MORATA v. GO (1983)1

FACTS: Spouses Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint against spouses Julius and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00 in CFI Cebu. On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, the Moratas filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the Gos of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by the Gos. The judge denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the provision of Sec 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Secs 11 and 12 of the law.

ISSUE: WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with PD 1508

HELD/RATIO: YES. The nature of the case at bar does not fall under the exceptions cited in Sections 22 and 63 of P.D. 1508. Since the law does not distinguish, this case/dispute should have been first settled amicably by the Lupon. Furthermore, there is no showing that that the intention of the law is to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts for it would not have included the rule on venue provided in Section 3 (pertaining to land disputes which are traditionally cognizable by CFIs/RTCs) thereof. This is further supported by Circular No. 22

1 Lou Macabodbod

2 SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.—The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.

3 SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.— No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:

[1] Where the accused is under detention;[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations

issued by then CJ Fernando which gave notice to all CFIs to recognize the Katarungang Pambarangay Law and desist from acting upon cases falling within the authority of the Lupons. This circular was noted by President Marcos. Hence, the Court declared that the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.

Purpose of the Law. By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.

Rosaria Lupitan Pang-et vs. Catherine Manacnes-Dao-As

1. Petitioner filed an action for recovery of possession of real property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada before the MTC against the respondent spouses

2. During the course of the trial--- parties thru their counsels --- agreed to refer the matter to the Brgy. Lupon for arbitration in accordance w/ the provisions of the KPL --- MTC proceedings is suspended

3. 3 days later --- Lupon issued a certification to File an Action due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an agreement for arbitration and their insistence that the case should go to court

4. More than a month later --- MCTC remanded the matter for conciliation by the Lupon & ordered the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award

5. In compliance, Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award ordering the petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the respondents of PHP 8K for the improvements

6. Respondent – aggrieved --- repudiated the award but was rejected by the Lupon

7. 1 month later --- petitioner filed w/ the Lupon a Motion for Execution while respondent filed a motion for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case & prayed that her repudiation be considered by the court

8. MTC denied respondent’s motion contending that the 10-day period for repudiation had already lapsed and the award became final

9. Almost 2 months later – the Brgy. Chairman issued a notice of execution of the award --- but was not implemented

10. 6 yrs later petitioner filed w/ the MTC an action for the enforcement of the award --- respondent – argues that the award was void for not having been personally signed by the spouses and in a language not understood by the parties

Issue: W/N the case properly undergone the KPL Rules?

Held: NO!1. The award was void:

a. Not personally signed by the parties --- even petitioner herself admitted that respondent was not the one who signed the document

b. Catherine (daughter of the respondents) --- even if she signed, it will be invalid as the parents cannot be assisted by anyone unless they are minor & incompetent

c. Written in English & not understood by the parties

d. Consent of the Spouses where vitiated by fraud2. The respondents never really intended to submit the case for arbitration

Atty. Evelyn Magno vs. Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba

1. Atty. Magno charged Atty. Jacoba w/ willful violation of the Sec. 415 of the LGC of 1991 & Canon 4 of the CPR as the latter allegedly acted as the Lawyer of Lorenzo Inos for land dispute

2. Atty. Magno was the niece of Lorenzo Inos & they had a disagreement over landscaping contract they entered into w/c was brought before the Brgy. Captain of San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija

a. At the Brgy. Conciliation: Atty. Jacoba clothed w/ SPA from Inos appeared for the latter accompanied by his son, Lorenzito w/c was objected by Atty. Magno

b. Respondent’s Contention: Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer since Atty. Magno herself is also a lawyer w/c was rebutted that it was just incidental

c. Atty. Jacoba later responded that she is appearing as an atty-in-fact and not as a counsel of Inos

3. Evidence against Atty. Jacoba:a. Atty. J asked for an ocular inspection of the land and an oral argument

between Magno, Jr & Lorenzito arose w/c made Atty. J to have the incident recorded in the brgy. Blotter

b. Inos appeared before the court on Jan 2003 w/ the assistance of Atty. J & she also signed as a witness during the said appearance

c. Sumbong – sent to the Punong Brgy --- she signed representing herself as the Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family

Issue: W/N respondent can validly represent the Inos in a Brgy. Conciliation?

Held: NO!1. Sec. 415 of the LGC –KPL - appearance of parties in person is mandatory

w/o the assistance of counsel except for minors incompetent who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers

2. Prohibition – applies to all KB proceedings === Sec. 412 (a) of the LGC clearly provides that as a precondition to the filing of a complaint in court, the

parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or the lupon/pangkat tagapamayapa

Sps. Maria Luisa & Julius Morata vs. Sps. Victor & Flora Go & Judge Tomol

Facts:1. Aug 5, 1982 – respondents Go filed in the defunct CFI of Cebu presided by

Judge Tomol a complaint against petitioners Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to Php 49,400

2. All parties are residents of Cebu w/c made petitioner file a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply w/ KPL & that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties

3. Judge Tomol – ordered denying the motion on the ground that KPL is only applicable to cases to be tried by the inferior courts

Petra Vda. De Borromeo vs. Hon. Julian Pogoy & Atty. Ricardo Reyes

Facts:1. Petitioner is the occupying the property of the late Vito Borromeo located at

Cebu City2. Respondent is the Administrator of the said estate3. Respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner demanding payment of the

arrear rentals and to vacate the premises4. Failure of petitioner --- Respondent filed an ejectment case before the MTC of

Cebu having respondent Pogoy as the presiding judge5. Petitioner --- moved to dismiss the case for failure to undergo the Brgy.

Conciliation w/c the respondent judge denied due to the alleged regularity in the performance of duty of his COC in filing the case

Issue: W/N MTC can take cognizance of the case despite failure in obtaining Certification from the Brgy?

Held: YES!

1. KPL – is only applicable where there is a private offended partya. In the case, the estate of the late Vito Borromeo was the real party-in-

interest therefore it is not a private offended party (a juridical person)b. Atty. Reyes – mere nominal party who is issuing in behalf of the

Intestate Estate2. Case can be filed directly in court3. Not on the ground that the COC has the presumption of regularity in the

performance of his duty.

Napoleon Gegare vs, CA & Armie Elma

Facts:1. Controversy = Lot 5989 w/ an area of 270 sq. m. situated at Dadiangas,

GenSan City registered under the name of Paulino Elma2. Reversion Case – filed by the RP against Elma in the CFI of South Cotabato

w/c was decided for the nullification of the title of Elma & the lot reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition & giving preferential right to its actual occupant, Napoleon Gegare

3. P & R filed an application for the said lot to the Board of Liquidators in 19754. 1976 – Board passed a resolution disposing the lot in favor of petitioner

Gegare by way of negotiated sale w/c respondent protested but another resolution was passed denying such protest

5. Request for Reconsideration = filed by Elma w/c was referred to Mr. Garlit (liquidator-designee) for verification & investigation of the lot

a. After the hearing – Mr. Garlit recommended the division of the lot to the parties

6. Aug 14, 1981 --- Board – Resolution approved the recommendation & divided the lot equally between Gegare & Elma at 135.5 sq. m. each disposed to them by negotiated sale

7. Elma paid the ½ of the lot & have it registered under his name while Gagere wanted the whole lot to be given to him

8. Nov. 27, 1985 – Gegare filed an action for Annulment & Cancellation of the Partition of the Lot against respondent & the Board at the RTC of GENSAN

9. Respondent Elma asked for it to be dismissed on the ff. grounds:a. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matterb. Petitioner has no capacity to suec. Petitioner is not a real-party-in-interestd. Action is barred by prior judgmente. Lack of Conciliation pursuant to PD 1508 (KPL)

Issue: W/N the case at bar is covered by the KPL?

Held: YES!

1. Even if the board is a gov’t instrumentality, petitioner & respondent are also contending parties in the case who are residents of the same brgy so Sec. 6 of PD 1508 should apply --- confrontation at the Brgy. Level is mandatory to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably. --- if the other only contending party id the gov’t or its instrumentality or subdivision, the case falls w/in the exception but when only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.

2. Other assignment of errors:a. Not served w/ summons – petitioner === they are actually sent

notices at the address of the petitioner appearing in the petition at Liwayway Disco Restaurant & Disco Pub at GenSan & one of the resolutions sent where even contested by the petitioner w/c proved that petitioner received such summons, pleadings & resolutions

b. The appellate court erred in giving due course to the petition w/c are interlocutory in character === when the board passed its resolution in 1981, petitioner appealed to the OP but was denied & he did not file any petition for review w/c made said decision final & duly implemented

c. Real party-in-interest === not the petitioner since he was not a party in the grant of the land by the gov’t to Elma w/c will not give him the right to ask for its nullification

EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs.LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent

FACTS:Edwin Tribiana & Lourdes Tribiana are husband and wife. Lourdes filed a

petition for habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter Khriza Mae 1 year and 4 months old it turned out that it being held by Edwin’s mother, Rosalina Tribiana.

Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that it failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwin’s motion to dismiss that there were prior efforts at a compromise but failed. Lourdes attached the Certification to file Action from their barangay.

RTC denied Edwin’s motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and his mother to bring Khriza Mae before the RTC. Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari. The CA denied Edwin’s petition and also the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, should have dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent under art. 151 of Family code.

HELD:The petition is lack of merit, for the habeas corpus on the ground of failure to

comply with the article 151 of Family Code, can not be allowed such to dismiss such with the compliance of art.151 because they are both different in nature. The petition for habeas corpus is a valid ground or contention of the respondent because she was deprived of personal liberty. The art. 151 cannot be applied with this present case, if ever it were supposed to be applied, Lourdes validly answer it with its compliance when she attached the court to file action from their Barangay.

Estela Berba vs. Josephine Pablo & Heirs of Carlos Palanca

1. Berba – resident of 978 Maligay Street, Malate, Manila --- owner of a land located at Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila w/ a house erected therein w/c was leased to respondent Pablo & heirs of Palanca since 1976 covered by a Contract of Lease w/c continued to a month-to-month basis after the expiration of the COL

2. 1999 – Rental = Php 3,450 w/c Pablo failed to pay & by May 1999- arrears = Php 81,818 w/c caused Berba to file a complaint for eviction & collection of unpaid rentals but only against Pablo in the office of the Punong Brgy.

3. June 5, 1999 --- Berba & Pablo executed an agreement approved by the Pangkat:

a. Pablo promised to pay 3k monthly to Berba for the arrears on top of the 3,450 monthly rentals

4. May 2000 --- Pablo & other lessees still had the balance of Php 71,716.005. May 2001 --- Php 135,115.636. May 2, 2001 --- Berba through counsel, wrote lessees demanding payment &

vacate w/in 30 days7. June 21, 2001 --- Berba filed a complaint against Pablo & Heirs of Palanca in

the MTC of Manila for unlawful detainer but she failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement had been reached

8. Pablo had the ff. contentions:a. Non-payment due to financial distressb. Not sure if the owner of the property was really Berbac. Plaintiff has no cause of action as she failed to secure a Cert. to file

an action from the Lupon

Issue: W/N Berba violated the KPL for not going through the Lupong tagapamayapa prior to filing the Complaint to the MTC?

Held: YES!1. The Brgy. Conciliation that happened was not for unlawful detainer but for

merely collection of rentals.2. The contention of Berba that Sec. 417 of the LGC w/c provides for the 6

month-period for the enforcement of an action in the proper court is not applicable as there was no really a confrontation before the Lupon w/ respect to the unlawful detainer case

3. Contention of Berba: they lived on different brgys & can’t be covered by the KPL --- not correct --- since although they lived on diff brgys, they lived on the same city w/c is Manila --- w/c conciliation at the Brgy. Level is mandatory before filing the case to the proper court

ALFREDO CHING VS. CAG.R. NO. 110844 (2000)

Facts: P was charged before the Makati RTC with Estafa, in relation to the “Trust Receipts Law.” Thereafter, P filed before the Manila RTC for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages. P then filed a petition before the Makati RTC for the suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil action.

Issue: Whether there is a prejudicial question

Held: No. The two essential requisites of a prejudicial question are: (1) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for the declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between the parties was not a trust receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence.

NOCUM V. LUCIO TAN

ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent.

Date: Sept. 23, 2005

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J

Doctrine: Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constitutin the plaintiff's cause of action. Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

·Lucio Tan filed a complaint for damages (moral and exemplary) for alleged malicious and defamatory imputations against him in 2 articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Petitioners Inquirer and reporter Nocum , and ALPAP and Capt. Umali, in their respective joint answers alleged that the complaint stated no cause of action. ALPAP and Capt. Umali also alleged that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint failed to state the resdience of complainant Lucio Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.

·RTC of Makati: Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on the ground of improper venue

·Lucio Tan filed an omnibus motion seeking reconsideration and admission of the amended complaint now alleging that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati" and that " This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati."

·RTC then set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the defect in the original complaint has already been cured in the Amended complaint which can still

be properly admitted purusuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of CivPro since the Order of Dismissal was not yet final. Also, the amendment was merely formal.

·2 petitions for certiorari were then filed (one by Nocum and PDI, one by ALPAP and Umali) but CA dismissed the petition. The motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. Thus, the appeal at the SC. After the filing of comment by Tan and the reply filed by PDI and Nocum, SC resolved to give due course to the petition.

·Contention of PDI and Nocum: Art 360 of RPC vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of the place (1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where the complainant, if pirivate person, resides; or (3) where the complaint, if a public official, holds office. Thus, since the original lcomplaint stated only the business adress of Lucio Tan and not his actual residence or the place of printing and first publication, the original complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the RTC.

iSSUE:/ HELD:

Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the original complaint? YES.

RATIO:

Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Here. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. Tan's cause of action is for damages arising from libel, jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Art. 360 of RPC provides that is the CFI that is specifically designated to try a libel case.

Jurisdiction is different from venue. (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case while venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue is a matter of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter, venue establishes a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, or the petitioner and the respondent; and (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties while venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.

In this case, the additional allegations in the Amended Complainant as to place of printing and first publication referred only to the question of venue and not jurisidiction. They would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would failure to

include them divest RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. Tan's failure to allege these allegations gave the court, the power upon motion by a party, to dismiss on the ground that the venue was not properly laid.

The amendment was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court,where originally it had none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. Venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions. Assuming that the venue was improperly laid, the issue would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In civil cases, venue may be waived. By dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue, RTC had jurisdiction over the case. PDI and Nocum recognized RTC's jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint by questioning the propriety of venue instead of a motion to dismiss.

Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.

Villacastin vs Pelaez

Facts: Pelaez and his wife mortgaged their agricultural lands Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). For failure of the Pelaez spouses to pay their mortgage obligation, the properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold at public auction.

The purported tenants of the property filed an action to annul the mortgage, foreclosure and sale of the properties, claiming that they are the owners thereof under Presidential Decree No. 27. Case was filed in the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu 

Villacastin filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the MCTC of Bantayan, Cebu, against Pelaez and a certain Elesio Monteseven. The complaint averred that Villacstin are the owners and actual possessors of the subject landholding. 

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu rendered a decision in favor of the tenants. 

MCTC rendered judgment in civil case in favor of Villacastin. RTC affirmed this decision. 

CA, however, ruled that regular courts should respect the primary jurisdiction vested upon the DARAB in cases involving agricultural lands such as the property subject of this case. 

Villacastin contend that the case they filed did not involve any agrarian matter and thus, the MCTC correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case. 

Issue: Whether or not the MCTC (and also the RTC) has jurisdiction over the case filed by Villacastin.

Held: MCTC has jurisdiction. 

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In ascertaining, for instance, whether an action is one for forcible entry falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined. A review of the complaintreveals that the pertinent allegations thereof sufficiently vest jurisdiction over the action on the MCTC. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are the owners and legal as well as actual possessors of a parcel of agricultural land. That Pelaez, by strategy and through stealth entered the above-described land of the Villacstin and took possession thereof. 

It has not escaped our notice that no landowner-tenant vinculum juris or juridical tie was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. 

Rule II of the DARAB Rules17 provides that the DARAB "shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Program 

Petitioners' action is clearly for the recovery of physical or material possession of the subject property only, a question which both the MCTC and the RTC ruled petitioners are entitled to. It does not involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter, nor an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.