Art - The Fungibility of Force

7/27/2019 Art - The Fungibility of Force

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2 Part : S t r a t e g i e s the Use o orcefrom using theirs. No other political d i p l o m t or m i l i b e n e f i t isRobert Jervis and Kenneth c o n t r Jervis asserts

e c t s of nuclear weapons on m a t i o n a l politics are powerful and pervasiveand W a l t z nuclear w e a p o n s a force for peace making not onlynuclear but also m conventional wars less likely between s t t e s p o s s e o r e n J o y protection.

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The Fungibilityof Force

ROBERT J. RT

FORCE AND N RCHYIn anarchy force is integral to foreign policy because military power can bewielded not only forcefully but also p e a c e f l y . The forceful use of militarypower is physical: a cripples or destroys the possessions of anotherstate. The peacefuJ use of i l i t power is intimidating: a 8tate n s t o hcripple or but actually do 80 To use m i l i t power forcefully8 to wage to use 1t p e a c e : is to t h r e a w O n l y when diplomacy ha8

failed is g e n e r a l l y waged. Mainly hope that be a v o i d e d r r e a t s usually made. For any given state war is the exception not the rule in its

relations with other c o u n t r i because most of the time a given at peacenot war. Consequently states military power more frequently in thepeaceful forceful mode

When used forcefully the ' e c t s of m i l i t power are to identify. Astate unleashes its military forces and it either objectives or fails to.The adversary is defeated and coerced; victorious and unbowed; orthe battle is fought to a draw. Used in force is a blunt instrument but it canachieve decisive results if wielded hen used f u l l e m p l o ytheir military power in more subtle and therefore in less well defined ways. Used

p e a c e f u l 1 i r y power is held ready and its exact influence on politicaoutcomes becomes more c u l t to trace. The w a g i n g use of poweris akin to a powerful flood: it washes away all before it. The f u l use of mil-

power is ak in to a g r a v t i o n a l f i e l m o n g large object8 in space: it affectsall motion t h a t place but it produces its effects imperceptibly. The e c t s

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4 obert J rtof 0 0 d s dramatic and easy to pinpoint; those of gravity seem more mundaneand are harder to discern. A 00d demonstrates 1ts e c t s by its presence; a grav-

o n a l field by its a b s e n c . M o s t of the t i m e effect of military power looks l i k e g r a v i t y e r e f l e u s e f u l n of i l i t p o w e r

not be equated sitnply physical use. Short of waging war or playingchicken in a c r i s I D i l i power shapes m o r e by its peacetime by its forceful u s e . n 0 focus only physical use of mil

power is to miss most of what most states do most time e m i lpower at their disposalTbe peaceful use of p o w e r may be less decisive than its wartime use

does not peacetime e c t s insignificant. c o n t r : peaceful use of military power explains why it remains central to statecrafi

Lurking behind the scenes unstated but e x p l i c l i e s military m u s c l e gives meaning posturing of the diplomats. Especially for great butfor the lesser ones too military power n d e r g i r d s other instruments of statecrafi. Diplomacy is the striking of compromises by with differing perspectives and clashing interests. T h e r e many a c t o r s go into the fashioning ofdiplomatic a g r e e m e n but central to each is a b o u t the consequences of failure. Fear of failure combined with the k n o w l e d g e force used ifagreement is not reached help produce a g r It is the ultimate ability ofeach its military u m e n t d i s c i p l i n e s diplomats.f a s h i o n to use force plays the sarne role in bargaining among nat lO ns

t h a t r r e a t to strike plays in labor-management n e g o l O . r r e a t ofa destructive war or a prolonged strike represents a s t r o p h i cdown that the t i e s would prefer to avoid. The breakdown e r w i t hdesire to avoid it work to v e n t it Environments where nothingprevent O p h i c breakdowns from o c c u the will of the par.

are called permissive realms. In such r e a l r r fear of failure anessential ingredient for s u c c In permissive realms of breakdown need not be made explicit butcan be left implicit and still be e c u v e . n e r e a t to use force (or to strike) not be articulated a u s e all parties understand that it is an integraI part of thesituation. Tbe threat cannot be disowned Tbe right to strike i n h e r e n t t u r eof collective n i n g ; s i m i l a r l y right of every state to resort to force is

parcel of international politics.n permissive realms m o r e o v e r often more effective if leftimolicit. When one makes an e x p l i c i t 1t the pressure

a g a i n s t b e e n d i r t e d to follow suit. Threat spawnsc o u n r r e a t so on. Voluntary m e n t m a y b estymied escalatory process because threats stiffen the b a r g a i n e r sharden their t i o n s . Implicit h r e a on the other hand have a bet1er chance ofavoiding the escalatory d y n a m i c can more easily produce agreement butonly desire of both p a r t i a v o i d breakdown is strong. Whether explicit

THE OF FORCE 5or implicit threats remain an integral feature of statecraft and it is these threatsthat r o d u c e gravitational effect of military o w e r . n a t in tum to theother instruments of t a t e more "punch" would w i s e have. nshort in a permissive like anarchy where i t n p l i c i t e a t s force bolsters diplomacy

C o e r c i o n e r e f o r e is to a political frarnework what a political framework isto a m a r k e t s a r y but sufficient c o n d i t i o n for e f f e c t i v efiructioning. An efficient marke depends u p o n expectation by its participants

t h a t rules goveming their economic interactions will be s t a b l e isthe political frarnework in which m a r k e e x i s t that provides these rnles. Withoutsuch a frarnework markets firuction poorly. If for exarnple seizure of assets isarbitrary aud r e q u e r private investrnent will be discouraged. f a state can alterthe prices of goods at will i n v e s t r n e n w i l l be skewed. f no punishment e x i sfor stock market r a u d either fraud will become or would-beers of stock will need to hire their own stock-fraud s c r e e n e To function well.free markets must be embedded in a p o l i t i f r a m e w o r k that e n f o r c rnles for stable economic exchanges. As the British historian E. H. put lt:

science of economics presupposes a given political order and cannot bet a b 1 y studied in isolation from politics."

Similarly the study of politics cannot t a b l y studied in isolation fromcoercion. Political u c t u r domestic or intemational cannot exist apart from its t a t e group cau get its way through the use of o r c e publicorder will break down might will make mafiosos will replace o v e m m e d c o n s will ensue u n t i l l i n e s drawn power a l a n c e s

l i s h e d uneasy peaces ensue. When the coercive power of govemment breaksdown force becomes privatized. When force is privately held it creates gangsterism; when publicly held it a t e s government. t is a state's legitimatemonopo1y use of force that creates the bedrock n d i t i o n for a stab1edomestic political order. the r o l e c o e r c i o n plays in o m affairs e l p sus to understand why it l a y s e v e n larger role in a e r m i realm like international politics. f force is an important element in politics within a t i o n it must be more so for politics among nations. When e s t s clash domestically mat1ers usual1y do not get out of hand because all sides k u o w t h e r e ultimate discipline of forceful coercion by the state. When interests clashinternationally reasonableness persuasion and logic much less weight they do domestically because there is no centra1 government standing in thebackground to euforce them. Instead h e r e separate states each of which pos ltS own coercive in a r n o u n t s . International poligangsterism but it resembles it in at least one respec t: all states havethe need to be privately armed because there is no legitimate public coercive b o v e them. As Kenneth Waltz aptly put it n o l i t i S bedxe liltma mU0 Inmtermuonalpoliucs force serves not only nltima


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6 R o b e lratio but indeed first and one. In domestic politics force has beensub]ccted to centraIgovemmentd conIZO1 mInternatIonal poHUCSIt has notConsequently statesm anarchy cannot d1spense wuh somethmg that evennational g o v e r r l e n t s cannot do without. .POWER ASSETS: COMPARISONS AND CONFUSIONSSo far 1 have a r g u e d force is integraI to statecmhbecause mternauonal po1itics i8 anarchic. By i t s e f factma kes force furlEIblc to a degec:Exactly howz z z z ; 1 2 2 3 3 : 2 : 2 t z z z : : t t J Z Z Z :questions. F i r s 1 a rough the of the main

i t i q u e itComparing Power C o m p a n n g e m s t r u m e n statecraft accord>ng to their u n g i b a dif

ficult task. We do not have a body of empirical studies that systematicallyana1yze the comparative fungibi1ity of a state's p o w e r s e t s The few e s w e

d o h v e v e n o u g h e f u l l y done focus on only one or two instru more concerned with looking at a s s e s p e c i issue areasa n J I t h c o m p a d n E a s s e t s a c m areas. As a

cient evidence to c o m p power assets according fimgibility. Through alittle logic however we p r o v i d e some a l 1 p a r k t i m a Consider what power assets a owns. They include: popu1ation-the size education 1eve1 and sk:ills of c i t i z e m y ; geography the 1 0 c a t i o d n a t -ural resource endowment g o v e m effectiveness of p o i t - s y s t v a l u e n o r r n s a and stands for the r e o f

{ of a p p e a l to f o r e i g n e w e a l level s o u r and l C l l v e l o m y ; l i t i c a l sk:ill and: L n t z z t t Z Z L h t i 3 f t z i : t z t Z : v e r s a g e o g r a p h y because m of 1 a e and p o i t i l

: e x t which the other values and a t i o n high1yable dependiug r e s p t i v e 1 y content of the values and 00 the educationand sk:ill of the p o p u 1 a c e ; m i 1 i t power somewhere between w e a l t h skill one hand and geography and g o v e r n on the other hand butcloser f o r r n e r 1atter In rank order r r e e most fungib1e power

a s s e a p p e a r to be w e a l politica1 sk:ill and m i l i power.Economic wealth has the h i g h e s t n g i b i l i t y . It easiest to convert into m M l i q 1 3 1 d assctofaIL n a m 4 m o n e y W M c h t u r n can be used to buy

F U N G I B oFFoRCE 7many different things such as a good press top-flight international negotiatorssmart 1awyers cutting-edge techno10gy b a r g n i n g power in intemational orga

n i z a t i o and so on. also n t e g r a l n t i l i power. A rich m o r e mi1itary p o w e r poor one. A t h a t is 1arge and rich can if it

so chooses generate especial1y 1arge a r u o u n military power. The old mercanti1ist ins ight t hat g e n e r a t e s power (and vice versa) is stillPo1itical sk:ill is a second p o w e r fuugib1e. By definitionsk:illed p o 1 i o p e r a t o r s ones who can operate well in different po1icyrealms b e c a u s e have mastered the techniques of persuasion and iufluence. equal1y adept at selliug t r a d e a g r e e m e n wars or foreign aid totheir citizens. Po1itical1y sk:i1lfu1 statesmen can with ease differentpo1icy realms. Indeed that is what we common1y mean by a po1itical1y sk:illfu11eader--


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8 Robert J. ArtConllating Sufficiency and

view argued here-that military power possesses a e l a t i v e l y e g rfungibility s c o n v e n t i o n a l o m R a l O n l y a c view is that put forward by David B o dwin, who a r g u m i l i t power is of

restricted l i t y . Bo dwin assertse m o s t i m p o r weaknesses d i t i o n a l e o r i z i n g about intemational politicshave tendency to e x a g g e r a t e effectiveness of p o w e r r e s o u r c e s tendency to treat military P?wer u l t i m a t e rod to which forms of

power should be compared L view power follows from his more genero argument that

Dower assets tend to be situationally s p e c i c . B y a t h e m e a n s functionsas a p o w e r s o u r c e in one - c o n t i n g e n c y framework may be irrelevant inanother. f s s e t s situationo ly or domain s p e c they are not easily a b l e from one policy reo m to In fact, as Bo dwin a g u e s : P o l i t -ical power r e s o . . . tend to be mllch less liquid t h a n o n o m i c resources ;and o though power r e s o u r c their of fimgibility no politico

s o u r c e beFIls to approach the dqree of fmgh1tlty of money EFor d w i r two consequences flow from the n - s p e C l nature otpower resources. First, we cannot rely on a gross s m e n t ofa overo 1power assetsm order to4etCHIme how well H W1ll dommy speciftareaInstead, we must a s s e s s s t r e n g o f t h e o u r c it wields s p e c domain. Second, the g e n e r a l l y low u n g r of p o w e o u r c e s

e x p l a what I d w i n a d o x of unrea1ized power : the fact aS t r o n g he tells us , is s i m p l e state at issue has assets m domain where it

p r e v and weak ones does notOn the face of Bo dwin's argllment is reasonable. It i n t u i t i v e senseto argue, for e x a m p l e armies are better at d e f e a t i n g l than t h e y at

p r o m o t exchange o so makes good sense to t a k e c a r e f u l l y we assess what assets a state can bring a specific e m o r e n e - t l l n e d our feel wi1l be of what the uchIy accompl on issue. To o w e : aredomain

t o a d absurd. Eqllo ly absurd, however, 11a s s e t s domain specific d e g r that a gross inventory of aoverall power not a r e l i a b even if on y a rough, guide to howwell the l i k e l y to do given domain. A s s e t s not equo b i l i and fine-tuning does not mean t i c a l l y o tering assessmellts

Wbat does mean for the fllngibility of military power? Shon d weaccept view about it? 1 r g u e we shon d no t. To see why, let uslook in greater at what else he has to say

T IE Y O F FORCE 9Bo dwin adduces four n p l e s that purport to d e m o n s limited versatility of military power.3 The examples are h y p o t h e t i c nonetheless

to ano yze because they are eqllivo ent to thought e x p e r i m e n n p l e sPossession of nuclear weapons is not just i r r e l e v to securing the electionof a U.S. citizen as UN s e c r e t y - g e n e r a l ; it is a hindrance

owner of a political power resource, such to deter atomicattack, is likely to have difficulty converting this resource into anotherresource that would, for i n s t a n c o u n to become the leader ofthe Third WorldPlanes loaded with nllclear weapons may s t r e n g a state' s ability to deternuclear attacks but may be 1ryelevant to rescumg the Pueblo [a u s.destroyerseized by the North e a n s in early 1968] on shortThe ability to get other countries to refrain from attacking one's homeland is

ability to win the hearts and m i n d the people in afaraway land [the reference is to the t n a m War]4m i n g l y persuasive at first glance , the examples are , in fact, highly misA IIttle reEEUon about each wdl show how Baldwm has cozzm Hed thecardinal error of o n f l a t i r insufficiency of an instrument fllngi

b i l i alld, therefore, how he has made military l o o k more domain s p e c in each example than it reo ly isConsider i r s t United Nations Throughout the United a t i o n s

t h e U n i States never SOllght, nor did it f a v o r the election of an e r i c a n s e c r e r y - g e n e r f t had money and bribes would have been of as little use as a

n u c l r e a t The Soviet Union would have v e t o e d J u s t a swould have vetoed a Soviet national as s e c r e t y - g e n e r Neither w O l l l d havec o u n t e n a n c e d e a p p n t m e n t of a z e n f r o m or from one of its clients t a t h e r is clear: the Cold War o l a r i z e d United Nations between East West, and l l < s l l p e r p o w e r was willing to al10w the other to undueinfIuence institution could v e n t it_ f o r e because neitherp o w e r would have ever agreed on a-national othercamp, sought r y - g e n e ranks of the n e u t r a l nations. why Cold War g e n e r a l came uno igned Scandinavian or Worid nations Dag l l I l o l d f r o m frorn Burma. for example), particlarly duting the heyday of the Cold a r . m s arrangement moreover,

e d b o h u p ? o w e r s i n r e s t s . r a r e w h e n bothe I I m t e d NatIons could be helpfU1, UN mediatIon wasmade more effect1vebecause it had a s e c r e t a r y g e n who was not o igned.Finally, even

g e n e : r a should not conclude thatu has nothing to do w1th AmencaI


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10 Robert J the n s t i t has been c l e a So, too , f a c t s t e m s from position as theworld'g strongest nation, a position deriving from both it8 economic and m i l i t ' e n g t h o u g h nu ear cannot buy n e r a l elections,great m i l i power brings great influence in an international i z a t i o n oneofwhose m purposes, after all, is to achieve collective security through the r e a t or use of force.

The World example is equally misleading. To see why, let us perform asimple experiment. o u g h a Third World leader who had anne d his

w i t h n u c l e w e a p o n s might not rise automatically top of the ThirdWorld Dack , he or she would become a mighty important actor o n e t h e l e s s how C h i n a and Jndia, h a v e nuclear weapons, would be

viewed if they did not o s s e s s think of how r I r or Libya, whichdo not h a v e would be viewed did. For the fonner set of states,nuclear weapoDs add global political t a n d i n . for the latter set, their mere

a t t e m p acquire them have caused their prominence to rise considerably. Bythemselves, nuclear weapons cannot buy the top slot Third World or elsewhere. Neither economic w e a l nor military power, nor any other p o w e ralone, top slot is reserved for the t h a t a s s e s the in all the key categories of power. Although they do not top position,nuclear weapons nevertheless do significantly enhance the international inHuenceof any s t a t e p o s s e s s e s : f f i if nfluence i8 measured by how seriously ais taken by p a r t i c u l Baldwin i8 c o r r nuclear weapons are not readily convertible into another instrumental asset.

t h o u g h point is i r r e l e v a n t : add u l t i m a s o u r f o r w h i c hall the o t h e r a mustered-political influence

The ueblo . p l e is the most complex cases, and the when x a m i n e d that p r o v i d e s strongest support for Baldwin's g e n e r a l g u m e n t

Even when reexamined, this strong case far short of e m o n s t r a t i n g military power has little fungibility. facts ueblocase are t f o r w u a r y 1968, Korea s e i z e d U.S.S. ueblo an intelligence s h i p with sophisticated e l e c o n i c eavesdropping capabilities was listening in on Korea. and did not r e l e a s e ship's crew members until 22 December 1968,almost a y e a r they had been captured. K o r e a c l a i m e d shippatrolling inside its twelve-mile i t o r i a l waters l i r r United denied

claim because its radio f i x ueblos h o w e d it was patrolling f i teen and a hal f nautical miles f r o m nearest K o r e a n land point. Irnme-

I y a f t e r United States beefed up c o n v e n t i o n a l and nuclearforces in East Asia, ending Navy and Air Force e s e r v i s 350tional aircraft to South Korea, as w e l l m o v m g carrierU S.S. : e r prise and its task force within a few minutes' fiying time ofWonsan, K o r e aSome of the aircraft sent to K o r e a n bases and those Enterprise were

THE FuNGmILITY OF FORCE 11nuclear capable. According to President Johnson, several military options wereconsidered but ultimately e c t e dmining Wonsan harbor; nning e r N o K o r e h a r b o r s ; interdicting c o a s s h i p p i n g ; a North Korean selected North Korean targets and navaI gunIn each case we d e c i d e d the risk possible accomplishment100 s m a l l n o t w to m e n t and lose the sale, 1consistentlywarned myadvisers 5

The American government's d e n i its military measures, and its subsequentdiplomatic efforts, were to no avail. North Korea refused to release the crew. Jnfact, right from the of the c r i s i s e N o K o r e n e g o t i a t o r s made clearthat only an American confession that it had spied on N orth Korea and hadintruded into its territorial waters would s e c u r e crew's release. For elevenmonths the United S t a t c o n t i n u e d to insist that the ueblo engaged inillegal activity, it had violated K o r e a s t o r i a l O n l y on22December, when General Gi1bert o o d w a r d e U . S . p r e n t a n v e negotiations, sig as m e n t in which the U.S.

did North Korea release The American admission of guilt however, m a d e under protest: immediately before sigrring thes t a t e m e n t government disavowed what it a b o u t to sign; and e d i a t e l ya f t e r s l g n m g govennnent disavowed what it had just n i t t e d

Although the facts of the ueblo c a s e g h t f o r w a r d to be put is no1. TIris much is clear: nuclear weapons, nor any ofAmerica s other military assets, a p p e have secured the crew s release.Equally clear, h o w e v e r none of its o t h e r s e c u r e d the release

conclude f r o m military power, diplomacy,and whatever o t h e r w e r e employed to s e c u r e crew's release have low

f u n g i b C l e a r l y would be a foolish conclusion to draw. There was onlysecured the release: the public humiliation of the United

States. f nothing but hnmiliation worked, it is reasonable to c o n c l u d e humiliation o r m o l i k e l y quickly North Korea's goal. adversary is finuly fixed on humiliation, posturing, economic b r i b p l o m a t i c pressure, economic h r e a other tool used in moderation is notlikely to succeed. Only measures, such as waging economic

b l o c k a d e likely to be successful. At that o i n t costs of such actions mustbe weighed the benefts. One clear lesson we d r a w from the ueblocase is that sometimes t h e r e tasks for which none traditional tools of

suffcien t. s i t u a t i o n s rare, but they do on occasion occur.The ueblo was one of themThere is, however, a second and i m p o r t point to be drawnexample. Although it that Am erica' s mil itary pow er did not l e a s e nevertheless , there o t h e r s o n s to undertake the military


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2 obert Jbulldop fheumtcd States subsequently c n E a g e d . Neither the United States norSouth Korea knew why the l h a d seized the PMbloe besident Johnson andhis advisors however s p e c u l a t h e s e r e l a t e d to the Tet e n S l v ein a n 1 l a t h e g a n e 1 E J I t d a y s aftrthepuebL0 s a p t u r e T h e y a s o n e d t h a tpueblo S SCIZUYCWas dehberately tlmed to d s t f a c t United States and to

z z r J ? s t t t z A J A f : ; 2 2 1 2 : J Z J Z Z : : ; Z Z Z Z E ; 1 : t E E : 1 : iPark h e United States feared t h a t o u g h these two incidents and perhapsers to come North Korea y i n g v e r t American m i l i s o u r c e s fromto Korea and to make the South Koreans c i e n t l y n e r v O U S

would bring their two divisions f g h t i n g e t n a r n back homeThe b l o s s e i z u problems U n i t e d S to get tS ship back; how to d e t e r from engaging in nrovocahve and how to reassure the South Koreans c i e n t l y keep their troopS in V i e t n a r nnot first were p r i r r purpos sub u e n t A m e r -ican i l i t I d u p in East A f t e r all the S t a t e s did not need addi

o n a l f o r c e s to p r e s s u r e m i l i t to r e l e a s e crew. Therewere a l r e 100000 e r i c o o p s in East m i l i t b u i l d ukowever would be a useful s1Enalfor deterrence of hrther provocations and c e o f i if North archives not blow whetber deterrence of furtheEProvocauon wozkex because we do notknow what additioual p l a n s h a d . What we do know is that the reassurance funcuon of the buildup d14work South Korea keptus divlsmnsm Z h i t Z ; : u t t Z P J Z Z Z l : T Z Z Z Z Z

1 t 1 s wrong to draw dle conclusiond Iat the Pueblo casc h o w s force haslittle f u n g i b i l i even though military postnring a p p e not to have g o t t e n

c r e w a s e dBaldwin sanalexample1s equaly problemauc p o i n t is to s h o w

$ 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 ; E L t r z ; t z z ; ; t z zm a dISIant lmd Presumably however the o i n t o f exarnple is to a r g u ethe latter task is not merely different f r o m but also m o r e 1fis the asscdmtHIs unexceptIonable c o m p e l l i n g g o v e r n m e n tchange its behavior a l w a y s been an n t l y more t a s k d e t e r ~ring a EEven govenment fkom attacking oncIhomeland.Not o n l y 1 s m e l l e n c e i f f c u l t i n t e : d d C H e n c e p u t i M m M C C O S I I L I C d l than interstate c o m p e The ability force the adversaries in a civil lay down their arms and negotiate an end to

dispute is a notoriously d i f f c u l t Chinese civil war 1940s

THE FuNGIBILITY OF FORCE 13 n e s e civil m 1960s Bosnian civil the 1990s all

a g i c a l l y show. i a l l y c u l t task in a situation like 1 a r nwhere the outside power s intemal ally faces an a d v e r s a r y has the force ofnationa1ism on its side. (Ho Chi was greatest nationalist fgure of

twentieth was widely recognized as such Vietnarn.) t ishard to p r e v in a civil w h e u the adversary monopolizes the appeal ofnationalism. Equally important however it is hard to prevail in a civil out to force n e United States could not have e t o a r n by forcealone but it would have had no chance to win without itNo thoughtful analyst of military w o u l d therefore disagree w i t h fol1owing p r o p o s i t i o n s can be teased out of the fourth n p l e : (1) power works better for defense than for c o n q u (2) military power alone cannot guarantee pacification once c o n q u has taken (3) military poweralone is not suffcient to compel a to a c c e p t legitimacy of its g o v ~

e r n m e n t ; (4) compel1ence is more c u l t d e t e r r e n c e . reasonable s t a t e m e n T h e r e is however also that should be drawn f r o m exarnple: (5) when an outside power arrays itself in a civil wrong sideof nationalism not only will force be insufficient to but too will all the other tools of statecraft-money political skil1 p r o p a g so on. Insuch cases m i l i power suffers from the n e m s u c i e n c y as the other

m e n t s n a t makes it no more but no less fungible t h e y a r e .All Baldwin s n p l e s demonstrate an important fact about militarypower: used alone it achieve many things. S u r e l y an l m p o

point to remember but is it is peculiar to military power alone or thatp r o v e s it has little fungihility? Surely not. lndeed no single u m e n t ofstatecraft is ever sufficient to attain any s i g n i c a n t f o r e i g u ~ p o l i c y objective-afact 1 shall s u f f i c i e n c y _ two reasons i s . F i r ; states

m a n m u s t . t 1 c l p a t e counteractions that will be undertaken by the states he istrying to inftuence. They will attempt to counter his stratagems oftheirown; they will use different types of u m e n t s to the is using;aud they will attempt to compensate for their weakness in one area with their

o t h e r . A ~ p r e p a r e d influence attempt therefore requires a u l t i ~u m e n t a l approach to deal likel y counters to it. S e c o n d r m p o r ~policy itself has facets. A multifaceted policy by necessity r e q u i rm i n s t r u m e n i m p l e m e n t it. For both reasons important matters

require a statesman to muster several if not all the u m e n t s disposaleven though he may rely more heavily on s o m e others. In sum in statetool s t a n d aloneFor military power then as for the other u m e n statecraft fungibilityshould not be equated with s u f f c i e n c y i n s u c i e n c y should not be equatedwith low fungibility. A given instrument can a of the way to a

gven goal even though it cannot the state all the way there. At one and thetIme an illStrument of statecraft u s e f u l l y i b u t e to attaining many


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2 : i E by to a c h i e v e HOW FORCE CHl VES FUNGffiILITYIf mihtary power1s a vcrsatile insmIment of t a t e c m then exactly how does itachieve its fungibi1ity? What paths through which it can influence e v e n

: 2 3 : 1 ; 2 2 : : ? c Z I Z L C : ; L Z t z z t teach w o r k s u s t r a w i t h examp1es.

SpiJl-Over f f e c

F u N G B I L I T Y OF FORCE 5A spill-over effect can be understood as a prerequisite or a by-product

A s a p : q u i s i the resu t produced by the act of force checking force createss o m e t h i n g is deliberate and viewed as essential in order to reach a given out

in another domain. As a by-product the encounter produces something inanother domain that be beneficial but is incidenta1 or even unintended. Ofcourse what is by-product and what is p r e r e q u i s i h a n g s on what outcomes arevalued in that other domain. Two examp1es will illustrate how the spill-overeffect works and how it manifests itse1f as a prerequisite or a by-product

Examples Banking and Cold War InterdependenceThe first examp1e has to do with banks; the second with e n t history. The

banking examp1e demonstrates the ro e force plays in solvency; the historicaln p l e the r o l e U.S. military power played in t i n g economicinterdependence

F i r s t k i n g e x n p l e . Begin w i t h t i o n : why do we deposit money in a bank? The answer is: we put our money in a bank because we thinkwe it out whenever we want We money is there when we

it In short we believe the bank to be solventSolvency is usually thought of solely in economic terms: a bank is solventbecause it has enough assets to meet its f i n a n liabilities if they are called7 Solvency however is a function not simply of finances but of physicaI safety. Abank s solvency depends on the fact both that its e x c e e d l i a b i l i t i balance sheet black) and that its a s s e t s physically (not easilystolen). Physical security is therefore as important to a solvencyu i d i even though we generally take the former for granted when we astable domestic order. If the banks within a c o u l d be robbed at wiII then itscitizens would not put their money in them. A state makes banks physically

by u s i n g m i l i t power to deter and defend against would-be robbers to compel them to give back the funds if a o b b e r y place are caught and the fnnds o v e r e d . Through its use of its legitimate monopolyon the use of force a state seeks to the threat of forcible seiznre.

s u c c in estabIishing the physical u r i t y of b a n k s it produces oneof the two p r e r e q u i s i required for a bank s solvency.

In in a weIl-ordered state public force suppresses private force. Theeffect suppression is to c r e a generalized stability that s e t s contextwithin which all societal interactions take place. This ' e c t spills over intonumerous e r d o m a i n s d p r o d u c e s m m a n i f e s t a t i o one of which is confidence about the physical n r i t y of a n k s . m s confidence can be viewed as aby-product of the public suppression of private o r as a p r e r e q s 1 t e b a n k i n gsolvency or more sensibly as bothA good historical example of the spiIl -over effect of military power economic interdependence produced among the free w o r l d s o n o m i e s during


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I L I T Y OF FORCE 17would have the political will to rebuild themselves economically. The initial pur.pose of NATO is the key to its (and to the United States-Japan defense treaty)

l o n g l a s t i n g function: t i o n of a politically stable island amidst a turbulent international sea

Second merica's provision of security to its allies in Europe and East dampened their respective concems about German and Japanese militaryrearmament The United States s e n c e protected a l l i e s not only from theSoviets but also from the Germans and the J apanese. Because G e r m a nJapanese military power was contained in a l l i a n c e s the United States dominated and e s p e c because m e r i c a n o o p s were visibly s e n t and within each n a t i G e r m a n y s Japan's n e i g h b o w h i l e did not forgetthe horrors they suffered at the hands of these two during the Second Worldnevertheless were not a l y z e d from cooperating The success European Common Market owes as much to the presence of m e r i c m i l i t a r yp o w e r o n continent of Europe as it does to the vision of men like Monnet The

can be said for the Far East. America's military presence has helped oil thew a t e for Japan s economic dominance there

Third America's m i l i p r e s helped m p e n C O l l i about disparities in relative economic g r o w about vulnerabilities inherent in interdependence which are heightened in an open economic order. Freer tradebenefits all nations but not equally. The most efficient e n e f i t m o s t ; nomic efficiencies can be tumed to effect. Interdependence brings depend e n c i the g r e a t e r more states a l i z e economically. Unequalfrom trade dependencies all too often historically have had adverse

p o l i t i m i l i e f f i Through its provision of military protection to itsa l l i United States mitigated the security extemalities of interdependenceand enabled the Ge rmans and the Japanese to bring their neighbors (America'sallies) i n t o o n o m i c orbits without those neighbors f e a t i n g t G e r m a n orJ apanese military n q u e s t or political domination would follow. security issue dealt w i t h economic p r e d o m i n of the Germans and J apanesewas easier for their neighbors to swallow

Finall yAmerica' s military presence fostered a solidatity that by virtueof being t n e r s a comrnon enemy. That sense of s o I i d helped d e v e l o p determination and the good will necessary to Qvercome theinevitable economic disputes that interdependencies bring. The spill-overeffects of military cooperation against the Soviets political wi to economic openness should not be underestimated t h o u g h are difficult top i n p o i n t Surely o w e v e r sense of o l i d a t i t y good will thatalliance in a common cause bred must have had these spi l-over e f f e c Finally

need to preserve a united front a g a i n s t common enemy put lirnits on how allies and the United States would permit their economic disputes to goThe need to maintain a united o l i t i c a l - m i l i front bounded the inevitable eco

nlic disputes and prevented t h e m escalating into a downward-spiraling


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8 R o b e J . A r t

economic n a t i o l i s m . P o l iJ a p a n e s e m i l i t a r y r e d a m p l i n g of concems about relati ve n s a n ddependmues and the sense Of SOManty aIIOf these were a dcd e r i -can military Europe and the Far East

Linkage Politicssecond way force exerts i n f l u other domains of o l i c y r o u g h) :

: 2 5 : 1 3 3 2 3 : : f z i i jpriced in o l l a r s funcdonaI t e between exchanEemtesmd

cannot be delinked. M o r e o v as the oil-dollar example i l l u s t r a t functional

t : r z z 1 : ; ; 5 : 2 1 : ; T Z Z : : : ; ; : : : f z Z Z : : i t Z I Z A r z t Z Z Z J ; : J Z C: : : : l f i y i 2 : ? k h h : f :I n two b e c o m e linked because a made a o n n e none b e f t e e but

? ; J ; : : ; t : 3 J f Z Z J p l z z c ; 2 : ; 2 ; : Z Z Z Z ta link io order to c o m p e n s a w e a k o on a given i s s u e e i rz r ; ; 2 s t z z r z t z ; E Z J r z r z t ; z zto do somethmg undesirable in the s t r o n g or by promising to doH H i S ;

; ? : : 2I Z i Z f f i c i i s s u e h a v e a r u c i a l u e n c e for a l y s exercise of p o w e r . . . [B]ecause i s s u e s con

THE FuNomlLITY OF FORCE 19nected domains be wholly delinked from one another. If they bed e l i n k e d we should not view them in isolation from e r . e r e f o r e explanation of an outcome in a given d o m a i n is based only on what goeson will always be iocomplete if not doworight wrong. n sumissue linkages e e x p l a t o r y power of a c t e d a l y s i s

n i n g linkages in particular make assets more f u n g i b l e theymight otherwise be Linkage politics is a fact of intemational politicallife. Weshould not expect S t a t e s m e n to make the best deals they canby compensating for weakness in w i t h strength io others. statescan better engage in these c o m p e n s a l i n k a g t h a n can weak ones. T h e y

o n g e r n m o t h a n are weak; c o n s e q u e n t l y e y c a n m o e a s i l y uti-i ze their leverage in the s t r o n g to make up deficit weak ones

p o w e r s also better able to shift l o n g i s s u e order tobuild positions of a n u n g n g t h when necessary. They can for exaroplemore easily generate power when they need to in order to link it to nonm i l i s k s . e r e f o r e because powerrul states can link issues ffiore e a s i l y can weaker ones can compensate for deficiencies better can generate rnoreresources and do so more quickly when needed and can s h i f t greater ease how p o w e : a state is overall r e m a i n s e s s e n t i a l detenninant tohow successful it is i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y ' e s p e c t i v e of how weak it may be gIven moment issue p a r t i c u l d o m a i n . I n linkage politics enhances the advantages of being powerful and boosts the fungibility offorce by enabling it to cross domains.

l e s : D e f i c i Petrodollars nd il PricesThree . . . brief examples show the of state g o a l s served

by constructing such l i n k a gThe first involves the relation between A m e r i and continuing bal c e o f p a y m e n t s deficits g l o b a l alliance system. Tbroughout most of theCold War United States m u a l large balance-of-payments deficitsHistorically no nation has been able to buy more abroad than it sells abroad(import exports) in as huge a volnme and for as long a period as United There a s o n s why it was able to g i n g f r o m liquidity that dollars provided which enabled w o r l d g r o w to general d e n c e i n American economy which caused foreigners to i n v e s tdollar holdings in the United States. Part of the r e a s o n foreigners continuedto take America s continuing ftow of dollars however was an implicit if note x p l i c a d e o for their acceptance of American I O.U. s (deficit doll a r s ) United p r o v i d e d the holders of them G e r m a n s the

Saudis) m i l i protection a g a i n s t enemies. America sm i l i c o m p e n s a t e its lack of fiscal discipline

A second n p l e involves the y c l i n g of e t r o d o l l Af ter the oil pricehikes of the 1970s the OPEC p r o d u c e e s p e c i its Persian Gulf members


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20 R o b e J . A r t

: 2 : r Z Z J J ; ; : 1 : z : c z t z r J i i t ; : ; : z z j Z Z 1 2 1 3 2 ; ; O G : : : : i : : ; : S E i E

: : ; ;them in the States Bodlde cis1ons were of cons1derable economz bene

f i t t o e u m t e 4 S t a t e s PEking sauadollars m zu s gave theAmcncmgovdemment access to a huge pool of fore1EIICapual' ;pncmg oum dollars meant United States could pnnt money to buy oil power hought 3 )

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' H E F ' u N O f f i Y O F FORCE 21a joint Saudi merican naval task force l a r d against ranian attacks on oil

t a n k s i n t h e G Saudis' i n c : their oil production from 9.7miIlion barrels per day 10.3 which h i g h level it could sus

and kept it there for the next ten months. S a u d i t i o n s had a considerableeffect on oil

As in the other cases in this i n s t a n m erican power alone was nots u f f i c i cause Saudi actions to lower oil prices but it was essential becaused u r i n g turbulent period Saudi decisions on how much oil they would pumpwere t e n n i n e d solely by economic factors. True the Saudis the

d e s i of the price hawks which included the ranians had been pumping since 1978 in ordert o lower oil r i c e s Saudis had also violated their longtenn strategy in March 1979 however when they decided to cut oil productionby 1 mbd primarily to a p p e r an a m o v e triggered a rapid increase in oilprices. This pumping followed a political decision to m o v e p l o m a t i cally away from the United States. Only a few months later however the confiict

w i t h i n Saudi ruling farnily between an American- versus an rab-oriented was resolved in a c o m p r o m i s e led to a political reconciliation with United States; and this political decision was followed by another to increaseoil production by 1 mbd r t i n g 1 1979. B e f o r an-r aqSaudi pumping decisions were affected by political calculations about their

s e c u n t which the a t e g l c c o n n t i o n with the mericans played a prominent role. If this in peacetime surely it was so in wartime too. The milprotection announced Americans on September 30 1980 was a condition for the Saudi increase in oil production that followed in

October. Again military power had b o u g h t e c o n o m i c b e n e In sum these . . . exarnples . . . merica's ability to run deficits c y c l i n g and moderate oil prices a l l illustrate just how pervasive hargain

n k a g e s are in international politics and s p e c c a l l y how military power be linked politically to produce them. In al l . . . cases military power was not sufficient. Without however the United States could not have produced the favorable economic o u t C O I D I had achievedNOTES

1. Exactly w h e r e point is is difficult to One could a r g u e more rnili-power is reasonable up u n t i l point where other begin to w o r r y tak:e counteractions. One c o u l d that more amounts of s i v e power will worry more q u i c k l y n o u n t s of defensive power. One could u t h e r m o a r g u epoint where reasonable becomes unreasonable is more dependent perceived intentions of the t h a n on its r n i l i c a p a b i l i t y . These o n a b l e points.chapter 1cannot s e t t l e d e b a b e t w e e n aggressive and defensive r e a l i n o r c 1 show how to distinguish between offense-and-defense dorninant worlds. More militarypower will buy a state more o p t i o n s s t a t e s not c o u n t e r powerful stateunable to ' P U p anning. Offensive rnilitary power is m o r e r e a t -


11/11

22 Robert J rte m n g defensive m i l i power two g u i s h e d ) probablyfungible. Defensive military t h e r e f o r e has less fungibility than o f f e m power,

u n l e of course, a militarily powerful c i d e s to s p r e a d d e f l power overanother state. 1 contest none points. What 1 do m a i n t a however is t h a t mil-

instrument possesses rnore fungibility for the militarily p o w e r s t a t e ther i l y weak this f u n g i b of force argument applies IDost

larly g I p o w e r s especially c a n s u p e r p o w2, David Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (New York: Blackwell, 1989), 151-52,Baldwin first developed g u m e n t in A n a l y s i s and P o l i t i c s World Poli-

tics 31 , o . 1 a n u a r y 1979): 161-94, which p r i n t e d volume of his previous1ypublished essays3, B a l d w i n w e r e not fully developed but consist of only

a sentence or two. e t h e y . e t game because Baldwin u s e d as il1ustrations of his more e r a l point about the 1imits utility of i l i t y p o w e r f a c the did not develop 1ed him view. He was t r y i show

m i 1 i t power is effective than commonly thought. 1p1es to show how versatile power in fact is. Neither Baldwin nor 1, however, canput a number g i b i l i t y of p o w e r and 1 agree p o l i t i c r e s o u r c e begins to a p p r o degree n g i b i l i t y of moneyBaldwin, Paradoxes of Power 5)

4. Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power 133, 134, 1355 Lyndon Baines Johnson he Vantage Point Perspectives of he P r e s i d e n 1 9 6 3

1969 New York: Holt, i n e h 1971), 536.6. 1 have b o r r o w e d term from Emst e v e n o u g b u s i n g f f e r e n t l yhe does. He phrase to e s c r i b e e f f e c t s 1 3 . cooperation on economic mat

t e r s states of Westem Europe could have political relations. g u e dt h a t c o o p e : . t i on economic matters would o v e r m t o political relations, inducegreater c o o p e r a t i o n and lead ultimately to the political integration of WestemEurope. See Emst Haas, Beyond the Nation State Functionalism and lntem ation al Organization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964), 48

7. Solvency is to be distinguished from l i q u i can be solvent but not liquidL i q u refers t o ability of a to meet all its liabilities upon demand. Most bariksare not able to do so ,however, if demands are called at the t i m e . reason ISassets given tied up in n v e s cannot be called back onshort notice, but take time to convert into cash. The function of a central t k : is to solve

l i q u i problem of a nation's banking s y s t by p r o v i d i n g l i q u i shorttenn in order to prevent

2The Sources of Military Doctrine

B R R Y R P OS E N

M I T A R Y ORG NIZ TIONS ND L I T A R Y DOCTRINEH y p o t h s - O t T e n s e D e f e n s e Deterrence

U n c e r t a i n R e d u c t i o n

Z Z Z I : z z t t f l y P offensive

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Art - The Fungibility of Force