ART.II SEC.2
BAYAN (BagongAlyansangMakabayan), JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP
TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Inde-pendiente), BISHOP ELMER
BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO
LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER,
petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO
MERCADO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO
FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO
BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.G.R. No. 138570.
October 10, 2000.*
Facts:On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States
of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized,
among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory
by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their
defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United
States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951.
Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft.In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States
negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected
the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security
which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military
bases in the Philippines.With the expiration of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted between
the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the
defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the
United States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense
Treaty.
ISSUES: Does the VFA have binding effect upon the states
concerned? Does the VFA violate the prohibition against nuclear
weapons under Article II, Section 8?(ISSUE FOR ART.2 SEC.8)
RULING: Yes.In international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon
states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers. International law continues to make
no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they are
equally binding obligations upon nations. In our jurisdiction, we
have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even
without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.Thus, no less
than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity
with all nations.
No.military bases established within the territory of another
state are no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by
new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided
missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the
sea even for months and years without returning to their home
country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes
for a land-home base not only of military aircraft but also of
military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are mobile as
compared to a land-based military headquarters.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
petitions are hereby DISMISSED.(Ruling for section 8 also)
Lim v Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002Facts:
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as
well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents be
restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and
that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered
issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition against
the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being
illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed
forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao
to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
"Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the
largest combined training operations involving Filipino and
American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United
States in 1951.
The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately
rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by
President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that
occurred on September 11, 2001.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P.
Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were
joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both
party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on
February 11, 2002.
Held: The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are
prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine
territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops
actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the
guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? The Court
cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south,
as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule,
it does not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per
se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or
impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be
established in accordance with the rules of evidence. It cannot
accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation
that the Arroyo government is engaged in "doublespeak" in trying to
pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign
troops on native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate
on what is really happening in Mindanao. Wherefore, the petition
and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed
J.B.L. Reyes vsBagatsing GR No. 65366 October 25,
1983Facts:Retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the
Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for a permit from the City of Manila
to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 starting
from Luneta to the gates of the United States embassy. The
objective of the rally was to peacefully protest the removal of all
foreign military bases and to present a petition containing such to
a representative of the Embassy so it may be delivered to the
United States Ambassador. This petition was to initially compel the
Mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on the application
for a permit but it was discovered that a denial has already been
sent through mail. It also included a provision that if it be held
somewhere else, permit may be issued. The respondent mayor alleges
that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation of
the resolutions during the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the Philippines is a
signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to
comply with such generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand,
contends that the denial of the permit is a violation of the
constitutional right of the freedom of speech and expression.
IssueWhether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to
hold a peaceful protest rally in front of the US Embassy RulingThe
Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy
to protect the exercise of the rights to free speech and peaceful
assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
could justify the denial of the permit. These rights are not only
assured by our constitution but also provided for in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted
principles of diplomatic relations and human rights, the former
takes higher ground. The right of the freedom of expression and
peaceful assembly is highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional
values.
Tanadavs.angara
Facts:On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then
Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary
Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).(for section 19)
Issue:WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional
powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition
before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos(for section 19)Does the WTO Agreement violates the
mandate of the Constitution specially Section 19,Article II?
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines
vs. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265(2007)Before the Court is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51,
Otherwise Known as The Milk Code, Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes
(RIRR). Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains
provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is
supposed to implement.
Issue:whether respondents officers of the DOH acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of
the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
Ruling:The Court notes that the following international
instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1) The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be
taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and
inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the
health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are
provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy
and lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions
regarding the use or marketing of breast milk substitutes.
The definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term
"milk company" the entities defined separately under the Milk Code
as "distributor" and "manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in
Section 5(w) the products manufactured or distributed by an entity
that would qualify it as a "milk company," whereas in the Milk
Code, what is used is the phrase "products within the scope of this
Code." Those are the only differences between the definitions given
in the Milk Code and the definition as re-stated in the RIRR. Since
all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to
both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no harm in the
RIRR providing for just one term to encompass both entities. The
definition of "milk company" in the RIRR and the definitions of
"distributor" and "manufacturer" provided for under the Milk Code
are practically the same. The Court is not convinced that the
definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR would bring about
any change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and
"manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined under the
Milk Code. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the
provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective,
purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable
regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare
and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal
restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause
of the Constitution.WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED.
Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012
dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra
vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from
implementing said provisions.
Shangri-la
Before the Court is this Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Developers Group of Companies, Inc. (DGCI) praying for
the reversal of this Courts Decision of March 31, 2006.The
certification of non-forum shopping submitted by petitioners is
insufficient; 2. The word Shangri-La and S logo were adopted and
used by the Kuok Group as part of their corporate names and the
names of their hotels; 3. Petitioners claim of legal and beneficial
ownership of mark and logo is baseless and unwarranted; 4. Change
of theory from owner to one who may be damaged as entitled to
relief is not allowable; 5. Finding of registration in patent
offices in different countries around the world is inaccurate; 6.
DGCIs registration of the Shangri-La mark and the S logo is valid
because there was at least two months use thereof prior to
application; 7. Section 2-A of R.A. No. 166 requires the actual
commercial use of trademarks in the Philippines pursuant to the
principle of territoriality applicable to trademarks. Hence,
petitioners use of subject marks outside of Philippine territory
did not confer on them any ownership rights thereto under
Philippine laws; 8. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals failure to find any bad faith on the part of DGCI is
conclusive on the Supreme Court; 9. DGCIs use of the subject marks
in the Philippines is entitled to protection under the
territoriality principle of trademarks.
Ruling:It would be a great injustice to adjudge the petitioners
guilty of infringing a mark when they are actually the originator
and creator thereof.Nor can the petitioners separate personalities
from their mother corporation be an obstacle in the enforcement of
their rights as part of the Kuok Group of Companies and as official
repository, manager and operator of the subject mark and logo.
Besides, R.A. No. 166 did not require the party seeking relief to
be the owner of the mark but any person who believes that he is or
will be damaged by the registration of a mark or trade name.
