ARISTOTLEFOREVERYBODYDIFFICULTTHOUGHTMADEEASY

MortimerJ.Adler

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Copyright©1978byMortimerJ.Adler

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FirstTouchstoneEdition1997

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ISBN0-684-83823-0ISBN:978-0-684-83823-6eISBN:978-1-439-10491-0

CONTENTS

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

PartIManthePhilosophicalAnimal

1.PhilosophicalGames

2.TheGreatDivide

3.Man’sThreeDimensions

PartIIMantheMaker

4.Aristotle’sCrusoe

5.ChangeandPermanence

6.TheFourCauses

7.ToBeandNottoBe

8.ProductiveIdeasandKnow-How

PartIIIMantheDoer

9.ThinkingaboutEndsandMeans

10.LivingandLivingWell

11.Good,Better,Best

12.HowtoPursueHappiness

13.GoodHabitsandGoodLuck

14.WhatOthersHaveaRighttoExpectfromUs

15.WhatWeHaveaRighttoExpectfromOthersandfromtheState

PartIVMantheKnower

16.WhatGoesintotheMindandWhatComesoutofIt

17.Logic’sLittleWords

18.TellingtheTruthandThinkingIt

19.BeyondaReasonableDoubt

PartVDifficultPhilosophicalQuestions

20.Infinity

21.Eternity

22.TheImmaterialityofMind

23.God

EPILOGUEForThoseWhoHaveReadorWhoWishtoReadAristotle

PREFACE

Whentheideaforthisbookfirstoccurredtome,IthoughtofentitlingitTheChildren’s Aristotle orAristotle for Children. But those titles would not haveaccuratelyconveyedtheaudienceforwhomthissimple,easy-to-readexpositionofAristotle’s common-sense philosophy is intended.The audience, I felt,waseverybody—of any age, from twelve or fourteen years old upward.Hence thetitlechosen,and thesubtitle“DifficultThoughtMadeEasy,” togetherwith thestatementthatthisbookisanintroductiontocommonsense.

WhenIsay“everybody,”Imeaneverybodyexceptprofessionalphilosophers;inotherwords,everybodyofordinaryexperienceandintelligenceunspoiledbythesophisticationandspecializationofacademic thought.Nevertheless, IhaveaddedanEpiloguewhichstudentsofphilosophywhocomeuponthisbookmayfind useful as a guide to the reading ofAristotle’s ownworks on the subjectscoveredinthisbook.

My two sons, Douglas and Philip (thirteen and eleven, respectively), readportionsofthemanuscriptasitcamefrommytypewriterlastsummerinAspen.Iamgratefultothemfortheirenthusiasmandtheirsuggestions.

I wish also to express my gratitude to Rosemary Barnes, who read andcriticizedthewholemanuscriptat that time,aswellas tomycolleaguesat theInstitute forPhilosophicalResearchwhogaveme thebenefitof theiradvice—JohnVanDoren,OttoBird,andCharlesVanDoren.Atalaterdate,justbeforethemanuscriptwentintotype,mywife,Caroline,readthewholeofitandmadesuggestionsforitsimprovement,forwhichIamgrateful.

Asalways,Iammuchindebttomyeditorialsecretary,MarlysAllen,forhertirelesseffortsateverystageintheproductionofthisbook.MortimerJ.AdlerChicago,December28,1977

INTRODUCTION

WhyAristotle?Whyforeverybody?And why is an exposition of Aristotle for everybody an introduction to

commonsense?I can answer these three questions better after I have answered one other.

Why philosophy?Why should everyone learn how to think philosophically—how to ask the kind of searching questions that children andphilosophers askandthatphilosopherssometimesanswer?

Ihavelongbeenoftheopinionthatphilosophyiseverybody’sbusiness—butnotinordertogetmoreinformationabouttheworld,oursociety,andourselves.Forthatpurpose,itwouldbebettertoturntothenaturalandthesocialsciencesand to history. It is in another way that philosophy is useful—to help us tounderstand things we already know, understand them better than we nowunderstand them. That is why I think everyone should learn how to thinkphilosophically.

Forthatpurpose,thereisnobetterteacherthanAristotle.Idonothesitatetorecommendhimastheteachertobeginwith.TheonlyotherteacherthatImighthavechosenisPlato,butinmyjudgmentheissecondbest.Platoraisedalmostall the questions that everyone should face; Aristotle raised them too and, inaddition, gave us clearer answers to them.Plato taughtAristotle how to thinkphilosophically, but Aristotle learned the lesson so well that he is the betterteacherforallofus.

Since we are concerned with learning how to think the way Aristotle did,whatAristotlethoughtismoreimportantthanwhohewasorwhenandhowhelived.The centuries and the changes that separate him fromusmaymake theconditionsofhislifeandthesocietyinwhichhelivedappearstrangetous;but,as Iwill try toexplain, theydonotmakeeither the styleor thecontentofhisthinkingstrangetous.

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in theMacedonian town of Stagira on the

north coast of theAegean Sea.His fatherwas a physician in the court of theKingofMacedonia.TheKing’sgrandsonbecameAlexandertheGreat,towhomAristotlelaterbecamebothtutorandfriend.

Attheageofeighteen,AristotletookupresidenceinAthensandenrolledinPlato’sAcademyasastudentofphilosophy.ItwasnotlongbeforePlatofoundAristotle a troublesome student who questioned what he taught and openlydisagreed with him. When Plato died, and Alexander became the ruler ofGreece,Aristotleopenedhisownschool,theLyceum.Thatwasin335B.C.

TheLyceumhadafinelibrary,anextensivecollectionofmaps,andazooinwhichAristotlecollectedspecimensofanimallife.Ithasbeensaidthatsomeofthesewere sent to him byAlexander from the countries he conquered.WhenAlexanderdiedin323B.C.,AristotleexiledhimselffromAthenstooneoftheAegeanislands.Hediedthereayearlaterattheageof63.

Aristotle lived in a society inwhich the citizenshad free time to enjoy thepursuitsofleisurebecausetheyhadslavestotakecareoftheirestatesandtodomenial work. It was also a society in which women occupied an inferiorposition.Plato, inprojecting the institutionsofan ideal state,proposed thatallpolitical offices, except that of military leader, should be open to women,becauseheregardedmenandwomenasessentiallyequal;butAristotleacceptedthemoreconventionalviewofhisdayconcerningtheinferiorityofwomen.

IshallhavemoretosayinalaterchapteraboutAristotle’sviewswithregardtoslaveryandtowomen.HereIwant tosayatoncethatmyuseof thewords“man,”“men,”and“mankind”intheirgenericsensetostandforhumanbeingsofbothgenders,andnotjustforthemaleportionofthepopulation,isinnowayan indication that I shareAristotle’sviewaboutwomen.On thecontrary,withregardtothispoint,IamaPlatonist.

There may be some persons who regard Aristotle’s antiquity as adisadvantage.Theymayfeelthatitwouldbemuchbettertoselectasateachersomeone alive today—someone acquainted with the world in which we live,someonewhoknowswhatmodernsciencehasdiscoveredaboutthatworld.Idonotagreewiththem.

ThoughAristotlewas aGreekwho lived twenty-five centuries ago, hewassufficientlyacquaintedwiththemainoutlinesoftheworldinwhichwelivetotalk about it as if he were alive today. As an aid to our being able to thinkphilosophically, Aristotle would not be a better teacher even if he wereacquaintedwitheverythingthatmodernscientistsknow.

In an effort to understand nature, society, and man, Aristotle began whereeveryoneshouldbegin—withwhathealreadyknewinthelightofhisordinary,commonplaceexperience.Beginningthere,histhinkingusednotionsthatallof

uspossess,notbecauseweweretaughttheminschool,butbecausetheyarethecommonstockofhumanthoughtaboutanythingandeverything.

Wesometimesrefertothesenotionsasourcommonsenseaboutthings.Theyarenotionsthatwehaveformedasaresultofthecommonexperiencewehavein the course of our daily lives—experiences we have without any effort ofinquiryonourpart,experiencesweallhavesimplybecauseweareawakeandconscious.Inaddition,thesecommonnotionsarenotionsweareabletoexpressinthecommonwordsweemployineverydayspeech.

Forgivemeforrepeatingtheword“common”somanytimes.Icannotavoiddoingso,andIhavetolaystressonthatwordbecausewhatitmeansliesattheheartofmyargument.Noteverythingiscommon.Therearemanythingswecallourown,butthereareotherthingsthatwerecognizeasnotexclusivelyours.Weshare themwithothers, suchasabook thatour friendshave readoramotionpicturesomeofushaveenjoyed,orahousethatallthemembersofthefamilysharewhentheyliveinittogether.

Thethingswesharearecommon.Therearemanythingsthatdifferentgroupsofpeopleshare.Therearefewerthingsthatweallshareandarecommontoallofus,simplybecauseweareallhuman.Itisinthislast,all-embracingsenseoftheword“common”thatIrefertocommonexperiencesandcommonnotions,orcommonsense,ascommon.

Ourcommon-sensenotionsareexpressedbysuchwordsas“thing,”“body,”“mind,”“change,”“cause,”“part,”“whole,”“one,”“many,”andsoon.Mostofus have been using these words and notions for a long time—since we werequiteyoung.Westartedtousetheminordertotalkaboutexperiencesthatallofus have had—of things moving or remaining at rest, of plants growing, ofanimals being born and dying, of sitting down and getting up, of aches andpains,ofgoingtosleep,dreaming,andwakingup,offeedingandexercisingourbodies,andofmakingupourminds.

Icouldenlargethislistofourcommonexperiences,justasIcouldenlargethelistof thecommonwordsweuseand thecommonnotionswehave.Butevenwithout the additions that could be made, it should be clear that the words,experiences, and notions I have mentioned are all common—not exclusivelyyours,ormine,oranyoneelse’s.

In contrast, the things that scientists observe in their laboratories or thatexplorers observe on their expeditions are very special experiences. We maylearnabout them from their reports,but, as a rule,wedonot experience themourselves.

HumanbeingshavelearnedagreatdealsinceAristotle’sday,mainlythroughthe discoveries ofmodern science.Applied science has created aworld and a

wayoflifeverydifferentfromhisworldandhiswayoflife.Hedidnothaveanautomobile,couldnottalkonthetelephone,neversawwhatcanbeseenthroughamicroscope or a telescope, did not have a close view of the surface of themoon, and never heard a description of its surface bymenwalking on it.ButAristotlehadthesamecommonexperiencesinhisdaythatwehaveinours.Thekindofthinkinghedidaboutthemenabledhimtounderstandthembetterthanmostofusdo.

Thatandthataloneisthereasonhecanhelpustounderstandthesecommonexperiencesbetterandhelpustounderstandourselvesandourlives,aswellastheworld and the society inwhichwe live, even though ourway of life, ourworld,andoursocietyaredifferentfromhis.

Aristotle’s thinkingbegan with common sense, but it did not end there. Itwentmuchfurther.Itaddedtoandsurroundedcommonsensewithinsightsandunderstandings that are not common at all. His understanding of things goesdeeper than ours and sometimes soars higher. It is, in a word, uncommoncommonsense.

Thatishisgreatcontributiontoallofus.WhatIamgoingtotrytodointhisbook is to make his uncommon common sense easier to understand. If itbecomeseasiertounderstand,itmightevenbecomelessuncommon.

PARTIMANTHEPHILOSOPHICALANIMAL

1

PhilosophicalGames

Manyofushaveplayedtwogameswithoutrealizingwewereonthewaytobecomingphilosophical.Oneiscalled“Animal,Vegetable,Mineral”;theother,“TwentyQuestions.”

Both games consist in asking questions. However, that is not what makesthem philosophical games; it is what lies behind the questions—a set ofcategories,aschemeofclassification.Classifyingthings,placingtheminthisorthat category, is a familiar process.Everyonedoes it at one timeor another—shopkeeperswhen they take stockofwhat is on their shelves, librarianswhentheycataloguebooks,secretarieswhentheyfilelettersordocuments.Butwhentheobjects tobeclassifiedare thecontentsof thephysicalworld,or theeven-larger universe that includes the physical world, then philosophy enters thepicture.

The two games—“Animal, Vegetable,Mineral” and “TwentyQuestions”—aresometimesplayedasiftheywerethesamegame.Thatoccurswhenthefirstofthetwentyquestionstobeaskedis“Animal,vegetable,ormineral?”inordertofindoutwhethertheobjectbeingthoughtoffallsintooneofthesethreelargecategories,orclasses,ofphysical things.Butonly someof theobjectswecanthink about are physical things. If, for example, the object decided on was ageometrical figure, such as a circle, or a number, such as the square root ofminusone,orifithappenedtobeoneoftheGreekgods,suchasZeus,Apollo,or Athena, asking whether the object in question was animal, vegetable, ormineralwouldnot—or,atleast,shouldnot—getananswer.

The game of twenty questions, when it is not begun by asking “Animal,vegetable, or mineral?” is concerned with discovering any object that can bethoughtaboutbyanybody.Itisnotlimitedtoobjectsthatarephysicalthings.Ofthe two games, it is the more likely to engage us in philosophical thoughtwithoutourbeingawareofit.Tobecomeawareofit,weneedAristotle’shelp.

ClassifyingwasoneoftheskillsinwhichAristotleexcelled.Anotherwashis

skill in asking questions. Philosophical thought began with the asking ofquestions—questions that can be answered on the basis of our ordinary,everydayexperienceandwithsomereflectionaboutthatexperiencethatresultsinasharpeningandrefinementofourcommonsense.

Animal, vegetable, and mineral is a rough-and-ready, threefold division ofthingswe find in the physical world. But we use theword “mineral” looselywhenweuseittostandforallthephysicalthingsthatfallononesideofthelinethatdivides livingorganisms from inanimate things—rosebushesormice fromsticksorstones.Allinanimatethingsarenotminerals,suchasgoldorsilverthatwedigfromdepositsintheearth.Somearerockformationsfoundontheearth’ssurface or in its interior; some are other forms ofmatter in liquid or gaseousstate.

Inthecategoryofnonlivingorinanimatebodiesthatislooselycoveredbytheterm “mineral,” Aristotle would have us distinguish between elementary andcomposite bodies. An elementary body, according to Aristotle, is one thatconsists in a single kind of matter—gold, for example, or copper or zinc. Incontrast, a composite body is one that is composed of two or more differentkindsofmatter, suchasbrass,which isamixtureofcopperandzinc.But, forAristotle, the more important distinction is the one that divides living fromnonlivingthings.

Whatdifferentiates all livingorganisms from inertbodies,whether theyareelementary or composite bodies? From our ordinary experience of livingorganisms,weknowthattheyallhavecertaincommoncharacteristics.Theytakenourishment;theygrow;theyreproduce.

Among living organisms, what differentiates plants from animals? Again,from our ordinary experience, we know that animals have certain commoncharacteristicsthatplantslack.Theyarenotrootedintheearthlikeplants;theyhavetheabilitytomovefromplacetoplacebytheirownmeansoflocomotion.Theydonotdrawtheirnourishmentfromtheairandfromthesoilasplantsdo.Inaddition,mostanimalshavesenseorgans.

Thelinethatdividesinertbodiesfromlivingorganismssometimesleavesuswonderingonwhichsideofthelineaparticularthingbelongs.Thisisalsotrueofthelinethatdividesplantsfromanimals.Forexample,someplantsappeartohavesensitivityeven though theydonothavesenseorgans likeeyesandears.Some animals, such as shellfish, seem to lack the power of locomotion; likeplantstheyappeartoberootedinonespot.

In classifying physical things as inanimate bodies, plants, and animals,Aristotlewasawarethathisdivisionofallphysicalthingsintothesethreelargeclassesdidnotexcludeborderlinecases—thingsthatinacertainrespectappear

tobelongononesideofthedividinglineandthat,inanotherrespect,appeartobelongontheotherside.Herecognizedthatintheworldofbodies,thetransitionfromthingslifelesstolivingthingsandfromplantlifetoanimallifeisgradualandnotaclear-cut,all-or-noneaffair.

Nevertheless, Aristotle persisted in thinking that the differences betweenlivingandnonlivingbodiesandbetweenplantsandanimalsseparatedthemintoquitedifferentkindsofthings.Hisreasonforholdingthisviewwasasfollows.

If we did not, in the first place, recognize and understand the clear-cutdistinctionbetweenastoneandamouse,wewouldneverfindourselvespuzzledby whether something difficult to classify was a living or a nonliving thing.Similarly, ifwedidnot recognize the clear-cut distinctionbetween a rosebushand a horse, we would never wonder whether a given specimen of livingorganismwasaplantorananimal.

Just as animals are a special kind of living organismbecause they performfunctionsthatplantsdonot,soforasimilarreasonarehumanbeingsaspecialkindof animal.Theyperformcertain functions thatnoother animalsperform,such as asking general questions and seeking answers to them by observationandby thought.That iswhyAristotle called humanbeings rational animals—questioningandthinkinganimals,abletoengageinphilosophicalthought.

There may be animals that appear to straddle the borderline that divideshumans from nonhumans. Porpoises and chimpanzees, it has recently beenlearned, have enough intelligence to engage in rudimentary forms ofcommunication. But they do not appear to ask themselves or one anotherquestionsaboutthenatureofthings,andtheydonotappeartotry,byonemeansor another, to discover the answers for themselves. We may speak of suchanimalsasalmosthuman,butwedonotincludethemasmembersofthehumanrace.

Eachdistinctkindofthing,Aristotlethought,hasanaturethatdistinguishesitfromalltheothers.Whatdifferentiatesoneclassofthingsfromeverythingelsedefinesthenaturepossessedbyeveryindividualthingthatbelongstothatclass.Whenwe speak of human nature, for example, we are simply saying that allhuman beings have certain characteristics and that these characteristicsdifferentiatethemfromotheranimals,fromplants,andfrominanimatethings.

Aristotle’sschemeofclassificationarrangedthefivemainclassesofphysicalthingsinanascendingorder.Heplacedelementaryandcompositebodiesatthebottomofthescale.Eachofthehigherclassesishigherbecauseitpossessesthecharacteristics of the class below and, in addition, has certain distinguishingcharacteristicsthattheclassbelowdoesnothave.

Inthescaleofnaturalthings,theanimateisahigherformofexistencethan

theinanimate;animalsareahigherformoflifethanplants;andhumanlifeisthehighestformoflifeonearth.

All living organisms, like all inanimate bodies, occupy space and haveweight, but in addition, as we have noted, they eat, grow, and reproduce.Because they are living organisms, animals, like plants, perform these vitalfunctions,buttheyalsoperformcertainfunctionsthatplantsdonot.Atthetopofthe scale are human beingswho perform all the vital functions performed byotheranimalsandwho,inaddition,havetheabilitytoseekknowledgebyaskingandansweringquestionsandtheabilitytothinkphilosophically.

Ofcourse,itcanbesaidthatmanyofthehigheranimalsthink,andeventhatcomputersthink.Norisittruethatonlyhumanshaveintelligence.Intelligenceinvaryingdegrees is tobe found throughout theanimalworld, just as it is tobefoundinvaryingdegreesinmembersofthehumanrace.Butthespecialkindofthinking that gives rise to asking and answering philosophical questionsdistinguisheshumans fromother animals.Noother animalplaysphilosophicalgames.

In theworldofphysical things thatAristotledivides into five largeclasses,theword“body”namestheone,all-embracingclass.Thereisnomoreinclusiveclassofwhichbodiesareasubclass.Everythinginthephysicalworldisabodyofonekindoranother.

Canwegototheoppositeextremeandfindasubclassofbodiesatwhichwemuststopbecauseweareunabletodivideitanyfurtherintosmallersubclasses?Isthehumanspeciessuchasubclassofanimals?

Facedwiththatquestion,mostofusprobablythinkatonceofdifferentracesor varieties ofmankind—differentiated by skin color, by facial characteristics,byheadshape,andsoon.Whydonotsuchcharacteristicsdividehumanbeingsintodifferentkindsorsubclasses?

In this connection, Aristotle made an important distinction. Not all thecharacteristics of a thing, he said, define its nature or essence. As we havealready seen, Aristotle thought man should be defined as a rational—orphilosophical—animal.Beingabletoaskquestionsaboutthewhat,thewhy,andthewhereforeofthingsiswhatmakesanyoneahumanbeing,nottheskincolor,thesnubnose,thestraighthair,ortheshapeofthehead.

Wecan,ofcourse,dividehumanbeingsintoanendlessvarietyofsubclasses—tall or short, fat or thin, white or black, strong or weak, and so on. Butalthough such differencesmay be used to distinguish one subgroup of humanbeingsfromanother,theycannotbeused,accordingtoAristotle,toexcludeanyofthesesubgroupsfromthehumanrace.Whatisevenmoreimportant,itcannotbe said that the members of one subgroup are more or less human than the

membersofanother.In otherwords, the differences between one subclass of human beings and

anotheraresuperficialorminor,ascomparedwiththebasicormajordifferencesthatseparatehumanbeingsfromotheranimals.Aristotlecalledthesuperficialorminor differences accidental; the basic or major differences he regarded asessential.

Humanbeingsandbruteanimalsareessentiallydifferent; tallhumanbeingsandshortones, fathumanbeingsandthin-ones,areaccidentallydifferent. It isonlyinthiswaythatonehumanbeingdiffersfromanother.Weareallanimalsofthesamekind,butoneindividualmayhavemoreandanotherindividuallessofthis or that human characteristic. Such individual differences are much lessimportant than the one thing that unites all men and women—their commonhumanity,whichistheonerespectinwhichallhumanbeingsareequal.

2

TheGreatDivide

Aristotle’s division of physical things into inanimate bodies and livingorganisms,andhisdivisionoflivingorganismsintoplants,animals,andhumanbeings,donotexhausthisschemeofclassificationorhissetofcategories.

Think, for example, of Wellington’s horse at the Battle of Waterloo or ofJuliusCaesar crossing theRubicon. Think of Shakespeare’sHamlet, theLochNessmonster,ortheangelGabriel.Thinkoftheodorofrosesinfullbloom,thecolorofaripetomato,Newton’stheoryofgravitation,orGod.

None of these is a physical thing that exists now as animal, vegetable, ormineral.Wellington’shorseandJuliusCaesarexistedinthepast,buttheyexistno longer. Shakespeare’s Hamlet is a fictitious person, not a real one. Theexistenceof theLochNessmonster is highlyquestionable.As for theodorofrosesinfullbloom,theangelGabriel,Newton’stheoryofgravitation,andGod,noneofthesefallunderanyoftheheadingsthatcoverbodiesthateitherexistorhaveexistedinthephysicalworld.

Theuniverseofobjectsthatcanbethoughtofismuchlargerthanthephysicalworld—the world of bodies, either those now in existence or those that haveexistedinthepast.Itincludestheworldofbodies,butitalsoincludesmuchelsebesides.Thelinethatdividesbodiesfromeverythingelseisthegreatdivide.

Whatisleftwhenweputthewholephysicalworldtooneside?Whatbelongsto the other half of the all-embracing universe of objects that we can thinkabout?Iamnotgoingtotrytogiveanexhaustiveenumerationofthekindsofobjectsthatarenotbodies,buthereatleastaresomeofthepossiblekinds:

mathematicalobjects,suchastrianglesandsquarerootsimaginary or fictitious characters, such as Shakespeare’sHamlet orMarkTwain’sHuckleberryFinndisembodiedorunembodiedspiritsofallsorts,includingghostsandangelsgodsorGodwhendivinebeingsarethoughtofasnothavingbodies

mythologicalbeings,suchascentaursandmermaidsmindsthatareabletothinkupthekindofquestionswehavebeenaskingideasortheoriesthatmindsthinkwith

I am fully aware that this enumerationofpossibleobjectsof thought raisesmany questions.Do such objects exist, in any sense of thatword? If they do,howdoestheirexistencedifferfromtheexistenceofbodies?Whatdoesitmeanto call them possibilities? Are there any objects of thought that areimpossibilities?Ifmindsarenotbodies,whatistheirrelationshiptobodies?

Iwill trytoanswersomeofthesequestions—withAristotle’shelp—inlaterchapters of this book. Some are difficult philosophical questions that I willpostponeuntiltheveryend.Forthemoment,askingthemservesthepurposeofcallingattentiontothelargeruniverseofwhichthephysicalworldisbutapart,eventhoughtheworldofbodiesmaybetheonlyonethatreallyexists.

Staying with that world, we must consider another distinction made byAristotle.Weneedittohandlethequestionabouttheodorofrosesinfullbloomorthecolorofaripetomato.Rosesandtomatoesarebodies,theyareplants,buttheirodorandtheircolorarenot.Consideringthephysicalworld,Aristotledrewalinethatdividesitsconstituents intotwomajorkinds.Ontheonesideof theline,heplacedbodies;ontheotherside,theircharacteristicsorattributes, suchastheirodorsorcolors.

Inoureverydayspeech,weordinarilymakethesamedistinction.Wedonotspeakofthesizeandweightofastoneasifitwereabody.Iwouldnotaskyouto handme the stone’s size orweight, for I know that youmust handme thestoneinorderformetofeelitssizeorweight.

Wecanthinkofthestone’ssizeorweightwithoutthinkingofthestone,butwecannotchange thestone’ssizeorweightwithoutchanging thestone. If thestoneislyinginapileofstones,wecantakeitfromthepileandleavetheotherstonesbehind,butwecannot take the stone’s sizeorweight away from it andleavethestonebehind.

What belongs to a body in the way in which the stone’s size or weightbelongstoitis,accordingtoAristotle,somethingthathasitsexistenceinathing(asthestone’sweightexistsinthestone),butdoesnotexistinandofitself(asthestoneexists).

Aphysicalthing,abody,maybelongtoacollectionofthingsfromwhichitcanberemoved—asonestonecanbe takenfromapileofstones.Buteachofthestonesinthepileexistsinandofitself,evenwhenitexistsinacollectionofstones.That isnot trueof thestone’ssizeorweight.Sizesandweightsdonotexist in andof themselves.They are always the sizes andweights of physical

things,andtheyceasetoexistwhenthebodiesinwhichtheyexistceasetoexist.Anotherwayof grasping this basic distinction between physical things and

theirattributes is toconsiderhow thingschange.Astonewitha roughsurfacecanbepolishedandmadesmooth.Astonethatisalmostroundinshapecanbemadeperfectlyround.Whilewearechangingastone’sattributes,wearedealingwithoneandthesamestone.Itisnotanotherstone,butthesamestonealtered.

If it didnot remain the same stonewhilebecomingdifferent in this or thatrespect,itcouldnotbesaidtohavechangedfrombeingroughtobeingsmoothorfrombeinglargertobeingsmaller.Whenweunderstandthis,weunderstandAristotle’sreasonforsayingthataphysicalthingisthatwhichremainswhatitis(this individual stone) while at the same time being subject to change in onerespectoranother(insizeorweight,shape,color,ortexture).

The attributes of bodies, unlike bodies themselves, are never subject tochange.Roughnessneverbecomessmoothness;greenneverbecomes red. It istheroughstonethatbecomessmooth;thegreentomatothatbecomesredwhenitripens. Physical things, in short, are changeable. Physical attributes are notchangeable;theyaretherespectsinwhichphysicalthingschange.

Aristotle attempted to make a complete enumeration of the attributes thatphysical thingshave.Itscompletenessmaybequestioned,but theattributeshenames are ones we are all acquainted with in common experience, especiallythosethataretheprincipalrespectsinwhichthingschange:

inquantity,whentheyincreaseordecreaseinweightorsizeinquality,whentheyalterinshape,color,ortextureinplaceorposition,whentheymovefromheretothere

A thing has other attributes, such as the relationships inwhich it stands tootherthings,theactionsitperforms,theresultsofitsbeingactedon,thetimeofitscomingintoexistence,thedurationofitsexistence,andthetimeofitsceasingtoexist.

Ofalltheattributesthataphysicalthinghas,themostimportantarethosethatithas throughout itsexistenceandwith respect towhich itdoesnotchangeaslongasitexists.Thesepermanentattributesmakeitthekindofthingit is.Forexample,itisapermanentattributeofsaltthatitdissolvesinwater;apermanentattribute of certainmetals that they are conductors of electricity; a permanentattribute of mammals that they give birth to living offspring and suckle theiryoung.

Suchattributesnotonlymakeathingthespecialkindofthingitis,theyalsodifferentiateonekindofthingfromanother.Beingabletoaskquestionsofthe

sort we have been asking is a permanent attribute of rational animals thatdifferentiatesus fromothermammals.Rational animals are, of course, bodies.Theyarephysicalthings,butnotonlyphysicalthings.

Werecognizethisfactinouruseoftheword“person.”Wecallhumanbeingspersons.Wedonotcallspiders,snakes,sharksorbirdspersons.Whenwetreatour pet cat or dog as if itwere a person,we treat it as if itwere human—oralmosthuman.Objectsthatweregardasmerethings,wedonottreatinthesamemanner.

Uptothispoint,theword“thing”hasbeenusedtorefertophysicalthings—tobodies.Nowtheword“thing”hasbeenusedincontrasttotheword“person.”Itisatroublesomeword.Itsmeaningissometimessobroadthatitreferstoanypossibleobjectofthought—notonlytoexistentphysicalthings,butalsototheirattributesaswell,and toobjects thatdonotexist,objects thatmayneverhaveexisted,andevenobjectsthatcannotpossiblyexist.Sometimestheword“thing”narrowlyappliesonlytobodiesthatnowexistinthephysicalworld,bodiesthathaveexistedthereinthepast,orbodiesthatcanexistthereinthefuture.

Usingthesamewordinavarietyofsensesisoftenunavoidable.Inthecaseof the most important words we use, especially words we use in ordinaryeverydayspeech,itisalmostimpossiblenottodoso.Aristotlefrequentlycalledattentiontothedifferentsensesinwhichhefounditnecessarytousethesameword.Whenwethinkaboutourexperienceashedid,wemustalsopayattentiontothedifferentsensesofthewordsweuse.

Human beings are physical things in one sense of that word and not inanotherwhenwe call thempersons, not things.As physical things, as bodies,theyhave the threedimensionswithwhichwe are all acquainted.Aspersons,theyalsohavethreedimensions,whicharequitedifferent.

3

MansThreeDimensions

Regarding ourselves simply as bodies—or merely as physical things—Iwould say that our three dimensions, like the three dimensions of any otherbody, are length, breadth, and height. That is the way in which any bodyoccupiesspace.

While,asbodies,wearephysicalthingslikeallotherbodies,weare,aswehavejustseen,thespecialkindofthing—theonlykindofthing—thatiscalledaperson.Whatareourthreedimensionsaspersons,notjustasbodies?

Inspace,adimensionisadirectioninwhichIcanmove.Icanmovemyhandfromlefttoright,fromfronttoback,fromuptodown.Likespatialdimensions,personaldimensionsarealsodirections—directionsinwhichI,asaperson,canactasahumanbeing.Iamsurethatwehaveonlythreedimensionsasphysicalbodies, but I cannot be as sure that we have only three dimensions as activehumanbeings—onlythreedirectionsinwhichouractivitiescantakeus.

However,IthinkthatthethreedimensionsIshallnamerepresentthreeveryimportant directions that human activity can take. Theremay be others, but Idoubt if thereareanyas important as these.The threearemaking,doing, andknowing.

In the first of these three dimensions, making, we have man the artist orartisan—the producer of all sorts of things: shoes, ships, and houses, books,music, and paintings. It is not just when human beings produce statues orpaintingsthatweshouldcallthemartists.Thatismuchtoorestrictedauseofthewordart.Anythingintheworldthatisartificialratherthannaturalisaworkofart—somethingman-made.

Inthesecondofthesedimensions,doing,wehavemanthemoralandsocialbeing—someonewhocandorightorwrong,someonewho,bywhatheorshedoes or does not do, either achieves happiness or fails to achieve it, someonewhofindsitnecessarytoassociatewithotherhumanbeingsinordertodowhat,asahumanbeing,heorshefeelsimpelledtodo.

In the third dimension, knowing, we have man as learner, acquiringknowledge of all sorts—not only about nature, not only about the society ofwhich human beings are a part, not only about human nature, but also aboutknowledgeitself.

Inallthreeofthesedimensions,manisathinker,butthekindofthinkinghedoesinordertomakethingsdiffersfromthekindofthinkinghedoesinordertoactmorallyandsocially.Bothkindsofthinkingdifferfromthekindofthinkingahumanbeingdoesinorderjusttoknow—toknowjustforthesakeofknowing.

Aristotlewasverymuchconcernedwiththedifferencesthatdistinguishthesethreekindsofthinking.Heusedtheterm“productivethinking”todescribethekindofthinkingthatmanengagesinasamaker;“practicalthinking”todescribethekindthatheengagesinasadoer;and“speculative”or“theoreticalthinking”todescribethekindheengagesinasaknower.

This threefold division of the kinds of thinking can be found inAristotle’sbooks.Someofthem,suchashisbooksonmoralandpoliticalphilosophy,areconcerned with practical thinking and with man as a doer—as an individualliving his own life and trying to make it as good as possible, and also as amember of society, associated with other human beings and cooperating withthem. Some of these books, such as the ones on natural philosophy, areconcernedwith theoretical thinking about thewhole physicalworld, includingmanasapartofthatworld,andman’smindandknowledgeaswell.

Hewroteatreatiseaboutmanasamaker,butthatbookdealsonlywithmanas amaker of poetry,music, and paintings.He entitled itPoetics because theGreek word from which we get the word “poetry” means making—makinganything,notjustthekindofobjectsthatentertainusandthatgiveuspleasurewhen we enjoy them. Men and women produce an extraordinary variety ofusefulthings,thingsweuseinourdailylives,suchastheclotheswewear,thehouseswe live in, thefurniture in thosehouses,and the implementsneeded tomakesuchthings.

Themoregeneraltreatmentofmanasamaker,particularlymanasamakerofusefulphysicalthings,wefindinthebooksthatAristotlewroteaboutnature—his books of natural philosophy. In his effort to understand the phenomena ofnature, Aristotle frequently resorted to comparisons between the way menproducethingsandthewaynatureworks.Hisunderstandingofwhatisinvolvedinhumanmakinghelpedhim—anditwillhelpus—tounderstandtheworkingsofnature.

That iswhy I amgoing tobegin, inPart II of this book,withmaking as adimensionofhumanactivity.Afterthat,inPartIII,Iamgoingtodealwiththedimension of human activity in whichman is a moral and social being. And

finally, inPart IV, Iwill come toman as a knower, postponing to the last themost difficult questions thatwe have to consider—questions about the humanmindandknowledgeitself.

The most challenging words in anyone’s vocabulary are three words thatnametheuniversalvalues thatelicit respectandevokewonder.Theyare truth,goodness, and beauty—or the true, the good, and the beautiful. These threevaluespertaintothethreedimensionsofhumanactivity.

In the sphereofmaking,weare concernedwithbeautyor, to say the least,with trying to produce things that are well made. In the sphere of doing, asindividuals and asmembers of society,we are concernedwith good and evil,rightandwrong.Inthesphereofknowing,weareconcernedwithtruth.

PARTIIMANTHEMAKER

4

Aristotle’sCrusoe

IfAristotlehadwritten the storyofRobinsonCrusoe, themoralof the talewouldhavebeendifferent.

Thestorymostofushave readcelebratesCrusoe’s ingenuity insolving theproblemofhowtolivesecurelyandcomfortablyontheislandwherehefoundhimselfacastawayafterashipwreck.Italsocelebrateshisvirtues—hiscourageand his foresight. It is a story of man’s conquest of nature, his mastery andcontroloverit.

ForAristotle,theislandwouldhaverepresentedNature,naturewithacapitalN,natureuntouchedbyhumans.Theworksofnature—theseedingoftreesandbushes,thegrowthofplants,thebirthanddeathofanimals,theshiftingofsands,the wearing away of rocks, the formation of caves—had been going on longbeforeCrusoe’s arrival. Aristotlewould have viewed the changes that Crusoebrought about as a way of understanding the changes that had taken placewithout him. For him, the storywould not have been a story ofman againstnature,butanaccountofmanworkingwithnature.

Whenwetrytounderstandsomethingthat isdifficult tounderstand,agoodcommon-senseruleistostartoutwithsomethingeasiertounderstandinordertoseeifthathelpsusovercomethedifficulties.Whatismoreunderstandablemaythrowsomelightonwhatislessunderstandable.Humanbeingsshouldbeableto understandwhat goes onwhen theymake something or change something.That is less difficult to understand than what goes on in nature when humanbeingsarenotinthepicture.Understandingworksofartmay,therefore,helpustounderstandtheworkingsofnature.

Isuggested,intheprecedingchapter,thatinitsbroadestmeaningthephrase“work of art” covers everything that is manmade. Let’s reconsider that. Iseverything produced by human beings artificial, not natural? When parentsproducechildren,are thechildrenartificial?Are theyworksofart? Ifyousayno,asIthinkyoushould,thenwehavenotyetsucceededincorrectlydrawing

thelinethatdividestheartificialfromthenatural.Supposethatlightningstrikesatreeinadenseforest.Thetreeissplitinhalf;

branches are cut off. The burning of some of them sets off a forest fire. Theforestfireandalltheotherchangesthatresultfromthelightning’sstrokeareallnatural,aretheynot?

But aperson,walking through thewoods, carelessly throwsawaya lightedcigarette. It sets the dry leaves of the underbrush on fire, and the woods areconsumedinflames.Thatforestfirewascausedbyahumanbeing,asthefirstonewascausedbylightning.Thefirstonewasaworkofnature.Wasthesecondaworkofman—somethingartificial,notnatural?

Suppose,however,thattheindividualinthewoodshadnotdroppedalightedcigarette.Supposehehadgathereddry twigsand leavesandheaped them inamoundthathesurroundedwithsmallstones.Then,lightingamatch,hesetfiretotheminordertocookhislunch.Wewouldordinarilysay,wouldwenot,thathehadbuiltafire.Wouldthefirehebuiltbeaworkofart,unlikethefiresetoffbythecarelessdroppingofalightedcigarette?

Before you answer that question too quickly, remember that fire itself issomethingnatural. Itdoesnotneedahumanbeing tomake ithappen. In fact,whenmandoesmakeithappen,whatdoeshemake—thefire itselfordoeshemerely cause it to happen at a certain time and place, as the man walkingthrough the woods caused it to happen at the spot where he decided to cooklunch?

Onemoreexampletoconsider:lightningsplitthetreeandcutoffsomeofitsbranches.Mencando that, too,withaxesandsaws;and theydo itwhen theyengageinlumberinginordertoobtainthewoodtheyneedtobuildhouses,ortomakechairsandtables.Youunderstandthatthehousesmenbuildareproductsofart,notofnature—artificial,notnatural.Buildingahouse,then,isnotquitethesameasbuildingafire, foryoucannotbequitesosure that thefireamanbuildsisartificial,notnatural.

Whatisthedifferencebetweentheman-madehouse—ortheman-madechairortable—andtheman-madefire?Orbetweenthetree’sbranchesthatarecutoffby lightning and the tree’s branches that are cut down by lumberjacks? Orbetween the fire built by the picnicker in order to cookhis lunch and the firecausedbythemantrampingthroughthewoodswhocarelesslydroppedalightedcigarette?

Let’s start with the easiest question first. The fire caused by the lightedcigarette was accidental rather than intentional. It was not for a purpose thatsome human being had in mind. It resulted from human carelessness—evenmindlessness—rather thanfromcarefulplanningandforesight.Theabsenceof

anyhumanpurpose,planning,orforesightputsitonthenaturalsideofthelinethatdividesthenaturalfromtheartificial.

It was man-caused but not man-made. It resulted from something that ahumanbeingdid,butman isapartofnature justasmuchas lightning is.Noteverythingthatresultsfromhumanbehaviorisahumanproductionoraworkofart.

Now,whatoftheman-madefire,deliberatelybuiltforthepurposeofcookinglunch,andtheman-madehouse,deliberatelybuiltforthepurposeofprovidingshelter? Here neither humanly-brought-about result is accidental. Purpose andplanning are certainly involved in both. So for, at least, both belong on theartificialsideofthelinethatdividesthenaturalfromtheartificial.What,then,isthedifferencebetweenthem?

Onedifferenceisclearimmediately.Fireshappeninnaturewhenmenarenotpresent, but houses do not. Men can help nature produce fires by lightingmatchesandsettingdryleavesandtwigsaflame.Butwhenhumanbeingsbuildhouses rather than fires, they are not helping nature produce them. In the onecase,wesaidbefore,mendonotmakefireitself,buttheymakefireshappenatacertaintimeandplace.Intheothercase,mendomakehouses.

Thehouse thatRobinsonCrusoebuiltafterhehadrescuedsometoolsfromtheshipwreckwassomethingthatheandhealoneproduced,notsomethinghejustmadehappenatacertaintimeandplace.Exceptforhisbeingontheisland,nohouseswouldhaveeverhappened,asfiresmighthavehappenedasaresultofboltsoflightning.

One more question remains. We have so far decided that Crusoe’s house,plannedandproducedforapurpose, isaworkofart,notofnature,somethingartificial,notnatural.Butisitentirelyartificial—whollyahumancreation?TheBible tells us that before God created the world there was nothing, and thatGod’screationoftheworldbroughtsomethingoutofnothing.DidCrusoebringsomethingoutofnothingwhenhebuilthishouse?

Hardly.Hebuiltitoutofthewoodhehadobtainedfromchoppingdowntreeswith his ax, cutting off branches with his saw, and smoothing them with hisplane.Thewood thatwent into thebuildingof thehousecamefromnature. Itwas there to begin with. So, too, was the iron out of which nails had beenformed,nailsthatCrusoerecoveredalongwithtoolsinthecarpenter’schestthatfloatedashoreaftertheshipwreck.Thehouse,madeoutofwoodandnails,wasindeedmadebyCrusoe,notbynature,butitwasmadeoutofnaturalmaterials.ThatisalsotrueofallthetoolsthatCrusoehadthegoodlucktobeabletouse.

Let’snot forget the children thatparentsproduce.Wehavealreadydecidedthatchildrenarenaturalproducts,notartificial—notworksofart.Isthatbecause

theyaresometimesaccidentalproductsratherthanintentionalones?Sometimes, we know, children are the result of carelessness or

thoughtlessness,andareasunexpectedastheyareunplannedfor.Butevenwhenchildren are wanted and planned for, even when some thought is involved inbegetting them, and even when, with some luck, parents help nature producechildrenatacertaintimeandplace,theyarenotlikethefirethatthepicnickerhelpednaturetoproduceorthehousethatCrusoebuiltoutofmaterialsprovidedbynature.

Whynot?For the timebeing, let usbe satisfiedwith the answer suggestedabove. Children, like the offspring of other animals, can certainly happenwithoutanythought,planning,orpurpose.Thatisnottrueofanythingwewouldcallaworkofartorartificial.Butjustashumanbeingscanmakefireshappenby knowing something about how fires happen in nature, so, too, can humanbeingsmakechildrenhappenbyknowingsomethingabouthowtheprocreationofoffspringhappensinnature.

When they are totally ignorant of that, then their offspring are entirelyaccidental. But when they have such knowledge, the having of offspring is,partlyatleast,theresultofplanningandpurpose.

We have surveyed a lot of happenings and productions, and we havecomparedthedifferencesbetweentheminordertoseeifwecanplaceeachononeortheothersideofthelinethatdividesthenaturalandtheartificial.Beforewegoon,itmightbeagoodideatosummarizewhatwehavelearned.

First,wedecidedthatfire itself issomethingentirelynatural.Theparticularfireamanpurposelybuildsatacertaintimeandplaceisanartificialhappening—somethingthatwouldnothavehappenedhadnotsomehumanbeingcausedittohappenthenandthere.

Second,theartificialityofthefirethepicnickerbuiltinordertomakelunchdiffers from the artificiality of the house thatCrusoe built in order to providehimselfwithshelter.Thoughbothspringfromhumanpurposes,houses,unlikefires,neveroccurinnaturewhenhumanbeingsarenotatwork.Letusrefertothe picnicker’s fire as an artificial happening and to Crusoe’s house as anartificialproduct.

Third,Crusoe’shouse, thoughanartificialproduct, isnotsomethingwhollyartificial.Itwasmadeoutofnaturalmaterials,notoutofnothing.Itis,therefore,unliketheworlditselfthat,accordingtotheBible,Godcreatedoutofnothing.Let us always call things that men make out of natural materials theirproductionsratherthantheircreations.

Fourth,weconsideredhumanchildrenandtheoffspringofotheranimals.Doweordinarilycallthemeitherproductionsorcreations?No,thelanguageweuse

for describing their coming to be involves such words as “reproduction” and“procreation.”

Letus take that factassignificant.Theresultsofbiological reproductionorprocreationarenot like the firecausedby lightning—anaturalevent; nor likethe fire built byman—anartificialhappening; nor like the house thatCrusoeerected—an artificial product; nor like the world that God created out ofnothing.

However, understanding howmen build houses will help us to understandhow animals reproduce or procreate offspring. Understanding howmenmakefires happen will help us to understand how fires happen as natural events.Understandingthedifferencebetweenmakingfireshappenandbuildinghouseswillhelpustounderstandthedifferencebetweenfireshappeninginnatureandanimalsreproducingtheirkind.

DonotasknowwhetherunderstandingallthiswillalsohelpustounderstandhowGodcreated theworld.ThatquestionmustwaituntilweseewhetherourunderstandingoftheworksofnatureandofartleadsusbacktotheBible’sstoryofcreation—astorythatAristotleneverread.

5

ChangeandPermanence

Aristotle tookasensibleattitude toward the thinkerswhoprecededhim.Hesaidhethoughtitwaswisetopayattentiontowhattheyhadtosayinordertodiscover which of their opinions were correct and which were incorrect. Bysiftingthetruefromthefalse,someadvancemightbemade.

Twoearlier thinkers—HeraclitusandParmenides—heldveryextremeviewsabouttheworld.Heraclitusdeclaredthateverything,absolutelyeverything,wasconstantlychanging.Nothing,absolutelynothing,everremainedthesame.Oneofhisfollowers,Cratylus,evenwentsofarastosaythatthismadeitimpossibleto use language to communicate, for words are constantly changing theirmeanings.Theonlywaytocommunicateisbywigglingyourfinger.

At theotherextreme,Parmenidesdeclared thatpermanencereignssupreme.Whatever is, is; whatever is not, is not; nothing ever comes into existence orperishes;nothingatallchanges,nothingmoves.Theappearanceofchangeandmotion,whichParmenidesacknowledgedaspartofourdailyexperience, isanillusion. We are being deceived by our senses. In reality, everything alwaysremainsthesame.

You may wonder how Parmenides could persuade anyone to accept soextreme a view, and one so contrary to our everyday experience. One of hisfollowers,amannamedZeno,triedtoinventargumentsthatwouldpersuadeusthatwhenweperceivedthingsmovingabout,wewerebeingdeceived.Weweresufferinganillusion.

Oneoftheseargumentsransomewhatlikethis:Youwanttohitaballfromoneendofthetenniscourttoanother.Inordertogetthere,theballfirsthastogothroughhalfthedistance.Ithastoreachthenet.Inordertogetthere,itfirsthastogothroughhalfthedistance—atleasttotheservicebox.Inordertogetthere,itfirsthastogothroughhalfthedistance;andsoonindefinitely,byacontinualhalvingof thedistances thatremain.Fromthis, ifwefollowedthedirectionofZeno’sreasoning,wewouldbeledtotheconclusionthattheballcouldneverget

started—couldneverleaveyourracket.Aristotle was acquainted with these opinions and arguments. His common

senseaswellashiscommonexperiencetoldhimtheywerewrong.Ifwordsarealways changing their meanings, how could Heraclitus and his followersrepeatedlysay thateverything ischangingandsuppose,as theyobviouslydid,thattheyweresayingthesamethingeachtime,nottheopposite?Ifthemotionoftheheavenlybodiesisanillusion,thensoisthechangefromdaytonight.Ifnothingcomesintoexistenceorperishes,noonedies,butwhereareParmenidesandhisfriendZenonow?

HeraclitusandParmenideswerewrong,butnotallwrong.Infact,eachwaspartlyright,andthewholetruth,Aristotlethought,consistedincombiningtwopartialtruths.

Ontheonehand,motionandchange,comingtobeandpassingaway,occurthroughout theworld of nature andwere occurring long before human beingscameonthescene.Farfrombeingfullofillusions,ourcommonexperienceofnature grasps the reality of change. Things are the way they seem to be—changing.

On the other hand, not everything is always changing in every respect. Inevery change, theremust be somethingpermanent—something that persists orremainsthesamewhilebecomingdifferentinonerespectoranother.Thattennisball, for example,which you tried to hit across the court, didmove fromoneplacetoanother,butwhenitreachedyouropponent’sbaseline,itwasthesametennisball thatyoupropelled in thatdirection. If ithadbeenadifferent tennisball, conjured up by amagician standing on the sidelines, itwould have beencalledafoul.

Motionfromheretothere(whichAristotlecalledlocalmotionorchangeofplace)isthemostobviousofthechangesinwhichsomethingremainsthesame.Themovingthingistheunchangingsubjectofthechangethatislocalmotion.Ifitwas “your tennis ball”when it left your racket, it is still “your tennis ball”whenyouropponenthitsitback—theselfsame,identicalball,notanotherball.

Whilewe are talking about localmotion, letmemention a distinction thatAristotlemakesbetweentwokindsoflocalmotion.Whenyouaccidentallydropatennisball,itfallstothegroundbecauseitisheavy(youandIsaybecauseofgravity, which is another word for heavy). You did not throw it down. It fellnaturally.Thatwasanatural,notanartificial,motion.

Butwhenyouhitthetennisballwithyourracket,thatisaman-mademotion,notanaturalone.Theforceofyourstrokeovercomesthenaturaltendencyoftheball tofallbecauseofitsweight,andthisforcesendsitonapathitwouldnothavefollowed ifyouhadnotpropelled it in thatdirectionbyyourstroke.The

same thing is truewhenwepropela rocket to themoon.That isnotanaturalmotionforaheavybodylikearocket.Withoutthepropellingforcewegiveit,itwouldnotnaturallyleavetheearth’sfieldofgravity.

From tennis balls to rockets, fromelevators to cannonballs, there is awidevarietyofbodiesinlocalmotionthatwouldnotbemovingastheydowereitnotforman’s interferencewith nature. Since they are not natural, shouldwe callthesemotionsartificial?Thatwordmightbeused,fortheyaremotionsbroughtaboutbymen.Aristotlecalled themviolentmotions—violent in the sense thattheyviolatethenaturaltendencyofthebodiesinquestion.

What other changes that occur naturally also occur artificially, or throughman’shavingahandinthem?Theheatof thesunripensa tomatoandturnsitfromgreentored.Thatisnotachangeinplace,butachangeincolor.Itisnotalocalmotion,butthealterationofanattributeofthetomato.

Frombeinggreenatonetime,thetomatohasbecomeredatanother,justasthetennisball,frombeinghereatonetime,isthereatanother.Whatiscommonto these two changes is time, not space. No change of place occurred in theripeningofthetomato,onlyachangeinquality;butneitherchange—thechangeinplaceandthechangeinquality—tookplacewithoutachangeintime.

Peoplepaintgreenthingsred,orredthingsgreen—houses,tables,chairs,andsoon.Theripeningofthetomatoisanaturalalteration;thepaintingofthingsisanartificialalterationofthem.Thehouse,table,orchair,whichwasatonetimegreen,didnotbecomeredatanothertimewithouthumanintervention.

Inadditiontolocalmotion(orchangeinplace)andalteration(orchangeinquality), there is still a third kind of change that is both natural and artificial.Thistimeletusbeginwiththeartificialformofit.

Takearubberballoonandblowitup.Asyoudoso,itchangesinsizeaswellasinshape.Itgetslarger,andwillcontinuetodosoasyoublowairintoit.Andwhenyouletairoutofit,itdecreasesinsizeandreturnstoitsoriginalshape.

Left on the table by itself, the balloon would not have increased in size.Blownup,withitsendtwistedandbound,theballoonwillnotdecreaseinsize.Thechangeinsize,accompaniedbyachangeinshape,isyourdoing.Youhavecausedtwoartificialchangestooccuratthesametime—achangeinquality(thealteration of the balloon’s shape) and a change in quantity (the increase ordecreaseintheballoon’ssize).

Changesinquantityoccurnaturallyaswellasartificially.Forexample,rockson a seacoastwear away as they are continually battered bywaves. They getsmaller.Theactionofwavesmayalsomakeseacoastcaveslarger.Morefamiliarexperiences of natural increase—in size and weight—occur in the world oflivingthings.Plantsandanimalsgrow.Theirgrowthinvolvesmanychanges,of

course,butamongthemarechangesinquantity—increasesinsizeandweight.Althoughoneaspectofthegrowthofalivingbodyiscertainlyanincreaseor

a change inquantity, it has apeculiar characteristic thatwedonot find in theincrease of inanimate bodies. You build a fire and you canmake it larger byaddingmorelogs.Ifmoreandmorelogsareavailabletopileonit,therewouldappeartobenolimittothesizeofthefireyoucanbuild.Ifyoufeedcarrotstoarabbit, the rabbit grows in size, but nomatter howmany carrots you feed therabbit,thereisalimittotherabbit’sincreaseinsize.

You can build smaller or larger pyramids and, given enough stones andhumanlabor,youcanmakeonelargerthananypyramidthathaseverbeenbuilt.But nomatterwhat you do in the feeding of animals, you cannotmake themgrowtobelargerthanacertainsize.Youcannotmakeahousecatthesizeofalionoratiger.

Thereverseisalsotrue.Theballoonyoublewupdecreasesinsizeasyouletthe air out of it, and the decrease cangoon to the pointwhere the balloon iscompletely collapsed. But when animals cease to grow, they may cease toincreaseinsize,buttheydonotdecreaseinsizetothevanishingpointsolongastheyremainalive.

Butanimalsandplantsdie.So,too,doballoonsburstandceasetobeballoonswhenyoublowtoomuchairintothem.Thisbringsustoafourthkindofchange—both natural and artificial—that is so different from the other three thatAristotleseparatesitsharplyfromtherest.

Alltheothers,aswehaveseen,taketimetohappen.Timeelapsesasbodiesmovefromheretothere,alterincolororshape,getlargerorsmaller.Butwhentheballoonbursts,itceasestobeaballooninstantaneously.Thatchangewouldappeartotakenotime,certainlynoappreciableamountoftime.Itoccursinaninstant; or perhapswe should say: at one instant theballoonexists, and at theverynextinstantitnolongerexists.Allwehaveleftareshredsorfragmentsofrubber,notaballoonwecanblowup.

Thesameistrueoftherabbitthatdies.Inoneinstantitisalive;atthenext,itisnomore.Allwehaveleftisthecarcass,which,inthecourseoffurthertime,willprogressivelydecayanddisintegrate.

This special kind of change (whichAristotle refers to as coming to be andpassingaway)isspecialinotherwaysthanbeinginstantaneous.Itissospecialthatitraisesseriousproblemsforus.

Ineverychange,wehavebeensayingsofar,somethingremainspermanentand unchanging. The body or thing that changes in place, in color, or in sizeremainsthesamebodywhenitmovesfromoneplaceoranother,whenitaltersincolor,whenitincreasesinsize.Butwhatremainsthesamewhentheballoon

bursts? What remains the same when the rabbit dies? The decaying,disintegratingcarcassisnottherabbitwefedcarrotsto.Theshredsofrubberarenottheballoonweblewup.

Nevertheless,thereissomethingpermanentinthisspecialkindofchange.Itiseasiertoseewhatitisintheproductionordestructionofthingsbymenthanitisinthebirthanddeathofplantsandanimals.

Pieces of wood, nails, and glue do not come together naturally to make achair.Menmakechairsbyputtingthesematerialstogetherinacertainway.Theyarethesamematerialsbeforetheywereputtogetherandshapedintoachairastheyareafterthathappens,attheinstantwhenthechaircomesintoexistenceassomethingyoucansiton.

Youfind thechairuncomfortableoryouhaveotherchairsandwanta tableinsteadofthisone.Youprobablycannotreuseallthenailsortheglue,butyoucantakethechairapartand,usingthepiecesofwoodandsomeofthenails,youcanbuildasmalltablewithmostofthesamematerials.Ifyouhadnotusedglueinthefirstplace,andifyouhadbeenabletoextractallthenailsinusableform,thematerialsinthechairthathasceasedtobeandinthetablethathascomeintobeingwouldbeidentical.Theywoulddifferonlyinrespecttohowtheyareputtogether.

It would, therefore, appear to be the case that in artificial productions anddestructions,whatpersistsorremainsthesamethroughoutthechangeisnotthethingthatwasproducedanddestroyed,butonlythematerialsthatapersonusedinputtingittogetherandthematerialsthatareleftwhenitistakenapart.

Somethinglikethatisalsothecaseinthedeathoftherabbit.Beingalivingbody, the rabbit is, after all, a material thing, just as the chair or table is amaterialthing.Thereismatterinitsmakeup.Andthatmatterremains,notinthesameform,ofcourse,butneverthelessitremains,whentherabbitbreaksup—dies, decays, disintegrates.And just as the inorganicmaterials of a chairmayenter into the compositionof a table, so theorganicmaterials of a rabbitmayenterintothecompositionofanotherlivingthing.

Therabbitmayhavebeenkilledbya jackalanddevouredfornourishment.To the extent that the jackal is able to assimilate what it eats, the organicmaterialsoftherabbitenterintothebone,flesh,andmuscleofthejackal.

Modernsciencehasanameforwhatisgoingonhere—anamethatAristotledidnotuse.Wecallittheconservationofmatter.Howeveritisreferredto,thepointisthatsomethingpersistsinthespecialkindofchangethatiscomingtobeandpassingaway.Thatsomething,inthecaseofartificialthingssuchastablesandchairs,consistsofthematerialsoutofwhichtheyaremade.

Inman-madeproductions,wecanusuallyidentifywhatthesematerialsare—

theseparticularpiecesofwood,theseparticularnails.Itisnotalwaysaseasytoidentify theparticularunitorunitsofmatter thatpersistwhenoneanimaleatsanotherorwhenlivingthingsdie.Buttherecanbenodoubtthatinallinstancesofcomingtobeandpassingaway,bothnaturalandartificial,eithermatteritselformaterialsofacertainkindundergotransformation.

What ismeant by “matter itself” as contrastedwith “materials of a certainkind”?Humanbeings,inmakingordestroyingartificialthings,neverworkwithmatteritself,butonlywithmaterialsofacertainkind.Doesnature,unlikeman,workwithmatteritself?Ifso,thenthatwhichpersistsorremainsthesubjectofchange in artificial production and destruction is not the same as that whichpersists or remains the subject of change in natural coming to be and passingaway.Similar, but not the same. The transformation of identifiable materials in

human production and destruction is only like but not identical with thetransformationofmatterinnaturalcomingtobeandpassingaway.Nevertheless,the similarity or likeness may help us to understand what happens when, innature,thingscometobeandpassaway.Wewilllookintothismorecloselyinthefollowingchapters.

6

TheFourCauses

The“fourcauses”aretheanswersthatAristotlegivestofourquestionsthatcanandshouldbeaskedaboutthechangeswithwhichweareacquaintedinourcommonexperience.Theyarecommon-sensequestions,andsoaretheanswers.Let us begin by considering them as they apply to changes brought about byhumanbeings,especiallythethingstheyproduceormake.Thatwillhelpustoconsiderthefourcausesastheyoperateintheworkingsofnature.

Thefirstquestionaboutanyhumanproductionis:Whatisitgoingtobemadeof? If you asked this question of a shoemaker at work, the answer would be“leather.” If you asked it of a jeweler, fashioning bracelets or rings out ofpreciousmetals, the answer might be “gold” or “silver.” If you asked it of agunsmithproducingarifle,theanswerwouldprobablybe“woodandsteel.”Thekindofmaterialnamedineachcase,onwhichthecraftsmanworksandoutofwhich he is producing a particular product, is the material cause of theproduction. It is one of four indispensable factors—factors without which theproductionwouldnotandcouldnotoccur.

The secondquestion is:Whomade it?Thatwould appear to be the easiestquestionofall,atleastwhenwearedealingwithhumanproductions.Itmaynotbe so easywhenwe come to the changes that take place in nature and to thethingsproducedbynatureratherthanbymen.Sofarashumanproductionsareconcerned,thequestionhasalreadybeenansweredinwhatwassaidinanswertothe first question: the shoemaker is themaker of the shoe, the jeweler of thebracelets or rings, the gunsmith of the gun. The maker in each case is theefficientcauseoftheproduction.

The thirdquestion is:What is it that isbeingmade?On the faceof it, thatquestion issoeasy that itmaymakeyou impatient tohave toconsider it. It isobvious,youmaysay, thatwhat isbeingmadebytheshoemakerisashoe,bythejeweleraring,andsoon.ButwhenItellyouthatAristotlecalledtheanswerto this question the formal cause of the change or production, you may be

puzzledbytheintroductionofthatword“formal,”thoughitis,asyouwillsoonsee,theprecisewordtopairwith“material,”thefirstofthefourcauses.Iwillreturntotheexplanationof“formal”afterwehaveconsideredthelastofthefourcauses.

Thefourthquestionis:Whatisitbeingmadefor?Whatpurposeisitintendedtofulfill?Whatobjectiveorusedidthemakerhaveinmindastheendtoserve?Initssimplestform,thequestionis:Whyisitbeingmade?Andtheanswer,withregard to the productions we have been talking about, comes quickly.We allknowwhat shoes and rings and guns are for—what function they perform orwhatpurposetheyserve.

This fourth factor in human productions Aristotle called the final cause,callingitthatbecausethefactorbeingreferredtoisanendinview.WhenyouorImakeanything,theendwehaveinmindissomethingthatweachievelastorfinally.Wemustfinishmakingitbeforewecanputittouseforthepurposewehadinmind.

I said earlier that the four causes are indispensable factors that must bepresent and operative whenever men produce anything. To call themindispensable is to say that, taken together, they are that without which theproductioncouldnothavetakenplace.Eachofthefourfactors,takenbyitself,isnecessary,butnonebyitselfissufficient.

Allfourmustbepresenttogetherandoperateinrelationtooneanotherinacertain way. The workman must have material to work on and must actuallyworkonit.Bydoingso,hemusttransformitintosomethingthatthematerialsinhandcanbemadetobecome.Andwhathasbeenmademustbeofsomeusetothepersonmakingit.Inotherwords,hemusthavehadareasonformakingit,forwithoutthat,hewouldprobablynothaveexpendedtheefforttomakeit.

Youmayquestionthelastofthesestatements.Youmaywonderwhetherthefinal cause—the reason for making something—must always be present andoperating.Isn’t itpossibleforsomeonetoproducesomethingwithouthavingareasonfordoingso—withouthaving inmind, inadvance,adeliberatepurposethathewishestoserve?

That question is not easy to answerwith certainty, though youmust admitthat, for the most part, human beings do make the effort to produce thingsbecause theyneedorwant the things they are engaged inproducing.Yet theymay also, on occasion, fiddle aroundwithmaterials and, as a result, producesomethingunexpected—aimlesslyor,shallwesay,playfully.

When this happens, therewould appear to be no final cause, no end resultbeingaimedat.Apurposefortheobjectproduced,afunctionforittoperform,maybethoughtupaftertheproductioniscompleted,buttheproducerofitdid

not have it in mind in advance. It could, therefore, hardly have been anindispensablefactor,oracause,ofwhatoccurred.

When we turn from human productions to the workings of nature, thequestion about the presence and operation of final causes becomes moreinsistent.Wecannotavoidfacingitsquarely,forweshouldcertainlybeuneasyaboutsayingthatnaturehasthisorthatinmindastheendresultthatitaimsat.Perhaps, when I am able to explain why Aristotle calls the third of the fourcauses the formal cause, I will also be able to answer the question about theoperationoffinalcausesintheworkingsofnature.

BeforeIdoso, letmesummarize thefourcausesbydescribingtheminthesimplest termspossible.Because these statementsabout the fourcausesare sovery simple, they may also be difficult to understand. We must pay closeattentiontothekeywordsthatareitalicizedineachstatement.

1. Materialcause:thatoutofwhichsomethingismade.2. Efficientcause:thatbywhichsomethingismade.3. Formalcause:thatintowhichsomethingismade.4. Finalcause:thatforthesakeofwhichsomethingismade.

Whatdowemeanwhenwe say“that intowhich something ismade”?Theleatheroutofwhichtheshoewasmadebytheshoemakerwasnotashoebeforetheshoemakerwenttoworkonit.Itbecameashoeorgotturnedintoashoebytheworkhedid,whichtransformeditfrombeingmerelyapieceofleatherintobeingashoemadeoutofleather.That,whichatanearliertimewasleathernothavingtheformofashoe,isnowatalatertimeleatherformedintoashoe.ThatiswhyAristotle says that “shoeness” is the formal cause in the production ofshoes.

Theintroductionofthatword“shoeness”willhelpustoavoidtheworsterrorwe can make in dealing with formal causes. We might be tempted, verynaturally,tothinkoftheformofathingasitsshape—somethingweareabletosketchonapieceofpaper.Butshoescomeinawidevarietyofshapes,aswellascolorsandsizes.Ifyoustoodinfrontofashoestorewindowwithsketchpadinhand,youwouldfinditverydifficultorimpossibletodrawwhatiscommontothevariousshapesoftheshoesinthewindow.

Youcanthinkofwhatiscommontothem,butyoucannotdrawit.Whenyoudohaveanideaofwhatiscommontoallshoes,ofeveryshape,size,andcolor,thenyouhavegraspedtheformthatAristotlecallsshoeness.Withouttherebeingsuchaform,shoescouldneverbemade; therawmaterialsoutofwhichshoesare made could never be transformed into shoes. Please notice that word

“transform.” It contains the word “form.”When you transform rawmaterialsintosomethingthattheyarenot—leatherintoshoes,goldintobracelets,andsoon—youaregivingthemaformthattheydidnotpreviouslyhave.Ashoemaker,byworkingonrawmaterials,transformsthemintosomethingtheycanbecomebutwhich,beforeheworkedonthem,theywerenot.

Wecangetfurtherawayfromthemistakeofthinkingthattheformalcauseistheshapeathingtakesbyconsideringotherkindsofchangethatwediscussedbefore—changes other than the production of things such as shoes, rings, andguns.

Thetennisballyousetinmotionmovesfromyourracketacrossthecourttoyouropponent’sbaseline.Youaretheefficientcauseofthatmotion,propellingtheballbytheforceofyourstroke.Theballisthematerialcause—thatwhichisbeingactedon.Butwhatistheformalcause?Itmustbesomeplaceotherthantheplacefromwhichtheballstartedoutwhenyouhitit.Letussupposethattheballlandsontheothersideofthenet,ismissedbyyouropponent,andcomestorestagainstthebackfence.Theplacewhereitcomestorestistheformalcauseoftheparticularmotionthatendedthere.Fromhavingbeenhere,onyoursideofthenet,itspositionorplacehasbeentransformedintobeingoverthere,againstthebackfence.

Thegreenchairthatyoupaintredissimilarlytransformedincolor.So,too,theballoonyoublewup;itistransformedinsize.Rednessistheformalcauseofthechangeyoubroughtaboutbypaintingthechair,justasovertherenessistheformalcauseofthechangeyoubroughtaboutbyhittingthetennisball.Ineachofthesechanges,youaretheefficientcause.Inoneofthem,thegreenchairisthematerialcause, thatwhichyouactedon inpainting it red. In theother, thecollapsedballoonisthematerialcause,thatwhichyouactedonwhenyoublewitup.

Thethreekindsofchange justconsideredalsooccurnaturally,withoutmanentering the picture as efficient cause. When we examine their naturaloccurrence, identifying the four causes becomesmoredifficult, and somenewproblems arise. However, what has already been said about humanly causedchangeswillbeofsomehelptous.

Sunshineripensthetomatoandturnsitfromgreentored.Theraysofthesunare the efficient cause of this alteration, and the tomato itself, the subjectundergoingthechange,isthematerialcauseofit.Here,asinaperson’spaintingagreenchairred,rednessistheformalcause.Fromhavingbeengreenincolor,that iswhat the tomatobecomes.Buthere there isnofinalcausedistinct fromtheformalcausejustnamed.

Thepersonwhopaintedthegreenchairredmayhavedonesoforthesakeof

having it match a set of chairs in a certain room. The purpose or end theindividualhadinmindwasdistinctfromtherednessthatwastheformalcauseinthetransformationofthechair’scolor.Butwewouldhardlysaythatthesun,inshiningonthetomato,wishedtomakeitredasasignthatithadatlastbecomeedible. The end result of the tomato’s ripening, so far as its surface color isconcerned,consistsinitsbeingred.Itsbeingredisboththeformalandthefinalcauseofthechange.

Muchthesamecanbesaidabouttherockthatwearsawayunderthebatteringofthewaves,becomingsmallerinsizeasaresultofthatprocess.Thisprocessmaygoonforalongtime,butatanygivenmoment,thesizeoftherockatthattimeisboth theformalandthefinalcauseof thechange—thedecrease insizethathasoccurredsofar.

Theaccountjustgivenofanaturalalterationincolorandanaturaldecreasein size applies as well to a natural change of place. The tennis ball that isaccidentallydroppedfallstothegroundandeventuallycomestorestthere.Thatlocalmotioncomestoanendattheplacewheretheballcomestorest,andthatplaceistheformalaswellasthefinalcauseofthemotion.

If,inthiscase,oneweretoaskabouttheefficientcause,theforceofgravitywouldprobablybenamed—ananswerthatmostofuslearnedinschool,butthatwouldhavepuzzledAristotle.Ihatfactdoesnotaffectourunderstandingofthedifferencebetweenanefficientcause,on theonehand,andmaterial, finalandformalcauses,ontheother.Howeveritisnamedordesignated,itisalwaysthatwhich, in any process of change, acts upon a changeable subject or exerts aninfluenceuponitthatresultsinthatchangeablesubject’sbecomingdifferentinacertainrespect—red,fromhavingbeengreen;smaller,fromhavingbeenlarger;there,fromhavingbeenhere.

Letusconsideroneotherkindofchange—thegrowthofalivingthingthat,thoughitinvolvesincreaseinsize,involvesmuchmorethanthis.Aristotleusesthefamiliarexampleoftheacornthatfallstothegroundfromanoak,takesrootthere, is nurtured by sunshine, rain, and nutrients in the soil, and eventuallydevelopsintoanotherfull-grownoaktree.

Theacorn,hetellsus,isanoakintheprocessofbecoming.Whatitistobeoakisboththefinalandtheformalcauseoftheacorn’sturningintoanoak.Theform that the acorn assumes when, through growth, it reaches its fulldevelopmentistheendthattheacornwasdestinedtoreachsimplybyvirtueofitsbeinganacorn.

If,insteadofbeinganacorn,theseedlinghadbeenakerneltakenfromanearofcorn,ourplanting it andnurturing itwouldhave resulted inadifferent endproduct—astalkofcornwithearsonit.AccordingtoAristotle,theendthatisto

beachievedand the form that is tobedeveloped in theprocessofgrowtharesomehowpresentattheverybeginning—intheseedthat,withpropernurturing,growsintothefullydevelopedplant.

They are not present actually, he would acknowledge, for then the acornwould already be an oak, and the kernel a stalk of corn.But they are presentpotentially,whichissimplytheoppositeoftheirbeingpresentactually.Itisthedifferencebetweenthepotentialitythatispresentintheacorn,ontheonehand,andthepotentialitythatispresentinthecornkernel,ontheother,whichcausestheoneseedtodevelopinonewayandtheotherseedtodevelopinanother.

Todaywehaveadifferentwayofsaying thesame thing.Aristotlesaid thatthe “entelechy” of one seed differed from the “entelechy” of the other.All hemeantbythatGreekwordwasthateachseedhadinitapotentialitythatdestinedittoreach,throughgrowthanddevelopment,adifferentfinalformorendresult.Wesay,whenweuse the languageofmodernscience, that thegeneticcodeinoneseedgivesitasetofdirectionsforgrowthanddevelopmentthatisdifferentfromthesetofdirectionsgivenbythegeneticcodeintheotherseed.

We think of the genetic code as programming a living thing’s growth anddevelopment fromtheverymomentwhen thatprocessstarts.Aristotle thoughtof a living thing’s inherent potentialities as guiding and controlling what itbecomesinitsprocessofgrowthanddevelopment.Uptoacertainpoint,thetwodescriptionsofwhathappensarealmostinterchangeable.Theobservablefactstobeaccountedforremainthesame.Acornsneverturnintocornstalks.

That this is somust be because there is something initially different in thematter that constitutes the acorn, on the one hand, and in the matter thatconstitutesthekerneloftablecorn,ontheother.Callingwhatistheregenesthatprogramgrowth anddevelopment or calling thempotentialities that guide andcontrol growth and development does not make much difference to ourunderstanding of what is going on. But, as most of us know, it doesmake adifferencetowhathumanbeingscandotointerferewithnaturalprocesses.

Our scientific knowledge of DNA (an abbreviation for a term inbiochemistry) enables us to experiment with the genetic code of an organismand,perhaps, tomake significant changes in thedirections itgives.Aristotle’sphilosophical understanding of the role that potentialities play did not enablehim,nordoesitenableus,tointerfereintheslightestwaywiththeworkingsofnature.

I shall have more to say in the next chapter about potentialities andactualities,andalsoaboutmatterandform,asfundamentalfactorsinchangesofall sorts, both natural and artificial. These four factors, although not identicalwiththefourcauses,arecloselyrelatedtothem.

Towhet your appetite forwhat is coming next, letme ask you to consideragain onemore change that has already beenmentioned—the special kind ofchange thatAristotlecalledcoming tobeandpassingaway.Asanexampleofthat special kind of change, I am going to take an occurrence that is mostfamiliartousinoureverydaylife.

We sit down todinner and, in the courseof it,we eat apieceof fruit.Theappleonourplate,whentakenfromthetree,hadfinishedgrowing.Butitisstillalivingthing,withseedsinitthatcanbeplantedtosproutmoreappletrees.Itshowsnosignsofdecayorrotting.Weeatit,allbutthecore.Whathasbecomeoftheapple?

Wehavenotonlyeatenit,cheweditup,digestedit,butwealsohavedrawnsomenourishmentfromit,whichmeansthatithassomehowbecomepartofus.Beforewestartedeatingit,theorganicmatterofthatpieceoffruithadtheformofanapple.Afterwefinishedeating,digesting,anddrawingnourishmentfromit,thematter,whichoncehadtheformofanapple,hassomehowbecomefusedormergedwithourownmatter,whichhastheformofahumanbeing.

The apple has not become a human being. Rather, it would appear,matteritselfhasbeentransformed,fromhavingtheformofanappletohavingtheformofahumanbeing.Itceasedtobeapplematterandbecamehumanmatter.

What ismeantby“matter itself” asopposed to “applematter” and“humanmatter”? Can we say that matter itself is that which remains the permanentunderlying subject of change in this remarkable kind of change that happenseverydaywhenweeatthefoodthatnourishesus?

IhopeIcanthrowsomelightonthese“matters”inthenextchapter.

7

ToBeandNottoBe

Weordinarilythinkofthebirthofalivingorganismasthecomingintobeingof something that did not exist before. And we often refer to the death of apersonashisorherpassingaway.

InAristotle’sthoughtaboutthechangesthatoccurintheworldofnatureandthe changes that human beings bring about by their effort, the special kind ofchange that he calls coming to be and passing away is distinguished from allotherkindsofchange,suchaschangeofplace,alterationinquality,andincreaseordecreaseinquantity.

This special kind of change in nature is more difficult to understand thanother kinds of change.Why? To find out, let us beginwith what is easier tounderstand—theproductionordestructionofthingsbyhumanbeings.

When people move things from one place to another, when they alter orenlarge them, the individual thing that theymove,alter,orenlargeremains theselfsamething.Itchangesonlywithrespecttoitsattributes—itsplace,itscolor,itssize.Itnotonlyremainsthesamekindofthingthatitwasbeforeitchanged;afterithasbeenchanged,italsopersistsasthisone,unique,individualthing.

Theenduringsamenessorpermanenceoftheindividualthingthatundergoesthesechanges is clear tous from the fact that its identitycanbenamed in thesame way before and after the change occurs: this ball, that chair. It is notanotherballoranotherchair,butthisoneorthatone.

Whensomeonetakesrawmaterials,suchaspiecesofwood,andtransformsthoserawmaterialsintoachair,anartificialthing—somethingthatdidnotexistbefore—comes into existence.What beforewere several pieces ofwood havenowbecomethisparticularchair.Piecesofwoodbecomingachair iscertainlynotthesameasthisgreenchairbecomingred.Thereasonisthatwhenthechairhascome intobeing, the several separatepiecesofwoodno longer remain, atleastnotasseveralseparatepiecesofwood,thoughthischairremainspreciselythischairwhenitchangesincolor.

Beforewego fromartificial production tonatural generation (which is justanothernamefortheprocessofcomingtobe),itwillbehelpfultousifwelookalittlemorecloselyatwhatishappeningintheeasier-to-understandprocessofartificialproduction.Thehelpwillcomefromgettingsomegraspofthemeaningof four words that were used in the preceding chapter. They are “matter,”“form,” “potentiality,” and “actuality.” Though what they mean can beunderstoodinthelightofcommonexperienceandincommon-senseterms,thewordsthemselvesarenotwordsweusefrequentlyineverydayspeech.

Piecesofwoodthatarenotachairbecomepiecesofwoodthatareachair.When the pieces ofwood are not a chair, their not being a chair is a lack ofchairness on their part.They lack—they are deprivedof—the formof a chair.Let’susetheword“privation”forthislackofacertainform.

Thereismoreinthesepiecesofwoodthantheprivationofchairness.Ifthatwasalltherewastoit,thesepiecesofwoodcouldneverbemadeintoachair.Inadditiontolackingchairness,thesepiecesofwoodmustalsohavethecapacitytoacquirechairness.Theircapacityisinseparablyconnectedwiththeirprivation,forifthesepiecesofwooddidnotlacktheformofachair,theywouldnothavethe capacity for acquiring that form, since not lacking it, they would alreadyhaveit.Onlywhencertainmaterials,suchaspiecesofwood,lackacertainformcantheyhavethecapacityforacquiringit.

Letus call that capacity apotentialityof thematerials inquestion.Anotherwordforpotentialityis“canbe.”Itmakesagreatdealofdifferencewhetheryousaythatsomethingisachairorcanbeachair.Thesepiecesofwoodarenotachair,buttheycanbeachair.AsIsaidamomentago,iftheywereachair,theycouldnotbecomeachair.

However,itisnottruetosaythatwhencertainmaterialslackacertainform,they always have the potentiality for acquiring it. For example, water and airlacktheformofachair,butunlikewood,waterandairarematerialsthatdonothavethepotentialityforacquiringtheformofachair.Althoughthepotentialityforacquiringacertainformisneverpresentinthematerialsunlessthatformisabsent, the mere absence of the form—the lack or privation of it—does notnecessarilymean that thematerials have the potentiality for acquiring it.Mencanmakechairsoutofwood,butnotoutofairorwater.

When the pieces of wood that lack the form of a chair and also have thepotentialityforacquiringthatformtakeonthatformasaresultofacarpenter’sskillandeffort,wesaythatthepiecesofwoodthatwerepotentiallyachairhavenowactuallybecomeachair.Throughoutthewholeprocessofbecoming,untilthe very moment when the chair is finally finished, the pieces of wood,undergoing transformation, were still only potentially a chair. Not until their

transformationhasbeencompleteddotheyactuallyhavetheformofachair.Whenthepiecesofwoodareactuallyachair,theirpotentialityforbecoming

a chair has been actualized; and so, of course, it no longer remains as apotentiality. The form the pieces of wood have acquired is the actuality thatremovesthepotentialitythataccompaniedthelackofthatforminthewoodbutdidnotaccompanythelackofitinwaterorair.

Wecannowseehowthesefourimportantwords—matter,form,potentiality,andactuality—arerelated.Mattermayhaveor lackacertain form.Lacking it,mattermayalsohave thecapacity foracquiring it,which is itspotentiality forhavingthatform.Butitdoesnotalwayshavesuchapotentialitywhenitlacksacertain form, aswe saw in the case ofwater and air as comparedwithwood.When it acquires the form forwhich it has a potentiality, that potentiality hasbeen actualized. Having the acquired form has transformed the matter frombeingapotentialchairintobeinganactualchair.

I have been using thewords “matter” and “materials” interchangeably.Butwhenwearereferringtowood,ontheonehand,andwater,ontheother,wearespeakingofdifferentkindsofmatter.Woodisnotjustmatter;itisacertainkindof matter—matter having the form of wood, which is different from matterhavingtheformofwater.

Onekindofmatter,wood,provideshumanbeingswithmaterialsoutofwhichthey canmake chairs; anotherkind,water, doesnot.The form thematter has,which makes it a certain kind of matter (wood), also gives it a certainpotentiality (forbecominga chair).Matter in the formofwaterdoesnothavethatpotentiality.

Whenweunderstandthissimplepoint,asimplestepofreasoningenablesustograspanotherimportantpoint.

Woodcanbecomeachair,butitcannotbecomeanelectriclightbulb;watercanbecomeafountain,butitcannotbecomeachair.

Matter having a certain form has a limited potentiality for acquiring otherforms.This is trueof everykindofmatter, all thedifferentkindsofmaterialsthat people can work on to produce things—chairs, electric light bulbs, andfountains.

Now suppose there was matter totally deprived of form—utterly formlessmatter. It would not actually be any kind of matter. But it would also bepotentially every kind of matter; since, lacking all forms, it would have thecapacitytoacquireanyform.Itwouldhaveanunlimitedpotentialityforforms.

Youwouldbequiterightif, thinkingaboutthis,youweretosay:“Holdon,matter without any form might have an unlimited potentiality, an unlimitedcapacity,foracquiringforms,butlackingallforms,itwouldbeactuallynothing.

Whatisactuallynothingdoesnotexist.Hencetotalkaboutformlessmatteristotalkaboutsomethingthatcannotexist.”Why,then,youmayask,didIbothertomentionitinthefirstplace?What’sthepointinthinkingaboutit?

Aristotlewouldsaythat,lookedatinoneway,youarerightinthinkingthatpure matter, formless matter, is not actually anything or, in other words, isnothing.Youare,therefore,alsorightinthinkingthatformlessmatterdoesnotexist.ButAristotlewouldaddthat,althoughformlessmatterisactuallynothing,itisalsopotentiallyeverything.Itispotentiallyeverypossiblekindofthingthatcanbe.

Still,youpersistinasking,ifformlessmatterdoesnotexistandcannotexist,whatisthepointinmentioningitorthinkingaboutit?Aristotle’sansweristhattherewouldbenoneedtomentionitorthinkaboutitifweconfinedourselvestotrying to understand artificial productions and destructions—the making andunmakingofsuchthingsaschairs.Butthebirthanddeathofanimalsarenotsoeasytounderstand.

Let’stakeananimal’sdeathfirst.Ourpetrabbitdies—decays,disintegrates,andeventuallydisappears.Thematterthathadtheformofarabbitnolongerhasthatform.Itnowhasacquiredanotherform,aswouldhappeniftherabbitwerekilledanddevouredbyawolf.Whenthishappens,matterthatwasthematterofonekindof thing (rabbit)hasnowbecome thematterofanotherkindof thing(wolf).

Ifyouthinkaboutthisforamoment,youwillseethatwhathasoccurredhereisdifferent fromwhatoccurredwhenwood,which isacertainkindofmatter,becomes a chair.Becoming a chair, it does not cease to bewood. It does notcease to be matter of a certain kind. A certain kind of matter has persistedthroughoutthischange.Itcanbeidentifiedasthesubjectof thechange.Thesepieces of wood that at one time were not actually a chair have now becomeactuallyachair.

Butinthetransformationthatoccurredwhenthewolfkilledanddevouredtherabbit,acertainkindofmatterdidnotpersistthroughoutthechange.Thematterofacertainkindofthing(matterhavingtheformofarabbit)becamethematterofanotherkindofthing(matterhavingtheformofawolf).Theonlyidentifiablesubjectofthischangeismatter—notmatterofacertainkind,sincematterofaparticularkinddoesnotpersistthroughoutthechange.

Letusnowturnfromdeathtobirth.Thatpetrabbitofyourscameintobeingasaresultofsexualreproduction.Aristotlewasaswellacquaintedwiththefactsof life asyouand I are.Theprocess that results in thebirthof a living rabbitbeganwhenanovumofa female rabbitwas fertilizedby thespermofamalerabbit.

From the moment of fertilization, a new organism has begun to develop,though while it is still being carried in the female rabbit’s uterus, it is not aseparatelivingthing.Thebirthoftherabbitisjustaphaseintherabbit’sprocessof development. It has been developingwithin themother rabbit before beingborn,anditgoesondevelopingafteritisbornuntilitreachesfullgrowth.

Birthisnothingbuttheseparationofonelivingbodyfromanother—thebabyrabbitfromthemotherrabbit.Andthatseparationisalocalmotion,amovementof the baby rabbit from being in one place to being in another—from beinginsidethemotherrabbittobeingoutsidethemotherrabbit.

Letusnowgobacktothebeginningofthebabyrabbit—themomentwhenitfirstcametobe.Beforethatmoment,therewasthefemalerabbit’sovumandthemale rabbit’s sperm. Neither the ovum nor the sperm was actually a rabbit,though both together had the potentiality for becoming a rabbit. Theactualizationofthatpotentialitytookplaceatthemomentoffertilization,whenthematterofthespermwasmergedorfusedwiththematterofovum.

Do thematter of the ovum and thematter of the sperm in separation fromeach other stand in the same relation to the matter of the baby rabbit afterfertilizationoccurs, as thematterof the rabbit stands to thematterof thewolfaftertherabbithasbeenkilledanddevouredbythewolf?Ifso,thensomethinglikewhatAristotlehadinmindwhenheaskedustothinkaboutformlessmatteris the subject of change in the coming to be and passing away of livingorganisms. It is thatwhichwe identifyaspersistingorenduring in thisspecialkindofchange.

ThisisasnearasIcancometoexplainingwhyAristotlethoughtitnecessarytomention formlessmatter. Youmay think that hewent too far—that naturalgenerationcanbeaccountedforinthesamewayasartificialproduction.Ifyoudothinkso,letmeaskyoutoconsideronemoreexample.

The example is one that Aristotle himself considered. He said that “natureproceedslittlebylittlefromthingslifelesstolivingthingsinsuchawaythatitisimpossibletodeterminetheexactlineofdemarcation.”Hewasquitecapableofimaginingthelinebetweenthenonlivingandthelivingbeingcrossedwhenthefirstlivingorganismsonearthemergedfromnonlivingmatter.Inthatcomingtobeofthefirstlivingorganisms,canweidentifythematterthatisthesubjectofthis remarkable change as beingmatter of a certain kind?Does it remain thesamekindofmatterbothbeforeandafter the first livingorganismscame intobeing?

Youmaynotwanttogosofarastocallitformlessmatter.But,ontheotherhand,youmay find itdifficult to identify it asmatterofacertainkind,whichwouldmeanthatithadandretainedacertainform.Ifthisisyourstateofmind,

thenyouunderstandwhyAristotle thoughtnaturalgenerationmoredifficult toexplain than artificial production; and you also understand why he thought itnecessarytomentionandaskyoutothinkaboutpureorformlessmatter,which,ofcourse,doesnotexist.

8

ProductiveIdeasandKnow-How

Theindividualwhofirst tookwoodandmade it intoachair—orabedorahouse—musthavehadsomeideaofwhathewasgoingtomakeorbuildbeforesettingtowork.Suchanindividualhadtounderstandtheformthatthepiecesofwoodwouldhave toacquire inorder tobecomeachair.Hecouldnotget thatidea fromanexperiencewithchairsbecausenochairs existedbeforehemadethisone.Perhaps,wemayguess,hegotitfromexperienceswithrockformationsthatprovidedhisbodywithsupportforsittingdown.Thefirstchairwasthusanimitationofsomething its inventorhadfoundinnature,as thefirsthousewas,perhaps,animitationofnaturalcaveformationsthatprovidedshelter.

Wherever or however the first chairmaker got the idea of a chair, the ideaitselfwasnotenough.Asweobservedinanearlierchapter,theformofachair—chairness—is common to chairs of every size, shape, and configuration ofparts. If all that the first carpenter had in his mind was an idea of chairs ingeneral, he could not have produced an individual chair, particular in everyrespect in which one individual chair can differ from others. In order totransformthewoodmaterialsheworkedon,bygivingthosematerialstheformofachair,healsohadtohavesomeideaoftheparticularchairhewasabouttoproduce.

Productivethinkinginvolveshavingwhatwemaybetemptedtocallcreativeideas. Since no Greek equivalent of the word “creative” was in Aristotle’svocabulary, we should resist that temptation, and speak instead of productiveideas.Productiveideasarebasedonsomeunderstandingoftheformsthatmattercan take, supplemented by imaginative thinking about such details as sizes,shapes, and configurations. Without a productive idea in this full sense, thecraftsman cannot transform raw materials into this individual thing—be it achair,abed,ahouse,oranythingelsethatcanbemadeoutofmaterialsprovidedbynature.

There are twoways inwhich a productive idea canbe expressed.The first

chairmakerorhousebuilderprobablydidnotdrawupaplanorblueprintofthethinghewasabouttoproduce.Withaproductiveideainmind,hejustproducedit. Thematerialization of that idea—its embodiment inmatter—expressed theproductiveideahehad.Ifyouhadaskedhimwhatideahehadinmindbeforehemadethechairorbuiltthehouse,hemightnothavebeenabletotellyouinsomanywords.Butoncehehadbroughtthechairorhouseintoexistence,hecouldhavepointedtoitandsaid,“There,thatiswhatIhadinmind.”

Much later in thehistoryofmankind,craftsmenofall sortsbecameable todraw up plans for the making of things. They became able to express theirproductiveideasbeforeactuallymaterializingthembytransformingmatter.Butevenatlaterstagesinthehistoryofhumanproductivity,craftsmendonotalwaysproceed toworkbyfirstputting theirproductive ideasdownonpaper insomefashion.Theystillsometimesholdtheideaintheirmindandletitguidetheminevery step of the work until the finished product comes into existence andexpressestheideatheyhadinthefirstplace.

This distinction between two ways in which productive ideas can beexpressedcallsourattentiontotwophasesinthemakingofthings,phasesthatcanbe separated.One individual canhave the ideaof aparticularhouse tobebuilt and can draw up the plans for the building of that house. Anotherindividual,orotherindividuals,canexecuteorcarryoutthatplan.Nowadayswedifferentiate between these different contributors to themaking of a house bycallingoneanarchitectandtheotherabuilder(or,ifthebuilderemploysotherpersonstoengageinbuildingthehouse,wecallthebuilderacontractor).

Theindividualwhodrawsuptheplans in thefirstplace is theonewhohastheproductive idea.Thosewhoexecute theplansmusthaveknow-how.In themakingofanything,whether itbeachairorahouse,productive ideasarenotenough. To carry them out, it is necessary to know how to dealwith the rawmaterialsinsuchawaythattheirpotentialityforbecomingachairorahouseisactualized. Unless that end result is reached, the productive idea will not beexpressedinmatter.Itwillnotbematerialized.

Ofcourse,oneandthesameindiviualmayhaveboththeproductiveideaandtheknow-howneeded formaking a chair or ahouse.Theonly thingwemustremember is that productive ideas and know-how are distinct factors in themakingofthings.Whatentersintothecraftsman’sknow-how?

First of all, hemust knowhow to choose the appropriate rawmaterials formaking the kind of thing he has in mind, with whatever tools he has at hisdisposal,orwithnoneatall,butonlyhisbarehands. If, forexample,hisonlytools are a hammer and saw, he cannotmake a chair out of iron or steel or ahouse out of stones.And it should gowithout saying that, regardless ofwhat

toolsareavailable,theartisancannotmakeachairorahouseoutofairorwater.Beyondknowinghowtochoosetheappropriatematerialstoworkonwiththe

tools at his disposal, the craftsman must also know how to use those toolsefficientlyandhowtoproceed,stepbystep,intheconstructionofthethinghewishes to make. In the building of a house, laying the foundations precedesgettingtheframeup,asthatprecedesputtingtheroofon.

Themind,thehands,andthetoolsofthecraftsman,takenalltogether,aretheefficientcauseofthethingthatisproduced.Theyactupontherawmaterialstoactualize the potentialities that suchmaterials have for being transformed intotheproductthatthemakerhadinmind.

Ofthesethreefactors(whichtogetherconstitutetheefficientcause),themindistheprincipalfactor.Itisthemaker’smindthathastheproductiveideaandtheknow-how, without which neither hands nor tools could ever make anything.Themaker’shandsandhistoolsaremerelytheinstrumentshismindusestoputhisproductiveideaandhisknow-howintotheactionsrequiredtoactontherawmaterialsandactualizetheirpotentialities.

Thehumanmindistheprincipalfactorinhumanproduction.Everythingelseisinstrumental.

To know how to make something is to have skill. Even in the simplestperformances,whichwesometimescallunskilledlabor,thereissomeknow-howand, therefore, someskill.From the simplest to themostcomplexactivities inwhichhumanbeingsengage—fromthebuildingoftoymodelsbychildrentothebuildingofbridges,dams,andschools—thelevelsofknow-howarethelevelsofskill.

AnotherEnglishword for “skill” is theword “technique.”The personwhohastheknow-howrequiredformakingsomethinghasthetechniqueformakingit. Imention thisbecause theEnglishword“technique”comesfromtheGreekword technikos,whichAristotle used in talking about the acquired ability thatsomemenmayhaveandothersmaynothaveformakingthings.Thecombiningformtechno-whichmeansartorskill,comesfromtheGreek techné. InLatin,thisbecomesarsandinEnglishart.Anartistisapersonwhohasthetechnique,skill, or know-how for making things. We would call such persons creativeartistsif,inadditiontohavingtheknow-how,theyalsohavetheproductiveideathatistheindispensableprimarysourcefromwhichcomesthethingtobemade.

Wesometimesusetheword“art”forthethingsproducedbyanartist.Weusethatwordasshortfor“worksofart.”Butsinceworksofartcannotbeproducedunlesssomeonehasacquiredtheknow-howtoproducethem,artinthesenseofknow-howmustfirstexistinahumanbeingbeforeitcanmakeitselfevidentinaworkofart.

Although you would readily refer to cooks, dressmakers, carpenters, orshoemakersasartistsorcraftsmenbecauseyourecognizedthattheyhadtheskillorknow-howformakingthisor that,youwouldprobablynotrefer tofarmers,physicians,orteachersasartists.Aristotle,however,recognizedtheirpossessionofacertainskillorknow-howthatwouldjustifycallingthemartists.Buthealsopointed out how different their art is from the art of cooks, carpenters, andshoemakers.

Thelatterproducethings—cakes,chairs,andshoes—thatwouldnevercomeinto existence without human productive ideas, know-how, and effort. Naturedoesnotproducesuchthings.Theyarealwaysworksofart.Butnature,withouthumanknow-howandeffort,doesproducefruitsandgrains.Why,then,shouldwe refer to farmers,who raise such things as apples or com, as artists?Whathavetheyproduced?

By themselves, nothing. Farmers havemerely helped nature to produce theapples and the corn that nature would have produced anyway. They have theskillorknow-how tocooperatewithnature in theproductionof fruitorgrain;and,bysodoing,theymaybeabletoobtainabettersupplyofnature’sproductsthanwouldhavefallentotheirhandsiftheyhadnotcooperatedwithnatureinproducingthem.

As farmers, having the know-how or skills that belong to agriculture,cooperate with nature in the production of fruits, grains, and vegetables, sophysicians, having the know-how or skills that belong tomedicine, cooperatewith nature in preserving or restoring the health of a living organism. Sincehealth,likeapplesandcorn,issomethingthatwouldexisteveniftherewerenophysicians, physicians, as well as farmers, are merely cooperative artists, notproductiveonesliketheshoemakersandthecarpenters.

So,too,areteachers.Humanbeingscanacquireknowledgewithouttheaidofteachers, justasapplesandcorngrowwithout theaidoffarmers.But teacherscanhelphumanbeingsacquireknowledge,justasfarmerscanhelpapplesandcorn to grow in desired qualities and quantities. Teaching, like farming andhealing,isacooperative,notaproductiveart.

The productive arts differ inmanyways. Humanmaking turns out a widevarietyofproducts—fromchairs,shoes,andhousestopaintings,statues,poems,andsongs.Paintingsandstatuesarelikeshoesandchairsinthattheyaremadeofmaterials that themaker somehow transforms. Also, like shoes and chairs,paintingsandstatuesexistatagivenplaceandatagiventime.

Ontheotherhand,apieceofmusic—asongthatissungoverandoveragain—does not exist just at one place and at one time. It can be sung at manydifferentplacesandatmanydifferenttimes.Inaddition,it takestimetosinga

songorplayapieceofmusic,asittakestimetoreciteapoemortellastory.Thesong and the story have a beginning, a middle, and an end in a sequence oftimes,whichisnottrueofastatueorapainting.

Thereisonefurtherdifferencebetweenasongorastoryandapaintingorastatue. Stories can be written down in words; songs can be written down inmusicalnotations.Thewordsofspeechandthenotationsofmusicaresymbolsthatcanberead.Thepersonwhoisable toread themcanget thestory that isbeingtoldbythem,singthesongorhearit.Butthepaintingandthestatuemustbeseendirectly.Toenjoytheworkofapainterorsculptor,youmustgotothematerialproductthathehasmade.

Though thepaintingor the statue is amaterial product like the shoeor thechair,itisalsosomethingtobeenjoyed,likethestoryorthesong,notsomethingtobeused,liketheshoeorthechair.Ofcourse,itispossibletouseapaintingtocoveraspotonthewall,asitispossibletoenjoyachairbylookingatitinsteadofsittingdownonit.

Nevertheless,usingandenjoyingaredifferentwaysthatmenapproachworksof art. They use them when they employ them to serve some purpose. Theyenjoy themwhen theyare satisfiedwith thepleasure theyget fromperceivingtheminonewayoranother—byseeing,hearing,orreading.

Thepleasurewegetwhenweenjoyaworkofarthassomethingtodowithourcallingthethingweenjoybeautiful.Butthatisnotallthereistoit.Itisalsopossible to call a chair, a table, or a house beautiful simply because it iswellmade. Itsbeingwellmade isonefactor thatenters into thebeautyofahumanproduct,whetheritisachairorastatue.Thepleasurewegetfrombeholdingitisanotherfactor.

Aristotle’ssuggestionthatthesetwofactorsarerelatedappearstomakegoodsense.Thepleasurewegetfromlookingatthestatueorthehouse,orlisteningtothestoryorthesong,issomehowconnectedwithitsbeingwellmade.Apoorlymadestatue,apoorlyconstructedhouse,apoorlytoldstorywouldnotgiveusasmuchpleasure.

We all know the difference between a piece of clothingmade by a skilledtailor, or a soupmadeby a skilled cook, and shirts or soupsmadebypersonswith very little skill. The well-made shirt and the well-made soup are moreenjoyable—giveusmorepleasure—thanpoorlymadeones.

Inaddition,thosewhohavetheartofcookingortailoringhavetheknow-howby which they can judge whether a shirt or a soup is well made.We wouldexpect skilled cooks or tailors to agree in their judgments.Wewould be verysurprisedifoneskilledcookthoughtasoupwaswellmadeandanother,havingequalskill,thoughtitwaspoorlymade.

Wewouldnotbesosurprised ifwefound that,of twopersons lookingatapainting that skilled artists agreed was well made, one liked it and the otherdidn’t.Wedonotexpectindividualstoenjoythesamethingsorenjoythemtothe same extent. What gives one person pleasure may not give pleasure toanother.

Just as one personmay havemore skill or know-how than another, so onepersonmay have better taste than another. It would be wiser to ask a skilledpersonwhetheracertainworkofartwaswellmadethantoaskthatquestionofapersonwhodidnotknowanythingabouthowsuchthingsshouldbemade.Soitmightbewisertoaskapersonwhohadbettertasteabouttheenjoyabilityofaworkofart.Wewouldexpectapersonofbettertastetolikeaworkofartthatwasbetter—notonlybettermadebutmoreenjoyable.

Thequestionwhetherweshouldallbeabletoagree,orwhetherweshouldallbe expected to agree, about the beauty of a work of art has never beensatisfactorilyanswered.Thereare some reasons for anwering itby sayingyes,andsomereasonsforansweringitbysayingno.Ifallthereweretothebeautyofaworkofartconsisted in itsbeingwellmade, thequestionwouldbeeasier toanswer.Weexpectthosewhohavetheknow-howneededtoproduceaworkofthatsorttobeabletoagreethatitiswellmadeorpoorlymade.

Wheredoesthisallimportantknow-howcomefrom?Howdoesthepersonofskillacquireit?

Therearetwoanswers.Intheearlierstagesofhumanproduction,theknow-how needed was based on common-sense knowledge of nature—knowledgeabouttherawmaterialsthatnatureprovidedthehumanproducertoworkonandknowledgeabouttheuseofthetoolstobeworkedwith.

In later stages, and especially in modern times, the know-how needed hasbeenbasedon scientific knowledgeof nature, and it nowconsists ofwhatwehave come to call the technology that scientific knowledge gives us.“Technology” is just another name for scientific know-how as comparedwithcommon-senseknow-how.

Does Aristotle’s uncommon common sense give us any useful know-how?Does philosophical thought—the understanding of natural processes that wehavebeenconsideringintheprecedingchapters—helpustoproducethings?

No,itdoesnot.Scientificknowledgecanbeappliedproductively.Scientificknowledge,throughtechnology,givesustheskillandpowertoproducethings.But the philosophical reflection or understanding that improves our common-sensegraspofthephysicalworldinwhichwelivegivesusneithertheskillnorthepowertoproduceanything.

Remember, for example, something said in an earlier chapter. Aristotle’s

philosophicalunderstandingofwhyacornsdevelopintooaksandkernelsofcorndevelop into stalks of corn does not enable us to interfere with these naturalprocessesinanyway.ButourscientificknowledgeaboutDNAandthegeneticcodedoesenableustoalterthepatternofdevelopmentbysplicingthegenes.

Isphilosophytotallyuseless,then,ascomparedwithscience?Yes,itis,ifweconfine ourselves to the use of knowledge or understanding for the sake ofproducingthings.Philosophybakesnocakesandbuildsnobridges.

Butthereisauseofknowledgeorunderstandingotherthantheuseweputittowhenweengage in theproductionof things.Knowledgeandunderstandingcanbeusedtodirectour livesandmanageoursocietiessothat theyarebetterratherthanworselivesandbetterratherthanworsesocieties.

That is a practical rather than a productive use of knowledge andunderstanding—a use for the sake of doing rather than a use for the sake ofmaking.

In that dimension of human life, philosophy is highly useful—more usefulthanscience.

PARTIIIMANTHEDOER

9

ThinkingaboutEndsandMeans

I do not have an automobile and Iwant one. The automobile Iwant costsmore money than I have available. It is necessary for me to get the moneyneededtobuythecar.ThereappeartobeanumberofwaysinwhichIcangetwhat is needed without violating the law. For example, I can save it, by notspendingwhatmoneyIhaveonsomethingelse;orIcan try toearnadditionalmoney;orIcanborrowit.

Inthisexample—theremighthavebeencountlessothersof thesamesort—gettingtheautomobileistheendinview.Gettingthemoneyneededtobuythecarisameanstothatend;itisalsoitselfanendtowhichthereare,aswehaveseen,anumberofmeans.

HowdoIchooseamongthem?Onemaybeeasierthantheothers;goingonewaymaygetmemygoalmorequicklythangoingtheotherways.Oftheseveralmeans, each serving to attain the end inview,onewouldnormally choose themeans that seems better by virtue of being easier, quicker, more likely tosucceed,andsoon.

Whenweactthisway,weactpurposefully.Tosaythatwehaveapurposeinwhatwedoistosaythatweareactingforsomegoalthatwehaveinmind.

Sometimesweactaimlessly—likeaboatjustdriftingonthecurrentwithnoone at the wheel to steer it. When we act in that way, we are also actingthoughtlessly.Wehavenothinginmindthatguidesouractinginonedirectionoranother.Toactaimlesslyrequiresnothinkingonourpart.

For the most part, however, we act purposefully, and then we cannot actwithoutthinkingfirst.Wehavetothinkaboutthegoalweareaimingat—theendwearetryingtoachieve.Wehavetothinkaboutthevariousmeansthatwecanusetoachieveit.Wehavetothinkaboutwhichisthebetterofalternativemeansandwhyoneisbetterthananother.Andiftheparticularmeansthatwechoosetoemployisameanswecannotusewithoutdoingsomethingelsefirstinordertolayourhandsonit,thenitisitselfanend,andwemustthinkaboutthemeansto

achievingit.ThinkingofthesortIhavejustdescribedispracticalthinking.Itisthinking

aboutendsandmeans—thinkingaboutthegoalyouwishtoreachandthinkingaboutwhatmustbedonetogetthere.Itisthekindofthinkingthatisnecessaryforpurposefulaction.

Productive thinking, aswe have seen, is thinking about things to bemade.Practicalthinking,incontrast,isthinkingaboutwhatistobedone.Tothinkwellforthesakeofmakingsomething,youhavetohavewhatwecalledproductiveideasandknow-how.Tothinkwellfor thesakeofgettingsomewherebywhatyoudo,youhavetohaveanideaofagoaltobereachedandideasaboutwaysofreaching it. And you also have to think about the reasons why one way ofpursuingyourgoalisbetterthananother.

Productive thinking, or thinking in order to produce something, does notactuallyproduceit.Suchthinkingmayleadtoactualproduction,butproductiondoes not actually begin until the producer goes to work and acts on the rawmaterialstotransformtheminawaythatwillmaterializetheproductiveideahehadinmind.

So, too,practical thinking,or thinking inorder to actpurposefullyor todowhatisnecessarytoachievesomeendorgoal,fallsshortofactualdoing.Doingbegins when practical thinking is put into practice. Productive thinking maycontinuewhileproductionisactuallygoingon.Practicalthinkingmaycontinueduring the course of purposeful action. But until making and doing actuallybegin,productivethinkingandpracticalthinkingbearnofruit.

Aristotle tells us that, except for the exceptional instances of aimlessbehavior,humanbeingsalwaysactwithsomeendinview.Thethinkingtheydoinordertoactpurposefullybeginswiththinkingaboutthegoaltobeachieved,butwhentheybegintodoanythingtoachievethatgoal,theyhavetostartwiththemeansforachievingit.Theendcomesfirst inthethinkingthat individualsdo in order to act purposefully, but the means come first in what they do toaccomplishtheirpurposes.

Insayingthathumanbeingsalways—orusually—actwithsomeendinview,Aristotlealsosaysthattheyactforsomegoodtheywishtoobtainandpossess.Heidentifiesanendbeingaimedatwithagoodthatisdesired.

Inhisview,itmakesnosenseatalltosaythatweareactingforanendthatweregardasbadforus.Thatamounts tosaying thatwhatweareaimingat issomethingwedonotdesire.Itisplaincommonsensethatwhatweregardasbadforusissomethingwedesiretoavoid,notsomethingwedesiretopossess.

Whataboutthemeansweneedtoachievetheendwehaveinmind?Toaimatanendistoseekagoodthatwedesire.Arethemeanswemustusetoachieve

the end also goods thatwe desire?Yes and no. Themeans are good, but notbecausewedesirethemfortheirownsake,butonlybecausewedesirethemforthesakeofsomethingelse.

Mustwealwaysregardmeansasgoodbecausetheyprovideuswithawayofgetting theendwewant toachieve?Certainly,meansaregoodonly if theydohelpussucceedinreachingourgoal.Butiftheyhaveotherconsequences,too,thentheymaybeundesirableforreasonsquiteapartfromachievingtheendwehaveinmind.

Stealingwouldget themoney that Ineed tobuyanautomobile Iwant,butstealingmightalsogetmeintoserioustroublethatIwouldwishtoavoid.Themeansweusetoattaintheendweseekmustnotonlybegoodbecausetheygetuswherewewanttogo,buttheymustalsonotlanduswherewedonotwanttobe—injail.

Tosumup:meansmaybeanendthatwehavetoachievebyothermeans,andanendmayalsobeameanstosomefurtherend.ThesetwoobservationsleadtotwoquestionsthatAristotlethinkswecannotavoid.Oneis:Arethereanymeansthatarepurelyormerelymeans,neverends?Theother is:Are thereanyendsthat are ends and never means—what Aristotle calls ultimate or final endsbecausetheyarenotmeanstoanyendsbeyondthemselves?

Anotherwayofaskingthefirstquestionistoaskwhetherthereareanythingsthatwedesireonlyforthesakeofsomethingelse,neverfortheirownsake.Andanotherwayofaskingthesecondquestionistoaskwhetherthereareanythingsthatwedesireonlyfortheirownsakeandneverforthesakeofsomethingelse.

Aristotlemaintained that there aremeans that aremerely or purelymeans,ends thatarealsomeans togoalsbeyond themselves,andends thatwepursuefortheirownsakeandnotforthesakeofanyfurthergoodtobeobtained.Hisreasonsforthinkingsoareasfollows.

Iftherewerenothingthatwedesiredforitsownsakeandnotforthesakeofsomethingelse,ourpracticalthinkingcouldnotbegin.Wehavealreadyseenthatpractical thinking must begin with thinking about an end to be sought orpursued.Nowifeveryendwethoughtaboutwereameanstosomefurtherend,andif thatfurtherendwerestillameanstosomeendbeyonditself,andsoonendlessly,practicalthinkingcouldneverbegin.

Wehaveseenthatwhenpracticalthinkingisputintopractice,wemuststartwithsomemeanstowhateverendwehaveinview.Ifthatmeansisitselfanendthatrequiresustofindmeansforachievingit,thenwecannotstartourdoing,orpurposeful action, with it. To start doing, wemust start with a means that ispurelyameans,andnotalsoanendthatrequiresothermeanstoachieveit.

So far Ihave toldyouonlywhy theremustbeends thatarenotmeansand

whytheremustbemeansthatarenotends.YourreactiontowhatIhavetoldyouso farwould not surpriseme if it consisted inwondering how you have everdoneanypracticalthinkingwithoutknowingwhatyourfinalorultimateendis.If practical thinking cannot begin with an end that is a means to somethingbeyonditself,andifyoudonotknowofanyendthatyouseekforitsownsakeand not for the sake of anything else, how could you ever begin to thinkpractically?

Sinceyouhaveundoubtedlydonealotofpracticalthinkinginthecourseofyour life,Aristotlemustbewrongwhenhe says thatpractical thinkingcannotbeginuntilyouhaveanultimateorfinalendinmind.

Soitwouldcertainlyseem.Adistinctionbetweentwowaysinwhichyoucanhaveanultimateorafinalendinmindwillopenthedoortoasolutionofthisproblem.Togetsomeunderstandingof therequireddistinction, let’sstartwithwhat we learned in school about geometry—the same kind of geometry withwhichAristotlewasacquainted.

What are called the first principlesofgeometry are the startingpointswithwhichyoumustbegininordertodemonstratethegeometricalpropositionsthathave to be proved. In Euclid’s geometry, the first principles consist ofdefinitions,axioms,andpostulates.Thedefinitionsofpoints,lines,straightlines,triangles,andsoonareneeded,andsoaresuchaxiomsas“thewholeisgreaterthan any of its parts” and “things equal to the same thing are equal to eachother.” Inaddition, thereare thepostulates—assumptions thatEuclidmakes inordertoprovethepropositionsthatneedproof.

Thedifferencebetweentheaxiomsandthepostulatesisthatyoucannotdenytheaxioms.Youcannotavoidaffirming them.Forexample, try to think thatapartisgreaterthanthewholetowhichitbelongs.ButwhenEuclidasksyoutoassumethatyoucandrawastraightlinefromanypointtoanypoint,youmaybewillingtomakethatassumption,butyoudonothavetodoso.Thereisnothingcompellingaboutitasthereisabouttheaxiomconcerningwholesandparts.

Asaxiomsandpostulatesaredifferentkindsofstartingpointsingeometricalthinking,soaretheredifferentkindsofstartingpointsinpracticalthinking.JustasyoucanassumewhatEuclidasksyoutotakeforgrantedinorder togethisgeometrical proofs started, so in your ownpractical thinking, you can assumethatacertaingoalorendisultimate,andasknofurtherquestionsaboutit,eveniftheycanbeasked.

Inotherwords,mostofusgetstartedinourpracticalthinkingnotbyhavingin mind that which is absolutely our final or ultimate goal, but rather byassumingthattheendwehaveinviewcanbetaken—forthetimebeingatleast—asifitwereagoalaboutwhichnofurtherquestionsneedbeasked.

Intheexamplewehavebeenconsidering,wemaytakebeingabletodrivetoschoolortoworkastheendforwhichhavinganautomobile,beingabletobuyit,gettingthemoneyneededtobuyit,andsoon,arethemeans.Ofcourse,yourealizethatyoucouldbeaskedwhyyouwanttodrivetoschoolortowork,andyouranswer to thatquestionmight lead toa furtherwhy until youcame to anansweraboutwhichnofurtherwhycouldbeasked.

Thatanswer, ifyouever reached it,wouldbeyourgraspof theultimateorfinalend,forthesakeofwhicheverythingelseisameans.Butyoudonothavetohave suchanend inview inorder tobeginpractical thinkingorpurposefuldoingbecauseyoucanprovisionallyassumethatsomeendyouhaveinmindis,forthetimebeing,ultimate—somethingyouwantforitsownsake.

Whenyoudowhatneedstobedonetogetit,youmayaskyourselfwhyyouwanted it,butyoudonothave toask thatquestion inorder to thinkabout themeansforgettingitorinordertodowhatneedstobedonetousemeansforthatpurpose.That question canbepostponed—for the timebeing, but not forever,not,atleast,ifyouwanttoleadawell-planned,purposefullife.

10

LivingandLivingWell

Theyoungerweare,themorethingswedoaimlessly.Ifnotaimlessly,thenatleast playfully. There is a difference between acting aimlessly and actingplayfully.Weactaimlesslywhenwehavenoendinview,nopurpose.Butwhenwebehave playfully,we do have an aim—pleasure, the funwe get out of thegame orwhatever it iswe are playing. The pleasurewe get from the activityitselfisourgoal.Wehavenoulteriorpurpose;thatispurposeenough.

Seriousactivity,ascontrastedwithplayfulactivity,alwayshassomeulteriorpurpose.Weengageintheactivitytoachievesomegoal,forwhichdoingthisorthat is ameans. Having and not having an ulterior purpose is one distinctionbetween work and play, about which I will have more to say later. We allrecognizethatworkisaseriousactivityandthatitisseldomaspleasantasplay.

Theyoungerweare,thelesslikelyitisthatwewillhaveawell-worked-outplanforliving.Whenweareyoung,ourgoalsarelikelytobeimmediateones—thingstodo,thingstoget,thingstobeenjoyedtoday,tomorrow,ornextweekatthemost.Having such goals is hardly a plan for living one’s life as awhole.One’slifeasawholeisaverydifficultthingtothinkaboutwhenoneisyoung.

As we get older, we become more and more purposeful.We also becomemore seriousand lessplayful.That isgenerally true,butnot trueofeveryone.Thereareexceptions.Someolderpersonsliveonlyforpleasureandenjoyment,and when we say that about them, we are not complimenting them. On thecontrary, we are criticizing them for devoting too much of their time andenergiestoplayingandnotenoughtoseriousactivities.Wearesayingthat thegrown-uppersonwholivesthiswayisnotreallygrown-upbutchildish.Itisallright for children toplay a largepart of the time, but not formaturemenandwomen.

Aswegrowolderandmorepurposeful,lessplayfulandmoreserious,wetrytofitallourvariouspurposestogetherintoacoherentschemeforliving.Ifwedon’t,weshould,Aristotletellsus.Weshouldtrytodevelopaplanforlivingin

ordertoliveaswellaspossible.Socrates, who was Plato’s teacher as Plato was Aristotle’s, said that an

unexamined life is not worth living. Aristotle went further and said that anunplannedlifeisnotworthexamining,foranunplannedlifeisoneinwhichwedonotknowwhatwearetryingtodoorwhy,andoneinwhichwedonotknowwhere we are trying to get or how to get there. It is a jumble, a mess. It iscertainlynotworthexaminingclosely.

In addition to not being worth examining, an unplanned life is not worthlivingbecauseitcannotbelivedwell.Toplanone’slifeistobethoughtfulaboutit,andthatmeansthinkingaboutendstobepursuedandthemeansforachievingthem.Livingthoughtlesslyislikeactingaimlessly.Itgetsyounowhere.

ButAristotledoesnotthinkitisenoughtopersuadeyouthatyoumusthaveaplan for living in order to livewell.He alsowishes to persuade you that youmusthave therightplan.Oneplan isnotasgoodasanother.Thereare lotsofwrongplans,butonlyonerightplan.Ifyouadoptoneofthewrongplans,youwillendup,Aristotlethinks,nothavinghadagoodlife.Toenduphavinghadagoodlife,youmusthaveliveditaccordingtotherightplan.

Therightplan?ItmaybeeasyforAristotletopersuadeusthatweoughttohaveaplanforlivinginordertolivethoughtfullyandpurposefully.That’sjustcommonsense.ButforAristotletopersuadeusthatthereisonlyonerightplanthatweoughttoadoptisnotsoeasy.Ifhecansucceedindoingthat,itwillbeanotherindicationofhisuncommoncommonsense.

What canpossiblymakeoneplan for living right andallotherswrong?Tothatquestion,Aristotlethinkstherecanbeonlyoneanswer.Therightplanistheone thataimsat the rightultimateend—theend thatallofusought toaimat.That may be the answer to the question, but it leaves a further questionunanswered.Whatistherightultimateend—theendthatallofusoughttoaimat?Youcanseeatoncethatiftherewerearightultimateend,weoughttoaimatit.Justaswefinditimpossibletothinkthatpartofawholeisgreaterthanthewholeofwhichitisapart,sowefinditimpossibletothinkthatawrongendisoneweoughttoaimat.Ifagoaliswrong,weoughtnottrytoachieveit.Onlyifitisright,oughtwetotry.

Granted,youmaysay,butthatstillleavestheimportantquestionunanswered.Whatistherightultimateend?Whatistheonegoalthatallofusoughttoseek?

Youmay think that that is a hardquestion to answer, butAristotle doesn’t.PerhapsIshouldsaythatoneofhisanswerstothatquestionisveryeasyforhimtogive.Butitisnotthecompleteanswer.Thecompleteanswerismuchhardertostateandtograsp.Let’sstartwiththeeasier,thoughincomplete,answer.

The right end that all of us ought to pursue is a good life. Aristotle’s

reasoningonthispointissimpleand,Ithink,convincing.Letmesummarizeit.Therearecertainthingswedoinorderjusttolive—suchthingsasnourishing

andcaringforourbodiesandkeepingthemhealthy,forthesakeofwhichmostofushavetoworktoearnthemoneyweneedtobuyfood,clothing,andshelter.

Thereareotherthingswedoinordertolivewell.Wemaketheefforttogetaneducationbecausewethinkthatknowingmorethanisnecessaryjusttokeepaliveenrichesourlife.Wedonotneedcertainpleasuresinordertokeepalive,buthavingthemcertainlymakeslifericherandbetter.

Bothlivingandlivingwellareendsforwhichwehavetofindthemeans.Butliving,orkeepingalive, is itselfameanstolivingwell. It is impossibletolivewellwithoutstayingalive—aslongaspossibleor,at least,as longas itseemsdesirabletodoso.

Living, Ihave justsaid, isameans to livingwell.Butwhat is livingwellameans to?There canbeno answer to that question,Aristotle tells us, becauselivingwell isanend in itself,anendweseekfor itsownsakeandnot for thesakeofanythingelseorforanyulteriorpurpose.

Anything else that we can think of, anything else that we call good ordesirable,isameanseithertolivingortolivingwell.Wecanthinkoflivingasameanstolivingwell,butwecannotthinkoflivingwellasameanstoanythingelse.

Aristotlethinksthatthatshouldbeobvioustoallofus.Healsothinksthatourcommonexperienceshowsthatallofusdo,infact,agreeaboutit.

The word he uses for living well (or for a good life) has usually beentranslated into English by the word “happiness.” Happiness, Aristotle says, isthatwhicheveryoneseeks.Noone,ifaskedwhetherhewantshappiness,wouldsay,“No,Iwantmiseryinstead.”

Inaddition,noone, ifaskedwhyhewantshappiness,cangiveareasonforwantingit.Theonlyreasonforwantingitwouldhavetobesomemoreultimateend,for theachievementofwhichhappiness isameans.Butnomoreultimateend exists. There is nothing beyond happiness, or a good life, for whichhappinesscanserveasameans.

Ihaveusedtheword“happiness”asinterchangeablewith“livingwell”or“agoodlife.”Whathasbeensaidabouthappinessisnotasplainandobviousiftheword isusedwithanyothermeaning. I canavoidusing theword“happiness”withanyothermeaning,butIcannotavoidusingtheword“happy”withmanydifferentmeanings,meaningsthatarerelatedtohappinessindifferentways.

Weaskoneanother“Didyouhaveahappychildhood?”Weaskoneanother“Doyoufeelhappynow?”Wesaytooneanother“Haveahappyvacation”or“HaveahappyNewYear.”Whenweuse theword“happy” in theseways,we

are talking about the pleasure or satisfaction thatwe experiencewhenwe getwhatwedesire.

Peoplewhofeelcontentedbecause theyhavewhat theywant feelhappy.Ahappytimeisonefilledwithpleasuresratherthanpains,withsatisfactionsratherthan dissatisfactions. That being so, we can be happy today and unhappytomorrow.Wecanhaveahappytimeononeoccasionandanunhappytimeonanother.

Different human beings want different things for themselves. Their desiresarenotalike.Whatonepersondesires,anothermaywishtoavoid.Thatamountsto saying that what some persons regard as good for themselves, others mayregardasbad.

Wedifferinourdesiresand,therefore,wedifferinwhatweregardasgoodforus.Whatmakesonepersonfeelhappymaydojusttheoppositeforanother.

Sincedifferentpersonsfeelhappyastheresultofdoingdifferentthingsorasthe result of getting the different things they desire, how can it be said thathappiness—livingwelloragoodlife—istheonerightgoalorultimateendthatallhumanbeingsoughttopursue?

Aristotlemaybeabletopersuadeusthatallofuswanthappiness.Hemaybeabletopersuadeusthatweallwanthappinessforitsownsakeandnotforthesake of anything else. But how can he persuade us that all of us, wantinghappinessforitsownsake,wantexactlythesamething?

Humanbeings,inseekinghappiness,certainlyappeartobeseekingdifferentthings.That is amatterof commonexperience,whichAristotle acknowledgedwithout hesitation. He knew from common experience, as we do, that someindividualsthinkthatachievinghappinessconsistsinaccumulatinggreatwealth;others,thatitconsistsinhavinggreatpowerorbecomingfamousorhavinglotsoffun.

If happiness, like feelinghappy, results fromgettingwhat youwant, and ifdifferentpersonswantdifferent thingsfor themselves, thenthehappinesstobeachievedmustbedifferentfordifferentpersons.

If that isso, thenhowcantherebeonerightplanfor livingwell?Howcanthere be one ultimate end that everyone ought to pursue?Happiness or livingwellmaybetheultimateendthatallofusseek,butitisnotthesameendforallofus.

PleaseremembersomethingIsaidearlierinthischapter.Isaidthattherewasaneasy,but incomplete,answer to thequestion,What is theonerightultimateend that all of us should seek?The easybut incomplete answer is: happiness,livingwell,oragoodlifeasawhole.Togetatthecompleteanswer,wemustseeifAristotlecanshowuswhylivingwell,agoodlife,orhappinessisthesamefor

allofus.

11

Good,Better,Best

Weknowfromcommonexperiencethatindividualsdifferintheirdesires.Wealsoknowthatinoureverydayspeechweusetheword“good”asalabelforthethingsweregardasdesirable.

If we look upon one thing asmore desirable than another, we regard it asbetter.Andofseveraldesirablethings,theonewedesiremostisbestinoureyes.

Reflection on these facts of common experience and common speech ledAristotle to the common-sense conclusion that the twonotions—the good andthedesirable—are inseparablyconnected.AsaxiomaticasEuclid’s“thepart isless than thewhole” and “thewhole is greater than the part” are “the good isdesirable”and“thedesirableisgood.”

Letme remind you nowof the problemwe left unsolved at the end of theprecedingchapter.WesawthatdifferencesinhumandesiresmadeitdifficultforAristotletopersuadeusthatallhumanbeingshavethesameendinviewwhenthey aim at living well, at a good life, or happiness.What one human beingthinkswillachievehappinessmightbequitedifferentfromwhatanotherthinksagoodlifeconsistsof.Thatbeingso,howcanAristotleupholdhisviewthatthereisonlyonerightplanforlivingwellorforattaininghappiness?

Hecannotdosounlesshecanhelpusunderstandthathumandesiresarenotall of the same sort, and thatwhat is true of one kind of desire is not true ofanotherkind.

The kind of desires that we have been considering so far are individualdesires, desires acquired in the course of an individual’s life and experience.Since individuals differ from one another not only in their temperaments anddispositions but also in the lives they lead and their special experiences, theydifferintheiracquired,individualdesires.

Whileeachhumanbeingisauniqueindividualwithauniquelifeanduniqueexperience, all human beings, as members of the human species, share in acommonhumanity.Themultitude andvarietyof individual differencesoverlie

thecommontraitsorattributesthatarepresentinallhumanbeingsbecausetheyareallhuman.

For the most part, these differences are differences in degree. All humanbeingshaveeyesandears,areabletoseeandhear,butoneindividual’svisionorhearingmaybemoreacutethananother’s.Allhumanbeingshavetheabilitytoreason,butthatcommonabilitymaybegreaterinoneindividualthaninanother.All human beings need food for sustenance and vitality, but one individual,beingoflargerbuildthananother,mayneedmorenourishmentthananother.

That last exampleof a common traitunderlying individualdifferencescallsattention to the other kind of desire—a kind of desire that is natural, notacquired, and that is the same in all human beings, not different in differentindividuals, except in degree.Whenwe say thatweneed food,we are sayingthat we desire food, just as much as when we say that we want a newautomobile, we are saying that we desire it. These two words—“need” and“want”—bothindicatedesires,butnotdesiresofthesamekind.

Needs are inborn or innate desires—desires inherent in our human naturebecausewehavecertainnaturalcapacitiesortendencies,capacitiesortendenciescommon to us all becausewe all have the samehumannature.We all have abiologicalcapacity fornourishment.Allplantsandanimalshave thatcapacity;stonesdonot.Thatiswhyalllivingthingsneedfood.Withoutit,theydie.Thefulfillmentofthecapacityisnecessarytosustainlife.

The individual does not acquire the desire for food in the course of hislifetimeorasaresultofhisownspecialexperience.Heneedsfoodwhetherheknowsitornot,andheneedsitevenwhenhedoesnotfeeltheneed,ashedoeswhen he has pangs of hunger. Hunger is merely the experience of feeling anaturalneedthatisalwayspresentandpresentinall.

Individuals born in Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America all have thesameneedforfoodanddrink,andallwill,oncertainoccasions,experiencethepangsofhungerandthirst.Butbornindifferentenvironmentsandgrowingupunderdifferentcircumstances,thesedifferentindividualswillacquiredesiresfordifferent kinds of food and drink.When they feel hungry or thirsty (which istheirawarenessofanaturalneed),theywillwantdifferentkindsofediblesanddrinkablestosatisfytheirdesire.

Theydonotneeddifferentkindsofediblesanddrinkables.Theywantthem.If thekindof foodor drink theywantwerenot available, their need couldbesatisfiedbyfoodanddrinktheydonotwantbecausetheyhavenotyetacquiredadesireforit.

Theexamplewehavebeenconsideringisabiologicalneed,aneedcommonnotonlytoallhumanbeingsbutalsotoalllivingthings.Letusnowconsidera

peculiarly human need, one that is common only to human beings because itarisesfromacapacitythatisaspecialattributeofhumannature.

Earlierinthisbook,Isuggestedthathumanbeingsdifferfromotheranimalsbytheircapacityforaskingquestionswiththeaimofacquiringknowledgeaboutthemselves and about the world in which they live. Recognizing this fact,Aristotle begins one of hismost important bookswith the sentence: “Man bynature desires to know.” He is saying, in other words, that the desire forknowledgeisasmuchanaturalneedasthedesireforfood.

However,thereisoneinterestingdifferencebetweentheneedforknowledgeand theneed for food.Deprivedof food,mosthumanbeingsare consciousofthatdeprivationwhentheyfeelthepangsofhunger.Butdeprivedofknowledge,it is not always the case thathumanbeings are consciousof their deprivation.Unfortunately, we seldom experience the pangs of ignorance as we feel thepangsofhunger.

Allacquireddesiresaredesiresweareconsciousofwhenwehavethem.Thatisnottrueofallnaturalneeds.Someofthem,liketheneedforfoodanddrink,weareconsciousofwhenwearedeprivedofwhatweneed.Butothernaturalneeds, like theneed forknowledge,wemayormaynotbeconsciousof,evenwhenwearedeprivedofwhatweneed.

Thefact thatwearenotconsciousofanaturalneedshouldnot leadus intothemistakeofthinkingthattheneedofwhichweareunawaredoesnotexist.Itistherewhetherornotweareawareofit.

Ihavegivenafewexamplesofnaturalneedsinordertocontrastthemwithacquired wants and in order to illustrate Aristotle’s distinction between twokinds of desire. It is not necessary here to try to give you an exhaustiveenumerationofthenaturalneedsthatallhumanbeingsshareincommon,astheyshare in common all the potentialities, capacities, and tendencies that areinherent in their specifichumannature.Mypresent interest is inshowinghowAristotle’sdistinctionbetweentwokindsofdesireswillhelphimtopersuadeusthatthereisonerightplanforlivingwellthatallofusoughttoadopt.

Tounderstandhisargument,wemustrecognizewhatIthinkallormostofusdo recognize—that we oftenwant thingswe do not need.We evenmake themistakeof saying thatweneed themwhenweonlywant them.Nooneneedscaviar,butmanypeople,havingacquiredthetasteforit,wantit;andtheymayevenallowthemselvestosaytheyneedit.

That isnot theonlymistakeyoucanmakeaboutyourwants.Youcanalsowantsomethingthatisnotreallygoodforyou.Somehumanbeingswantdrugsorothersubstancesthatareharmfultothem.Theyhaveacquiredstrongdesiresfor these thingsandwant themsostrongly that they ignore the injury theyare

doingthemselves.Theywantsomethingthatisbadforthem.Butbecausetheywant it, it appears good to them at the time they are seeking to gratify theirdesires.

Ifitdidnotappeargoodtothem,itwouldbefalsetosaythatthedesirableisgood.Whentheydesirethatwhichisreallybadforthem,itneverthelessappearsgood to them. Their desire orwantwaswrong ormistaken. That iswhy thatwhichappearedgoodtothemwasnotreallygood.

Incontrast to the thingsyouwant,whichappeargoodat the timeyouwantthembutmayturnouttobetheoppositeofgoodatalatertime,thethingsyouneedarealwaysgoodforyou.Becausetheyarereallygoodforyou,theyarenotgoodatonetimeandtheoppositeatanother.

Youmay bemistaken in thinking that you need somethingwhen you onlywantit—caviar,forexample—butyourneedsareneverwrongormisdirected,asyourwantsmaybeandoftenare.Youcannothaveawrongormistakenneed.And anything you need is something really good for you, not something thatmerelyappearstobegoodatacertaintimebecauseyoudesireit.

WenowseethatAristotle’sdistinctionbetweennaturalandacquireddesires(orbetweenneedsandwants)iscloselyrelatedtoanotherdistinctionhemakes—betweenrealandapparentgoods.Thethingsthatarereallygoodforyouarethethingsthatsatisfyyournaturalneeds.Thethingsthatonlyappeartobegoodfor you, andmay not be really good for you, are the things that satisfy youracquiredwants.

Anotherwayofmakingthispointistosaythatapparentgoodsarethethingswecallgoodbecausewedoinfactconsciouslydesirethematthetime.Wewantthem.Becausewewantthem,theyappeargoodtousandwecallthemgood.Incontrast,realgoodsarethingsweneed,whetherweareconsciousoftheneedornot.Theirgoodnessconsistsintheirsatisfyingadesireinherentinhumannature.

There is still one other way of making the same point, and it is worthconsideringbecauseitadvancesourunderstandingofAristotle’sargument.Thegoodisthedesirableandthedesirableisgood.Butathingmaybedesirableintwo different senses of “desirable,” just as it may be good in two senses of“good.”Wecancallsomethingdesirablebecauseatagiventimewedoinfactdesire it. Or we can call something desirable because we ought to desire itwhether,atagiventime,weactuallydesireitornot.

What is desirable in one sensemay not be desirable in the other.Wemayactually desire what we ought not to desire, or in fact fail to desire what weoughttodesire.Thatwhichisreallygoodforusissomethingwealwaysoughttodesirebecauseweneedit,andwecannothavewrongneeds.Butthatwhichonlyappearstobegoodforusissomethingthatmaybewrongforustodesire.It

maybesomethingweoughtnottodesirebecauseitwillturnouttobereallybadforuseventhough,atthetimewewantit,itappearstobegoodbecausewewantit.

The one right plan for achieving happiness or a good life is, according toAristotle,aplanthatinvolvesusinseekingandacquiringallthethingsthatarereallygoodforustohave.Theyarethethingsweneednotonlyinordertolivebut also in order to live well. If we seek all the real goods that we ought topossessinthecourseofourlives,wewillbepursuinghappinessaccordingtotheonerightplanoflifethatweoughttoadopt.

Sincenaturalneeds,basedonourcommonhumancapacitiesandtendencies,arethesameinallhumanbeings,whatisreallygoodforanyonepersonisreallygood for any other. That is why human happiness is the same for all humanbeings: it consists in thepossessionof all the things that are reallygood for apersontohave,accumulatednotatonetimebutinthecourseofalifetime.Andthatiswhytheonerightplanforlivingwellisthesameforallhumanbeings.

Nohumanlifecanbecompletelydeprivedofrealgoods,foronthebiologicallevelthetotaldeprivationofbasicneedswouldmakeitimpossibletostayaliveforlong.Thebiologicalneedsforfood,drink,clothing,shelter,andsleepmustbesatisfied,atleasttoaminimalextent,inorderforthelivingorganismtostayalive.Butwhenthoseneedsaresatisfiedtothatminimalextentandnomore,juststayingalive—orbaresubsistence—servespoorlyasameanstolivingwell.

Notonlymustthesebasicbiologicalneedsbesatisfiedbeyondthelevelofthebarestminimumrequiredtosustainlifeitselfbut,inaddition,manyotherhumanneedsmust be satisfied in order to approach the fulfillment of all our humancapacities and tendencies. If happiness consists in such complete fulfillment,thenoneindividualapproachesmorecloselytoachievingitinproportionasheis more able than another to satisfy his human needs and come into thepossessionofthethingsthatarereallygoodforhim.

Oneplanforlivingwellisbetterthananothertotheextentthatitguidestheindividual to a more complete realization of his capacities and to a morecompletesatisfactionofhisneeds.Andthebestplanofall,theoneweoughttoadopt,isonethataimsateveryrealgoodintherightorderandmeasureand,inaddition,allowsus to seek thingswewantbutdonotneed, so longasgettingthem does not interferewith our being able to satisfy our needs or fulfill ourcapacities.

Notallapparentgoods—thingsthatwewantbutdonotneed—turnouttobebad for us. Some are not injurious in themselves; and some are notdisadvantageous in thesense that they impedeor frustrateoureffort toget thethingsthatweneedandthatarereallygoodforus.Thepursuitofhappinessby

onemanmaydiffer from itspursuitbyanothereven ifbothare following theonerightplanforlivingwell.

Thereasonforsuchdifferences,whentheyoccur,isthateachindividualmaywant different things for himself over and above the things he needs. Thoughwhatisreallygoodforonehumanbeingisthesameforall,whatappearstobegoodtooneindividual,accordingtohiswants,maybequitedifferentfromwhatappearstobegoodtoanotherindividual.Whateachindividualwantsforhimselfmaybeanapparentgoodthat isneither injurioustohimnoranimpedimenttohispursuitofhappiness.

Younowhave somegrasp ofAristotle’s views about happiness andhow itshouldbepursued.Youseewhyhethinksitisthesameforallhumanbeingsandwhy all should try to achieve it by adopting the one sound plan for doing so.Otherquestionsremaintobeanswered.

Whataretherealgoodsthatanindividualshouldseekinordertolivewellormakeagoodlifeforhimselforherself?Wehavementionedsomeofthem,butnotall.Cantheenumerationofrealgoodsbecompleted?

If itcanbe, then there isstilla furtherquestion—themost importantofall:Howshouldwetrytocomeintopossessionofallthethingswenaturallyneed—alltherealgoodsweshouldhaveinourlives?Whatmeansareindispensabletoachievingtheultimateendwehaveinmind?

Onlywhenthesequestionshavebeenansweredwillwehaveafullgraspoftheplanoflifetobefollowedinordertoachievehappiness.

12

HowtoPursueHappiness

When Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence, did heunderstandAristotle’sviewofhappinessandhowtopursueit?

TheDeclarationsays thatallhumanbeings,beingequalbynature,haveanequalrighttolife,liberty,andthepursuitofhappiness.Living,wehaveseen,isitselfameanstolivingwell.Soisfreedom.

Unlesswecanexerciseafreechoiceaboutthethingswewantorneed,andunless we can freely carry out the choices we make—without coercion orimpediment—wecannotpursuehappiness.Ifeverythingisdeterminedforus,ifthe pattern of our life is imposeduponus, therewouldbe no sense in talkingaboutplanningourlivesoraboutadoptingaplanforlivingwell.

Weneedtostayaliveinordertolivewell.Weneedlibertyinordertomakeaneffort—aplannedeffort—tolivewell.Becauseweneedthesethingsinorderto pursue happiness, we have a right to them. But do we need to pursuehappiness? Do we need to live well? If not, what is the basis for saying, asJeffersondid,thatallhumanbeingshavearight—arightinherentintheirhumannature—topursuehappiness?

Theanswer to thatquestion lies inanumberofpoints thatwerecovered intheprecedingchapters.Livingwell,orhappiness,wesaw,istheultimateorfinalendofallourdoinginthislife—thatwhichweseekforitsownsakeandforthesakeofnofurthergoodbeyondit.Wealsosawthatwedoinfactdesirecertainthingsandwhenwedo,theyappeargoodtous.Thereareotherthingsweoughttodesirebecausetheyarereallygoodforus,whetherornottheyappeartobesoatthetime.

Nowifagoodlifeasawholeisonethatinvolveshavingall thethingsthatarereallygoodforus,thenweoughttodesiretolivewell—toachievehappinessoragoodlife.Sinceanythingthatisreallygoodforusissomethingweoughttodesire,thesumtotalofrealgoodsiscertainlysomethingweoughttodesire.

Theword“ought”expressesthenotionofadutyoranobligation.Wehavea

dutyoranobligationtodowhatweoughttodo.Tosaythatweoughttopursuehappiness as the ultimate goal of our life is to say that we have a duty orobligationtotrytolivewellortomakeagoodlifeforourselves.

To fulfill that duty or obligation, we need whatever is indispensable tomaking a good life for ourselves—we need the real goods that, taken alltogether,constituteormakeuphappinessoragoodlife.Thatiswhywehavearighttothem.Ifwedidnothavetheobligationtotrytolivewellandifwedidnotneedcertain things inorder todoso,wewouldnothave the right to themthatThomasJeffersonassertedallofushave.

Thomas Jefferson thought that all human beings, having the same humannature,hadthesamenaturalrights.Thatamountstosayingthattheyallhavethesamenaturalneeds—thatwhatisreallygoodforanyonehumanbeingisreallygood for all human beings. To this extent, Thomas Jefferson appears to haveadoptedAristotle’sviewthatthepursuitofhappinessinvolvesallhumanbeingsinseekingandtryingtoobtainthesamesetofrealgoodsforthemselves.

BeforeIattempttoenumeratetherealgoodsthatAristotlethoughtallofusshould seek, I would like to spend a moment on the difference between thequestion “What should I do in order to pursue happiness?” and the question“What steps should I take in order to make a chair, a picture, or a piece ofmusic?” The difference between these two questions throws light on thedifferencebetweendoingandmaking,andbetweenthekindofthinkingthat isinvolvedinactinginordertolivewellandthekindofthinkingthatisinvolvedinproducingsomethingthatiswellmade.

If you undertake tomake a chair, a picture, or a piece ofmusic, youmusthaveaproductiveideaofthethingtobemadeandyoumusthavetheknow-howortheskillrequiredtoproduceawell-madechair,picture,orpieceofmusic.Theproductiveideaandtheknow-howarethemeanstothatend.Butyouareundernoobligationtoseekthatend.Onlyifyouaredeterminedtomakethatparticularchair,picture,orpieceofmusicmustyouemploythemeansrequiredtoproduceit.

Pursuing happiness is different fromproducing a chair, picture, or piece ofmusicbecauseyoudonotbeginbysaying,“IfIwishtopursuehappiness,Imustdo thisor that.”There isno if about it, as there is in thecaseof thechair, thepicture,or thepieceofmusic.Youmaynotwish toproduceaparticularchair,norneedyou,butyououghttopursuehappiness.Thatiswhythereisnoifaboutit.

Yououghttopursuehappiness,buthowoughtyougoaboutdoingso?Thisisthequestionthatremainstobeanswered.

Aristotle offers us two related answers to that question. The first answer

consistsinhisenumerationoftherealgoodsthatallofusneed—thegoodsthat,takentogether,constitutehappinessoragoodlifeasawhole.Thesecondanswerconsistsinhisprescriptionforobtainingalltherealgoodsweneedinthecourseofalifetime.Thefirstansweriseasierthanthesecond,soletusstartwithit.

Weare,bynature,questioning, thinking,andknowinganimals.Asanimals,wehavebodiesthatneedtobecaredforincertainways.Ashumananimals,wehavemindsthatneedtobeexercisedincertainways.SomeoftherealgoodsweneedAristotlecallsbodilygoods,suchashealth,vitality,andvigor.Andsinceour sensesgiveus theexperienceofbodilypleasures andpains,Aristotle alsoincludes such pleasures among the real goods. Few of us, I think, wouldchallengehiscommon-senseobservation thatweought toseekbodilypleasureandoughttoavoid,ifwecan,bodilypain.

Thesebodilygoodsaregoodswesharewithotheranimals.Theyaregoodsforusbecauseweareanimals.It isonlyinthewaythatweseekthemthatwedifferfromotheranimals.Forexample,otheranimalsinstinctivelytrytoavoidbodilypainandalwaysinstinctivelytrytoenjoybodilypleasure.Bywatchingapetcatordog,youwillseethatthisisso.Buthumanbeingssometimesgiveupbodilypleasureorendurebodilypainforthesakeofsomeothergoodthattheythinkismoredesirable.Andwemayeventhinkitadvisableforustolimitourenjoymentofbodilypleasuresinordertomakeroominourlivesforother,moreimportantgoods.

Thebodilygoodsthathavebeenmentionedaremeanstotheultimateendofhappiness or a good life. But they are also themselves ends for which othergoodsserveasmeans.For thesakeofourbodilyhealth,vitality,andpleasure,weneedfood,drink,shelter,clothing,andsleep.

Aristotle lumps all these things together under one headingwhich he callsexternalgoodsorwealth.Wealth,accordingtoAristotle,isarealgoodbecauseitis anecessarymeans tobodilyhealth, vitality, andpleasure.Without a certainamountofwealth,wecannotenjoyhealth,vitality,orpleasure,andwithoutthesethingswecannotlivewell.

Individualswhoarestarving,whoarefreezingorsweltering,individualswhoaredeprivedofsleeporwhosebodiesareconsumedbytheefforttokeepalivefrommomenttomoment,individualswholacktheexternalsthatgivethemthesimple comforts of life, cannot livewell.They are as badly off as individualswho are forced towork as slaves,who are in chains, orwho are confined byprisonwalls.The lackofacertainamountofwealth isasmuchanobstacle tolivingwell and achieving happiness as the deprivation of a certain amount offreedom.

InbothcasesIhavesaid,asAristotlewouldsay,“acertainamount.”Hedoes

not say that unlimited freedom is needed to live well, nor does he say thatunlimitedwealth is needed. The reason for the limitation is not the same, butbothare limited,notunlimited,goods, just asbodilypleasure is alsoa limitedgood,ofwhichwecanwanttoomuchforourownultimategood.

Tothetwokindsofgoodsthathavealreadybeenmentioned—bodilygoodsand external goods, or wealth—Aristotle adds a third. These goods he callsgoodsofthesoul.Wemightrefertothemaspsychologicalgoods,aswewouldprobablyrefertothegoodsofthebodyasphysicalgoods.

Themostobviousofthesepsychologicalgoodsaregoodsofthemind,suchasknowledgeofallsorts,includingknow-howandskill.Amongtheskillsallofusneediscertainlytheskillofthinking.Weneeditnotonlyinordertoproducewell-madethings,butalsoinordertoactwellandlivewell.

Lessobvious,perhaps,arethepsychologicalgoodsthatweneedbecausewearesocialanimalsaswellasthinkinganimals.Wecannotlivewellincompletesolitude.Asolitarylifeisnotagoodlife,anymorethanthelifeofaslaveorofamaninchainsisagoodlife.

Just aswe naturally desire to acquire knowledge, sowe naturally desire toloveotherhumanbeingsandtobelovedbythem.Atotallylovelesslife—alifewithoutfriendsofanysort—isalifedeprivedofamuch-neededgood.

Even thoughotherhumanbeingsareasexternal toourselvesas thevariousforms of wealth are, Aristotle does not place friendship among the externalgoods.Hetreatsitratherasapsychologicalgood—agoodofthesoul.Becauseitfulfillsapsychologicalneedonourpart,friendshipislikeknowledgeandskillratherthanlikethethingsthatsatisfyourbodilyneeds.

There are pleasures of the mind as well as pleasures of the body. Amongthem, for example, is the pleasure we get from making things and from ourenjoymentofworksofart—thingsthatarewellmadebyothers.Thereisalsothesatisfaction we feel in acquiring knowledge, in having skills of one sort oranother,andinlovingandbeingloved.

Humanbeingsdesiretobeloved.Theyalsowishtoberespectedforthetraitstheythinkadmirableorlovable.Recognizingthis,Aristotleincludes,amongthegoods that contribute to a good life, self-esteem and honor. But, in his view,being honored is not a real good unless it is for the right reason—unless wereally deserve the honor we receive. Some individuals seek fame instead ofhonor. They are satisfied with having a good reputation even if they do notdeserveit.

IhavenowalmostcompletelyenumeratedtherealgoodsthatAristotlethinksgotomakeagoodlifeasawhole.Theyarethecomponentpartsofthatwhole,andassuchtheyarethemeanswemustusetoachievethatwholeforourselves.

ThisisAristotle’sfirstanswertothequestionabouthowtosucceedinachievinghappiness. To the extent that we manage to obtain and possess all these realgoods,wesucceedinourefforttolivewellandmakeagoodlifeforourselves.

Aristotle’s second answer to the samequestion involves a different kind ofprescriptionforustofollow.Itdirectsustoactinsuchawaythatwedevelopagoodmoral character.Overandaboveall the realgoods thathave so farbeenmentioned, there isonemoreclassofgoods thatweneed—goodhabits;morespecifically,goodhabitsofchoice.

Personswhohavedevelopedtheskillofplayingtenniswellpossessagoodhabit,onethatenablesthemregularlytoplaywell.Personswhohaveacquiredtheskillofsolvingproblemsingeometryoralgebrahaveagoodhabit.So,too,havethosewhoregularlyandwithoutdifficultyrestrainthemselvesfromeatingor drinking more than is good for them, or from indulging too much in thepleasuresofsleeporplay.

These are all good habits, but the good habitsmentioned last are differentfromtheothers.Skillinplayingtennisisagoodbodilyhabit,andskillinsolvingmathematicalproblemswitheaseisagoodhabitofthemind.Goodhabitsofthiskindenableustoperformcertainactionswithexcellence,notonlyregularlybutalsowithouteffort.Contrastedwiththesehabitsofactionarehabitsthatenableustomakecertainchoicesregularly,withease,andwithouthavingtogothroughtheprocessofmakingupourmindsanddecidinghowtochooseeachtimethatwedoso.

Thepersonwhohasacquiredthefirmandsettleddispositiontoavoideatingor drinking too much has a habit of this sort. It is a good habit because thedecisiontorestrainoneselfwhentemptedtooverindulgeinfoodanddrinkistherightdecision.

Foodanddrinkarerealgoods,butonlyinmoderateamounts.Therecanbetoomuchofmanyrealgoods,pleasuresofallsorts.Weoftenwantmoreofthemthan isgood forus,more thanweneed.That iswhyAristotle tellsus thatweneedgoodhabitsofchoiceordecision—inordertoseekrealgoodsintherightamountandalsoinordertoseekthemintherightorderandintherightrelationtooneanother.

ThenamethatAristotlegivestoallgoodhabitsisaGreekwordthatcanbestbetranslatedbytheEnglishword“excellence.”However,thatGreekwordmorefrequentlycomesdowntousinEnglishbywayofitsLatintranslation,andsothemoreusualEnglishwordforgoodhabitsistheword“virtue.”

Good habits of the kind exemplified by skills of one sort or another arevirtuesofthemind,orintellectualvirtues.Goodhabitsofthekindexemplifiedby a settled disposition to choose or decide correctly constitute a person’s

character,andsoAristotlecallsthemmoralvirtues.Bothkindsofvirtueare realgoods thatweneed foragood life.Butmoral

virtue plays a very special role in our pursuit of happiness, so special thatAristotle tellsus thatagoodlife isone thathasbeen livedbymakingmorallyvirtuouschoicesordecisions.

WhyAristotlethinksthatstatementsumsitupIwilltrytoexplaininthenextchapter.

13

GoodHabitsandGoodLuck

Someoftherealgoodsthatarerequiredforagoodlifearemeanstoothers.Externalgoods,suchasfood,clothing,andshelter,aremeanstohealth,vitality,andvigor.Weneedwealthtolivewellbecauseweneedhealthtolivewell.

Similarly,weneedhealth,vitality,andvigor inorder toengage inactivitiesthatarenecessarytoobtainstillothergoods.Ifwedidnothavetodoanythingatall in order to livewell, wewould not need vitality and vigor in order to beactive.

Intheorderofgoods,thehighestrankingbelongstothosethatwedesirefortheirownsakeaswellasforthesakeofagoodlife.Wealth,forexample,isnotdesirable for its own sake, but only as a means to living well. But such realgoodsasfriendshipandknowledgearedesirablefortheirownsakeaswellasforthesakeofagoodlife.

Somerealgoodsarelimitedgoods;othersareunlimitedgoods.Forexample,wealthandbodilypleasurearelimitedgoods.Youcanwantmoreofthemthanyouneed,andmorethanyouneedisnotreallygoodforyou.Knowledge,skill,and the pleasures of the mind are unlimited goods. More of them is alwaysbetter.Theyaregoodsofwhichyoucannothavetoomuch.Iftherewerenolimitedgoodsofwhichyoucouldwantmorethanyouneed;

ifallrealgoodswereequallyimportant,sothatnoneofthemshouldbesoughtforthesakeofanyother; ifwantingcertainthingsthatappeargoodtoyoudidnotcomeintoconflictwithseekingotherthingsthatarereallygoodforyou—iflife could be lived this way, then there would be little or no difficulty aboutliving a good life, and therewould be no need for good habits of choice anddecisioninordertosucceedinone’spursuitofhappiness.

Butthat,Aristotleknew,isnotthewayitis.Ifyouthinkaboutyourownlifefor amoment, youwill see that hewas right. Just think about the regrets youhavehad.Rememberthetimesyouweresorrybecauseyouweretoolazytotakethetroubletodowhatwasnecessarytogetsomethingyouneeded.Orremember

when you allowed yourself the pleasure of oversleeping or overeating andregretteditlater.Orthetimewhenyoudidnotdosomethingyououghttohavedonebecauseyoufearedthepainyoumightsufferindoingit.

Ifyouhadmadetherightchoiceanddecisioneveryoneofthosetimes,youwouldhavenoregrets.Choicesanddecisionsthatleaveyouwithnoregretsarechoicesanddecisionsthatcontributetoyourpursuitofhappinessbyputtingrealgoodsintherightorder,bylimitingtheamountwhenitshouldbelimited,andbyputtingasidethingsyouwantiftheygetinthewayofobtainingthingsyouneed.

Moralvirtue,Aristotletellsus,isthehabitofmakingrightchoices.Makingoneor tworightchoicesamongmanywrongchoiceswillnotdo.If thewrongchoicesgreatlyoutnumbertherightchoices,youwillbemovingsteadilyinthewrongdirection—away fromachievinghappiness insteadof toward it.That iswhyAristotlestressesthenotionofhabit.

You know how habits get formed. To form the habit of being on time forappointments,youhavetotrytobepunctualoverandoveragain.Gradually,thehabit of being punctual gets formed. Once it is formed, you have a firm andsettled disposition to be on time in getting where you promised to be. Thestrongerthehabit,theeasieritistoactthatwayandtheharderitistobreakthehabitortoactinanoppositefashion.

Whenyouhaveformedahabitanditiswelldeveloped,youtakepleasureindoingwhatyouare in thehabitofdoingbecauseyoudo itwithease—almostwithouteffort.Youfindactingagainstyourhabitspainful.

WhatIhavejustsaidistrueofbothgoodandbadhabits.Ifyouhaveformedthehabitofoversleeping,itiseasyandpleasanttoturnthealarmclockoffandgo on sleeping. It is hard and painful to get up on time. So, too, if you haveformed thehabitof allowingyourself tooverindulge in certainpleasuresor toavoidtakingcertainpains,itishardtostopdoingit.

Such habits are bad habits, inAristotle’s view, because they interferewithyourdoingwhatyououghttodoinordertogetthingsyouneed.Theoppositehabitsaregoodhabitsbecausetheyenableyoutoobtainwhatisreallygoodforyouinsteadofwhatonlyappearstobegoodforyouatthetimeandmayturnouttobebadforyouinthelongrun.

Goodhabits,ormoralvirtues,arehabitsofmakingtherightchoicesamonggoods,realandapparent.Badhabits,whichAristotlecalls“vices,”arehabitsofmakingthewrongchoices.Everytimeyoumakearightchoiceandactonit,youaredoingsomethingthatmovesyoutowardyourultimategoaloflivingagoodlife.Everytimeyoumakeawrongchoiceandactonit,youaremovingintheopposite direction. The virtuous person is one who makes the right choices

regularly,timeandtimeagain,althoughnotnecessarilyeverysingletime.ThatiswhyAristotlethinksthatvirtueplayssuchaspecialroleinthepursuit

of happiness. That is why he regards moral virtue as the principal means tohappinessandasthemostimportantofallthethingsthatarereallygoodforustohave.Moralvirtueisalsoanunlimitedgood.Youcannothavetoomuchofit.Habitsofmakingrightchoicesanddecisionscanneverbetoofirmlyformed.

Aristotlecallsoneaspectofmoralvirtuetemperance.Itconsistsinhabituallyresistingthetemptationtooverindulgeinpleasuresofallsortsorthetemptationtoseekmorethanisgoodforusofanylimitedgood,suchaswealth.Onereasonwhy bodily pleasures tempt us is that we can usually enjoy them right away.Havingtemperanceenablesustoresistwhatappearstobegoodintheshortrunforthesakeofwhatisreallygoodforusinthelongrun.Havingtemperancealsoenablesustoseekwealthintherightamount—onlyasameanstoothergoods,andnotforitsownsakeasifitwereanendinitselfandanunlimitedgood.

Aristotlecallsanotheraspectofmoralvirtuecourage. Justas temperance isan habitual disposition to resist the lure of pleasures for the sake of moreimportantgoodsthatoverindulgenceinpleasurewouldpreventusfromgetting,socourageisanhabitualdispositiontotakewhateverpainsmaybeinvolvedindoingwhatweoughttodoforthesakeofagoodlife.

For example, we recognize that getting knowledge and developing certainskillsareintellectualvirtuesthatweoughttohave.Butacquiringknowledgeandskills may be painful. Studying is often hard to do; learning how to play amusical instrument well, how to write well, or how to think well involvespracticingthatisoftenirksome.

Thehabit of avoidingwhat is difficult or irksomebecause it is painful cancertainlyinterferewithyouracquiringknowledgeandskillsthatarereallygoodforyoutohave.ThatbadhabitAristotlecallstheviceofcowardice.

The personwho habitually avoids taking pains and trouble for the sake ofobtainingrealgoodsisasmuchacowardasthesoldierwhorunsawayinbattleforfearofgettinghurt.Thesoldierwhoriskshis lifeorovercomeshis fearofinjuryforthesakeofvictoryinagoodcausehascourage.So,too,hasanyonewhohabituallytakestrouble,undergoeshardships,andsufferspain,inordertoobtainthingsthatarereallygoodforhim.

Temperanceandcouragedifferasaspectsofmoralvirtue.Oneisconcernedwith resisting the lure of bodily pleasures and with limiting our craving forlimited goods.The other is concernedwith suffering pains and hardships.Butbotharealikeinoneveryimportantrespect.Botharehabitsofmakingtherightchoice between things that only appear to be good and things that are reallygood.Botharehabitsofmakingtherightchoicebetweensomethingthatmaybe

really good, but only in the short run of today, tomorrow, or next week, andsomethingthatisreallygoodforusinthelongrunorforourlifeasawhole.

Aristotle realized that it is hard for those who are young in years orexperiencetokeeptheireyesonremote,futuregoodsinrelationtoimmediatelypresentpleasuresandpains.Heknewthatthatisdifficultevenforthosewhoareolder.Buthealsoremindedusthatthedifficultyoflookingaheadtoone’slifeasawholeisadifficultyallofusmustovercomeintryingtoacquiremoralvirtue—the habit of choosing rightly between goods of lasting importance andtransientpleasuresandpains.

Hispointingthisoutcallsourattentionto thefact that tryingto livewell isnoteasyforanyofus.Thatdoesnotmakethegoalanylessdesirabletoattain.Nordoes it relieveusof theobligation tomake theeffort.On thecontrary, inAristotle’s view the satisfaction that comes fromhaving succeeded in living agoodlifeorintryingtoliveoneisworthallthetroubleandeffortittakes.

However,awillingnesstotakethetroubleandmaketheeffortisnotbyitselfenough.Ifanindividualhastheappropriaterawmaterialsathisorherdisposaland ifheor shehas theskillorknow-hownecessary forproducingsomethingthatiswellmade,producingitisalmostentirelywithintheindividual’spower.Ifindividualsfail,thefaultistheirs.Unfortunately,whatistrueofmakingaworkofartisnottrueoflivingagoodlife.

Successinthatventureisnotentirelywithinourpower.Wecanfailwithoutbeingatfault.WecanfailevenifwehavethemoralvirtuethatAristotlethoughtwas requisite for success.Good habits of choice are requisite for success, buthavingthemdoesnotguaranteeit.

Thereasonwhythisissoisthatalltherealgoodsweshouldseektopossessinordertolivewellarenotentirelywithinourpowertoobtain.Some,suchasgood habits ofmind and character (the intellectual and themoral virtues) aremuchmorewithinourpowertopossessthanothers,suchaswealthandhealth,orevenfreedomandfriendship.Evenacquiringknowledgeandskillorforminggoodhabitsofchoicemaydependonhavinghelpfulparentsandteachers,whichisbeyondourowncontrol.

We are not able to control the conditions under which we are born andbrought up.We cannotmake fortune smile upon us.Much that happens to ushappensbychanceratherthanbychoiceonourpart.

Effortonourpartdoesnotassureusthatwewillcomeintopossessionoftheexternal goodswe need to live a good life.Nor does the carewe take of ourbodiesassureusthatwewillretainourhealthandvigor.Povertyanddisablingdiseaseandeventhelossoffreedomandoffriendscanbeourlotinspiteofthemostvirtuousconductonourpart.

Moral virtue, however important it is for living a good life, is not enoughbecausechanceaswellaschoiceplaysaroleinthepursuitofhappiness.Goodluckisasnecessaryasgoodhabits.Someoftherealgoodswecometopossessarelargelythegiftoffortune,thoughmakingagooduseofthemafterwehavethemdependsonourhavinggoodhabits.That, inAristotle’sview, stillmakesmoralvirtuethecontrollingfactorinlivingagoodlife.

In addition, having good habits enables a person to bear up undermisfortunes.Ifwecannotcontrolwhathappenstousbychance,wecanatleasttake advantage of the good things that fall into our lap as a result of goodfortune;andwecantrytomakeupforthethingsofwhichwearedeprivedbymisfortune.Moralvirtuehelpsusinbothwaystodealwiththetwistsandturnsoffortune—goodandbad.

Aristotlesumsallthisupwhenhesaysthatoursuccessinlivingagoodlifedependsontwothings.Oneishavingthemoralvirtuethatenablesustomakerightchoicesfromdaytoday.Theotherisbeingblessedbygoodluckorgoodfortune. Asmoral virtue prevents us from aiming in the wrong direction andchoosingthingsthatarenotreallygoodforus,sogoodfortunesuppliesuswithrealgoodsthatarenotentirelywithinourpowertoobtainbychoice.

Agoodlife,ithasbeensaid,isoneinwhichapersonhaseverythingthatheorshedesires,providedthatheorshedesiresnothingamiss.Inordertodesirenothingamiss,onemusthavemoralvirtue.Butonemustalsohavegoodsthatliebeyondthereachofchoice—thegoodsbestowedonusbygoodluck,inadditiontothegoodsacquiredbygoodhabitsofchoice.

Among these goods of fortune are things that depend on the physicalenvironmentandonthesocietyinwhichweareborn,broughtup,andliveourlives.Aristotleneverletsusforgetthatwearesocialanimalsaswellasphysicalorganisms.Havingagoodfamilyandlivinginagoodsocietyareasimportantasliving in a good climate and having good air, goodwater, and other physicalresourcesavailable.

Up to thispoint,wehavebeenconsidering thepursuit ofhappiness as if itwereasolitaryaffair—asifitweresomethingeachofuscoulddobyhimselforherselfalone,withnothoughtofothers.Thatishardlythewaythingsare.Sincewecannotlivewellincompletesolitude,wemustthinkofwhatwehavetodoinordertolivewellwithothers.Wemustalsothinkofwhatotherscanandshoulddotohelpusinourefforttoleadagoodlife.

Thepursuitofhappiness isselfish to theextent that thegood life itaimsatdirectlyisone’sowngoodlife,notthegoodlifeofanybodyelse.Butwhenwerealize thatwecannot succeed in thepursuit ofhappinesswithout consideringthe happiness of others, our self-interest becomes enlightened. We cannot be

entirelyselfishandsucceed.That iswhy,according toAristotle, the twoaspectsofmoralvirtue thatwe

havesofarconsideredarenotenough. Inaddition to temperanceandcourage,there is justice. Justice is concernedwith the good of others, not only of ourfriendsor thosewhomwelove,butofeveryoneelse.Justice isalsoconcernedwiththegoodoftheall-envelopingsocietyinwhichwelive—thesocietywecallthestate.

Livinginagoodsocietycontributesgreatlytotheindividual’spursuitofhisown happiness because a good society is one that deals justly with theindividualswho are itsmembers. It also requires the individual to deal justlywithotherindividualsandtoactforthegoodofsocietyasawhole.Thatgoodisagoodinwhichallthemembersofsocietyparticipate.

Persons who are not temperate and courageous injure themselves byhabituallymaking thewrongchoices.Personswhohabituallymake thewrongchoiceswillalsobeunjustandinjureothersaswellasthesocietyinwhichtheylive.The reason for this is that thosewho firmly aimat a really good life forthemselves will regularly make choices that carry out that aim. Choices sodirectedwillalsoaimdirectlyatareallygoodlifeforothersandatthewelfareofthesocietyinwhichothersshareaswellasthemselves.

Consider,forexample,thepersonwhowantsmorewealththanisreallygoodforhim;orthepersonwhooverindulgeshisappetiteforbodilypleasures;orthepersonwho craves something that is not really good for anyone—power overotherhumanbeingsinordertodominatetheirlives.Suchpersonswillcertainlyruin theirown lives. It isalsohighlyprobable that theywill injureothersasaresultofaiminginthewrongdirection.Butpersonswhoaimtheirownlivesintherightdirectioncannothelpbenefittingothersand thesociety inwhich theylive.

14

WhatOthersHaveaRighttoExpectfromUs

Aristotlesaidtwothingsthatseemtomeuncommonlywiseabouttherelationofonehumanbeingtoanother.Onceunderstood,theyarealsocommonsense.

Hesaidthatifallmenwerefriends,justicewouldnotbenecessary.Healsosaidthatjusticeisthebondofmeninstates.

Puttingthetworemarkstogether,weareledtoconcludethatthemembersofa state (which is the largest organized society towhichwebelong) arenot allfriendswithoneanother.Iftheywere,theywouldnotneedtobeboundtogetherbyjusticetoformthesocietythatwecallastate.

Most of us belong to more than one society or organized group. We aremembers of a family, either as parents or children or as both. We may alsobelong to other organized groups, such as a school, a club, a businessorganization of one sort or another. All these are societies or associations ofhumanbeingswhohavecombinedwithoneanotherforsomecommonpurpose.

The purpose of the association distinguishes twoof these organized groupsfromall the rest.Associationssuchasschools,universities,hospitals,businessorganizations, and clubs all aim at serving some particular good. Educationalinstitutions, for example, aim at the dissemination and advancement ofknowledge; hospitals, at the care of health; business organizations, at theproductionordistributionofthingstobeboughtandsold;andsoon.

In contrast, the family is a society that aims at sustaining the life of itsmembers,andthestateisasocietythataimsatenrichingandimprovingthatlife.If there were no additional advantages to be derived from living in states,Aristotlethinksthathumanbeingswouldhavebeencontenttocontinuelivinginthe smaller society of the family or in the slightly larger society formed by agroupof families,something likewhatwecalla tribe.What ledmen togroupfamiliesintotribesandgrouptribesintostilllargersocietieswas,inAristotle’sview, the advantages to be gained from the larger and more inclusiveassociations.

Aswehaveseen,ouraimashumanbeingsshouldbenotmerelytostayalivebuttolivewell—aswellaspossible.Stayingalive,ofcourse,isindispensabletolivingwell.Notbeingsolitarybutsocialanimals,humanbeingsmustassociatewithoneanotherinordertosustainandpreservetheirlivesandtobringintotheworldanothergenerationthatmustbecaredforandprotectedduringinfancy.

The family and the tribe, according to Aristotle, are the associations orsocietiesthatoriginallycameintobeingtoservethesepurposes.Theymaynotdosoanylonger,ornottothesameextent,butAristotleasksustothinkabouttheir origin.What caused human beings to form these associations in the firstplace?

Oneanswerthatmaysuggestitselfis“instinct.”Instinctcausesbeestoformbeehives and ants to form ant colonies or ant mounds. Perhaps, then, it is ahumaninstincttoformfamilies,tribes,andstates.Ifso,thesesocietieswouldbecompletelynatural,incontrasttosuchassociationsasschools,clubs,orbusinessorganizations.The latter are hardly the products of instinct.Men join togethervoluntarilytoformtheseassociationsfortheparticularpurposestheyserve.

InAristotle’s view, families, tribes, and states are nomore the products ofinstinct than are schools, clubs, and business organizations. They are not likebeehives and antmounds,which for a given species of bee or ant are alwaysorganized in exactly the sameway, generation after generation, andwhereveryou find that particular species of bee or ant. But though all human beingsbelong to the same species,we findquite different patterns of association andorganizationinhumanfamilies,tribes,andstates.

That, according to Aristotle, indicates that these societies were, in origin,voluntarilyandpurposefullyformed,andformedwithsomeplanoforganizationthat thehumanbeingsinvolvedthoughtupfor themselves.Tothisextent, theyarelikeschools,clubs,andbusinessorganizationsthathumanbeingsvoluntarily,purposefully,and thoughtfully institute.But families, tribes,andstatesarealsounlikeschools,clubs,andbusinessorganizationsbecausetheyarenaturalaswellasvoluntary.

DoesnotAristotlecontradicthimselfbysayingthatfamilies,tribes,andstatesarebothvoluntaryandnatural?Hewouldbecontradictinghimselfifhethoughtthat families, tribes,andstateswerenatural in thesamewaythatbeehivesandant mounds are natural—the product of instinct. But, according to Aristotle,there isanotherway inwhichasocietycanbenatural. Itcanbenatural in thesensethatitmustbeformedtoservesomenaturalneed—theneedtostayaliveortheneedtolivewell.

A society canbenatural in this sense and alsobevoluntarily, purposefully,andthoughtfullyformed—toservetheneedthatmakesthesocietynatural.

Families,accordingtheAristotle,originatedfromtheneedofhumanbeingstostayaliveand toprotectand rear theiryoung.Groupsof families,or tribes,being a little larger and involvingmorehumanbeingsworking together, cameintobeing inorder toserve that sameneeda littlemoreeffectively.Theeven-larger organization of the state,which originally grew out of combinations offamiliesandtribes,notonlyservedthatsameneedstillmoreeffectivelybutalsoserved the additional purpose of enabling some individuals, if not all, to livewell.Lifeitselfbeingsecure,attentionandeffortcouldbeturnedtoimprovinglifeandmakingitricherandbetter.

When Aristotle says that man is by nature a political animal, he is sayingmorethanismeantbythestatementthatmanisasocialanimal.Thereareothersocialanimals,suchasbeesandants,wolvesthathunt inpacks,andlionsthatliveinfamilies.Butonlymenorganizetheirsocietiesvoluntarily,purposefully,and thoughtfully and establish laws or customs that differ from one humansocietytoanother.

That isonemeaningof thestatement thatmanisapoliticalanimal.Heisacustom-making and law-making animal. There is another meaning. WhenAristotledeclaresthatmanisbynatureapoliticalanimal,heisalsosayingthathuman beings cannot live well, cannot achieve the best kind of lives forthemselves,bylivingtogetheronlyinfamiliesandintribes.Todothat,Aristotlethinkstheymustlivetogetherincitiesorstates.

TheGreekwordforacityorstateis“polis,”fromwhichwegettheEnglishword“political.”TheLatinwordforacityorstateis“civis,”fromwhichwegettheEnglishwords“civil”and“civilized.”Beingpoliticalbynature,menmustliveinstatestoliveaswellaspossible.Thegoodlifeisthecivilorcivilizedlife.

Nowletusreturntothetwostatementswithwhichthischapterbegan.Ifallmenwerefriends,justicewouldnotbenecessary.Sincethemembersofastateareseldomifeverallfriendswithoneanother,justiceisnecessarytobindthemtogetherpeacefullyandharmoniouslyinthatlargestofallhumansocieties—thestate.

Letus,forthemoment,supposethatthemembersofafamilyareallfriendswithoneanother—friendsinthehighestsenseofthatword.

When two human beings are friends in this highest sense, they love eachother.Theirloveimpelseachofthemtowishforthegoodoftheother—towishtobenefit theother, todowhatevermaybenecessaryto improveorenrichthelifeoftheother.

Each, out of such friendship or love, will act to promote the happiness orgoodlifeoftheother.Neitherwoulddoanythingtoinjuretheotherbyimpedingorobstructingtheother’spursuitofhappiness.

That iswhy justicewould be unnecessary in a family inwhich the parentsloved their children, in which the children loved their parents, and in whichhusband andwife, brothers and sisters, loved one another perfectly and at alltimes.Butinmostfamiliestherearetimeswhenloveorfriendshipfailsorfallsshortofperfection.Thenonememberofthefamilymaysaytoanother,“Youarenotbeingfairtome,”or“Whatyouaskisunjust,”or“Ihavearighttoexpectthisorthatfromyou.”

Atsuchmoments,loveceasestobethethingthatbindsthemembersofthefamily together, and justiceenters thepicture—justice that tries to see that theindividual obtains what he or she has a right to expect, that the individual isbeing fairly treated by the others, and that he or she is protected from beingharmedorinjuredbythem.

If justice did not intervenewhen love failed or fell short of perfection, themembersof the familymightnot stay together,orat least theywouldnot livetogetherpeacefullyandharmoniously,tryingtoshareintheenjoymentofgoodscommontothemall.Whathasjustbeensaidiseventruerofstatesinwhichthemembersare,forthemostpart,notrelatedbyfriendshiporlove.Whereloveisabsent,justicemuststepintobindmentogetherinstates,sothattheycanlivepeacefullyandharmoniouslywithoneanother,actingandworkingtogetherforacommonpurpose.

Aristotleknewthatthereareseveraldifferentkindsoffriendship.Ofthese,hethought that only one was perfect friendship—the kind that exists betweenpersonswholoveoneanotherandwishonlytobenefittheother.

Aristotlealsoknewthatsuchfriendshipsarerare.Morefrequently,wespeakofanotherpersonasbeingafriendbecauseheisusefultousorbecausewegetsome pleasure from him. Such friendships are selfish. The person we call afriendservessomeinterestofourown,andweregardhimorherasafriendonlysolongasthatremainsthecase.Incontrast,truefriendshiporloveisunselfish.Itisbenevolent.Itaimsatservingthegoodoftheother.

Justice, like love, isconcernedwith thegoodof theotherperson.However,there isacleardifferencebetweenthem.Anyonewhounderstands loveknowsthatoneindividualshouldneversaytoanother,“Ihavearighttobeloved.Yououghttoloveme.”

Whenwetrulylovesomeone,wedonotgivethepersonlovedwhatheorshehas a right to claim from us. On the contrary, we give to them of ourselvesgenerouslyandunselfishly,without any regard to their rights.Wedo for themmorethantheyhaveanyrighttoexpect.

We sometimes even love personswho do not love us in return.We do notmaketheirreturningourloveaconditionforourlovingthem.Butwhenweact

justlytowardothers,givingthemwhattheyhavearighttoexpect,weareselfishtotheextentthatwewantjusticefromtheminreturn.Tosaythatweshoulddountootherswhatwewouldhavethemdountousisselfishinthissense.

Whatdoothershavearighttoexpectfromus?Thatwekeepthepromiseswemaketothem.Thatwetellthemthetruthwhenevertellingaliewouldhurttheminsomeway.Thatwereturnanythingwehaveborrowedandpromisedtoreturn.Thatwepayourdebtstothem.Thatwedonotstealwhatbelongstothem.Thatwedonotinjuretheirhealth,damagetheirbodies,orkillthem.Thatwedonotinterferewiththeirfreedomofactionwhentheirconduct innowayinjuresus.Thatwedonotmakefalsestatementsthatwouldinjuretheirreputationorgivethemabadname.

Allthesethings,andmoreofthesamesort,canbesummedupbysayingthatothershavea right toexpect fromus thatwedonothing thatmight impedeorobstructtheirpursuitofhappiness—nothingthatmightinterferewithorpreventtheir obtaining or possessing the real goods they need tomake good lives forthemselves.Itistheirneedfortheserealgoodsthatgivesthemarighttothem,andit is theirrighttothemthatweareobligedtorespect—ifweourselvesarejust.

Wemaynotalwaysbejust,at leastnotperfectlyjust.Somepersonsarethevery opposite of just. Instead of having the habit of respecting the rights ofothers,theyarehabituallyinclinedintheoppositedirection—togetthingstheywantforthemselvesevenwhentodosotheymustrunroughshodovertherightsofothers.

Thatiswhylawsaremadetoprescribewhatthemembersofastateshouldorshouldnotdoinordertodealjustlywithoneanother.Ifeveryonehadthehabitofbeingjustinallhisdealingswithothers,therewouldbenoneedforsuchlawsorfortheirenforcementbythestate.Butsincefewindividualsareperfectlyjust,and since some are habitually inclined to be unjust, laws that prescribe justconductmustbeenforcedbythestatetopreventoneindividualfromseriouslyinjuringanotherbyviolatinghisorherrights.

Do others have a right to expect us to act positively to help them in theirpursuitofhappiness?Notinterferingwith,impeding,orobstructingtheireffortstoobtainorpossesstherealgoodstheyneedisonething.Helpingthemtoobtainsuchgoodsisanother.Havetheyarighttoclaimourhelp?

According to Aristotle’s understanding of the difference between love andjustice, the answer is no. It is the generosity of love, not the obligations ofjustice, that impelsone individual tohelpanother toobtainorpossess the realgoodsneededforagoodlife.Thatiswhythelawsthatthestateenforcesdonotrequireindividualstohelponeanotherbytakingpositiveactiontopromotethe

pursuitofhappinessbyothers.However,thestatedoesmakeandenforcelawsthatrequiretheindividualto

actpositivelyfor thewelfareof thecommunityasawhole.Thewelfareof thecommunity affects thepursuit of happiness by itsmembers.Agood society, asociety in which the common good of the people is served and advanced,contributes to thegood lifeof its individuals.Aristotle says in somanywordsthattheendthatthegoodstateshouldserveisthehappinessoftheindividualswhocomposeit.Itshouldpromotetheirpursuitofhappiness.

When,therefore,we,asindividuals,obeylawsthatdirectustobehaveforthewelfareofthecommunityasawhole,weareindirectlyhelpingtopromotethepursuitofhappinessbyourfellowhumanbeings.Whatwedodirectlyforafewothersoutofourloveforthem,wedoindirectlyforalltherestbyobeyinglawsthatrequireustoactforthewelfareofthecommunityinwhichthey,aswellaswe,live.

15

WhatWeHaveaRighttoExpectfromOthersandfromtheState

Lovethyneighborasthyself!Dountoothersasyouwouldhavethemdountoyou!Bothofthesefamiliarmaximsrelateyourselftoothers.Bothappeartomake

yourself the pivot of your action toward others. Love yourself and love yourneighbor in thesamewayandeven,perhaps, in thesamemeasureasyou loveyourself.Thinkofhowyouwishotherstobehavetowardyouandbehaveinthesamewaytowardthem.

We seem to have reversed that order by considering first, in the precedingchapter,whatothershavearighttoexpectfromusandnow,inthischapter,whatwehavearighttoexpectfromothers.Itwouldbemoreaccuratetosaythatwehaverisenaboveanorderthatputsusfirstandotherssecond.

Rightsarerights.Ifanyonehumanbeinghasthem,baseduponneedsthatheorsheshares incommonwithallotherhumanbeings, thenall theothershavethesamerights,too.Itmakesnodifferencewhetheryouthinkfirstofyourownrightsorfirstoftherightsofothers.

However, there is a sense inwhichyoudo come first.First in theorder ofthinking about what you should do. The ultimate goal that should control allyourpracticalthinking,yourchoices,andyouractionisagoodlifeforyourself.Youareunderanobligationto liveaswellas it ishumanlypossible todo—toobtainandpossess,inthecourseofalifetime,allthethingsthatarereallygoodforyou.

Justice,aswehaveseen,doesnotrequireyoutopromote,bypositiveactiononyourpart,thehappinessofothers,asyouarerequiredtopursueyourownbytheloveyoubearyourself.Justiceonlyrequiresyounottoimpedeorfrustrateothersintheirpursuitofhappiness.Ifyougobeyondthattohelpthemintheirpursuit,youdosobecauseyoulovethemasyouloveyourself.

Yourrightsandtherightsofothers,withwhichjusticeisconcerned,arebasedonthethingsthatarereallygoodforanyhumanbeingbecausetheyfulfillneedsinherent in human nature. Thinking about what is good, and especially aboutwhatisreallygood,mustprecedethinkingaboutrights.Forexample,ifyoudidnotthinkthathavingacertainamountofwealth,havingasatisfactorydegreeofhealth,andhavingfreedomarereallygoodforyou,youwouldnotbeledtosaythateveryonehasarighttothesethings,notonlyasmeanstolivingbutalsoasmeanstolivingwell.

Whatyouhavearight toexpectfromothers is, therefore, thesameaswhattheyhave a right to expect fromyou.Rights are the samebecause everyone’srightsare the sameandbecausewhat is reallygood foryou is reallygood foreveryotherhumanbeing.Andthat issobecauseallofusarehuman,allofushavethesamehumannature,inherentinwhicharethesamefundamentalneedscallingforfulfillment.

Among those needs is the need to live in association with other humanbeings.We are not the kind of animal that can go it alone.Aswe have seen,human societies—families, tribes, and states—have arisen to fulfill this need.But they alsohelpus to fulfill other needs—ourneed for goodsonwhich thepreservationoflifeitselfdependsandourneedforhighergoodsonwhichlivingagoodlifedepends.

Although society is itself goodbecauseweneed to live in associationwithother human beings, a particular society may not be good if the way it isorganized or the way it operates either fails to help or positively hindersindividualswhoaremembersofitintheireffortstoacquireandpossessthingsthatarereallygoodforthem.

Forexample,afamilyisnotagoodfamilyifitdoesnotgivethechildreninitthefreedomtheyhavearightto,ifitdoesnotcarefortheirhealth,ifitdoesnothelpthemtogrowupastheyshould.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthefamilyitselfisa bad thing, for young children cannot preserve their own lives and grow upwithout families. Itmeans only that a particular family is not good because itdoesnotdoforitschildrenwhattheyhavearighttoexpectfromit.

Inhisconcernwithwhat isgoodandbad,Aristotle isconcernedwithgoodand bad societies as well as with good and bad human beings andwith theirgoodandbadlives.Whathasalreadybeensaidaboutsocietyitselfbeinggoodis, for him, a simple common-sense observation. We cannot get along at allwithoutlivinginsociety.

Beginning there,Aristotle thengoeson toconsiderwhatmakesaparticularsocietygoodoronesocietybetterthananother.Andjustashisultimatequestionabouthuman life isabout thebest life thateachofuscan live, sohisultimate

questionaboutsocietyisaboutthebestsocietyinwhichwecanliveandpursuehappiness.

Since Aristotle thinks that, of all human societies, the state, or politicalsociety, is theone thatmostenablesus to live thegoodorcivilized life, letusconcentrateonhisanswerstoquestionsaboutthegoodstateandthebeststate.

Itseemsobvioustohimthatagoodstateisonethatisgovernedwell.That,forAristotle,isasobviousasitistosaythatagoodlifeisonethatislivedwell.For him, a state cannot exist without government. Human beings cannot livetogetherpeacefullyandharmoniouslyintheabsenceofgovernment.

That might not be true if all human beings were friends and loved oneanother.Itmightnotevenbetrueifallhumanswereperfectlyjust,sothattherewas no need for the enforcement of just laws to prevent one individual frominjuring another. ButAristotle knew from common experience that all humanbeingsarenotboundtogetherbyloveorfriendship,thatmosthumanbeingsarenotperfectlyjust,andthatsomearequiteunjustintheirselfishness.

Thatiswhyhiscommon-senseconclusionwasthatgovernmentisnecessaryfortheexistenceofastateorapoliticalsociety.

Being necessary, government itself is good, just as society itself, beingnecessary,isgood.However,aswehaveseen,aparticularsocietymaybebadornotasgoodasitshouldbe.So,too,aparticularformofgovernmentmaybebadornotasgoodasitshouldbe.

It has been said, by some who lack Aristotle’s common sense, thatgovernmentisnotnecessaryatall.Theyfailtoseethathumanbeings—beingastheyare,notasonemightwishtheywere—cannotlivetogetherpeacefullyandact together for a commonpurposewithout livingunder a government havingthepower to enforce laws and tomakedecisions. It is not only that criminalsmustberestrained.Inorderthatanumberofindividualsmayacttogetherforacommonpurpose,theremustalsobesomemachineryformakingthedecisionsthattheirconcertedactionsrequire.

It has also been said that, although government may be necessary, it is anecessaryevilbecauseitinvolvestheuseofcoerciveforce(theforceusedintheenforcementoflaws)andbecauseit involveslimitationsonthefreedomoftheindividual. Those who say this fail to understand very important points thatAristotlemakesabouttheenforcementoflawsandaboutthelimitationsonthelibertyofindividualsinasociety.

AccordingtoAristotle,thegoodman—thevirtuousmanwhoisjust—obeysjust lawsbecauseheisvirtuous,notbecausehefears thepunishment thatmayfollow from his breaking the law or disturbing the peace.He obeys laws andkeepsthepeacevoluntarily,notunderthecoercionoflawenforcement.Heisnot

coercedbygovernment,andsoforhimgovernmentisnotanevilasitisforthebadman.

Nordoes thegoodman feel thathis freedom is limitedbygovernment.Hedoesnotwantmorefreedomthanhecanusewithout injuringothers.Only thebadmanwantsmorefreedomthanthat,andsoonlyhefeelsthathisfreedomtodoashepleases,withoutregardforothers,islimitedbygovernment.

Thefactthatgovernmentitselfisnecessaryandgooddoesnotmakeallformsofgovernmentgood, or asgoodas they shouldbe.ForAristotle, the line thatdividesgoodfrombadformsofgovernmentisdeterminedbytheanswerstothefollowingquestions.

First, does the government serve the common good of the peoplewho aregoverned,ordoesitservetheselfishinterestsofthosewhowieldthepowerofgovernment?Governmentthatservestheself-interestoftherulersistyrannical.Onlygovernmentthatpromotesthegoodlifeoftheruledisgood.

Second,doesthegovernmentrestmerelyonthepoweratthedisposaloftherulers,ordoesitrestonlawsthathavebeenmadeinawaytowhichtheruledhaveagreedandinthemakingofwhichtheyhavehadapart?Governmentthatrests solelyonmightor force,whether it be in thehandsofonemanormorethan one, is despotic, evenwhen it is benevolent orwell-disposed rather thantyrannical.Tobegood,governmentmusthaveauthoritythatthosewhoareruledacknowledgeandaccept,notmerelypowerorforcethattheyfearandsubmittofromfear.

Government that is good in this way Aristotle called constitutionalgovernment or political government. By calling such government political, hemeanttosuggestthatitistheonlyformofgovernmentthatisproperforstatesorpoliticalsocieties.

This brings us to a third question. It applies to government that is neithertyrannical nor despotic, but constitutional—a government based on laws, inwhich even thosewho govern are ruled by laws. About such government wehave to ask: Is the constitution—the fundamental law on which governmentitself isbased—ajustconstitution?Andarethelawsmadebythatgovernmentjustlaws?

Any government that is not tyrannical is to that extent good. Amongnontyrannicalgovernments,aconstitutionalgovernmentisbetterthanadespoticone. And, among constitutional governments, the best is the one with a justconstitutionandwithjustlaws.

In praising constitutional government, Aristotle speaks of it as thegovernment of free men and equals. He also speaks of it as that form ofgovernmentinwhichthecitizensruleandareruledinturn.

Thosewhoareruledbyadespotaresubjects,notcitizenswithsomevoiceintheir owngovernment.Thosewho are ruled by a tyrant are no better off thanslaves. In both cases, they are ruled as inferiors, not equals.Only thosewho,beingcitizens,areruledbyothercitizenswhomtheyhavechosentoholdpublicofficeforatimeareruledasequals,andasfreemenshouldberuled.

At this point in his thinking,Aristotlemade a seriousmistake. Living at atimeand inasociety inwhichsomehumanbeingswereborn intoslaveryandtreatedasslaves,aswellasasocietyinwhichwomenweretreatedasinferiors,hemade themistakeof thinking thatmanyhumanbeingshad inferiornatures.Hedidnotrealizethatthosewhoappearedtobeinferiorappearedtobesoastheresultofthewayinwhichtheyweretreated,notasaresultofinadequatenativeendowments.

Making thismistake,hedividedhumanbeings into twogroups.On theonehand,heplacedthosewhowerefittoberuledascitizens—asfreeandequalandwithavoiceintheirowngovernment.Ontheotherhand,heplacedthosewhowere fit only to be ruled despotically, either as subjects or slaves—without avoiceintheirowngovernmentandsoasneitherfreenorequal.

WeliveatatimeandinasocietyinwhichnoonecanbeexcusedformakingAristotle’smistake.Correctinghismistake,weareledtotheconclusionthatallhuman beings should be governed as citizens with a voice in their owngovernment and thus be ruled as free and equal. The only exceptions to thatallinclusiveallarethosewhoarestillintheirinfancyorthosewhoarementallydisabled. Reaching this conclusion just stated, we also see that constitutionalgovernmentisjustonlyifitsconstitutiongivesallhumanbeingstheequalstatusofcitizenshipwithoutregardtosex,race,creed,color,orwealth.Indoingso,italsogivesthemthefreedomtheyhavearightto,thefreedomofbeingruledascitizens,notasslavesorsubjects.

Onehumanbeingisneithermorenorlesshumanthananother,eventhoughonemaybesuperiororinferiortoanotherinmanyotherrespectsasaresultofdifferences in native endowments or acquired traits. These inequalities shouldcertainlybeconsideredintheselectionofsomehumanbeingsratherthanotherstoholdpublicoffice,but they shouldbe totallydisregarded inconsidering thequalificationsforcitizenship.

Allhumanbeingsareequalashumans.Beingequalashumans,theyareequalin the rights that arise fromneeds inherent in their commonhuman nature.Aconstitutionisnotjustifitdoesnottreatequalsequally.Norisitjustifitdoesnot recognize the equal right of all to freedom—to be ruled as human beingsshouldberuled,ascitizens,notasslavesorsubjects.

Wenowhavereachedoneanswertothequestionaboutwhatwehavearight

toexpect fromthestate inwhichwe liveand thegovernmentunderwhichwelive.Wehave a right to be ruled as citizens under a government towhichwehavegivenourconsentandwhichallowsustohaveavoiceinthatgovernment.

Is that allwe have a right to expect?Even though hemade themistake ofthinking that only some human beings had the right to be ruled as citizens,Aristotle thought that thosehumanbeingshada right toexpectmore fromthestate in which they lived. The best state, in his opinion, was one that dideverythingitcoulddotopromotethepursuitofhappinessbyitscitizens.Thatremainstruewhetheronlysomehumanbeingsorallshouldbecitizens.

Whatcanastatedotopromotethepursuitofhappinessbyitscitizens?Itcanhelpthemtoobtainandpossessalltherealgoodsthattheyneedandhavearightto. To understand this, we must remember one point made in the precedingchapter.

Ofalltherealgoodswemusthaveinordertolivewell,somearemoreandsome are lesswithin our individual power to acquire and possess. Some, likemoralvirtueandknowledge,dependlargelyonthechoicesweourselvesmake.Some, like wealth and health, depend to a considerable extent on our havinggoodluckoronourbeingblessedbygoodfortune.

Themainways inwhich a good state and a good government can help itsindividuals in their pursuit of happiness is to do what it can to overcomedeprivationstheysufferasaresultofbadluckormisfortune,notasaresultoffaultontheirpart.Itshoulddoforthemwhattheycannot,bychoiceandeffort,doforthemselves.Thebeststateandthebestgovernmentarethosethatdothemostinthisdirection.

Theonethingthatnostateorgovernmentcando,nomatterhowgooditis,istomakeitscitizensmorallyvirtuous.Whetherornottheyacquiremoralvirtuedependsalmostentirelyuponthechoiceseachofthemmakes.Thebeststateandthebestgovernmentcan,therefore,onlygiveitscitizensexternalconditionsthatenable and encourage them to try to livewell. It cannot guarantee that, giventhese conditions, they will all succeed. Their success or failure ultimatelydependsontheusetheymakeofthegoodconditionsunderwhichtheylivetheirlives.

PARTIVMANTHEKNOWER

16

WhatGoesintotheMindandWhatComesoutofIt

Earlierchaptershavedealtwiththinkingandwithknowingbutnotwiththemindthatthinksandknows.

In Part II, we considered productive thinking—the kind of thinking that isinvolved in the making of things. There we also considered the kind ofknowledgeneededformaking—thekindwecalledskillorknow-how.

In Part III, we examined practical thinking and practical knowledge—thinkingabout themeansandendsofhumanactionandknowledgeofwhat isgoodandbadforustoseek,orrightandwrongforustodointheconductofourlives.

Now,inPartIV,wewillbeconcernedwiththeoreticalthinking,thinkingforthesakeofknowing,notjustforthesakeofproductionoraction.Andwewillbeconcernedwithknowledge itself—withknowledgeof theway thingsareaswellaswithknowledgeofwhatweoughtoroughtnottodo.Hereforthefirsttimewewillconsiderwhatweknowaboutthemindthatthinksandknows.

Languageplaysalargepart inhumanthinkingandknowing.Thewordsweuse, according to Aristotle, express the ideas we think with. The declarativesentencesweutterorthestatementswemakeexpressopinionsthatweaffirmordeny—opinionsthatmaybeeithertrueorfalse.

Whenastatementwemakehappenstobetrue,itexpressesknowledge.Ifithappens to be false, we have made an error. We cannot be in error aboutsomething and have knowledge about it at the same time. Opinions may beeither true or false, correct or erroneous, but incorrect, erroneous, or falseknowledgeisasimpossibleasaroundsquare.

Wheredo the ideaswithwhichwe thinkcome from? It seemedobvious toAristotlethatwearenotbornwiththeminourminds—thattheyaresomehowtheproductsofourexperience.Thatiswhyhisaccountofhumanthinkingandknowing turns first to the senses and to the experience that results from thefunctioningofoursenses.

Thesensesarethewindowsordoorwaysofthemind.Whatevercomesintothemindfromtheoutsideworldcomesintoitthroughthesenses.Whatcomesinto itmaybewords or sentences that other humanbeings utter.As everyoneknows, we learn a great deal that way, certainly from the moment that ourschoolingbegins.Butlearningdoesnotbeginwithschooling.Nordoesallourlearning, even after schooling, involve statementsmade by others. Taking thehumanraceasawhole,aswellashuman infants ineverygeneration, learningbeginswithsenseexperiencebeforethelearnersusewordstoexpresswhattheyhavelearned.

InAristotle’sday,itwasgenerallythoughtthatwehavefiveexternalsenses—sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. The reason Aristotle called themexternalsensesisthateachinvolvesasenseorganonthesurfaceofourbodies,there tobeactedonby theoutsideworld: sight results from theactiononoureyesofthingsoutsideus,hearingfromwhatoutsideactsonourears,touchfromwhat outside acts on our skin, smell fromwhat outside acts on our nose, andtastefromwhatoutsideactsonourtongueandmouth.

Modernscientificresearchhasdiscoveredthatwehavemorethanfivesensesandsenseorgans;forexample,thesenseorgansbywhichwesensehungerandthirstwithinourownbodiesandthesenseorgansbywhichwesensethemotionofour limbsor thepositionofourbodies.But theexactnumberofsensesandsenseorgansdoesnotaffecttheaccountthatAristotlegivesofthecontributionthatthesensesandsenseexperiencemaketoourthinkingandknowing.

Eachofthesensesproducessensationsonlywhenitssenseorganisactedonphysicallybysomething in theoutsideworld.Thesensesarepassivereceiversthatmust be activated from the outside. Each of our sense organs is a highlyspecialized receiver.Wecannot tasteor smell thingswithour eyes;wecannothearorseethemwithourtonguesandnoses.Weareawareofcolorsthroughoureyes,ofsoundsthroughourears,ofodorsthroughournose,andsoon.

Certainaspectsoftheworldarounduswecanbeawareofinmorethanoneway.Thesizeandshapeofbodieswecanseeaswellasfeelbytouch.Wecanseeandhear themotionofbodiesfromoneplace toanother,andwecaneventellwhetherthatmotionissloworfast.

Sensationsof thevariouskinds justmentionedare the rawmaterials outofwhich our sense experience is formed. Though these raw materials come inseparatelyfromoutside,throughthechannelsofdifferentsenseorgans,theydonotremainseparate,orisolatedfromoneanother,inoursenseexperience.Theworldweexperiencethroughoursensesisaworldofbodiesofvarioussizesandshapes, inmotionorat rest,andrelatedtooneanother inspace inavarietyofways. Our experience of this world of bodies also includes a wide variety of

qualities—the colors bodies have, the sounds theymake, the roughness or thesmoothnessoftheirsurfaces,andsoon.

AccordingtoAristotle,oursenseexperienceistheproductofperceptiononour part. The sensations we receive passively through our sense organs aremerely the raw materials that we somehow put together to constitute theseamless fabric of our sense experience. In that putting together,we aremoreactivethanpassive.

Sensationisinputfromtheoutside.Butthesenseexperiencethatarisesfromourperceptionof that outsideworld involvesmemory and imaginationonourpart.Itiscomposedofmanyelements,allhavingtheirorigininwhatourvarioussensestakein,buttransformedbythewaytheyareputtogethertomakeupthewholethatistheworldweperceive.

Ifwedescribeanytypicalperceptualexperienceinwords,weseeatoncethatthereismuchmoretoit thantherawmaterialsofsensation.Forexample,youperceiveabig,black,barkingdogchasinga tiger-striped,yellowcatdownthestreet,andthecatrunsinfrontofablueautomobilethatscreechestoasuddenhalt.Inthatdescriptionofasenseexperience,onlyafewwordsnamevisibleoraudible qualities sensedby the eye and the ear—the colors and the sounds.Adog and a cat, an automobile and a street, chasing, running, and suddenlyslowing down to a halt—all these things that you perceive involvemore thansensationsreceivedfromoutside.

When you perceive an object that you call a dog or a cat, or when youperceive actions that you call chasing or running, your memory and yourimaginationareinvolved,especiallyifthedogyouperceiveisastrangertoyou,whilethecatisafamiliaranimalthatyouhaveseenaroundbefore.Inaddition,your understanding is involved. You have some understanding of the kind ofanimalthatacatis,differentinkindfromdogs.Youhavesomeunderstandingofwhat tigersare like,as indicatedbyyourperceptionof thecatas tigerstriped.Youunderstandthedifferencebetweenwalkingandrunning,betweengoingfastandslowingdown.Ifyoudidnotunderstandallthesethings,youcouldnothavehadtheperceptualexperiencethatwasdescribed.

AccordingtoAristotle,thesevariousunderstandingsthatwehaveresultfromthe activity of ourmind, not from the activity of our senses.Ourmind formsideas of cats and dogs, of running and chasing. Ideas are based on theinformation that our senses receive from the outside world, but the ideasthemselves are not received from the outside world. They are, according toAristotle,theproductofthemind’sactivityinitsefforttounderstandtheworldweexperiencethroughoursenses.

Justaswecansensethingsbecausetheyarecapableofbeingsensed,sowe

canunderstand thingsbecause theyareunderstandable. If thebarkingdogandthescreechingcarwerenotvisibleandaudible,wecouldnotseeandhearthem.Similarly, if the dog and the catwere not understandable as different kinds ofthings,wecouldnotunderstandthemashavingdifferentnatures.InAristotle’sview,weapprehendthenaturesofcatsordogsbyourideaorunderstandingofwhatacatisorwhatadogis,justasweapprehendtheblacknessofthedogorthebluenessoftheautomobilebythevisualsensationsreceivedbyoureyes.

Whenacarpentersetsouttomakeachair,hemusthaveinmindanideaofthechairhewantstomake.Hemustnotonlyhaveanideaofchairsingeneralbut also the more definite idea of the particular chair he wishes to make.Working with these ideas and with pieces of wood as his raw material, thecarpentershapesthosepiecesofwoodandputsthemtogethersothattheytakeon the form of a chair. The idea in the mind of the productive worker hasbecometheformofthematerialheworkson.

Livingmatterhavingacertainformisacat.Livingmatterhavingadifferentformisadog.Whenchildrenlearntodistinguishbetweencatsanddogsandtorecognizeeachwhentheyseeit,theirperceptionofcatsanddogsinvolvessomeunderstandingofthespecialnatureofeachofthesetwokindsofanimals.Thatunderstanding consists in their having an idea ofwhat a cat is and an idea ofwhatadogis.

InAristotle’sview,havingtheideaofacatamountstohavinginone’smindtheformthatiscommontoallcatsandmakeseachcatthekindofanimalitis.Thisleadshimtosaythat,justasthehandisthetooloftools(theinstrumentbywhichweuseotherinstruments),sothemindistheformofforms.Anotherwayofsayingthesamethingdescribesthemindastheplacewheretheformsthatareinthingsbecomeourideasofthem.

Themindformsideasbytakingtheformsofthingsandseparatingthemfromthematterofthings.Producingideasistheveryoppositeofproducingthings.Inproducing things, we put the ideas that we have in our minds into things bytransformingmatterinaccordancewithourideas.Inproducingideas,ourmindstaketheformsoutofthingsandturnthemintoideaswherebyweunderstandthenatureofthethingsthathavethisorthatform.

Getting or producing ideas should also be contrasted with eating things.Whenweeatanapple,wetakebothitsformanditsmatterintoourbodies.Theform without the matter would not nourish us. The matter without the formwouldnotbeanapple.Butwhenwegettheideaofanapple,wetaketheformawayfromthematteroftheapple.Theactionofourmindindoingsoturnstheformofanappleintoanideaofthekindoffruitanappleis.

Theideasorunderstandingssofarmentionedareideasorunderstandingsof

objects that we perceive. They are the kind of objects that are present in oursenseexperience.Theyarealsothekindofobjectswecanrememberwhentheyareabsent.Theyareeventhekindofobjectsthatwecanimagine,aswemightimagine a cat or dog that we have never perceived, or dream of one that isstrangelyshapedorcolored.

Butwhenthemindstartsproducingideasonthebasisofsenseexperience,itdoesnot stopwith ideas that enableus tounderstandobjectswecanperceive,remember, and imagine.We can understandmany objects of thought that wecannotperceive,suchasgoodandbad,rightandwrong,freedomandjustice.Wecouldnothavediscussedtheseobjectsinearlierchaptersofthisbookifwedidnotunderstandthem—ifwehadnotformedideasofthem.

Thinkingbeginswith theformationof ideason thebasisof the informationreceived by our senses. Sensations are the input the mind receives from theoutside world. Ideas are the output the mind produces as a result of what itreceives.

Thinkinggoesfurther.Itrelatestheideasitproduces.Itjoinsthemtogether,separates them,andsetsoneideaagainstanother.Bythesefurtheractivitiesofthinking, themindproducesknowledge,notonlyknowledgeaboutobjectswecanperceive, remember,or imagine,butalsoknowledgeofobjects thatdonotfall within our sense experience. Arithmetic, algebra, and geometry are goodexamplesofsuchknowledge.

Asensationisneithertruenorfalse.Yousimplyhaveit,aswhenyousensetheblacknessofadogorthebluenessofanautomobile.Evenwhenyoursensesdeceiveyou,as theyoftendo, thesensation itself isneither truenorfalse.Thedog,forexample,mayhavebeeninshadows.Inbrightsunlight,itwouldhavebeen seen by you as gray, not black. Your sensing it as black when it is inshadowsisnotfalse;butif,onthebasisofthatinformationalone,youthinkthatitisblack,youmaybeinerror.Theerrorisinyourthinking,notinyoursensing.

Every common noun and almost every adjective and verb in our languagenames an object of thought—an object we can think about because we haveformedanideaofit.Notall theobjectswecanthinkaboutareobjectswecanalso perceive, remember, or imagine. Dogs and cats, for example, are objectsthatwecanperceive,butwecanalsothinkaboutthemwhentherearenodogsandcatsaroundforustoperceivethroughoursenses.Inaddition,wecanthinkabouttheverysmallparticlesofmatterinsidetheatomalthoughoursensesareunable toperceiveanythingsosmall, evenwith thehelpof themostpowerfulmicroscope.

Likesensations,ideasareneithertruenorfalse.IfyouandIweretalkingtoone another, and I spoke the singleword “dog” or the singleword “cat,” you

wouldnotbeabletorespondbysayingeitheryesorno.Letusassumeforthemoment thatyouandIhad thesameunderstandingof thesewords.What theymeantforme,theyalsomeantforyou,becauseforeachofustheyexpressedthesameideas.WhenIsaid“dog,”youandIthoughtaboutthesameobject.So,too,whenIsaid“cat.”

NowsupposethatwhenIsaid“cat,”Inoddedorpointedinthedirectionofananimal in the room that started to bark at that very moment. You wouldimmediatelysay,“No,thatisnotacat,that’sadog.”Myutteringtheword“cat”whilenodding or pointing to an animal that both of uswere perceiving couldhave been spelled out in a sentence: “That animal over there is a cat.” Yoursayingnocouldalsohavebeenspelledoutbysaying,“Ifyouthinkthatanimalisacat,youareinerror.Thatstatementyouhavejustmadeisfalse.”

Wecannotbeinerrorjustthinkingofcatsordogsanymorethanwecanbeinerrorwhenwe see the dog standing in the shadows as black rather than gray.Only when we make some assertion, such as “That dog is black,” does thequestionarisewhetherwhatwesayorthinkistrueorfalse.Thatword“is”mustenter intoour thinking,andalongwith itgoesanotherword,“not.”When“is”and“isnot”enterintoourthinking,wehavepassedfromthelevelofjusthavingideastothelevelofcombiningandseparatingthem.Thenwehavereachedthelevelwhereweareformingopinionsthatcanbeeithertrueorfalse.

There are other words, such as “and,” “if” and “then,” “since” and“therefore,”“either,or,”“notboth,”thatenterourthinkingatastillhigherlevelof thought.This is the level atwhichmakingone statement leadsus toaffirmanotherortorejectanotherasfalse.

Aristotledistinguishesamongthesethreelevelsofthoughtinhisaccountofhowthemindoperatestoproduceknowledge.Fromtherawmaterialsofsenseexperience, the mind forms ideas. Ideas in turn are the raw materials out ofwhichthemindformsjudgmentsinwhichsomethingisaffirmedordenied.Assingle ideas are expressed in speechby singlewordsorphrases, so judgmentsareexpressedbysentences—declarativesentencesinwhichthewords“is”or“isnot”occur.

The third level Aristotle calls reasoning or inference. Only when onestatementbecomesthebasisforassertingordenyinganotherstatementdoesthemind move up to the third level of thought. At this level, thinking involvesgivingreasonsforwhatwethink.Atthislevel,whatwethinkmaynotonlybeeithertrueorfalse,itmayalsobeeitherlogicalorillogical.

Aristotlewasagreatlogician.Hefoundedthescienceoflogic.Hewrotethefirst book on the subject, a book that was the standard textbook for manycenturiesandthatstillexertsconsiderableinfluence.Inthenextchapter,weshall

considersomeofhisbasicrulesforconductingourthinkinginalogicalmanner.Althoughlogicalthinkingisbetterthanillogicalthinking,itdoesnotalways

reach conclusions that are true.Aristotle pointedout that it is possible for themindtoholdopinions thatare truewithoutreaching themina logicalmanner,even as it is possible for logical thinking to result in false conclusions.Henceafterwepaysomeattentiontowhatmakesthinkinglogicalorillogical,weshallhavetoconsiderwhatmakesthinkingtrueorfalse

17

Logic’sLittleWords

AsNewton’snameisassociatedwiththelawofgravitation,soAristotle’sisassociatedwiththelawofcontradiction.AsEinstein’snameistothetheoryofrelativity, soAristotle’s is to the theoryof the syllogism.Twowords lieat theheart of the law of contradiction: “is” and “is not.” Two pairs of words arecentral to the theory of the syllogism—Aristotle’s account of correct andincorrectreasoning.Theyare“if’and“then,”“since”and“therefore.”

Asaruleofthought,thelawofcontradictiontellsusprimarilywhatnottodo.Itisalawagainstcontradiction,alawthatcommandsustoavoidcontradictingourselves,either inourspeechor inour thought. It tellsus thatweshouldnotansweraquestionbysayingbothyesandno.Statedinanotherway, it tellsusthatweshouldnotaffirmanddeny thesameproposition. If Isayor think thatPlatowasAristotle’steacher,IshouldavoidsayingorthinkingthatPlatowasnotAristotle’steacher.TosayorthinkthatwouldbetodenysomethingthatIhaveaffirmed.

Youmay askwhy this rule of thought is sobasic and so sound.Aristotle’sanswer is that the lawofcontradiction isnotonlya ruleof thoughtbutalsoastatementabouttheworlditself—abouttherealitieswetrytothinkabout.

The law of contradiction, as a statement about reality, says what isimmediatelyobvious to common sense.A thing—whatever itmaybe—cannotbothexistandnotexistatthesametime.Iteitherexistsoritdoesnotexist,butnot both at once. A thing cannot have a certain attribute and not have thatattributeatthesametime.TheappleinmyhandthatIamlookingatcannot,atthisinstant,bebothredincolorandnotredincolor.

This is so very obvious that Aristotle calls the law of contradiction self-evident. Its self-evidence, for him,means its undeniability. It is impossible tothink that the apple is both red and not red at the same time, just as it isimpossibletothinkthatapartisgreaterthanthewholetowhichitbelongs.Itisimpossibletothinkthatatennisballthatyouhitoverthefenceistobefoundin

thegrassthatliesbeyondand,atthesametime,tothinkthatitcannotbefoundtherebecauseitnolongerexists.

Thelawofcontradictionasastatementaboutrealityitselfunderliesthelawof contradiction as a rule of thought. The law of contradiction as a statementaboutrealitydescribesthewaythingsare.Thelawofcontradictionasaruleofthoughtprescribesthewayweshouldthinkaboutthingsifwewishourthinkingaboutthemtoconformtothewaythingsare.

Whenapairofstatementsarecontradictory,bothcannotbetrue,norcanbothbefalse.Onemustbetrue,theotherfalse.PlatoeitherwasorwasnotAristotle’steacher.Allswansarewhiteorsomearenot.However,ifinsteadofsayingthatsome swans are not white, which contradicts the statement that all swans arewhite, Ihad saidnoswansarewhite, acontradictionwouldnothave resulted.PeoplewhoarenotacquaintedwithAristotle’sdistinctionbetweencontradictoryandcontrarystatementsmaybesurprisedbythis.

It is possible for bothof these statements—“All swans arewhite” and “Noswansarewhite”—tobefalse,thoughbothcannotbetrue.Someswansmaybewhiteandsomeblack,inwhichcaseitisfalsetosaythatallswansarewhiteorthatnoneis.Aristotlecallsapairofstatementscontrary,notcontradictory,whenbothcannotbetrue,butbothcanbefalse.

Is there a pair of statements, both ofwhich can be true, but both ofwhichcannotbefalse?Yes,accordingtoAristotle, thestatementthatsomeswansarewhiteandthestatementthatsomeswansarenotwhitecanbothbetrue,butbothcannotbefalse.Swansmustbeeitherwhiteornotwhite,andsoifonlysomearewhite,somemustbenotwhite.Aristotlecallsthispairofstatementssubcontrary.

Suppose,however,thatinsteadofsayingthatsomeswansarewhiteandsomeswansarenotwhite, Ihadsaid“Someswansarewhite”and“Someswansareblack.”Would that pair of statements have been subcontrary—impossible forboth tobe false?No,because some swansmightbegray, or green, yellow,orblue.Whiteandblackarenotexclusivealternatives.Itisnottruethatanyvisibleobjectmustbeeitherwhiteorblack.

Thisbeingthecase, itwillnotdotoposeas thecontraryof“Allswansarewhite”thestatement“Allswansareblack,”forneithermaybetrueandbothcanbefalse.Tostatethecontraryof“Allswansarewhite,”onemustsay“Noswansarewhite,”not“Allswansareblack.”

Unlike“black”and“white,”somepairsof terms,whicharecontrary terms,do exhaust the alternatives. For example, all integers or whole numbers areeitheroddoreven.There isno thirdpossibility.Whenoneuses terms thatareexclusive alternatives, it is possible to state a contradictionwithout using “is”and“isnot.”The statement that anygivenwholenumber is anoddnumber is

contradictedbythestatementthatthatnumberisanevennumber,becauseifitisodd,itisnoteven,andifitiseven,itisnotodd,anditmustbeoneortheother.

IcannotexaggeratetheimportanceofAristotle’srulesconcerningstatementsthat are incompatible with one another in one of these three ways—throughbeing contradictory of one another, through being contrary to one another, orsubcontrarytooneanother.Theimportanceisthatobservingtheserulesnotonlyhelps us to avoid making inconsistent statements but also helps us to detectinconsistenciesinthestatementsmadebyothersandtochallengewhattheysay.

When a person we are conversing with contradicts himself or herself ormakescontrarystatements,wehaveeveryrighttostophimandsay,“Youcannotmakebothof those statements.Bothcannotbe true.Whichof the twodoyoureallymean?Whichdoyouwanttoclaimastrue?”

It is particularly important to observe that general statements—statementscontainingtheword“all”—canbecontradictedbyasinglenegativeinstance.Tocontradictthegeneralizationthatallswansarewhite,oneneedsonlytopointtoa single swan that is not white. That single negative instance falsifies thegeneralization.

Scientificgeneralizationsareput to the test in thisway.Theclaimthat theyaretruecanbeupheldonlysolongasnonegativeinstancesarefoundtofalsifythem. Since the search for negative instances is an unending one, a scientificgeneralizationcanneverberegardedasfinallyorcompletelyverified.

Humanbeingsarepronetogeneralize,especiallyintheirthinkingaboutotherhumanbeingswhodiffer from themselves in sex, race,or religion. If theyaremen, they will permit themselves to say—unthinkingly, one hopes—that allwomenaresuchandsuch.Iftheyarewhitepersons,theywillpermitthemselvesto say that all blacks are so and so. If they are Protestants, they will permitthemselvestosaythatallCatholicsarethisorthat.Ineveryoneofthesecases,one negative instance suffices to invalidate the generalization; and the morenegative instances one can point to, the easier it is to show how wild thegeneralizationwasinthefirstplace.

Theuseofcontraryterms,suchas“black”and“white,”or“odd”and“even,”brings into play another set of words that control our thinking according tocertainrules—“either-or”and“notboth.”Forexample,whenwetossacointodecidesomething,weknowthatwhenit lands, itmustbeeitherheadsor tails,notboth.Thatisastrongdisjunction.Thereare,however,weakdisjunctions,inwhichsomethingmaybeeitherthisorthat,andperhapsboth,thoughnotinthesamerespectoratthesametime.Tosayoftomatoesthattheyareeitherredorgreenpermitsustosaythatoneandthesametomatocanbebothredandgreen,butatdifferenttimes.

Disjunctions,especiallystrongdisjunctions,enableustomakesimple,directinferences.Ifweknowthatawholenumberisnotodd,wecaninferimmediatelythatitmustbeeven.Similarly,ifweknowthatawholenumberisnotaprimenumber, we can infer immediately that it must be divisible by numbers otherthanitselfandone.Whenwesee that the tossedcoinhas landedheadsup,weknowatoncethatwe,whobetontails,havelostthetoss.Wedonothavetoturnthecoinovertobesureofthat.

InferencesofthissortAristotlecallsimmediateinferencesbecauseonegoesimmediately fromthe truthor falsityofonestatement to the truthor falsityofanother.Nostepsofreasoningareinvolved.Ifoneknowsthatitistruethatallswansarewhite,onealsoknowsimmediatelythatsomeswansarewhite;andinadditiononeknowsthatatleastsomewhiteobjectsareswans.

Onecanmakemistakesinthissimpleprocessofinference,andmistakesarefrequentlymade.Forexample,fromthefactthatallswansarewhite,itiscorrectto infer that somewhite objects are swans, but quite incorrect to infer that allwhiteobjectsareswans.

That incorrect inference Aristotle calls an illicit conversion. The class ofwhiteobjectsislargerthantheclassofswans.Swansareonlysomeofthewhiteobjectsintheworld.Tomakethemistakeofthinkingthatbecauseallswansarewhite,wecanalsosaythatallwhiteobjectsareswansistotreatthetwoclassesascoextensive,whichtheyarenot.

Two pairs ofwords are operative in immediate inference aswell as in themorecomplexprocessofreasoning.Theyare“if”and“then,”and“since”and“therefore.”Inordertoexpressthelogicalcorrectnessofanimmediateinference(theinferencethatsomeswansarewhitefromthefactthatallswansarewhite),wesay,“Ifallswansarewhite,thenitmustfollow thatsomeswansarewhite.”To express the incorrectness of an illicit conversion,we say, “If all swans arewhite,thenitdoesnotfollowthatallwhiteobjectsareswans.”

“If-then”statementsofthesetwokindsarestatementsoflogicallycorrectandlogicallyincorrectinferences.Theimportantpointtonotehereisthatthetruthofthese “if-then” statements about logically correct and logically incorrectinferences does not in any way depend upon the truth of the statementsconnectedby“if”and“then.”

Thestatementthatallswansarewhitemayinfactbefalse,anditwouldstillbelogicallycorrecttoinferthatsomeswansarewhite,if—butonlyif—allare.Evenifthestatementthatallwhiteobjectsareswanswereinfacttrueinsteadoffalse,itwouldstillbelogicallyincorrecttoinferthatallwhiteobjectsareswansfromthefactthatallswansarewhite.

Somuchfortheuseof“if”and“then”—thelatteraccompaniedbythewords

“itmust follow”or“itdoesnot follow”—toexpressour recognitionofcorrectand incorrect inferences. What about “since” and “therefore”? When wesubstitute“since”and“therefore”for“if”and“then,”weareactuallymakingtheinferencethatwedidnotmakewhenwesaidonly“if”and“then.”

To stay with the same example that we have been using, I have made noactual inferencesabout swansorwhiteobjects inall the“if-then” statements Ihavemadeaboutthem.IdonotmakeanactualinferenceuntilIsay,“Sinceallswansarewhite, it therefore followsthatsomeswansarewhite.”Myassertionthatallswansarewhiteenablesmetoassertthatsomeswansarewhite.

Only when I make assertions of this kind, connected by “since” and“therefore,” does the truth or falsity of my first statement affect the truth orfalsityofmysecond.Myinferencemaybelogicallycorrect,buttheconclusionof my actual inference may be actually false because my initial statement,introducedbytheword“since,”isfalseinfact.Thetruthmaybethatnoswansare white, and so it was false to conclude that some are, even though it waslogicallycorrecttodoso.

WhenIsay,“Ifallswansarewhite…,”Iamonlysayingifallare,notthatallare.ButwhenIsay“Sinceallswansarewhite…,”Iamsayingthatallare.ShouldIberightinmakingthatassertion,Iwouldalsoberightinassertingthatsomeswansarewhite.

WhathasjustbeensaidaboutAristotle’srulesofimmediateinferencehelpsmetosummarizebrieflytherulesofreasoningthatconstitutehis theoryofthesyllogism.Hereisamodelsyllogism:

Majorpremise:Allanimalsaremortal.Minorpremise:Allmenareanimals.Conclusion:Allmenaremortal.Let us consider two more examples of reasoning syllogistically—from a

major and a minor premise .to a conclusion. First, this one in which thereasoning is logically valid, but the conclusion is false because the minorpremiseisfalse.

Majorpremise:Angelsareneithermalenorfemale.Minorpremise:Somemenareangels.Conclusion:Somemenareneithermalenorfemale.And this one in which a true conclusion follows logically from two true

premises.Majorpremise:Mammalsdonotlayeggs.Minorpremise:Humanbeingsaremammals.Conclusion:Humanbeingsdonotlayeggs.Consideringthesethreedifferentpiecesofreasoning,wecanobserveatonce

that syllogistic reasoning is more complicated than immediate inference. Inimmediate inference,we go at once from a single statement to another singlestatement, and both statements will have the same terms. In syllogisticreasoning,wegofromtwostatements,inwhichtherearethreedifferentterms,toaconclusioninwhichtwoofthesethreetermsoccur.

In the first example above, the three terms in themajor andminorpremisewere“animals,”“men,”and“mortal.”Andthetwotermsintheconclusionwere“men”(atermintheminorpremise)and“mortal”(aterminthemajorpremise).Thatisalwaysthecaseinsyllogisticreasoning,anditisalwaysthecasethatthethirdterm,whichoccursinbothpremises(“animals”),hasbeendroppedoutoftheconclusion.

Aristotlecalls the term that is common to themajorand theminorpremisethemiddle term. It is dropped out of the conclusion because it has served itsfunctioninthereasoningprocess.Thatfunctionistoconnecttheothertwotermswitheachother.Themiddletermmediatesbetweenthem.ThatiswhyAristotlecalls syllogistic reasoningmediatedascontrastedwith immediate inference. Inimmediate inference, there is no middle term because there is no need ofmediation.

I will not bother to spell out how this works in the three examples ofsyllogisticreasoningjustgiven.Youcandothatforyourself.Theonlyadditionalrulesthatyoumustnotearethese.First,thatifthemajorortheminorpremiseisnegative(ifitcontainssomeformof“isnot”insteadof“is,”or“no”insteadof“all”), then the conclusion must also be negative. You cannot draw anaffirmativeconclusionifoneofthepremisesisnegative.

Thesecondruleisthatthemiddletermmustfunctionconnectively.Hereisanexampleinwhichthemiddletermfailstodoso.

Majorpremise:Nomenarebynaturebeastsofburden.Minorpremise:Nomulesarebynaturemen.Conclusion:Nomulesarebynaturebeastsofburden.Not only is the conclusion false in fact, but it is also a logically incorrect

conclusion. An affirmative conclusion must be drawn from two affirmativepremises, but no conclusion at all can be validly drawn from two negativepremises.Thereasonisthatthenegativeinthemajorpremiseexcludesallmenfromtheclassofthingsthatarebynaturebeastsofburden;andthenegativeintheminorpremiseexcludesallmulesfromtheclassofmen.Hencewecannotcorrectlyinferanythingatallabouttherelationbetweentheclassofmulesandtheclassofthingsthatarebynaturebeastsofburden.

Itisinterestingtoobserveintheexamplejustgiventhatthemajorandminorpremisesarebothtrue,whiletheconclusionthatdoesnotlogicallyfollowfrom

themisfalse.It isquitepossibleforbothpremisestobefalseinfactandforafalseconclusiontofollowlogicallyfromthem.Forexample:

Majorpremise:Nofathershavedaughters.Minorpremise:Allmarriedmenarefathers.Conclusion:Nomarriedmenhavedaughters.Whatalltheseexamples(andmanyothersthatwemightconsider)showusis

something that has already been pointed out and is, perhaps,worth repeating.Reasoningmaybe logicallycorrect regardlessofwhether thepremisesand theconclusionaretrueorfalseinfact.Onlyifbothpremisesareinfacttrueistheconclusionthatfollowslogicallyfromthemalsoinfacttrue.

Ifeitherpremiseisfalse,thentheconclusionthatfollowslogicallyfromthemmaybeeithertrueorfalse.Wecannottellwhichitis.Ontheotherhand,iftheconclusionthatfollowslogicallyfromcertainpremisesisinfactfalse,thenwecaninfer thatoneorbothof thepremisesfromwhichit isdrawnmustalsobefalse.

This leadsus toonemore importantruleofreasoningthatAristotlepointedout. In syllogistic reasoning, as in immediate inference, the validity of theinference is expressed by an “if” and a “then.” In the case of syllogisticreasoning,weare saying that if the twopremises are true, then theconclusionthatlogicallyfollowsfromthemisalsotrue.Wehavenotyetassertedthetruthof the premises.We have asserted only the validity of the inference from thepremises to the conclusion.Onlywhenwe assert the truth of the premises bysubstituting “since” for “if,” canwe also substitute “therefore” for “then” andassertthetruthoftheconclusion.

Therulewithwhichwearehereconcernedhastwoparts.Ontheonehand,itsays thatwehave a right to assert the truth of the conclusion ifwe assert thetruthofthepremises.Ontheotherhand,itsaysthatwehavearighttoquestionthetruthofthepremisesifwedenythetruthoftheconclusion.Isay“questionthe truthof thepremises”rather than“deny the truthof thepremises”becausewhenwedenythetruthoftheconclusion,weknowonlythateitheroneofthepremisesisfalseorthatbothmaybe,butwedonotknowwhichisthecase.

The double-edged rule just stated is particularly applicable to a kind ofreasoning thatAristotle calledhypothetical. It usually involves four terms,notthree.

Alexander Hamilton, in one of the Federalist papers, said: “If men wereangels,nogovernmentwouldbenecessary.”If,havingsaidthat,Hamiltonwenton to deny thatmenwere angels, no conclusionwould follow.Denying the ifstatement (which is called the antecedent in hypothetical reasoning) does notentitleyoutodenythethenstatement(whichiscalledtheconsequent).

However, Hamilton obviously thought that government is unquestionablynecessary for a society of human beings. He would, therefore, have had nohesitationindenyingthatmenareangels.Hewouldhavebeenrightindoingsobecausedenyingtheconsequent(orthethenstatement)inhypotheticalreasoningdoesentitleyoutodenytheantecedent(ortheifstatement).

The truth that Hamilton is getting at can also be expressed in a singlecomplexstatementthatconcealsratherthanrevealsthereasoningbehindit.Thatcomplex statement is as follows: “Becausemen are not angels, government isnecessary forhuman society.”The reasoning that goesunexpressed involves aseries of statements about the difference between men and angels as well asstatements about the special characteristics of men that make governmentnecessary for human society. The kind of compressed argument that omits orconcealsindispensablepremisesAristotlecalledanenthymeme.

18

TellingtheTruthandThinkingIt

Theword “truth” has been used over and over again in the two precedingchapters. Since those chapters are about the way the mind works and aboutthinkingandknowing,itisquitenaturalthatreferencetotruthandfalsityshouldhavebeenfrequent.Whenweknowsomething,whatweknowisthetruthaboutit.Whenwetrytothinkcorrectlyandsoundly,oureffortistogetatthetruth.

I thought it possible to use the words “truth” and “falsity” (or “true” and“false”)withoutexplainingwhat theymeanbecauseeveryonedoesunderstandwhat they mean. They are common notions, commonly used. The question“Whatistruth?”isnotadifficultquestiontoanswer.Afteryouunderstandwhattruth is, the difficult question, aswe shall see, is:How canwe tellwhether aparticularstatementistrueorfalse?

The reason why I say that everyone, as a matter of common sense,understandstruthandfalsityisthateveryoneknowshowtotellalie.Everyoneof us has told lies on one occasion or another, and everyone understands thedifferencebetweentellingalieandtellingthetruth.

Let us suppose that I think a certain restaurant is closed on Sunday. On aSunday morning, you ask me whether that restaurant is open for dinner thatevening. I tellyou that it is.For themoment, letusnotbeconcernedwith thereason why I lied to you. My lying consisted in saying in words the veryoppositeofwhatIthink.IsaidthatacertainrestaurantisopenfordinnerwhenatthesametimeIthinkitisnotopen.

Tosay“is”whenyouthink“isnot”—ortosay“isnot”whenyouthink“is”—istotellalie.Totellthetruthistheveryoppositeofthis.Itconsistsinsaying“is”whenyouthink“is,”and“isnot”whenyouthink“isnot.”

AnAmericanphilosopherwhotaughtatHarvardUniversityatthebeginningofthiscenturywittilyremarkedthataliarisapersonwhowillfullymisplaceshisontological predicates. “Is” and “is not” are what he meant by ontologicalpredicates.Aliar,inotherwords,isapersonwhointentionallyputs“is”inplace

of“isnot,”or“isnot”inplaceof“is.”Totellthetruth,then,istohavewhatonesaysinwordsagreewithorconformtowhatonethinks.Tolieisnottosayinwordswhatonethinks,buttheveryoppositeofit.

AsIsaidamomentago,everyoneunderstandsthis.AllIhavedoneistospellout, as explicitly as possible, what everyone understands. I have done so aspreparation for Aristotle’s simple, clear, and common-sense answer to thequestionaboutwhatmakesourthinkingtrueorfalse.

His answer is that, just as telling the truth to another person consists in anagreementbetweenwhatonesaysandwhatonethinks,sothinkingtrulyconsistsinanagreementbetweenwhatone thinksandwhatone is thinkingabout.Forexample, if I am asked whether Christopher Columbus was a Spaniard or anItalian,IthinktrulyifIthinkhewasanItalianandfalselyifIthinkhewasnotanItalian.

ThisoneexamplesufficesforanunderstandingofAristotle’sexplanationofwhatmakesourthinkingtrueorfalse.Wethinktruly(orhavetruthinourmind)ifwethinkthatthatwhichis,is;orthatthatwhichisnot,isnot.Wethinkfalsely(orhave falsity inourmind) ifwe think that thatwhich is, isnot;or that thatwhichisnot,is.

Inthecaseoftellingthetruthtosomeoneelse,theagreementisbetweenwhatwe say inwords to another person andwhatwe actually think. In the case ofthinkingthetruth,theagreementisbetweenwhatwethinkandthefactsastheyare.Truthconsistsinacorrespondencebetweenthemindandreality.

We express most of our thoughts in words, whether we are speaking toourselvesortosomeoneelseorwritingourthoughtsdowninsomefashion.Notallthethoughtsweexpressorallyareeithertrueorfalse.Aristotlepointsoutthatquestionsareneithertruenorfalse;noraretherequestswemakeofothers,northe commands we give. Only declarative sentences—sentences that containsome formof thewords “is” and “is not,” or that canbe rephrased to containthosewords—aretrueorfalse.

This should not seem surprising in view of the fact that Aristotle’sunderstandingofwhatmakesastatementtrueliesinitsagreementwiththefactsofthematter.Declarativestatementsaretheonlystatementsthattrytodescribethefacts—thewaythingsare.Onlysuchstatementscaneithersucceedindoingsoorfailtodoso.Iftheysucceed,theyaretrue;iftheyfail,theyarefalse.

It would appear, then, that statements that are prescriptive rather thandescriptive cannot be either true or false. A prescriptive statement is one thatprescribeswhatyouorIoughttodo.HowcanastatementthatsaysthatIoughttodevotemoretimetoreadingbooksandlesstoplayinggamesbetrueorfalseif truth and falsity in the statement of our thoughts consist in an agreement

betweenwhatweassertordenyandthewaythingsareorarenot?Being able to answer that question is of great importance. If therewere no

answertoit,statementsaboutthegoalsweoughttoaimatinlife,andaboutthemeanswe ought to employ in order to reach them,would be neither true norfalse.

EverythingwelearnedfromAristotleaboutthepursuitofhappiness(inPartIIIofthisbook)mightstillbeinterestingasanexpressionofAristotle’sopinionsaboutsuchmatters.Buthecouldnotclaim,andIcouldnotclaim,truthforhisrecommendationsaboutwhatweoughttodoinordertoachievethegoodhumanlifethatweareunderamoralobligationtotrytoachieve.

Aristotleobviouslythoughtthathisteachingaboutthegoodlifeandhowtoachieveitwastrue.Therefore,hemusthavehadananswertothequestionaboutthetruthofstatementsthatcontainthewords“ought”or“oughtnot.”Hedid.Hesaidthat, justasadescriptivestatementis trueif itagreeswithorconformstoreality,soaprescriptive statement is true if itagreeswithorconforms to rightdesire.

What is rightdesire? It consists indesiringwhatoneought todesire.Whatoughtonetodesire?Whateverisreallygoodforahumanbeing.Whatisreallygoodforahumanbeing?Whateversatisfiesahumanneed.

The statement that a person ought to desire whatever is really good forhimselforherself isaself-evident truth.It isself-evident inthesamewaythatthestatementthatapartislessthanthefinitewholetowhichitbelongsisself-evidentlytrue.Justasitisimpossibleforustothinkofapartthatisgreaterthanthewholetowhichitbelongs,orofawholethatislessthananyofitsparts,soitisimpossibleforustothinkthatweoughtnottodesirethatwhichisreallygoodforus,orthatweoughttodesirethatwhichisreallybadforus.

Among our human needs is the need for knowledge. Knowledge is reallygoodforhumanbeingstohave.Sincerightdesireconsistsindesiringwhatweought to desire, the statement thatwe ought to desire knowledge conforms toright desire. Because it conforms to right desire, it is true, according toAristotle’stheoryofwhatmakesaprescriptivestatementtrue.

Wehavejusttakentheeasieststeptowardansweringthequestionabouthowwecan tellwhether a statement is trueor false.A statement such as “A finitewholeisgreaterthananyofitsparts”revealsitstruthonitsveryface.Assoonaswe understand the terms thatmake up the statement—“whole,” “part,” and“greaterthan”—weimmediatelyseethatthestatementistrue.Itisimpossibletounderstand what a whole is, what a part is, and the relation of greater than,without at the same time understanding awhole to be greater than any of itsparts.

Therearenotmanystatementswecanmakethatareself-evidentlytrueinthisway.Thestatementthatwhatisreallygoodoughttobedesiredisoneofthem.Butitstruthisnotasmanifestasthetruthaboutwholesandpartsbecauseitiseasier for us to understand wholes and parts than it is to understand thedistinction between real and apparent goods and the distinction betweenwhatoughttobedesiredandwhatisinfactdesired.

Wesometimescallstatementsself-evidentthatarenotself-evident.Whenwedo so, we usually wish to recommend them as generally acceptable truths—acceptable without any further argument. That is what Thomas Jefferson didwhenhewrote,intheDeclarationofIndependence,that“weholdthesetruthstobe self-evident: that allmen are created equal, that they are endowedby theirCreatorwithcertainunalienablerights,”andsoon.ThesestatementsmayhavebeenacceptedastruebythesignersoftheDeclarationandbyothers,butafairlyextendedargumentwouldhavebeennecessarytoestablishtheirtruth.

What Ihave justsaid indicatesanotherway inwhichwecan tellwhetherastatement is true or false. If it is not self-evidently true, its truth may beestablishedbyargumentorreasoning.AccordingtoAristotle,thetruthofsomestatementscanbedemonstratedinthisway.Twoconditionsarerequiredforthedemonstrationorproofof a statement’s truth.One is the truthof thepremisesused in the reasoning.Theother is thecorrectnessorvalidityof the reasoningitself.

Let the statement be: “The United States is larger than the State of NewYork.”Twopremisesareneededtoestablishitstruth.Oneis:“Awholeislargerthananyofitsparts.”Theotheris:“TheUnitedStatesisawhole,ofwhichtheStateofNewYork isonepart.”From these twostatements, it follows that theUnitedStatesislargerthantheStateofNewYork.Thepremisesbeingtrue,theconclusionthatfollowsfromthemisalsotrue.

Justasveryfewstatementscanbeseenbyustobeself-evidentlytrue,soalsovery fewcanbe seenbyus tobe trueas a resultofvalid reasoning from truepremises.Thetruthofmostofthestatementsthatexpresswhatwethinkisnotso easily determined. In most cases, we remain in doubt about whether astatementistrueorfalse.Whenweareabletoresolveourdoubts,wedosobyappealingtotheevidenceaffordedusbytheexperienceofoursenses.

Forexample,ifweareindoubtwhetheracertainbuildingistwelveorfifteenstoriestall,thewaytoremovethatdoubtistolookatthebuildingandcountitsstories.Asingle, relatively simpleobservationwill telluswhethera statementaboutthebuilding’sheightistrueorfalse.

The appeal to observation is the way to determine the truth of statementsabout things thatareperceivable throughoursenses.Youmayaskwhetherwe

cantrustoursenses.Notalways,butthewaytocheckourownobservationistohaveitconfirmedorcorroboratedbytheobservationofothers.

Forexample, as a resultofmyownobservation, Imaymake the statementthat the automobile that crashed into the wall was going very fast. Otherwitnessesof the sameeventmayhave tobe appealed to inorder toget at thetruthofthismatter.Ifallofthemreportthesameobservation,itisprobablytruethat the automobilewas going very fastwhen it crashed. Themorewitnesseswhoagreeonthispoint,themoreprobableitis.

Astatementthatisonlyprobablytruehasthesametruththatispossessedbyastatementthatweregardascertainlytrue.Eithertheautowasgoingveryfastor itwasnot.Astatementabout its speed iseither trueor false.Whenwesaythat a statement is only probably true,we are not estimating the degree of itstruth.Weareassessingourowndegreeofassuranceinclaimingtruthforit.

Degreesofprobabilityarenotmeasuresofthetruthofastatement,butonlymeasuresoftheassurancewithwhichwecandetermineitstruth.Atruththatweaffirmwithcertitude,suchasthetruthaboutwholesandparts, isnomoretruethanatruththatweregardasonlyprobable,suchasthetruthaboutthespeedoftheautothatcrashed.

Somewitnessesarequalifiedtomakeobservationsthathelpustodeterminethe truth of statements; some are not. For example, as a result of my ownobservation, Imay say that the ring on your finger is gold. Itmay, of course,look as if it were gold and still be only gold plated. It is difficult, if notimpossible, to tell which it is by unaided observation. Even an experiencedjewelerwouldnotgiveyouanopinionaboutthisjustbylookingatorhandlingthering.Thejewelerknowstherearewaysofdeterminingtherealcharacterofobjects that look as if they are made of gold. By putting your ring to theappropriate test and by observing the result of it, the jeweler, as an expertwitness,cansaywhethermyoriginalstatementabouttheringistrueorfalse.

So far we have considered statements about particular objects—statementsabout theheightofacertainbuilding,about thespeedofacertainautomobile,aboutthemetalofacertainring.Thetruthofsuchstatementscanbecheckedbyobservation.Sometimes,asaresultofobservation,ourownortheobservationofothersaswell,wecanberelativelysureabout the truthof thestatementunderconsideration;sometimes,weareleftunsure.

Observation seldom gives us the certainty we have about the truth ofstatementsthatareself-evidentlytrueorthatcanbeestablishedastruebyvalidreasoning. I say “seldom” rather than “never” because, according toAristotle,somesimplestatementsaboutobservableobjectsareasevidently trueassomegeneral statementsare self-evidently true.That there isapieceofpaper inmy

typewriterasIamwritingthissentenceis immediatelyevident tome.Idonotneed the confirmation of other witnesses to assure me of the truth of mystatementabout thisobservable fact. Iamascertainof its truthas Iamof thetruthofthestatementaboutwholesandparts.

Weareleftwithalargeclassofstatementsthatwecallgeneralizationsfromexperience,suchstatementsas“Allswansarewhite”or“AllEskimosareshort.”Sinceitisimpossibleforusoranyoneelsetoobservethecolorofallswans,ortheheightofallEskimos,observationbyitselfcannotestablishthetruthofthesegeneralizations.

A number of observations may persuade us that the generalizations areprobably true. The larger the number of observations, the more we may bepersuaded. Increasing their number can only increase the probability. It canneverresultincertaintythatthegeneralizationsaretrue.

However,wecanbecertainthatageneralizationisfalse,evenifwecanneverbecertainthatitistrue.Ipointedoutintheprecedingchapterthatthestatement“Someswansareblack”oreventhestatement“ThisswanthatIamobservingisblack”contradictsthestatement“Allswansarewhite.”Contradictorystatementscannot both be true. The truth of my observation that this one swan is blackfalsifies the generalization that all swans are white. In the light of that oneobservation,Iknowwithcertitudethatthegeneralizationisfalse.

Aristotle’s answer to the question about howwe are able to tell whether astatementistrueorfalsecanbesummarizedbysayingthatweareabletodosobyappealing toexperience,on theonehand,and toreason,on theotherhand.Sense perception provides uswith oneway of checking the truth or falsity ofstatements in question. In addition, Aristotle recommends that we alwaysconsidertheopinionsofothersbeforemakingupourownminds—theopinionsheldbymostmen,orbythefewwhoareexperts,orbythewise.

19

BeyondaReasonableDoubt

Inourcourtstwostandardsaresetfortheverdicttoberenderedbyajury.Onquestionsoffactthatthecourtsubmitstothejury,thejuryissometimesrequiredtogiveananswer that itholdsbeyondareasonabledoubt;andsometimes it issufficient if the jury’s answer is one that it thinks is supported by apreponderanceoftheevidence.

Aristotlemadeasomewhatsimilardistinctionbetweentwowaysinwhichwecan answer questions of all sorts. Like the jury’s answer that is beyond areasonabledoubt,wesometimescanansweraquestionbyastatement thathasthe status of knowledge. When our answers do not consist of knowledge.Aristotle calls themopinions.Opinions approach knowledge to the extent thattheyhavetheweightoftheevidenceontheirside.Attheveryoppositeendofthescalearethoseopinionsthataretotallyunsupportedbyevidence.

Aristotle’sdistinctionbetweenknowledgeandopinionisaverysharpone—toosharp,perhaps,forustoacceptwithoutqualification.Forhim,whenwehaveknowledge,whatwe know consists of necessary truths.We affirm such truthswith certitude because they are beyond all reasonable doubt. For example,wecannotdoubtthatafinitewholeisgreaterthananyofitsparts.Ifsomethingisafinitewhole,itmustbegreaterthananyofitsparts.Itisimpossibleforitnottobe.

Such self-evident truths constitute one exampleofwhatAristotlemeansbyknowledge. The other example consists of conclusions that can be validlydemonstrated by premises that are self-evidently true. When we affirm suchconclusions,wenotonlyknow thatwhat theyassert is true,butwealsoknowwhywhattheyassertistrue.Knowingthereasonswhywhattheyassertistrue,we know that what they assert cannot be otherwise. Here, too, we are inpossessionofnecessarytruths.

Aristotle in his day thought that mathematics, especially geometry,exemplifiedknowledgeofthishighquality.Theviewthatisheldofmathematics

in our day does not agree with Aristotle’s. Nevertheless mathematics comesnearer than any other science to exemplifying what Aristotle meant byknowledge.

Consideringthe truthsofgeometry,wecanunderstandoneotherdistinctionthat Aristotlemade between knowledge and opinion. There are twoways, hesays, inwhich one can affirm the conclusion of a geometrical demonstration.The teacher who understands the demonstration affirms the conclusion in thelight of the premises that prove it. He or she has knowledge. In contrast, thestudent who does not understand the demonstration but who affirms theconclusion only because the teacher said it is true does not have knowledge.Even if the truth itself is a necessary truth, to affirm it on the authority ofsomeoneelseistoholditasamatterofopinionratherthanasknowledge.Formostofus, thescientific truthswithwhichweareacquaintedareopinionsweholdontheauthorityofscientists,notknowledgethatweourselvespossess.

Wemayfindthiswayofdistinguishingbetweenknowledgeandopinionmoreuseful as well as more acceptable. Only a very few statements are necessarytruths for us because they are self-evidently true, and their opposites areimpossible.Allotherstatementsexpressopinionsthatmayormaynotbetrue.Though Aristotle would call all statements of this sort statements of opinionrather than of knowledge, let us seewhetherwe can divide opinions into twogroups, one of which has some resemblance to what Aristotle meant byknowledge.

The opinions we hold may either be supported by reasons and byobservations,ortheymaybeheldbyuswithoutsuchsupport.Forexample,ifIholdanopiniononlybecausesomeoneelsetoldmeitwastrue,andImyselfdonothaveanyotherreasonforthinkingittobetrue,thenthatisamereopiniononmypart.Thestatementmayinfactbetrue.Thatdoesnotmakeitanythelessamereopinion.Sofarasaffirmingitisconcerned,Ihavenogroundsthatprovidemewith reasons for thinking it tobe trueapart from theauthorityof someoneelse.

Eachofusalsohasanumberofpersonalprejudices—thingswehold tobetruesimplybecausewewanttobelievethem.Wehavenorationalgroundsforbelieving them. Instead, we are emotionally attached to them. For example,persons often believe that their country is the best country in theworld. Thatmayormaynotbetrue.Itmayevenbepossibletoarguethatitistruebycitingevidenceofonesortoranotherorbygivingreasonsforthinkingso.Butpersonswhobelievethisusuallydonotciteevidenceorgivereasons.Theyjustwishtobelieveit.

Thestatementstowhichoneisemotionallyattachedbysuchwishfulthinking

aremereopinions.Otherpersonsmaybeemotionallyattached toopinions thatare opposite. Since neither one opinion nor the other, which may be its veryopposite,issupportedbyreasonsorevidence,oneopinionofthissortisasgoodasanother.

Inthecaseofmereopinions,everyoneisentitledtopreferhisorherown—thosetowhichtheindividualisemotionallyattached.Aboutsuchopinionstherecanbenoargument,atleastnonethatisrational.Opinionsofthissortarelikeexpressionsofpersonaltasteinfoodordrink.Youmaylikeorangejuicebetterthanpineapple juice,andImaypreferpineapple juice toorangejuice.Youareentitledtoyourlikes,andItomine.Thereisnopointinourarguingaboutwhichisbetter.

Differencesofopinionbecomearguableonlywhentheopinionsaboutwhichwedifferarenotmereopinionsinthesensejustindicated—onlywhentheyarenot simply personal prejudices, expressions of taste, or things thatwewish tobelieve.

Forexample,Imayhavegoodreasonsforthinkingthatharnessingtheenergyofthesunwillprovideuswithsufficientenergywhenwerunoutoffossilfuelssuchascoalandoil.Youmayhavegoodreasonsforthinkingthatsolarenergywillnotsolvetheproblem.Eachofus,inaddition,maybeabletocitestatisticsprovided by careful studies of energy sources. Neither of us may be able topersuade the other. Nevertheless, the opinions we hold and about which wedifferandarguearenotmereopinionsonourpart.

Letus suppose thatneitherofushas studied theenergyproblemourselves.Wehavesimplyreadwhathasbeensaidbyothersonthesubject.Theoppositeopinionsweholdarebasedontheauthorityofothers.Letusfurthersupposethatyou have most of the authorities in this field on your side; or that of theauthorities that can be appealed to, you have the most expert on your side.Aristotlewouldsaythatyouhavethestrongercase.Inhisview,theopinionthatisheldeitherbymostmen,orbymostofthosewhoareexperts,orbythebest-qualifiedamongtheexperts,islikelytoturnouttobethebetteropiniontohold.

We approach nearer to what Aristotle meant by knowledge, and we movefurtherawayfrommereopinion,whentheopinionsheldarebasedonscientificevidence and scientific reasoning. Those opinions that are supported by apreponderance of the evidence and by the soundest reasoning are regarded byscientistsinourdayasknowledge.

ItisnotknowledgeinAristotle’ssenseofthetermbecausewhatweclaimtoknowmayturnoutnottobethebetteroftwooppositeopinionswhen,byfurtherscientificinvestigation,moreevidenceisfoundontheoppositeside;orwhen,byfurther scientific thought, better reasons are found for holding the opposite

opinion.Noscientificconclusionisknownbyustobefinallyorultimatelytrue—truebeyond thepossibilityofcorrectionor rejectionbyfurther investigationandfurtherthoughtaboutthematter.

Theopposite of anyopinion thatwehold as a scientific conclusion alwaysremains possible because no scientific conclusion is itself a necessary truth.Nevertheless,alargenumberofscientificconclusionshavebeensupportedbyapreponderanceoftheevidenceandbyunchallengedreasonsformanycenturies.Thefact thatnewdiscoveriesmayshift thescalesagainst theseconclusionsorthe fact that the reasons in favorof themmaybeseriouslychallengedbynewthinkingaboutthesubjectdoesnotpreventusfromregardingsuchconclusionsaswell-establishedknowledge—forthetimebeing.

Arescientificconclusions,supportedbyapreponderanceoftheevidenceandby the best reasoning that is available at the time, the only opinions we areentitled to regard as knowledge? No. Philosophical conclusions may also beopinionsthatweareentitledtoregardasknowledgebecausetheyaresupportedbysound reasoningandby theweightof theevidence that is in favorof themratherthantheiropposites.

Howdotheconclusionsofphilosophicalthoughtdifferfromtheconclusionsof scientific research? The answer lies in the two words “thought” and“research.”Scientificconclusionsarebasedontheinvestigationsundertakenbyscientists,whetherinlaboratoriesornot.Thethinkingthatscientistsdotoreachthese conclusions never by itself suffices. It is always thinking about theobservationsorfindingsofcarefullyplannedandcarefullyexecutedresearchorinvestigation.

In contrast, philosophical thought reaches conclusions based on commonexperience, the kind of experience that all of us have every day of our liveswithout doing any research—without carefully carrying out carefully plannedinvestigations.Philosophersdonoresearch.Theydonotdeviseexperimentsorcarryoutinvestigations.

Philosophical thought about common experience begins with the common-sense opinions that most persons hold. It improves upon such common-senseopinionsbybeingmore reflectiveandanalytical thanmostpersonsare. Inmyownviewofthematter,itreachesitsbestandmost-refinedconclusionsinwhatIhavecalledAristotle’suncommoncommonsense.

Scientific or philosophical conclusions are usually generalizations fromexperience—either the special experience that results from research orinvestigationorthecommonexperiencethatallofushavewithoutinvestigationorresearch.Aswenotedinanearlierchapter,anygeneralizationcanbefalsifiedbyasinglenegativeobservation.This isas trueofaphilosophicalas it isofa

scientific generalization. The longer a generalization goes without beingfalsified, themore entitledwe are to regard it as established knowledge eventhough we can never regard it as finally or ultimately true—beyond thepossibilityofcorrectionorrejection.

Because philosophical conclusions are based on common rather than onspecialexperience,becausetheyarenotaffectedbytheresultsofinvestigationor research, conclusions of the kind that Aristotle reached more than twothousandyearsagocanstillclaimthestatusofphilosophicalknowledgeinourday.Nothinginourcommonexperiencesincehistimehasfalsifiedthem.

MostofthescientificconclusionsthatwerecurrentlyacceptedinAristotle’sdayhavebeenrejectedorcorrectedsince then.Theyhaveeitherbeenfalsifiedbythediscoveriesoflaterresearch,ortheyhavebeencorrectedandimprovedbybetter thinking as well as by better observations and more thoroughinvestigations.

Notallopinionsthatcanberegardedasestablishedknowledgetaketheformof scientific or philosophical generalizations from experience. Historicalinvestigationorresearchreachesconclusionsaboutparticularmattersoffact—the date when some event took place, the steps by which some individualbecamearuler,thecircumstancesthatledtotheoutbreakofawar,andsoforth.

Here, as in the case of science, research amasses evidence about whichhistoriansthinkand,inthelightoftheirthinking,advanceconclusionsthattheyregard as supportedby a preponderanceof the evidence andbygood reasons.When they are reached in this way, historical conclusions can be regarded asestablishedknowledgeeventhoughfurtherresearchmaychangeourviewofthematter.

Wenowseethatthereareatleastfivedifferentkindsofknowledge,onlyoneofwhich is knowledge in the strict sense thatAristotle attaches to thatword.That one is the knowledge we have when we understand truths that are self-evident.Theotherfourkindsare(1)thewell-foundedopinionsofmathematicalthought—the conclusions thatmathematicians are able to demonstrate; (2) thewell-established generalizations of scientific research or investigation; (3) thephilosophical opinions that are based on common experience and on therefinement of common sense by philosophical reflection; and (4) the opinionsaboutparticularfactsthathistoriansareabletosupportbyhistoricalresearch.

Allfourareopinionsinthesensethattheyareneversofirmlyestablishedbyreasonsandevidencethattheycannotbefalsifiedorcorrectedbyfurtherthoughtornewobservations.Yetallfourarealsoknowledgeinthesensethatatagiventimetheyhavetheweightof theevidencein theirfavorandthereasoningthatsupportsthemremainsunchallenged.

PARTVDIFFICULTPHILOSOPHICALQUESTIONS

20Infinity

Difficultphilosophicalquestionsarequestionsthatitisimpossibletoanswerinthelightofcommonexperienceandbytheuseofcommonsense.Toanswerthemrequiressustainedreflectionandreasoning.

How do such questions arise? For Aristotle they arose in part from therefinementsofcommonsensethathisownphilosophicalthoughtdeveloped.Inpart, theywerequestionsheaskedinresponsetotheviewsofothersthatwerecurrentinhisday.

AmongthestudentsofnaturewhoprecededhimweretwoGreekphysicists,LeucippusandDemocritus,whofirstproposed the theoryofatoms.Accordingtotheir theory,everythingin theworldofnature iscomposedof tiny, invisibleparticles ofmatter, separated by a void—space totally devoid ofmatter. Theycalledtheseparticlesatomstoindicatethattheseunitsofmatterwerenotmerelyvery small, but absolutely small.Nothing smaller, in their view, can exist, foreachatomisanindivisibleunitofmatter.Itcannotbecutupintosmallerunits.

Atoms,accordingtoDemocritus,differfromoneanotheronlyinsize,shape,andweight.Theyareconstantlyinmotion.Andtheyareinfiniteinnumber.

Confrontedwiththistheory,Aristotleraisedtwoobjectionstoit.Inthefirstplace,hechallengedthecentralnotioninthetheoryofatomism.Ifanatomisasolid unit ofmatterwith no void or empty space inside it, then, he argued, itcannotbeuncuttableorindivisible.Eitheranatomhassomeemptyspaceinsideit,inwhichcaseitisnotaunitofmatter;or,lackingemptyspace,thematteriscontinuous,inwhichcaseitisdivisible.

The reasoning here can be illustrated by taking something larger than anatom.Iamholdinginmyhandonematchstick.Ibreakitintotwosmallerpiecesof wood. Each of these pieces of wood is now a separate unit of matter. Nolongerbeingonepieceofwood,theycannolongerbebrokenintotwo.Buteachofthetwopiecesofwoodcanbefurtherdivided,andsoonwithoutend.

Whateveriscontinuous,Aristotleheld,isinfinitelydivisible.Anythingthatis

one—asingleunitofmatter—mustbecontinuous.Ifitwerenot,itwouldnotbeone unit of matter, but two or more. By this reasoning, Aristotle thought heshowedthattherecouldbenoatoms.Theremaybeverysmallunitsofmatter,but however small these particles may be, they can be divided into smallerparticles,ifeachisaunitofmatter—oneandcontinuous.

In the secondplace,Aristotleobjected to theview that therearean infinitenumberofatoms in theworld.Thenumbermaybevery large, so large that itcannotbecountedinanytimethatacountermightusetodoso.Butitcannotbean infinite number because,Aristotlemaintained, an infinite number of thingscannotactuallycoexistatanymomentoftime.

ThesetwoobjectionsthatAristotleraisedagainsttheatomistsofhisdaymayatfirstappeartobeinconsistent.Ontheonehand,Aristotleappearstobesayingthatanycontinuousunitofmattermustbeinfinitelydivisible.Ontheotherhand,he appears to be saying that there cannot be an infinite number of units inexistenceatanyone time. Ishenotbothaffirming theexistenceofan infinityandalsodenyingit?

TheapparentcontradictionisresolvedbyadistinctionthatischaracteristicofAristotle’sthought.Wehavecomeuponthisdistinctioninanearlierchapterofthisbook(seechapter7).Itisthedistinctionbetweenthepotentialandtheactual—betweenwhatcanbe(butisnot)andwhatis.

Aristotlethinksthattherecanbetwoinfinities—bothpotential,neitheractual.One is the potential infinite of addition. The other is the potential infinite ofdivision.

The potential infinite of addition is exemplified in the infinity of wholenumbers.Thereisnowholenumberthatisthelastnumberintheseriesofwholenumbersfromone,two,three,four,andsoon.Givenanynumberinthatseries,howeverlargeitmaybe,thereisanextonethatislarger.Itispossibletogoonadding number after number without end. But it is only possible, you cannotactually carry out this process of addition, for to do sowould take an infinitetime—timewithoutend.

Aristotle,asweshallseeinthenextchapter,didnotdenytheinfinityoftime.Onthecontrary,heaffirmedtheeternityoftheworld—thatithasnobeginningorend.Butaninfinitetimedoesnotexistatanyonemoment.Liketheinfiniteseriesofwholenumbers,itisonlyapotential,notanactual,infinite.

So, too, the infinityofdivision isapotential,notanactual, infinite. Just asyou can go on adding number after number without end, so you can go ondividing anything that is continuous without end. The number of fractionsbetween the whole numbers two and three is infinite, just as the number ofwhole numbers is infinite. Both infinities, however, are potential, not actual.

Theydonotactuallyexistatanymomentoftime.Atthisoranyothermoment,Aristotlemaintained,therecannotbeanactual

infinity of coexisting things, as therewould be if the atomistswere correct intheir view. They held, it must be remembered, that at this very moment anactuallyinfinitenumberofatomscoexist.ItisthatandthatalonewhichAristotledenied.

His reasoning on this score ran as follows. Either the number of actuallycoexisting things is definite or indefinite. If it is infinite, it is indefinite. Butnothingcanbebothactualand indefinite.Therefore, therecannotbeanactualinfinityofanysort—anactuallyinfinitenumberofcoexistingatoms,anactuallyinfiniteworld,anactuallyinfinitespacethatisfilledwithactuallyexistingunitsofmatter.

Theonlyinfinitiesthattherecanbe,accordingtoAristotle,arethepotentialinfinitiesthatareinvolvedintheendlessprocessesofadditionordivision.Sinceone moment of time succeeds another or precedes another, and since twomomentsoftimedonotactuallycoexist,timecanbeinfinite.

21Eternity

Timecanbe infinite,Aristotle thought,because it ismadeupofa seriesofmoments or instants that precede or succeed one another and do not actuallycoexist.Onemomentoftimeceasestoexistasthenextmomentoftimecomesinto existence.Since thatprocess cangoonendlessly, there canbe an infinitenumberofmomentsorinstantsoftime.

Timecanbeinfinite,butisit?Ifitis,thentheworldthatnowexistshasnoend.Evenifithadabeginning,itcangoonwithoutend,forthereisnoendtotime.Therecanalwaysbeanothermoment.

Aristotlewent further.Henotonly thought that time isendless,buthealsothought that the world had no beginning as well as no end. If the world hadneither beginningnor end, then time is infinite in both directions.There is nomomentoftimethatisnotprecededbyanearliermoment.Thereisnomomentoftimethatisnotsucceededbyalatermoment.

WhydidAristotle thinktheworldiseternal?Heusedtheword“eternal” toexpress his understanding that the world has neither beginning nor end.Sometimestheword“eternal”isusedtosignifytimelessness,aswhenitissaidthatGodiseternal.Aristotleusedtheword“eternal”inthatsense,too.But, inhis view, the eternity of theworld is one thing, and the eternity ofGod quiteanother.

To understand this distinction between the two eternities—the eternity oftimelessness and the eternity of time without beginning or end—we mustconsiderAristotle’sunderstandingoftimeitself.

Time,hesaid,isthemeasureofmotionorchange.Anotherwayofexpressingthis thought is to say that time is the dimension in which motion or changeoccurs, just as space is the dimension inwhichmaterial things exist. Existingthingsoccupyorfillspace.Changingthingsendureintime.Thebilliardballthatrolls fromone side of the table to the other does so in a period of time.Thatmotion takes time. The duration of themotion ismeasured by the number of

momentsoftimethatittookforthebilliardballtogetfromheretothere.Itfollows,Aristotlethought,thattimehasneitherbeginningnorendifmotion

orchangehasneitherbeginningnorend.Butwhydidhe think thatmotionorchangecannotbeginandcannotend?Thatisaverydifficultquestion,indeed.

Theanswer,ifthereisananswer,liesinAristotle’snotionofcauseandeffectand in his notion of God. Anything that happens, Aristotle said,must have acause.Ifabodymoves,somethingmustcauseittomove.Thatwhichcausesabody to move must itself move. For example, the billiard ball did not moveitself. Itwasmovedby thebilliardcue thatstruck it.Toset thebilliardball inmotion, thebilliardcueitselfhadtomove.Butsomethingelsehadtomoveit.Andsoon.

What this amounts to is a denial onAristotle’s part of a firstmover in theseries of movers and things moved. Aristotle, as we shall see, did affirm theexistence—morethanthat,thenecessaryexistence—ofafirstmover.But,inhisview,thefirstmoverdidnotcomefirstinaseriesofthingsmovingandmoved.The first mover was not the first efficient cause of motion—the mover thatstartedthingsmoving.

In chapter 23 onGod,we shall return toAristotle’s conception of the firstmover.Forthepresent,IneedonlypointoutthatAristotle’sGod,unliketheGodoftheBible,didnotcreatetheworld.AristotlewouldhavedeniedthestatementwithwhichtheBibleopens:“InthebeginningGodcreatedtheheavensandtheearth.” He would have denied it because he saw no reason whatsoever forthinkingthattheworldeverhadabeginning.

If there is no reason for thinking that the world in motion ever had abeginning,thereisequallynoreasonforthinkingthattheworldinmotionwillever come to an end. The individual things of which the world is composedcome into existence and pass away. There cannot be an infinite number ofindividualthingscoexistingatanyonetime.Buttherecanbeaninfinitenumberofthingscomingintobeingandpassingawayinaninfinitetime,ortimewithoutbeginningorend.Comingintobeingandpassingawayis,aswehaveseen,onetypeof change.Like localmotion, ormovement fromoneplace to another, itneverstartedanditneverends.

ThetypeofmotionthatAristotlehadmostinmindwhenhetalkedabouttheeternity of motion was not the movement of bodies on earth nor any otherterrestrialchange.Helookedupattheheavensandatthemovementthereofthesunandmoon,theplanets,andthestars.Thesemotions,hethought,mostclearlyexemplifiedtheeternityofmotionand,withit,theeternityoftheworld.Asweshall see in chapter 23, the eternityofGod is usedbyAristotle to explain theeternity of the world. These two eternities are as different as timelessness is

differentfromeverlastingtime.

22

TheImmaterialityofMind

The three philosophical questions with which we are concerned in thischapter are not all equally difficult. The first and least difficult question iswhether thematerial things of the physicalworld are also immaterial in somerespect.Moredifficultisthequestionwhethertheexistenceofthehumanmindintroduces an elementof immateriality into aworld that is otherwisematerial.Finally,andmostdifficultofall,isthequestionwhethertheuniverseincludesabeingorbeingswhollyimmaterial.

Thereaderwhorememberswhatwassaidinchapter8willhavesomecluetothe answer that Aristotle gave to the first question.We saw there that all thechanging things of physical nature are composed of matter and form. Weunderstood this in terms ofworks of human art. The artist or craftsman takesmaterialsthatcanbeformedinonewayoranotherandproducesaworkofartby transforming thematerials heworks on—giving them a form they did notoriginallyhave.Thewoodthatbecomesachairasaresultofhumanproductivitytakesona form—theformofchairness—that itdidnothavebefore themakertransformedit.

It is important to remember thatweunderstood that form isnot shape.Thechairs thatmen produce havemany different shapes, butwhatever shape theyhave, theyareall chairs. It is the form,not the shape, thatmakesall chairsofdifferentshapesthesamekindofthing.Thatformwasanideainthemindofthemakerbeforeitbecametheformbywhichhetransformedthewoodintoachair.Havingthatidea,themakerunderstoodthekindofmaterialthinghewishedtomake.Asthe idea in themindof themaker isanunderstandingof thekindofthingtobemade,sotheforminthematerialstransformedbythemakeriswhatmakesitthekindofthingthatismade.

Whethertheyareproductsofhumanartornaturalratherthanartificialthings,allmaterialthingshaveanaspectthatisnotmaterial.Formisnotmatter;matterisnotform.Thingscomposedofformandmatterhaveanimmaterialaswellasa

materialaspect.Aswe have seen,wemay be able to think aboutmatterwithout form, but

purematter—totallyunformedmatter—cannotexist.Theformsthatmattercantake actualize its potentialities.Lacking all form,matter by itself can have noactuality;andwhathasnoactualitydoesnotexist.

Isitequallytruetosaythattheformsthatmattertakesdonotexistapartfromthemattertowhichtheygivesomekindofactuality—theactualityofachairorthe actuality of a tree? The forms that are the immaterial aspect of materialthingsarematerialforms—formsthathavetheirexistenceinmatter.Butisthattheonlyexistencetheyhave?Cantheyalsoexistapartfromthematterofthingsthatarecomposedofmatterandform?

Aristotle’sanswertothatquestionisaffirmative.Oncemoreitisnecessarytoremembersomethingsaidinanearlierchapter.Inchapter16,Ipointedoutthat,accordingtoAristotle,thehumanmindunderstandsthekindofthingthatachairoratreeisbyhavinganideaofit.Havinganideaconsistsinhavinginthemindtheformofthethingwithouthavingthematterofitalso.

Thepoint justmaderelates to thedifferencebetweenmindin itsactivityasknowerandmindinitsactivityasproducer.

As producer, the mind has a productive idea that it uses to transform rawmaterials into chairs and tables. It puts its ideas into those rawmaterials andgivesthemtheformofachairoratable.Asaknower,themindgetsideasfromthe natural things of the physical world. It gets them by taking the forms ofmaterial things away from the matter of those composite objects—trees orhorses.Bydoingso,itunderstandsthekindofthingatreeorahorseis.

Another point to remember from chapter 16 is the difference betweenknowingandeating.Whenweeat(takefoodintooursystemanddigestit),wetake both the matter and the form of the composite thing that gives usnourishment—anappleorapotato.

AsAristotlesawit, thereasonwhytheappleorpotato thatweeatgivesusnourishment is thatwhenwe digest and assimilate it,we transform itsmatter.Nourishment involves theassimilationof the foodweeat.Assimilationoccurswhenmatterthathadtheformofanappleorapotatolosesthatformandtakesontheformofhumanflesh,bone,andblood.Thatiswhywemusttakeintoourownbodiesboththematterandtheformofthematerialthingsfromwhichweseeknourishment.

If knowingwere exactly like eating,wewouldneverbe able tounderstandthekindofthinganappleorapotatois.Tounderstandthekindofthinganappleorapotatois,wemusttaketheformsofthosecompositethingsawayfromthematterthattheyform.

Inassimilatingediblethings,wemustseparatethematterfromtheformandreplacetheformthematterhadbytheformofourownbodies.

Inunderstandingknowablethings,wemustseparatetheformfromthematterandkeeptheformseparatefrommatter.Onlyasseparatefrommatterdoestheformbecomeanideainourminds,anideabywhichweunderstandthekindofthinganappleorapotatois.

Why?This is thedifficult question that remains tobe answered.Aristotle’sanswerturnsonadistinctionbetweenthekindofthingapotatooranappleisingeneral, andparticular potatoes or apples, each a unique thing.This particularapple that Ihave inmyhand is theunique thing it isbecause the form,whichmakesitanapple,isunitedwiththisunitofmatterthatmakesitthisapple,notthat one over there on the table. That one over there has the same form in adifferent unit of matter. The different units of matter that enter into thecompositionoftwoindividualapplesiswhatmakesthemdifferentindividuals.Theformthateachofthemhasiswhatmakesthembothapples—thesamekindoffruit.

Whenwe have the idea that enables us to understand the kind of thing anappleis,weareunderstandingapplesingeneral,notthisorthatindividualapple.InAristotle’sview,wecanperceivethroughoursensestheindividualityofthisorthatapple,butwecannot,throughtheideaswehaveinourminds,understanditsindividuality.Onlykindsingeneralareunderstandable,notindividuals.

Thatiswhythemind,initsunderstandingofkindsingeneral,mustseparatetheformsofmaterialthingsfromtheirmatterandkeepthoseformsseparateastheideasbywhichweunderstand.ThatisalsowhyAristotlecalledthemindtheformofforms—theplacewheretheformsofmaterialthingscanexistapartfromtheirmatter.

WehavenowreachedAristotle’sanswertothesecondquestionstatedatthebeginning of this chapter. Does the human mind introduce an element ofimmaterialityintoaworldthatisotherwisematerial?Yes,Aristotlesaid,itdoes.

Ifthemindwerenotanimmaterialelementinthemakeupofhumanbeings,itwouldnot giveus the ability to understandmaterial thingsby separating theirforms from their matter. And if the mind did not keep or hold the forms ofmaterialthingsseparatefromtheirmatter,wewouldnothavetheideasbywhichweunderstandkindsingeneral—thekindofthingapotatoisasdistinctfromthekindofthinganappleis.

To keep or hold forms separate from matter, the mind itself must beimmaterial. If itwerematerial, the formswouldbekeptorheld inmatter,andthentheywouldnolongerbeideasbywhichweunderstandkindsingeneral.

Thereisanotherwayofsayingthesamethingthatmayhelpustounderstand

Aristotle’s argument a little better. Sensing and perceiving are one mode ofknowing.Whenwesenseandperceiveindividualthings(thisorthatapple),suchknowing involves the action of our sense organs and our brains, which arematerialelementsinourmakeup.

Understandingisadifferentmodeofknowing.Bysensingandperceiving,weknowthisorthatindividualthing.Byunderstanding,weknowthekindofthingin general that this individual thing is. Unlike sensing and perceiving, suchknowingdoesnotinvolvetheactionofanymaterialorgan,noteventhebrain.

Seeingisanactoftheeye,butunderstandingisnotanactofourbrain.Itisanactofourmind—animmaterialelementinourmakeupthatmayberelatedto,butisdistinctfrom,thebrainasamaterialorgan.

Tosumupwhatwehavelearnedsofar:AccordingtoAristotle,theformsofmaterialthingsinthephysicalworldareimmaterialaspectsofthem.Inaddition,the material world, of which we are a part, includes an immaterial elementbecausewehavemindsaswellasbrains,mindsthataredistinctfrombrains.

These are Aristotle’s answers to the first two of the three difficultphilosophical questions with which we began. The third and most difficultquestion—abouttheexistenceofatotallyimmaterialbeing—willbeansweredinthefollowingchapter.

23

God

Aristotle’s view of the universe as eternal—as everlastingly undergoingchange—leadshimtoquestionthecauseofeverlastingchange.Heattributesallthechangesconstantlyoccurringonearthtothemotionoftheheavenlybodies.Butwhatkeepsthemeverlastinglyinmotion?

Itcannotbesomething that is itself inmotionorchanging inanyway. If itwere, it, too,wouldneedacauseof itsmotion,acauseof itschanging.Giveninfinite time, onemight go back from effect to cause in an infinite series andnever reach a first cause—a mover in motion that is not itself moved bysomethingelseinmotion.

Aprimemoverthatmoveseverythingthatisinmotionwithoutmovingandwithout being moved must cause motion by being attractive rather thanpropulsive.Thebatthathitstheballandpropelsitistheefficientoractivecauseoftheball’smotion.Thecandyinthewindowthatenticesmeintothestoretobuy and eat it causesmymotion in a differentway.Without itselfmoving, itattractsme.Itisnottheefficientbutthefinalcauseofmyenteringthestore—thereasonwhyImoveinthatdirection.

Tomoveeverythingelsewithoutitselfbeingmovedorinmotion,theprimemover,Aristotleargues,mustfunctionasanattractiveorfinalcause.Inthinkingthis, he did not have inmind the gravitational attraction that the earth exertsupon the bodies that fall to its surface, or the gravitational attraction that themoonexertsuponthetides.

Inhisview,attractiveorfinalcausesoperateonintelligencesthatcanrespondtothemandadoptthemasmotivesforaction.Whenhesaysthataheavybodythatfallstoearthwishestocometorestthere,heisspeakingmetaphorically,notliterally.Thatmotionisonlylikethemotionofthepersonthatisattractedbythecandyinthewindowtoenterthestore.

Thinking in this way, Aristotle found it necessary to endow the heavenlybodies with intelligences that function as their motors. As the engine of an

automobile is its motor, so an intelligence is the motor that keeps a star inmotion.Butunliketheautomobileengine,whichmustitselfbesetinmotion,thecelestial intelligences function asmotors through being attracted by the primemoveroftheuniverse.

Tobeanunmovedandeternalmoverofauniverseeverlastingly inmotion,theprimemovermustbeimmutable.Buttobeimmutable,inAristotle’sview,itmustalsobeimmaterial.Anythingthatismaterialhaspotentialities:itissubjecttochangeormotion.Itisalsoimperfect,foratanytimeitisnotactuallyallthatitcanbe.

We have seen, in earlier chapters, that that which is purely or completelypotentialcannotexist.Nothingexists that isnotactual insomerespects,whilebeingpotentialinotherrespects.Thereverse,however,isnottrue.Pureactuality(formwithoutmatter)canexist, thoughpurepotentiality(matterwithoutform)cannot.

It is by such reasoning thatAristotle came to the conclusion that theprimemover is pure actuality—a being totally devoid of matter or potentiality. Inaddition,thisimmaterialbeingisaperfectbeing,abeinglackingnoperfectionthatremainsforittoattain.Thisperfectbeing,whichistheprimemoveroftheuniverse,AristotlecalledGod.

God, for Aristotle, is not the only immaterial being in the universe. TheintelligencesthatkeepthestarsintheireternalroundsthroughbeingattractedbytheperfectionofGodarealsoimmaterial.Butthoughthey,too,areimmaterialinAristotle’stheory,hedidnotregardthemasperfectorpureactualities.OnlyGodisthat.

It is difficult if not impossible to explain the potentiality that must beattributed to thestellar intelligences if theyarenotpureactualities.Somethingthat is both immaterial and has potentiality does not fit easily intoAristotle’sschemeofthings.

Tomodernears,Aristotle’saccountofwhatkeepstheuniverseeverlastinglyinmotionsoundsmythical.Yetit isinterestingtofollowthereasoningthatledhim to affirm the existence of the immaterial and perfect being that he calledGod.ThatreasoningprovidedamodelforlaterthinkersintheireffortstoprovetheexistenceofGod—notAristotle’sGod,buttheGodofGenesis,theGodwhocreatedtheworldoutofnothing.

TheconceptionofGodasPrimeMoverandtheconceptionofGodasCreatorarealikeinthreerespects:theimmateriality,theimmutability,andtheperfectionoftheDivineBeing.ButAristotle’sPrimeMoveronlyservestoaccountfortheeternityoftheuniverseanditseverlastingmotion.Itwastheneedtoexplainthatwhich ledAristotle todevelophis theoryof themotionof theheavenlybodies

andhisconceptofthePrimeMoverasthefinalcauseoftheirmovements.Aristotledidnot think it necessary to explain the existenceof theuniverse.

Beingeternal,itnevercameintoexistence,andso,inhisview,itdidnotneedanefficient cause that brought it into being—a cause that operated like a humanmakerwhoproducesaworkofart.Weordinarilyspeakofthehumanbeingwhomakes something as creative. However, the human creator always has thematerialsofnaturetoworkon.Hedoesnotmakesomethingoutofnothing.Heis,therefore,notcreativeinthewaythatGodisthoughttobecreative.

The conception of God as Creator arose from the need to explain theexistence of the universe, as the conception of God as PrimeMover arose inAristotle’s mind from the need to explain the eternity of the universe and itseverlastingmotion.ItisdifficulttodeterminewhethertheconceptionofGodasCreatorwouldhavearisen in themindsof later thinkers in theWesthad itnotbeenfor theopeningsentenceofGenesis,which reads,“In thebeginningGodcreatedtheheavensandtheearth.”ThisisregardedasdivinelyrevealedtruthbythethreemajorreligionsoftheWest—Judaism,Christianity,andIslam.

ItwouldbebothnaturalandreasonabletoaskwhetherAristotlewouldhaveaccepted or rejected what is asserted by that sentence. Since he thought theuniverse to be eternal, would he not have denied that the universe had abeginning?And,denying that,wouldhenotalsohave rejected thenotionofaGodwhocreatedit?

If tocreate is tocausesomething thatdoesnotexist tocome intoexistence(comparable towhat thehumanartistdoes inproducingaworkofart), thenaworldthathasnobeginningdoesnotneedacreator.Butevenaworldthathasnobeginningmayneedacauseforitscontinuedexistenceifitsexistenceisnotnecessary. Something that does not necessarily exist, in Aristotle’s view, issomethingthatmayormaynotexist.If theworlddoesnotexistnecessarily, itmay cease to exist. What, then, keeps a world that may cease to existeverlastinglyinexistence?

Aristotledidnothimselfraiseorfacethatquestion.Ifhehad,hemighthavereasonedhiswaytotheconclusionthatacausewasneededtokeeptheuniverseeverlastinglyinexistence,justashedidreasonhiswaytotheconclusionthatacausewasneededtokeeptheuniverseeverlastinglyinmotion.Byaslightshiftinthemeaningoftheword“creator,”theconclusionsoreachedmighthaveledtotheconceptionofGodasCreator,notjustasPrimeMover.

Inonesenseoftheword,tocreateistocausesomethingthatdoesnotexisttocomeintoexistence.Inanothersenseoftheword(amoresubtlesense,perhaps),tocreate is tocause theexistenceof thatwhichmayormaynotexist,withoutregard to its coming intoexistence. It is in the latter,more subtle senseof the

word that Aristotle might have conceived God both as Prime Mover and asCreator.

TheAristoteliantheoriesdescribedinthischapterandthetheorythatIhavesuggestedhemighthavedevelopedwithintheframeworkofhisphilosophyarenot common sense. They are not even refinements of common sense, thoughtheymaybebasedonsuchrefinements.

In this very important respect, the theories dealtwith in this chapter differfromthephilosophicalviewswehaveconsideredinearlierchaptersofthisbook.ThetheoriesdealtwithinthischaptermightberegardedasAristotle’stheology,nothisphilosophyIfhistheologyisnotrelatedtoourcommon-sensethought,ashis philosophy is, it is at least related to common religious beliefs—religiousbeliefs that haveprevailed inWestern civilization formore than two thousandyears.ThisfactismyreasonforthinkingthatAristotle’sconceptionofGod,andthereasoningthatledhimtodevelopit,shouldbeincludedinthisbook.

ForThoseWhoHaveReadorWhoWishtoRead

Aristotle

Inmy Introduction to this book, I recommended to anyonewhowished tolearnhowtothinkphilosophicallythatAristotlewastheteachertobeginwith.IdidnotrecommendthatanyoneshouldstartbyreadingthebooksthatAristotlewrote.ThatistheverylastthingIwouldtellanyonetodo.

Aristotle’s books are much too difficult for beginners. Even in the besttranslations, much of what is said remains obscure. The translators usemanywords that are unfamiliar, words that we do not use in our everyday speech.ThoughsomeoftheGreekwordsthatAristotlehimselfusedwerewordsthathisfellowGreeksused,hegavethemspecialmeanings.

Nevertheless, some readers of this book may wish to read those parts ofAristotle’sworksfromwhichIhavedrawntheinspirationforthisexpositionofhisthoughts.Itisevenpossiblethatamongthereadersofthisbooktherewillbesomewho have read theworks ofAristotle before—if not in their entirety, atleast certain of his major treatises. They may wish to check my expositionagainstthetextsonwhichIhavereliedforthemaintenetsofAristotle’sthought.

To both groups of readers, I must confess that I have simplified whereverpossible.Ihavesubstitutedcommonplacewordsforunusualones.Ihavekepttothemain thrustofAristotle’s thoughtonmajorpointsofhisdoctrineandhavenever allowedmyself to be drawnoff themain path by the qualifications, thecomplications, and the subtleties thatAristotlehimself introduces, often to theperplexityratherthantheenlightenmentofhisreaders.

ToprovidethosewhohavereadorwhowishtoreadAristotlewithaguidetothe texts that have served as my sources, I have drawn up a second table ofcontents for this book,whichparallels the table of contents that appears at itsbeginning. In this second table of contents, I have changed all the titles,substitutingfortheoriginals(whichwereappropriatetothestyleandsubstanceof my rendition of Aristotle’s thought) a set of titles that more preciselydescribes the Aristotelian doctrines being expounded in the five parts of this

bookandeachofitstwenty-threechapters.To make this clear, I have placed in brackets, after the more precisely

descriptivetitles,thetitlesthatappearinthetableofcontentsatthebeginningofthisbook.Underthetitleofeachofthetwenty-threechapters,Iwillsometimesplace brief statements, in Aristotelian language, of the doctrines beingexpounded in that chapter. In every case, Iwill append a list of references toappropriate portions ofAristotle’sworks, in some cases indicating the specialrelevanceofaparticularportionbeingcited.PartI.Aristotle’sUniverseofDiscourse:HisCategoriesandHisTaxonomy

[ManthePhilosophicalAnimal]1. Aristotle’s Fourfold Classification of Sensible, Material Substances:

InorganicBodies,Plants,Animals,Men[PhilosophicalGames]In this chapter we are concerned with the criteria by which Aristotle

distinguishedbetween livingandnonliving things;within thedomainof livingthings, between plants and animals; and within the domain of animal life,betweenbruteanimalsandrationalanimals,i.e.,humanbeings.Metaphysics,Bk.I,Ch.1.OntheSoul,Bk.I,Chs.1,5;Bk.II,Chs.1-3,5,9;Bk.III,Chs.3,12.HistoryofAnimals,Bk.X,Ch.1.GenerationofAnimals,Bk.I,Chs.1-9;BookIV,Chs.4-6.PartsofAnimals,Bk.I,Chs.4-5.ItisalsopointedoutthatAristotlewasawareofdifficultiesinapplyingthis

scheme of classification. The difficulties arise because of the existence ofborderlinecasesthatstraddlethelinesthatdividethelivingfromthenonliving,andplantsfromanimals.HistoryofAnimals,Bk.VIII,Ch.1.Thedistinctionbetweenessentialandaccidentaldifferencesisintroduced.Categories,Ch.5.Metaphysics,Bk.V,Chs.4,11;Bk.IX,Ch.8.2.TheRangeofBeings:TheTenCategories[TheGreatDivide]Inthischapterweareconcernedwiththebeingofobjectsthatdonotexistin

the way that sensible, material substances exist (e.g., mathematical objects,fictions, minds, ideas, immaterial substances, such as the disembodiedintelligencesthatarethecelestialmotors,andGod).Metaphysics,Bk.III,Chs.5-6;Bk.XII,Ch.8;Bk.XIII,Chs.1-5.OntheHeavens,Bk.II,Chs.1,12.OntheSoul,Bk.III,Chs.4-6.Thedistinctionbetweensubstanceandaccident,i.e.,betweenbodiesandtheir

attributes.

Categories,Chs.5-7.Physics,Bk.I,Ch.2.Metaphysics,Bk.VII,Chs.4-6.The foregoingdistinction is related to thepoint thatmaterial substancesare

thesubjectsofchange,andtheiraccidentsaretherespectsinwhichtheychange.Physics,Bk.I,Chs.6-7;Bk.II,Ch.3.Essenceorspecificnatureinrelationtosubstantialform.Metaphysics,Bk.V,Chs.4,11;Bk.VII,Ch.16-VIII,Ch.6;Bk.IX,Ch.8.OntheSoul,Bk.II,Ch.4.Thehierarchyofspecificnaturesoressences.Metaphysics,Bk.VIII,Ch.3.OntheSoul,Bk.II,Ch.3.Aristotle’s inventory of the various categories under which the accidental

attributesofsubstancefall.Categories,Ch.4.Amongtheaccidentsofsubstance,somearepermanentorunchanging;these

arethepropertiesthatareinseparablefromtheessentialnatureofeachkindofmaterialsubstance.Topics,Bk.V,Chs.1-3.Aristotle’spolicywithregardtotheambiguityofwords.OnInterpretation,Ch.1.Topics,Bk.II,Ch.4.3. Productive, Practical, and Theoretic Reason or Mind [Man’s Three

Dimensions]ThischapterbrieflysummarizesAristotle’s threefolddivisionof intellectual

activityor thought into thought for the sakeofmaking things, thought for thesake of moral and political action, and thought for the sake of acquiringknowledgeasanendinitself.Ethics,Bk.VI,Chs.2,4.OntheSoul,Bk.III,Ch.7.PartII.Aristotle’sPhilosophyofNatureandofArt[MantheMaker]4.NatureasanArtistandtheHumanArtistasImitatorofNature[Aristotle’s

Crusoe]Thedifferencebetweenwhathappensbynatureandwhathappensbyart.Physics,Bk.I,Chs.7-8;Bk.II,Chs.1-3,8-9.Poetics,Chs.1-4.Thedifferencebetweenwhathappensbyartandwhathappensbychance.Physics,Bk.II,Chs.4-6.Politics,Bk.I,Ch.11.

Thedifferencebetweenthechangesbroughtaboutbynatureandthechangesbroughtaboutbyart.Metaphysics,Bk.VII,Chs.7-9.The difference between man’s production of corporeal things and the

generationorprocreationoflivingthingsinnature.GenerationofAnimalsMetaphysics,Bk.VII,Ch.7.5.TheThreeMainModesofAccidentalChange:ChangeofPlace,Changeof

Quality,ChangeofQuantity[ChangeandPermanence]The distinction between substantial change and accidental change, and the

differentiationofthreedistinctmodesofaccidentalchange.Categories,Ch.14.Physics,Bk.III,Ch.1;Bk.V,Chs.1-2,5;Bk.VII,Ch.4;Bk.VIII,Ch.7.Corporeal substances as the permanent or enduring subjects that persist

throughoutallaccidentalchanges.Physics,Bk.I,Chs.6-7;Bk.II,Chs.1-3.Metaphysics,Bks.VII-IX;Bk.XII,Chs.1-5.Aristotle’s refutation of the Parmenidean denial of change and of the

Heracliteandenialofpermanence.Physics,Bk.I,Chs.2-4,8-9;Bk.VI,Ch.9.TheAristoteliandistinctionbetweennaturalandviolentmotion.Physics,Bk.IV,Chs.1,8;Bk.V,Ch.6;Bk.VIII,Ch.4.OntheHeavens,Bk.I,Chs.2-3,7-8.Thespecialcharacterof thesubjectofchange ingenerationandcorruption:

primematterasthesubjectofchangeinsubstantialchange.Physics,Bk.I,Ch.7;Bk.II,Chs.1-3.Metaphysics,Bk.VII,Chs.7-9;Bk.XI,Ch.11;Bk.XII,Chs.2-3.6.Aristotle’sDoctrineof theFourCauses:Efficient,Material,Formal,and

Final[TheFourCauses]Thedoctrinestated.Physics,Bk.II,Chs.5-9.Metaphysics,Bk.I,Chs.5-10;Bk.V,Ch.3;Bk.VI,Chs.2-3;Bk.VII,Ch.

17;Bk.VIII,Chs.2-4;Bk.IX,Ch.8;Bk.XII,Chs.4-5.Theconsiderationoffinalcausesinnatureandart.Physics,Bk.II,Chs.8-9.OntheSoul,Bk.II,Chs.12-13.PartsofAnimals,Bks.II-IV.GenerationofAnimals,Bk.I,Chs.4-13.The role of potentiality and actuality in both substantial and accidental

change.Physics,Bk.III,Chs.1-3.Metaphysics,Bk.I,Chs.6-7;Bk.VII,Chs.3,7-17;Bk.VIII,Chs.4-6;Bk.

XII,Chs.2-5.The role of substance as the material cause and of accidental form as the

formalcauseinaccidentalchange;andofprimematterasthematerialcauseandsubstantialformastheformalcauseinsubstantialchange.Physics,Bk.I,Chs.4-9;Bk.II,Ch.7;Bk.II,Ch.3.Metaphysics,Bk.I,Chs.6-7;Bk.V,Ch.8;Bk.VII,Chs.3,7-17;Bk.VIII,

Chs.4-6;Bk.IX,Chs.6-9;Bk.XII,Chs.2-5.7.FurtherDevelopments in theTheoryofPotentialityandActuality,andof

MatterandForm,EspeciallywithRespecttoSubstantialChange,orGenerationandCorruption[ToBeandNottoBe]Physics,Bk.III,Chs.1-3.Metaphysics,Bk.VII,Chs.6-9;Bk.IX,Chs.1,3-9;Bk.XI,Chs.9,11;Bk.

XII,Chs.2-3,5.GenerationandCorruptions,Bk.I.Chs.1,3-5;Bk.II,Chs.1,7,9.8.Aristotle’sAnalysis of the IntellectualFactors inArtisticProductionand

HisClassificationoftheArts[ProductiveIdeasandKnow-How]Theintellectualvirtueofart.Ethics,Bk.VI,Ch.4.Theartistasimitator.Poetics,Chs.1-5.The special character of the three cooperative arts of farming, healing, and

teaching.Physics,Bk.II,Chs.1-2,8.Thebeautyofproductsthatarewellmade.Poetics,Ch.7.PartIIIAristotle’sMoralandPoliticalPhilosophy[MantheDoer]9.TheEndastheFirstPrincipleinPracticalThinkingandtheUseofMeans

astheBeginningofAction:TheEndasFirstintheOrderofIntentionandLastintheOrderofExecution[ThinkingaboutEndsandMeans]

Thegoodasthedesirableandthedesirableasthegood.Ethics,Bk.I,Chs.1-2.Thedistinctionbetweenendsandmeansasgoodsdesirablefortheirownsake

andgoodsdesirableforthesakeofsomethingelse.Ethics,Bk.I,Chs.5,7,9.Theultimateendinpracticalthinkingcomparedwithaxiomsorself-evident

truthsintheoreticalthinking.

PosteriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Ch.2.10.HappinessConceivedasThatWhichLeavesNothingtoBeDesiredand,

as soConceived, the Final orUltimate End to Be Sought [Living and LivingWell]

Thedistinctionbetweenlivingandlivingwell.Politics,Bk.I,Chs.1-2,9.The conception of happiness as a whole good life, together with various

viewsheldbyindividualsconcerningwhatagoodlifeconsistsin.Ethics,Bk.I,Chs.4-5,7-10;Bk.X,Chs.2,6-8.11. Aristotle’s Distinction Between Real and Apparent Goods, or Between

GoodsThatOughttoBeDesiredandGoodsThatAreinFactDesired,TogetherwithHisDistinctionBetweenNaturalandAcquiredDesires[Good,Better,Best]Ethics,Bk.II,Ch.6;Bk.III,Chs.4-5;Bk.X,Ch.5.OntheSoul,Bk.II,Chs.2-3;Bk.III,Chs.3,7.Rhetoric,Bk.I,Chs.6-7.12.TheRealGoodsThatAre theComponents of theWholeofGoodsThat

Constitute Happiness, and Moral Virtue as Indispensable to the Pursuit ofHappiness[HowtoPursueHappiness]Ethics,Bk.I,Chs.4-5,7-10;Bk.VII,Chs.11-14;Bk.IX,Chs.4,8-11;Bk.

X,Chs.1-8.13.Moral Virtue and Good Fortune as the Two Indispensable Operative

FactorsinthePursuitofHappiness[GoodHabitsandGoodLuck]Moral virtue in general and the three main aspects of moral virtue:

temperance,courage,andjustice.Ethics,Bks.II-V.Good fortune as indispensable to happiness: the distinction between the

virtuousandtheblessedman.Ethics,Bk.I,Ch.10;Bk.VII,Ch.13;Bk.X,Ch.8.Politics,Bk.VII,Chs.1,13.The distinction between limited and unlimited goods: moral virtue as

resultinginmoderationwithrespecttolimitedgoods.Ethics,Bk.VII,Ch.14.Politics,Bk.I,Chs.8-10;Bk.VII,Ch.1.14.TheObligationsoftheIndividualWithRegardtotheHappinessofOthers

andWithRegardtotheWelfareoftheOrganizedCommunity[WhatOthersHaveaRighttoExpectfromUs]

Manasasocialandpoliticalanimal.Politics,Bk.I,Chs.1-2.The family, the tribe, and the state, or political society, as organized

communities.Politics,Bk.I,Chs.1-2.Justiceasmoralvirtuedirectedtowardthegoodofothers.Ethics,Bk.V,Chs.1-2.Thedistinctionbetweenjustice,on theonehand,andfriendshipor love,on

theother.Ethics,Bk.VIII,Chs.1,9.Thekindsoffriendship.Ethics,Bk.VIII,Chs.2-6.15.TheRoleoftheStateinAbettingorFacilitatingtheIndividual’sPursuitof

Happiness[WhatWeHaveaRighttoExpectfromOthersandfromtheState]Aristotle’s conceptionof thegood state as one that promotes thepursuit of

happinessbyitscitizens.Politics,Bk.I,Ch.2;Bk.II,Ch.6;Bk.III,Chs.9-10;Bk.VII,Chs.1-3,13-

14.Aristotle’stheoryoftheformsofgovernment,andofthecriteriaforjudging

thegoodnessandbadnessofdiverseformsofgovernment.Politics,Bk.I,Chs.1,5,12-13;Bk.III,Chs.6-7,11,15-16;Bk.V,Chs.2-3,

8,12;Bk.VI,Ch.4;Bk.VII,Chs.2,14.Aristotle’sdistinctionbetweennaturalandlegalorconventionalslavery.Politics,Bk.I,Chs.4-7,13.Aristotle’stheoryofnaturalasdistinctfromlegalorconventionaljustice.Ethics,Bk.V,Ch.7.Aristotle’sviewoftheroleofwomeninthefamilyandthestate.Politics,Bk.I,Ch.13.Part IV. Aristotle’s Psychology, Logic, and Theory of Knowledge [Man the

Knower]16. The Senses and the Intellect: Perception, Memory, Imagination, and

ConceptualThought[WhatGoesintotheMindandWhatComesoutofIt]Languageinrelationtothought.Categories,Ch.1.OnInterpretation,Chs.1-2.Aristotle’s account of the external senses and of their distinction from the

interiorsenses:thecommonsense,memory,andimagination.OntheSoul,Bk.II,Chs.5-12;Bk.III,Chs.1-3.SenseandtheSensibleHistoryofAnimals,Bk.IV,Ch.8.Thedistinctionbetweenmeresensationsandperceptualexperience.Metaphysics,Bk.I,Ch.1.Aristotle’s doctrine that sensations and ideas, taken by themselves or in

isolation,areneithertruenorfalse.Categories,Ch.4.OnInterpretation,Ch.1.OntheSoul,Bk.II,Ch.6;Bk.III,Chs.3,6.Metaphysics,Bk.IV,Ch.5;Bk.V,Ch.29.Aristotle’s theory of ideas as forms that the intellect abstracts from

experience.OntheSoul,Bk.III,Chs.4,7-8.Metaphysics,Bk.XIII,Chs.2-3.17.ImmediateInferenceandSyllogisticReasoning[Logic’sLittleWords]Thelawofcontradictionasanontologicalprincipleandasaruleofthought.OnInterpretation,Ch.6.PriorAnalytics,Bk.II,Ch.17.PosteriorAnalytics,

Bk.I,Ch.11.Metaphysics,Bk.IV,Chs.3-8;Bk.IX,Chs.5-6.Thesquareofopposition:contradictories,contraries,andsubcontrariesOnInterpretation,Chs.6,10.Categories,Ch.10.PriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Ch.2.ImmediateinferencebasedonthesquareofoppositionOnInterpretation,Chs.7-10.PriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Chs.2-3;Bk.II,Chs.8-

10,22.Therulesofthesyllogism.PriorAnalytics,Bk.I.PosteriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Ch.12.Aristotle’sdistinctionbetweenlogicalvalidityandfactualtruth.PriorAnalytics,Bk.II,Chs.2-4.PosteriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Ch.12.Theenthymemeinrhetoricalargument.PriorAnalytics,Bk.II,Ch.27.Rhetoric,Bk.II,Chs.20,22.18.TheoreticalandPracticalTruth [Telling theTruthandThinking It]The

definitionoftruthMetaphysics,Bk.IV,Ch.7.Categories,Ch.5.Thetruthofaxiomsorfirstprinciples:self-evidenttruths.PosteriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Chs.3,5,10,12.Sentencesthatareneithertruenorfalse.OnInterpretation,Ch.2.Aristotle’s theory of the difference between the truth of factual and of

normativestatements:“is-statements”and“ought-statements.”Ethics,Bk.VI,Ch.2.Thecertitudeorprobabilitywithwhichpropositionsareaffirmedordenied.

OnInterpretation,Ch.9.PriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Ch.13;Bk.II,Ch.25.PosteriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Chs.2,6,8,30,33.Metaphysics,Bk.IV,Chs.4-6;Bk.VI,Ch.1;Bk.IX,Chs.6-7.19.Aristotle’sTheoryofKnowledgeandHisDistinctionBetweenKnowledge

andRightOpinion[BeyondaReasonableDoubt]Categories,Ch.5.PriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Ch.13.PosteriorAnalytics,Bk.I,Chs.2,4-8,30,33.Topics,Bk.I,Ch.2.Rhetoric,Bk.II,Ch.25.Metaphysics,Bk.IV,Ch.4;Bk.VI,Ch.2;Bk.VII,Ch.15;Bk.IX,Ch.10;

Bk.XI,Chs.6,8.OntheSoul,Bk.III,Ch.3.Part V. Aristotle’s Cosmology and Theology [Difficult Philosophical

Questions]20.TheActualandthePotentialInfinite[Infinity]Aristotle’scriticismofthetheoryoftheatomists.Physics,Bk.I,Ch.2.OntheHeavens,Bk.III,Ch.4;Bk.IV,Ch.2.Aristotle’s doctrine with regard to the infinite divisibility of continuous

magnitudesandofmatter.Physics,Bk.III,Chs.I,6-7;Bk.V,Ch.3;Bk.VI,Chs.1-2.Metaphysics,Bk.III,Ch.4;Bk.V,Ch.13.Aristotle’sdenialofactuallyinfinitemultitudesormagnitudes,togetherwith

hisaffirmationofthepotentialinfinitesofadditionordivision.Physics,Bk.III,Chs.4-8.Metaphysics,Bk.XI,Ch.10.21.TheEternityoftheWorldandofMotionorChange[Eternity]Aristotle’sconceptionoftimeasthemeasureofmotion.Physics,Bk.IV,Chs.10-14.Aristotle’sargumentsfortheendlessnessoftimeandfortheeverlastingness

ofmotionorchange.Physics,Bk.VII,Chs.1-2;Bk.VIII,Chs.1-6,8.Aristotle’s theory of the influence of the motion of the heavens upon

terrestrialmotionsandchanges.OntheHeavens,Bk.I,Chs.2,9-12;Bk.II,Ch.3.GenerationandCorruption,Bk.II,Chs.10-11.Aristotle’sconceptionoftheimmutabilityoreternityofGod:thetimelessness

oftheeternalorimmutable.Metaphysics,Bk.XII,Chs.6-7,9.22. The Immateriality of the Human Intellect: Conceptual Thought as

InvolvingtheAbstractionofFormsFromMatter[TheImmaterialityofMind]PostenorAnalytics,Bk.I,Ch.3.OntheSoul,Bk.III,Chs.4-5,7-8.Metaphysics,Bk.XIII,Chs.2-3.23.ThePrimeMover:TheDivineBeingasPureActuality[God]Aristotle’stheoryofintelligencesascelestialmotors.OntheHeavens,Bk.II,Chs.1,12.Metaphysics,Bk.XII,Ch.8.Aristotle’s arguments for the existence of a prime mover that causes the

motionoftheheavensinthemannerofafinal,notanefficient,cause.Physics,Bk.VIII,Chs.1-6.Metaphysics,Bk.XII,Chs.6-9.

ALSOBYMORTIMERJ.ADLER

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