Atlantic Voices Vol 5, No. 01 (January 2015)

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 1 1

- Flora Pidoux

Since Obama’s election in 2009, Asia

has been put at the center of America’s

foreign policy, as illustrated by the

American President’s recent visit to India.

Determined to withdraw from

Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington wished

to shift its focus on a region where

alliances needed to be reasserted as China

was slowly regaining its historical

influence.

In Asia, the United States is faced with

counter strategies aimed at deterring its

engagement in China’s backyard. Beijing,

following the principles of Sun Tzu and

the Game of Go, is trying to defend their

interests by building alliances with its

immediate neighbors and exploiting the

West’s tense relations with Russia.

This issue aims to addressing the role

of Asia in today’s world order and the

implication of the new American pivot to

Asia for NATO. While this rebalancing

strategy seems to loosen the Euro-Atlantic

ties, it also appears to have brought China

and Russia closer, and fueled the

competition between the first and second

economic powers.

Political leaders present at the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum (Source: AP/Press Association Images )

Looking Far East: Pivoting Global

Security To Asia-Pacific

Volume 5 - Issue 1 January 2015

Contents:

Rebalancing Towards Long Term Challenges To U.S. Security

Phillip Ulrich provides interesting insight into the challenges that the U.S is currently

facing after the 2009 Obama administration’s refocusing of U.S foreign policy.

China’s Anti-Access Challenge and America’s Air-Sea Battle

Response

Eirik Torsvoll analyzes both China’s and the United States’ current military and eco-

nomic goals, strategies, and capabilities to predict the future threats and obstacles that

may arise between these two nations in the near future.

Sino-Russian Ties And The Emerging Role Of The Asia-Pacific Region Christopher Weidacher Hsiung examines the role that the Asia-Pacific region plays in

global finance and the recent interest that Russia, the U.S, and the EU has in furthering relations due to the region’s economic growth.


extricate American forces and resources. The problems

include extensive budget cuts, aggressive Russian be-

havior in Ukraine and the rise of the Islamic State in

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These events mean that

NATO and European Allies seem to return to past

prominence and relevance for the United States.

The Moment For A Rebalance

The need for a rebalance of U.S. foreign policy to-

wards the Asia-Pacific was based on several factors.

Firstly, the United States has large economic interests

in the region, with some of its largest trading partners

situated in that area. Secondly, the United States had

been absent from the region since 2001 when U.S. for-

eign policy focused on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In that time, China’s influence has risen, and the re-

balance is an effort to counter the mounting Chinese

dominance towards neighboring countries. Thirdly, the

United States had to reaffirm its commitment to its

allies in the region. For example Japan and Korea who

have found themselves increasingly under Chinese pres-

sure, due to the absence of the United States since

2001.

The opportunity for making a rebalance of U.S. for-

eign policy has presented itself, as the United States

was finally able to move attention and resources away

from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These resources

could then be diverted to the Asia-Pacific.

Additionally the Strategic Guidance asserted that the

U.S. engagement in Europe could be downsized, as:

Most European countries are now producers of security

rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in

By Philip Christian Ulrich

A s the Obama administration took office in

2009, it wanted to redefine and refocus

U.S. foreign policy. The objective was to

disengage from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in

order to focus on other international challenges, do-

mestic reforms, and reconstruction. Even as President

Obama announced an increase of 30,000 troops for

Afghanistan he proclaimed: “the nation that I’m most

interested in building is our own”1 To many, this signaled

a more withdrawn U.S. foreign policy under Presi-

dent Obama.

In January 2012, the Obama administration pub-

lished a new “Strategic Guidance” to steer U.S. for-

eign policy. The new document presented a new pri-

ority for the United States:

U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably

linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western

Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and

South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and oppor-

tunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue

to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity re-

balance toward the Asia-Pacific region.2

With this statement the official policy of the Unit-

ed States became to conduct a rebalance of its foreign

policy to the Asia-Pacific region, comparative to its

strategic importance.

However, the rebalance is currently failing, due to

both domestic and international circumstances, which

have forced the United States to return to regions

from which the Obama administration had hoped to

Rebalancing Towards Long Term Challenges To U.S. Security


Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to

rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a

focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities.3

These factors made it possible to rebalance U.S. for-

eign policy to allocate resources and strategic attention to

the Asia-Pacific region, in correlation with the region’s

importance to the United States.

U.S. Efforts To Rebalance

In order to conduct the rebalance towards the Asia-

Pacific region, the United States has followed a strategy

based on three pillars: economic, diplomatic and military.

Economic: The United States has worked on closer

economic cooperation in the region, through the Trans-

Pacific Partnership (TTP). While the TTP is not meant to

exclude China from economic cooperation in the region4,

it is meant to harness Chinese influence by creating an

international network with clearly defined rules. Present-

ly China has expressed interest in joining the TTP, but is

not yet a member. Even if China does not join the TTP,

some sort of regional economic cooperation will be

something which the United States will pursue.

Diplomatic: The United States increased its diplomatic

efforts in the region while Hillary Clinton was Secretary

of State, an effort which has decreased somewhat while

John Kerry has been Secretary of State.

The diplomatic efforts have led to an opening in rela-

tions between the United States and Vietnam as well as

with Myanmar. These diplomatic efforts meant that the

United States gained support among a number of coun-

tries in the region, who had not previously had good dip-

lomatic relations with the U.S. The many travels by Sec-

retaries Clinton and Panetta and later Secretaries Kerry

and Hagel, was a clear signal to the regional allies, as well

as new partners, that the United States was serious about

the rebalance, and intended to increase its efforts in the

region. This reassured regional allies and partners, that

the United States would support them in their territo-

rial disputes with China or at least act as a counter-

weight to Chinese influence in the region.

Military: Besides the economic and diplomatic ef-

forts, the United States has pursued closer cooperation

with nations in the region, including closer military-to-

military cooperation as well as rotational deployments

of U.S. military personnel5.

These cooperation and deployments are supple-

mented by the fact that it is the intention of the U.S.

Navy to deploy 60 percent of its fleet to the Asia-

Pacific region in 2020, compared to a 50/50 division

today between the Atlantic and Asia-Pacific6.

If one looks at the efforts by the United States, the

diplomatic and military efforts look like a modern ver-

sion of “Containment” known from the Cold War.

Closer military-to-military cooperation and rotational

deployments of military forces combined with diplo-

matic efforts in China’s neighboring countries, give a

distinct look of containment of China, in order to

counter its increased influence in the region over the

past decade.

However, the increased efforts seen from the Unit-

ed States following the publication of the 2012 Strate-

gic Guidance has decreased in the past year due to chal-

lenges arising in regions from which the Obama-

administration had hoped to disengage the United

States.

“Leading From Behind” To Focus

One of the major foreign policy priorities for the

Obama administration was to end U.S. commitment in

Iraq, and begin the process of drawing down the U.S.

and NATO missions in Afghanistan. The objective was

to end the state of constant conflict in which the Unit-


ISIL in Syria on the 22nd of September 20147.

The aim of this policy of non-intervention was to

make sure that the United States would not have to

commit resources, either economic, diplomatic or mil-

itary, to a new long term conflict which was not essen-

tial to their national security. Instead, the United States

was to focus its foreign policy attention increasingly

towards the Asia-Pacific, and its resources towards eco-

nomic reconstruction within the United States.

Implications For NATO

A U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific

would mean a less prominent role for

the European allies in U.S. foreign poli-

cy. Instead, Asian allies would more

likely be the center of attention for U.S.

diplomatic and military efforts. The de-

creased emphasis would be a result of

both the geographical distance between

the European powers to the Asia-Pacific,

and to the consequent small role, that NATO as an alli-

ance plays in the Asia-Pacific region. Because there are

no ongoing or immediate crises in the Asia-Pacific re-

gion which would warrant NATO intervention, the

Alliance would not be able to argue for a continual

presence in the region, on a scale, which would make it

useful for the United States in its efforts to rebalance.

The individual members of NATO have great interests

in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the Alliance as a

whole has a limited role to play in the region due to the

purpose and scale of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. The

purpose of the Alliance is to protect its member states,

as well as act as the foundation for military contingency

operations, such as in Libya. It would not be possible to

extend this to a more or less permanent presence in the

Asia-Pacific in order to support a U.S. rebalance.

ed States had found itself since the terrorist attacks on

9/11 2001.

Over the following years, the Obama administra-

tion pursued a policy of keeping the United States

away from engagement in new conflicts. Particularly

the Arab Spring in early 2011 presented challenges for

the administration to uphold its policy of non-

intervention in new conflicts, as U.S. interests were

potentially threatened by unrest in the Middle East.

The policy was followed with regards to the public

uprising in Tunisia and Egypt

as well as uprisings in the

Gulf states. The United

States chose not to intervene

or to make noticeable public

statements against the rulers

in these countries. In the

case of Egypt, this ended

when President Obama

called for the resignation of

President Mubarak, however no further U.S. efforts

were made. Thereby the administration kept a dis-

tance to events in the Middle East and avoided possi-

ble U.S. engagement.

However, the Obama administration was pres-

sured to intervene in Libya in order to prevent the

killing of civilians. The U.S. commitment to the Libya

campaign was characterized by what became known

as “leading from behind”. In order to keep a low U.S.

engagement, the United States quickly transferred

responsibility to NATO.

After the engagement in Libya, the Obama admin-

istration returned to its policy of limited engagement

with regards to the civil war in Syria. This policy of

non-intervention persisted until U.S. planes attacked

U.S. President Barack Obama joined Leaders of the Asso-

ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and leaders

of Southeast Asia 2012. (Source: Agence France-Presse)


attack against them all.” This is a binding, treaty obliga-

tion. It is non-negotiable. And here in Wales, we’ve left ab-

solutely no doubt -- we will defend every Ally.

Second, we agreed to be resolute in reassuring our Al-

lies in Eastern Europe. Increased NATO air patrols over the

Baltics will continue. Rotations of additional forces through-

out Eastern Europe for training and exercises will contin-

ue. Naval patrols in the Black Sea will continue. And all 28

NATO nations agreed to contribute to all of these measures --

for as long as necessary.”10

The redeployment of forces to Europe is a sign that

European countries are not able to be “producers of

security” to such a degree that the United States can

limit its commitment to the region such as the Obama-

administration had hoped.

2014 also saw the emergence of another contingen-

cy, which limits the ability of the Obama-

administration to carry through its rebalance to Asia-

Pacific.

The rise of ISIL and its conquest of territory in both

Syria and Iraq has forced the United States to recommit

military forces to Iraq in order to bolster the govern-

ment in Baghdad.

U.S. air operations began in early August 2014, in

order to protect U.S. personnel in the city of Erbil as

well as protect Yezidi civilians trapped on Mount Sin-

jar11. Since then, air operations expanded to include

operations against ISIL inside Syria. These air opera-

tions against ISIL have been supplemented by the de-

ployment of advisors to train and assist Iraqi forces in

their struggle against ISIL forces on the ground.

The recommitment of U.S. forces to the Middle

East, in line with the deployment of forces to Europe,

limits the ability of the United States to follow through

on the rebalance to Asia-Pacific.

A less prominent U.S. presence in Europe would in

turn require the European allies to take on a greater part

of burden sharing within the NATO Alliance, as well as

in international missions. The need for greater European

participation would arise as American resources increas-

ingly transferred to the United States or the Asia-Pacific.

This increased burden sharing was to be part of the ability

of the European allies to be “producers of security”

meaning greater role in international missions and within

the NATO Alliance.

In all, the U.S. rebalance is seen by many as a threat

to the central role of Europe in U.S. foreign policy. This

means that the Alliance has had to consider the more

withdrawn U.S. attitude during the considerations on the

future of NATO following the end of the International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.

A Failing Rebalance - International Challenges

Presently the Obama administration’s rebalance to

Asia-Pacific is threatened by factors on two fronts: inter-

national and domestic.

Internationally, the Russian annexation of the Crime-

an Peninsula in the spring of 2014 meant that the United

States has had to reengage in Europe, in order to show

support for the Eastern European allies in NATO. In ad-

dition to returning battle tanks to Europe, the U.S. Army

expects to send an additional 3,000 soldiers to Europe

complimenting the 67,000 American soldiers already in

the European theater 8 9.

Following the NATO Summit in Wales in September

2014, President Obama emphasized the United States’

commitment to the NATO Alliance:

“First and foremost, we have reaffirmed the central mis-

sion of the Alliance. Article 5 enshrines our solemn duty to each

other -- “an armed attack against one…shall be considered an


A Failing Rebalance – Domestic Challenges

Domestically the rebalance to Asia-Pacific is

under pressure from the strained financial situation

of the American Department of Defense. In order

to get the deficit in U.S. finances under control, in

2011 Congress agreed on the Budget Control Act,

which set up an automatic solution to deficit re-

duction in case Congress failed to reach a political

agreement. The automatic solut ion,

“Sequestration”, called for automatic budget cuts

across all federal budgets.

For the Department of Defense this meant a

$500 billion reduction over a ten year period. This

would supplement the already planned $485 bil-

lion proposed by the Obama-administration for the

same period.

The passing of the Budget Control Act in 2011

and its enactment in the 2012 and 2013 defense

budgets meant a great challenge to the Department

of Defense. In budget years 2014 and 2015, se-

questration has been put on hold and this has lim-

ited its impact. However, if Congress is unable to

find a solution, sequestration will return from Oc-

tober 2015. This will mean further heavy reduc-

tions in defense budgets, and thus also in the ability

of the United States to deploy forces to contingen-

cies like the ones in Ukraine and Iraq.

These extensive budgetary problems have

caused major issues for the Department of De-

fense. Firstly, it has limited its options for adapting

to the changing security situation in which the

United States finds itself, with Russia asserting it-

self in Eastern Europe, campaign against ISIL and

the continued rise of China as a future peer-

competitor. Secondly, sequestration and continu-

ing resolutions has limited the department’s ability

to implement budgetary cuts while also maintaining

readiness and investments in modernizing existing

weapons systems as well as in new systems.

Budget cuts mean that the strained resources are

unable to match the demands of following through on

expanding U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific as well

maintaining a presence in Europe and conducting the

campaign in Iraq and Syria.

Consequences Of A Failing Rebalance

The foreign policy context in which the rebalance

was to take place was one of transitioning from a peri-

od of constant conflict since 2001 to a new period of

focusing on long-term challenges to the United States.

A precondition for the realization of this situation was

for the United States to keep out of new conflicts,

which did not involve central U.S. national interests.

As was seen with the Arab Spring uprisings, the

Obama-administration tried to pursue a more with-

drawn policy, in order to fulfill this precondition for

the rebalance.

The increased U.S. presence in Europe and the

creation of a coalition against ISIL, meant that by ne-

cessity the relationship and need for cooperation be-

tween the United States and its European Allies will

remain closer than the Obama administration had

wanted in 2012.

Although it was never the intention of the Obama

administration to end cooperation with its European

Allies, it was the intention that as the need for U.S.,

presence in Europe decreased, diplomatic and mili-

tary focus could be shifted to the Asia-Pacific. This

would in turn mean less focus on Europe than on the

Asia-Pacific. This would particularly be the case since

the NATO Alliance does not have a central role in

U.S. efforts in Asia-Pacific, and therefore the im-


portance of European allies would wane. This situa-

tion has not materialized.

The relevance of and commitment to the NATO

Alliance for the United States has, in turn, risen in the

past year, by events in Eastern Europe and the Middle

East. This in turn means a more central and relevant

role for the European allies.

The United States again needs NATO to bolster its

stance against Russia, something which the Obama

administration had hoped would not be necessary fol-

lowing the end of the Cold War. The implication for

NATO of the Russian behavior in Eastern Europe,

and the failing rebalance to Asia, is a return to promi-

nence in U.S. foreign policy. Rather than the U.S.

rebalance making Asian allies more central to U.S.

foreign policy, NATO is again the central forum for

cooperation, dialogue and coalition building for the

United States.

For the United States, it means that another

chance for focusing increasingly on the Asia-Pacific

region is limited by unforeseen contingencies12. These

contingencies mean that the precondition of a transi-

tional period from perpetual conflict to peace is no

longer possible. Rather, the U.S. rebalance will con-

tinue in a decreased fashion, primarily focused on

more limited diplomatic and economic factors. How-

ever, the military show of support which several allies

in the region has sought after, will be less forthcoming

given the economic strains on the U.S. Department of

Defense as well as the pull back to regions from which

the United States had hoped to increasingly disengage.

Philip Chr. Ulrich holds an M.A. in American

Studies from the University of Southern Denmark. He

analyzes American foreign and defense policy for the

Danish website Kongressen.com. He has previously

worked as head of section at the Royal Danish De-

fence College, where he published several briefs on

U.S. defense and foreign policy. He has also complet-

ed an internship at the Lessons Learned / Develop-

ment Section at the Civil-Military Cooperation Cen-

tre of Excellence.

1Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way For-

ward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1st December 2009)

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-

address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan

2 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington D.C., January 2012), p. 2

3 Ibid, p. 3

4 Mireya Solis: The Containment Fallacy: China and the TTP http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis

5 Marine Rotational Force – Darwin http://www.marforpac.marines.mil/Units/MarineRotationalForceDarwin.aspx

6 Jim Garamone: Panetta Describes U.S. Shift in Asia-Pacific, American Forces Press Service http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116591

7 Remarks by the President on airstrikes in Syria (23rd September 2014) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/statement-president-airstrikes-syria

8 Kristina Wong: Army plans to shift 3,000 troops to Europe http://thehill.com/policy/defense/229105-army-plans-to-shift-3000-troops-to-europe

9 Alexander A. Burnett: Command assists departure of battle tanks from Europe http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119695

10 Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference (5th September 2014 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/remarks-president-obama-nato-summit-press-conference

1 Statement by the President (7th August 2014) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-president

2 The United States has attempted twice since the end of the Cold War to shift focus to the Asia-Pacific: Philip Chr. Ulrich: The U.S. Pivot To-wards Asia-Pacific. Third Time’s the Charm?, (Copenhagen, Royal Danish Defence College, 2013)

About the author

Bibliography


By Eirik Torsvoll

T he privileged position Washington has enjoyed in

the Asia-Pacific since 1945 is under pressure. Chi-

na’s rise, or return, depending on how you look at

it historically, is challenging the hegemonic presence of the

United States. The American position has been underpinned by

the country’s superior military power, which has acted as the

ultimate guarantor of Washington’s ability to influence region-

al developments. However, U.S. military power is dependent

upon projecting power through bases as well as access to the

theater of operations. This fact is currently being exploited by

Beijing. For several years now, China has been expanding its

missile capabilities, building a

large and complex missile net-

work capable of credibly threat-

ening U.S. forces deployed in

China’s maritime periphery.

These capabilities form the foun-

dation for what are popularly

referred to as anti-access and

area-denial (A2/AD) capabili-

ties.

Defeating such measures has

been at the top of the agenda for

Pentagon planners in recent

years, particularly as the United States has begun its long-term

strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The American response

has been a military war-fighting concept known as the Air-Sea

Battle concept, which proposes to break through the A2/AD

systems by creating a networked, integrated force, that has the

ability to attack targets in-depth, even in a prohibitive anti-

access environment.

This article will argue that China’s A2/AD capabilities will

be a major factor in numerous security issues faced by the

United States and China in the Asia-Pacific. It will start by

defining the conflicting regional goals of Beijing and Wash-

ington by way of their grand strategies. Thereafter, it will

describe China’s A2/AD capabilities and their implication

for these strategies, as well as two worrying variables that

could increase China’s propensity for bellicosity in the fu-

ture. Finally, it will review the U.S. Air-Sea Battle con-

cept, which has been presented as a way to counter A2/AD

capabilities.

Competing Grand Strategies In The Asia-Pacific

A grand strategy can be defined, in the words of John

Lewis Gaddis of Yale University, as “the calculated rela-

tionship of means to large

ends”. Put differently, it is the

answers to the questions:

“where are you”, “where do you

want to go”, and “how do you

get there?” For China and the

United States the answers to

these queries will be at odds

with one another in Asia-Pacific

security affairs. This is because

America’s interests are defined

by being an established (and

therefore status quo) power,

while being a rising (and therefore likely revisionist) power

marks China’s concerns.

The U.S. Grand Strategy

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the pre-

eminent U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific became even

more pronounced. Now acting as the sole superpower in a

unipolar system, Washington developed in the 1990s a

grand strategy for its international relations that can be

China’s Anti-Access Challenge And America’s Air-Sea Battle Response

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert speaks to mod-

erator Michael O' Hanlon at the Brookings Institute about the Air-Sea

Battle concept. (Source: Photo credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Commu-

nication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Lawlor)


characterized as “primacy.” This approach is built on the

logic that a preponderance of U.S. power is the best way

to assure stability and peace, in addition to buttressing

U.S. political and economic interests. Washington there-

fore should strive to maintain its lead, particularly in mili-

tary capabilities.

The developments in the power configuration of the

world have changed the appropriateness and ability of

Washington to follow a global grand strategy of primacy,

but the basic approach of pursuing military dominance still

remains. With this aspiration in mind, it is no surprise that

Washington is concerned with China’s A2/AD challenge,

as this threatens to neutralize America’s established mili-

tary superiority and access to the maritime commons. The

fear of the consequences of Chinese capabilities has been

expressed in several official documents, such as the Pen-

tagon’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the Joint

Operational Access document.

The Chinese Grand Strategy

China’s grand strategy is harder to establish than the

American one, as Beijing does not release official white

documents describing its national security strategy. As

such, much ink has been spilled trying to discern what Chi-

na wants and how it will go about getting it, and, if in fact

it will pursue its goals in a strategic way or go after its in-

terest in a more ad hoc approach. Assuming China does

indeed follow a grand strategic rationale of its own, the

range of suggested strategies of Beijing runs a wide spec-

trum.

Beijing’s hardball approach to its territorial claims in

the South China Sea and East China Sea, its unilateral es-

tablishment of an air defense identification zone in the East

China Sea, and its continued military build-up, particularly

with the energetic pursuit of A2/AD capabilities, suggests

a desire to carve out a sphere of influence for itself in its

neighborhood. The intended end state seems to be a “zone

of exceptionalism,” where the regional norms, as well as

facts on the ground, would be bent towards China’s na-

tional interest.

China seems to be pursing this goal by advancing incre-

mentally, i.e. by employing a gradualist model of expan-

sion. This is displayed by its behavior in the South China

Sea, where it slowly but surely advances its assertions by

both challenging and openly defying the territorial claims

of its neighbors. Beijing’s current grand strategy therefore

appears to be geared toward creating a de facto sphere of

influence in the Asia-Pacific, casting doubt about Washing-

ton’s ability and will to intervene militarily during a hypo-

thetical conflict, and thereby “winning without fighting.”

It is within this context of clashing grand strategies that

the implications of China’s A2/AD capabilities become

apparent.

China’s A2/AD Capabilities

The idea behind anti-access and area-denial, to prevent

an enemy from accessing, as well as maneuvering within, a

theater of operation is not a new one. This is, in fact, a

timeless goal in military planning. Punji stick traps have,

for example, been used by various militaries throughout

history to slow down or prohibit the movement of enemy

infantry units, such as during the Vietnam War when the

Viet Cong used them to great effect against U.S. forces.

Interestingly, A2/AD means are traditionally employed by

a weaker party, in an attempt to offset the military superi-

ority of an adversary. It thus usually relies on exploiting

the cost-benefit ratio of a more powerful state by putting

their more capital-intensive assets at risk through, ideally,

relatively inexpensive means.

The novelty of today’s A2/AD measures, however, is

in the power of technology, which has made missile capa-

bilities much more potent and accessible. China now has

the ability to target U.S. bases and forces beyond ranges of

a thousand nautical miles. Its missile capabilities include

advanced cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air

missiles, with greater precision and range than previously

possible. When this capability is coupled with existing and

expanding military power, such as modern submarines,

fighter jets, and minelayers, it becomes a dangerous pic-

ture for any U.S. commander attempting to operate near


or within China’s maritime periphery. The development

has turned the offense-defense balance decidedly in the

favor of the latter.

The reach and effectiveness of China’s missiles is signif-

icant, because much of the U.S. force projection in the

region is reliant on bases and access to the maritime com-

mons. When this is put at risk, decision-makers in Wash-

ington must make a much tougher call on whether to de-

ploy U.S. forces in a given situation. The calculus is wors-

ened further by the fact that U.S. forces are operating far

from home, being reliant on a long logistical chain, while

China would be operating in its own backyard. Beijing is

thus exploiting a “home field advantage” as well as the cost-

effectiveness of missile attacks against capital-intensive

U.S. military assets.

What is at stake is America’s ability to deter China

from using, or threatening to use, force against its neigh-

bors in the region. A response to China’s A2/AD capabili-

ties has therefore been deemed crucial in Washington.

Additionally, by being able to cast doubt over the United

States’ resolve and ability to intervene in a given situation,

Beijing is strengthening its overall regional power. This

allows China greater flexibility in pursuing favorable out-

comes to its strategic interests, including territorial dis-

putes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as well as

changing the status of Taiwan. It could also lead decision-

makers in Beijing into thinking that it had the upper hand

in any conflict against the United States, and open up for

adventurism in new areas of China’s neighborhood.

Factors That Could Increase The Likelihood Of

Chinese Aggression

While it is not unreasonable to claim that China is not

likely to pursue any type of aggressive military actions in

its neighborhood, military planners need to be able to pro-

pose viable alternatives during worst-case scenarios, in

order to deter the adversary. Regarding Chinese

aggression, two factors that could increase the likelihood

of bellicosity are worth mentioning. These add to the need

for the United States to develop responses to potential

belligerence from Beijing, such as the proposed Air-Sea

Battle concept.

China’s First-Mover Advantage

The current unresolved maritime disputes in China’s

neighborhood has led some to worry that conflict between

the United States and China, for example over the

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, might break

out due to a mistake or misunderstanding. However, oth-

ers worry not about miscalculation, but deliberate calcula-

tion based on offensive military doctrines on the part of

China. The latter could be one of the biggest threats to the

stability of the Asia-Pacific today.

Such a doctrine could be based on China’s so-called

“first-mover advantage.” Building on the logic of strategic

offense combined with tactical defense, this would entail

Beijing deciding to pre-empt its opponents by taking, for

example, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and then daring oth-

er powers to reclaim it. If China’s seizure were successful,

its antagonists would face impediments to taking the is-

lands back, such as mounting a costly offensive, risking

further instability, and being potentially seen as an aggres-

sor. A comparison to Vladimir Putin’s hasty annexation of

Crimea and the somewhat tepid, at least militarily,

response from the West, seems apt to exemplify the

power of the first-mover advantage. Such an incentive

could combine with China’s potential short-term dilemma

to provoke hostile actions from Beijing.

China’s Short-Term Dilemma

Analysts have in recent years begun to see a slowdown

in the Chinese economy, and speculation has started over

whether Beijing’s astounding growth model has reached its

limits. This issue is compounded by other structural prob-

lems haunting China, such as environmental degradation,

water and farmland management issues, an aging popula-

tion, weak government, and rising food prices. Adding to

this, these problems are piling up simultaneously, and have


a dangerous potential of reinforcing each other. Thus, Beijing

could in the near-future face difficult tradeoffs between focus-

ing on its domestic economic security or continued expansion

of its regional security influence. A population that continues

to grow in age, nationalistic-inclinations, and expectations for

the future will exacerbate this predicament.

Decision-makers in Beijing may therefore be faced with a

short-term dilemma of acting on foreign policy goals now

while in a position of relative strength, or postponing any bold

actions for the future, but then with a potentially weaker hand

to play. This “window of opportunity” for China correspond-

ingly represents a “window of vulnerability” for the United

States. As such, the short-term period in U.S.-Sino relations

could represent the most critical period where Washington

needs to establish a firm deterrence against Chinese aggression.

America’s Air-Sea Battle Concept

The U.S. developed the current iteration of the Air-Sea

Battle (ASB) concept as a response to the rising A2/AD capa-

bilities of actors such as China. However, its conceptual ante-

cedent was introduced much earlier. The name is inspired by

the AirLand Battle concept, launched in 1981, which called for

closer cooperation between U.S. Land and Air forces to coun-

ter the numerical advantage of the Soviet Union’s forces in

Europe. In a similar fashion, the ASB, coined in the early

1990s, then refashioned and reintroduced in 2010 to fit newly

forming A2/AD challenges, is at heart an enterprise to create a

closer integrated and networked U.S. Sea and Air forces. This

is then supposed to be used to counter challenges to access in

the global commons, including air, sea, space, and cyberspace.

So how exactly does ASB envision defeating an adversary’s

A2/AD capabilities? It aims at creating pockets and corridors

under Washington’s control via a variety of means, including

air and sea operations, but also, importantly, potential actions

in space and cyberspace. These could be used sequentially or

concurrently, depending on the intensity needed. ASB thus

relies on a combination of current U.S. military assets, while

also requiring new technological investments. The latter in-

cludes acquiring penetrating strike assets, such as long-range

stealth bombers and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

An ASB-directed campaign would be aimed at affecting

an adversary’s A2/AD systems, attempting to disrupt their

abilities of command and control, as well defeating their

weapons platforms and missile launchers. An operation

against China would most likely initially rely heavily on U.S.

cyber and space capabilities to incapacitate and confuse their

computer networks. ASB also opens up for conventional

strikes on China’s mainland to take out their systems

through force, however this is an aspect of the concept that

has received widespread interest and criticism.

The criticism leveled against ASB has partly been be-

cause of a lack of understanding of the concept. Such confu-

sion is as good as inevitable when discussing a concept

whose actual war plan remains classified. Nevertheless, the

Pentagon did not do itself any favors when revealing ASB in

2010, and then waiting until 2013 to release an official un-

classified document with more details on its content. In the

meantime others were left to define ASB, sometimes badly.

One sticking point has been the proposed plan for strik-

ing China’s mainland. Some have presented this as the defin-

ing, and basically only, feature of ASB. This is not the case.

ASB is certainly more than mainland strikes, and envisions

giving U.S. decision-makers and military commanders the

freedom to choose how to respond during a crisis. This can

range, for example, from low-intensity shows of force, me-

dium-intensity cyber attacks, or high-intensity combined

operations of mainland strikes and attacks in other domains.

In other words, a mainland strike would probably only be

initiated in the most extreme of crisis situations.

Lastly, the question of timing is important to note. ASB

assumes that an actor like China would be the one to move

aggressively first, and thus it is only meant as a response, not

as a tool for a first strike. ASB is therefore, ideally, only

intended for its deterrent effect. It would create

disincentives to aggressive behavior where China's A2/AD

means, its first-mover advantage, and short-term dilemma

could influence Beijing to act differently.


If You Want Peace, Prepare For War

Thinking about conflict between the United States and

China in the Asia-Pacific is indeed a grim exercise. It is

nonetheless a useful one, for that old saying still holds true:

if you want peace, prepare for war. From Washington’s

perspective, strengthening deterrence by proposing plausi-

ble ways of counteracting aggressive behavior from China

in an A2/AD environment is crucial. The question re-

mains, however, whether the ASB is the right approach for

the task or if there are other, more credible and convincing

ways, of countering China’s A2/AD challenge.

Eirik Torsvoll is the Vice President of YATA Norway.

He holds an M.A. in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher

School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, where

he studied U.S. foreign policy, security studies, and the

Asia-Pacific. He tweets at: @eiriktorsvoll.

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About the author

Bibliography


By Christopher Weidacher Hsiung

T his essay analyses recent developments of

Sino-Russia relations in the context of a

changing Asia-Pacific region. It is argued

that while China-Russia ties have been bolstered due

to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, for instance with an

unprecedented natural gas deal in May 2014 , steps to

forge closer bilateral relations have in fact been un-

derway ever since the end of the cold war, emanating

from both a response to jointly counterbalance the

U.S. to factors inherent to the bilateral relationship as

such.

All Eyes On The Asia-Pacific Region

Spurred by decades of robust economic perfor-

mance compared to that of the rest of the world, the

importance of the Asia-Pacific region, and especially

China, is growing fast. With the 2008 global financial

crisis, which hit the U.S and Europe hard, this devel-

opment has only been exacerbated in recent years.

According to the IMF, GDP growth for the Asia-

Pacific region in 2013 was 5.2%. The East Asia re-

gion, the fastest growing economic region within the

Asia-Pacific as such, grew by 6.7%. Since the global

financial crisis, China alone is responsible for 35% of

the world’s economic growth. On the other hand, the

economically troubled European Union was only able

to muster a meager 0.1% GDP growth in 2013. The

U.S economy, on path to recovery, did better with a

2.2% GDP growth in 2013.

The emerging role of the Asia-Pacific region as

engine and driver of global economic growth and dy-

namism has prompted the outside world to look in-

creasingly to the Asia-Pacific region. The EU has al-

ready close trade links with the region as it is one of

the leading trading partner of many Asian countries, a

position Europe seeks to sustain and enhance. The

U.S. has announced its strong interest in the region,

evident by a policy of rebalancing to Asia, or popular-

ly named “the U.S. pivot to Asia”. The policy, an-

nounced by the Obama administration in 2011, aims

to move American attention and resources away from

the Middle East and Europe to the Asia-Pacific region

through a series of diplomatic, economic and military

policies by forging closer cooperation with existing

alliances and engaging with emerging powers, espe-

cially China. The emerging role of the Asia-Pacific

region has also caught the interest of Russia. Moscow,

recognizing the growing economic role the Asia-

Pacific region can play for its economy and political

standing in world affairs, has thus initiated its own

“Asia pivot” seeking close ties with Asian countries

such as India, South Korea and Japan. For Moscow,

engaging with the East has mainly meant forging clos-

er ties with China.

Russia’s Recent Moves Towards China

Since the global financial crisis in 2008, Moscow

has increasingly tried to integrate itself into Asia-

Pacific, efforts symbolically marked by the fact that

Russia hosted the 2012 APEC meeting in Vladivostok.

However, as Russia foreign policy expert Bobo Lo has

argued, Russia’s “Asia pivot” is less of a comprehen-

Sino-RussianTiesAndTheEmergingRoleOf

TheAsia-Paci�icRegion


sive Asia policy than a China centered policy. Since Xi

Jinping became China’s new president in 2013 and Vladi-

mir Putin started his third term as Russia’s president in

2012, the two sides have been engaged in numerous high-

level encounters and met for several bilateral state visits

and in numerous multilateral settings, be it for BRICS

summits, at meetings for the China-Russia led Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), or for G-20 and APEC

summits.

China and Russia have tried to boost cooperation in

economy and trade, long lagging behind those of the

more developed political relations. Bilateral trade

amounted to 90 billion USD in 2013 (up from 40 billion

USD six years before) and goals were made to reach tar-

gets of 100 billion USD in

2015 and 200 billion USD

by 2020. Much of the

trade relations are cen-

tered around pursuing

closer energy cooperation,

illustrated by the signature

of the gigantic natural gas

deal in May 2014, worth a

staggering 400 billion USD,

the most significant achieve-

ment in this regard. Alt-

hough it is still too early to assess the commercial gains of

the agreement, the energy deal is, according to Beijing

and Moscow, a milestone in their bilateral energy rela-

tionship, especially considering that China and Russia had

been negotiating a natural gas deal for the last decade.

And in October 2014 when Chinese premier Li Keqiang

met his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev, China

and Russia agreed to a 150 billion Yuan currency swap as

a move to further increase trade, but also to lessen Mos-

cow’s dependency on the dollar and promote the Chinese

Yuan as a global trade currency.

China and Russia have also intensified military rela-

tions with arms deals, such as the sale of S-400 surface-

to-air missiles, considered Russia’s most advanced air

and missile defense system. The Chinese purchase will

significantly enhance Beijing’s deterrence capabilities

against advanced air force powers. Plus, China and

Russia have increased bilateral and multilateral military

exercises, both at land and sea: for instance the SCO

“Peace Mission 2014” which was the largest military

exercise so far in the history of the organization.

On regional cooperation, China and Russia have

agreed to let the SCO expand with new members, as

India and Pakistan will

to join the organization

next year. Regarding

international hot spot

issues, China and Rus-

sia continue to coordi-

nate their positions,

for instance regarding

Syria. There are also

signs of increased coop-

eration in the Arctic

region, as Russia has

started to invite China to invest into oil and gas explo-

ration in the Russian Arctic.

Counterbalancing The U.S.

For many observers, particularly in the West, the

China-Russia relationship is often portrayed as nothing

else than a pragmatic and strategic response to the post

-cold war U.S-led international order, where Washing-

ton is perceived to be determined to remain the sole

super power by constraining China and Russia to chal-

lenge its positon. In the eyes of Beijing and Moscow,

Russia's President Vladimir Putin (L) and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping

stand during a signing ceremony at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing,

Nov. 9, 2014 (Source Reuters)


U.S. behavior and policies such as NATO eastward ex-

pansion, the U.S. alliance system in Asia, U.S. support to

Taiwan, American military presence in Central Asia and

U.S criticism of domestic affairs and human rights in Chi-

na and Russia, are all clear examples of U.S. actions di-

rected at containing China and Russia. Since China and

Russia are not currently powerful enough to counterbal-

ance American power independently, Beijing and Mos-

cow have instead tried to do so jointly by developing clos-

er bilateral relations. The Ukraine crisis and the ongoing

standoff between Russia and the West is, according to

this perspective, just following a similar logic.

While the crisis in Ukraine surely has had this effect, it

is important to note that this crisis should be regarded as

reinforcing a larger general trend of improved Sino-

Russian relations underway ever since the end of the Cold

War. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, China

and the newly independent Russia needed to move fast to

consolidate diplomatic relations as both countries faced

new external and domestic challenges in the early post-

cold war years. For Russia this meant domestic turmoil

following the collapse of the Soviet Union and for China,

Tiananmen led to international isolation from 1989.

There had also been a constructive process of Sino-Soviet

normalization underway since the mid-1980s which lead-

ers in both capitals wished to see continue. Several agree-

ments and joint statements were thus made during the

1990s to early 2000s to first guarantee and stabilize bilat-

eral relations in a period of uncertainty, and then slowly

to establish firm foundations and principles to move the

relationship forward. Important milestones in this regard

where the “Strategic Partnership” agreement in 1996, the

2001 “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Coop-

eration” and the 2010 “Comprehensive Strategic Partner-

ship” agreement. From the early 1990s and up to now,

China and Russia have thus not only formalized and in-

creasingly institutionalized their bilateral relations, but

also incrementally improved cooperation in areas rang-

ing from trade and economics, border relations, and

military, regional and international cooperation.

Inherent Bilateral Factors

While the “U.S factor” surely has been a significant

driver for improved China-Russia relations, an often

overlooked aspect is the inherent value both Beijing

and Moscow see in improving bilateral relations per se.

There are mainly three significant dimensions in this

regard. The first revolves around the weight of history

and ideology in Sino-Russian relations. The long histo-

ry between China and Russia has often been troubled

and deep-rooted mistrust has long characterized the

relationship. During the Cold War, the relationship

seemed to change every decade; going from formal

alliance in the 1950s, to a split in diplomatic relations

in the 1960s and border war in 1969, then to normali-

zation of relations from the start of the mid-1980s to

the current state of strategic partnership. Inflamed ide-

ological confrontation over which country was to lead

world communism was also prevalent. In order to not

repeat the troubled past, leaders on both sides are

committed to prevent ideology and historical memo-

ries to affect their relationship. Beijing and Moscow

often state the lack of ideological tension in current

relations as an important achievement when compared

to the past.

The second factor is geographical proximity. China

and Russia are neighboring great powers and share a

4 300 kilometer long border. For both China and Rus-

sia, upholding a stable border to guarantee and main-

tain a secure external environment is of outmost im-

portance. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and the

subsequent border war in 1969 turned the Sino-Soviet


border into the most militarized border in the

1970s and 1980s. Not until the normalization

process was initiated in the mid-1980s, which also

included resolving the border conflict and fol-

lowed by a series of border agreements through-

out the 1990s, did the border issue finally come to

an end in 2004. By resolving the border issue the

necessary foundation was laid to move political

relations forward. Moreover, it also allowed Chi-

na and Russia to reallocate resources and attention

elsewhere, where the challenges were more

pressing: in East Asia and South East Asia for Chi-

na, and in the post-Soviet sphere for Russia.

The third factor relates to domestic moderni-

zation and economic development. China and

Russia are currently undergoing major domestic

transformations where both countries play a tangi-

ble material role for each other. For China, Russia

offers an important source for its growing demand

for oil and natural gas imports to fuel its contin-

ued economic development. There is already a

major oil pipeline in place, the Eastern Siberia-

Pacific Ocean (ESPO), which supplies China with

15 million tons of oil annually, and the above

mentioned natural gas deals supplement this

growing area of energy trade. There has also been

a beneficial military-technical cooperation for a

long time. China, still subjected to boycotts from

Western arms providers has turned to Russia for

its military modernization. And Russia, in need of

capital, especially in the financially troubled

1990s, has seen China as an important buyer. Ac-

cording to a SIPRI report, between 1991 and

2010, up to 90% of China’s conventional weapons

where supplied by Russia. Critics have often

pointed out that Russia has withheld much of its

most sophisticated weapons and instead sold these to

India. True as this might be, there is no doubt that

Russia’s arms sales to China have been of significant

importance for China’s military modernization pro-

gram. And as pointed out above, there are signs that

Russia is now willing to sell more advanced weaponry

to China.

A Formal Alliance In The Making?

A common question often raised is whether Bei-

jing and Moscow are in the making of forging a formal

military-political alliance, and if such an alliance could

pose a threat to the current international order as

such. While there are increased signs of more outright

rejection of Western values and ideas in both capitals,

an alliance directed against the West is not likely as

neither Beijing nor Moscow wish for this. Despite all

the frustration with the U.S dominance in world af-

fairs, both China and Russia are still dependent on

constructive and cooperative relations with the Unit-

ed States. Sino-U.S. bilateral trade which in 2013

stood at 521 billion USD, well exceeded Sino-Russian

trade. And although China is now Russia’s largest

trading partner, Russia is only China’s tenth largest.

China and the U.S. also need to have workable rela-

tions to handle many of today’s global issues such as

combating climate change. Moreover, a severe dis-

ruption in Sino-American relations would threaten

China’s need for a stable and secure external environ-

ment, the key precondition for China to continue to

modernize its economy. And although Putin nowa-

days seems willing to jeopardize links with the West,

Russia still needs to have cooperative ties with Europe

and the U.S and cannot in the long run risk to isolate

itself from the West. Finally, it should also be pointed

out that closer Sino-Russian ties do not imply that

there are no challenges or underlying tensions facing


the relationship such as a deep-rooted lack of mu-

tual trust, increased competition in Central Asia

and different long-term perspectives on interna-

tional order. These factors can not only limit, but

also severely constrain the relationship in the fu-

ture.

Observers have also pondered over what im-

plications closer China-Russia ties could have for

Europe. One particular issue worth considering is

the closer energy relation between Beijing and

Moscow, which can have certain implications for

Europe-Russia relations. As noted above, the

Western sanctions following Russia’s annexation

of Crimea have not isolated Russia to the extent

intended, as Moscow turned to China instead. For

one, this has shown that Europe needs to diversify

its own gas and oil imports away from Russia for

such measures to have any effect. However, as

both Russia and Europe seek to diversify their

respective energy relations, both sides are locked

in an interdependent energy relation. Russia still

heavily needs the European market for the high

price it pays for Russian gas. And for Europe to

diversifying energy sources, it is easier said than

done. Moreover, the China-Russia May 2014 gas

deal mentioned above is set to supply China with

38 billion cubic meters, still considerably smaller

when compared to the 161.5 bcm that Russia sup-

plied Europe with in 2013. It is thus fair to say

that Russia’s improved energy relation with China

will give Moscow some needed maneuver and

bargaining power vis-à-vis Europe, but that it will

not replace Europe as its main energy partner

with China any time soon.

Christopher Weidacher Hsiung is a researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies and a PhD-candidate at the political science department at Oslo University, specializing in Chinese foreign poli-cy, Sino-Russian relations and China’s Arctic policy. Mr. Weidacher Hsiung has a master’s degree in politi-cal science from Lund University and has previously worked at the Swedish Embassy in Beijing, at the Swedish Trade Council in Taipei and at the European University Centre at Beijing University. In the spring of 2014, he was a visiting scholar at the School of In-ternational Studies at Beking University. Mr. Weidacher Hsiung has also conducted Chinese lan-guage studies at Lund University, Taiwan National University, Beijing Foreign Language University and at Wuhan Huazhong University.

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About the author

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Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable

contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.

We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of

importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your

work please see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the

ATA Secretariat at the address listed below.

Editor: Flora Pidoux & Elizabeth Williams

ATA Programs

The Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association is pleased to announce

that the third annual NATO & EU Roundtable will take place on April 2-

4, 2015 in Tallinn at the Hotel Palace, and in Saka Cliff Manor in Eastern

Estonia. The Roundtable will focus on three key issues: Upcoming chal-

lenges in ensuring security in the alliances; Cyber security; Relations with

partner countries. The event will bring together about 60 young profes-

sionals and students who will discuss the security challenges related to the

work of NATO and the European Union. The goal of the event is to in-

crease the knowledge of young people in foreign and security policy and

to discuss the working principles of NATO.

The Atlantic Council is now accepting applications for an inaugu-

ral class of fellows. The Millennium Fellowship is a two-year program.

Throughout the fellowship, and beyond, fellows will join a global net-

work of outstanding peers, have unparalleled opportunities to engage

with world leaders at flagship Atlantic Council events, learn directly from

top experts, collaborate on projects with global impact, and develop pro-

fessional skills through training, master classes, and mentorship.

To apply for the fellowship, please complete the following ques-

tions and submit no later than 11:59 PM EST on March 1,

2015. Please email us at [email protected] with any ques-

tions.

Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic

Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes

the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,

Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37

countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,

the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially

include to the successor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

◊ the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

security issues.

◊ the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members.

◊ the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in

Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of

international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with

NATO.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

Documents

Atlantic Voices Vol 5, No. 01 (January 2015)