As of 2013, the ONLY FISA Courty Published Opinion 082208 --on expanded NSA and FBI powers to surveil

7/29/2019 As of 2013, the ONLY FISA Courty Published Opinion 082208 --on expanded NSA and FBI powers to surveil.

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United States Foreign IntelligenceSurveillance Court of Review

No. 08-01IN RE: DIRECTIVES [ redacted tex t ]* PURSUANT TO

SECTION lOSB OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT.

[redac ted t ex t ]P e t i t i o n e r , Appel lan t .

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE UNITED STATESFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

[Hon. Reggie B. Walton, U.S. D i s t r i c t Judge]

BeforeSelya , Chief Judg e ,

Winter and Arnold, Senior C i r cu i t Judges .[ redacted t ex t ]Grego ry G. Garre , Act ing S o l i c i t o r Genera l , with whom Michael

B. Mukasey, Attorney Genera l , Mark F i l i p , Deputy Attorney Genera l ,*The t e x t and foo tno tes t ha t have been redac ted from t h i s

opinion conta in c l a s s i f i ed in fo rmat ion .


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J . Pat r ick Rowan, Acting Assis tan t Attorney General , John A.Eisenberg, Off ice of the Deputy Attorney General , John R. Phi l l ips ,Office of Legal Counsel, Sharon Swingle, Civ i l Divis ion , andMatthew G. Olsen, John C. Demers, Jamil N. Ja f fe r , Andrew H.Tannenbaum, and Matthew A. Anzaldi , Nat ional Securi ty Divis ion,United Sta tes Department of Jus t ice , were on br i e f , fo r respondent .

August 22, 2008


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SELYA , Chief Judge. This pe t i t i on fo r review stems fromd i rec t ives issued to the pe t i t i one r [ redacted tex t ] pursuan t to anow-expired se t of amendments to the Foreign In te l l igenceSurvei l lance Act o f 1978 (FISA), so U.s. c. 1801-1871 (2007 ) .Among o ther th ings , those amendments, known as the Pro tec t AmericaAct of 2007 (PAA), Pub . L. No. 110 - 55, 121 St a t . 552, author izedthe United Sta tes to d i r e c t communications se rv ice providers toa s s i s t it in acquir ing fore ign in te l l igence when those acqu i s i t ionsta rgeted th i rd persons (such as the se rv ice provide r ' s customers )reasonably bel ieved to be located outs ide the United Sta tes .Having rece ived [redacted tex t ] such d i r e c t ive s , the pe t i t i one rchal lenged t h e i r l ega l i t y before the Foreign In te l l igenceSurvei l lance Court (FISC) . When t ha t cour t found the di rec t iveslawful and compelled obedience to them, the pe t i t i one r brought t h i spe t i t i on fo r review.

As framed, the pe t i t i on presents mat ters of both f i r s timpression and c ons t i t u t i ona l s ign i f i cance . At i t s most elementall evel , the pe t i t i on r equ i res us to weigh the na t i on ' s secur i tyi n t e re s t s aga ins t the Fourth Amendment pr ivacy i n t e r e s t s of UnitedSta tes persons .

Afte r a ca re fu l c a l ib r a t i on of th i s balance andcons idera t ion of the myriad of l ega l i s sues presented , we aff irm

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the lower cour t ' s dete rmina t ions tha t the d i r e c t ive s a t i s sue arelawful and t ha t compliance with them i s obl iga tory .I . THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

On August 5, 2007, Congress enacted the PAA, codi f ied inper t inen t p a r t a t 50 U.S.C. 1805a to 1805c, as a measuredexpansion of FISA's scope. Subjec t to cer ta in condi t ions , the PAAallowed the government to conduct warrant less fore ign in te l l igencesu rve i l l ance on t a rge t s ( including United Sta tes persons)"reasonably bel ieved" to be located outs ide the United Sta tes . 1 50U.S.C. 1805b (a) . This proviso i s of c r i t i c a l importance here .

Under the new s t a tu t e , the Direc to r of Nat ionalIn te l l igence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG) were permi t ted toauthor ize , fo r per iods of up to one year , "the acquis i t ion offoreign in te l l igence informat ion concerning persons reasonablybe l ieved to be outs ide the United States" i f they determined t ha tthe acqu i s i t ion met f ive spec i f i ed c r i t e r i a . Id . These c r i t e r i aincluded (i) t ha t reasonable procedures were in place to ensuretha t the t a rge ted person was reasonably .believed to .be locatedouts ide the United Sta tes ; (i i ) t ha t the acquis i t ions d id not

1We r e f e r to the PAA in the p a s t t ense .because i t s provis ionsexpired on February 16, 2008.

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cons t i tu te e lec t ron ic surve i l l ance ; 2 ( i i i ) t ha t the surve i l l ancewould involve the ass i s t ance of a communications service provider ;(iv) t ha t a s ign i f i can t purpose of the surve i l l ance was to obta infore ign in te l l igence in format ion ; and (v ) t ha t minimizat ionprocedures in place met the requirements of 50 U.S.C. 1801(h) .Id . 1805b(a) (1)- (5) . Except in l imi ted circumstances (notre levant here) , t h i s mul t i - p a r t determinat ion was requi red to bemade in the form of a wri t t en ce r t i f i c a t i on "suppor ted asappropr ia te by a f f i dav i t of appropr ia te of f i c i a l s in the na t iona lsecur i ty f i e ld . " Id . 1805b(a) . Pursuant to t h i s author iza t ion,the DNI and the AG were al lowed to i ssue d i r ec t i ves to "person[s]"

a term t ha t inc ludes agents of communications se rv i ce providersde l inea t ing the ass i s t ance needed to acquire the in format ion .

Id . 1805b(e) ; see id . 1805b(a) (3) .The PAA was a stopgap measure. By i t s terms, it sunse t

on February 16, 2008. Following a lengthy in ter regnum, the l apsedprovis ions were repealed on July 10, 2008, through theins t rumenta l i ty of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.110-261, 403, 122 Sta t . 2436, 2473 (2008). But because thece r t i f i c a t i ons and d i r ec t i ves involved in the i n s t an t case were

2The PAA spec i f i ca l ly s ta ted , however, t ha t "[n]o th ing in thedef in i t ion of e lec t ron ic surve i l lance . . . sha l l be cons t rued toencompass surve i l lance di rec ted a t a person reasonably bel ieved tobe loca ted outs ide of the United Sta tes . " 50 u.s .c. 1805a.

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i ssued during the shor t s he l f l i f e of the PAA, they remained ine f f ec t . See FISA Amendments Act of 2008 404(a) (1) . We thereforeassess the va l id i t y o f the ac t ions a t i ssue here through the prismof the PAA.

[redacted tex t ]I I . BACKGROUND

Beginning in [redacted tex t ) 2007, th e government i ssueddi rec t ives to the p e t i t i o n e r commanding it to a s s i s t in warran t lesssurve i l lance of ce r t a in customers [ redacted t ex t and footnote 3 ) These d i r ec t i ves were i ssued pursuant to ce r t i f i c a t i ons t ha tpurported to conta in a l l the informat ion requi red by the PAA. 4

The ce r t i f i c a t i ons requi re ce r t a in pro tec t ions above andbeyond those spec i f i ed by the PAA. For example, they requi re theAG and the Nat ional Secur i ty Agency (NSA) to fol low the proceduresse t out under Executive Order 12333 2.5 , 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941,59,951 (Dec . 4, 1981) , 5 before any surve i l l ance i s under taken.Moreover, a f f idav i t s suppor t ing the ce r t i f i c a t i ons s p e l l ou t

3 [redacted tex t )4The or ig ina l ce r t i f i c a t i ons were amended, and we r e fe rthroughout to the amended ce r t i f i c a t i ons and th e d i r ec t i ves i ssued

in pursuance thereof .5Executive Order 12333 was amended in 2003, 2004, and 2008through Executive Orders 13284, 13355, and 13470, re spec t ive ly .Those amendments d id not mate r i a l ly a l t e r the prov i s ion r e levan there .

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add i t iona l safeguards to be employed in e f f e c t i n g th e acqu i s i t ions .This l a s t s e t o f c l a s s i f i ed procedures has not been included in thein format ion t r ansmi t ted to th e p e t i t i o n e r . In essence, asimplemented, th e ce r t i f i ca t i ons permi t su rve i l l ances conducted toobta in fo re ign i n t e l l igence fo r na t iona l se c u r i t y purposes whenthose su rve i l l ances a re d i rec ted aga ins t fore ign powers o r agen t so f fore ign powers reasonably be l ieved to be loca ted out s ide theUnited Sta tes .

The government 's e f f o r t s did not impress th e pe t i t i one r ,wh ich re fused to comply with th e d i r e c t ive s . On [ redac ted t e x t ] ,the government moved to compel compliance. Fol lowing ampli tudinousbr ie f ing , th e FISC handed down a meticulous opin ion va l ida t ing th ed i rec t ives and gran t ing th e motion t o compel .

The FISC's dec i s ion was docketed on [ redac ted t e x t ] . Sixbus iness days l a t e r , th e p e t i t i o n e r f i l ed a pe t i t i on fo r review.The next day, it moved fo r a s t ay pending appeal. The FISC re fusedto gran t th e s tay . On [ redacted t ex t ] , th e p e t i t i o n e r begancompliance under t h r e a t of c i v i l contempt. [ redac ted t ex t ]

On [ redacted t ex t ] , th e p e t i t i o n e r moved in t h i s c o u r tfo r a s tay pending appea l . We reserved dec i s ion on th e motion andcompliance cont inued. We then heard ora l argument on th e meri t sand took the case under advisement . We have j u r i s d i c t i on to reviewth e FISC's dec i s ion pursuan t to 50 U.S.C. 1805b(i) inasmuch as

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t h a t dec is ion i s the funct ional equ iva len t o f a ru l ing on ape t i t i on brought pursuan t 50 U.S.C . 1805b(h) . See In re SealedCase, 310 F.3d 717, 721 (Foreign In t . Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).I I I . ANALYSIS

We br i e f l y address a pre l iminary m at te r : s tanding. Wethen turn to the c ons t i t u t i ona l i s sues t ha t l i e a t the h e a r t of thep e t i t i o n e r ' s assevera t iona l a r ray .

A . Standing .Federa l appe l la te cour ts t yp i c a l ly review s tanding

dete rmina t ions de novo, see , ~ ' Muir v. Nayy Fed. Cred i t Union,529 F.3d. 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir . 2008), and we apply t h a t s tandardof review here .

The FISC determined t ha t the p e t i t i o n e r had s tanding tomount a cha l lenge to the l ega l i t y o f the d i r e c t ive s based on theFourth Amendment r i gh t s o f t h i rd -pa r ty customers . At f i r s t blush ,th i s has a c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e r ing: it i s common ground t ha tl i t i gan t s ord ina r i l y cannot br ing s u i t to v ind ica te the r i gh t s ofth i rd par t i e s . See, ~ ' Hinck v . United Sta tes , 127 S.Ct . 2011,2017 n .3 (2007); Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) . Butt ha t pruden t ia l l im i t a t i on may in p a r t i c u l a r cases be re laxed bycongress iona l ac t i o n . Warth, 422 U.S. a t 501; see Bennet t v .Spear, 520 u.s. 154, 162 (1997) ( recogniz ing t ha t Congress can"modif[y] o r abroga t [e ]" pruden t ia l s tanding requ i rements ) . Thus,

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i f Congress, e i t h e r express ly o r by f a i r impl ica t ion , cedes to apar ty a r i gh t to br ing s u i t based on th e l e g a l r i gh t s o r i n t e re s t sof others , t ha t par ty has s tanding to sue; provided, however, t ha tcons t i tu t iona l s tanding requirements a re s a t i s f i e d . See Warth, 422U.S. a t 500-01. Those cons t i tu t iona l requirements are fami l iar ;the s u i to r must p laus ib ly a l l ege t ha t it has su f fe red an in jury ,which was caused by the defendant , and the e f fec t s of which can beredressed by the s u i t . See id . a t 498-99; N.H . Right to Life PACv. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1s t Cir . 1996).

Here, the pe t i t i one r e a s i l y exceeds the c ons t i t u t i ona lthreshold fo r s tanding. I t faces an i n ju ry in the nature of theburden t ha t it must shoulder to f ac i l i t a t e the government 'ssu rve i l l ances of i t s customers ; t ha t i n ju ry i s obviously andindisputably caused by the government through the d i r e c t ive s ; andth i s cour t i s capable of redress ing the i n ju ry .

That br ings us to the ques t ion of whether Congress hasprovided t h a t a par ty in the p e t i t i o n e r ' s pos i t ion may br ing su i tto enforce the r i gh t s of o thers . That ques t ion demands anaf f i rmat ive answer.

The PAA express ly declares t ha t a se rv ice prov ide r tha thas received a d i r e c t ive "may chal lenge the l ega l i t y of tha td i rec t ive , " so U.S.C. 1805b(h) (1 ) (A), and "may f i l e a pe t i t i onwith the Court of Review" fo r r e l i e f from an adverse FISC dec is ion ,

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id . 1805b( i ) . There a re a var ie ty of ways in which a di rec t ivecould be unlawful, and th e PAA does nothing to circumscribe thetypes of claims of i l l ega l i t y t ha t can be brought . We th ink tha tthe language i s broad enough to permi t a serv ice provider to bringa cons t i tu t iona l cha l lenge to the l ega l i t y of a di rec t iveregardless of whether the provider or one of i t s customers suf fe r sthe infr ingement t ha t makes the di rec t ive unlawful . The shor t ofit i s t ha t the PAA grants an aggrieved serv ice provider a r i gh t ofact ion and extends t ha t r i gh t to encompass claims brought by it onthe bas i s of customers ' r i gh t s .

For present purposes, t ha t i s game, se t , and match. Assa id , the pe t i t ione r ' s response to the government ' s motion tocompel i s the funct ional equivalent of a pe t i t i on under sec t ion1805b(h) (1) (A). The pe t i t ione r ' s claim, as a cha l lenge to thecons t i t u t i ona l i t y of the d i r e c t ive s , qui te c lear ly cons t i tu te s achal lenge to t he i r l ega l i t y . Thus, the pe t i t ione r ' s FourthAmendment claim on behalf of i t s customers f a l l s within the ambitof the s ta tu tory provis ion . I t follows inexorably t ha t thepe t i t i one r has s tanding to maintain th i s l i t i g a t i o n .

B . The Fourth Amendment Challenge .We t u rn now to the pe t i t ione r ' s Fourth Amendment

arguments. In the Fourth Amendment context ,cour ts review f indings of fac t fo r c l ea r

federa l appel la tee r ro r and l ega l

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conclusions ( including de te rmina t ions about the ul t imatec ons t i t u t i ona l i t y of government searches o r se izures ) de novo.See, ~ ~ United Sta tes v . Martins , 413 F.3d 139, 146 (1s t Ci r .2005); United Sta tes v. Runyan, 290 F. 3d 223, 23 4 (5th Cir . 2002).We therefore review de novo th e FISC's conclus ion t ha t thesu rve i l l ances ca r r ied out pursuan t to the d i r e c t ive s are lawful .

The p e t i t i o n e r ' s remonstrance has two main branches.Fi r s t , it asse r t s t h a t the government, in i s su ing the di rec t ives ,had to abide by the requirements a t tendan t to the Warrant Clause ofthe Fourth Amendment. Second, it argues t ha t even if a fore igni n t e l l igence except ion to the warrant requirements e x i s t s andexcuses compliance with the Warrant Clause, the survei l lancesmandated by the di rec t ives a re unreasonable and, t he re fo re , v io l a t ethe Fourth Amendment. The pe t i t i one r l im i t s each o f i t s cla ims tothe harm t ha t may be i n f l i c t ed upon United Sta tes persons .

1 . The Nature of the Challenge. As a threshold mat te r ,the pe t i t ione r a s se r t s t ha t i t s Fourth Amendment arguments add upto a fac ia l chal lenge to the PAA. The government con tes t s th i scharac te r i za t ion , asse r t ing tha t the p e t i t i o n e r presen t s only anas-appl ied cha l lenge . We agree wi th the government.

A f a c i a l chal lenge asks a cour t to cons ider thec ons t i t u t i ona l i t y of a s t a tu t e without fac tua l development cente redaround a par t i cu l a r appl ica t ion . See, ~ ~ Wash. Sta te Grange v.

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Wash. Sta te Repub. Party, 128 S.Ct . 1184, 1190 (2008). Here,however, the re i s a par t icu la r ized record and the s t a tu t e - the PAA-has been appl ied to the pe t i t i one r in a s pe c i f i c se t t i ng . Thepe t i t i one r ' s p l a i n t s take account of t h i s se t t i ng . So viewed, theygo p as t the ques t ion of whether the PAA i s va l id on i t s face - aques t ion t h a t would be answered by deciding whether any app l i ca t ionof the s t a t u t e passed c ons t i t u t i ona l muster , see , ~ ' id . - andask ins tead whether t h i s spec i f ic app l i ca t ion offends theCons t i tu t ion . As such, the p e t i t i o n e r ' s chal lenge f a l l s outs idethe normal circumference of a f a c i a l cha l lenge .

This makes p e r fe c t sense. Where, as here , a s t a t u t e hasbeen implemented in a def ined context , an inqu i r ing co u r t may onlycons ider the s t a tu t e ' s cons t i t u t i ona l i t y i n t ha t context ; the cour tmay not specula te about the va l i d i t y of the law as it might beappl ied i n d i f f e r e n t ways o r on d i f f e r e n t f a c t s . See N a t ' l Endow.fo r the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584 (1998); see a l so Yazoo &Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 220(1912) (explaining t ha t how a cour t may apply a s t a tu t e to o thercases and how f a r pa r t s of the s t a t u t e may be sus ta ined on o th e rfac t s "are mat te rs upon which [a reviewing cour t ] need notspecu la te" ) .

We the re fo re deem the p e t i t i o n e r ' s chal lenge an as-appl ied chal lenge and l i m i t our analys is accordingly . This means

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tha t , to succeed, the pe t i t i one r must prove more than a t he o re t i c a lr i sk t ha t the PAA could on ce r t a i n fac t s y ie ld unconst i tu t ionalappl ica t ions . Ins tead , it must persuade us t ha t the PAA i sunconst i tu t ional as implemented here .

2 . The Foreign Inte l l igence Exception . The recurrenttheme permeat ing the p e t i t i o n e r ' s arguments i s the not ion tha tthe re i s no fore ign in te l l igence except ion to the FourthAmendment's Warrant Clause. 6 The FISC re jec ted t h i s not ion ,pos i t ing tha t our decis ion in In re Sealed Case confirmed theexis tence o f a foreign in te l l igence except ion to the warrantrequirement .

While the Sealed Case cour t avoided an express holdingt ha t a foreign in te l l igence except ion ex i s t s by assuming arguendot ha t whether o r not the warrant requi rements were met, the s t a t u t ecould surv ive on reasonableness grounds, see 310 F.3d a t 741-42, webel ieve t ha t the FISC's reading of t ha t decis ion i s p laus ib le .

6The Fourth Amendment reads :The r i gh t of the people to be secure in t h e i r persons,houses, papers , and e f fec t s , aga ins t unreasonablesearches and se izures , sha l l not be v io la t ed , and noWarrants sha l l i ssue , bu t upon probable cause, sup portedby Oath o r af f i rmat ion , and par t i cu l a r l y descr ib ing theplace to be searched, and the persons o r th ings to bese ized .U.S. Const . amend . IV.

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The p e t i t i o n e r argues c o r re c t l y t ha t th e Supreme Courthas not exp l i c i t l y recognized such an excep t ion ; indeed, th e Courtreserved t ha t ques t ion in United Sta tes v . United S ta t e s D i s t r i c tCourt (Keith) , 407 U.S . 297, 308-09 (1972) . But th e Court hasrecognized a comparable except ion, out s ide th e fore ign i n t e l l igencecontext , in so -ca l l ed " spec ia l needsn cases . In those cases , theCourt excused compliance with th e Warrant Clause when th e purposebehind th e governmental ac t ion went beyond rou t ine law enforcementand i n s i s t i ng upon a warrant would mater i a l ly i n t e r fe re with th eaccomplishment o f t ha t purpose. See, ~ ' Vernonia Sch. Dis t . 47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (upholding drug t e s t i ng o f highschool a th l e t e s and expla in ing t ha t the excep t ion to th e warrantrequirement appl ied "when s p ec i a l needs, beyond th e normal need fo rlaw enforcement , make th e warrant and probable-cause requ i remen t [s]impract icablen (quot ing G r i f f i n v. Wiscons in , 483 U.S. 868, 873(1987))) ; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass 'n , 489 U.S . 602, 620(1989) (upholding r egu la t ions i n s t i t u t i n g drug and a lcohol t e s t i ngof r a i l ro a d workers fo r sa fe ty rea sons ) ; c f . Terry v. Ohio, 392U.S . 1, 23-24 (1968) (upholding p a t - f r i s k fo r weapons to p ro t e c to f f i c e r sa fe ty during inves t iga to ry stop) .

The ques t ion , then, i s whether the reason ing o f th espec ia l needs cases app l ies by analogy to j u s t i f y a fore igni n t e l l igence except ion to th e warrant re.quirement fo r su rve i l l ance

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under taken fo r nat ional secur i ty purposes and d i rec ted a t a fore ignpower o r an agent of a fore ign power reasonably bel ieved to belocated outs ide the United Sta tes . Applying pr inc ip le s der ivedfrom the spec ia l needs cases , we conclude t ha t t h i s type of fore ignin te l l igence survei l lance possesses cha rac t e r i s t i c s t ha t qual i fy itfo r such an except ion.

For one th ing , the purpose behind the survei l lancesordered pursuan t to the d i r e c t ive s goes wel l beyond any gardenvar ie ty law enforcement ob jec t ive . It involves the acqu i s i t ionfrom overseas fore ign agents of fore ign in te l l igence to helppro tec t na t iona l secur i ty . Moreover, t h i s i s the s o r t of s i tua t ionin which the government 's i n t e r e s t i s par t i cu l a r l y in tense .

The pe t i t i one r has a f a l lback pos i t ion . Even i f the re i sa narrow fore ign in te l l igence except ion, it assevera tes , ade f in i t i on o f t ha t except ion should r equ i re the fore igni n t e l l igence purpose to be the pr imary purpose of the su rve i l l ance .For t ha t propos i t ion , it c i t e s the Fourth C i r c u i t ' s decis ion inUnited Sta tes v . Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir .1980). That dog w i l l not hunt .

This cour t previous ly has upheld as reasonable under theFourth Amendment the Pa t r io t Act ' s s ubs t i t u t i on of "a s ign i f i c a n tpurpose" fo r the ta l i smanic phrase "primary purpose." In re SealedCase, 310 F. 3d a t 742-45. As we expla ined the re , the Fourth

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Circu i t ' s "primary purpose" l anguage - from which the pre-Pa t r io tAct in te rpre ta t ion of "purpose" der ived - drew an "uns table ,unrea l i s t i c , and confusing" l ine between fore ign in te l l igencepurposes and cr iminal inves t iga t ion purposes . Id . a t 743. Asurvei l lance with a fore ign in te l l igence purpose of ten wi l l havesome anci l l a ry cr iminal- law purpose . See id . The prevent ion orapprehension of t e rror i sm suspects , fo r ins tance , i s i nex t r i cab lyin ter twined with the na t iona l secur i ty concerns t ha t a re a t thecore of fore ign in te l l igence co l lec t ion . See id . In our view themore appropr ia te cons idera t ion i s the programmatic purpose of thesurvei l lances and whether - as in the spec ia l needs cases - tha tprogrammatic purpose involves some l eg i t imate objec t ive beyondordinary crime cont ro l . Id . a t 745-46.

Under t h i s analys is , the survei l lances author ized by thedi rec t ives eas i ly pass muster . Thei r s ta ted purpose centers ongarner ing foreign in te l l igence . There i s no ind ica t ion t ha t thecol lec t ions of information are pr imari ly re la ted to ordinarycr iminal- law enforcement purposes . Without something more than apure ly specula t ive se t of imaginings, we cannot i n f e r t ha t thepurpose of th e di rec t ives (and, thus , of the survei l lances) i so ther than t h e i r s ta ted purpose . See, ~ . United Sta tes v. Chern.Found., Inc . , 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) ("The presumption ofregula r i ty supports the o f f i c i a l ac ts of publ ic of f i ce r s , and, in

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th e absence o f c l e a r evidence to th e con t ra ry , cour t s presume t ha tthey have prope r ly discharged t h e i r o f f i c i a l du t i es . " )

We add, moreover , t h a t the re i s a high degree ofprobab i l i ty t ha t r equ i r ing a warrant would hinder the government 'sa b i l i t y to c o l l e c t t ime-sens i t ive in fo rmat ion and, thus , wouldimpede th e v i t a l na t iona l secur i ty i n t e r e s t s t h a t are a t s t ake .See, ~ ' Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d a t 915 (explain ing t ha t whenthe objec t of a su rve i l l ance i s a fo re ign power o r itsco l labora to r s , "the government has th e gre a t e s t neeq fo r speed,s t e a l t h , and secrecy") . [ redacted t ex t ] Compulsory compliance withth e warrant requ i remen t would in t roduce an element of delay , thusf rus t r a t i ng th e government 's a b i l i t y to c o l l e c t in fo rmat ion in at imely manner. [ redacted t ex t ]

For these reasons , we hold t h a t a fo re ign i n t e l l igenceexcept ion to th e Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement e x i s t s whensu rve i l l ance i s conducted to obta in fo re ign i n t e l l igence fo rna t iona l se c u r i t y purposes and i s d i rec ted ag a in s t fo re ign powerso r agen t s o f fore ign powers reasonably be l ieved to be loca tedou t s ide th e United S t a t e s .

3. Reasonableness . This hold ing does not g r an t thegovernment c a r t e blanche: even though the fo re ign i n t e l l igenceexcept ion app l ies in a given case , governmental ac t ion in t rud ing oni nd iv idua l pr ivacy i n t e re s t s must comport with the Fourth

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Amendment's reasonableness requirement . See United Sta tes v.Place , 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). Thus, the ques t ion here reducesto whether the PAA, as appl ied through the d i r e c t ive s , c ons t i t u t e sa suf f i c i en t ly reasonable exerc i se o f governmental power to sa t i s fythe Fourth Amendment.

We begin wi th bedrock. The Fourth Amendment protec t s ther i gh t " to be secure aga ins t unreasonable searches andse izures ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. To determine the reasonablenessof a par t i cu l a r governmental act ion , an inqui r ing cour t mustcons ider the t o t a l i ty o f the circumstances . Samson v. Cal i fo rn ia ,547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8- 9(1985). This mode of approach takes in to account the na ture of thegovernment in t rus ion and how the in t rus ion i s implemented. SeeGarner, 471 U.S. a t 8; Place , 462 U.S. a t 703. The more importantthe government ' s i n t e r e s t , th e gre a t e r the i n t rus ion t ha t may becons t i tu t iona l ly to le ra ted . See, ~ ' Michigan v . Summers, 452u.s. 692, 701-05 (1981).

The t o t a l i t y of the ci rcumstances model r equ i res thecour t to balance the i n t e r e s t s a t s take . See Samson, 547 U.S. a t848; United Sta tes v . Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001). I f theprotec t ions tha t are in place fo r ind iv idua l pr ivacy i n t e r e s t s aresu f f i c i en t in l i g h t of the governmental i n t e r e s t a t s take , thecons t i tu t iona l sca les wi l l tilt in favor of upholding the

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government 's ac t ions . I f , however, those pro tec t ions a rei n s u f f i c i e n t to a l l ev i a t e the r i s ks o f government e r r o r and abuse,the sca les w i l l t ip toward a f ind ing o f u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y .

Here, the r e levan t governmental i n t e r e s t - the i n t e r e s tin na t iona l secur i ty - i s o f the h ighes t order o f magnitude. SeeHaig v . Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981); In r e S e a l e d Case, 310 F.3da t 746. Consequently, we must determine whether the pro tec t ionsafforded to the pr ivacy r i gh t s o f t a rge ted persons are reasonablein l i gh t of t h i s impor tan t i n t e r e s t .

At the ou t se t , we dispose o f two s t raw men - argumentsbased on a misreading o f our p r i o r decis ion in Sealed Case. Fi r s t ,the pe t i t i one r notes t ha t we found re l evan t s ix f ac to r scon t r ibu t ing to the pro tec t ion of ind iv idua l pr ivacy in the face o fa governmental i n t rus ion fo r na t iona l se c u r i t y purposes . See In reSealed Case, 310 F.3d a t 737-41 (contempla t ing p r i o r j u d i c i a lreview, presence o r absence o f probable cause , par t i cu l a r i t y ,necess i ty , dura t ion , and minimizat ion) . On t ha t exiguous bas i s , itreasons t ha t our dec i s ion the re r equ i res a more r igorous s tandardfo r gauging reasonab leness .

This i s a mistaken judgment. In Sealed Case, we d id notformulate a r i g i d s i x - fac t o r t e s t fo r reasonab leness . That wouldbe a t odds with the t o t a l i t y of the circumstances t e s t t ha t mustguide an ana lys i s in the p r ec in c t s pa t ro l led by the Fourth

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Amendment. We merely ind ica ted t ha t the s ix enumerated fac to rswere re l evan t under the c i rcumstances of t ha t case .

t ha t our Sealedecond, the pe t i t i one r a s se r t sCase decis ion s tands fo r the propos i t ion t ha t , in order to gaincons t i tu t iona l approval , the PAA procedures must conta inpro tec t ions equivalent to the th ree pr inc ipa l warrant requi rements:pr i o r j ud i c i a l review, probable cause, and pa r t i cu l a r i t y . That i sincorrec t . What we sa id t h e r e - and r e i t e r a t e t o d a y - i s t ha t themore a se t of procedures resembles those associa ted with thet r ad i t i ona l warrant requi rements , the more eas i l y it can bedetermined tha t those procedures are with in c ons t i t u t i ona l bounds.See id . a t 737, 742. We therefore dec l ine the p e t i t i o n e r ' si nv i t a t i on to re incorporate in to the fore ign in te l l igence except ionthe same warrant requi rements t ha t we al ready have heldinapp l icab le .

Having placed Sealed Case in to perspec t ive , we tu rn tothe p e t i t i o n e r ' s content ion t ha t the t o t a l i t y of the ci rcumstancesdemands a f inding of unreasonableness here. That content ion bo i l sdown to the idea t ha t the pro tec t ions af forded under the PAA areinsuf f i c i en t ly analogous to the pro tec t ions deemed adequate inSealed Case because th e PAA l acks (i) a pa r t i cu l a r i t y requi rement ,( i i ) a pr i o r j ud i c i a l review requi rement fo r determining probablecause tha t a t a rge t i s a fore ign power o r an agent of a fore ign

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power, and ( i i i ) any plaus ib l e proxies fo r the omi t ted pro tec t ions .For good measure, the p e t i t i o n e r suggests t h a t the PAA's l ack ofe i t h e r a necess i ty requirement o r a reasonable dura t iona l l imi tdiminishes the ove ra l l reasonableness of surve i l l ances conductedpursuant t he re to .

The government r e jo in s t h a t the PAA, a s appl ied here ,cons t i tu tes reasonable governmental ac t ion . It emphasizes both thepro tec t ions spe l led ou t in the PAA i t s e l f and those mandated underthe c e r t i f i c a t i o n s and d i r ec t i ves . This matrix of sa feguardscomprises a t l e a s t f ive components: t a rge t ing procedures ,minimizat ion procedures , a procedure to ensure t h a t a s ign i f i can tpurpose of a surve i l l ance i s to ob ta in fore ign in te l l igenceinformat ion, procedures incorpora ted through Execut ive Order 12333 2.5 , and [redacted tex t ] procedures [ redacted t ext ] out l ined inan a f f i d a v i t support ing the ce r t i f i c a t i ons .

The record suppor t s the government. Notwithstanding theparade of hor r i b l e s t r o t t e d out by the pe t i t i one r , it has presentedno evidence of any ac tua l harm, any egregious r i sk o f e r r o r , o r anybroad po ten t i a l f o r abuse in the ci rcumstances of the i n s t an t case .Thus, assess ing the i n t rus ions a t i s sue in l i g h t of thegovernmental i n t e r e s t a t s take and the panoply of pro tec t ions t ha ta re in place , we di sce rn no pr inc ip l ed bas i s for i nva l ida t ing the

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PAA as appl ied here . In the pages t ha t fol low, we expla in ourreasoning.

The p e t i t i o n e r ' s arguments about pa r t i cu l a r i t y and p r i o rjud ic ia l review a re defeated by the way in which the s t a t u t e hasbeen appl ied . When combined with the PAA's o ther p ro tec t ions , th e[redacted tex t ] procedures and the procedures incorpora ted throughthe Executive Order a re c ons t i t u t i ona l ly su f f i c i en t compensationfo r any encroachments .

The [redac ted tex t ] procedures [ redacted tex t ] arede l inea ted in an ex par te appendix f i l ed by the government. Theya l so a re descr ibed, a l b e i t with gre a t e r genera l i ty , in th egovernment 's br i e f . [redacted tex t ) Although the PAA i t s e l f doesnot mandate a showing of par t i cu l a r i t y , see 50 u.s.c. 1805b (b ) ,th i s pre -su rve i l l ance procedure s t r i kes us as analogous to and inconformity with the pa r t i cu l a r i t y showing contemplated by SealedCase. 310 F.3d a t 740.

[redacted tex t )The procedures incorpora ted through sec t ion 2.5 of

Executive Order 12333, made app l icab le to the su rve i l l ances throughthe ce r t i f i ca t ions and d i r e c t ive s , serve to a l l ay the probablecause concern. That sec t ion s t a t e s in re levant par t :

The Attorney General hereby i s de lega ted thepower to approve the use fo r in te l l igencepurposes, within the United Sta tes o r aga ins t

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a United Sta tes person abroad, of anytechnique fo r which a warrant would berequired i f under taken fo r law enforcementpurposes, provided t ha t such techniques sha l lnot be under taken unless the Attorney Generalhas determined in each case t ha t the re i sprobable cause to bel ieve t ha t the techniquei s d i rec ted aga ins t a fore ign power o r anagent of a fore ign power.

46 Fed. Reg. a t 59,951 (emphasis suppl ied) . Thus, in order fo r thegovernment to a c t upon the ce r t i f i ca t i ons , the AG f i r s t had to makea determinat ion t ha t probable cause ex i s t ed to be l ieve t h a t thet a rge ted person i s a fore ign power o r an agent of a fore ign power.Moreover, th i s de te rmina t ion was n ot made in a vacuum . The AG'sdec is ion was informed by the contents of an app l i ca t ion madepursuant to Department of Defense (DOD) regu la t ions . See DOD,Procedures Governing th e A c t iv i t i e s of DOD In te l l igence Componentstha t Affec t United Sta tes Persons , DOD 5240.1-R, Proc. 5, P t. 2.C(Dec. 1982) . Those r egu la t ions required t ha t the appl ica t ioninclude a s ta tement of fac t s demonstra t ing both probable cause andnecess i ty . See id . They a l so required a s ta tement of the per iod- not to exceed 90 days - during which the su rve i l l ance was thoughtto be requi red . 7 See id .

7At o ra l argument , the government augmented t h i s desc r ip t ion ,s t a t i ng tha t , under the DOD procedure , the NSA t yp i c a l ly providesthe AG with a two- to- three-page submiss ion a r t i cu l a t i ng the fac t sunder lying the de te rmina t ion t h a t the person in ques t ion i s anagent of a fore ign power; t ha t the National Secur i ty Divis ion ofthe Department o f Jus t ice wri tes i t s own memorandum to the AG; and

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[redacted t ex t and footnote 8 ]The p e t i t i o n e r ' s add i t iona l c r i t i c i sms about the

survei l lances can be grouped in to concerns about po t en t i a l abuse ofexecut ive disc re t ion and concerns about the r i sk of governmente r ro r ( including inadver ten t o r inc identa l co l lec t ion ofinformat ion from non- targeted United Sta tes persons) . We addressthese g roups of c r i t i c i sms sequent ia l ly .

The pe t i t i one r suggests t ha t , by p lac ing disc re t ionent i re ly in the hands o f the Execut ive Branch without pr i o rjud ic ia l involvement, the procedures cede to t ha t Branch over lybroad power t h a t inv i te s abuse . But t h i s i s little more than alament about the r i sk tha t government o f f i c i a l s w i l l not opera te ingood fa i th . That s o r t of r i sk ex i s t s even when a warrant i srequired . In the absence of a showing of f raud o r o t h e r misconductby the a f f i an t , the prosecutor , o r the judge, a presumption ofregula r i ty t r ad i t i ona l l y a t t aches to the obta in ing of a wa r r a n t .See, ~ ' McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 323-24 (D.C. Cir .1982) .

Here - where an except ion affords r e l i e f from the warrantrequirement - common sense suggests t ha t we import the same

t ha t an ora l b r i e f ing of the AG ensues.8 [redacted tex t ]

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presumption. Once we have determined t h a t pro tec t ions su f f i c i en tto meet the Fourth Amendment 's reasonableness requiremen t are inplace , the re i s no j u s t i f i ca t ion fo r assuming, in the absence ofevidence to tha t e f fec t , t ha t those prophylact ic procedures havebeen implemented in bad f a i t h .

Simi la r ly , the fac t t ha t the re i s some po te n t i a l fo re r ro r i s not a su f f i c i en t reason to i nva l ida te the su rve i l l ances .[redacted tex t ]

Equally as important , some r i sk of e r ro r ex i s t s under theor ig ina l FISA procedures - procedures t ha t received our imprimaturin Sealed Case, 310 F.3d a t 746. A pr i o r j ud i c i a l review processdoes not ensure t ha t the types of e r rors complained of here[redacted tex t ] would have been prevented.

It i s a l so s ign i f i c a n t t ha t e f f e c t ive minimizat ionprocedures are in p lace . These procedures se rve as an add i t iona lbackstop aga ins t i den t i f i ca t i on e r ro r s as wel l as a means ofreducing the impact of i nc iden ta l in t rus ions in to the pr ivacy ofnon- ta rge ted United Sta tes persons . The minimizat ion proceduresimplemented here are almost i de n t i c a l to those used under FISA toensure the cur ta i lment of both mistaken and i nc iden ta lacqu i s i t ions . These minimizat ion procedures were upheld by theFISC in th i s case, and the pe t i t i one r s t a t ed a t ora l argument tha tit i s not quarre l ing about minimizat ion but , r a the r , about

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par t i cu l a r i t y . Thus, we see no reason to ques t ion th e adequacy ofthe minimizat ion pro toco l .

The p e t i t i o n e r ' s concern with i nc iden ta l co l l ec t ions i soverblown . It i s se t t l ed beyond peradventure t ha t i nc iden ta lco l l ec t ions occurr ing as a r e su l t of c ons t i t u t i ona l ly permiss ib leacqu i s i t ions do not render those acqu i s i t ions unlawful . 9 See,

~ ' United Sta tes v . Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 157-58 (1974); UnitedSta tes v. Schwartz , 535 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir . 1976). Thegovernment assures us t h a t it does not main ta in a database o fi nc iden ta l ly co l l ec ted in format ion from non- targeted United Sta tespersons , and the re i s no evidence to the contrary . On these fac t s ,inc iden ta l ly co l l ec ted communications of non- targeted United Sta tespersons do no t v io l a t e the Fourth Amendment.

To the ex ten t t ha t the pe t i t i one r may be concerned aboutthe adequacy of the t a rge t ing procedures , it i s worth not ing t ha tthose procedures include provis ions designed to prevent e r rors .[redacted tex t ] Furthermore, a PAA provis ion cod i f ied a t 50 U.S.C. 1805b(d) r equ i res the AG and the DNI to asses s compliance withthose procedures and to repor t to Congress semi-annual ly .

9The pe t i t i one r has n ot charged t ha t the Executive Branch i ssurve i l l ing overseas persons in order i n t e n t iona l ly t o su rve i lpersons in the United Sta tes . Because the i s sue i s not before us,we do not pass on th e l eg i t imacy v e l non of such a prac t ice .

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[4 . A Part ing Shot . The pe t i t i one r f i r e s a par t ing shot .I t presented fo r the f i r s t t ime a t ora l argument a spec i f ic pr ivacyconcern t ha t could possib ly a r i se under the d i rec t i ves . Thispar t ing shot may have been waived by the f a i l u re to urge it e i t he rbefore the FISC o r in the p e t i t i o n e r ' s pre-argument f i l i ngs in t h i scour t . We need not probe t ha t poin t , however, because thepe t i t i one r i s f i r i ng blanks: no i ssue f a l l i ng within t h i sdescr ip t ion has a r i sen to da te . Were such an i ssue to a r i se , therea re safeguards in place t ha t may meet the reasonableness s tandard .We do, however, d i r e c t the government promptly to not i fy thepe t i t i one r i f th i s i ssue a r i se s under the d i r e c t ive s . 10

The foregoing paragraph i s a summary of our holding onth i s i ssue . We discuss with grea te r spec i f i t y the p e t i t i o n e r ' sargument, the government 's safeguards , and our order in thec l a s s i f i ed vers ion of th i s opinion . ]

5 . Recapi tu la t ion . After assess ing the prophylact icprocedures appl icable here , inc luding the provis ions of the PAA,the a f f i dav i t s suppor t ing the ce r t i f i ca t ions , sec t ion 2.5 ofExecutive Order 12333, and the dec la ra t ion mentioned above, weconclude t ha t they are very much in tune with the cons idera t ionsdiscussed in Sealed Case. Col lec t ive ly , these procedures require

10 [redacted tex t ]

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a showing o f p a r t i c u l a r i t y , a meaningful probable causedeterminat ion, and a showing of necess i ty . They a l so r equ i re adura t iona l l i m i t no t to exceed 90 days - an i n t e rva l t ha t weprevious ly found reasonable . 11 See In re Sea led Case, 310 F.3d a t740. Fina l ly , the r i s ks of e r r o r and abuse are wi th in acceptablel imi t s and e f fec t ive minimizat ion procedures are in place .

Balancing these f indings ag a in s t the v i t a l na ture o f thegovernment 's na t iona l se c u r i t y i n t e r e s t and the manner of thein t rus ion , we hold t ha t the s u r v e i l l an ce s a t i s sue s a t i s f y theFourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement .IV. CONCLUSION

Our government i s tasked with pro tec t ing an i n t e r e s t ofu t most s ign i f i cance to the na t ion - the sa fe ty and se c u r i t y of i t speople . But the Cons t i tu t ion i s the corners tone o f our freedoms,and government cannot un i l a t e ra l l y sac r i f i ce c ons t i t u t i ona l r i gh t son the a l t a r of na t iona l s e c ur i t y . Thus, in car ry ing out itsna t iona l se c u r i t y miss ion, the government must s imul taneouslyf u l f i l l i t s c ons t i t u t i ona l r e s pons ib i l i t y to provide reasonablepro tec t ions fo r the pr ivacy of United Sta tes persons . Thej ud i c i a ry ' s duty i s to hold tha t de l ica te ba lance s teady and t r u e .

11This t ime per iod was deemed acceptable because o f the use ofcont inuing minimiza t ion procedures . In r e S e a l e d Case, 310 F.3d a t740 . Those minimiza t ion procedures are near ly i de n t i c a l to theminimizat ion procedures employed in t h i s case . See t e x t supra .

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We bel ieve t ha t our decis ion to uphold the PAA as appl iedin th i s case comports with t ha t solemn ob l iga t ion . In t h a t regard ,we caut ion tha t our decis ion does no t c ons t i t u t e an endorsement ofbroad-based, indiscr iminate execut ive power. Rather , our decis ionrecognizes t ha t where the government has i n s t i t u t ed severa l l aye rsof serv iceable sa feguards t o p ro t e c t ind iv idua l s aga ins tunwarranted harms and to minimize i nc iden ta l in t rus ions , i t se f fo r t s t o p ro t e c t na t iona l secur i ty should not be f rus t r a t ed bythe cour t s . This i s such a case .

We need go no fu r the r . The dec i s ion g ran t ing thegovernment 's motion to compel i s aff i rmed; the pe t i t i on fo r reviewi s denied and dismissed; and the motion fo r a s tay i s denied asmoot.

So Ordered .

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