Assigned Copyright Cases

8/12/2019 Assigned Copyright Cases

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G.R. No. 108946 January 28, 1999

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and BJ PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioners,vs.HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, GABRIEL ZOSA, WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR.,and CASEY FRANCISCO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari. Petitioners seek to annul the resolution of the Department of Justice,dated August 12, 1992, in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27854, entitled "Gabriel Zosa, et al. v. CityProsecutor of Quezon City and Francisco Joaquin, Jr.," and its resolution, dated December 3, 1992,denying petitioner Joaquin's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of Copyright No. M922,dated January 28, 1971, of Rhoda and Me, a dating game show aired from 1970 to 1977.

On June 28, 1973, petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an addendum to its certificate ofcopyright specifying the show's format and style of presentation.

On July 14, 1991, while watching television, petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr., president of BJPI, sawon RPN Channel 9 an episode of It's a Date, which was produced by IXL Productions, Inc. (IXL). OnJuly 18, 1991, he wrote a letter to private respondent Gabriel M. Zosa, president and generalmanager of IXL, informing Zosa that BJPI had a copyright to Rhoda and Me and demanding that IXLdiscontinue airing It's a Date.

In a letter, dated July 19, 1991, private respondent Zosa apologized to petitioner Joaquin andrequested a meeting to discuss a possible settlement. IXL, however, continued airing It's a Date,

prompting petitioner Joaquin to send a second letter on July 25, 1991 in which he reiterated hisdemand and warned that, if IXL did not comply, he would endorse the matter to his attorneys forproper legal action.

Meanwhile, private respondent Zosa sought to register IXL's copyright to the first episode of It's aDate for which it was issued by the National Library a certificate of copyright August 14, 1991.

Upon complaint of petitioners, an information for violation of P.D. No. 49 was filed against privaterespondent Zosa together with certain officers of RPN Channel 9, namely, William Esposo, FelipeMedina, and Casey Francisco, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where it was docketed asCriminal Case No. 92-27854 and assigned to Branch 104 thereof. However, private respondentZosa sought a review of the resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor before the Department ofJustice.

On August 12, 1992, respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Assistant CityProsecutor's findings and directed him to move for the dismissal of the case against private

respondents.1

Petitioner Joaquin filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion denied by respondent Secretaryof Justice on December 3, 1992. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that:


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1. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction when he invoked non-presentation of the mastertape as being fatal to the existence of probable cause to proveinfringement, despite the fact that private respondents never raisedthe same as a controverted issue.

2. The public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction when he arrogated unto himself the determinationof what is copyrightable an issue which is exclusively within the

jurisdiction of the regional trial court to assess in a proper proceeding.

Both public and private respondents maintain that petitioners failed to establish the existence ofprobable cause due to their failure to present the copyrighted master videotape of Rhoda and Me.They contend that petitioner BJPI's copyright covers only a specific episode of Rhoda and Meandthat the formats or concepts of dating game shows are not covered by copyright protection underP.D. No. 49.

Non-Assignment of Error.

Petitioners claim that their failure to submit the copyrighted master videotape of the television showRhoda and Me was not raised in issue by private respondents during the preliminary investigationand, therefore, it was error for the Secretary of Justice to reverse the investigating prosecutor'sfinding of probable cause on this ground.

A preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the state prosecutor who is given by law thepower to direct and control criminal

actions.2

He is, however, subject to the control of the Secretary of Justice. Thus, Rule 112, 4 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:

Sec. 4. Duty of investigating fiscal. If the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the

respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information.He shall certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer,has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonableground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probablyguilty thereof, that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidencesubmitted against him and that he was given an opportunity to submit controvertingevidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend dismissal of the complaint.

In either case, he shall forward the records of the case to the provincial or city fiscalor chief state prosecutor within five (5) days from his resolution. The latter shall takeappropriate action thereon ten (10) days from receipt thereof, immediately informingthe parties of said action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscalwithout the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chiefstate prosecutor.

Where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case buthis findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor onthe ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the


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corresponding information against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscalor state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution ofthe provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscalconcerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another

preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint orinformation.

In reviewing resolutions of prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from consideringerrors, although unassigned, for the purpose of determining whether there is probable cause forfiling cases in court. He must make his own finding, of probable cause and is not confined to theissues raised by the parties during preliminary investigation. Moreover, his findings are not subject toreview unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.

Opinion of the Secretary of Justice

Petitioners contend, however, that the determination of the question whether the format or

mechanics of a show is entitled to copyright protection is for the court, and not the Secretary ofJustice, to make. They assail the following portion of the resolution of the respondent Secretary ofJustice:

[T]he essence of copyright infringement is the copying, in whole or in part, ofcopyrightable materials as defined and enumerated in Section 2 of PD. No. 49.Apartfrom the manner in which it is actually expressed, however, the idea of a dating gameshow is, in the opinionof this Office, a non-copyrightable material. Ideas, concepts,formats, or schemes in their abstract form clearly do not fall within the class of works or

materials susceptible of copyright registration as provided in PD. No. 49.3(Emphasis

added.)

It is indeed true that the question whether the format or mechanics of petitioners television show isentitled to copyright protection is a legal question for the court to make. This does not, however,preclude respondent Secretary of Justice from making a preliminary determination of this question inresolving whether there is probable cause for filing the case in court. In doing so in this case, he didnot commit any grave error.

Presentation of Master Tape

Petitioners claim that respondent Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in ruling that themaster videotape should have been predented in order to determine whether there was probablecause for copyright infringement. They contend that 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v. Court of

Appeals,4on which respondent Secretary of Justice relied in reversing the resolution of the

investigating prosecutor, is inapplicable to the case at bar because in the present case, the partiespresented sufficient evidence which clearly establish "linkage between the copyright show "Rhoda

and Me" and the infringing TV show "It's a Date."5

The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation involved raids conducted on various videotapeoutlets allegedlly selling or renting out "pirated" videotapes. The trial court found that the affidavits ofNBI agents, given in support of the application for the search warrant, were insufficient without the


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master tape. Accordingly, the trial court lifted the search warrants it had previously issued against

the defendants. On petition for review, this Court sustained the action of the trial court and ruled:6

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the piratedfilms were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants againstthose who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the

effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not benecessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative ofwhether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrantsis not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes werenecessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets whichallegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted filmsbelonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantialsimilarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the

applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with thepurchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether thelatter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrightedfilms to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probablecause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve asbasis for the issuance of a search warrant.

This ruling was qualified in the later case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals7in

which it was held:

In fine, the supposedpronunciamentoin said case regarding the necessity for thepresentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search

warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining theexistence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as tothe true nexus between the master tape and the printed copies . An objective and carefulreading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that saiddirective was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar

copyright infringement cases. . .8

In the case at bar during the preliminary investigation, petitioners and private respondents presentedwritten descriptions of the formats of their respective televisions shows, on the basis of which theinvestigating prosecutor ruled:

As may [be] gleaned from the evidence on record, the substance of the television

productions complainant's "RHODA AND ME" and Zosa's "IT'S A DATE" is that twomatches are made between a male and a female, both single, and the two couplesare treated to a night or two of dining and/or dancing at the expense of the show. Themajor concepts of both shows is the same. Any difference appear mere variations ofthe major concepts.

That there is an infringement on the copyright of the show "RHODA AND ME" both incontent and in the execution of the video presentation are established because


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respondent's "IT'S A DATE" is practically an exact copy of complainant's "RHODAAND ME" because of substantial similarities as follows, to wit:

RHODA AND ME "IT'S A DATE"

Set 1 Set 1

a. Unmarried participant of one gender (searcher) appears on one side of

a divider, while three (3) unmarried participants of the other gender are onthe other side of the divider. This arrangement is done to ensure that thesearcher does not see the searchees.

a. same

b. Searcher asks a question to be answered by each of the searchees.The purpose is to determine who among the searchees is the mostcompatible with the searcher.

b. same

c. Searcher speculates on the match to the searchee. c. same

d. Selection is made by the use of compute (sic) methods, or by the wayquestions are answered, or similar methods.

d. Selection is based on the answer of the Searchees.

Set 2 Set 2

Same as above with the genders of the searcher and searchees

interchanged.9

same

Petitioners assert that the format of Rhoda and Meis a product of ingenuity and skill and is thusentitled to copyright protection. It is their position that the presentation of a point-by-point comparisonof the formats of the two shows clearly demonstrates the nexus between the shows and henceestablishes the existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. Such being the case, theydid not have to produce the master tape.

To begin with the format of a show is not copyrightable. Section 2 of P.D. No. 49,10

otherwiseknown as the DECREE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, enumerates the classes of work entitledto copyright protection, to wit:

Sec. 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsistwith respect to any of the following classes of works:

(A) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories, andgazetteers:

(B) Periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;

(C) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery;

(D) Letters;

(E) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works andentertainments in dumb shows, the acting form of which is fixed in writing or

otherwise;

(F) Musical compositions, with or without words;

(G) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography, andother works of art; models or designs for works of art;

(H) Reproductions of a work of art;


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(I) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or notpatentable, and other works of applied art;

(J) Maps, plans, sketches, and charts;

(K) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;

(I) Photographic works and works produced by a process analogous to photographylantern slides;

(M) Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous tocinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;

(N) Computer programs;

(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations advertising copies, labels tags, and box wraps;

(P) Dramatizations, translations, adaptations, abridgements, arrangements and other

alterations of literary, musical or artistic works or of works of the Philippinegovernment as herein defined, which shall be protected as provided in Section 8 ofthis Decree.

(Q) Collections of literary, scholarly, or artistic works or of works referred to inSection 9 of this Decree which by reason of the selection and arrangement of theircontents constitute intellectual creations, the same to be protected as such inaccordance with Section 8 of this Decree.

(R) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.

This provision is substantially the same as 172 of the INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF

PHILIPPINES (R.A. No. 8293). 11The format or mechanics of a television show is not included inthe list of protected works in 2 of P.D. No. 49. For this reason, the protection afforded by the lawcannot be extended to cover them.

Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new orindependent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated bythe statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, andmay be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons and

on terms and conditions specified in the statute.12

Since . . . copyright in published works is purely a statutory creation, a copyright may be

obtained only for a work falling within the statutory enumeration or description.13

Regardless of the historical viewpoint, it is authoritatively settled in the United States thatthere is no copyright except that which is both created and secured by act of Congress . .

. . .14

P.D. No. 49, 2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished works and not toconcepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method ofoperation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,


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illustrated, or embodied in such work.15

Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THEPHILIPPINES provides:

Sec. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections172 and 173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure,system, method or operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere data as such,

even if they are expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of theday and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of pressinformation; or any official text of a legislative, administrative or legal nature, as wellas any official translation thereof.

What then is the subject matter of petitioners' copyright? This Court is of the opinion that petitionerBJPI's copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling withinthe class of works mentioned in P.D. 49, 2(M), to wit:

Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous tocinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;

The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show.Accordingly, by the very nature of the subject of petitioner BJPI's copyright, the investigatingprosecutor should have the opportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows.

Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is insufficient; thepresentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the determination of theexistence of probable cause. As aptly observed by respondent Secretary of Justice:

A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves awhole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity ordissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright/format of bothdating game shows.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED

SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

Facts:BJ Productions, Inc (BJPI) is a holder of a Certificate of Copyright no. M92 2 issued on January 28, 1971 of Rhodaand Me which is a dating show aired from 1970 to 1977. It submitted to the National Library an addendum itscertificate of copyright specifying the shows format and style of presentation. While watching the television, itsPresident, Francisco Joaquin saw on RPN Channel 9 the episode on Its a Date produced by IXL Productions. Hewrote a letter to IXLs president Gabriel Zosa informing him that BJPI has a copyright of the same format as shownon their Its a Date show in their Rhoda and Me show. Zosa soughtto register IXLs copyright to theirfirstepisode of Its a Date to the National Library. Petitioner filed a complaint in violation of PD No. 49 against therespondent before the RTC of Quezon City. Respondent sought a review of the resolution from the Asst. City

Prosecutor before the Department of Justice.

Sec. of Justice Franklin Drilon directed to move for dismissal of the case against the respondents and denied thepetitioners motion for reconsideration hence this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not the format or mechanics of the petitioners television show is entitled to a copyright protection.

Ruling:


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The Supreme Court held that the format of a show is not copyrightable as provided by Section 2 of PD no. 49otherwise known as the Decree on Intellectual Property which enumerates the classes of work that are covered bythe copyright protection. Similarly, RA 8293, the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines provides that formator mechanics of a television show is not included in the list of the protected work by the copyright law ofthe Philippines. PD 49 enumerates the works subject to copyright protection which refers to finished works and noton concepts. It does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method or operation, concept, principlesor discovery regardless of the form to which it is described, explained, and illustrated or embodied in the work.

Joaquin vs DrilononFebruary 9, 2012

Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Game Show Ideas and Concepts Not Covered by Copyright

BJ Productions Inc. (BJPI) was the holder of copyright over the show Rhoda and Me.It holds rights over

the shows format and style of presentation. In 1991, BJPIs president Francisco Joaquin saw on TV RPN

9s showItsa Date, which is basically the same as Rhoda and Me.He eventually sued Gabriel Zosa, the

manager of the show Its a Date. Zosa later sought a review of the prosecutors resolution before the

Secretary of Justice (Drilon). Drilon reversed the findings of the fiscal and directed him to dismiss the

case against Zosa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of Drilon is valid.

HELD:Yes. The essence of copyright infringement is the copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable

materials as defined and enumerated in Section 2 of PD. No. 49 (Copyright Law). Apart from the manner

in which it is actually expressed, however, the idea of a dating game show is a non-copyrightable

material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes in their abstract form clearly do not fall within the class of

works or materials susceptible of copyright registration as provided in PD. No. 49. What is covered by

BJPIs copyright is the specific episodes of the showRhoda and Me.

Further, BJPI should have presented the master videotape of the show in order to show the linkage

between the copyright show (Rhoda and Me) and the infringing show (Itsa Date). This is based on the

ruling in 20thCentury Fox vs CA (though this has been qualified by Columbia Pictures vs CA, this is still

good law). Though BJPI did provide a lot of written evidence and description to show the linkage

between the shows, the same were not enough. A television show includes more than mere words can

describe because it involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no

similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright/format of both dating

game shows.

G.R. No. 147043 June 21, 2005


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NBI - MICROSOFT CORPORATION & LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.,petitioners,vs.JUDY C. HWANG, BENITO KEH & YVONNE K. CHUA/BELTRON COMPUTER PHILIPPINESINC., JONATHAN K. CHUA, EMILY K. CHUA, BENITO T. SANCHEZ, NANCY I. VELASCO,ALFONSO CHUA, ALBERTO CHUA, SOPHIA ONG, DEANNA CHUA/TAIWAN MACHINERYDISPLAY & TRADE CENTER, INC., and THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari1of the Resolutions2of the Department of Justice dismissing for "lack ofmerit and insufficiency of evidence" petitioner Microsoft Corporations complaint aga inst respondentsfor copyright infringement and unfair competition.

The Facts

Petitioner Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft"), a Delaware, United States corporation, owns thecopyright and trademark to several computer software.3Respondents Benito Keh and Yvonne Kehare the President/Managing Director and General Manager, respectively, of respondent BeltronComputer Philippines, Inc. ("Beltron"), a domestic corporation. Respondents Jonathan K. Chua,Emily K. Chua, Benito T. Sanchez, and Nancy I. Velasco are Beltrons Directors. On the other hand,respondents Alfonso Chua, Alberto Chua, Judy K. Chua Hwang, Sophia Ong, and Deanna Chua arethe Directors of respondent Taiwan Machinery Display & Trade Center, Inc. ("TMTC"), also adomestic corporation.4

In May 1993, Microsoft and Beltron entered into a Licensing Agreement ("Agreement"). UnderSection 2(a) of the Agreement, as amended in January 1994, Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee,

to:

(i) xxx reproduce and install no more than one (1) copy of [Microsoft] software on eachCustomer System hard disk or Read Only Memory ("ROM"); [and]

(ii) xxx distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of the Product (reproduced as perSection 2(a)(i) and/or acquired from Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor) in objectcode form to end users[.] xxxx5

The Agreement also authorized Microsoft and Beltron to terminate the contract if the other fails tocomply with any of the Agreements provisions. Microsoft terminated the Agreement effective 22June 1995 for Beltrons non-payment of royalties.6

Afterwards, Microsoft learned that respondents were illegally copying and selling Microsoft software.Consequently, Microsoft, through its Philippine agent,7hired the services of Pinkerton ConsultingServices ("PCS"), a private investigative firm. Microsoft also sought the assistance of the NationalBureau of Investigation ("NBI"). On 10 November 1995, PCS employee John Benedic8Sacriz("Sacriz") and NBI agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("Samiano"), posing as representatives of acomputer shop,9bought computer hardware (central processing unit ("CPU") and computer monitor)and software (12 computer disks ("CDs") in read-only memory ("ROM") format) from respondents.The CPU contained pre-installed10Microsoft Windows 3.1 and MS-DOS software. The 12 CD-ROMs,
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encased in plastic containers with Microsoft packaging, also contained Microsoft software.11At leasttwo of the CD-ROMs were "installers," so-called because they contain several software (Microsoftonly or both Microsoft and non-Microsoft).12Sacriz and Samiano were not given the Microsoft end-user license agreements, users manuals, registration cards or certificates of authenticity for thearticles they purchased. The receipt issued to Sacriz and Samiano for the CPU and monitor bore theheading "T.M.T.C. (PHILS.) INC. BELTRON COMPUTER."13The receipt for the 12 CD-ROMs did

not indicate its source although the name "Gerlie" appears below the entry "delivered by."14

On 17 November 1995, Microsoft applied for search warrants against respondents in the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 23, Manila ("RTC").15The RTC granted Microsofts application and issued twosearch warrants ("Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685").16Using Search Warrant Nos. 95-684and 95-685, the NBI searched the premises of Beltron and TMTC and seized several computer-related hardware, software, accessories, and paraphernalia. Among these were 2,831 pieces ofCD-ROMscontaining Microsoft software.17

Based on the articles obtained from respondents, Microsoft and a certain Lotus DevelopmentCorporation ("Lotus Corporation") charged respondents before the Department of Justice ("DOJ")with copyright infringement under Section 5(A) in relation to Section 29 of Presidential Decree No.49, as amended, ("PD 49")18and with unfair competition under Article 189(1)19of the Revised PenalCode. In its Complaint ("I.S. No. 96-193"), which the NBI indorsed, Microsoft alleged thatrespondents illegally copied and sold Microsoft software.20

In their joint counter-affidavit, respondents Yvonne Keh ("respondent Keh") and Emily K. Chua("respondent Chua") denied the charges against respondents. Respondents Keh and Chua allegedthat: (1) Microsofts real intention in filing the complaint under I.S. No. 96 -193 was to pressureBeltron to pay its alleged unpaid royalties, thus Microsoft should have filed a collection suit instead ofa criminal complaint; (2) TMTC bought the confiscated 59 boxes of MS-DOS CDs from a Microsoftdealer in Singapore (R.R. Donnelly); (3) respondents are not the "source" of the Microsoft Windows3.1 software pre-installed in the CPU bought by Sacriz and Samiano, but only of the MS-DOSsoftware; (4) Microsofts alleged proof of purchase (receipt) for the 12 CD-ROMs is inconclusivebecause the receipt does not indicate its source; and (5) respondents Benito Keh, Jonathan K.

Chua, Alfonso Chua, Alberto Chua, Judy K. Chua Hwang, Sophia Ong, and Deanna Chua arestockholders of Beltron and TMTC in name only and thus cannot be held criminally liable.21

The other respondents did not file counter-affidavits.

Meanwhile, respondents moved to quash Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685. The RTCpartially granted their motion in its Order of 16 April 1996. Microsoft sought reconsideration but theRTC denied Microsofts motion in its Order of 19 July 1996. Microsoft appealed to the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600. In its Decision of 29 November 2001, the Court of Appealsgranted Microsofts appeal and set aside the RTC Orders of 16 April 1996 and 19 July 1996. TheCourt of Appeals Decision became final on 27 December 2001.

The DOJ Resolutions

In the Resolution of 26 October 1999, DOJ State Prosecutor Jocelyn A. Ong ("State ProsecutorOng") recommended the dismissal of Microsofts complaint for lack of merit and insufficiency ofevidence. State Prosecutor Ong also recommended the dismissal of Lotus Corporations complaintfor lack of interest to prosecute and for insufficiency of evidence. Assistant Chief State ProsecutorLualhati R. Buenafe ("Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Buenafe") approved State Prosecutor Ongsrecommendations.22The 26 October 1999 Resolution reads in part:
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[T]wo (2) issues have to be resolved in this case, namely:

a) Whether or not Beltron Computer and/or its stockholders should be held liable for theoffenses charged.

b) Whether or not prima facie case exist[s] against Taiwan Machinery Display and Trade

Center, Inc. (TMTC) for violation of the offense charged.

Complainant had alleged that from the time the license agreement was terminated, respondent/sis/are no longer authorized to copy/distribute/sell Microsoft products. However, respondent/s averredthat the case is civil in nature, not criminal, considering that the case stemmed only out of the desireof complainant to collect from them the amount of US$135,121.32 and that the contract entered intoby the parties cannot be unilaterally terminated.

In the order of Honorable William Bayhon dated July 19, 1996 [denying reconsideration to the Orderpartially quashing the search warrants], he observed the following:

"It is further argued by counsel for respondent that the act taken by private complainant is to spite

revenge against the respondent Beltron for the latter failed to pay the alleged monetary obligation inthe amount of US$135,121.32. That respondent has some monetary obligation to complainant whichis not denied by the complainant."

["]It appears therefore that prior to the issuance of the subject search warrants, complainant hadsome business transactions with the respondent [Beltron] along the same line of products.Complainant failed to reveal the true circumstances existing between the two of them as it nowappears, indeed the search warrant[s] xxx [are] being used as a leverage to secure collection of themoney obligation which the Court cannot allow."

From said order, it can be gleaned that the [RTC] xxx, had admitted that the search warrants appliedfor by complainant were merely used as a leverage for the collection of the alleged monetary

obligation of the respondent/s.

From said order, it can be surmise (sic) that the obligations between the parties is civil in nature notcriminal.

Moreover, complainant had time and again harped that respondent/s is/are not authorized tosell/copy/distribute Microsoft products at the time of the execution of the search warrants. Still, thisoffice has no power to pass upon said issue for one has then to interpret the provisions of thecontract entered into by the parties, which question, should be raised in a proper civil proceeding.

Accordingly, absen[t] a resolution from the proper court of (sic) whether or not the contract is stillbinding between the parties at the time of the execution of the search warrants, this office cannotpass upon the issue of whether respondent/s is or are liable for the offense charged.

As to the second issue, we find for the respondent/s. TMTC had provided sufficient evidence suchas pro-forma invoice from R.R. Donnelley; Debt Advice of the Bank of Commerce; Official Receiptsfrom the Bureau of Customs; and Import Entry Declaration of the Bureau of Customs to prove thatindeed the Microsoft software in their possession were bought from Singapore.

Thus, respondent/s in this case has/have no intent to defraud the public, as provided under Article189 of the Revised Penal Code, for they bought said Microsoft MS-DOS 6.0 from an alleged


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licensee of Microsoft in Singapore, with all the necessary papers. In their opinion, what they haveare genuine Microsoft software, therefore no unfair competition exist.

Moreover, violation of P.D. 49 does not exist, for respondent/s was/were not the manufacturers ofthe Microsoft software seized and were selling their products as genuine Microsoft software,considering that they bought it from a Microsoft licensee.

Complainant, on the other hand, considering that it has the burden of proving that the respondent/sis/are liable for the offense charged, has not presented any evidence that the items seized namelythe 59 boxes of MS-DOS 6.0 software are counterfeit.

The certification issued on December 12, 1995 by Christopher Austin, Corporate Attorney of thecomplainant, does not disclose this fact. For the term used by Mr. Austin was that the items seizedwere unauthorized.

The question now, is whether the products were unauthorized because TMTC has no license to sellMicrosoft products, or is it unauthorized because R.R. Donnelley has no authority to sell saidproducts here in the Philippines.

Still, to determine the culpability of the respondents, complainant should present evidence that whatis in the possession of the respondent/s is/are counterfeit Microsoft products.

This it failed to do.23

Microsoft sought reconsideration and prayed for an ocular inspection of the articles seized fromrespondents. However, in the Resolution of 3 December 1999, Assistant Chief State ProsecutorBuenafe, upon State Prosecutor Ongs recommendation, denied Microsofts motion.24

Microsoft appealed to the Office of the DOJ Secretary. In the Resolution of 3 August 2000, DOJUndersecretary Regis V. Puno dismissed Microsofts appeal.25Microsoft sought reconsideration but

its motion was denied in the Resolution of 22 December 2000.26

Hence, this petition. Microsoft contends that:

I. THE DOJ ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENTS WAS ONLY CIVIL INNATURE BY VIRTUE OF THE LICENSE AGREEMENT.

II. THE DOJ MISAPPRECIATED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENTS WERE ENGAGED IN THEILLEGAL IMPORTATION, SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTERFEIT SOFTWARE ASEVIDENCED BY THE ITEMS PURCHASED DURING THE TEST-BUY AND THE ITEMS SEIZEDFROM RESPONDENTS PREMISES.

III. THE DOJ MISAPPRECIATED THE LAW ON COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND UNFAIRCOMPETITION.

IV. ONLY TWO OUT OF THE NINE RESPONDENTS BOTHERED TO FILE COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS; HENCE, THE CHARGES AGAINST SEVEN [RESPONDENTS] REMAINUNCONTROVERTED.27

In its Comment, filed by the Solicitor General, the DOJ maintains that it did not commit grave abuseof discretion in dismissing Microsofts complaint.28
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For their part, respondents allege in their Comment that Microsoft is guilty of forum-shoppingbecause its petition in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 was filed ahead of, and has a "common interest" with,this petition. On the merits, respondents reiterate their claims in their motion to quash SearchWarrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685 that the articles seized from them were either owned by others,purchased from legitimate sources, or not produced by Microsoft. Respondents also insist that the

Agreement entitled Beltron to "copy and replicate or reproduce" Microsoft products. On the

confiscated 2,831 CD-ROMs, respondents allege that a certain corporation29

left the CD-ROMs withthem for safekeeping. Lastly, respondents claim that there is no proof that the CPU Sacriz andSamiano bought from them contained pre-installed Microsoft software because the receipt for theCPU does not indicate "[s]oftware hard disk."30

In its Reply, Microsoft counters that it is not liable for forum-shopping because its petition in CA-G.R.CV No. 54600 involved the Orders of the RTC partially quashing Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and95-685 while this petition concerns the DOJ Resolutions dismissing its complaint againstrespondents for copyright infringement and unfair competition. On the merits, Microsoft maintainsthat respondents should be indicted for copyright infringement and unfair competition.31

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

(1) Whether Microsoft engaged in forum-shopping; and

(2) Whether the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause tocharge respondents with copyright infringement and unfair competition.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has merit.

Microsoft did no t Engage in Forum-Shopping

Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties, eithersimultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.32Thus, it exists where the elementsof litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who representthe same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief beingfounded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in thetwo cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of whichparty is successful, would amount to res judicatain the other case.33Forum-shopping is an act ofmalpractice because it abuses court processes.34To check this pernicious practice, Section 5, Rule7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the principal party in an initiatory pleading to submita certification against forum-shopping.35Failure to comply with this requirement is a cause for thedismissal of the case and, in case of willful forum-shopping, for the imposition of administrative

sanctions.

Here, Microsoft correctly contends that it is not liable for forum-shopping. What Microsoft appealed inCA-G.R. CV No. 54600 were the RTC Orders partially quashing Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and95-685. In the present case, Microsoft is appealing from the DOJ Resolutions dismissing itscomplaint against respondents for copyright infringement and unfair competition. Thus, although theparties in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 and this petition are identical, the rights asserted and the reliefsprayed for are not such that the judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 does not amount to res

judicata in the present case. This renders forum-shopping impossible here.
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The DOJ Ac ted with Grave Abuse of Discret ion

in not Finding Probable Cause to Charge Respondents w i th

Copyright Infr ingement and Unfai r Comp eti t ion

Generally, this Court is loath to interfere in the prosecutors discretion in determining probablecause36unless such discretion is shown to have been abused.37This case falls under the

exception.

Unlike the higher quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt required to secure a conviction, it is thelower standard of probable cause which is applied during the preliminary investigation to determinewhether the accused should be held for trial. This standard is met if the facts and circumstancesincite a reasonable belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Aswe explained in Pilapi l v. Sand iganbayan:38

The term [probable cause] does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolutecertainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable causedoes not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It isenough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

PD 49 and Art icle 189(1)

Section 539of PD 49 ("Section 5") enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright owner.Contrary to the DOJs ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized"manufacturing" of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the actscovered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 withoutobtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders himself civilly40and criminally41liable forcopyright infringement. We held in Colum bia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of A ppeals:42

Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner ofthe copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is asynonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of theowner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner ofthe copyright. (Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, under Section 5(A), a copyright owner is vested with the exclusive right to "copy,distribute, multiply, [and] sell" his intellectual works.

On the other hand, the elements of unfair competition under Article 189(1)43of the Revised PenalCode are:

(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearanceof the goods of anothermanufacturer or dealer;

(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2)wrappingof their packages, or in the (3) device or wordstherein, or in (4) any otherfeatureof their appearance[;]

(c) That the offender offersto sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance oropportunity to do the same with a like purpose[; and]
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(d) That there is actual intent to deceivethe public or defraud a competitor.44

The element of intent to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the goods or theirappearance.45

On the Suff ic iency of Evidence to

Support a Finding of Probable CauseAgainst Respondents

In its pleadings filed with the DOJ, Microsoft invoked three clusters of evidence to support itscomplaint against respondents, namely: (1) the 12 CD-ROMs containing Microsoft software Sacrizand Samiano bought from respondents; (2) the CPU with pre-installed Microsoft software Sacriz andSamiano also purchased from respondents; and (3) the 2,831 CD-ROMs containing Microsoftsoftware seized from respondents.46The DOJ, on the one hand, refused to pass upon the relevanceof these pieces of evidence because: (1) the "obligations between the parties is civil and notcriminal" considering that Microsoft merely sought the issuance of Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and95-685 to pressure Beltron to pay its obligation under the Agreement, and (2) the validity ofMicrosofts termination of the Agreement must first be resolved by the "proper court." On the other

hand, the DOJ ruled that Microsoft failed to present evidence proving that what were obtained fromrespondents were counterfeit Microsoft products.

This is grave abuse of discretion.47

First.Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted wellwithin its rights in filing the complaint under I.S. No. 96-193 based on the incriminatingevidence obtained from respondents. Hence, it was highly irregular for the DOJ to hold,based on the RTC Order of 19 July 1996, that Microsoft sought the issuance of SearchWarrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685, and by inference, the filing of the complaint under I.S. No.96-193, merely to pressure Beltron to pay its overdue royalties to Microsoft. Significantly, inits Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 54600 dated 29 November 2001, the Court of Appeals setaside the RTC Order of 19 July 1996. Respondents no longer contested that ruling whichbecame final on 27 December 2001.

Second.There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior "resolutionfrom the proper court of (sic) whether or not the [Agreement] is still binding between theparties." Beltron has not filed any suit to question Microsofts termination of the Agreement.Microsoft can neither be expected nor compelled to wait until Beltron decides to sue beforeMicrosoft can seek remedies for violation of its intellectual property rights.

Furthermore, some of the counterfeit CD-ROMs bought from respondents were "installer"CD-ROMs containing Microsoft software only or both Microsoft and non-Microsoft software.These articles are counterfeitper se because Microsoft does not (and could not haveauthorized anyone to) produce such CD-ROMs. The copying of the genuine Microsoft

software to produce these fake CD-ROMs and their distribution are illegal even if the copieror distributor is a Microsoft licensee. As far as these installer CD-ROMs are concerned, the

Agreement (and the alleged question on the validity of its termination) is immaterial to thedetermination of respondents liability for copyright infringement and unfair competition.

Lastly, Section 10(b)48of the Agreement provides that Microsofts "rights and remedies"under the contract are "not xxx exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remediesprovided by law or [the] Agreement." Thus, even if the Agreement still subsists, Microsoft is
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not precluded from seeking remedies under PD 49 and Article 189(1) of the Revised PenalCode to vindicate its rights.

Third.The Court finds that the 12 CD-ROMs ("installer" and "non-installer") and the CPU withpre-installed Microsoft software Sacriz and Samiano bought from respondents and the 2,831Microsoft CD-ROMs seized from respondents suffice to support a finding of probable cause

to indict respondents for copyright infringement under Section 5(A) in relation to Section 29of PD 49 for unauthorized copying and selling of protected intellectual works. The installerCD-ROMs with Microsoft software, to repeat, are counterfeitper se.On the other hand, theillegality of the "non-installer" CD-ROMs purchased from respondents and of the Microsoftsoftware pre-installed in the CPU is shown by the absence of the standard featuresaccompanying authentic Microsoft products, namely, the Microsoft end-user licenseagreements, users manuals, registration cards or certificates of authenticity.

On the 2,831 Microsoft CD-ROMs49seized from respondents, respondent Beltron, the onlyrespondent who was party to the Agreement, could not have reproduced them under the Agreementas the Solicitor General50and respondents contend. Beltrons rights51under the Agreement werelimited to:

(1) the "reproduc[tion] and install[ation of] no more than one copyof [Microsoft] software oneach Customer System hard disk or Read Only Memory ("ROM")"; and

(2) the "distribut[ion] xxx and licens[ing of] copies of the [Microsoft] Product [as reproducedabove] and/or acquired from Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor) in objectcode form to end users."

The Agreement defines an authorized replicator as "a third party approved by [Microsoft] which mayreproduce and manufacture [Microsoft] Product[s] for [Beltron] xxx."52An authorized distributor, onthe other hand, is a "third party approved by [Microsoft] from which [Beltron] may purchaseMED53Product."54Being a mere reproducer/installer of one Microsoft software copy on eachcustomers hard disk or ROM, Beltron could only have acquired the hundreds of Microsoft CD-ROMsfound in respondents possession from Microsoft distributors or replicators.

However, respondents makes no such claim. What respondents contend is that these CD-ROMswere left to them for safekeeping. But neither is this claim tenable for lack of substantiation. Indeed,respondents Keh and Chua, the only respondents who filed counter-affidavits, did not make thisclaim in the DOJ. These circumstances give rise to the reasonable inference that respondents mass-produced the CD-ROMs in question without securing Microsofts prior authorization.

The counterfeit "non-installer" CD-ROMs Sacriz and Samiano bought from respondents also sufficeto support a finding of probable cause to indict respondents for unfair competition under Article189(1) of the Revised Penal Code for passing off Microsoft products. From the pictures of the CD-ROMs packaging,55one cannot distinguish them from the packaging of CD-ROMs containing

genuine Microsoft software. Such replication, coupled with the similarity of content of these fake CD-ROMs and the CD-ROMs with genuine Microsoft software, implies intent to deceive.

Respondents contention thatthe 12 CD-ROMs Sacriz and Samiano purchased cannot be traced tothem because the receipt for these articles does not indicate its source is unavailing. The receipt inquestion should be taken together with Microsofts claim that Sacriz and Samiano bought the CD-ROMs from respondents.56Together, these considerations point to respondents as the vendor of thecounterfeit CD-ROMs. Respondents do not give any reason why the Court should not give credenceto Microsofts claim. For the same reason, the fact that the receipt for the CPU does not indicate
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"[s]oftware hard disk" does not mean that the CPU had no pre-installed Microsoft software.Respondents Keh and Chua admit in their counter-affidavit that respondents are the "source" of thepre-installed MS-DOS software.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated 26 October 1999, 3December 1999, 3 August 2000, and 22 December 2000 of the Department of Justice.

SO ORDERED.

NBI, Microsoft Corporation vs HwangonFebruary 12, 2012

Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Copyright Infringement

In May 1993, Microsoft and Beltron Computer Philippines, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement. Under

Section 2(a) of the Agreement Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee, to:

1. Reproduce and install no more than one copy of Windows on each Customer System hard disk;

2. Distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of Windows (reproduced as per Section 2 of the

Agreement and/or acquired from an Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor.

Their agreement allowed either party to terminate if one fails to comply with their respective obligations.

Microsoft terminated the Agreement in June 1995 by reason of Beltrons non-payment of royalties. Later,

Microsoft learned that Beltron was illegally copying and selling copies of Windows. Microsoft then sought

the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation. NBI agents made some purchase from Beltron

where they acquired a computer unit pre-installed with Windows, 12 windows installer CDs packed as

Microsoft products. The agents were not given the end-user license agreements, user manuals, and

certificates of authenticity for the products purchased. They were given a receipt which has a header of

T.M.T.C. (Phils) Inc. BELTRON COMPUTER. TMTC stands for Taiwan Machinery Display and Trade

Center.

A search warrant was subsequently issued where 2,831 CDs of Windows installers, among others, were

seized. Based on the items seized from Beltron, Microsoft filed a case of copyright infringement against

Beltron and TMTC as well as their officers (Hwang et al) before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Beltron,

in its counter-affidavit, argued the following:

1. That Microsofts issue with Beltron was really just to have leverage in forcing Beltron to pay the

unpaid royalties; and that Microsoft should have filed a collection suit.


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2. That the computer unit allegedly purchased by the NBI agents from them cannot be decisively traced

as coming from Beltron because the receipt issued to the agents did not list the computer unit as one

of the items bought.

3. That the 12 installers purchased by the agents which are actually listed in the receipt were not

manufactured by Beltron but rather they were genuine copies purchased by TMTC from an

authorized Microsoft seller in Singapore.

4. That the 2,831 installers seized from them were not a property of Beltron but rather they were left to

them by someone for safekeeping.

The DOJ secretary agreed with Beltron and dismissed the case. The Secretary ruled that the issue of the

authority of Beltron to copy and sell Microsoft products should first be resolved in a civil suit. Microsoft

appealed the decision of the DOJ secretary before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Beltron filed a motion

to quash the search warrant before the RTC that issued the same. The RTC partially granted the quashal.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC. Hwang et al did not appeal the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ Secretary is correct.

HELD: No. Section 5 of Presidential Decree 49 enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright

owner. Contrary to the DOJs ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the

unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the

acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without

obtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders himself civilly and criminally liable for copyright

infringement.

Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the

copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a

synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the

owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the

copyright.

Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its rights in

filing the complaint before DOJ on the incriminating evidence obtained from Beltron. Hence, it was highly

irregular for the DOJ to hold that Microsoft sought the issuance of the search warrants and the filing of

the complaint merely to pressure Beltron to pay its overdue royalties to Microsoft.

There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior resolution from the proper court

of whether or not the Agreement is still binding between the parties. Beltron has not filed any suit to


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question Microsofts termination of the Agreement. Microsoft can neither be expected nor compelled to

wait until Beltron decides to sue before Microsoft can seek remedies for violation of its intellectual

property rights.

Furthermore, the articles seized from Beltron are counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not (and

could not have authorized anyone to) produce such CD installers The copying of the genuine Microsoft

software to produce these fake CDs and their distribution are illegal even if the copier or distributor is a

Microsoft licensee. As far as these installer CD-ROMs are concerned, the Agreement (and the alleged

question on the validity of its termination) is immaterial to the determination of Beltrons liability for

copyright infringement and unfair competition. Beltrons defense that the box of CD i nstallers found in

their possession was only left to them for safekeeping is not tenable.

NBI-Microsoft Corporation & Lotus Development Corporation v. Judy C.Hwang, Benito Keh & Yvonne K. Chua/Beltron Computer Philippines Inc.,Jonathan K. Chua, Emily K. Chua, Benito T. Sanchez, Nancy I. Velasco,Alfonso Chua, Alberto Chua, Sophia Ong, Deanna Chua/Taiwan MachineryDisplay & Trade Center, Inc., and The Secretary of Justice (G.R. No. 147043, 21June 2005)

Microsoft Corp. and Beltron Computer Phils., Inc. entered into a LicensingAgreement where Beltron was authorized to reproduce and install no more than onecopy of Microsoft software on each customer system hard disk. Microsoft Corp.

terminated the agreement for non-payment of royalties. Upon learning that Beltronwas illegally copying and selling Microsoft software, Microsoft Corp. secured searchwarrants leading to the search of Beltrons premises which resulted in the seizure ofcounterfeit Microsoft software.

Microsoft filed a complaint for copyright infringement and unfair competition with the

Department of Justice. The DOJ dismissed the complaint on the ground that Beltron

had no intent to defraud the public as the software products seized came from an

alleged Microsoft licensee in Singapore, and that it did not manufacture the seized

software products.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Microsoft Corp. and held that copyright

infringement under the Presidential decree 49 (the Old Copyright Law) is not

confined to the unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual works but covers the

unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by Section 05 of the said Law

(i.e., copying, distributing, multiplying and selling), which acts were done by Beltron

to the prejudice and damage of Microsoft Corp. Moreover, the Supreme Court held


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that the counterfeit cd-roms bought from Beltron suffice to support a finding of

probable cause for unfair competition under Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal

Code (now repealed by the IP Code) considering that the packaging of these

products could not be distinguished from those of authentic Microsoft software. Such

replication, together with the similarity in the content of the counterfeit cd-roms,

implies an intent to deceive the public.

Documents

Assigned Copyright Cases