1. Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan

Facts:Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels requested the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. A Petition for Extradition was filed with the RTC, but before the court could act, Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. This was granted. After the hearing, Jimenez submitted a required Memorandum, which sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing and the court directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixed bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Issue:WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.

Held: As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

2. Leviste vs CA GR No 189122                                                                

Facts:Jose Antonio Leviste  was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.

On this matter, Leviste questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue:Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of Leviste.

Ruling:No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances:1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. 

That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.

3. PANFILO D. BONGCAC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 156687-88  

Facts

Panfilo D. Bongcac, secretary of Mayor of Tagbilaran City, was designated as the "Mayor’s representative to the City Market Committee," "Consultant and Coordinator on market matters," and "adviser to the Acting Market Administrator. In January 1991, respondents Engr. Fortunato Lim and Toribio Bon applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in Tagbilaran City and were referred to petitioner. Petitioner showed them the Minutes of the City Market Committee meeting held on 9 January 1991 which included their names as among the awardees of the market stalls. Petitioner informed Lim and Bon that the city government could not afford to construct a new market and if they were interested, they should give him more money for the construction of the stalls or tiendas they were applying for. Accordingly, Lim issued and delivered to petitioner a BPI check, pay to cash, in the amount of P62,000. Bon issued and delivered to petitioner two Metrobank checks, pay to cash, in the amounts of P30,000 and P10,000. Petitioner issued handwritten receipts to Lim and Bon. The checks were subsequently encashed. Thereafter, Lim and Bon read in the 30 June 1991 issue of a local newspaper that petitioner was "sacked" as market body consultant and was terminated as secretary to the Mayor. They looked for him and demanded that he either make an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or tiendas already constructed. Petitioner failed to do so. Thus, he was charged with two counts of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the Sandiganbayan. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued and the cases were tried jointly.

On 28 March 2001, the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of Estafa on both cases filed against him. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan. The motion was denied in the Resolution dated 3 September 2001. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, petition sought the reversal of the 28 March 2001 Decision of the Sandiganbayan, to which the court however denied in its Resolution issued on 20 February 2002. No motion for reconsideration was filed. Consequently, the Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory. On 4 December 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a notice to

petitioner and counsel directing them to be present on 8 January 2003 for the execution of judgment in the criminal cases. On 26 December 2002, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief with this Court. The petition sought to "reverse and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan" and to "declare that petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged." Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings praying that the execution of judgment be held in abeyance to await the action of this Court on the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief he filed. On 10 January 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying, for lack of merit, petitioner’s Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings. It further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner to serve the sentence imposed upon him. The cash bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Petitioner was given five days to voluntarily surrender.

On 3 March 2003, the SC issued a Resolution denying, for lack of merit, the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief. Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order praying that the Resolution dated 10 January 2003 issued by the Sandiganbayan be set aside and that the bench warrant of arrest and the order cancelling the bail bond pending resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief be recalled. Petitioner likewise sought to suspend the final execution of the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision until after the resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief.

Issue

Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying petitioner’s motion to hold in abeyance the execution of judgment.

Ruling

No. Petitioner appealed the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision via a petition for review on certiorari before this Court which, however, denied that petition in the Resolution of 20 February 2002. The Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April 2002 after petitioner failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision likewise became final and executory. Petitioner could no longer seek a reversal of the judgment of conviction rendered by the Sandiganbayan, as what petitioner did when he filed the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief.

In the present petition, petitioner prayed that the execution of the Sandiganbayan’s Decision be "suspended until after final resolution of petitioner’s Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief." The Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief filed sought to "reverse and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan" and to "declare that petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged." That petition was likewise denied. It is clear, therefore, that the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief and the instant petition are merely dilatory tactics employed by petitioner in his efforts to delay the execution of the judgment in the criminal cases for estafa which had long become final and executory. Petitioner cannot perpetually file any petition or pleading to forestall the execution of a final judgment. Execution of a final judgment is the fruit and end of the suit. While a litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits in the hope of securing a favorable ruling. The 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment.

4. NARCISO VS. STA. ROMANA-CRUZ MARCH 17, 2000

FACTS:

After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wifeof Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommendedand thereafter filed, the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso on November 13,1991, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179. Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutor’s resolution [before] the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied. Joselito Narciso moved forreconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ. Failing before DOJ, the accused on February6, 1992, filed in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 an "Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and toLift the Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was granted and the case was set for reinvestigation by another prosecutor. Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was assigned for reinvestigation, found no reason to disturb the findings of the previous prosecutor and recommended the remand of the case to the court for arraignment and trial. On August 3,1992, accused filed an ‘Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso to Post Bail’. The Public

Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00. On  August 14, 1992 ,the private prosecutor representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accused ’s deceased wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail’. Accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion by filing a ‘Motion to Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail". Arraignment was conducted on September 14, 1992 and the case was set for hearing on November 9, 16, 23, December 2, 9, 1992, January 6, 13, 20, 27, 1993, February3, 7, 10 and 24 1993. On October 15, 1992, private complainant through counsel filed her opposition to the motion to expunge [filed by] accused. On November 3, 1992 private complainant moved for the postponement of the trials set on November 9, 16 and 23 and the subsequent hearings thereon pending the resolution of their ‘Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail’. ISSUE:

Whether the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Order of the Regional Trial Court which granted bail to the petitioner is substantially and procedurally infirm notwithstanding the absence of any opposition from the public prosecutor.RULING:

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7,Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution." Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution evidence against him was not strong. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA. Clearly, the grant

of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.5. JOCELYN V. GRAGEDA vs. JUDGE NIETO T. TRESVALLESA.M. MTJ No. 04-1526             February 2, 2004

The complainant in this administrative case was the wife of Gil Grageda who died at about 8:30 in the evening of November 24, 2000 in Constantino, Virac, Catanduanes due to multiple stab wounds. On December 1, 2000, a complaint charging Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen for the murder of Gil Grageda was filed for preliminary investigation with the Municipal Trial Court, of Virac, Catanduanes, presided by respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles. After Criminal Case was filed in his court for preliminary investigation, Judge Tresvalles conducted a preliminary examination on December 5, 2000 and on the same day, he issued an Order stating that "After conducting the preliminary investigation, the Court believes that a prima facie case exists that the crime charged has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Therefore a warrant of arrest issue for his arrest and a bail bond amounting to P30,000.00 is hereby fixed for his provisional liberty on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong.

The corresponding warrant for the arrest of Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. was issued on the same day, stating that the bail for the accused’s temporary liberty was in the amount of P30,000.00.

The accused surrendered on December 11, 2000. The respondent Judge immediately issued an order committing the person of the accused Tablizo, to the Municipal Jail Warden. The following day, December 12, 2000, the respondent Judge issued an Order releasing accused Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. from the custody of law after the latter posted a personal bail bond in the amount of P30,000.00.

Provincial Prosecutor Antonio C.A. Ayo, Jr. thereafter conducted preliminary investigation ultimately recommending the filing of an information for murder against Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. with the aggravating circumstances of use of motor vehicle, treachery and evident premeditation. No bail was recommended for the temporary liberty of the accused. Thereafter, an information charging Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, which is now awaiting decision.

The respondent was, thereafter, charged with gross ignorance of the law, conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bench, failure to conduct himself in a manner that would justify his continued stay in the judiciary, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. According to the complainant, the respondent judge granted bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. 5307

without the requisite bail hearing, despite the fact that there was an eyewitness to the murder who made a positive identification of the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether a bail hearing is necessary before an accused should be released on bail.

Ruling:

Yes. It is true that a hearing is necessary before an accused should be released on bail in cases where the granting of bail is discretionary on the part of the judge. However, it is also equally true that in the exercise of his sound discretion and opinion, he is not also precluded in seeing to it that the evidence of the prosecution is adduced in support for the denial of bail to the accused to guide the court on what to do on the matter.

The Office of the Court Administrator opined that Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court make it mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense is granted bail, and that failure to do so amounts to gross ignorance of the law. According to the Executive Judge, a hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of the facts set forth under Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea of bail. Thus, the grant of bail without due hearing deprives the prosecution of procedural due process, a right to which it is equally entitled to as the defense.

The importance of a hearing in applications for bail should once more be emphasized. Section 8, Rule 114 provides as follows:

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. - At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, or otherwise, unable to testify.

The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the bail hearing depends the right of an accused to provisional liberty vis-à-vis the duty of the State to protect the people against dangerous elements. The resolution of the issue affects important norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on the other. To minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judge’s decision, the Rules require the judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.

6. Government of Hongkong vs. Hon. Olalia

Facts: The Department of Justice received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of Juan Antonio Munoz. After an order of arrest was issued against him, he was detained. Munoz then filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Munoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent Judge Olalia, to whom the case was raffled off. The petitioner thereafter moved to vacate the Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

Held: No. In extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. The prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. So an extraditee cannot be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

7. SHIRLEY C. RUIZ vs. JUDGE ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR. A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731             February 16, 2005

Ruiz is the private complainant in I.S. No. 2000-1031 for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law

pending before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Santos, who was arrested during entrapment operations relative to the carnapping of Ruiz’s vehicle, was one of the respondents therein.

After her arrest on May 24, 2000, Santos was detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City, pending the filing of formal charges in court. Upon inquest, she executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Rule 112, Section 7 of the then applicable 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Inquest Prosecutor thus set the hearing of the preliminary investigation on May 31, 2000 at 2:00 PM. However, on May 30, 2000, Santos obtained an Order of Release signed by respondent Judge Beldia who was then detailed as assisting judge of Branch 272, RTC-Marikina City.Respondent Judge Beldia apparently granted bail to Santos and approved the corresponding bail bond without serving notice to the prosecutor.

Consequently, Ruiz filed the instant administrative complaint contending that respondent Judge Beldia had no authority to grant bail to Santos since the Investigating Prosecutor has yet to conclude the preliminary investigation. She claimed that for as long as the information has not yet been filed in court, a court has no power to grant bail to a detained person since it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

In his Comment dated August 14, 2000, respondent Judge Beldia maintained that Section 1 (c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows any person in custody, even if not formally charged in court, to apply for bail.

Issue:Whether a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory.

Held:

Yes. Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory. In Cortes v. Judge Catral, the Court ruled that in all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing must be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation on the matter must be sought. The rationale for this was explained in this wise:

Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicant’s character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice. There is no dearth of jurisprudence on the rules to be applied in the grant of bail.  These same rules have been incorporated in the Rules of Court, of which a judge must have more than just a superficial understanding, if he were to discharge his functions properly and competently. Indeed, everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. When, as in this case, the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

8. ATTY. GACAL VS. JUDGE INFANTE (2011)FACTS:

The MCTC of Sarangani issued a warrant of arrest in connection with a murder case without bail. The office of the provincial prosecutor affirmed the findings and accordingly filed with the RTC an information for murder but

with a recommendation for bail in the amount of 400,000. The case was raffled to Judge Infante’s branch. The latter issued twin orders – granting bail and the release of the accused from custody.

Atty. Gacal filed a very-urgent motion but was denied by the judge on the ground of pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor. The latter, in his comment, recommended bail as a matter of course and the recommendation and release of the accused were proper; such recommendation was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutor’s right to a bail hearing.

Atty. Gacal charges Judge Infante with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and evident partiality for the latter’s failure to set a hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him immediately after allowing bail.

ISSUE:

WON bail hearing is unnecessary when the accused did not file an application for bail; and because the public prosecutor had recommended bail.

HELD:

NO. A hearing, separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, should still be held. This will give the Prosecution a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs. The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did not warrant dispensing with the hearing. The public prosecutor’s recommendation of bail was not material in deciding whether to conduct the mandatory hearing or not. For one, the public prosecutor’s recommendation, albeit persuasive, did not necessarily bind the trial judge, in whom alone the discretion to determine whether to grant bail or not was vested.

Whatever the public prosecutor recommended, including the amount of bail, was non-binding. Nor did such recommendation constitute a showing that the evidence of guilt was not strong. If it was otherwise, the trial judge could become unavoidably controlled by the Prosecution.

9 Okabe vs. Hon. Guttierez

Facts: 

Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court’s permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent’s counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latter’s documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:

SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

10 Borlonga vs. Pena

Facts:-

Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City.- Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.- Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.-Attached to the MD were the following documents:1. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the

original owner of the subject property;2. An unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from MarilynG. Ong;3. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.- The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.- Respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.-City Prosecutor’s Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the report, the Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the

documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre- Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685,and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.-Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus MQ : They insist that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted bythe petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Moreover they claim that the respondent’s affidavit was not based on the latter’s personal knowledge and therefore should not have been used by the court in determining probable cause.-On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was

yet to be settled by the court.- MTCC’s answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, (according to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail.

Issue:

1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit;

2) WON the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were properly issued;

3) WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause; and4) WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest.

Ruling:

Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.

RD:

For issues numbered 1 and 3:-The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure are relevant to the aforesaid issues:

“SECTION 1. Definition. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. …SEC. 3. Procedure. – Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined

the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. …SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. –(a) Where filed with the fiscal. – If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.” -Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the complainant and did not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should not be faulted for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.-Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants were illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. There is no provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge could determine probable cause. For issue number 2:- For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid.- On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the affidavit executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. The respondent’s claims of the falsity of the documents were mere assertions.- It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the

complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures were falsified does not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the time of the execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion-A finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion. While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. 

11 Qui vs. People

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act upon the person of one Christian John Ignacio, a minor 8 years of age by then and there angrily shouting invectives while pointing her fingers at said minor and threatening to knock down his head which acts are prejudicial to the childs psychological and emotional development, debase, demean and degrade the intrinsic worth and dignity of said Christian John Ignacio as a human being, thus, convicted. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal and application for bail pending appeal. The OSG however, denied such application on the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law and that she is a flight-risk, as she in fact failed to attend several hearings. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to bail pending appeal.

Ruling:

NO. Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. The Court held: Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the

trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.5ςrνllIn the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.6ςrνllThe CA denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal on the ground that she is a flight risk, a bail-negating factor under Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114 quoted above. The appellate court anchored its denial on several circumstances, pointed out by the OSG, which showed petitioners propensity to evade the law, as when she failed to attend the hearings before the RTC, which compelled said court to issue three warrants for petitioners arrest. There is no dispute, and petitioner does not deny the fact, that on various dates, specifically on August 24, 2005, February 20, 2006 and March 8, 2010, the RTC issued warrants for her arrest. The March 8, 2010 RTC Order also directed the forfeiture of her bail bond.

12 Far Eastern Surety vs. People

Facts:

The petition traces its roots to the personal bail bond, with serial no. JCR (2) 1807, for the provisional release of accused Tuazon was filed before the RTC. The personal bail bond was under the signatures of Paul and Teodorico as the petitioner’s authorized signatories. The RTC approved the bail bond. The Supreme Court required all bonding companies to accredit all their authorized agents with the courts. The petitioner applied for its Certification of Accreditation and Authority to transact surety business with the courts and accordingly designated Samuel as its authorized representative in Tarlac Province wherein Tuazon failed to appear Samuel filed a Motion for Extension of Time. The petitioner allegedly verified from its register that it neither authorized nor sanctioned the issuance of a bail bond, and on this basis, it filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Cancel Fake/Falsified Bail Bond. The petitioner alleged that the signature of Teodorico in the bail bond had been forged; it also alleged that Paul was not an authorized signatory; his name was not listed in the Secretary’s Certificate submitted to the Court. In support of its motion, it attached copies of the Personal Bail Bond, its Corporate Secretary’s Certificate, and the Special Power of Attorney in favor of Medy S. Patricio, and prayed to be relieved from any liability under the bail bond. The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion on the ground that the petitioner had indirectly acknowledged the bond’s validity when it filed a motion for extension of time with the trial court. The RTC subsequently issued a Judgment of Forfeiture for P200,000.00 against the petitioner. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON the Rule 45 is the proper remedy.

Ruling:

No. Under Rule 41 of the Rules, an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be undertaken in three (3) ways, depending on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (1) an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved. The first mode of appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and of law. The second mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is filed with the Court only on questions of law.8 It is only where pure questions of law are raised or involved can an appeal be brought to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.9 we nevertheless hold that the proper remedy to question this irregularity is not through a Rule 45 petition. If indeed there is merit to the claim that the signatures had been forged or that the signatory was unauthorized, or that the R TC failed to observe the mandate of A.M. No. 04-7 -02-SC, the proper recourse to question the RTC s ruling on the motion to cancel the bond should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not through the process and medium the petitioner took.

13 Conquilla vs. Bernardo

 Facts:

Conquilla charged respondent judge with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law. A criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against complainant before the MTC. Respondent Judge conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest dated with the bail fixed at P12,000. Upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order reducing the bail for complainant’s provisional liberty to P6,000 wherein complainant posted cash bail of P6,000for her provisional liberty. Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that first level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, respondent judge committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he conducted the preliminary investigation and issued the warrant of arrest. Complainant claims that the hasty issuance of the warrant of arrest was without legal basis and unjustly prejudiced complainant and deprived her of her liberty. Complainant submits that respondent judge

usurped the power of the prosecutor, who was not even given the chance to comment on complainant’s Motion to Reduce Bail. Furthermore, complainant alleges that when she learned about the warrant of arrest, she called respondent judge’s wife, who said “she would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and would have the case for direct assault against herein complainant dismissed provided herein complainant cancel the wife’s debt of P35,000.00 and provided that herein complainant loan the wife an additional amount of P50,000.00.”1 Hence this petition.

Issue: WON lower court judge has the authority to conduct preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

No. The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by removing the conduct of preliminary investigation from judges of the first level courts. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be authorized by law. Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 112 provides:

 SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. ‒

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. ‒ Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on records clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. ‒ When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court SHALL be conducted by the prosecutor. The procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. (Emphasis supplied.) 

Clearly, MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. In this case, the crime charged against complainant was direct assault against a public school teacher, who is a person in authority under Article 1523 of the Revised Penal Code.4 Under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, when the assault is committed against a person in authority while engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such performance, the imposable penalty isprision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The duration of the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods is 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, the offense charged against complainant requires the conduct of preliminary investigation as provided under Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which reads: 

SECTION 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. ‒ Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. Except as provided in Section 6 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and (1) day without regard to the fine. (Emphasis supplied.)

 It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation himself.

14 Pantillo III vs. Caney

Facts:

The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim went to the City Prosecutor’s Office, Surigao City, to attend the inquest proceedings. Later, Pantilo was informed by Perocho that Melgazo had been released from detention as verified in the logbook of detention prisoners and as per order of Judge Canoy after he posted bail in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000). Pantilo proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to request a copy of the Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the Surigao City Prosecutor’s Office. Puzzled, he inquired from the City Prosecutor’s Office the details surrounding the release of Melgazo. He

learned that no Information had yet been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for the approval of the bail. Likewise, he also learned from the City Police Station that no written Order of Release had been issued but only a verbal order directing the police officers to release Melgazo from his detention cell.[6] One of the police officers even said that Judge Canoy assured him that a written Order of Release would be available the following day after the Information is filed in Court. Melgazo filed a Motion for the Release of his impounded vehicle as physical evidence pending the trial of the case.[7] The motion was received by the Office of the Clerk of Court at 8:30 a.m. that day and was subsequently raffled in the afternoon. In the Notice of Hearing of the said motion, Melgazo prayed that it be heard on September 5, 2008 at 8:30 a.m. According to Pantilo, this clearly violated the rules which require that the other party must be served a copy of the motion at least three (3) days before the hearing. Hence this administrative complaint against Judge Victor A. Caney.

  Issue: WON Melgazo's release from detention was proper under "constructive bail."

Ruling:

No. Ther is no such species of bail under the Rules such as “constructive bail,” Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of another. "Procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.”[17] In other words, “[r]ules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings.”[18] In this case, the reason of Judge Canoy is hardly persuasive enough to disregard the Rules.[19] In addition to, Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court “may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held.”  In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with the Surigao City RTC, Branch 29.  Despite the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo.  This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114. In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not deposit the amount of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer.  In clear departure from

Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy instead verbally ordered Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, to accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day.  Worse, respondent judge did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo.  Immediately upon receipt by Suriaga of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge Canoy ordered the police escorts to release Melgazo without any written order of release.  In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release order.

 

15 Gacal vs. Infante

 Facts:

 MCTC Judge Balanag issued a warrant for the arrest of Ancheta in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder but with a recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.00. was raffled to Judge Infante’s Branch. Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from custody. Atty. Gacal filed an MR which was denied by Judge Infante on the ground that the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor, and on the further ground that the private prosecutor had not been authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court. Judge Infante directed that the consideration of the bail issue be held in abeyance until after the public prosecutor had submitted a comment, because he wanted to know the position of the public prosecutor on  Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion but the prosecutor did not file any comment. Thereupon, Atty. Gacal sought authority to appear as a private prosecutor. The public prosecutor did not oppose Atty. Gacal’s request. With that, Atty. Gacal moved for the reconsideration of the grant of bail to Ancheta. In response, Judge Infante required the public prosecutor to file his comment on Atty. Gacal’s motion for reconsideration, and again reset the arraignment of the accused to June 20, 2003. The public prosecutor filed a comment, stating that he had recommended bail as a matter of course

approving bail upon his recommendation and releasing the accused were proper; and that his recommendation of bail was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutor’s right to a bail hearing. When no order regarding the matter of bail was issued, Atty. Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his gross incompetence manifested by his failure to exercise judicial power to resolve the issue of bail. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON bail hearing is mandatory in nature.

Ruling: 

Yes. Judge Infante would excuse himself from blame and responsibility by insisting that the hearing was no longer necessary considering that the accused had not filed a petition for bail; that inasmuch as no application for bail had been filed by the accused, his twin orders were not orders granting an application for bail, but were instead his approval of the bail bond posted; and that Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion and other motions and written submissions lacked the requisite written conformity of the public prosecutor, rendering them null and void. The peculiar feature of the instant case, however, is the absence of a petition/motion for admission to bail filed by the herein accused. On the contrary, it is the consistent position of the fiscal to recommend bail since the prosecution evidence being merely circumstantial, is not strong for the purpose of granting bail. xxx. This court believes that bail hearing, albeit necessary in the grant of bail involving capital offense, is not at all times and in all instances essential to afford the party the right to due process especially so, when the fiscal in this case was given reasonable opportunity to explain his side, and yet he maintained the propriety of grant of bail without need of hearing since the prosecution evidence is not strong for the purpose of granting bail. Although, in theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused at the time set for the arraignment and trial; and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose of preventing the release of an accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the judge may not want to release, a hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal action.”

 

16 Re: Anonymous letter complaint against Hon. Marilou Runes-Tamang

Facts: 

An anonymous “Concerned Filipino Citizen” sent to then Chief Justice Davide, a letter dated  requesting the investigation of MeTC Judge Tamang, of San Juan, Metro Manila.[4]  The letter-sender complained that Judge Tamang, through the connivance of the arresting officer and court employees of MeTC at San Juan, had been indiscriminately approving fake bonds for a fee of P1,000.00 “per count ng kaso.” The letter-sender also requested the investigation of Judge Tamang’s husband, a sheriff of the RTC in Pasig and an alleged drug addict. Hence this petition to determine the ultimate liabilities of a presiding judge, her branch clerk of court, and her process server in connection with an anomaly involving the approval of bail bonds in criminal cases.

 Issue: WON Judge tamang is liable for the anomaly involving the approval of bail bonds.

Ruling:

Yes. Judge Tamang admittedly approved not only the bail bonds issued by Covenant, a blacklisted bonding company, but also the bail bonds in some instances for accused persons charged in criminal cases pending outside her territorial jurisdiction.   The following requisites must be complied with, otherwise, the bond should be rejected: (1)   Photographs of accused (2)   Affidavit of justification (3)   Clearance from the Supreme Court (4)   Certificate of compliance with the Circular from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner (5)   Authority of agent (6)   Current certificate of authority (7)   Procedure. All applications for bail/judicial bonds, before their approval by the Judge concerned, shall be coursed thru the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized personnel who shall see to it that the bond is in order and the signature of the bonding officer authentic before affixing his signature thereto. He shall also indicate therein the outstanding liability of the bonding

company, if any, for the information and guidance of the Court. For this particular purpose, the Clerk of Court shall keep a file of specimen signature of authorized bonding officers, to prevent the submission of “fake bail bonds.” Judge Tamang approved bail bonds issued by Covenant although they manifestly lacked the required clearance from the Supreme Court indicating that Covenant was qualified to transact business with the courts. As earlier stated, Covenant was a blacklisted company at the time of issuance of the bail bonds. She was thereby guilty of a neglect of duty, for, according to Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 & 65,] the judge is still bound to review the supporting documents before approving the bail bonds, even if it is the Clerk of Court who has the duty to ascertain that the bail bonds are in order, and that all requisites for approval have been complied with. The Court concurred with the OCA’s following observation submitted in said case, to wit: Although the duty to ensure compliance with the requisites of the bail bond application rests mainly with the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized personnel and the task of the Judge is only to approve the same, said task has an accompanying responsibility on the part of the approving Judge to review or determine its validity. Understandably, he should be employing the minimum standard the rules require the clerks of court to observe. Considering the seriousness of the purpose in the posting of bail bond, approval thereof should pass through strict scrutiny and with utmost caution on the part of both the Clerk of Court (or his duly authorized personnel) and the approving Judge.[ Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction, viz: Section 17. Bail, where filed.— (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality.  If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. Under the provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any RTC of the place of arrest, or if no RTC Judge is available, with any MeTC or MTC of the place of arrest. 

17. JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDAG.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010

FACTS:Petitioner was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas before the RTC of Makati City. Judge Alameda presided over the case and issued a commitment order against Leviste who was placed under police custody while confined at Makati Medical Center. Leviste was released from detention after posting a cash bond worth P40,000.00 and was scheduled for arraignment. The heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the re-examination of the evidence on record or conduct reinvestigation to determine proper offense but were denied by RTC. Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion and moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda and to defer action on the admission of the Amended Information. The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition. Hence, this petition. Prior to the arraignment, Leviste filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela in which the trial court granted thereby allowing him to post bail in the amount of P300,000.00.

ISSUE:WON the posting of bail by Leviste is a waiver of his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation.

HELD:NO. By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause.

Sec. 26 of Rule 114 of Rules of Court provides: “SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. – An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. xxx”

18. PEOPLE vs WILFREDO CAWALINGG.R. No. 157147, April 17, 2009

FACTS:Respondent Cawaling was charged with murder of Leodegario Capispisan through a gunshot wound. Several witnesses were presented in which they pointed to Cawaling as the perpetrator of the crime. However, his companion Palti Umambong admitted that it was he who shot Capispisan to death.

ISSUE:WON the Manifestation with Motion to withdraw property bond and post cash bond shall be granted.

HELD:NO. With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Court’s consequent failure to execute the judgment of conviction because of Cawaling’s flight, the motion must be denied. The posted property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and replaced with a cash bond by movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate proof of his death is presented.

Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: “SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. – Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.”

19. DOLORES C. BELLEZA vs ATTY. ALAN S. MACASAA.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009

FACTS:Petitioner Belleza went to see respondent Macasa on referral, to avail of his legal services in connection with the case of her son who was arrested for alleged violation of RA 9165. Macasa received from Belleza an amount for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. Macasa did not issue receipt just like the previous payments made. When Belleza went to the court, she found out that Macasa did not remit the amount to the court.

ISSUE:WON the negligence of Macasa impeded the constitutional right to bail of petitioner’s son.

HELD:YES. In failing to use the amount entrusted to Macasa for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, he unduly impeded his client’s constitutional right to bail. Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 provides that, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

20. LANIE CERVANTES vs JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINANA.M. No. MTJ-08-1709, July 31, 2009

FACTS:Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant of arrest in a criminal case for Slander against Cervantes wherein the latter posted bail. On arraignment, complainant pleaded not guilty but later on filed a Motion to Admit Counter-Affidavit with her Ganting Salaysay. The Clerk of Court refused to accept the Motion. Judge Pangilinan advised the complainant that he should not accept her belatedly filed Motion because she had already been arraigned. Hence, spawned the filing of the present complaint.

ISSUE:

WON the warrant of arrest and posting of bail has legal basis.

HELD:Section 16 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides that, “The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.” There being no showing that complainant failed to appear in court when required by Judge Pangilinan, the warrant of arrest he issued had no legal basis.

21. CARLOS T. GO, SR. vs LUIS T. RAMOSG.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009

FACTS:Respondent Ramos filed a complaint-affidavit for deportation against Jimmy Go, alleging that Go is an illegal and undesirable alien. To prove his contention, he presented Jimmy’s birth certificate and averred that through stealth, machination and scheming Jimmy managed to cover up his true citizenship and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, he was able to procure a Philippine passport from DFA. Jimmy refuted the allegations averring that the complaint was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy was then charged with violation of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Carlos and Jimmy Go filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Pasig City. They challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings. The Board ordered the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus but was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.

ISSUE:WON bail shall be granted to an alien under deportation.

HELD:NO. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the Board. Hence, in the present case, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis.

22. PEOPLE vs LUIS B. PLAZAG.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009

FACTS:Respondent Plaza was indicted for murder. He then filed a Demurrer to Evidence which was denied by Judge Buyser. The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which respondent filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge Buyser’s ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, the prosecution contended, in the main, that the case being for Murder, it is

non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death and that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail instead.

ISSUE:WON bail should be granted to Plaza.

HELD:YES. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that, “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.” Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

23. ESTER F. BARBERO vs JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAOA.M. No. MTJ-07-1682, June 19, 2008

FACTS:Petitioner Barbero filed a criminal case of Estafa against Herman Medina and was raffled to Judge Anghad which issued a warrant of arrest against Medina. Respondent Judge Dumlao approved Medina’s bail and issued an order commanding the BJMP and PNP to release Medina. Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlao’s approval of Medina’s bail and his order to release Medina were unlawful.

ISSUE:WON the order of Judge Dumlao to approve Medina’s bail is proper.

HELD:NO. Section 17(a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that: “SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. – (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city , or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.” Section 17 provides that the bail may be filed with the court where the case is pending, unless (1) the judge in that court is absent or unavailable, or (2) the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending. If such the case, the bail should be filed with another branch of the same court or with any RTC of the place.

In the present case, there was no showing that Judge Anghad was absent or unavailable or that Medina was arrested outside Santiago City. Thus, Medina’s bail should have been filed with Judge Anghad.

24. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV vs HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR.G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

FACTS:On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the AFP stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’etat before the RTC of Makati City. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests in order for him to fulfill his functions as senator. However, the RTC denied his motion. Thus, his Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:WON there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail.

HELD:Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter, file his certificate of candidacy, cast his vote and be proclaimed as senator-elect and take his oath of office. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.