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1
In this chapter we will forward a number of theoretical consideration regarding a
growing body of literature closely related to this thesis; Critical Border Theory (CBT).
Despite the positive developments that this research project has achieved, there are
certain key areas that remain underdeveloped or problematic. Thus this chapter looks
to contextualise the new thinking space that this literature has enabled and how this
allows one to go beyond the presence/absence dichotomy discussed in the previous
chapter. Secondly, it draws out some of the contradictory or problematic tendencies in
this literature and discusses why they are flawed. Finally, in conclusion, it offers a
synthesis of some of the elements of CBT of particular use in honing the objectives of
this thesis.
This thesis bases itself on the proposition that globalisation, understood not as the
reality but a problematique, has led not to the disappearance of borders but to their
multiplication. In itself this proposition is far from new. Critical thinkers, in the post-
Cold War era, have long pointed, not to the presence/absence of borders, but to their
changing configurations. Etienne Balibar, for example, has affirmed that borders are no
longer at territorial boundaries and that they are to be found at the centre of politics1.
The importance of borders in political interactions and their reconfiguration in the
post-Cold War era is the central focus of CBT. In a recently published text establishing
the objectives for CBT, “Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical Border
Studies”, Noel Parker, Nick Vaughan-Williams et Al. maintain that borders are
“increasingly ephemeral and/or impalpable: electronic, non-visible, and located in
zones that defy straightforwardly territorial logic”2. Therefore, what we seek to add to
this literature is not a new declaration about how many borders there are, but rather
give a more complete contextualization of the process of multiplication of borders
within the globalisation problematique.
Critical border literature creates a precarious research space, mapping at times a
historically/spatially contingent understanding of borders, whilst at others falling back
1 BALIBAR, Etienne, “The Borders of Europe”, in CHEAH, P and ROBBINS, B (eds), Cosmopolitics: Thinking
and feeling beyond the nation, University of Minnesota Press, 1998, pp. 216-233. 2 PARKER, Noel, VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, Nick et Al., “Lines in the Sand? Towards and Agenda for Critical
Border Studies”, Geopolitics, Vol 14, 2009, pp. 582-587, p. 583.
2
on easy explanations grounded in eternal truths, structures and inevitability. In the
Post-Cold War context theorists find it difficult to resist establishing new unchanging
and readily applicable categories to facilitate explanation. As we have argued in the
previous chapter, and as Didier Bigo and R.B. J Walker have also argued the general
move is familiar enough. “Boundaries are either here or they are not. State sovereignty
is either here or it is being replaced by something vaguely cosmopolitan”3. If a case is
made for diminishing state boundaries scholars often seek to identify new key actors
that define a new global reality.
Here the objective is not to create a new paradigm that correctly identifies the new
actors that have come on the scene since the mythological outdating of the State after
following the Cold War. If this were the case it would be possible to identify
readymade paradigms capable of establishing the new actors and their limits. In order
to define stable actors and explain the multiplication of borders one could adopt John
Lewis Gaddis’ integration vs. fragmentation paradigm4 or use the key actors described
by Francisco Javier Peñas. Peñas’ divides the world between a unified West emerging
from the Cold War, sharing a concept of civilization and capitalist economy and a
disperse and territorially imprecise Other consisting of those ideas and movements
differing from the objectives of the West.5
Despite sympathy with Peñas’ definition there is a need to move beyond structurally
rigid actors. It is inaccurate to identify a homogenous western block in a world of
emerging contested geographies where the “first world” and “third world” are not
territorially locked. In current global politics it is possible to identify homogenizing
(never homogenized) transversal fields of meaning grouped around accepted
problems, the globalization problematique being one of these, and the material
landscapes of power that these carve out. Identifying these theoretical/practical
assemblages allows a more complete interpretation of how and why bordering takes
3 BIGO, Didier and WALKER, R.B.J, “Political Sociology and the Problem of the International”, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, 2007, Vol. 35, nº3, pp. 725-739, p 730. 4 GADDIS, John, “Towards the post-Cold War World”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, nº2, 1991, pp. 102-122.
5 PEÑAS, Francisco Javier, Occidentalización, fin de la Guerra fría y Relaciones Internacionales, tesis
doctoral, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, 1993, pp. 289-290. [Later published by Alianza editorial, 1997]
3
place. It is essential to move beyond actors and structures towards complex systems
(that are both theoretical and practical) of diverse elements that one may denominate
as “fields”, “dispositifs” or geographies. Defining new key actors or new key
structures, or for that matter claiming the continued validity of the Nation-State, only
reproduces that which is flawed in the discipline. As Yosef Lapid rightly argues it is just
as easy to argue in favour of the demise of the Nation-State, overtaken by new actors,
as it is to argue that it continues to be the cornerstone of political interactions. The
future of the State is not of upmost importance in this regard. On the other hand it is
important to analyse the complex global geography crisscrossed by the “sub”, the
“trans”, the “intra” and the “supra”6.
CBT has made important inroads in this regard. It has begun to shed light on the new
and unexpected variations in border practice and in doing so unravel some of the
complexity of the global geography of power. However, whilst it has becomes overly
technical focusing on complex and abstract ideas regarding biopolitics, biometrics and
sovereign power, it has not been able to situate this process within a contingent
moment or problematique that would allow it to resist falling back on stable truths and
structures. Following on from the ontology established in the first chapter it is evident
that there is never necessity or inevitability in power relations, including bordering and
sovereignty. Beyond contingency there is nothing. In the following section this idea will
be flesh out drawing on CBT before going into more in-depth criticism in the following
section.
In agreement with Parker and Vaughan-Williams et Al., it is time that the discipline
revisited the “idea of border in a very general sense, together with a host of cognates:
territory, space, inside/outside, network, region, periphery, margins, limes, threshold
and so on”7. This thesis relates closely to this project and thus is able to situate itself
within CBT literature. Parker and Vaughan-Williams et Al. identify three axes of
enquiry; epistemology, ontology and spatiality, as well as identifying a number of
6 LAPID, Yosef, “Rethinking the “International”: IBO Clues for Post-Westphalian Mazes”, in ALBERT,
Mathias, JACOBSON, David and LAPID, Yosef (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2001, p 23. 7 PARKER and VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, “Lines in the Sand?”, Op. cit., p 583.
4
research questions8. This thesis contributes to the aim of establishing new border
ontologies. This axis of investigation is the most underdeveloped. Parker and Vaughan-
Williams et Al. propose only two vague suggestions. Firstly that borders may be
foundational acts and secondly that one may investigate new ontological registers to
describe their changing and indeterminate relations9. This chapter forwards the idea
that border ontology is only possible in the context of a (global) landscape of meaning
and relationships; beyond this borders have no meaning.
10
11
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- 12
8 Ibid, p 583.
9 Ibid, p 585.
10 Ibid, p 586.
11 LAPID, Identities, Borders, Orders, Op. cit., p 2.
12- -
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5
13
14
15
16
13
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- 15
VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, Nick, Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2009, p 115. 16
VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, Nick, “The UK Border Security Continuum: virtual biopolitics and the simulation of the sovereign ban”, Environment and Planning D, Volume 28, 2010, pp. 1071-1083, p 1072.
6
17
- 18 -
Parker rightly argues that there is a need for ontology of the global that shows how an
unstable variety of players can coexist and interact in a common field19. Whilst Parker’s
analysis appears confusing at times it does allow one to draw conclusions about how
this ontology may work. Deleuze argues that groups, sets and series exist but these are
completely constituted by difference20. Deleuze states “we wish… to think difference
in itself, and the relation of the different to the different independent of the forms of
representation which lead back to the same”21. He means to think entities as
compositions of multiplicities that can only be understand in movement. He inverts the
synthesis of objects as stable groupings in order to observe them as pure multiplicity.
We do not start with the synthesised object but rather track the process of synthesis
and describe how assemblages are formed. Objects have no stable meaning rather
they are in a constant process of acquiring and redefining meaning. Parker states that
an important part of this is to identify how representations of difference have been
17
RAJARAM, Prem Kumar, “Dystopic geographies of empire” in (eds) BISWAS, S. and NAIR, S., International Relations and States of Exception: Margins, Peripheries, and Excluded Bodies, Routledge, Oxon, 2010, pp. 71-94, p 88. 18
PARKER, Noel, “From Borders to Margins: A Deleuzian ontology for identities in the Post-International Environment”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 2009, p. 17-39. 19
Ibid, p 17. 20
Ibid, p.20. 21
Ibid, p 21.
7
implanted and block the way to an unbridled devenir of identities22. The identity of
such entities can only be realised in terms of their matching or not matching some
principle for the set (enunciation)23. These lines of enunciation create lines of
resonance around which material realities form and in turn alter the lines of
enunciation.
Parker demonstrates the link between this thought and the dynamic proposition of
Spinoza. For Spinoza each entity is the outcome of the movement of parts within it and
of its movement in respect to other bodies. That is to so that bodies and souls are
determined not by fixed organs or form; but by effects of internal or external
movement24. This leads back to the processual relationships that were discussed
earlier. Identities do not constitute themselves through the rejection of an external
other rather by how they internalize exteriority, how they conjugate a multiplicity.
Parker argues that entities become autonomous, and become part of a set solely in
alignment with each other25. Entities acquire meaning in this process of alignment.
Parker concludes that this makes identities conceivable on the basis of the particular
entities themselves26. There is a slight problem with the last two references to Parker.
Entities should never be treated as autonomous and are not conceivable by
themselves. Entities are conceivable by the processes of interiorization and as part of a
greater landscape that they form a part of. Parker returns to this when he states that
in this ontology identities are determined in a world populated by undifferentiated and
yet distinct, entities that differentiate themselves alongside others27. The boundaries,
or what Parker denominates as margins, are indeterminate and are determined by the
interactions of the entities28. In conclusion, the identity of each entity may be
determined just as fully from its relations with others as by that which goes on “inside”
it29.
22
Ibid, 21. 23
Ibid, p 22. 24
Ibid, p 27. 25
Ibid, p 22. 26
Ibid, p 23. 27
Ibid, 25-26. 28
Ibid, p 26. 29
Ibid, p 30.
8
Finally, Parker proposes how this ontology may be used in a way that is similar to
geophilosophy. He suggests that it may lead to a “plan de composition” in which
theorists are able to map the assemblage of entities associating with each other. This
plots the interactions that are “within” entities and become sufficiently stable to
constitute entities, and interactions that are “between” entities that are supported by
stable patterns (albeit temporarily) underpinning their separate but interrelated
identities30. In the context of this thesis what is necessary is an analysis of the
processes “between” entities that have allowed for the establishment of relatively
predictable relationships in the post-Cold War era.
-
31
32
33
Thus, whilst this thesis argues that after the end of the Cold-War relations of powers
stabilised around the globalisation paradigm, Bigo similarly argues that there is a
process of indifferentialisation between security problems inside and outside the state.
30
Ibid, p 27. 31
BIGO, Didier, “Globalized (in)security: the field and the Ban-opticon”, Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes, The (in)security games, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2006. 32
BIGO and WALKER, “Political Sociology”, Op. cit., p 732. 33
Ibid, p 733.
9
Drawing on the argument of this thesis it is possible to link this occurrence to the
globalisation problematique. The network of (in)security that Bigo draws attention to is
largely composed of what has been defined here as the theoretical problems posed by
globalisation. Bigo demonstrates how a link has been established between diverse and
seemingly extremely different security threats such as terrorism, transnational
organized crime, drugs and immigration. Especially since 9/11 global radical Islam has
also become associated with these same threats34. These threats are not to be
considered as the objective reality rather as the focusing of the stakes of security
around certain problems associated with globalisation. As Bigo affirms “The
interpenetration of internal and external security is in no sense a reflection of an
increase of threats in the contemporary epoch”35.
The globalisation problematique begins to appear in the search for a new paradigm at
the end of the Cold War. Lacking the stable elements of the Cold War a panic sets in
and academics rush to establish where the threats will be coming from. Whilst not fully
exploring the importance of this in bordering, a number of authors, in addition to Bigo,
touch upon this. Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock state that the idea of fragmentation
is central in the definition of globalisation as a security qua survival problem36. This
new paradigm reads the new situation within the old framework of International
Relations. A new binary split between contrasting systems emerge, as Ronnie Lipshutz
suggests, the split between democracy and totalitarianism is replaced by authorized
and forbidden identities, permitted order and feared disorder37. In this new context of
enmity the supposedly inevitable process of globalisation opens the ordered world to
“all sorts of pernicious, malevolent and immoral forces, beliefs, and disorderly
34
BIGO, Didier, “The Mobius Ribbon of External Security(ies)” in ALBERT, Mathias, JACOBSON, David and LAPID, Yosef (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2001, pp. 91-116, p 108-109. 35
Ibid, p 111. 36
ALBERT, Mathias and BROCK, Lothar, “What keeps Westphalia together? Normative Differentiation in the Modern System of States?”, in ALBERT, Mathias, JACOBSON, David and LAPID, Yosef (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2001, pp. 29-50, p 32. 37
LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie “(B)orders and (Dis)orders: The Role of Moral Authority in Global Politics”, in ALBERT, Mathias, JACOBSON, David and LAPID, Yosef (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2001, pp. 73-90, p 75.
10
tendencies”38. Globalisation becomes the buzz word grouping together everything and
anything from social and economic crises to challenges to sovereignty, identity and
borders. It is necessary to reemphasise that “the facts are constructed (or not) as
problems by these specific actors39 and do not reflect the needs of the State in this
new context. According to Bigo the globalisation problematique means that police
officers, customs officers, gendarmes, intelligence agencies and the army all consider
themselves to share the same enemies. These common enemies are seen to spread
insecurity so much that security necessarily must expand beyond traditional limits.40.
This begins to explain the changing border practices detailed by CBT theorists. Lipshutz
underlines two key tactics that are used to counter the globalisation problematique.
The first tactic he denominates as “democratization and enlargement”, a strategy that
consists of a mission to expand the boundaries of the “good world” through the
exportation of Western liberal democracy. It is commonly assumed that the
prevalence of this system makes the world a safer place. The second contradictory
tactic is that of disciplinary deterrence, or the way to deal with those rebel elements
that cannot be converted41. Through this second strategy it is possible to explain the
pre-emptive action taken against rebellious states, organised crime, terrorists, human
traffickers, border smuggles or other individuals such as immigrants that do not
respect the sanctity of State boundaries42.
Whilst CBT offer a great number of theoretical innovations that are extremely useful,
as we have begun to discuss above, it is important to highlight some of its key
deficiencies. The main line of criticism developed here is that it often does not take the
contingency and the temporality of its propositions sufficiently into account. It is
possible to follow at least four main lines of criticisms. Firstly, it sometimes
unknowingly accepts a linear process towards globalisation. This contrasts with our
proposal that globalisation should never be understood as a process but rather as a
configuration or understanding that orders practice. Secondly, it often assumes that
38
Ibid, p 75. 39
BIGO, “Mobius Ribbon”, Op. cit., p 93. 40
Ibid, p 94. 41
LIPSCHUTZ, “(B)orders and (Dis)orders”, Op. cit., p 84. 42
BIGO, “Mobius Ribbon”, Op. cit., p 92-93.
11
the multiplication of borders is the effect of a stable cause, in particular the need to
stabilise identity against an Other. Thirdly, it situates these new practices as a
reconfiguration of what Campbell and Shapiro have called “transcendence without
presence”, that is to say that border practice represents “the way that it is” in another
form. Finally, there is a tendency to apply or rely solely on a particular author from
other disciplines. Such a practice should be approached with extreme caution. Against
these insufficiencies this chapter promotes a stress on contingency; this is to say the
irreducibility of the multiplication of borders to a cause or causes. It is rather the
product of a complex geography composed of heterogeneous and conflicting spaces.
This proposal will be briefly introduced to conclude this chapter.
I
The first critique deals with a line of explanation that was also present in the second
chapter. This is the use of the word globalisation to explain all that is difficult to
comprehend in global politics. Globalisation should not be reduced to a definable
process that can be located in time and space. This of course is not to say that there
are not processes and transversal effects that constantly cross state boundaries rather
that these, firstly, are not entirely new and, secondly, that they do not form the part of
a singular process. Globalisation cannot be considered as a necessary direction that
the world is taking. It is important to address the heterogeneity of processes rather
than a singular process of globalisation. Related to the last point, it is inadequate to
talk about how globalisation effects the state and causes novel border practices.
Globalisation cannot be used to refer to everything and anything that effects the State
in the post-Cold War era.
There is a fine line between analysing changing practices and becoming caught up in a
sensationalistic discourse about globalisation. Albert and Brock for example walk this
tightrope and on occasions are overcome by an overemphasis of an overwhelming
process. As they state, “The world seems to be moving from complex interdependence
to cyberspace, from old-fashioned multinationals producing material goods that can be
controlled on borders to new strategic alliance that trade not goods but expectations
12
and information” 43. One must question how accurate a description this is of the global
reality or whether this captures only a minute part of how human beings interact
globally. Later in the text they again make the brash statement that “the social
construct of territorial congruency between nation, state, society and economy
crumbles. As this construct formed the very core of the modern territorial system, this
system itself is being transformed”44. This sensationalistic discourse of change is
always in danger of being blind to the underlying continuities and changes moving in
adverse directions.
This becomes evident in their interpretation of new forms of bordering as they are
explained to be simple movements to gain lost ground or to recreate actors mirroring
the State. For example they claim that “the heterogeneous nation-state meets a
militant and at times brutal tribalism”45 or that the trend towards the debordering of
societies and economies leads to counter moves directed at regaining lost territorial
congruency46. It is necessary to resituate this desperation back within the contingent
construction of threats and of solutions.
Mansbach and Wilmer on the other hand seek to offer political solutions in a new
globalised context and in doing so they accept the globalisation problematique as the
reality of global politics. They take for granted that state authority has been eroded
and that new authority structures are equally as important. They then predict what
political action and security will be like in this new context stating that there could be a
restructuring of the state, a restructuring of the global system and interstate
institutions or a drop into chaos47. The problem with this text as is the case with many
other texts in the “Identity, Order, Borders” compilation is that it takes for granted
that there was once upon a time a Westphalian system that is now in crisis. They
depict an all too easy shift from a Westphalian problematique to a globalisation
43
ALBERT and BROCK, “What keeps Westphalia”, Op. cit., p 30. 44
Ibid, p 37. 45
Ibid, p 30. 46
Ibid, p 38. 47
MANSBACH, Richard and WILMIR, Franke, “War, violence and the Westphalian State System as a Moral Community” in ALBERT, Mathias, JACOBSON, David and LAPID, Yosef (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2001, pp. 51-72, p 65.
13
problematique. Mansbach and Wilmar argue that “the Westphalian order was both
structure and agent through which norms delimiting legitimate and illegitimate
violence internally and were constructed and acted on for several hundred years”48.
This in itself is a gross generalisation as it is quite easy to argue that the Westphalian
system has never been homogenously put in place and has coexisted with imperialism
and colonialism. It is impossible to consistently argue, as Mansbach and Wilmer
attempt to do, that Westphalian states are only now being undermined by new or
reformulated identities49 rather that processes of homogenisation have always been
undermined by processes of differentiation.
Furthermore globalisation should never be reduced to being the cause and motor of
current phenomenon. Wendy Brown often falls into this caricature of globalisation.
For example she states that:
“Globalization features a host of related tensions between global networks and
local nationalism, virtual power and physical power, private appropriation and
open sourcing, secrecy and transparency, territorialisation and
deterritorialization. It also features tensions between national interests and the
global market, hence between the nation and the state and between the security
of the subject and the movements of capital”50.
In this statement globalisation represents an ominous anything and everything that is
occurring at this moment. Brown’s analysis is compatible with the argumentation
forwarded in this chapter if globalisation is not reduced to a process that is occurring.
For example, when she argues that the danger posed by immigration is
overdetermined by the economic, political, security and cultural effects of
globalisation51. If this sentence is reformulated to apply that a connection is
established between the illegal immigrant and a series of problems that have been
established at the centre of the IR debate in the post-Cold War it becomes coherent.
48
Ibid, p 52. 49
Ibid, p 53. 50
BROWN, Wendy, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, Zone Books, New York, 2010, p 8. 51
Ibid, p 117.
14
Globalisation, as is done by Brown, is often explained as a force influencing actors.
Albert and Brock for example state that “under the pressure of globalization, state and
nation seem to be moving together rather than apart”52. Similarly, Chris Brown
predicts future configurations of world politics basing them on the supposed changes
provoked by the forces of globalisation. He adopts Benjamin Barber’s paradigm of
“Jihad vs. McWorld” in which uniformisation caused by globalisation is sporadically
resisted by irrational outbursts53. It seems that many authors assume that
“globalization can be looked at as a new condition under which the old stories about
the meaning of belonging to a nation have to be retold differently”54 or that
globalisation challenges the assumptions we had about the discipline55. Here however
we do not believe that globalisation is what has provoked us to rethink bordering. The
philosophical arguments underlying this rethinking were already well established
before the end of the Cold-War.
II
Closely related to this first point is the second critique, the refutation that current
bordering processes are the fruit of some kind of need. This need is generally
explained in two ways. On one hand as the need of the sovereign state to protect itself
against penetration caused by globalisation or on the other hand as the need to
exclude some in order to create a sense of community. Again, we reiterate the
requirement of seeing current practice not as necessary but rather grounded in a
contingent context of socially constructed answers to imaginary questions.
-
52
ALBERT and BROCK, “What keeps Westphalia”, Op. cit., p 31. 53
BROWN, Chris, “Borders and Identity in International Political Theory” in ALBERT, Mathias, JACOBSON, David and LAPID, Yosef (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2001, pp. 117-136, p 132. 54
ALBERT and BROCK, “What keeps Westphalia”, Op. cit., p 46. 55
BROWN, “Borders and Identity”, Op. cit., p 119.
15
56 -
57
58
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59
56
BROWN, Walled States, Op. cit., p 107. 57
Ibid, p 109. 58
DELEUZE, Gilles and GUATTARI, Félix, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Continuum, London, 2004. 59
BIGO and WALKER, “Political Sociology”, Op. cit., p 734.
16
60
61 -
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62 -
63
64
65
66
60
RAJARAM, “Locating Political Space”, Op. cit., p 266. 61
SALTER, “At the threshold”, Op. cit., p 42. 62
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SALTER, Mark, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Volume 31, 2006, pp 167-189. 64
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68
69
70
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71
67
68
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69
70
71
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72
73
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74
75
We have already alluded to the third point in the last section. As there is no necessity
of bordering it may be argued that there is no transcendental truth about sovereignty
which current bordering is the reflection of. Much CBT theory bases its judgment on
“transcendence without presence” whilst here there is a tendency towards a theory of
presence without transcendence. The statements of some authors are often grounded
in assumptions about a transcendental human nature and sovereign logic based on
exclusion. This allows them to argue that current bordering is the reconfiguration of
this eternal process in another context. Again it is essential to reject these
presumptions and ground our understandings in processual ontologies and
contingency.
72
73
74
75
19
76
77
76
77
BROWN, Wendy, Walled states, Op. cit., p 123.
20
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78
We believe that it is not possible to simply reapply this logic to new border practices.
Vaughan-Williams relies heavily on Giorgio Agamben’s philosophy in order to provide
theoretical innovation in his book “Border Politics”. Agamben argues that the originary
separation in Ancient Greek thought between zoé (the biological fact of living) and bios
(politically qualified life) has become increasingly indistinguishable in modern society79.
Sovereign power generates a confused state where zoé can be taken as bios and vice
versa. The individual in this confused state is exposed as ‘bare life’ to be categorized by
the whim of sovereign decision, that is to say that the inclusion/exclusion is no longer
so clear cut and has become increasingly arbirtary80. In this blurred state or ‘state of
exception’, the sovereign power is necessary as a law founding decision of inclusion
and exclusion to fill the legal vacuum. Agamben, as has already stated, implies that the
78
79
VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, Border politics, op. cit., p 97. 80
Ibid, p 103.
21
existence of citizenship and political institutions depends on a discriminatory law
founding violence81. ‘Bare life’ is the founding element which is simultaneously
included and excluded in the system, creating the appearance of unity, yet relying on
the excluded other to give it meaning. The idea that the implementation of law is a
constant bordering decision is the key element which Vaughan-Williams discusses.
Vaughan-Williams follows Agamben’s thought to create a new concept regarding the
bordering process: the ‘generalised biopolitical border’. This term implies that
bordering is a process of inclusion and exclusion of ‘bare life’ in the political order. The
sovereign decision is constantly at work to create reason, in a zone of indistinction or
‘camp’ that is not necessarily restricted to any particular territory82. As the sovereign
decision is not restricted territorially, Vaughan-Williams argues that camps of
exception exist both inside and outside the traditional state83. Therefore, the
‘generalised biopolitical border’ refers to a sort of global archipelago, where sovereign
power produces ‘bare life’ through decisions of inclusion and exclusion on a global
scale84. These bordering practices occur at different sites that may come in the form of
offshore borders that stop unwanted individuals, e-bordering or practices that exclude
individuals inside particular Nation-States. To demonstrate his thesis Vaughan-Williams
uses an example that demonstrates how sovereign power secures the political
community by raising interior biopolitical borders against perceived dangers. The
production of Jean Charles De Menezes as ‘bare life’ through his profiling and shooting
in London’s tube as a perceived terrorist threat serves as a clear illustration85.
Vaughan-Williams argues that the strength of understanding bordering as a
‘generalized biopolitical border’ is that it undoes the clear distinction between
domestic and international political ordering. The political order is not a stable reality
and is in constant reproduction through the suspension of law in the state of
81
Ibid, p 99. 82
Ibid, p 112. 83
Ibid, p. 116. 84
Ibid, p. 116. 85
Ibid, p. 130.
22
exception86. The relationship between border and subject is blurred as borders and
citizens are continually being defined through the categorization of ‘bare life’87. As a
result the logic of a territorial separation between friend and enemy is thrown into
disarray88. Depending on sovereign decision, friend can be turned instantly into enemy
or vice versa. The argumentation followed by Vaughan-Williams is interesting in the
sense that it brings our attention to certain new phenomenon. However, it would be
more useful to contextualize this beyond a logic of sovereignty, even if this is a logic of
sovereignty updated to modern circumstances.
IV
Leading from the critique of Vaughan-Williams’ use of transcendence without
presence borrowed form Agamben it is necessary to question the usefulness of
application as has already been done in earlier chapters. By no means is Vaughan-
Williams the only culprit in this regard. Parker is also guilty of stating “Deleuze teaches
us”89 which, had he heard it, would probably have given Deleuze a heart attack after
his lifelong crusade against the figures of the Priest and the Psychoanalyst. In the case
of Vaughan-Williams, he readily accepts Agamben’s analysis and simply applies it to
the bordering process. In this regard one should always be skeptical of the worth of
following or applying an idea to our subject matter, the use of thinkers as a toolbox or
‘IKEA of ideas’ to combine and mix in different combinations hampers critical analysis
as it restricts our thinking90. There is no specific combination of ideas which will lead to
a revelation of solutions for the analytical problems faced. Ideas emerge in a certain
context which their expropriation and reapplication distorts. Application in a restrictive
area such as International Relations distorts and restricts the ability for critical thought.
For example, in the case of Agamben effective solutions can be found to problems
which he has developed in his own work. However, in adopting these solutions
thought is restricted to believing that his interpretation of “bare life” is correct.
86
Ibid, p. 132. 87
Ibid, p. 134. 88
Ibid, p. 135. 89
PARKER, “From Borders to Margins”, Op. cit., p. 23. 90
PARDO, José Luis, “Introducción”, in Gilles Deleuze, Dos regímenes de locos: textos y entrevistas (1975-1995), Pre-textos, Valencia, 2007, p 15.
23
Vaughan-Williams, in following Agamben, limits his analysis by avoiding cultural,
economic and linguistic bordering. He explicitly states that the main aim of his work is
to shift analysis of borders from geopolitics to biopolitics91. Yet, we may interpret this
as the promotion of an Agambenean methodology rather than biopolitics per se. This
becomes evident in the third chapter which seemingly traces the evolution of
biopolitical thought in order to concluding that Agamben offers the most suited
perspective to explain bordering process.
Towards a new geography of the International: Building on CBT
After our analysis of the shortcomings of CBT it is useful to try to draw out in more
detail the lines of encounter that are useful in conjunction with our earlier proposals.
This will help to fine tune analysis during the rest of the thesis. There is a need to
emphasize a heterogeneous mapping of border practices. In order to do so one must
briefly discuss how borders should be defined seeking to build on how they are
explained in CBT. In relation to this widened scope of borders we will underline the
need to be particularly aware of the heterogeneous and complex societal relationships
at stake. A number of problematic assumptions have impeded a social sensitive,
approach of CBT and to combat this we return to a quote cited in the first chapter:
“The ideal book should exhibit everything on a plane of exteriority, on a single page, a
flat surface: events lived, historic determinations, concepts thought, individuals,
groups and social formations”92. To adequately understand bordering in the post-Cold
War era we firstly need to put forward a new geography of the international. We need
to map a vast array of factors that create a common ground in this period. These
factors are often grounded in the reconfiguration of old concepts that are used to
resolve new circumstances.
It is necessary in the context of this new geography to develop a complex
understanding of borders. There is no nature of borders or sovereignty as these are
multifaceted terms that may be applied to differing phenomena. As a result
pinpointing what a border is, and how it is, may include contradictory configurations.
91
VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, Border Politics, Op. cit., p.65. 92
DELEUZE, Gilles and GUATTARI, Félix, Rizoma: Introducción, Pre-textos, Valencia, 1977, p 21.
24
We make the open proposal that borders are entities that are constituted by
micropolitical phenomena to try and accommodate this problem. Border meaning is
contingent and generated by a plurality of factors. Wendy Brown in relating to walls
similarly argues that they may be infused by extremely different meanings, yet
independently they mean nothing at all93.
Borders are never the execution of a stable logic. Their meaning is continually
interrupted and reconfigured. There is no single logic of sovereignty or borders.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that trying to map border practices is irrelevant. One
may still find much use in the conceptualisation of individual understandings and how
they punctually influence human relations. Borders are multifaceted conceptual
imaginaries. This suggests that they may be understood in contradictory ways and not
simply be reduced to a point of exclusion. This contradicts many CBT works we have
analyzed which imply that the border marks the defining limit of sovereign power or
the place of the inclusion/exclusion of “bare life” in the political system94. We argue
that this formulation provides a limited understanding of one possible interpretation
of borders. It does not sufficiently exhaust the totality of a greater appreciation. In
contrast here we will emphasise the border's heterogeneity. They may represent a
point of exclusion but also one of encounter and hybridisation.
The usage of the term is infused with a variety of different meanings particularly in
relation to Global Politics. Michele Acuto proposes that borders may exist as walls, as
permeable ideal lines and as borderlands95. These definitions are of great use here.
Here we will adopt these terms and slightly modify them to suggest that borders may
be considered in at least three configurations; boundaries, imaginary borderlines and
borderlands. Boundaries refer to solid events and physical infrastructure that impede
93
BROWN, Wendy, Walled States, Op.cit., p 74. 94
Such a conception is forwarded by many of the contributors in EDKINS, Jenny, PIN-FAT, Véronique and SHAPIRO, Michael, Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics, Routledge, New York, 2004 and in RAJARAM, Prem Kumar and GRUNDY-WARR, Carl, “The irregular migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia and Thailand”, International Migration, Volume 42, nº1, 2004, pp. 33-64 and SALTER, Michael, “When the exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty and citizenship”, Citizenship Studies, Volume 12, nº4, 2008, pp. 365-380. 95
ACUTO, Michele, “Edges of Conflict: A Three-Fold Conceptualization of National Borders”, Borderlands, Volume 7, nº 1, 2008, http://www.borderlands.net.au/issues/vol7no1.html (Accessed 30/04/2011).
25
the free movement, association and socialisation of individuals. Imaginary borderlines
reflect historical representation and references. They are based on dominant
ideologies and influence the way in which individuals perform border experiences.
Borderlands are zones of indistinction where constant interaction and confusion
between dominant ideologies takes place. These three categorizations are imperfect
and in turn extremely broad. It is possible to distil them even further and in multiple
different ways96.
The way in which these borders are generated and enacted are complex and
dependent on societal, economic or political forces and processes of identification
rather than a simple logic of sovereignty. We agree with Hannah Arendt when she
states “The world in which we are born, would not exist without the human activity
that produced it”97 and Halit Mustafa Tagma when he affirms that “historically and
theoretically, the articulation of the “we” is at the core of the problem... a subject's
body (race, religion, national background, and ideology, etc.) that all come in to play at
ground level”98. These elements have not been entirely forgotten by CBT authors yet
they do not have the central role we believe they deserve. We agree with Salter99 and
Vaughan-Williams100 when they suggest that border experiences are heterogeneous
and may be simultaneously reflect absent and present, strong and weak borders.
There have been a number of socially sensitive works but without full
contextualization101.
96
For example, one may adopt Henri Gobard's terminology in L'aliénation linguistique. According to Gobard alienation may occur at a vernacular, vehicular, referential and mythical level. DELEUZE, Gilles, Dos regímenes de locos: textos y entrevistas (1975-1995), Pre-textos, Valencia, 2007, p 77. 97
98
- 99
SALTER, “At the threshold of security”, Op. cit. 100
VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, “The UK Border Security Continuum”, Op. cit. 101
--
26
102
103
104
Bigo manages to create a similar map by encapsulating the security debate in the post-
Cold War era as focusing on certain attractors that have defined the debate and thus
dictated that which is considered important in theory and in practice. There are
heterogeneous molecular forms of interpretation whilst these heterogeneous
molecular speculations group around homogenising molecular attractor’s based on
102
LAPID, “Introduction: Identities, Borders” Op. cit., p 17-18. 103
WALKER, R.B.J., “Lines of Insecurity: International, Imperial, Exceptional”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, nº1, 2006,pp. 65-82, p 75. 104
ALBERT, Mathias and KRATCHOVIL, Friedrich, “Conclusion”, in ALBERT, Mathias, JACOBSON, David and LAPID, Yosef (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2001, pp. 275-292, p 289
27
accepted security problems. Bigo uses the term “Field Studies”, inspired by Pierre
Bourdieu, to describe this mapping. He argues that this approach allows us to plot a
“variety of practices and emerging configurations of the agents systems of disposition
in relation to their trajectories and positions”105.
This allows Bigo to, as discussed earlier, trace “a new topology of security, new graphs
and charts of the relationship between the different forms of security and insecurity”
in which he concludes that in practice it is now impossible to oppose national and state
security106. He plots how there is a merging rationality, based on a series of common
threat attractors joining the two security fields based around the “problems” of
terrorism, drugs, crime and immigration107. In order to demonstrate this he maps a
process of change over the last 20 years amongst the comprehension of the police
force that has moved from internal security to police beyond borders108.
Bigo strongly grounds this explanation in contingency stating that these problems are
constructed and do not necessarily reflect the security “needs”. He rather links it to a
moment in which “apocalyptic discourses on the end of bipolarity reactivate these
fearful diagrams of thought, which arise from the anguish about generalized
destruction (annihilation of populations by wars of religion or fears of atomic threats
or destruction by internal subversion)”109. Here Bigo approaches our argument that
the theory/practice of globalisation has created a landscape in which contemporary
border practice makes sense.
This chapter has served a number of purposes. It has introduced a new literature to
which this thesis hopes to add. In doing so it has drawn out some of the common lines
of argument expressed by these authors. Some of these are extremely relevant and
useful to our objectives. On the other hand, much of the literature is marred by
awkward assumptions that distance explanation from contingency and posit it back in
the realm of stable truths, whether this truth is grounded in a globalisation process or
105
BIGO, Mobius Ribbon, Op. cit., p 98. 106
Ibid, p 95. 107
Ibid, p 100. 108
Ibid, p 103. 109
Ibid, p 114.
28
a hidden logic of sovereignty. To counter these misconceptions we have begun to
formulate a more adequate explanation of the multiplication of borders by relating it
to a molar molecular relationship. The practice/theory of borders is extremely diverse
and contradictory. However practice/theory tends to gravitate towards molar points of
resonance. In the context of the post-Cold War there is gravitation towards the
globalisation problematique as a defining problem. In the following chapters we will
seek to plot the movement towards this new centre of analysis via the mutation of,
rather than the rupture with, various elements of International Theory. This process
occurs as IR theory tries to come to grips with the “new” context of the post-Cold War
era.
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