of an EU Council Joint Action
and facilitate action in the framework of
EU Commission instruments. The CRT
concept document also seeks the setting-
up of an early operational presence on the ground to support EU
political structures in defining a concrete process in order to
turn a fuzzy political concept into a measurable and tangible
mission. At this stage, CRTs play a key role not only in the op-
erationalization of civilian crisis management in the planning
phase, but also in providing timely reinforcement of existing EU
mechanisms in charge of conflict prevention, mediation, stabili-
zation and confidence-building measures including monitoring,
and early identification of needs on the ground. In this way, a
timely deployment of crisis response tools can directly affect
trust and confidence among stakeholders inside the country and
thus facilitate the imple-
mentation of civilian
crisis management in
cooperation with other
actors, both local and
multinational, both mili-
tary and civilian.
The EGF initiative
gathers five full members
(France, Italy, The Neth-
erlands, Portugal, and
Spain), two partner states
(Poland, Lithuania) and
one observer (Turkey).
These nations aim to put
at the disposal a convinc-
ing and operational in-
strument for crisis management, first and foremost under EU
command, but also other security organizations, such as NATO,
UN, OSCE, or ad hoc coalitions. Their “gendarmerie” assets
seek to contribute to the crisis management capability in sensi-
tive post-conflict areas.3 This concept is globally known under its
French version as “gendarmerie” but it has been nationally
adapted in several European states taking into consideration
some specific and local characteristics. Defined as a “force organ-
ized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and
safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment”, the American
concept of “constabulary forces” would be
what comes close to the concept. From a
European perspective, such forces are
seen as “militarized police forces”. In-
deed, besides the basic training
(involving law enforcement and investi-
gation techniques), they also receive military training with a
focus on non-lethal use of force to enable them to respond to
potential violence through negotiations and conflict manage-
ment. On the request of Libyan leaders, the EGF co-operation
programs could provide an appropriate training in international
rule of law to forces to promote better governance. The local
forces’ mandate could include conducting criminal investigation
tasks, performing security and public order missions, conducting
public surveillance, traffic regulations, border policing and
criminal intelligence, covering detection of offences, tracing of
offenders, and their transfer to the appropriate judicial authori-
ties. Some of the identi-
fied internal threats in
Libya entail attacks on
the infrastructure used
for the exploitation of its
crude oil to undermine
its economy. Protecting
the energy-related facili-
ties appears to be crucial
for success in the recon-
struction of the country.
The lessons learned from
the NATO Training Mis-
sion-Iraq (NTM-I) could
lead the Libyan authori-
ties to be interested in
the specific program
dedicated to train oil police forces. Indeed, among the various
offers of police training, NATO or EU using the EGF assets
could instruct local forces in oil-policing which consists in pre-
venting attacks from land and sea terrorists and smugglers on the
main critical refineries and the coverage of some 21,000 km of
oil and gas pipelines.4
From a technical aspect, NATO or EU members should
Protecting the energy-related facilities appears to be crucial for success in the
reconstruction of the country.
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton visiting Benghazi in 2011 (Photo: Euro-pean Commission)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 7
possible to achieve this goal in an acceptable atmosphere.
In the long term: reintegrate Libya into the regional politi-
cal landscape
Geographically, Libya is located at the crossroads between the
Maghreb and the Mashrek regions and is considered, together
with Morocco and Egypt, as a strategic location. In the long run,
and if the Libyan authorities wish so, the participation in regional
political forums could improve its security situation. Certainly,
the security issues and their implications are different for each
country. In parallel to the basic post-conflict efforts, newly
elected Libyan leaders should anticipate the re-appearance of the
country in several Euro-Mediterranean arenas. These could help
or accelerate the improvement of its security. In several cases
Libyan leaders would only have to renew the previously negoti-
ated commitments. In others, they would have to formally apply
for membership of targeted programs because these could meet
their expectations.
Since the beginning of the Hel-
sinki process and the conclusion of the
Final Act in 1975, the security in the
Mediterranean area has been considered
directly connected to the security of the
European continent and vice versa. Libya as well as Lebanon and
Syria have taken part in the OSCE meetings. However, they
never took a step further, beyond the informal discussions,
unlike countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco
or Tunisia. In addition, Libya has been excluded from this proc-
ess or had excluded itself from such discussions for most of the
time due to Muammar Qaddafi’s support for international crimi-
nal groups. A bilateral agreement could be signed with the
OSCE which would provide a wide spectrum of political and
security tools to its partner as mentioned in the decision 571
adopted by the Permanent Council. The issues discussed are
mainly related to human security, e.g. tolerance and nondis-
crimination, migration and migrants’ human rights, including in
countries of destination, water management, desertification, and
anti-terrorism measures. The long-term and comprehensive
approach adopted by the OSCE implies that the discussions and
the activities in these areas aim to instill into the partner states a
more democratic vision of their political development. How-
ever, the implementation of the moral commitments is on a
voluntary basis; therefore, the OSCE should review its modus
operandi and first ask the newly elected government how the
continue to supply Libyan authorities with ground surveillance
intelligence while aiming to have the national coastguards and
the border police forces fully operational in the interim. On the
other hand, the OSCE and the EU could provide civilian person-
nel for technical assistance in the development and implementa-
tion of national strategies and action plans, based on the vision of
the Libyan authorities and their commitments. Such assistance
could be composed of inter alia: training plans and programs
through the sharing of good practices including new technologies
and national know-how, confidence-building by promoting and
facilitating interagency, bilateral and multilateral cooperation in
the Mediterranean neighborhood in the field of border security
and management, drafting of national border strategies, specific
theoretical and practical training of border personnel (including
border guards and customs), or on the spot monitoring, patrol-
ling and mentoring exercises. Moreover, the OSCE and the UN,
thanks to their long-standing and concrete experience, could
cooperate to make some assets available
for a DDR process. DDR programs
should be demand-driven, and the na-
tional authorities should demonstrate
leadership and commitment to the proc-
ess. The more precise and concrete the
programs are, the clearer the measures to be taken will be. Con-
sequently, it would be easier to implement them. The frame-
work offered by both the UN and the OSCE has already demon-
strated that dialogue and inclusiveness are crucial to building
capacity of local and national institutions. The OSCE Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), upon
request of the Libyan transitional leadership, could provide ex-
pertise and advice on drafting an electoral code thus ensuring
that the elections process complies with international standards.
The first step would consist of a meeting between a team of in-
ternational and local experts, representatives of the informal
groups as well as representatives of all official political parties.
The coordination of actions and trust not only among na-
tional actors but also between national and international/
regional partners is critical for success. According to western
standards, the result of a DDR process should give priority to
demilitarizing above all the mindsets which dominate the Libyan
population since a large number of small arms-light weapons
have overflowed the country during the previous months of con-
flict. But the traditional and strongly family-based structures,
together with an ancestral culture of negotiation, should make it
In the long run, Libya’s participation in regional political forums could
improve its security situation.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 8
Civil Defense agency thanks to a close cooperation with the Euro
-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC)
and the International Civil Defense Organization; confidence-
building and strategic-level training of Libyan high-ranking mili-
tary and civilians through the so-called
“NATO Regional Cooperation Course”
at the NATO Defense College (NDC).
With regard to the European
initiatives, the Libyan leaders have the
opportunity to tap into these forums. In
terms of socio-economic development, the EU, under the lead-
ership of the Commission and the Council, has defined specific
strategies towards each Southern Mediterranean partner. From
the very beginning, the European Communities, and then the
European Union have recognized that certain interests are shared
by both rims of the mare nostrum. Political stability and economic
development were the main goals to be achieved by both the
European institutions and the national political leaders. Under
the influence of the southern European members, a process was
launched in the early 1990s towards fourteen countries of the
Mediterranean area including Libya. As common policy of the
EU under the direction of both the European Commission and
the Council of the EU, the “Barcelona Process”, later called
“European Neighborhood Policy” (ENP), covers three major
aspects of regional security that also convey the European con-
cerns and beliefs. The first dimension called “Political and Secu-
rity Dialogue” was set up to create a peaceful and stable area
through the implementation of principles of rule of law, democ-
racy and human rights. The second one, the “Economic and Fi-
nancial Partnership”, consists of progressively establishing a free-
trade zone characterized by shared economic opportunities
through sustainable and balanced socio-economic development.
Finally, the “Social, Cultural and Human
Partnership” should contribute to promot-
ing “understanding and intercultural dia-
logue between cultures, religions and
people, and facilitating exchanges be-
tween civil society and ordinary citizens,
particularly women and young people”. The results were not
necessarily those expected and quite uneven because of several
major factors: a lack of coordination between the European insti-
tutions, the overlapping with national initiatives and the misjudg-
ment of the diversity of expectations and perceptions among the
organization could provide support.
This is all the more the case as this organization has largely
lost its relevance since the EU and NATO developed their own
approaches to this critical region. Indeed, in 1994, NATO under
the influence of the US and its allies from
the southern region, have come to focus
much more on the Mediterranean area.
The assessment of the risks and threats
resulting from the socio-economic prob-
lems of the Southern Mediterranean and
Middle East were quite accurate. The Alliance with its own
Mediterranean initiative seeks to develop a security dialogue
with non‐member riparian states. However, sensitive political
issues have tended to be excluded from this dialogue. On the
other hand, NATO has defined a precise role in the area in order
to avoid duplication with parallel initiatives undertaken by the
former WEU, the EU and some Allies’ national policies (namely
France). To date, seven countries of the Mediterranean region
are involved through bilateral agreements: Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. According to the non-
discrimination principle, Libya is implicitly offered the same
basis for cooperation with NATO as others. Upon request of the
Libyan leadership, the Allies would adopt a tailored approach to
meet its specific needs. As for the framework of a negotiated
Individual Cooperation Program (ICP), the Alliance would es-
sentially provide “military service” which consists of collabora-
tive activities such as military education, training and doctrine,
defense policy and strategy, defense investment, civil emergency
planning, public diplomacy, crisis management, armaments, and
intelligence activities. Over fifteen years, a wide range of mecha-
nisms have been used and tailored which could definitely be
useful for the region in the wake of security challenges: a tailored
Operational Capabilities Concept
(OCC) which aims to improve the abil-
ity to contribute effectively to NATO-
led crisis response operations through
achieving interoperability; the access to
a trust fund mechanism that currently
includes ongoing substantial projects; the enhancement of its
civil preparedness through a Civil Emergency Planning (CEP)
action plan in order to prevent damages and to protect the popu-
lation and the critical infrastructures following either natural
disasters or high-level criminal attacks; the creation of a Libyan
Libya is implicitly offered the same basis for cooperation with
NATO as others.
The uneven EU initiatives were not always fully supported by the major
European players.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 9
leaders of the five members of the Union du Maghreb Arabe and
from the Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, and Malta). At a ministerial level, the 5+5 Mediterranean
group deals with several topics, namely within the ‘Barcelona
Process’: defense, energy security, immigration, education,
transportation, etc. The newly elected Libyan authorities will
have to decide whether they want to renew their commitment to
this informal process or not. Despite the participants repeatedly
stating that this process does not duplicate other initiatives, it is
quite difficult to
maintain. It
seems to be a
result that re-
flects a balance
of power be-
tween some
European coun-
tries, and the
u n s a t i s f y i n g
cooperation as
well as the con-
tinuous rivalry
between the
Southern Mediterranean countries.
Conclusion
The first general elections in Libya led the designation of the
General National Congress (GNC) which will not have as duties
to draft a new constitution as initially announced. The 200 mem-
bers will soon appoint a panel of 60 personalities to that pur-
pose. Certainly, the way of conducting relations with the “new
Libya” as with other countries should be reviewed. After centu-
ries of influencing international affairs, the members of the At-
lantic Alliance have lost their hegemony to a certain degree.
They still have the ability to persuade but the preventive inter-
vention in order to protect the Libyan people against Qaddafi’s
violent repression, namely in Benghazi, has shown that it re-
quires specific circumstances. This display of influence remains
exceptional and is not an end in itself. NATO officials’ self-
proclaimed success is only justifiable from a military standpoint.
The political aspect is not to be underestimated since Libya has
historically succumbed to instability. The Euro-Atlantic powers
southern partners. Despite the detailed action plan for each
country drafted by the European Commission and the newly
established European External Action Service, North African
countries were still perceived as threats (e.g. migration, terror-
ism, drug- and arms-trafficking) than as real partners. As a re-
sult, the European partners tended to give priority to the hard
security dimension (joint border control, national initiatives for
heavy arms supply to security services) turning a blind eye to the
use of financial aid (misappropriation of European funds, corrup-
tion, predatory
behavior of the
local élite, etc.).
International
observers state
that some of the
leading European
countries yielded
to the “migration
threat” and to
some leaders’
blackmailing. The
latest Joint Com-
munication by the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
rity Policy and the European Commission (November 2011)
confirms the latter. It does not change the mindset according to
which the European bureaucratic apparatus as a “philanthropic
entity” could not act without analyzing the current events in
Libya and in its neighborhood in terms of “aid”. Likewise, the
latest initiative – the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – has
become a hollow shell because of the “unified” vision that it im-
plies. Neither the initial qualification of “Mediterranean Union”
nor the approved final version under German pressure do match
the reality.
The uneven EU initiatives were not always fully supported
by the major European players either. Indeed, even if they were
officially designed to be complementary, the EU hard security
actions towards the Southern Mediterranean rim were chal-
lenged by the French program named “5+5” process (dialogue
5+5). Originally proposed by the French President François
Mitterrand in the early 1980s, but only endorsed in 1990 by the
Italian President Bettino Craxi, and the Spanish Prime Minister
Felipe González, these informal meetings bring together political
Writings on a wall in Tripoli
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 10
questions among the Allies about burden-sharing and the Alli-
ance’s cohesion and the risk of a de facto two-tier Alliance, the
consensus rule within the North Atlantic Council, the coordina-
tion between the Alliance and the EU, the development of ap-
propriate capabilities, and the coordination between NATO
activities and those of other international organizations. The
short term mission in Libya is now over but the Allies, acting in
coordination with other multilateral institutions, should be ready
to respond to a potential Libyan request, if necessary.
1 The first move into this direction is the change operated in June
2012 when following tensions within the NTC, its members
decided to adjust the mandate of the General National Congress.
2 Council of the European Union: “Civilian Headline Goal 2008 -
Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in an
Integrated Format - Civilian Response Team”, General Secre-
tariat Document, DG IX, 10462/05 OA-SB/BL, Brussels, 2005.
3 Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic,
the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the
Portuguese Republic, establishing the European Gendarmerie
Force (EUROGENDFOR), 2006.
4 Gaub, Florence: “Building a New Military? The NATO Training
Mission-Iraq”, NATO Defense College Research Paper, no 67, April
2011.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the
author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic
Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.
have a clear vision of what the new Libya should look like: de-
mocratized, a liberalized economy, an effective protection of
human rights, etc. But there are challenging powers (e.g.
Qatar’s financial support of religious movements, ancestral tribal
composition of the population) affecting the Libyan society and
the emerging leaders. According to the reactions of western
leaders, the newly elected GNC seems to satisfy those wishes. 80
seats were allocated only to political parties: 39 seats won by the
Alliance of National Forces (NFA) led by Mahmoud Jibril; 17 for
Justice and Reconstruction (PJR) associated to the Muslim
Brotherhood movement; finally, a multitude of small groups
share the remaining 24 seats; 120 seats were reserved for inde-
pendent candidates. But, again, the ideological spectrum is quite
narrow, religion is entirely part of Libyan life and culture. More-
over, like in all parliamentarian regimes, the next step is to agree
on shaping alliances and coalitions between independents and
political parties. In order to gain influence, allies should act very
carefully; they should not repeat some mistakes which could be
used as justification for authoritative outcomes, e.g. sultanistic
centralized regimes. As this short paper has shown, the allies
have many means to help the Libyan central government. These
means cover a large part of the security spectrum. But a new
mindset would consist of recognizing that it is up to the legiti-
mate Libyan government to request joining the different pro-
grams or to renew/to decline previous commitments. Mean-
while, even if NATO is capable of deploying powerful forces in
large numbers, and of using them to enable entry where neces-
sary, it is not its role to commit to nation-building missions.
NATO itself fully depends on the contribution of its members
and other international organizations. It has no real capabilities
for civil implementation and/or low-end peace enforcement
missions. As demonstrated, several initiatives are in competition
to perform the myriad of non-military functions essential for the
success of any nation-building operation. However, unlike the
1990s’ events in Central and Eastern Europe, the events of 2011
in the Middle East/Northern Africa region take place in a funda-
mentally different historical, cultural area with specific strategic
factors at play. To date, it has been sufficient to focus diplomacy
on the top governmental leadership; from now on, the western
countries’ – common or national – strategy should also focus on
a broader cultural, sectarian, ethnic and tribal civil society, far
from their traditional mindset.
The experience in Afghanistan as well as the Libyan case raise
About the author
Samir Battiss
Dr Samir Battiss is currently lecturer at the Department of
Political Science of the Quebec University in Montreal
(Canada) and associate researcher at the Research Center
for International Relations of the National School of Public
Administration (Montreal, Canada).
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 11
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