Arx Journal Volume 6 2008

ARX- ONLINE JOURNAL OF MILITARY ARCHITECTURE

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ARX is published by the FortressExplorer Society (FES) and is onlyavailable (FREE of charge) in PDFformat.

This journal is downloadable onlyfrom the Fortress Explorer Websiteand is subject to the provisions ofinternational copyright laws.

The Fortress Explorer (FE) Websiteis an informational portal dedicatedto the promotion of the subject ofMilitary Architecture andFortification, with a particularemphasis on the Maltese Islandsand on the rich Hospitaller militaryheritage spread around the shores ofthe Mediterranean.

ARX is designed and produced byDr. Stephen C Spiteri Ph.D.

ISSUE 6 / MAY 20084. Les Fortifications et le Patrimoine Militaire immaterialby Philippe de la Hausse de la Louvière

6. Maltese Siege Batteries of the Blockadeby Dr. Stephen C. Spiteri(with gazetteer of sites)

52. Matteo Bonavia - Royal Engineerby Denis A. Darmanin

56. Mining the Gran Castello for Destruction in 1645by Godwin Vella

60. Fort St. Rocco -The first British flankless fort in Maltaby Dr. Stephen C. Spiteri

64. A Medieval Tower at Qrendi? - Dr. Stephen C. Spiteri


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LESFORTIFICATIONSET LEPATRIMOINEMILITAIREIMMATERIAL

by

Philippe de la Hausse de la Louvière

La république de Maurice est l’unde ces rares pays dans le monde nepossédant pas d’armée, malgré unehistoire mouvementée marquée parles conflits militaires. Sa positionstratégique justifiait sa fortificationdès le 17e siècle, lorsque leshollandais s’y sont installés, suivisdes colons français puis anglais. Al’époque, les batailles faisaient rage,les bateaux étaient arraisonnés, etles commerçants ainsi que les fortsétaient puissamment armés.Beaucoup de mauriciens ignorentcet héritage, malgré les nombreuxforts inscrits au patrimoine nationalet le fait que 35% de nosmonuments nationaux ont desaffiliations militaires. Cependant, lesrécents débats sur l’esclavage et lemarronnage ont suscité l’intérêt dela population pour la résistancearmée et le patrimoine militaire.L’exploration sous marine de deuxépaves a dévoilé la portée de cesconflits sur la mixité culturelle et lasociété actuelle. Les épavescomprennent un vaisseau coulé lorsde la seule bataille gagnée par lesforces navales de Napoléon faceaux anglais, en 1810. L’autre

vaisseau est l’un des raresfragments connus de navire ayantservi au commerce des esclaves, etreprésente donc un précieuxtémoignage.

Les conflits franco-britanniques du19e siècle et l’esclavage sont deuxpériodes charnières qui ontdéterminé la forme et la structurede la société moderne – unedémocratie créole dont 50% de lapopulation descend d’ancêtresesclaves. Ces vestiges ainsi qued’autres rappellent les origines dela mixité culturelle de Mauriceaujourd’hui.Habitée depuis quatre sièclesseulement, la population deMaurice est originaire de troiscontinents européens et asiatiquesvenus en colons, et esclaves natifsde Madagascar et du continentafricain. Le fait que Maurice aitsigné les trois conventions del’UNESCO concernant laprotection du patrimoine cultureltémoigne de sa diversité culturelle.Comment protéger et conserver lepatrimoine militaire d’un paysdémilitarisé qui prône les valeursd’une société non-militaire ? Etpourquoi voudrait-on protéger etvaloriser un tel héritage ? Je penseque ces deux questions trouventréponse dans l’interdépendance dumatériel et de l’immatériel.Maurice est devenue ce qu’elle estaujourd’hui à cause de son passémilitaire, et de l’évolutiongéopolitique des 400 dernièresannées. De plus, alors que

Maurice épouse une zone de paixdans l’océan indien, il est significatifde noter que la plus grande basemilitaire américaine en dehors duterritoire des Etats-Unis se trouve àDiégo Garcia, territoire revendiquépar les Mauriciens. La protection etl’étude de notre héritage militaire nepeut qu’être bénéfique auxmauriciens du 21e siècle, car ellepermet d’apprécier les avantagesd’une société de paix, et decomprendre le rôle que les rivalitéspassées ont joué dans ladétermination des valeurscontemporaines.Une aile entière de notre muséenational est dédiée à la bataille deGrand Port, plusieurs ONGs etstructures gouvernementales ontentamé des projets de restaurationsur d’importantes fortifications, et leMinistère du tourisme s’estrécemment embarqué dans un vasteprojet de restauration de la citadelle,dans la capitale. Plusieurs ONG’sont demandé les autoritésd’enregistrer l’Ile de la Passe, un ilotfortifié, sur la liste indicative dupatrimoine de l’humanité, maisjusqu’ici elles n’ont pas réagi. Ilfaut maintenant prêter attention auxvaleurs immatérielles de ces sites, àla vie des hommes et des femmesqui y ont vécu, le rôle qu’ils ont jouédans la construction de la sociétécontemporaine, ainsi de suite… Ilnous faut intégrer la sauvegarde dessites fortifiés dans la conscience descommunautés, afin que matériel etimmatériel se complètent et sesoutiennent mutuellement.


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MALTESE'SIEGE'BATTERIES OFTHEBLOCKADE1798-1800

byDr. Stephen C . Spiteri

The French capture of the Malteseislands in the summer of 1798 wasno accidental affair. This small butstrategically sited archipelago, builtinto a formidable bulwark over thecourse of 268 years by the Order ofHospitaller knights, had become animportant and heavily fortified basethat no naval super power vying forthe control of the MediterraneanSea in the late eighteenth centurycould afford to ignore. Napoleon hadset his eyes on the Island as early asSeptember 1797, realizing both itsstrategic importance and the need toprevent the British from acquiringthe place: ‘Why should we not seizethe island of Malta?’ he wrote to theMinister of War a year before theArmy of the East set out on itsincredible mission to conquer Egyptin an imaginative strategic attempt tocut off Britain’s lifeline to India byseizing Egypt and the Levant; ‘oursquadron … could take some troopsand, whilst passing by, land agarrison of 2000 men at Malta, anisland which will sooner or laterbelong to Britain if we have thestupidity of not forestalling them.May you [the Executive Directory]

take a resolution which willauthorise me to cultivate the meansof information which I have alreadyon Malta and at the moment which Iwill consider opportune seize theplace and put a garrison therein’.(1)

In April of the following year theExecutive Directory instructedNapoleon to seize the island ofMalta, but only if this could beaccomplished without compromisingthe success of the Orient expedition.Yet the fall of Malta was inevitable.At the end of the l8th century, theOrder of St. John, impoverished andanachronistic, and ruling over analienated population, had reached itslowest ebb. Napoleon’s troops, aidedby a strong fifth columnist partyinvolving many of the seniorHospitaller knights themselves,seized the islands with hardly a shotbeing fired, in the words of Dr.Alfred Sant, in ‘a gallant, almostchivalric manner … almost withoutany blood letting, allowing the Grand

Master and the Knights to leaveMalta with full military honours’.(2)

Above, and below, Napoleon Bonaparte andhis invasion of Malta.


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The inhabitants’ initial reception ofthe Republican occupation, however,was rapidly replaced by adisillusionment which, in the spaceof a mere three months, erupted intoopen rebellion. Most historiansblame the high-handed manner inwhich the French authorities wentabout introducing radical politicaland administrative changes and also,perhaps more importantly, in themanner with which they began todespoil the churches of their sacredreligious treasures and icons to paytheir garrison. The Maltese responsewas quick and savage and caughtthe French off their guard. Vauboisand his French garrison reacted bybarricading themselves inside thesafety of the formidable harbourfortifications. Their half-heartedsorties against the insurgents’encirclement were bravely repulsedby the inhabitants, who despite beingunprepared and very poorly armedquickly managed to organize an

effective resistance. In this manner,the struggle quickly evolved into astalemate with the Maltese incontrol of the countryside and theFrench firmly in command of thefortified harbour areas.

The French, on their part, werecontent to simply hold out until thearrival of reinforcements but theMaltese were desperate and quicklysought foreign assistance. A numberof delegates were dispatched toSicily to implore the help of the Kingof the Two Sicilies. Somewhere offthe coast of Sicily, they wereintercepted by the British fleet thenreturning from its victory at theBattle of the Nile under thecommand of Lord Nelson. Onboarding the vanguard, the Maltesedelegates explained to Nelson thattheir compatriots had risen againstthe French and were intending toentreat King Ferdinand to providethem with arms and ammunition.They also implored Nelson, as anally of’ His Majesty the King of’

Two Sicilies to succour them byblockading the Grand Harbour.Nelson’s battle weary fleet was thenin no state to undertake a blockadeand so he in turn requested thePortuguese, Britain’s allies, to do sountil the British fleet could return torelieve them later on.

Subsequently, Nelson, mistrustingthe Portuguese, sent CaptainAlexander Ball with some ships toassist the insurgents. The allied shipskept up a blockade of the Frenchinside the harbour area. The Frenchforce, under the command ofGeneral Vaubois, consisted of 3053men, well armed and well led. TheMaltese, on the other hand,numbered around 10,000 men butwere ill-equipped and unable to laysiege to the French positions. Thearrival of British troops, althoughserving to alleviate the plight of theMaltese did little to break thedeadlock, and the blockade was tocontinue for two years until theFrench were forced to surrenderwhen their food supplies ran dry.

The story of this blockade and siege,and its historical, political, andmilitary significance, has beenalready well studied and narrated bymany other historians, chief amongstthem Dr. Carmelo Testa. It is notthe intention to repeat it here. Whatis less well studied and understood,however, is the nature of thefieldworks, camps, batteries andfortifications which the Malteseinsurgents, on their own initiative,built to envelope the Frenchpositions in the harbour areas aroundValletta. The importance of thesefortification lies largely in the factthat these works were designed andbuilt, unaided, by the Maltesethemselves, relying as they did ontheir long experience andinvolvement in the Hospitallers’defensive efforts. This monographseeks to draw attention to thesetruly ‘Maltese’ fortifications.

Drawings of French, Maltese, and Britishtroops involved in the Blockade (Courtesy ofMr. Denis A. Darmanin).


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Order of Battle

The French force, under the ablecommand of General Vaubois andconsisting of 3053 infantry and fivecompanies of artillery, was wellarmed and well led. They werereputed to have corn for eighteenmonths and plenty of oil. The ringof massive and solidly built rock-hewn ramparts, stretching some 5kms around Valletta and its twoharbours, were practicallyimpregnable and ‘ a prova dibomba’.

The Maltese insurgents on the otherhand, numbered around 10,000 men,of whom only 2,358 were adequatelyarmed. (3) They also deployed anumber of cannon, taken mainlyfrom the coastal batteries, towers,and entrenchments that had beenbuilt by the Hospitaller Knights forthe defence of the island throughoutthe course of the seventeenth andeighteenth centuries. The Malteseleaders of the popular revolt,however, were mainly patriots andnot soldiers. Although resourceful,they were inexperienced in the artof warfare, especially against awell-trained professional army thatalso had the advantage of occupyingformidable strongholds. Theirdesperate situation was aggravatedfurther by a serious scarcity ofprovisions, and by divided politicalloyalties within the various factions.

Fortunately for the Maltese, theFrench were soon to be cut off fromany outside help trying to reach

them by sea. Following Nelson’spromise a combined picket force ofBritish and Portuguese ships beganto patrol the sea outside the mouthof the Grand Harbour.

As a result, there followed a twoyear blockade, which, for a handfulof engagements, was relatively quietas investments go. Indeed, for mostof the time the two sides simply satand faced each other, the Frenchbehind the safety of the strongharbour fortifications and theMaltese from behind their quicklyprepared positions which envelopedthe harbour defences within a largesemi-circular contravallation.

Maltese ‘siege’ fortifications

The fortifications hastily erected bythe Maltese insurgents weredesigned to keep the Frenchgarrison hemmed inside its fortifiedharbour enclave. Consequently,these fortifications were not reallysiege works in the true sense of theword. The primary Maltesepreoccupation throughout the revoltrevolved around the fear of apunitive French reprisal against therural villages. The inhabitants knewthat they had neither the men northe resources to lay siege to theformidable and well-armed harbour

Top left, Marble bust of VincenzoBorg 'Brared', on display at thesmall museum at St. Helen'sChurch, B'Kara. Left, Close-upview of the Cupola of St. HelenChurch, B'Kara, on which wereposted sentinels so as to keep alookout for any movements ofFrench troops during the durationof the blockade.

General Vaubois,Commander of theFrench garrison


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inhabitants had to do was to link thefieldwalls together, plugging incountry lanes, roads, and valleys,and in so doing create an extensiveand continuous form ofcircumvallation. They then stiffenedthis with a number of camps,batteries, and sentry-posts placed atstrategic intervals. This organicform of circumvallation, laid out in a

large crescent shaped line, spannedall the way from in front of FortTigné, to the west of the harbourentrance, right round to St. Rocco,opposite Fort Ricasoli on the otherside of the anchorage - a perimeterof some 10 kms as the crow flies.

The insurgents’ main camps weresituated at Gharghar, San Giuseppe,Tas-Samra, Corradino, Tarxien,Zejtun and Zabbar, with secondarycamps to the rear at San AntonPalace in Balzan, and Città Vecchia.(4) Each camp was responsible fora number of batteries either in thevicinity of the camp itself, or spreadout in the neighbouring countryside.Thus, for example, Vincenzo Borg’smen at Gharghar manned five suchbatteries, three large ones at

fortifications and so all their effortswere aimed at making a Frenchexcursion out of the harbour enclaveas difficult as possible. Here, theyingeniously exploited the nature ofthe rural landscape surrounding thefortifications which, divided intoinnumerable stone-walled fields,provided a ready made system ofentrenchments. All that the

Names of Posts No. of men Pieces of OrdnanceSergeants Corporals Privates Mortars 32-pdrs 18-pdrs 12-pdrs 8-pdrs 4-pdrs

Gharghar or B'Kara 25 23 290 - - 8 - - -St Joseph 23 14 192 - - - - 1 2Tas-Samra 27 14 182 - 2 2 2 2 1Corradino 16 18 190 - - 1 1 1 2Ta' Borg (Tarxien) 15 15 200 2x10" 2x1.68 Pd 3 1 1 -Zejtun 18 23 307 - - - 1 2 1Zabbar & St Roque 8 39 362 1x 13" 4 5 2 4 2Mdina 8 4 136 - - 1 2 6 5San Anton Palace 9 11 160 - - - - - -

Total 149 170 2039 3 8 20 9 17 13

1

23

4

5

3

8

7

6

9

12

10

11


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Ta’Ittwila, Imrabat, Ta’ Ischini andSqaq Cappara, and Ghemmuna, alloverlooking Fort Manoel and Tigne',except for the last one. Otherimportant batteries were located atTas-Samra, facing Portes DesBombes, Marsa (Jesuits Hill),Tarxien (Ta’ Borg), Corradino (dellaCampana and del Palazzo), Zejtunand San. Rocco, facing the landfront of Fort Ricasoli, and at QalaLembi, opposite Fort Tigne'.

To date, most of the informationregarding the insurgents' defensivepositions came from the so-calledLindenthal map, first studied byProf. Quentin Hughes and laterpublished by Dr. Carmel Testa in hisseminal work on the French inMalta. This paper now presents anew, hitherto unknown plan whichreveals in much greater detail all ofthe Maltese 'siege' positions. Entitled‘General Plan of the Fortifications,City and Harbours of Malta with theEnvirons & the British Batteriesestablished in the Late Blockade’, it

seems to have been drawn up fromsurveys carried out by CaptainGordon and the Royal Engineerswith soundings taken by Mr.Reynolds, Master in the Navy. Theplan was copied by 2nd. Asst.Draughtsman Thomas Decklam,under the direction of Captain S. T.Dickens, CRE on 15 July 1803(hereafter this plan is referred to asthe 'Gordon' map). Added to thiscartographic information is the visualinformation provided by a number ofcontemporary drawings depicting anumber of the batteries, mostly doneby Antonio Grech which, despitetheir rather naive graphic style,provide valuable constructionaldetails which otherwise would havebeen lost. All of these drawings,however, show the batteries fromthe rear and provide no informationon the manner in which the faces ofthe batteries were revetted andstrengthened against bombardment.

Shape, form and construction

The available information tends toshow that the locally-contrivedfortified works were, basically, across between the coastalentrenchments of the Hospitaller

Thick layer of soil on superior slope ofmerlon and sentry-room

Gunplatform of Hardstone(Zonqor) flagstones

Flanking wall built of rubblestone, 'a secco'

Ashlar parapet - sevencourses high (28cmblocks) - 'muro doppio'

Rubble Infil ('Mazacan')

Sectional elevations shwoing rampart andbanquette construction at Ta' FalcaEntrenchment (1732).

Below, General layout of a typical parapetemployed in a Maltese 'siege' battery.

Flagpole holder


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period, most of which were erectedpost-1761, and improvised ‘operesoldatesche’ in stone. A close studyof the available information on theMaltese siege fortifications showsthat these consisted of three maintypes: (a) large batteries of six to 9guns placed behind masonryparapets, with flanking and rearwalls surrounding a gun platformfitted, guncrew shelters, 'barracks'and sentry-post; (b) small outlyingbatteries and (c) long stretches ofstone entrenchment walls formusketry fire.

The large batteries were insubstance considerably more thanjust ephemeral fieldworks. A numberof contemporary prints and sketchesdepict the batteries at Gharghar

(Ittwila), Tas-Samra, ta’ Borg andMarsa, show the unmistakableinfluence of, and similarity to, thepermanent type of bastionedentrenchments and coastal batteriesbuilt earlier in the century by theKnights at places such as Spinola,Armier, and Birzebbuga, with theirthick parapets and merlons

Hospitaller 18th century coastal entrench-ments came in two basic types - the bastionedenceinte and the tenaille trace, examples ofwhich are shown on this page. Top left, Ta'Falca; left, Benghisa Point; above, top,Armier. Most of the tenaille trace entrench-ments were built in the 'pietra a secco' styleas shown above at Benghisa Point (nowdemolished) and in the redan of the NaxxarEntrenchment, below, erected around 1722by Charles Francois de Mondion.


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constructed of coursed ashlarmasonry, v-shaped embrasures withnarrow necks, and masonryplatforms [both continuous andsingular] for both cannon andmortars, possibly of Zonqorflagstones. It is not surprising that

these works were modelled on theold coastal batteries andentrenchments built by the Knights(the last one of which was erectedat Delimara Point in 1795) given thatmany of the capomastri andlabourers involved in theconstruction of the siege batteriesduring the blockade would have hadbeen continually employed inHospitaller fortifications. The lastmassive programme of coastalwork, begun in 1761, continued for adecade or two until funds ran out.Where the Maltese 'siege' worksdiffered considerably from theirHospitaller fortifications, however,was largely in plan since the 'siege'batteries were basically elongatedplatforms facing directly onto theenemy positions, thereby lacking thebastioned or tenaille trace of theHospitaller coastal defences. Mostof the Maltese ‘batteries’ were opento the rear with practically no, orvery little, provision for flankingdefences, and these usually in theform of simple, traverse-like stonerubble walls, some of which seem tohave been existing field walls orrural stone huts that were simplyincorporated into the enclosures.Only one battery, that at Tarxienseems to have been enclosed to therear with a large redan-styleentrenchment (see gazetteer below).The most important and labourintensive part of these batteries wasthe main parapet, pierced withbetween four and six embrasures inthe larger batteries. Contemporarywatercolour paintings by AntonioGrech show the superior slopes ofthe batteries' parapets and merlons,together with the roofs and terracesof adjoining magazines, as beingcovered with a thick layer of reddishsoil. This was a technique intendedto provided added protection to themasonry structures in order toprevent the stone from splintering onbeing hit by enemy shot – atechnique which was alsorecommended earlier during the

Dry and wet masonry rusticationtechniques employed in 18th centuryHospitaller coastal entrenchments: Left,top to bottom, Bahar ic-Caghaq and Ta'Kassisu, Mellieha. Above, 'Pietra asecco' style at Xghajra and, below,smooth -faced coursed ashlar(Coralline Limestone) at Ta' Falca, l/oMgarr.


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course of the eighteenth century bythe Order’s French militaryengineers in one of their reports onthe parapets of the harbourfortifications. Judging from the scaleof the drawings, this comprised alayer of soil some 30 cms thickspread out evenly on the superiorslopes of the merlons and on theroofs of the adjoining sentry-postand buildings. It is not clear from thecontemporary drawings if thesuperior slopes of the merlons werebuilt with a pronounced slope or not,and if so, if these were covered inflagstones or lime-mortar in theestablished manner found in otherHospitaller fortifications. It ispresumed that this was the case,although the haste with which theworks materialized all over theIslands tends to argue against toomany refinements. Most prints showbattery parapets built of smoothfaced dressed ashlars, sevencourses high. Given that most of thestone blocks employed came fromdismantled rural buildings (a factthat is well documented), this meansthat the battery parapets werearound 1.96 m high (mostcontemporary buildings wereerected with ashlar blocks of stone0.28m high). A two meter highparapet, as also clearly shown bythe contemporary prints, providedmore than adequate full-lengthprotection to the gun crews and any

soldiers sheltering within the fortifiedenclosures.It is not known what type offoundations, if any, such heavymasonry parapets were built on. Thepainting of the Gharghar Battery, forexample, seems to suggest that itsparapet rested directly on anunderlying rubble field wall and thismay, indeed, have been the case formost of the other batteries given thatmost were located inside existingfields. This method would havegiven the battery fronts a higherelevation, making them difficult toescalade but would also have madethem rather unstable in the long run,especially if subjected to continualbombardment. A sounder alternativewould have been the exploitation ofoutcrops of Globigerina limestonewhere these could be found, or theside of surface-quarries which arealso frequently encountered in therural areas around the GrandHarbour.

Another important feature found inall the batteries, were the gunplatforms. The contemporarydrawings show that all embrasuresand gun positions, including mortars,were equipped with hardstoneflagstone platforms much in thesame manner as can still be seen inmany Hospitaller fortifications andbatteries of the period. Thedrawings tend to show platforms ofthe individual wedge-shaped type,serving each embrasure as well ascontinuous gun platforms serving thewhole battery. Although the formerhastened the process of constructionand cut down on the quantity offlagstones required, the lack of acontinuous platform meant that gunscould not be easily moved from oneembrasure to the other if the needarose. The earthen nature of theground inside such a batteryenclosure (given that most werefields) would have necessitated goodand well-laid hardstone platforms.Another important consideration in

Above, top, Embrasure opening inparapet of Wied Musa Battery showingrusticated nature of masonry and use ofashlar quoins. Below, Parapet and gunplatform of Wied Musa Battery (1715-16). This is one of the best preservedplatforms of its type. Above, Superiorslope of Ta' Kassisu entrenchmentshowing soil-bound rubble fill.


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such large fieldworks would havebeen the need for the drainage ofrain water. Again, no information isavailable on this issue, but withoutany such provisions, many of thesebatteries would have been turnedinto a morass of mud in the rainyseasons, and possibly also sufferedstructural instability in the enclosingwalls and parapets

A number of camps and batterieswere provided with a largeunderground barrel-vaultedmagazine, or casemate, ‘magazenosotteraneo coperto con troglio a'prova di bomba’ capable of housingmany soldiers.(5) The capomastriunder the command of VincenzoBorg ‘Brared’ built a five-gunposition with an underground shelterwithin only a few days while anotherbattery at Tal-Imrabat was fittedwith two underground cellarscapable of housing a hundredsoldiers.

A feature common to most batteriesseems to have been the small box-like sentry rooms which could also

In the hands of Maltese insurgents, therubble fieldwalls became veritable,

and effectiveentrenchments,

which, coupled with the narrowcountry lanes, provided perfectconditions for ambuscades and

good defensive positions againstdirect assault.


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have doubled up as a store forfirearms and munitions. Most of thedrawings show these placed oneither side of the main parapets oralong the rubble wall enclosures tothe rear. Almost invariably, all arefitted with ring-like flagpole holdersthat could have been nothing morethan re-utilized gate-post pivotsfound in most farm buildings.Vincenzo Borg is recorded to havebuilt 25 such stone sentry rooms,many of which as freestanding postsalong the surrounding country lanesand fields, in order to guard the lineof circumvallation.

This line of circumvallation was aninteresting element that exploited animportant characteristic feature ofthe Maltese rural landscape - theubiquitous rubble-stone field walls.The Maltese quickly linked thesetogether by plugging in lanes androads to create a continuousmasonry obstacle, in the form of averitable 'entrenchment' that wasintended to surround thefortifications and prevent the Frenchgarrison from breaking out of itsenclave to attack the insurgents intheir camps and villages. Although,for most of its length, this wall ofcircumvallation consisted simply ofexisting fieldwalls, usually around 5feet high, and built of rubble stone 'a'secco' (dry stone walling) someparts were rebuilt by the insurgentsto a greater thickness and evenfitted with banquettes to serve asmusketry parapets.

Vincenzo Borg erected 200 canes(around 400 ms) of 'muro dellalarghezza di palmi quattro conbanchina dietro per la moschetterianelle strade e posti avanzatiall'inimico per impedire le sortite

contro la campagna'. (6). In someplaces existing walls weredismantled, such as the fields andenclosures belonging to theContessa Bologna, at the 'clausurata' Scibiesch' situated 'sotto il tiro delcannone' so as to assist 'il passaggiodei soldati'[Maltese] .(7)

General Graham was muchimpressed by these walls. In a letterto the Duke of York, dated 30December 1799, he wrote that'...the whole country is highlycultivated and divided into very smallfields by dry-stone walls, frequentlyvery high, which the barefootedinhabitants get over with great agilityand behind which they are excellent

tirailleurs. These walls everywherego to the foot of the glacis, andaround the Cottonera, which hasnone they run close to the works.Under their cover the Maltesefrequently fire on the Frenchsentries on the ramparts, showinggreat address in avoiding the returnof musketry and grape-shot byshifting their places after firing; bythose means they have madethemselves very formidable to theFrench as marskmen. The enemyhave no outposts nor do they showthemselves outside their works.'

The defensive qualities of these fieldwalls are best illustrated by thefailed French counterattack of 12

Right, Masonry pivot holes for woodengates commonly found in Maltesefarmhouses. Blocks such as these wouldhave been easily re-utilized to serve asexcellent flagpole holders.

Many rural buildingswere dismantled by

the Maltese for theirmasonry blocks and

timber beams - the twomost important

building materialsemployed in the

construction of theinsurgents'

fortified works.


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September 1799, when a companyof French soldiers from Fort Manoelundertook a sudden sortie to silencea solitary gun position posted onMensija Hill (San Gwann). TheFrench advanced up the hill close tothe position but were stopped in theirtracks with a hot hail of musketryfire from behind adjoining fieldwallsand trees and were soon forced tobeat a hasty retreat once other

insurgents from neighbouringpositions began to congregate in thearea and launched their own savageretaliatory attack.Many buildings outside theestablished perimeter at times alsoserved as 'advanced' posts. CasaBlacas, for example, abandonedafter the summary murder of itsowner, the Knight Vatanges, houseda company of soldiers from Tas-Samra camp, who were sent thereto keep watch on San GiuseppeRoad.The work on all the fortifiedpositions was usually done at nightunder the cover of darkness toprevent the French from firing onthe insurgents as they thusemployed. Many Maltese men, fromall walks of life, gave a helping handin their construction. John Camilleri,a priest, worked on the constructionof Tal Borg Battery when notinvolved in the fighting. The men at

Tas-Samra, for example, managed topull down, under the cover ofdarkness, all the field walls oppositetheir position all the way up tovicinity of the Floriana outerworks,in order to deny the French anyfrom of shelter in the event of anattack. They then encumbered withthat same rubble and stones themain highway (Starda SanGiuseppe) leading to Mdina and the

Above, top, A remnant of theBlockade - an explosive iron shellnow used as a counterweight inthe belfry of St. Helen Church,B'Kara (Courtesy of B'KaraParish Church). Above, and right,iron round shot fired from theCottonera enceinte by Frenchsoldiers during the Blockade,embedded in the facade of ahouse in Triq Bajada, Zabbar.


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countryside, thereby effectivelysealing all approaches from Floriana.As an added anti-personnelmeasure, they also threw brokenglass into the streets and countrylanes. In a letter to Lord Hamiltondated 18 May 1800, GeneralGraham, states that the whole areaaround the harbour, for a distance ofeight miles, was littered withobstructions and the enemy only hada few roads which they could use tomake a sortie. The roads in front ofFort Tigne' and Fort Manoel, forexample are described as being 'verynarrow and in a bad condition' whileall roads facing Cottonera and FortRicasoli had been 'broken up orblocked'.

The Lindenthal map shows aperimeter of around ten kilometresof such walls spread out in a roughlysemicircular pattern around theharbour areas. This perimeterconsisted roughly of two parts, thefirst, starting from near San RoccoBattery, went all the way round toCasal Nuovo (Rahal il-Gdid) afterskirting the outskirts of Zabbar; theother, according to Mifsud, wentfrom Corradino down to Marsa,Blata l-Bajda, Msida, Ta' Xbiex,

Gzira and ended near Qala Lembiopposite Fort Tigne'.

This was a vast perimeter by anstandards and required an extensivenetwork of sentry posts to keepcontinually under control andsurveillance. One must also notforget that added to these 'siege'positions were a number of otherposts located outside the harbourarea which were intended to guardand defend vulnerable bays andcoastal areas. Vincenzo Borg'smen, for example, attacked andcaptured the tower at St. Julian'sBay and his men occupied and heldthe Qawra entrenchment andmanned its artillery, which they usedto good effect to repel an incursionby some French gunboats inSeptember 1798. Vincenzo also builta large battery on the peninsula nowknown as Dragonara Point(Ghemmuna) to protect theentrances to St. Julian's and St.George's Bays. The Maltese alsoinvested in St. Paul's Bay, whichbecame their principal harbour forthe duration of the blockade. To thisend they made use of the existingHospitaller towers and coastalbatteries. Vincenzo Borg had three

large wooden beacons, enclosed inglass, built to alert vesselsapproaching Malta not to enter theGrand harbour. One of these wasplaced at St. Paul's Bay (possibly ontop of a tower), another at St.Julians and the third at Casal Zabbarin front of the Cottonera Lines. Themen of Zejtun manned the towersand batteries of Marsaxlokk andMarsascala, and those of Mdina, St.Paul's Bay.

Construction Materials

Owing to the acute sense ofurgency, the majority of the Malteseinsurgents’ fortifications were builtwith whatever material was foundreadily available at hand. Much ofthe masonry, as a matter of fact,was cannibalized from houses andfarmsteads in the rural areas, as inthe case of the Lembi Battery,which was built with the stoneworkand earth taken from a clausura(field) at Sliema belonging toSalvatore Camilleri. In a laterpetition, Camilleri claimed these

French sortie on the Corradinoposition, after Agostino Scolaro.


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demolition works had caused him2,260 scudi worth of damage to hisproperty (8). The magazine of St.Rocco Battery was constructed withtimber beams taken from ruinedhouses at Paola. (9).

It is very unlikely that any limemortars were used to bond themasonry parapets and wallstogether, given the expense involved.In all probability, the infil of‘mazacan’ forming the core of theparapets would have been boundtogether with a cheap soil mortar, atechnique, as a matter of fact, alsofrequently employed by the Knightsin many of the works offortifications. The rubble-stoneflanking walls and those shownenclosing the batteries from the rear,however, would have been built inthe 'pietra a' secco' style as can stillbe encountered at the Naxxar(1722) and Ta' Falca (1732)entrenchments. As in these works,the insurgents' walls may have alsoemployed large ashlar quoins forsalients and corners.

A report in the Cathedral Archivesat Mdina mentions that, in all, 920scudi were paid for the constructionof 392 metres of 'double' walls atthe localities of Mrabat, Ta' Xini,

Sqaq Kappara, the camp and batteryat Gharghar and at Ta' Ghemmuna.(9a)

Another important material wasZonqor, a durable hardstonelaboriously quarried, which was usedin Hospitaller fortifications toprovide the guns with stableplatforms on which these couldrecoil effortlessly. Zonqor slabs, too,would have been cannibalized frombuildings and street pavings in thesurrounding areas.

The military experience that nativecapomastri had acquired under theHospitaller knights was also put touse in the arming of the batterieswith guns removed from the oldcoastal batteries. The insurgentsappear to have encounteredconsiderable difficulty, however, intransporting heavy cannon over theuneven terrain, ‘lavoro fatto congran stento per trasportare cannonidalla trincea di S. Paolo detta laMistra e da altri luoghi difficilissimiper armare le batterie’, (10) andeven constructed special carriagesfor the purpose. In all, the Malteseseem to have been able to arm theirworks with around seventy guns anda small number of mortars.

It is evident that the men who wereresponsible for building these worksof fortification were well versed inmilitary matters. The soldiers andcapomastri who erected thedefences did so using theirknowledge and experience of such

matters acquired under the knights.Men like Michele Cachia, VincenzoChetcuti and nameless othercapomaestri serving with theinsurgents in the capacity ofengineers and builders wereresponsible for designing andbuilding these works.(11)

Michele Cachia was one of the mostdistinguished Maltese architects ofhis time and during the Order’s rulehad also served as adjutant to theknight-commander of the villagemilitia of Zejtun. He took an activeleading role in the construction ofTal-Borg Battery at Paola, Kordin,and Zejtun and in other militaryworks at Marsa and in the innerbasin of the Grand harbour. In 1799,

General Graham wrote to hissuperiors informing them of thedefensive redoubts that he himselfhad built near Torre de Grazia (DelleGrazie Tower), which work wasconstructed chiefly by the Malteseunder the direction of MatteoBonavia, ‘a very zealous andintelligent inhabitant, bred in the lineof an engineer.’ Bonavia wasappointed by the Britishexpeditionary force, together withhis son, to act as assistant engineer.Contemporary documents alsomention Pietro and Saverio Xerriwho served as engineers and werestationed at the San GiuseppeCamp. Salvatore Camilleri, fromValletta, stated that he had drawn upthe 'modello' (plan?) of the 'Trinceadella Marsa'. Apart from havingsuffered the loss of his field inSliema, which was dismantled toprovide building material for abattery, Salvatore also claimed thathe had built at his own expense acasemate at Marsa Battery. He isalso recorded as having producedtwo detailed scale models in wax ofthe fortifications of Valletta,Cospicua, Vittoriosa, and Sengleafor the benefit of Britishofficers.(12)

View from Tas-Samra Hill showing thecountryside and fields outside theglacis of the Floriana land frontfortifications with the San GiuseppeRoad in the foreground.


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The Maltese were also assisted byforeign military engineers. InSeptember 1798, the PortugueseAdmiral Nizza ordered hisengineering officer, Don AntonioConsalvo Saverio Pereira, to goashore and advise the Maltese onthe best siting and construction oftheir trenches. He was critical of thework at Tal-Borg when he found outthat his instructions for the mountingof a howitzer were ignored.

At a later stage by both Italian andBritish military engineers came onthe scene. One of these was SignorAlberto Diodat ingegnere, (13) aNapolitan. Another was CaptainGordon, the first Royal Engineerofficer to work in Malta. It is notknown what works Diodat helpedsupervise, but Gordon is known tohave set up a number of advancedpositions under Ball's directions atBighi. Gordon died in Malta on 30November 1802. A small marbleplaque dedicated to his memorywas, until a while ago, to be foundinside Fort Ricasoli.

Lt.-Col. Lindenthal, an Austrian,seems to have also functioned insuch a capacity for in December1799, Ball wrote to Lt.-GeneralHenry Fox requesting that he retainLindenthal's services in the absenceof an engineer in order to constructadvanced positions.

Arming the Batteries

In all, the Maltese seem to havebeen able to arm their works withsome seventy guns and a smallnumber of mortars and howitzers,most of which (save for themortars) were collected from themany batteries and towers scatteredaround the Island’s coastline. On 10December 1798 Captain Ballinformed Nelson that the Maltesehad requested eight mortars andsome battering cannon from the

British but were 'much disappointedat getting only two mortars and notany cannon.' Still, Grech'scontemporary drawing of Tal-BorgBattery shows a British navalcarronade mounted on a staticmount. Some guns seem to havealso been brought from Sicily, and atleast one of these, 'El Pronto' fellinto the sea at Marsaxlokk when itwas being transferred from ship toshore, only to be recoveredcenturies later in the 1960s by RoyalNavy divers and placed on display atthe Palace Armoury in Valletta.

The Maltese appear to have had asurprisingly low amount of cannon,given the fact that in 1798, thecoastal fortifications would havebeen armed with around 300guns.(14) A French inventory of theartillery pieces deployed in thecoastal defences of Gozo andComino alone, for example, drawnup on 30 August 1798 (15), shows atleast 61 guns, more than half ofwhich were 8-pdrs and over.Allowing for the cannon which theinsurgents would have retained forthe defence of St. Paul’s Bay,Marsaxlokk and other importantanchorages, this still leaves a largenumber of cannon unaccounted for.Such a discrepancy may beexplained by the fact that many ofthe guns could have been taken overby the French before the outbreakof the revolt. On the other hand, theinsurgents appear to haveencountered considerable difficultyin actually transporting the heavyguns to their batteries, ‘lavoro fattocon gran stento per trasportarecannoni dalla trincea di S. Paolodetta la Mistra e da altri luoghidifficilissimi per armare le batterie,’(16), having had to construct specialcarriages for the purpose.(17)

The French, on the other hand, couldcount on 598 cannon, 49 mortarsand 10 howitzers, 254,469 roundshot, 7,606 grapeshot rounds, 6,753

bombs, 7,460 grenades, 1,143,939.musketry cartridges and 672,000 lbsof gunpowder.(18) It has also to beappreciated that their forces were ineffect stretched out over twenty-five miles of fortification and,consequently, Vaubois could hardlyafford to risk his three thousand menon counterattacks withoutweakening his position.Notwithstanding, the French didattempt two major sorties in 1799, inorder to silence the batteries at Tas-Samra, Gharghar, and Corradino, butboth were repulsed by the insurgentswith heavy losses for the French.The Maltese themselves attempted anumber of general assaults thatgained nothing for the insurgentswhile a plot involving an insurrectioninside Valletta was discovered andits leaders executed before a firingsquad.

British Field Works

The arrival of two British regimentsfrom Messina, the 30th and 89thBritish Regiments of Foot, inDecember 1799, under thecommand of General Graham calledfor the construction of otherprovisional works of fortification.Most of these men were dispatchedto Ghaxaq and Zejtun while threecompanies of the 89th werestationed at Naxxar. (19)

The 30th Regiment was charged tooccupy the advanced posts atZejtun, Zabbar, and the battery atSan Rocco. The 89th was stationedat Gudja and Luqa with advancedposts at Tarxien and the Maltesebattery in front of it. The Marineswere sent to San Giuseppe –northwest of Hamrun - andassigned the advanced post andbattery at Samra.During the night the advanced postscommunicated with one another byadvanced sentries or patrols. In allthese posts there were also a


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considerable number of armedMaltese, who in the night occupiedsmall houses in front of the line ofcommunication, making frequentpatrols. (20)

The general headquarters wereinitially established at San AntonPalace but were later transferred toVilla Muscat Dorell at Gudja,conveniently located behind the mainBritish positions. Fort Rohan (i.e.,St. Lucian’s Tower and battery),inside Marsaxlokk Bay (on thesouthern part of the Island) waschosen as the main base for theunloading of supplies. By the end of1799, the British forces had taken uptheir final positions outside the mainfortifications. General Grahamseems to have been very fearful ofa French counterattack and wasanxious to secure his rear with theconstruction of a number ofredoubts; ‘...an entrenched post isestablished at Marsa Scirocco, and afortnights provisions are already instore there. The next work to beundertaken immediately is a strongredoubt near the Torre de Grazia(Delle Grazie Tower) for theprotection of the right, and whichwill secure a retreat from thebattery of San Rocco towardsZejtun, though Zabbar should belost.’

Since Graham's men were muchemployed in landing stores andmunitions, the work was 'chieflydone by the Maltese under thedirection of Bonavia, a very zealousand intelligent inhabitant, bred in theline of an engineer' whom Graham'appointed', together with his son, 'toact as assistant engineers'.

'I flatter myself' wrote Graham toLord Nelson, 'that Your Excellencywill not think that I exceed thebounds of my instructions byincurring the expenses of thesepurely defensive works, withoutwhich I shall consider the small

force here exposed to too much risk,should the enemy determine to makea vigorous effort against us.’(21)His greatest fear was theunexpected arrival of a French reliefforce, in the event of which, Britishtroops would have had to beevacuated. An emergency retreatand evacuation plan was, therefore,laid down. This involved theconstruction of a strong redoubt at l-Hofra, a hill halfway between thevillage of Zabbar and the coast. Thiswas designed to shield the retreat ofthe troops from San Rocco Batterytowards the village of Zabbar fromwhere all the forces were to bepulled back hastily and concentratedin the village of Zejtun, a defensiblemaze of narrow streets and tightpacked houses standing on a hill andsurrounded by a rural terraincrisscrossed with rubble walls.(22)From Zejtun, the 30th and 89th werethen to withdraw to the safety of theawaiting ships anchored beneath St.Lucian’s Tower. In front of thistower the British built a continuousentrenchment spanning fromVendôme Redoubt towards FerrettiBattery, effectively sealing off thepeninsula from the rest of themainland. The position was furtherstrengthened with the constructionof a redoubt built on the high groundahead of the entrenchment.(23) Asthings turned out, however, the planwas never put to use. French reliefforces never reached the Island andVaubois’ troops never attempted tobreak out, not even to attempt tospike the guns of the Maltesebatteries, some of which wereastonishingly close to the Frenchpositions.

The first British works offortification on Malta were anumber of siege batteries builtaround the harbour area under thedirection of Captain Ball. The firstrecorded was a work to take 10-inch mortars taken from HM BombShip Stromboli and erected by a

small artillery detachment under thecommand of Lt. John Vivion in orderto bombard the French vessels atanchor inside the Grand Harbour.(24) Other batteries were built andarmed with the guns taken fromBall’s ship, the Alexander. Thesebatteries appear to have been builtvery close to the enemy linesbecause, Captain Gordon, theengineer officer, believed them to beuntenable.(25)Again in October 1799, Ballconstructed what he considered tobe an important battery on the Bighipeninsula even though his militaryengineers thought it untenable; ‘I amsure it is irregular according to stricttactical rules to go thereimmediately, but I think if YourLordship were to see it you wouldapt to deviate from the regularprogression.(26) Once again inOctober of 1799, Captain Ballinformed Nelson that he was ' busyin constructing batteries close to theenemy fortifications, which whencompleted will block up the port ofLa Valette, and make it very difficultfor a ship to enter.' These workswere 'attended with very heavyexpences', because, as he goes on toexplain 'we are upon a rock withoutsoil, which we are obliged to bringfrom a great distance, and to send toSicily for all our fascines.' Curiously,however, none of these worksappear on any of the known plans,including those mentioned in thispaper, and their exact positionsremain unknown until revealed byfurther research. Judging by Ball'sreference to 'fascines', it wouldappear that the British advancedbatteries were more ephemeral innature and made of gabions filledwith earth.

French surrender

The investment made by the Anglo-Maltese forces in the fieldfortifications, coupled with naval


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blockade of the harbour, provedeffective in keeping the Frenchtightly sealed within their harbourenclave. The few half-heartedFrench attempts to counterattackthe insurgents’ positions at Zabbar,Corradino, and Gharghar had failed.Trapped within their fortifications,the French garrison began to suffergreatly for want of food. Thesituation, however, was not muchbetter for the Maltese and theirallies, all of whom were similarly‘dying off fast for want’ of food.(27) In 1800, it was still touch andgo which of the two sides wouldsurvive. In February, some 1,200Neapolitan troops arrived in Malta tobe followed by more supplies.Meanwhile, the French were tryingto run in a relief force. Their ships,however, were intercepted off CapePassero by an English squadron andforced to strike their colours.Although this victory helped easethe worry of the high command, theBritish were still not confident oftheir ability to intercept further reliefforces before they could reach theisland.In July 1800, another 1,500 menunder Major General Pigot arrived inMalta and General Vaubois, nowconvinced that there was no morehope of receiving any help andreinforcements, and with his stocksof food practically exhausted, finallycapitulated to the British on 4September 1800. The following dayBritish soldiers entered thefortifications of Floriana, Tigne' andRicasoli and hoisted the Union Jackover the harbour fortifications. Totheir great annoyance, the Maltesepatriots were excluded from thearrangement and ratification of theterms of capitulation, because,according to general Pigot, for alltheir great exertions, perseveranceand bravery, the Maltese couldnever have compelled the French tosurrender without the help of Britishfleet and army.

With peace restored and the Islandssecured in British possession, the‘siege’ batteries and otherfortifications no longer had any roleto play in the defence of the island.Eventually they were all dismantled,their stonework reutilized infieldwalls and other rural buildings.It is not known, however, exactlywhen these works were dismantled.It could well be that the majoritywere only dismantled after 1814,when Malta was made a Britishpossession at the Treat of Paris in1815.

Today there are no physical remainsleft whatsoever of the Maltese'siege' positions. Most of the siteswere heavily developed andurbanized and are totallyunrecognisable. A few sites, such asTas-Samra and Capuchin Conventstill have features that were standingat the time, such as neighbouringbuildings and churches, which stoodin the immediate vicinity of thedefensive works.

Given the limitations of the availableinformation, it is difficult to draw anydefinite conclusions about theeffectiveness of these works offortification. It is true that theyhelped enforce the blockade, andtherefore, were more or lesssuccessful in their intended role,despite their shortcomings but thenagain they were never attacked withany real determination by theFrench. Sited safely out of range, orat the extreme range, of the Frenchbatteries on the main fortifications(with the exception of Tas-Samrawhich was well within range ofFloriana guns), (28) they did notsuffer unduly from the effects ofheavy counter-bombardment.General Graham believed that thepuny Maltese batteries were moreinsulting to the French thanannoying, since the latter's gunscould respond to them by tenfold

fire. Writing of San Rocco Battery,for example, he thought it'unfortunate' that this battery hadopened up in the first place as it hadgiven the French ' a jealousy in thatquarter'. They fired frequently on it.It was then estimated that theFrench had fired some 23,300bombs and grenades, and 81,000round shots during the course of thesiege. On one day alone, they fired114 cannonballs and many bombs.At one time, on 4 March 1800, aFrench cannon ball managed to hitand blow up a gunpowder magazinenear Tal-Borg Battery. Earlier, on15 December 1799, three gunners atthe same battery were killed byFrench retaliatory fire.(29) Threeother Maltese insurgents arementioned as having lost their livesat Tas- Samra Battery by enemyaction.(30) On at least one occasion,Borg's positions near the seashore atSliema were hit with the fire fromsome French ships which were alsoable to go in and out of Marsamxettharbour with impunity, owing to thevery bad weather whichmomentarily kept the blockadingships away.The insurgents' own fire, on theother hand, rather than aimed at thefortifications, was more often thannot directed at the urban areas inorder to demoralize the inhabitants.On learning that Borg's threebatteries at Gharghar were 'finishedand ready to begin', Captain Ballsuggested that these fire upon thetown houses of Valletta 'a little in thenight to give the alarm, and a little inthe day'. Borg's cannon onGharghar hill were so far away,however, that their fire had hardlyany effect on the town. On 23February 1800, Tal-Borg Batteryfired on the harbour hitting a ferryboat discharging its passenger atVittoriosa wharf, killing manycivilians.(31) A cannon-ball firedfrom Tas-Samra, on the other hand,decapitated an unfortunate French


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soldier manning one of the guns onSt. James Bastion in Valletta

Shells from Tarxien are said to havereached Valletta but without causingmuch damage. Four fire shells called'matte' fell on the roofs of houses inSenglea but burnt out harmlessly.(32). By early 1799, the mortars atTal-Borg had fired some 400 shellson Cospicua and Sengleademolishing many houses but leavinghardly a dent on the ramparts.Zabbar, being the nearest to theFrench-held fortifications, sufferedaccordingly. The dome of the parishchurch developed serious cracks onbeing hit repeatedly by stray shotsand, eventually, had to be built anew.In one particular incident, inNovember 1799, a cannon ballstruck the dome, dislodging somestones within which fell and killed a35-year old women praying insidethe church. (33)

General Graham seems to give theMaltese patriots less credit than theydeserved, for they had not built theirbatteries with the intention of layingsiege to the fortifications but toharass the enemy and, moreimportantly, to place French infantry,in the event of a counter attack, at atactical disadvantage once theydared venture outside the protectivecover of their own fortress guns. Ina way, these positions weredesigned to tempt the French outinto the open where they could notenjoy the cover of their own guns.Indeed, in all of the infantry attackson the Maltese positions, which theinsurgents repulsed with greatcourage, the Frenchsoldierssuffered greatly and were alwayscompelled to beat a hastey retreat tothe safety of their ramparts.

However, had the French managedto land strong reinforcements,equipped with batteries of fieldartillery, then their attacks on the

insurgents' positions might haveturned out to be a very differentstory.

Bibliography

Carmel Testa, The French in Malta (Malta, 1998).--------, Maz-Zewg Nahat tas- Swar; Zmien il-Francizi f'Malta, 3 vols (Malta, 1974, 1979 & 1982).A. Mifsud, Origine della Sovranita' Inglese su Malta (Malta, 1907).W. Hardman, A history of Malta during the Period of the French and British Occupations (1798- 1815)Quentin Hughes, Britain in the Mediterranean and the defence of her naval stations (Liverpool, 1981)--------------------, Malta, Guide to the Fortifications (Malta, 1989).Stephen C. Spiteri, British Military Architecture in Malta (Malta,1996)Victor Denaro, The Maltese Siege Inglots of 1799 (Malta, 1956).Joe. de Bono, Gozo under the French (Gozo, 1998).Sketch map of the South-East Malta from the Marsa Scirocco to Valletta, showing British Outposts. Contains reference table to entrenchments. Enclosed in a letter of 28 December 1799 from Lt. Col. Lewis Lindenthal.'General Plan of the Fortifications, City and Harbours of Malta with the Environs & the British Batteries established in the Late Blockade’; Reference table copied from surveys by Captain Gordon and the Royal Engineers. Soundings by Mr Reynolds, Master in the Navy. Copied by Thomas Decklam, 2nd. Asst. Draughtsman. Directed and examined by S. T. Dickens, Captain, CRE on 15 July 1803. Pencil additions show the places where the greatest damage was done in the storm of January 1821.

References & Notes

1. Denaro, 1963, 4.2. De Bono, foreword by Dr. A. Sant.3. Hardman, 1908, 259, Gen. Graham toLt.W. Gen. H. Fox - 28.12.1799.4. Ibid., 257-259.5. Mifsud, 1907, Doc. 38, 258-259.6. Ibid., Doc.38, 259.7. Ibid., Mifsud, 270, Doc. 41.8. Ibid., 269.9. Ibid., 260.9a. Archives of the Cathedral Museum,Mdina, Misc.136, f.36v et.seq.10. Ibid.11. Ibid., 262 & 266.12. Ibid., 269.13. Ibid., 266.14. Archives of the Order (A.O.M),Valletta, Vol. 1015.15. Testa, 1979, III, 249.16. Mifsud, Doc. 38, 260.17. Ibid., 260.18. National Library, Valletta,Ms. 6524 (23.09.1799).19. Hardman, 246 - Gen. Graham to Lt.Gen. H. Fox (10.12.1799).20. Ibid., 257 Gen. Graham to Lt. Gen. H.Fox (28.12.1799).21. Ibid., 258.22. Hughes, 1993, 32.23. Public Records Office, Kew WO1/291.24. Hardman, 158 - Capt. Ball to LordNelson (26.12.1798).25. Ibid., 231 - Capt. Ball to Lord Nelson(10.10.1799).26. Ibid., 232 - Capt. Ball to Lord Nelson(14.10.1799).27. Ibid., 253 - Sir T. Toubridge to LordNelson (28.12.1799).28. Ibid. 287.29.Ibid., 430.30. Ibid., 289 n.28.31. Ibid., 732, n.6932. Ibid., 567.33. Ibid., 366.

GAZETTEERMALTESESIEGEBATTERIESand related sites !


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(1) TAS-SAMRA BATTERY

Tas-Samra Battery was positionedon a hillock overlooking the Florianaland front fortifications and the mainroadway out of Valletta and Floriana(through Porte des Bombes) alongStrada San Giuseppe which passedthrough Hamrun and led north toMdina. It also overlooked thesensitive areas down at Marsa andCorradino. It was known as an'advanced camp' ('campo avanzatodella Samra') given it proximity tothe Floriana fortifications. Such wasits importance, that the French, in adesperate attempt to neutralize it ,had on one occasion bombarded itfor five hours without respite. TheMaltese, far from being discouraged,flew a large black flag from thebattery and placed a large woodencross on top of the nearby church.At one point it appears to havearmed with nine guns (see table onpage 9) but is only shown with four

A

The gazetteer of Anglo-Maltese fortificationsand related sites : 1798-1800

Church of ourLady of Atociawith woodencross erectedby insurgentson roof

Batteryparapet withembrasures

Paved batteryplatform

Top, right, Detail from the Gordon mapshowing Tas-Samra Battery andsurrounding buildings and lanes (copyrightNational Archives,Kew UK). Casa Blacas ismarked 'A'. Right, Author's graphicreconstruction.


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guns and two mortars in acontemporary illustration. Thebattery platform had a broad v-shaped plan open at the rear but wasshielded by a number of adjoininggarden / fieldwalls, some buildings,and a church, all of which occupiedthe same hillock.The battery parapet seems to havebeen fitted with five embrasures anda continuous flagstoned gunplatform.

Above, Various views of the Church of Atociaat Tas-Samra, Hamrun, with its arcadedportico and sundial. The church seems tohave changed very little from the way itwould have appeared back in 1798-1800.The battery stood exactly south of thischurch, in an area nowadays heavily builtup. The structure which flanked the batteryappears to have survived as have otherlandmarks in the area, such as the largebuilding in Atocia Street, right, which servedas a barracks for Canon Caruana's men.

Above, Contemporary view from the rear ofthe Tas-Samra Battery. The drawing shows arelatively low parapet, covered with a soiltopping, five embrasures, four guns and twomortars and an adjoining stretch of lowparapet without embrasures. There are alsotwo small sentry rooms. In the backgroundcan be seen the land front fortifications ofFloriana and Porte des Bombes. Flankingthe battery is a building which hosts aflagpole and, to the extreme right, one canclearly make out the side of the arcadedportico of the Church.


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Casa Blacas (marked 'A' on map),itself used as a blockhouse. Theother, smaller, was armed with threecannon and surrounded by a moatfilled with water.

Above, Portrait of Canon Frangisku SaverioCaruana, commander of the Tas-SamraCamp. Below, View from Tas-Samra Hillshowing the fields and rural buildingsoutside the glacis of the Floriana land frontfortifications. Casa Blacas is shown in theforeground, highlighted in red. It was usedby the Maltese insurgents as sort ofadvanced blockhouse to control the mainroad (Strada San Giuseppe - present day StJoseph High Road) coming out of Florianafrom Porte des Bombes. The section of theroad leading to Casa Blacas was strewn withstone and broken glass to hinder theapproach of French troops.

Two small stone sentry boxesguarded the east side of the batterywhile a relatively large house and itswalled garden enclosure protectedthe west flank of the battery. Thisbuilding seems to have served as asort of barrack for the troops for thedrawing shows a flag flying from apole fixed to the side of the building.The platform seems to have beenbordered to the rear by a lowmasonry kerb.

The church of Our Lady of Atocia,(or Tas-Samra as it is known by theMaltese), with its arcaded porticostood immediately to the rear of thebattery and is one of the fewlandmarks dating to the blockadethat are still standing as existing atthe time. The church contains one ofthe very last paintings by AntoineFavray, an altarpiece of the Virginand Child signed and dated 1791.The contemporary drawing of thebattery shows one of the side archesof the church's portico. A largesundial is carved into the masonry onthe south side of the church.Another large building, still standing,stood a little distance away in analley to the rear of the church. Thistoo given its size and dominatingposition could have been used toaccommodate the 223 men stationedin the Tas-Samra camp.Other documents state that it was at

times garrisoned by as much as 600men owing to its very closeproximity to the Floriana outerworksand fortifications.According to Mifsud, the Samracamp was garrisoned by thebattalions of Zebbug, Siggiewi, andNaxxar and, later, was also assistedby English sailors and marines. TheZebbug battalion was divided intofour companies and each in turn intothree platoons. A half 'guard platoon'consisting of a sergeant, corporaland twelve soldiers, kept constantwatch on top of the Atocia Church.Another platoon was stationed onthe 'ramp' (?) of the camp.

The Tas-Samra camp was under theoverall command of CanonFrangisku Saverio Caruana and thedirect command of Angelo Cilia andhis deputy Isidoro Attard. It had achaplain, Fra Antonio Baldacchino,and a surgeon, Antonio Muscat.Vincenzo Borg states that two of theguns, possibly the 32-pdr culverines,were brought from B'kara afterhaving been removed andtransported with great difficulty fromSt. Mary Tower in Comino.

Tas-Samra camp fed two other smallbatteries located in the immediatevicinity. One, a four gunemplacement, was placed somedistance down the hill in front of


24 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

(2) CORRADINO BATTERIES

The Corradino camp and batteriescovered a very large surface areaand presented one of the largestadvanced positions held by theinsurgents. The battery and campwere sited on, and exploited, theextensive grounds and fields of thewhat had been the Grand Master'sStables. This large, and little knownbuilding, a Baroque palace-likestructure, is shown in a painting ofCorradino (see opposite page) andwas a very distinctive landmark. Itwas eventually demolished by anorder of 21 January 1811, when,because of its old and ruinous state(possibly because of the Frenchbombardment) it was dismantled andits stonework reutilised for theformation of a new coastal road atthe foot of the Corradino headland.It was a massive building whichmust have also served as a barracksfor the insurgents. Santo Formosa


Grand Master's Stables

Batteryparapet withembrasures

Battery nearentrance toStables

Top, right, Detail from the 'Gordon' mapshowing the Grand Master's Stables and theCorradino batteries and entrenchment(copyright National Archives, Kew, UK).

BatteryoverlookingSenglea

Battery facingFloriana

Dismantledfield walls

A

B

C


25 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

was seriously wounded in his rightleg when the building was hit by aFrench bomb which crashed throughthree floors, burying him in thedebris.

The Corradino position consisted ofthree batteries: one covering themain entrance to the stables andfacing Ghajn Dwieli (A); anotherlinked by a long entrenchment wall,overlooking the Grand Harbour (B);and a third, isolated, situated towardsthe south western end of theenclosure, overlooking the FlorianaLines (C). Mifsud states that theposition was divided into two parts.The first was an entrenchmentknown as Della Campana whichoverlooked the road coming fromSenglea. This was armed with two8-pdr cannon removed from theXrop (Xiorb) l-Ghagin coastal

entrenchment. The second consistedof two batteries, one of which hecalls 'la trincea del palazzo' (i.e. theGrand Master's stables) which wasarmed with two 8-pdr guns placed infront of the entrance to the palace,facing Ghajn Dwieli, and the other,also with two pieces 'dietro ilpalazzo', facing Marsa, as shown inthe Gordon map. Early in theinsurrection, Santo Formosa armedthe position with four 6-pdr gunswhile the British later added two 9-inch mortars and a third. North ofthe position, towards the cliff-face ofthe Corradino heights, stood a'Belvedere Tower' which may alsohave been used as an advancedsentry post by the insurgents.No contemporary drawings ofCorradino batteries are known to theauthor. The Lindenthal and Gordonmaps differ on the plan of this

battery. The graphic reconstructionshown here is based on the moredetailed Gordon map. A colouredsketch by Agostino Scolaro, entitled'Sortita de' francesi nel Coradino nel1798' shows French troops attackingthe position, from the main road atGhajn Dwieli, with the 'palazzo' tothe rear, and the Maltese insurgentsfiring back from behind the safety ofthe fieldwalls in the area.

The whole position is recorded ashaving been armed with five cannon(see table on page 9), amongst thesean 18-pdr taken from St Julian'sBattery.

The Corradino camp wasgarrisoned by 224 men, mostly fromRabat and Casal Dingli and placedunder the overall command ofEmmanuele Vitale.

Eighteenth-century painting at theMuseum of Fine Arts, Valletta, showingthe Grand Master's Stables on the summitof Corradino Hill (Painting brought toauthor's attention by Mrs. Theresa Vella).

Detail from drawing by Agostino Scolaro showing theGrand Master's Stables (upper left hand corner) andMaltese insurgents firing on attacking French troops frombehind stone walls.


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(3) TAL-BORG BATTERY - TARXIEN

Tal-Borg Battery was located onhigh ground, north of the village ofTarxien and about 700m south of St.John Almoner Bastion on theCottonera enceinte. It was one ofthe largest and best defendedbatteries erected by the Malteseinsurgents during the course of theblockade. It was built in a fieldbelonging to a certain CaterinaBusuttil who later received 142scudi in compensation. According tothe Gordon map, the work consistedof a large platform, built on twodifferent levels, apparently atdifferent stages. Grech's drawingshows a thick masonry parapet,seven courses high protected with acovering layer of soil on the superiorslopes of the merlons.

The west side of this battery, facingCorradino, was flanked by a large


Upper batteryparapet withembrasures

Paved batteryplatform

Lower batteryparapet withembrasures

Reinforced bombproofmagazine covered withlayer of soil

Farm building,partiallydemolished,serving as shelterand traverse

Dry stonewallentrenchmentclosing offrear ofbattery

Possibleparapetextension (asshown inAntonioGrechdrawing)

flankingcannon firingthroughopening

'Bastion'

Rear views of Tal-Borg Battery, after Antonio Grech (above - courtesy of Ian Bouskill ) andunknown artist below. Note the reddish soil layers on magazine and merlons as well themortar battery to the right.


27 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

partially ruined rectangular farmbuilding ('razzett') which wasincorporated into the layout to serveboth as a traverse and a protectiveshelter for the guncrews andgarrison. Contemporary drawingsalso show a large barrack building,with its roof well covered in aprotective layer of soil and with aside entrance facing away from theline of enemy fire, towards the rearof the gun platform. Unlike the otherworks, the Tal-Borg Battery wasdefended to the rear by aentrenchment-like wall stiffened atthe salient with a small bastion, in themanner encountered at the Ta' Falcaentrenchments near Mgarr, built bythe Knights around 1732. TheLindenthal and Gordon maps differin the plan and details of the battery.The plan shown in the Gordon map,however, corresponds more closelyto the illustration by Antonio Grech.

This battery is known to have beenbuilt under the able supervision ofthe engineer Michele Cachia. Theposition was garrisoned by acompany of around 230 men.

The main upper platform, and thefirst to be built, was armed with fiveiron cannon 'fatti nella fabrica di S.Gervas e portati dalla Cottonera',(see table on page 9) together withtwo 6-inch mortars disembarkedfrom a British vessel on 7 December1798. Grech's drawing also shows anaval carronade placed on a staticnaval mount.

The lower battery was armed withonly two guns but seems to have hadat least five embrasures. Mifsudstates that the Tal-Borg Battery waslater armed with two 'fusieri chesparano colle granate' as well asnine 18-pdrs, four of which 'venneroposti sotto la batteria Tal Borg inun'altra batteria'. At least one of theguns, as shown in Grech's drawing(and perhaps even more) wasemployed in protecting the rear of

battery, its muzzle opening outthrough a cutting in the rubble,fieldwall type of entrenchmentplaced across the gorge of the work.The enclosure, however, was onlyloosely formed and had a crudecutting in lieu of a gateway. At leastone internal field wall, probablyretained from an existing field,seems to have served as a traverse,dividing the interior into areas. TheGrech drawing also shows two smallbox-like sentry rooms grafted ontothe main parapet, both of whichwere fitted with flagpoles and shownflying the colours of the Kingdom ofTwo Sicilies and the Royal Navyrespectively.

Grech's illustration also clearlyshows an open well (bir) situatedclose to the flanking building on thewestern end of the battery,

immediately to the rear of the gun-platform. It also hints at theexistence of a third parapet, fittedwith embrasures, grafted to the leftof the farm building.

No traces of the battery existnowadays but it is said that Tal-BorgBattery occupied the site of thepresent-day Pace Grasso footballground.

Above, Detail from the Gordon mapshowing Tal-Borg Battery and surroundingbuildings and lanes at Tarxien (copyrightNational Archives, Kew UK).

Above, Enlarged detail showing the repre-sentation of Tal- Borg Battery in theLindenthal map. This differs considerablyfrom the way it is shown in the Gordon mapalthough it likewise reveals a redan-traceentrenchment to the rear. It is very crudelydrawn when compared to the Gordon mapwhich is also drawn to a much larger scale,and, hence, is more attentive to detail in truecartographic fashion. This makes theGordon plan more likely to be the correctrepresentation.


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(4) CAPUCHIN CONVENT BATTERY

The Capuchin Convent Battery wasa medium sized gun position facingKalkara Creek and the Post ofCastile in Birgu. It was very close tothe Cottonera fortifications butsheltered from them by the CapuchinConvent on its left side. It was builtin such a manner to cut across andplug a country lane (today Triq il-Kapuccini) coming up from KalkaraCreek. The convent itself (albeitreshaped) and the country lane stillexist.

There is no reference to this batteryor its armament other than in theGordon map. It may have been oneof the batteries built by Captain Ballin the vicinity of Bighi which hementions in a letter to Lord Nelson.

Gazetteer of Anglo-Maltese fortificationsand related sites : 1798-1800

Top, Detail from the Gordonmap showing Capuchin

Convent Battery overlookingKalkara Creek (copyright

National Archives, Kew, UK).Above views of the conventand adjoining country lane

today. Below, Author'sproposed graphic

reconstruction of the battery -actual number of embrasures

is unknown


29 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

(5) ST. PETER BATTERY & THE ZEJTUN BATTERIES

Like the Capuchin Battery, there ishardly any record of St Peter'sBattery other than the entry in theGordon map. This small battery wassituated some three hundred metresto the rear of the Capuchin Battery,roughly half way between the latterand St Rocco Chapel. It wasprobably manned by the Zejtunmilitia. Its armament is unknown.

The village of Zejtun, which is notshown in the Gordon map, had anumber of small batteries. One,called 'della Croce', was situatedclose to the parish church. Anothertwo, known as 'Tal Caspio' weresituated close to St. Clement'sChurch and were armed with two8-pdrs. Another three, known as 'Tal

Fax', were placed close to theChurch of St. Gregory guarding theroad to the bay of Marsascala. Theproposed reconstruction of thebattery shown below is purelyhypothetical in its details, and isbased on the elements found in theother documented batteries. TheGordon map shows an open work to

the rear and was fronted by anascending road. There seem to havebeen no farm buildings in the vicinityfor quite some distance all around,thereby suggesting that some formof barrack accommodation couldhave been provide by anunderground vaulted chamber asbuilt at the Gharghar Battery.

Top, Detail from theGordon map showingSt. Peter Batteryoverlooking KalkaraCreek (copyrightNational Archives,Kew, UK). Right,Author's proposedgraphic reconstructionof St. Peter's Battery -actual number ofembrasuresis unknown.


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(6) WINDMILL REDOUBT

Windmill Redoubt was situated alongthe line of circumvallation linking thetowns of Zabbar and Tarxien andguarding the road to Zejtun. Thewindmill itself, with some modifications,is still standing while the immediate areaaround it now serves as a large trafficround about. The redoubt, constructedof rubble-stone walls, possibly incorpo-rating stretches of existing field walls,was roughly triangular in plan and wasdesigned in such a way as to plug threeintersecting country lanes, the presentday Triq 10 ta' Settembru 1797, Triq id-Dejma, and Triq Ghollieq.

The solid windmill building, whichoccupied nearly all the north side of theredoubt, served as a blockhouse,providing accommodation and shelter tothe troops assigned to defend it, whileits tower doubled up as an excellent

lookout post from where Malteseinsurgents kept a watch on neighbour-ing enemy positions and the gatewaysalong the Cottonera enceinte. No

information is known to the author as tothe size of the garrison and number andquality of cannon and other armamentsthat were deployed in this post.



31 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

Previouse page, top, Map of Zejtun showinglocation of main batteries; bottom, detail

from the Gordon map showing location ofWindmill Redoubt (copyright National

Archives, Kew, UK). This page, Author'sproposed graphic reconstruction of

Windmill Redoubt, built to exploit an existingwindmill and a strategic road junction

linking the villages of Zabbar, Tarxien, andZejtun. Below, View of the windmill today,

serving as a roundabout and traffic island.

Road to Hompesch Arch


32 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

(7) ZABBAR BATTERIES & REDOUBT

Zabbar, or Citta' Rohan as it wascalled in the last years of the Order'srule, was the closest Maltese townto the French harbour fortifications.As such, it received continual Frenchattention, being repeated attacked byFrench troops and bombarded fromthe guns on the Cottonera ramparts.The people of Zabbar reacted bybarricading its streets and alleys andfortified it with batteries and aredoubt. Mifsud mentions that thevillagers erected a battery 'sotto lastatua della Madonna con 2 pezzi diartiglieria' and built two other trinceein the square near the church of St.Roque and in the 'piazza che da perla strada detta Ta' Uied il Ghajn(Wied il-Ghajn). The Gordon mapshows three batteries, altogetherplugging the main approaches to the

Road from Notre Dame Gate

Parish Church of Zabbar

Battery

enclosure

Battery


Top, Detail from the Gordon map showinglocation of the batteries and redoubt at

Zabbar (copyright National Archives, Kew,UK). The adjoining sketch shows the

Author's graphic reconstruction of part ofthe village layout with the position of the two

batteries, built to guard the directapproaches from Notre Dame Gate in the

Cottonera enceinte. The large battery nearthe side of the parish church is enclosed by

barricades to the rear. The church domeand belfries served as lookout posts.


33 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

main town square and church,together with a large reboubt. Thelatter consisted of a large tenaille-trace type of entrenchment built toenvelope a large building, or block ofhouses, fronting a road leading intothe town, present-day Triq Bajada.This redoubt is very similar in planto the 'pietra a secco' type ofentrenchment which was built by theknights around the base of St.Agatha Tower in Mellieha.

The Zabbar militia battalion wasunder the command of ClementeEllul, and his deputies GiuseppeCachia and Giuseppe Ellul. Theartillery men at Zabbar wereFrancesco Grima, Giuseppe Bonnici,Francesco Pace, Pasquale Falzon,Giovanni Spiteri, Salvatore Micallef,Paolo Scicluna, Michele Darmanin,Giuseppe Agius and Angelo Fava.

In a letter to Lord Hamilton (18 May1800), General Graham states thatthe batteries near Zabbar werecompletely protected by stonecasemates, thereby suggesting thatthese positions were either fittedwith underground shelters for thetroops, as at Gharghar, or werecovered over to protect the guncrews.

Battery

Redoubt

Above, Author's graphicreconstruction of the large

redoubt and batteryprotecting the southwest

flank of the village (alongTriq Bajada). The range of

buildings which wereincorporated into the

redoubt appears to havesurvived and included a

windmill (see photographleft). The other batterieswere located close to the

churches shown in thephotographs below.


34 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

(8) SAN ROCCO BATTERY

The San Rocco, or St. Rocque (St.Rock) Battery marked thesouthernmost end of the Cottoneraside of the insurgents'circumvallation. This position wasset up to control both Fort Ricasoliand the entrance to the GrandHarbour. The battery consisted oftwo distinct gun platforms set on topof a low hillock (later occupied byFort St. Rocco - 1872), and at adistance of around 30-50 ms apart,open to the rear and separated by avarious field / orchard walls. Theposition was served by a largemagazine built by Michele Cachiaaround December 1799, in whichwere employed timber beamsremoved from the 'Casini di CasalNuovi' (Rahal il-Gdid).

Initially the work was armed withonly two 6-pdr iron guns but as canbe seen from a contemporarydrawing the two positions werearmed with a total of 10 guns andtwo mortars by the end of theblockade. The main battery, situatedon higher ground contained most of


Upper batteryparapet withembrasures

Lower batteryparapet with4 embrasures

Reinforced 'bombproofmagazine covered withlayer of soil

Rubble walllinking thetwo batteries


35 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

the guns. Mifsud states that the 'grantrincea detta di San Rocco' wasarmed with a total of seven guns,five 12-pdr cannon and two 8-pdrs.The lower battery, however, situatedcloser to the shoreline, is shownarmed with four guns. Possibly theseare the four 32-pdrs listed inMifsud's table which would havebeen most usefully employed in acoastal defence role, aimed at mouthof the harbour.

The Gordon map shows twobatteries fronted by a country lanestraddling a hillock, south of whichstood a long stretch of rubble-stonetype of coastal entrenchment built by

Bali de' Tigne in the latter half of theeighteenth century.

Gen. Graham was not muchimpressed by San Rocco Battery.He remarks that it was continuallybeing fired upon by the Frenchgunners in Fort Ricasoli even thoughit was about 700 ms distant from thefort.

Site of San Rocco Battery

Site of Church& Redoubt

Previous page, Rear view of San RoccoBattery, by unknown artist showing clearlythe two gun positions and magazine to therear; below, detail from the Gordon mapshowing location of San Rocco Batteries(copyright National Archives, Kew UK).Parts of the enceinte of the Hospitallercoastal entrenchment along the adjoiningshoreline are still visible today (right)


36 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

(9) JESUIT HILL BATTERY

The batteries overlooking the innerreaches of the Grand Harbour, in thearea generally known as Marsa arewell documented. The oneoccupying the higher ground, knownas Jesuit Hill ( Jesuit Battery orPoint Cortin Battery), was aimed atthe harbour side of the Florianaenceinte. This small battery wasconsidered as an advanced post ofTas-Samra camp although its guardscame from Casal Fornaro (Qormi).

Grech's drawing shows a smallbattery armed with only two cannon,fronted by a short stretch ofmasonry parapet pierced with twoembrasures, a flanking rubble wall(possibly an existing field wall) onone side, and a large magazineexpertly grafted into the adjoiningterracing on the other. In this mannerthe magazine was well camouflagedand protected by a thick layer of soil.

Grech's drawing, as well as theGordon map, show a large buildingsituated to the rear of the battery.This could have served as a kind ofblockhouse or barrack block. InGrech's drawing, one of the cornersof this building (to the left of thepicture) is shown being hit by acannon ball fired from a Frenchbattery on Magazine Bastion atFloriana - the insurgents guns arereturning fire.


Battery parapetwith twoembrasures

Reinforced 'bombproof'magazine covered withlayer of soil

Top, right, Rear view of Jesuit Hill Batterywith the lower Marsa Battery in thebackground, after Antonio Grech(courtesy of Ian Bouskill ); below it, detailfrom the Gordon map showing the twoMarsa batteries (copyright NationalArchives, Kew, UK).Right, Author's graphic reconstruction ofJesuit Hill Battery with rubble field wallenclosure and adjoining reinforcedmagazine built to exploit the protectivecover provided by the field terracing onthat particular hillock.


37 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

(10) MARSA BATTERY

The second battery in the innerharbour area was Marsa Battery, or'Trincea della Marsa' which wassituated at the foot of Jesuit Hill,close to the shoreline. This was alsoa small work consisting of a shortparapet fitted with three embrasures,the merlons being of unequal length,and served by a continuoushardstone platform.

Contemporary drawings show asentry room or magazine to the leftand a low rubble stone type offlanking wall to the right. It wasarmed with two iron guns and ahowitzer on a field carriage. Anoften published drawing showsCaptain Alexander Ball and Gen.Graham inspecting the MarsaBattery on horseback. The samehowitzer is again shown in thebackground.Salvatore Camilleri from Vallettaclaimed that he had made the'modello' (plan?) of this battery andeven built at his own expense the'casamatta' or magazine whichseems to have been locatedimmediately to the rear of the work.Unlike the other batteries, thesuperior slopes of the merlons of theMarsa Battery are not showncovered with a protectivelayer of soil.


Above, top, Rear view of Marsa Battery, after Major James Weir, Royal Marines; below it,another view showing Captain Alexander Ball and Gen. Graham inspecting the same batteryon horseback. Both pictures show a field howitzer. Below, Author's graphic reconstructionof Marsa Battery

Battery parapetwith threeembrasures andcontinuoushardstonegunplatform

Reinforced 'bombproof'magazine covered withlayer of soil

Reinforced sentry room(possibly a pre-existingfarm building)


38 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

(11) GHARGHAR BATTERY

The Gharghar, or Harhar (Araar),Battery, also known as Ta' Ittuila (It-Twila) was one of the batteries builtby Vincenzo Borg. It was designedto control the approaches from Gziraand overlooked the land frontdefences of Fort Manoel. TheGharghar Battery is beautifullyillustrated in one of Grech's drawingswhich shows a relatively linearplatform with a high frontal masonryparapet, two flanking walls, the rightone of which is clearly built onto anexisting fieldwall, and encloseing therear, a high rubble wall whichstopped short of the flanking walls toprovided entrances into the work.

The drawing shows three masonrysentry posts, one on either side ofthe gun platform and a third guardingthe opening at the rear of thebattery. Presumably, a fourth wouldhave protected the left opening (notshown in the picture).

Gharghar Battery was fitted with aninteresting arrangement for theaccommodation of troops in the formof an underground vaulted casemate,a 'magazeno sotteraneo copertro controglio a prova di bomba' capable ofhousing a hundred men, although thisclaim may be slightly exaggeratedgiven the scale of the structure. TheGrech drawing shows a semi-

circular double arched barrel-vault,what at the time would have beentermed 'troglio raddopiato' andcovered with soil. A secondanonymous drawing of the batteryshows a rectangular opening in theground, at the rear of the gunplatform, possibly a ventilation shaftfeeding the underground casemate.It is not clear, however, if this


Rear view of Gharghar Battery, after Antonio Grech (above - courtesy of Ian Bouskill ).Below, Author's graphic reconstruction of Gharghar Battery with its underground casematedmagazine.


39 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

drawing actually depicts theGharghar Battery and not anothersmaller battery situated in thevicinity, as clearly shown in theLindenthal map. This is because thesecond drawing shows a parapetwith only five embrasures and nosentry rooms along the flanks.The Grech's drawing, however,depicts a parapet pierced by sixembrasures, the merlons of whichare covered with a protective layerof soil. The battery was armed with'cinque pezzi di cannone da 18' (18-pdrs, with each gun served by itsown wedge-shaped platform asshown in the diagram below. Someof the guns used to arm this batterywere transported all the way fromthe Hospitaller coastal battery atMistra. General Graham's report onthe posts, number of men andordnance drawn up on 28 December1799 shows the Gharghar or B'karacamp armed with a total of eight 18-pdr guns. However, this is acollective figure which alsoincorporates all the other batteriesand advanced positions erected bySalvatore Borg in the vicinity of FortTigne' and Sliema (see followingpage).

The Gharghar Battery is shownfitted with two flagpoles flyingBritish colours and those of theKingdom of the Two Sicilies.Mifsud states that it was in this

battery 'ove fu' inalberato loStendardo Inglese per la prima voltanella Campagna di Malta'. TheGordon map shows the batterysituated high on a hill flanked by twovalleys and isolated from anyneighbouring farm buildings. Therewere also no roads or country lanesleading to the position. Variousadvanced posts surrounded theposition. Amongst these was asolitary gun emplacement at alocality known as 'Il-Harrub ta'Stiefnu' which had been set up sincethe first days of the insurrection.Early twentieth century surveysheets of the Gharghar site show a

chapel which is still standing. Thiswould have been located to the rearof the battery, while a farm buildingwhich was occupied by VincenzoBorg's men, served as his fieldheadquarters.

The Gharghar camp was garrisonedby the men of the B'kara and MostaBattalions. General Graham's reportof 28 December 1799, cited earlier,gives the total number of menstationed at the Gharghar camp as338. It was estimated that a soldierstationed at the Harhar camp costthe Maltese authorities around twotari and ten grani a day. Aninteresting detail in Grech's depictionof Gharghar Battery is provided bythe small herd of the cattle showngrazing in the fields adjoining theposition.

Top left, Drawing of what has always beentaken to be another rear view of theGharghar Battery. This drawing, however,has many different features from Grech'spainting - it shows no sentry posts and acontinuous gun platform. It may, therefore,be showing instead the Sqaq CapparaBattery, which likewise overlooked FortManoel (shown in the background). Below,Detail from the Gordon map (copyrightNational Archives, Kew, UK).


40 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

Building used by Vincenzo Borg 'Brared' as his fieldheadquarters during the blockade. This building was locatedabout 150 to 200 metres to the rear of the battery. Above,detail from an early 20th century survey sheet s howing theGharghar area still unencumbered by modern buildings.

Probable siteof Battery


41 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

(13) SLIEMA BATTERIES

Vincenzo Borg was, undoubtedly, themost successful builder of Maltesefortifications during the blockade.His works stretched from the limitsof Tarxien all the way to Sliema.Mifsud states that Borg wasresponsible for building at least fourother batteries on the Marsamxettside, apart from the central GhargharBattery. These comprised a batteryknown as Ta' Imrabat (possibly inthe vicinity of present-day ImrabatStreet) which was built to take four'mortari di bomba' and fitted with alarge bombproof, undergroundvaulted casemate ('magazenosotteraneo a prova di bomba')capable of housing, like the GhargharBattery, a 100 men, as well as aguncrew shelter capable ofaccommodating 'circa vent'artiglieri'(marked 'C' on sketch plan).The second, called Ta' Ischina' was

a small work equipped with an 18-pdr situated in a field called Ta' Xini( Ta' Cini). Vincenzo Borg used tospend many a night on guard duty atthis post on the look out for Frenchvessels attempting to leave theharbour.

A third battery, called Ta' SqaqCappara (present day Kappara),was built closer to Fort Manoelwhich it was intended to bombard. Itis shown in the Lindenthal map, sitedbelow and to the north of theGharghar Battery. Surprisingly it isomitted from the Gordon map. Thismay also be the battery depicted inthe anonymous drawing shown on

the previous page and often taken torepresent the Gharghar Battery.

The Gordon map shows in greatdetail the location of a large numberof batteries and parapets situatedalong a road descending from ahillock at Sliema and ending at acoastal battery facing Fort Tigne'.

In all, the Gordon map shows sixdifferent walled positions situatedalong the present day Triq il-Kbira.One of these batteries was sitedexactly opposite the facade of thesmall church of Our Lady of DivineGrace. One of these, at Ghar il-

Lembi (possibly the one marked 'A')was armed with three guns, to befollowed by a second (B) armedwith two iron guns closer to theenemy.

The Gordon map also shows that theend of the insurgents line wasmarked by a coastal battery situatedat what appears to be Font Ghadir,slightly to the rear of the smallheadland later the site of Fort Sliema(1872). This may be the Ta' IschinaBattery mentioned earlier. If not,then no information exists to date on

A

B

C


Author's graphic reconstruction of thelayout of the Sliema batteries, asillustrated in the Gordon map (seefollowing page).


42 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

CDetail from the Gordon map showinglocation of the batteries at Sliema (copyrightNational Archives, Kew, UK). Below, Detailfrom survey sheet showing location of SqaqCappara (present-day Kappara).


43 / ISSUE 6/ 2008

this obscure work.Carmelo Testa wrote that VincenzoBorg was also responsible forbuilding a large coastal work atDragonara point, in front of theSpinola entrenchments, the site ofthe present-day Casino. This batterywas known as Ta' Ghemmuna andcontained an extensive parapet fittedwith nine embrasures and a largemagazine. It was built in February1799 after news reached Malta thata strong French naval force withsome thirty vessel was sightedapproaching the Island and theBritish blockading ships had to leaveMalta to regroup under Nelsonleaving the island unprotected. Thisbattery, which was armed withseven guns, was intended to preventthe French from landing troops at St.George's and St. Julian's bays andthereby attack the insurgentspositions from the rear.

Right, Survet sheet showing location of Ta'Ghemmuna Battery, on the site of thepresent-day Casino at Dragonara.


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ST. LUCIAN ENTRENCHMENT AND REDOUBT

The greatest fear of the Britishmilitary force in Malta in 1799 wasthe threat posed by the possibility ofthe arrival of large French reliefforce, in the event of which, Britishtroops would have had to beevacuated. An emergency retreatand evacuation plan was thereforelaid down to ensure an organizedand quick retreat from the Islandfrom the harbour at Marsaxlokk.This involved the construction of astrong redoubt around St. RoccoChapel, halfway between the villageof Zabbar and the coast, in thevicinity of the old Hospitaller Towerat Delle Grazie (today Xghajra).This work was intended to shield theretreat of British troops from SanRocco Battery towards Zabbar. Thistown was to serve as rallying pointfor all the British forces and fromthere they where to be pull backhastily to the village of Zejtun.Once at Zejtun, the Britishregiments (30th and 89th) were to

retreat to the safety of ships waitingat anchor near St. Lucian’s Tower(or Fort Rohan as it was called afterits was enclosed, together with itsbattery, by a ditch in the 1790s) inMarsaxlokk Bay. This formidableHospitaller tower with its adjoining

battery was to serve as the keep ofa large British entrenchment cuttingoff the neck of the St. Lucianpeninsula. Here the British military,assisted by the Maltese engineerMatteo Bonavia, established anextensive defensive perimeter, a


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continuous wall which, as shown inLindenthal's map, sought to seal offthe peninsula from the rest of themainland (see aerial photograph,right). The position wasstrengthened further with theconstruction of a diamond-shapedredoubt built on the ahead of theentrenchment. The Gordon mapdoes not included the fortificationserected around St. Lucian but itdoes show the layout of the redoubtbuilt at St. Rocco, whichincorporated into its enclosure asmall rural chapel and an abuttingbuilding. None of these works havesurvived.

In December 1799, Gen. Grahamwrote to the Duke of York to informhim that the strong 'moat' [sic -entrenchment] which he wasconstructing 'about a mile-and-a-halfbehind the ridge of Gudja and Zejtunto serve as a place of retreat andcommunication with the ships andstores' was 'nearly completed andbeing supported by some of the hightowers on the coast'. Graham wasconfident that this work was capableof providing adequate protection 'forsome days' if attacked.

Above,Detail from the Gordon mapshowing location of San Rocco Redoubt,

built around a small chapel, right.Opposite page, Detail from the Lindenthal

map showing the British fortificationsenveloping St. Lucian Tower

(copyright NationalArchives,

Kew, UK).


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SITE OF AMBUSH AT MRIEHEL

At dawn of 4 September 1798, adetachment of French soldiers leftPorte des Bombs for Mdina tostrengthen the garrison there,unaware of the uprising that haderupted there the previous day. Thesentinels that Vincenzo Borg hadplaced on the steeple of the B'Karachurch saw the French columnmaking its way up Strada SanGiuseppe and raised the alarm. Inlittle time the Maltese silently took upa position behind the fieldwalls onthe outskirts of the village. The placechosen for the ambuscade was nearthe low arches of the Wignacourtaqueduct at Mriehel (opposite thepresent-day brewery - see photo-graph). The site was not chosenaccidentally.

The determining factor was thepresence, in the locality, of a wind-mill, from on top of which Vincenzo'smen could see the French troopsclearly moving in their direction. Asthe column arrived near the lowarches and began ascending a lowhillock, the hidden villagers, mostlyfrom B'Kara, Qormi, and Mosta,broke cover and opened fire withtheir 20 muskets and a hail of stones.Caught in the open, in an area devoidof any form of cover whatsoever,the French troops panicked and fledback in disorder to Porte desBombes leaving behind them manydead and wounded. Three woundedsoldiers, among them an officer,


The site of the ambush of the French troopson 4 September 1798: above, windmillbuilding, minus its tower and sails and, onthe following page, the stretch of theWignacourt aqueduct opposite SimmondsFarson Cisk brewery where the ambushtook place in the area known as 'l'Arcata il


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were carried away by the fleeingFrench soldiers. The Maltese ontheir part suffered only two casual-ties.Although the locality in which theencounter took place has beenheavily urbanized and developedover the years, the central featuresin the landscape that determined thechoice of the ambush site are stillextant. Both the aqueduct and thewindmill, minus its tower, can still beseen along Notabile Road oppositeFarsons Brewery.

Bascia'. Below, Detail of a sectionalelevation of the Wignacourt aqueduct drawnin the mid-1800s showing the profile thearea as it would have stood around 1798with the strategically placed windmilloccupying the higher ground, thereby

allowing the Maltese insurgents a very clearview of the approaching French column.Top, Drawing by Rev. Frederick Markhamof the 'Knisja il-Qadima' at B'Kara with thesaid windmill shown high in thebackground.


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It was during on of my unscheduledvisits to the Museum of Fine Arts inValletta in the summer of 1996,when my attention was drawn to aportrait titled “Comm. Tigné, late 18Cent.”, located in the then Room26. Somehow, it did not seem quiteto fit the period and person beingportrayed. The portrait is of aseated man wearing a dark uniform,emphasised by the bullion fringeepaulette worn on the right shoulder.An open scroll is on a table or stoolin front of him, on which are also aninkwell with quill, a pair of callipers,charcoal pen and a setsquare.

The Uniform

The major clue to identifying thisofficer is by the uniform he iswearing, which strongly resemblesthat referred to as the Board ofOrdnance uniform, as worn byBritish officers of the RoyalRegiment of Engineers in the verylate 18th and early 19th centuries.Although labelled as being ‘Comm.de Tigné’, this staunch FrenchKnight of the Order of St. John was82 years old and a paralytic when

the French invaded Malta and evenif not, it is doubtful that he wouldhave worn any uniform other thanthat of the Order. Bali René Jacobde Tigné had remained bed-ridden inValletta during the entire blockade ofthe French by the Maltese andBritish. He died of old age onOctober 15, 1800, shortly after thecapitulation of the French garrison,and was interred at St. Johns Co-Cathedral in Valletta.(1)

According to an article in an issue ofthe Royal Engineers Journal titled,‘Uniforms of the Corps of RoyalEngineers’,(2) “Various otherchanges in dress were introducedduring 1796-99.......while theofficer’s coat was differently cut,becoming a double-breastedsquare along the waistline in

front, but falling over the hipsinto two long tails.....”.

A book which title is not given but isreferred to as “the Welch andStalker book” (3) states: “RoyalEngineers. Coat as made for Mr.George Cardew, December, 1798.Blue superfine cloth coat, blackGenoa velvet lapels and stand-upcollar lined with the same velvet,and a coat button on the end ofthe collar, to run with the lapel.Nine twistholes in the lapel a littlelonger than to admit the button.Three-pointed flap with fourholes.... Artillery buttons. Lapelshort of the waist.”

The fact that the portrait shows theofficer with only one epaulette issignificant. Company officers below

MATTEOBONAVIAROYALENGINEER

byDenis Darmanin


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field rank; i.e. Lieutenants andCaptains, at the time wore only oneepaulette on the right shoulder.Although a similar uniform isreferred to as having been worn byofficers of the Royal Artillery duringthis period, (4)the uniform wouldhave had collar, cuffs, and facingson lapels in scarlet, while the stockwould have been black.

By far the most striking items ofdress are the buttons on the ‘coatee’at front, cuffs and pocket flap.These are gilded and show the armsof the Board of Ordnance, i.e. apressed Norman shield with threecannonballs in chief and threecannon above each other in field.There is a hint of ‘piles of shot’inserted between the threecannonballs, which R.A. and R.E.1795-c.1802 long with otherdesigns, is a pattern button.variation very common in thistype of button. (5)

Although mainly worn by the RoyalRegiment of Artillery from 1795 tocirca 1802, this button was then alsoa standard issue to the R.Es. (6)

The Scroll

The unfurled scroll on the tableshows the plan of a fort surroundedby a ditch. The British had not builtany forts in those early years. Thefirst major works in fortificationswere St. Clement’s Retrenchment in1849, Fort Verdala in 1852 andLascaris Battery in 1854. The onlyworks at the time were minorstrategic alterations to the existingforts and fortifications, built by theOrder and which were quite reliableto meet any defensive needs of theera. They proved to be so and hadsurvived the onslaught during theSecond World War.

Considering the small size and starshape of this fort, the closest incomparison is Fort Manoel at

Manoel Island in MarsamxettHarbour.(7) Four identical bastionsare at each corner, each linked by acurtain. Taking account of someartistic license, the structures infront of each curtain, at the front ofthe Couvre Porte and the two sidecurtains, represent the place-of-arms. The one at the rear is aravelin with a tenaille behind. At theouter edge are the covertways thatsurround the fort.Partly visible beneath the unfurledsection are three ‘arrowhead’ typepoints, which when compared withthe fort’s plan, are nothing morethan the spurs on the glacis. Oneremaining example overlooks theroad behind the Armed Forces ofMalta E.O.D and Diving Unit.

Historical Background

Going by events in Malta during1795-1802 and the presence of aBritish military engineer, the paintingmust have been executed during theblockade of the French garrisonunder General Vaubois or the firstyears of British rule that followed.If going by the first, then the officeris definitely surveying and planning

the siege works but if the latter, thenhe is either conducting somestrategic plan or the fort was thensubject of some report in hand.

Following the revolt of the Malteseagainst the French occupation onSeptember 2, 1798, the MalteseNational Assembly asked LordNelson for British military assistanceafter a request to King Ferdinand ofNaples did not render any results.Much has been written on this partof Malta’s history, but Britain couldnot assist Malta with enough armsand ammunition, while troops weredesperately needed elsewhere.Little by little, some consignmentswere dispatched to the island andwith them very small militarydetachments. On October 24, 1798Lord Nelson arrived off Valletta onHMS Vanguard and after takingstock of the dire situation, askedVaubois to surrender; to which theFrenchman had refused. Beforedeparting, he left a small supply ofpowder for the Maltese and CaptainAlexander Ball, RN, to commandthe British and Portuguese navalforce blockading Grand Harbour.On December 29, HMS Strombolosucceeded in berthing at Marsaxlokk


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and sent ashore 46 ten-inch mortarshells, 12 muskets, bayonets andcartridge boxes, four pistols, somethree-inch rope and two bushels ofcoal. With them landed the firstBritish troops to set foot on Malta; asmall detachment from the RoyalRegiment of Artillery, consisting ofGunners William Crawford of Capt.and Brevet Lt-Col. G. Wilson’sCompany, 1 Battalion R.A., andJohn Mulholland and William Willeyof Major George Bowater’s Coy., 1Btn., R.A., under the command ofLieut. John Vivion (799).Detachments of the 30th(Cambridgeshire) Regiment of Footand 89th (or Royal Irish Fusiliers)Regiment of Foot, along with anumber of women and children,arrived on December 6, 1799. (8)

The Officer

To identify the person depicted inthe portrait with any degree ofcertainty was to be quite a task.Narrowing it down was less difficultbut definitely not accurate enough.

There were various possibilities asto the identity of the officer, eventhat of being a Maltese. During theblockade, Captain William Gordon,R.E., (9) was the first from theCorps to land in Malta, (10) havingarrived on board HMS Perseus onFebruary 20, 1800. In 1801, CaptainGordon had written a report on thedefences of Valletta, St. Elmo andother fortifications, which is now inthe Royal Engineers Museum. Tobe recorded with a portrait was avery common practice then.

Similar reports were previouslymade in 1800 by Major WilliamMcKerras, R.E. (11) but as alreadystated, the single epaulette on thecoatee indicates an officer of alesser rank. Two other engineerswhose ‘war service’ included Malta(1800) were Lieut. James Robertson

Arnold (later Lieut. General SirJames Arnold) and Lieut. John FoxBurgoyne (later Field Marshal SirJohn Fox Burgoyne).

In 1803 Captain Samuel TrevorDickens, R.E. (12) had also writtena report on the state of militaryworks on the islands of Malta andGozo, which made him another likelycandidate for the portrait. In 1805Colonel Dickens (13) wasCommanding Officer RoyalEngineers in Malta and during Julywas authorised to raise the MalteseMilitary Artificers and Sappers andMiners.

The final possibility, that of thesubject being Maltese, is MatteoBonavia (1748-1823), (14) Adjutantof the new Corps, but also referredto as “assistant Engineer”.(15) Hisdress is described as “and theMaltese officer who wasappointed adjutant (wore) that ofan officer of the RoyalEngineers.” (16) By 1805 the R.E.officers’ uniform had changed, but

retaining the old practice in overseasstations was still quite common.

Nor is the practice referred to as‘hand me down’, when a slightlyoutdated British uniform was handeddown to Colonial troops, to beexcluded. Bonavia was formerly aclerk of works under the Order ofSt. John in Malta. He was a strongopponent of the French and hadaccompanied Canon SaverioCaruana, one of the three leaders ofthe Maltese insurgents, on boardHMS Vanguard as an interpreter inhis meeting with Lord Nelson,probably being one of the fewMaltese who could speak English atthe time.

In his capacity as chief engineer ofthe Maltese rural militia, Bonaviawas captured by the French andimprisoned in Fort Tigné, fromwhere he later escaped to continuethe fight with his fellow countrymen.He was made Adjutant of theSappers and Miners, with the salaryof 5s. per diem as engineer’s payand 3 s. a day as Adjutant; quite asum for those days.

Due to his popularity with theMaltese Sappers and hisextraordinary influence over them,Bonavia was instrumental in helpingthe British conquer the prejudice theMaltese had against military life.(17)He continued to serve until June1814, when he resigned. Acommission from the Prince Regentdated October 25, 1825 appointedhis son Calcedonio (18) as Sub-Lieutenant in his stead.(19) ByRoyal Warrant dated October 5th,1815, the two companies of MalteseSappers and Miners stationed inMalta were ordered to disband.Calcedonius Bonavia was retainedas a Sub-Lieutenant in the corps andappointed Overseer with 4s. a dayextra to his engineers pay until heretired from the military on half payon 1 June 1917. He continued his


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employment with the RoyalEngineers department in a civilcapacity and also on half-pay untilhis death in 1850.

A Contradiction

The name of Matteo Bonaviadoesn’t appear in the Army Lists atthe Society of Generalogists Libraryin London. Can it be assumed thathe was just an employee of theMalta Government rather than acommissioned officer in the BritishArmy? But then, how does onejustifies the uniform and that he wasAdjutant of the Maltese Sappers andMiners?

The same Army Lists confirm thatCalcedonio Bonavia had received acommission on October 25th, 1815,and that he went on half pay 1stJune 1817. He appears regularlyunder the heading Malta MilitaryArtificers on Half Pay, as Sub-lieutenant until 1850/1851 when he isshown under ‘Casualties since ourlast issue’ as he had died in 1850.

Conclusion

Following various enquiries andresearch, my good friend JosephAttard Tabone led me to a newsource where better evidence canbe located. This was theGovernment Annual Reports for1927. (20) In the section titled“Report of the Curator of the ArtSection” (O 15, Appendix C),prepared by Vincent Bonello asCurator of the Fine Arts Section,Entry No. 10 states: “Portrait ofMatteo Bonavia. Purchased.Matteo Bonavia was an architectand engineer (1748-1823). He wasassistant to Bali` Tigné”.

To have assumed that one of thepossibilities represented in theportrait was a Maltese was,therefore, quite correct. MatteoBonavia should be officially

recognised as having been the firstMaltese officer in the RoyalEngineers.

References and Notes

1.Manuscripts Vol. 418 (2), 236, NationalLibrary of Malta.2.Royal Engineers’ Journal, June 1934,passim.3.ibid.4.Captain R.J. Macdonald, RA, The Historyof the Dress of the Royal Regiment ofArtillery, 1625-1897, London, 1894.5.David C. Cavendish, BA, AMA, curator/archivist Gibraltar Museum, “Eighteen-Century Artillery Buttons”, in The Bulletinof the Military Historical Society, Vol. XX,No. 78, November 1969, 33-40.6. Major D.A. Campbell, RA, “The Journalof the Royal Artillery, Vol. LXX, No. 2, pp147-148, and Ernest J. Martin, “Buttons ofthe British Army - the Royal Artillery andRoyal Engineers” in Just Buttons, 33-36 (nodate available).7. Stephen C. Spiteri, The Knights’Fortifications, Malta, 1990, IllustrationsNos. 138 and 139, pp. 136-137.8.Lt-Col. M.E.S. Laws, OBE, MC, (lateRA), “The Royal Artillery in the Blockadeof Valletta, 1798-1800”, in The Journal ofthe Royal Artillery, Vol. LXXV, 97-99, 1948.9. Captain William Gordon was originallycommissioned into the Royal Artillery on1786. He became 2nd Lieutenant in theRoyal Engineers on August 22,1787,Lieutenant on May 27, 1791, CaptainLieutenant on December 31, 1795 andCaptain on August 28, 1799. He saw ‘warservice’ in Holland 1793-95, Malta 1800and Elba 1801. He died in Malta onNovember 30, 1802.10. Lt-Col. M.E.S. Laws, op. cit., 105-106.11. Major William McKerras was firstcommissioned in the Royal Artillery in1779. He became a 2nd Lieutenant ofEngineers on march 15, 1780, Lieutenant,Royal Engineers on September 21, 1787,Captain Lieutenant on June 1, 1794,Captain on June 24, 1798 and promoted toBrevet Major on 1797 after ‘war service’ inSanto Domingo, West Indies. His other‘war service’ were Gibraltar 1779-83,Holland 1799, Ferrol 1800 and Egypt 1801.He was killed while reconnoitering AboukirBay in Egypt on February 27, 1801.12. T.W.J. Connolly, History of the RoyalSappers and Miners, 2nd Edition, Chatham1857, pp. 154-155. Captain Samuel T.Dickens was Commissioned as 2ndLieutenant on March 15, 1780. He becamea Captain on August 29, 1798 and Lt.Colonel on March 1, 1805. His ‘warservice’ is recorded as Ferrol 1800and Malta 1800. As Sir Samuel

Dickens KCH, he was promoted toLieut. General on January 10, 1837and died in Ipswich on October 11,1847.13. Colonel A.G. Chesney, Historyof the Maltese Corps of the BritishArmy, London, 1897, p. 75.14. ibid. p. 78.15. Connolly, op. cit. ,p. 155.16. Chesney, op. cit., p. 80.17. ibid. p. 78 (n).18. ibid. p. 90.19. ibid., pp. 91-92 (n).20. GR-65 (Museums), N.L.M.

This paper was first published by theauthor, with minor alterations andunder the title “Portrait of anUnknown Officer” in: The Bulletinof the Military Historical Society(UK), Vol. 47, No. 188, May 1997,and The Sunday Times (of Malta),October 12, 1997.

Acknowledgements

I am ever grateful to Mr. DominicCutajar, former Curator of theMuseum of Fine Arts, Valletta andMr. Dennis Vella for theirassistance, especially with thephotographs of the portrait. Also toDr. Stephen C. Spiteri, Dr. John N.Rhodes TD, curator of the RoyalEngineers Museum, Chatham, Kent,Joseph Attard Tabone and to RobertMarrion, Bryan Fosten, and the lateNorman Litchfield.


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Notwithstanding the huge resourcesthat had been invested inrefortification of Gozo's main centralfortress during Grand MasterWignacourt's reign at the beginningof the seventeenth century, theHospitaller knights and their militaryengineers continued to view theGran Castello as an inherently weakmilitary position, incapable ofresisting a determined assault by amodest opponent. This weaknesswas seen to derive largely from thefortress' isolated and landlockedposition in centre of the island,threatened as it was by neighbouringhigh ground.

This deficiency became particularlyworrying during the mid-1640’swhen a strong attack on the Castellowas being feared.(1) The Orderreacted to this pressing menace byre-evaluating the Island’s extantfortifications and establishing acontingency plan of action.(2) In his“Breve relattione delle qualita` dellaFortezza dell’Gozzo e di quello che

convenga farsi”, Fra GiovanniBendinelli Palavicini confirmed theCastello’s critical weaknesses andproposed the abandonment of Gozo,and the redeployment of the militia,artillery pieces and ammunition inMalta.(3) The greater part of thelocal population and all heavyartillery and related munitions wereto be transferred immediately, whilethe smaller artillery, the defendinggarrison and the remaining civilianswere to be carried over to Maltashortly before the arrival of thehostile besiegers.

Blowing-Up the Castello’s MainFronts

The proposed plan, however, wouldhave rendered Gozo and its defencesfully accessible to the Ottomans whowould in turn employ it as a base ofattack against Malta. Palavicini,therefore, suggested the blowing upof the Castello’s main bastions viathe excavation of a series of subter-ranean mines along the south andeast facing flanks, namely “nell’

angoli tanto interiori quanto esteriori,e mezzo delli loro fronti”.(4) Thefornelli or explosive mine chambersat the end of each tunnel were to becharged with gunpowder barrels andeventually exploded shortly beforethe arrival of the enemy.

Palavicini’s drastic proposal wasbacked by another reconnaissanceby Count d’Arpajon who stated that“non possa far altro che in tutto aquesto conformarmi”. Likewise,d’Arpajon urged the Order toproceed with the abandonment ofGozo, leaving behind a small garrisonand enough supplies for fifteen daysonly.(5)

These two reports were presentedand discussed during the CouncilMeeting of 16th June 1645.(6)Palavicini’s and d’Arpajon matching

MINING THEGRANCASTELLOFORDESTRUCTIONIN 1645

byGodwin Vella

Graphic aerial view of St. John’sDemi-bastion and adjoiningworks. Note the subterraneanmine entrance at its foot (afterStephen C. Spiteri).

Entrance to undergroud gallery


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recommendations were approvedwithout hesitation. The Castello wasto be abandoned if attacked by astrong force, while the proposedtunnels were to be dug out immedi-ately. The following 1st July, theCommissioner of Works was in-structed to send over to Gozo askilled tradesman or an engineer toco-ordinate the excavation of thesaid subterranean mines.(7) Thesewere in fact completed that sameyear.(8)

A notable Ottoman assault wasactually attempted in 1645, whennine galleys from Bizerta headedtowards Mgarr Bay. The vigilant andswift cavalry under the command ofthe Island’s Governor, though,prohibited their landing.(9) Thethreat of a massive incursion over,the entrances of the highlightedunderground structures seem to havebeen walled up and subsequentlyobscured by the re-modelling of theaccess road along the south-facingflank and the accumulation of a thicklayer of earth and debris in theremaining part of the ditch.

Mine gallery?

The entrance of what looks to beone such 1645 subterranean minecomplex was brought to light in

autumn 1991, during the extensiverehabilitation and restoration projectof St. John’s demi-bastion andadjoining battery. It is found at thebase of the northern extremity of the

Demi-Bastion’s east-facing wall, andheads towards the northwest. Whenthe first two meters or so werecleared, two side passages emerged,while it became evident that thecentral gallery was carefullybackfilled and sealed by a well-builtwall. The then Museums Depart-ment was called in and it wasdecided to halt the clearance worksin view of a future scientific dig.(10)

To date, this relatively recent and yetintriguing archaeological feature is

Above, General view showing theentrance to the subterranean mine inthe lower left corner. The section of aBronze Age silo-pit and the entrance ofa World War II shelter are visible in theupper right corner. Above, right, Flankand rouded orillion of St. MichaelBastion.


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Above, Lateral gallery - note the rock-hewn channel skirting along the left-hand wall.

still awaiting exploration, and accessis not possible except for the firstfew metres.

The central gallery is some 1.5metres wide and has a flattened arch

ceiling. Its maximum height reachesup to about 1.4 metres, though theoriginal floor seems to be lying at alower level. The backfilling consistsof well-packed stone boulderscemented together with terra soil,while the sealing wall is built ofashlar blocks of irregular dimensions.The flanking tunnel on the right handside is blocked, whereas the one onthe opposite wall can be followed foraround two metres to the pointwhere it splits up into two smallerpassages set at ninety degrees toeach other. Worth noting also is asmall rock-hewn channel runningalong a sidewall, possibly for thehousing of the fuse.A striking characteristic of this rock-hewn complex is the inferior work-manship manifested in the renderingof the visible sections of the wallsand ceilings. This must be attributedto the hurried fashion in which therespective subterranean mines weredug out. In the aforementionedinstructions of 1st July 1645, theCommissioner of Works was alsourged to engage the services of asmuch as possible workmen, providedthat their fee was not excessive.

Despite the Gran Castello’s seriousdeficiencies and the excavation of aseries of subterranean mines to blow

it up, the dilemma of whether itshould have been retained or re-placed by a new coastal fortifiedtown haunted the Order until theirexpulsion by the French in 1798. FortChambray was not intended toreplace the Castello but to compelthe enemy to attack two strongholdsand thus alleviate it of some of thepressure,(11) while the Castello wasrelieved of its role as an armedcitadel only on 1st April 1868.(12)Equally significant, however, its early17th century defences were at nostage enhanced to reflect thesubsequent developments in the artof fortification.

Acknowledgements

Information by George Vella andStephen C. Spiteri was crucial to puttogether parts of this article.

References and Notes

1. A. Samut-Tagliaferro, TheCoastal Fortifications of Gozo andComino, (Malta 1993), 92.2. These included also Garzes Tower(1607) and the first MarsalfornTower (1615).3. AOM 6551, Discorsi e PareriSopra le Fortificazioni – Tomo II,fol.96v.4.Ibid. fol. 97r.5.AOM 6554, fol.299.6. AOM 6553, Decreti in Materiadi Guerra 1554-1645, fol. 41r.7. Ibid., fol. 64v.8. Agius De Soldanis, (Farrugia G.,Ghawdex bil-Grajja Tieghu, Malta1936,) 145.9.Ibid.10.Verbal communication from Mr.George Vella, officer in charge ofthe quoted restoration project (11October 2006).11.S. C. Spiteri, Fortresses of theKnights (Malta, 2001), 243.12. Samut-Tagliaferro, 285.

Below, Subterranean mine entrance asdiscovered in 1991 (photo by Mr.George Vella). Note the rough finish ofthe visible wall sections sealing off themouth of the gallery.


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FORT STROCCOTHE FIRSTBRITISHFLANKLESSFORT INMALTA

byDr Stephen C Spiteri

Col. Lewis, writing in the 1860s,stated that in the early years of thenineteenth century, British officersconsidered Fort Tigne', built by theKnights of St. John in 1792-95, toepitomise the 'perfection of a smallfort without flanks ... capable ofconsiderable resistance.' MajorMcKerras writing soon after theBritish took over Malta in December1800, considered it a workconstructed with great deal of

ingenuity. The British military wereimmediately impressed by this smalldiamond-shaped fort and theirengineers were quick to take up its'theme' of a flankless fort, erectingtheir first such work on the Island ofAnholt, off Denmark, in 1812, andthen in a more fully-developed form,at Fort George on the island of Vidooff Corfu in 1825. The three mainaspects of such 'polygonal' forts,inspired by the writings of theFrenchmen Marc Rene' Marquis ofMontelambert, were an irregularpentagonal plan, an isolated keepcommanding the gorge of the work,and the use of caponiers andcounterscarp galleries to provideflanking fire.

The first British 'polygonal' fort to bebuilt in Malta, however, would onlymaterialize in the 1870s. It waserected at San Rocco, on the easternshoreline, opposite Fort Ricasoli,where it was placed to command theapproaches to the Grand Harbour.Unfortunately, given the importanceof the site, it was not to last long andwas eventually replaced by a muchlarger coastal defence battery.Luckily, however, the record plan ofthe first Fort St. Rocco, drawn byLieut. Chard RE and signed by Col.Henry Wray, CRE, on 9 January1878 has survived and this shows

a small fan-shaped work, with adetached rectangular keep, linked byflanking caponiers to the body of thework and flanked by counterscarpmusketry galleries accessed byunderground communication tunnels.

Work on this fort appears to havebegun either late in 1872, or early inthe following year for by January1873 it was already being proposedto upgrade its armament of three 11-inch RML guns to 12.5-inch guns.

More of a battery than a fort, itsrelatively small interior was occupiedby three circular barbetteemplacements for RML coastalguns, their adjoining magazines, andthe sloping glacis of the keep to therear.

The magazines stood in theintervening spaces between the

Fort Tigne'

Fort George - VidoIsland, Corfu(1824)

British Battery, Anholt Island (1812)


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Left counterscarpmusketry gallerywith drop ditch

Barbette emplacements for12.5-inch RML guns

Right counterscarpmusketry gallerywith drop ditch

Right caponier withcommunicationgallery linking keep tofort

Magazine buildingsserving as bonnetswith low musketryparapets on roofs

Salient caponier

Left caponier (access from keep)

Main gate

GlacisRectangular Keep

Ditch


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three emplacements, placed belowground, and capable of storing 197shells/cartidges each. Above these,at ground level, stood the ammunitionserving rooms, the roofs of whichwere fitted wit 'bonnets' (loopparapets pierced with loopholes) forinfantry fire.

The most unique feature of this fortwas its rectangular keep, a single-storey blockhouse type of structurebuilt in stone and designed to house asmall garrison of sixteen men, twosergeants and an officer. The menslept in a single barrel-vaulted roomon one side of the building and theofficers in three smaller vaults onthe other side, the two separated bya vaulted corridor in which stood acentral staircase leading to theterrace, which was itself surroundedby a high four-step banquette andparapet.The walls of the keep were piercedby a total of 12 musketry loopholesand were defended by threecaponiers, one of which served as acaponier of communication linkingthe keep to the body of the fort (seereconstruction drawings, right).The southern face of the keep,guarding the main access path intothe fort, was the most heavilydefended, fitted with four loopholesand a spur-shaped caponier. Thekeep had no gate or door and wasonly accessible from inside the fort.The main gate into the fort itself wassituated on the left hand side of thegorge, flanked by the keep.

Lt. Gen. Nicholson and Maj. GenGoodenough, inspecting Fort St.Rocco in 1888, found a number offaults inherent in the design of thework. They believed it to be 'verycramped, owing to the interior beingalmost filled up by the keep and itsglacis.' The keep, in particular, theyfound to be 'really unnecessary', andthe 'work would have been betterwithout it.' Projecting above everypart of the fort, it was seen as a

Author's graphic reconstruction showingvarious cutaway views of the interior of thekeep and its caponiers.

liability as it provided a conspicuousskyline and an 'excellent mark forships to fire at'. Theirrecommendation was to cut downthe 'useless' stone parapet andbanquette to roof level.

In the end, the whole keep waseventually swept away and a largefort, devoid of any keep was plantedin its stead. A few elements of theold fort, however, particularly the

front of the work with its ditch andcounterscarp, including the twogalleries have survived, albeit inruins.

For further reading see Stephen C.Spiteri, British Military Architecture inMalta (Malta, 1996), 241-252 andQuentin Hughes, Britain in theMediterranean and the Defence of herNaval Stations (Liverpool, 1981).All artwork, copyright of Stephen CSpiteri 2008


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A MEDIEVALTOWERAT QRENDI?

byDr Stephen C Spiteri

An important component in thedefence of the Maltese throughoutits history has been the tower. Bythe late 1300s, the Maltese islandsalready seem to have acquired anetwork of such elements, many ofwhich appear to have been privatelyowned. Others, like the one which

stood in the plain of Burmarrad,seem to have formed part of royalfiefs and were granted in return formilitary service. The growing threatof Muslim corsair razzie towardsthe late fifteenth century led to theadoption of a system of coastalwatchposts. An attempt, in 1488, bythe islanders to get the king of Sicilyto build them a strong tower on theisland of Comino, however, provedfutile. At least one small coastalwatch tower is known to have beenbuilt during this period, at the mouthof the Grand Harbour (Tarf il-Ghases). Matteo Perez D’Aleccio’smap of Malta at the time of theGreat Siege depicts around eleventowers spread across thecountryside. Some of these, althoughhaving long since disappeared, arealso known through documentarysources. Torre Falca, which onceguarded the road from Mgarr,soldiered on well into the eighteenthcentury.

The nature of Maltese medievaltowers, however, is little understood

owing to the nearly total absence ofsurviving structures. The only twosources of information are theremains of the base of a circulartower at Xlendi, in Gozo, and,perhaps, Torri Tal-Kavalier inQrendi. The latter, long believed bymany historians as being a sixteenthor seventeenth century work, needsto be re-evaluated in the light of its

Author's graphicreconstruction of the

Qrendi Tower and itsadjoining cluster of

late medievalbuildings (left), based

on existingstructures.

One of the buildingsappears to have been a

church that was latertransformed into a barn.Following page, top left,

Early 20th centuryphotograph of Qrendi

Tower showing clearly itsoctagonal form, box-

machicolations (detail topright) and projecting rain

water spouts(Maltese 'mizieb' - sing.)


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various archaic architecturalfeatures and contextual setting.Qrendi Tower’s octagonal plan,pointed internal arches, heavy use ofmachicolation, and total absence ofgun loops, together with the fact thatit forms part of a medieval complexof buildings (including what alsoappears to have been a church - seedrawing on opposite page), arepossible indications of a pre-1530origin. If so, it reveals a high level ofworkmanship and shows that towerdesign in late-medieval Malta wasnot confined to simple rectangulartemplates, of the type described byMgr. A. Mifsud’s in his work LaMilitia e le Torre Antiche diMalta.The remains of the base of XlendiTower, likewise built with fine,smooth-faced ashlar reveal that thiswas a large structure with acircular-plan. If D’Aleccio’sillustrations of the Maltesecountryside can be trusted for theirdetail, than it would seem thatcircular towers were not anuncommon feature in the locallandscape.The basic defensive device of theMaltese medieval tower seems tohave been the piombatoio, or box-machicolation, the drop-box knownas the gallerija tal-mishun, abalcony-like structure that wasprojected outwards on stone corbelsand used for dropping projectiles and

boiling oil on assailants. QrendiTower has eight, one on each face,while Gauci Tower in Naxxar, atower built privately around the timeof the arrival of the knights in Malta,has nine, has three on each face.Drop-boxes remained a commonfeature of towers and rural buildingsin Malta well into the eighteenthcentury.

Author'scutaway graphic

reconstruction of GauciTower at Naxxar, with

detail of one of its'galleriji tal-mishun',

shown in the photograph,above.

Documents

Arx Journal Volume 6 2008