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Arctic Airpower: Searching for an Air Force Strategy
by
Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Sheets United States Air Force
Str
ate
gy
Re
se
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Under the Direction of: Professor Brett D. Weigle
United States Army War College Class of 2018
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the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S.
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6. AUTHOR(S)
Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Sheets United States Air Force
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Professor Brett D. Weigle
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U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Word Count: 5306
14. ABSTRACT
The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the Air Force.
Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has
brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversaries on the Arctic’s strategic
importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic
region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the
Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to
close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will
examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review
current U.S. national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategies for the Arctic to identify the
ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic
capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes,
support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Polar, Alaska, Russia, China, Search and Rescue
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UU
18. NUMBER OF PAGES
34
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT
UU b. ABSTRACT
UU c. THIS PAGE
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98), Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Deleted: The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States and the Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversaries on the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S. national and Department of Defense strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains.
Arctic Airpower: Searching for an Air Force Strategy
(5306 words)
Abstract
ries on the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are
designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many
gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets
and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain
awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic
environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S.
national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends,
ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force
Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to
regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space
domains.The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the
Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic.
Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversa
Deleted: The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States and the Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversaries on
Deleted: ries on the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S. national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains. the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S. national and Department of Defense strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains.The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversa
Arctic Airpower: Searching for an Air Force Strategy
I believe in the future he who holds Alaska will hold the world, and I think it is the most important strategic place in the world.
—Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell1
The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the
U.S. Air Force. During World War II and the Cold War, this region played a key role in
guaranteeing the defense of the American homeland and ensuring the Air Force’s ability
to support a multitude of operations in Europe and Asia. Military emphasis on the Arctic
declined post-Cold War, and so did the importance of resourcing and maintaining
appropriate Arctic infrastructure and capabilities. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for
increased maritime access to the Arctic.2 Additionally, it has brought about a renewed
Arctic focus by the American allies, and potential adversaries on the region’s strategic
importance.3 With the release of the national and defense strategies for the Arctic in
2013, the United States slowly began to refocus on its interests in the Arctic.
The Air Force plays a role in ensuring American strategic success in the Arctic.
The Air Force unwaveringly monitors American territorial airspace and defends the
homeland in the Arctic region. For example, on May 3, 2017, the Air Force identified a
Russian TU-95 bomber and two SU-35 fighter aircraft near Alaskan airspace and
intercepted them with two F-22 fighters.4 Additionally, the Air Force maintains Arctic
safety through its coordination and execution of over 1,800 search and rescue missions
in the region since 1991.5 Air Force satellites, radars, and command and control units
monitor the Arctic continually. These assets provide Arctic navigation guidance and
enhanced polar communication.6 The Air Force has relied on broad strategies at the
national and the Department of Defense (DoD) levels to develop its plans for the Arctic.
2
The increasing international interest in the Arctic raises questions about the Air Force’s
lack of a specific strategy for the Arctic.
This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests
in the region. Next, the paper will review current U.S. government and DoD strategies
for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. The paper concludes
with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an
Air Force strategy.
The Arctic Environment
The national territories, seas, and straits north of the Arctic Circle, which is the
line that circles the globe at 66° 34' N latitude, defines the Arctic region. Additionally, the
Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 added to the definition “all United States territory
north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim
Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and
Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain” (see Figure 1).7 Canada, Denmark, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States are Arctic nations because they
possess sovereign territory north of this line. This mix of allies and adversaries, along
with increased access to the region, creates a complex geopolitical environment.
3
Figure 1. The Arctic Region8
In recent years, the climate of the Arctic region has experienced a significant
increase in annual average temperature. The increased polar temperatures have
reduced the polar ice caps by 40 percent since 1979.9 This has cleared parts of the
Arctic Sea for maritime transit for more extended periods each year (see Figure 2).10 As
the polar ice recedes, it provides increased maritime access for American and
international commercial, governmental, and military activities in the Arctic.
Figure 2. Reduction of Arctic Sea Ice11
4
The Arctic region holds a vast amount of natural resources that are crucial to the
Arctic nations. A recent U.S. Geological Survey report estimated vast deposits of
subsea oil and natural gas along with substantial traces of precious minerals, such as
nickel, copper, and cobalt.12 This region potentially holds up to 13 percent of the world’s
undiscovered oil reserves and 30 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves (see
Figure 3).13 Fisheries make up another important Arctic renewable resource. For
instance, the Bering Sea fisheries provide more than half of the annual wild-caught fish
and shellfish for the United States.14
Figure 3. Arctic Sea Routes and Potential Oil and Gas Fields15
5
Diminishing sea ice will likely increase the commercial shipping and maritime
tourism traffic throughout the region.16 The future may see the opening of three sea
lanes for full or seasonal maritime use: the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest
Passage, and the Central Arctic route (See Figure 3).17 There was a 118 percent
increase in Bering Strait commercial shipping from 2008 to 2012 due to more navigable
Arctic Oceans.18 The Arctic shipping route from Asia to Europe reduces transit time by
thirty percent as compared to the Suez Canal route.19 In August 2016, the Crystal
Serenity traveled from New York to Alaska, marking the first ever transit of the
Northwest Passage by a giant luxury cruise ship.20 More cruise lines are expected to
continue this route as the receding polar ice makes the Arctic routes more tempting for
commercial shippers. The increased activity and presence increasingly highlight the
future importance of the region and the U.S. role in providing safety and security to the
Arctic.
A recent Heritage Foundation report listed the Arctic “as an important operating
environment” for the United States, but America “is not well positioned in the region.”21
As nations such as Russia, China, and other allies focus on the Arctic, it will present
new and significant security challenges to the United States. Increased access means
increased activity and more chances for disputes, accidents, and disaster. The shortest
air route from Europe and Asia to North America is over the Arctic.22 A navigable Arctic
Ocean provides potential adversaries a shorter maritime route to America’s northern
border. The Arctic provides the northern flank for U.S. homeland defense strategy.23
The 2017 National Security Strategy highlights this interest, as it states the first and
most fundamental American responsibility is to “protect the homeland.”24
6
The Arctic plays a role in the potential future success of America's economy and
access to resources which contribute to this success. The increased access to oil,
natural gas, fisheries, and commercial maritime routes makes the Arctic a significant
region for potential economic growth. However, this access increases international
competition for these resources, as well as intensifying existing disputes over territories
and boundaries to secure these assets.25 The current National Security Strategy
promotes American prosperity as another national interest that further highlights the
importance of this region.26
The 2017 National Security Strategy also highlights the importance of
maintaining partnerships and alliances.27 Several international organizations are
shaping U.S. Arctic interests in this regard. In 1996, Canada, Denmark, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States formed the Arctic Council.28 The Arctic
Council is a forum to discuss common regional issues, focusing on sustainable
development, environmental protection, cooperation, and coordination. Elements of
U.S. defense requirements for the region stem from two recent agreements made
through the Arctic Council: Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and
Rescue in the Arctic in 2011 and Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and
Response in the Arctic in 2013.29 This paper will discuss both in more detail. While such
cooperation is key to American interests in the Arctic, several U.S. near-peer
competitors are developing capabilities to compete in the region.
Russia was one of the first nations to expand its Arctic government and military
presence. This regional competitor and potential U.S. adversary is developing a new
Arctic joint military command, four Arctic brigades, ten air defense radar stations, 14
7
operational airfields, 16 deep water ports and 40 new icebreakers.30 This Russian
military development appears significant when compared to the U.S. Arctic military
infrastructure, as seen in Figure 4. The new airfields give Russia a quick strike
capability against the United States and its northern NATO allies.
These airfields are the base for Russian interceptors, fighter, and attack aircraft,
along with various electronic warfare and transport aircraft.31 Russia’s air patrols over
the Arctic have also increased since 2007.32 Strategic Russian bombers, such as the
Tu-95 and Tu-22M3, have increasingly penetrated air defense zones of the United
States, Finland, and Norway since 2014.33 Russia’s stated goal for its regional
expansion is to exercise sovereignty over its territories and waterways and to counter
the perceived NATO expansion and threat.34
Figure 4. Russian Arctic Military Presence35
8
Russia asserts that it will continue to use a cooperative strategy with the other
nations in the Arctic. In this complex geopolitical environment, it is difficult to interpret
whether Russian actions are cooperative or aggressive, similar to their operations in
Ukraine in 2014.36 Military actions in Ukraine demonstrate Russia's willingness to use
force to guarantee its interests. Russian military leaders have made statements which
contradict their stated desire for Arctic cooperation. In 2014, the Russian Land Forces
commander, Colonel General Oleg Salyukov, stated that Russian militarization of the
Arctic was to “demonstrate to other Arctic nations Russia’s military presence in the
increasingly contested region.”37 The Eleventh U.S. Air Force commander, Lieutenant
General Kenneth Wilsbach, recently commented on the development of Russian Arctic
amphibious units: “Amphibious operations are clearly for inserting troops and taking
territory.”38
China has also shown increased interest in the region. In 2013, the Arctic Council
accepted China’s request to be named a “permanent observer state.”39 While not an
Arctic nation, China is interested in the region for shipping routes, fisheries, and natural
energy resources.40 China looks to cooperate in the region but has also introduced a
military aspect to their regional engagement. In 2015, five Chinese naval vessels took
part in a joint Russian-Chinese military exercise only 12 nautical miles from U.S.
territory in the Alaskan Arctic. A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies
report stated that “the incident reflects a growing Chinese ambition to establish itself as
a player in the Arctic region.”41
In January 2018, China released its Arctic policy which solidified those
comments. Overall, China’s objective is “to understand, protect, develop, and participate
9
in the governance of the Arctic.”42 China’s rhetoric appears to support a stable Arctic,
where nations work together to enhance mutual interests. However, China has stated
similar intentions for the South China Sea but has shown disregard for regional
sovereignty and international freedom of navigation laws there.43 Russia and China are
not the only nations looking to increase national presence in the Arctic, as many of
America's allies are developing Arctic security strategies with similar priority.
Canada and Norway are advancing their respective national strategies to
safeguard their Arctic interests. Canada, in its 2017 National Defense Policy, outlined
plans to upgrade its military surveillance, communication and aircraft capabilities in the
Arctic. Additionally, it announced plans to expand its northern Air Defense Identification
Zone and forward deploy CF-18 fighter aircraft to increase patrol capabilities.44
Norway has also focused on expanding its military presence in the Arctic to
protect their national interests. Fundamental to Norway’s Arctic strategy is its
procurement of the F-35 Lightning II multi-role fighter aircraft and the development of
AEGIS frigates.45 Ensuring airspace sovereignty and providing missile defense are the
primary reasons for these acquisitions. Norway’s Defense Minister describes Norway’s
Arctic region as “more challenging and less predictable,” and these military additions
highlight their desire to improve security and defense.46 In 2017, Norway clarified its
strategy by deploying an armored battalion to deter undesired Russian actions near its
northern border.47 While these two U.S. allies believe the Arctic region will continue to
be peaceful, neither wishes to fall behind Russia in their regional presence or ability to
influence.
10
Assessing U.S. Arctic Strategies and Agreements
A review of national-level, defense, and individual military service Arctic
strategies is in order. Doing so will identify strategic capabilities gaps which the Air
Force is uniquely positioned to fill, and this will drive the need for its own Arctic strategy.
The 2017 National Security Strategy asserts that protection of American borders is the
highest priority for U.S. national security. Following this interest is securing the U.S.
economy, rebuilding the American military, and developing partnerships to advance
U.S. interests and values.48 While the 2017 National Security Strategy does not
explicitly mention the Arctic region, the Arctic environment presents a challenge to U.S.
interests and objectives.
The first U.S. strategic document to direct actions in the Arctic is the 2009
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD) 25. The NSPD 66/HSPD 25 is broad in its approach, directing policy
to “meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region”
and to “strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations.”49 The
directive lays out U.S. national security interests for the region, including “missile
defense and early warning systems…strategic deterrence and ensuring freedom of
overflight.”50 The directive tasks the Secretary of Defense to “develop greater
capabilities and capacity…to protect American air, land and sea borders” and “preserve
the global mobility of U.S. military and civilian vessels and aircraft.”51
The NSPD 66/HSPD 25 provided the first direction for the DoD to begin focusing
resources on the Arctic, highlighting America’s interest in the region to the international
community. The document emphasized the maritime nature of the Arctic and sought to
establish an Arctic policy primarily focusing on that domain. Critics of the directive also
11
note the United States “remains a somewhat reluctant Arctic actor” and demonstrates a
lack of urgency in dealing with Arctic issues.52 The NSPD 66/HSPD 25 acknowledges
there is a lack of U.S. Arctic infrastructure and capabilities but does little to resource the
means for future development.53
In 2013, the White House released the National Strategy for the Arctic Region.
The objective of this strategy is to position America “to efficiently respond to challenges
and emerging opportunities arising from significant increases in Arctic activity.”54 The
national strategy provides direction for two broad defense tasks. The first is to “advance
U.S. security interests” and the second is to “pursue responsible Arctic region
stewardship.”55
Critics of the national Arctic strategy note that it falls short in many areas of
ensuring U.S. interests in this region. They argue that it is vague and does not lay out
specific tasks or ways to meet the desired objectives. Additionally, the objectives are
unattainable until they receive funding. Finally, the National Strategy for the Arctic does
not assign any direct tasks to the military or any other federal agency.56
In 2016, the interagency Arctic Executive Steering Committee released the
Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. This
document provided more detailed, specific guidance to the DoD.57 This plan tasks the
DoD to lead the evaluation of space-based observation capabilities; conduct maritime
exercises and operations in the Arctic region; and lead international Arctic search and
rescue exercises.58 While this framework provides increased detail for ways to ensure
national interests, it does not instill a sense of urgency to support the region because it
required three years to develop.
12
The 2013 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy delivers the initial strategy for
the DoD in the Arctic. The strategy defines a DoD end-state to maintain “a secure and
stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is
protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.”59 This strategy
outlines two supporting objectives for the DoD. It directs the DoD to “ensure security,
support safety, and promote defense cooperation” and “prepare for a wide range of
challenges and contingencies.”60
In 2016, the DoD released its Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect U.S.
National Security Interests in the Arctic Region as an updated military strategy for the
Arctic. The U.S. national end-states and objectives for the Arctic remain unchanged in
this strategy while it clarifies the DoD’s Arctic interests. These interests include shaping
military activity “to avoid conflict while improving its capability to operate safely” and the
seeking to preserve “the rights and freedoms regarding navigation and overflight.”61
Specifically, this document outlines broad strategy ways which include:
enhance the capability of U.S. forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty,
strengthen deterrence at home and abroad,
strengthen alliances and partnerships,
preserve freedom of the seas,
improve domain awareness in the Arctic,
evolve DoD Arctic infrastructure and capabilities,
support civil authorities and foreign humanitarian assistance,
partner to support safety,
promote regional cooperation and rule of law.62
13
The 2016 Report to Congress identifies many of the DoD gaps in meeting the
objectives of the 2013 strategy. This report discusses the challenges of the military to
maneuver, employ and sustain capabilities due to the harsh Arctic environment. The
report briefly mentions the limited polar navigation aids, poorly mapped terrain and
waterways, and the challenges of satellite communication above 65 degrees north
latitude.63 Overall, the 2016 Report to Congress does an excellent job of defining the
objectives and the resource gaps in pursuing a national Arctic strategy.
The Report to Congress is the first document which mentions Air Force
requirements for the Arctic, though the statements are brief. Specifically, it mentions the
need to modernized existing platforms for improved air mobility to access the region.
Furthermore, it addresses the requirement for enhanced personnel recovery
capabilities, “particularly for long-range operations in or over the Arctic Ocean.”64
Colonel John Conway, a retired USAF intelligence officer and military defense
analyst, delivers a critique of the 2016 DoD Arctic strategy when he notes the current
DoD strategy reflects “no great urgency to improve its Arctic posture.”65 This criticism is
due mainly to a lack of DoD and national focus on the Arctic while American competitors
advance their capabilities and infrastructure. Conway also states that the DoD strategy
focuses solely on maritime capabilities and fails to address the need for airpower in the
Arctic.66
The Unified Command Plan establishes responsibilities among combatant
commands for organizing and coordinating military action in the Arctic (Figure 5).
Two geographic combatant commands share primary responsibility for military operations in the Arctic: U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) … USNORTHCOM has geographic combatant command responsibility for
14
Alaska and a subordinate unified command, Alaskan Command, which focuses on planning and execution of USNORTHCOM missions in Alaska and the USNORTHCOM portion of the Arctic …The Forces for Unified Command document assigns most Federal forces based in Alaska to U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).67
Additionally, the Commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for defining the
requirements and capabilities required for Arctic military operations and advocating for
future requirements.68
Figure 5. Combatant Command Arctic Areas of Responsibility69
The Navy developed its Arctic Roadmap in 2014 to support the DoD’s objectives
for the Arctic. Due to the region’s maritime nature, the Navy acts as the de facto lead
Service in the DoD for Arctic matters. The strategic objectives for the Navy are to
15
ensure U.S. sovereignty and provide homeland defense; provide forces to respond to
crisis and contingencies; provide access to global commons; and develop and promote
Arctic partnerships.70
The Navy’s strategy describes the environment, climate, vast distances, and
limited U.S. Arctic infrastructure as primary challenges for current and future naval
operations.71 The Navy states, “Given the vast distances and virtually no supporting
infrastructure, naval forces without specialized equipment and operational experience
face substantial impediments”; consequently, their ability to operate in the Arctic is a
“flexible, periodic presence.”72 The Navy will support and execute missions in the region
including sea control, power projection, search and rescue, disaster response, and
defense support to civil authorities.73
The Center for International Maritime Security notes the reluctance of the Navy to
prioritize the Arctic. The Navy admits its unwillingness to commit its limited resources to
develop a more significant Arctic capability. Currently, the Navy focuses its resources
on regions where they are engaged in conflict or the probability of future conflict is
higher.74 While the Navy is the de facto lead Service for the Arctic, Conway notes they
do not mention working with any of the other Services to secure national interests in the
Arctic.75
In 2013, the Coast Guard released its Arctic Strategy, which is rooted in the
NSPD 66/HSPD 25 and the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The Coast
Guard’s role in the Arctic is to provide homeland security, safety management, and
stewardship of U.S. waters, and guarantee freedom of navigation and overflight in U.S.
Arctic waters as described in their strategy.76 Like the Navy, the lack of infrastructure
16
and Arctic capability prohibits the Coast Guard from achieving an enduring presence in
the region.
A nation’s power in the Arctic is often measured by the number of icebreakers
they possess and the capabilities of those ships. The U.S. Coast Guard currently
maintains only one heavy polar icebreaker and a medium polar icebreaker.77
Icebreakers are crucial to providing yearlong access to the Arctic Ocean and the lack of
these assets limits maritime access to the ice-filled ocean. Every year the heavy
icebreaker deploys for part of the year to Antarctica, straining this limited capability.78
Additionally, the Coast Guard strategy notes limited basing in the Arctic. The nearest
Coast Guard facility to the northern Alaska Coast is its air station at Kodiak, over 900
miles south of Barrow, Alaska.79
Absent from the discussion are the Arctic strategies of the U.S. Army and the
U.S. Marine Corps. Like the Air Force, these Services have yet to develop a specific
Arctic strategy while still acknowledging the importance of the region. Both Services
recognize the unique skills and requirements for operating in the Arctic. The Army
established the Northern Warfare Training Center in Alaska, while the Marines operate
the Mountain Warfare Center in eastern California to train individual soldiers and
Marines in basic Arctic skills.80
Both Services regularly exercise in the Arctic to demonstrate capability and
develop future skills. In February 2017, the Army (with support from the Air Force)
completed exercise SPARTAN PEGASUS, which involved the airborne insertion and
ground operations of 150 soldiers.81 The Marines have enough equipment to support a
brigade prepositioned in underground mountain bunkers in Norway’s Arctic region.82
17
Since January 2017, over 300 Marines have deployed as a rotational force to Vaernes,
Norway, for training and as a deterrence to Russia.83
The DoD’s strategy to engage in the Arctic lacks urgency. Additionally, it lacks a
comprehensive DoD plan to modernize existing equipment or develop new Arctic
capabilities. The gaps in the DoD and the Coast Guard capabilities include the lack of
persistent presence; degraded navigation, and communication capability; the lack of
infrastructure to operate; and the vastness of the region. The stated national and
military objectives and ends for the Arctic are clear. The ways and means are still
lacking, which increases the risk for the strategies seeking to guarantee American Arctic
interests.
Air Force Arctic Missions and Capabilities
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the DoD’s Arctic Strategy do not
discuss exploitation and control of the air and space domains in sufficient detail to
ensure the success of U.S. strategies in the Arctic. The Air Force currently executes
several of its core missions in the Arctic to achieve national objectives. Air and space
superiority, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), rapid global mobility,
and command and control need modernization and enhancement as involvement in the
Arctic environment continues to develop.84
Essential to Arctic domain awareness and the homeland defense is the ability of
the Air Force to conduct its ISR mission. Early warning radars are part of America’s
defense against ballistic missiles and enemy aircraft. For missile warning and defense
and space awareness, the Air Force has radars and personnel stationed at Clear Air
Station, Alaska and Thule Air Base, Greenland.85
18
Defense of America’s homeland and deterrence of adversaries occurs in the
Arctic through the Air Force's air and space superiority mission. A squadron of F-22
Raptors, stationed at Elmendorf-Richardson, provide air dominance while Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska hosts a squadron of E-3 Sentry Airborne Early Warning
and Control (AWACS) aircraft.86 The fighters and the AWACS are responsible for
Russian military aircraft intercepts on American’s Arctic border.87 The Air Force plans to
base a squadron of F-35 Lightning II multi-role fighters at Eielson Air Force Base,
Alaska to ensure this capability remains in the future.88
The Air Force’s global mobility mission encompasses several national tasks for
the Arctic. It gives the nation the ability to defend the homeland and provide support to
civil authorities and foreign humanitarian assistance. Two subsets of the global mobility
mission, airlift and combat search and rescue, directly support these national
requirements.
Two squadrons of C-17 Globemaster III and a squadron of C-130H Hercules
mobility aircraft provide tactical and strategic airlift from Elmendorf-Richardson. 89 These
aircraft provide support to homeland defense and support contingency support for
homeland disaster response. In November 2015, a C-17 delivered four U.S. Army
Stryker vehicles and 40 soldiers north of the Arctic Circle to Deadhorse, Alaska.90 This
exercise highlights the importance of rapid mobility to overcome the vast distances
faced by the DoD in the Arctic.
While not stationed near the Arctic, the Air National Guard also operates a
squadron of ski-equipped LC-130 Hercules aircraft. These aircraft have the niche
capability to “operate from prepared and unprepared snowfields, floating ice sheets,
19
glaciers, and traditional paved runways.”91 These aircraft are based at Stratton Air
National Guard Base, Scotia, New York and can rapidly deploy to support a range of
Arctic operations.92
Air Force airlift capabilities can support Arctic intergovernmental agreements in
the region where there is limited support infrastructure and disaster response is slow. In
2013, the Arctic Council coordinated the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. This agreement works to
coordinate the response to clean up oil spills in the Arctic.93 Few nations, other than the
United States, can expeditiously bring personnel and equipment in large amounts to an
Arctic emergency area.
The Air Force also supports the DoD’s requirements for support to civil
authorities and humanitarian assistance with its Alaska-based aircraft. Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson provides dedicated personnel recovery capability through two
Alaska Air National Guard aircraft squadrons (HC-130J Combat King II aircraft and HH-
60G Pavehawk helicopters) that are manned by Air Force Special Operations personnel
in a Guardian Angel squadron.94 These squadrons train for Air Force combat search
and rescue missions while providing Alaska with a civilian search and rescue capability.
Both the HH-60G and the HC-130J are air refuelable assets giving them unlimited
range. This capability gives the Air Force the ability to provide search and rescue and
humanitarian assistance missions outside the range of similar Coast Guard, Navy and
Army assets.
The Air Force’s search and rescue capability is also key to supporting another
Arctic Council agreement. In 2011, members of the Arctic Council signed the
20
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.
The agreement assigns responsibility to the United States for the coastline around
Alaska, with Russia supporting in the west and Canada to the east, north across the
Arctic Sea to the North Pole (see Figure 6).95 Under this agreement, the Coast Guard is
the authority for search and rescue coordination in the U.S. Arctic sector. Alaska’s most
northern city, Barrow, lies 1,200 miles from the North Pole, which is a significant
distance for ships to cover; airpower provides the quickest response.
Figure 6. Arctic Search and Rescue Regions96
21
Finally, the Air Force provides a critical command and control mission for both Air
Force and joint operations in the Arctic from the North American Aerospace Defense
Command’s Air Operations Center in Colorado.97 The Alaska Air National Guard’s 11th
Rescue Coordination Center coordinates interagency and joint search and rescue
operations in Alaska.98 The Air Force will launch two satellites in 2018 as part of the
Enhanced Polar System to provide secure military communications above the Arctic
Circle.99
The current national and DoD Arctic strategies adequately define the ends and
outline the ways for the Air Force to support national Arctic interests. However, they do
not effectively integrate the air and space domains because of their heavy maritime
focus.
Components of an Air Force Arctic Strategy
When asked about the development of an Arctic strategy, Lieutenant General
Mark Nowland, Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations, stated, “What do the plans
say we have to do now, what are the gaps between the changing conditions, what are
the concept of operations that fill those gaps?”100 An Air Force Arctic strategy could
ensure the Air Force means to secure national objectives for the Arctic.
A senior fellow from the American Security Project recently stated that, in regards
to the Arctic, “There is a danger that other countries may perceive U.S. inattention as
weakness.”101 Countries, such as Russia or China, may attempt to take advantage of
the United States’ lack of capabilities and presence in the Arctic to advance their own
interests.102 To enhance homeland defense and security, the U.S. Air Force’s Arctic
objectives should be: 1) provide a postured, prepared, and modernized force to defend
22
the nation and respond to wide range of contingencies, and 2) strengthen joint and
strategic partnerships.103
Developing new and modernizing existing Air Force Arctic surveillance and
communication capabilities, space-based infrastructure, and aircraft are top priorities.
Arctic maritime, air, and space domain awareness will all increase due to these
capabilities.104 The development of enhanced communication and navigation
infrastructure will increase the security, safety, and ability to command and control
future Arctic operations.105 Another priority is upgrading air assets that support disaster
response, humanitarian aid, and search and rescue missions. This requires improving
the niche capabilities of the LC-130 ski aircraft and the aging HH-60G helicopter fleet to
meet future challenges.
The Air Force will need to revitalize and expand Arctic training for airmen through
its Arctic Survival School at Eielson Air Force Base. The Air Force should reinstate
Arctic research and studies at the Air University.106 Previously, the Air Force maintained
this capability through its education and training command with a specialized center
which conducted Arctic research and published its findings in manuals and
newsletters.107 Air Force research should be coordinated with the Army’s Cold Regions
Research and Engineering Laboratory in Fairbanks, Alaska, and the National/Navy Ice
Center in Suitland, Maryland.108 Joint solutions to Arctic challenges might fill the gaps in
the various Service Arctic strategies.
The second objective of the Air Force’s Arctic strategy must focus on
strengthening joint and strategic partnerships with the other Services and agencies to
ensure national and DoD objectives. The Air Force should participate in U.S. Northern
23
Command’s Arctic Capabilities Advocacy Working Group to advance knowledge of
Arctic requirements, capabilities, and problems.109
The Air Force must continue to train with joint partners, allies, and strategic
competitors to be prepared for a range of Arctic contingencies. The Air Force should
continue to support and participate in homeland defense exercises such as VIGILANT
SHIELD, a combined United States and Canada air sovereignty exercise.110 The Air
Force needs to train all Arctic Council nations—not just U.S. allies. Expanding exercises
like ARCTIC CHINOOK, a search and rescue simulation exercise that Russia observed
in 2016, will bring all Arctic nations into closer cooperation for mutual benefit.111
Conclusion
Secretary of Defense James Mattis described the Arctic as “key strategic
terrain.”112 He continued by stating, “I believe that our interests and the security of the
Arctic would benefit from increasing the focus of the Department of Defense on this
region.”113 The gaps in DoD focus, capabilities, and the rapidly changing environment
put American Arctic interests at risk. Military gaps in domain awareness,
communication, and rapid response capabilities decrease U.S. ability to achieve its
strategic objectives in the Arctic. These gaps in the Arctic military capabilities could
potentially allow the United States to fall behind adversaries and limit America’s ability
to influence the region. The Air Force has the assets and mission sets to provide a joint
solution to the challenges in this theater. A dedicated Arctic strategy will allow the Air
Force to focus on developing its capabilities, adapting to regional changes, and
securing the air and space domains to safeguard American interests in the Arctic.
24
Endnotes
1 Brigadier General William Mitchell, “Statement of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell,” Congressional Record (February 12, 1935), 121, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= mdp.39015025110605;view=1up;seq=115 (accessed November 22, 2017).
2 U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 2013), 7, https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Strategy/ cg_arctic_strategy.pdf, (accessed October 27, 2017).
3 Dawn A. Berry, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Governance of Greenland’s Security,” in Governing the North American Arctic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 104-5, 111.
4 Barbara Starr, Ryan Brown, and Zachary Cohen, “U.S. F-22s Intercept Russian Bombers, Fighters, Near Alaska,” CNN Online (May 4, 2014): http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/04/politics/us-f-22-intercept-russian-aircraft-alaska/index.html (accessed January 12, 2018).
5 Alaska Rescue Coordination Center, “2017 SAR Mission Statistics,” email message to author, January 19, 2018.
6 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), 18-19, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf (accessed October 27, 2017).
7 Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, Public Law 98-373, amended as Public Law 101-609 (November 16, 1990), Section 112, https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/arctic/iarpc/ arc_res_pol_act.jsp (accessed February 1, 2018).
8 U.S. Arctic Research Commission, “Arctic Boundary Map: Polar,” https://www.arctic.gov/ maps.html (accessed February 9, 2018).
9 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 5.
10 Ibid.
11 Daily Chart, “The Decline of Arctic Sea Ice,” The Economist Online (May 1, 2017): https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/05/daily-chart (accessed March 1, 2018).
12 U.S. Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimated of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle” (Menlo Park, CA: USGS, 2008), 4, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/ (accessed November 7, 2017); U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 5; Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2014), 151-52.
13 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 5.
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14 Thad W. Allen and Christine T. Whitman, Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on
America’s Fourth Coast, Independent Task Force Report No. 75 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2017), 41, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/02/TFR75_Arctic.pdf (accessed October 27, 2017).
15 CNA Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2014), 17, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/ MAB_5-8-14.pdf, (accessed January 28, 2018).
16 David J. Hayes, Managing for the Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: A Report to the President (Washington, DC: Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska, March 2013), 17, https://www.afsc.noaa.gov/ publications/misc_pdf/iamreport.pdf (accessed December 6, 2017); Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North, 168.
17 CNA, National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change, 17-19.
18 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 5.
19 Rachael Gosnell, “The Complexities of Arctic Maritime Traffic, The Arctic Institute Online (January 30, 2018): https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/complexities-arctic-maritime-traffic/ (accessed February 18, 2018).
20 The Associated Press, “Giant Luxury Cruise Ship Crystal Serenity Makes Historic Voyage in Melting Arctic,” The Mercury News Online (September 9, 2016): https://www.mercurynews. com/2016/09/09/giant-cruise-ship-makes-historic-voyage-in-melting-arctic/ (accessed February 18, 2018).
21 Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2018), 103, 104, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength (accessed February 28, 2018).
22 Michael J. Forsyth, “Why Alaska and the Arctic are Critical to the National Security of the United States,” Military Review Online (January-February 2018): 114, http://www.armyupress. army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/ (accessed March 1, 2018).
23 North American Aerospace Defense Command, “Alaska NORAD Region,” http://www.norad.mil/About-NORAD/Alaskan-NORAD-Region/ (accessed November 7, 2017).
24 Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 7, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed January 28, 2018).
25 Sherri Goodman, “Changing Climate for Arctic Security,” The Wilson Quarterly Online (Summer 2017): https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/into-the-arctic/changing-climates-for-arctic-security/ (accessed September 23, 2017).
26 Trump, National Security Strategy, 17.
27 Ibid., 4.
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28 The Arctic Council, “The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder,” September 25, 2017,
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us (accessed October 27, 2017).
29 Ibid.
30 Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff, The New Ice Curtain: Russia’s Strategic Reach to the Arctic (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, August 2015), 73, https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-ice-curtain (accessed October 27, 2017); Robbie Gramer, “Here’s What Russia’s Military Build-Up in the Arctic Looks Like,” Foreign Policy Online (January 25, 2017): http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/25/heres-what-russias-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-looks-like-trump-oil-military-high-north-infographic-map/ (accessed November 15, 2017).
31 Conley and Rohloff, The New Ice Curtain, 76, 79-80.
32 Ibid., 9.
33 Ibid., 81-82.
34 Alexander Serguinn, “Is Russia Going Hard or Soft in the Arctic,” The Wilson Quarterly Online (Summer 2017): https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/into-the-arctic/is-russia-going-hard-or-soft-in-the-arctic/ (accessed October 29, 2017).
35 Wood, 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength, 208.
36 Julianne Smith and Adam Twardowski, The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2017), 5, https://www.cnas.org/ publications/reports/the-future-of-u-s-russia-relations (accessed November 20, 2017).
37 “Russia to Form Arctic Military Command by 2017,” The Moscow Times Online (October 1, 2014): https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-to-form-arctic-military-command-by-2017-39975 (accessed December 16, 2017).
38 Jason Sherman, “The Arctic Heats Up: In the High North, Things are Cold No More,” Air Force Magazine 101, no. 1 (January 2018): 37.
39 Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks and Mark Cancian, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence and Partnerships, An Independent Review of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 183.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 186.
42 March Lanteigne and Mingming Shi, “China Stakes its Claim to the Arctic,” The Diplomat Online (January 29, 2018): https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/china-stakes-its-claim-to-the-arctic/ (accessed January 31, 2018).
43 Green, Hicks, Cancian, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025, 14.
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44 Adam Lajeunesse, “What Canada’s New Defense Policy Means for the Arctic,” Arctic
Deeply Online (June 16, 2017): https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/community/2017/06/16/ what-canadas-new-defense-policy-means-for-the-arctic (accessed February 1, 2018).
45 Ine E. Soreide, “Security Challenges in the High North: Norwegian Perspectives,” in Advancing U.S.-Nordic-Baltic Security Cooperation: Adapting Partnerships to a New Security Environment (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014), 6.
46 Reuters Staff, “Norway Plans to Send Armored Unit Close to its Russian Border,” Reuters Online (October 13, 2017): https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-military/norway-plans-to-send-armored-unit-close-to-russian-border-idUSKBN1CI1R4 (accessed February 1, 2018).
47 Ibid.
48 Trump, National Security Strategy, 4.
49 George W. Bush, National Security Directive/NSPD-66, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-25 (Washington, DC: The White House, January 9, 2009), 2, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090112-3.html (accessed November 15, 2017).
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 3.
52 Andreas Osthagen, “The United States as an Arctic Actor,” The Arctic Institute, December 12, 2011, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/united-states-arctic-actor/ (accessed February 1, 2018).
53 Ibid.
54 Barack H. Obama, National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2013), 2, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ nat_arctic_strategy.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).
55 Ibid., 6, 7.
56 Mihaela David, “U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region: Strong Foothold or on Thin Ice?” The Arctic Institute: Center for Circumpolar Security Studies Online (May 13, 2013): https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/us-national-strategy-for-arctic-region/ (accessed February 2, 2018).
57 Barack H. Obama, Executive Order 13689 – Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic (Washington, DC: The White House, January 21, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/executive-order-enhancing-coordination-national-efforts-arctic (accessed February 14, 2018).
58 Arctic Executive Steering Committee, Implementation Framework for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2016), 8, 10, 24. https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/national_strategy_for_the_arctic_regio_implementation_framework_2016.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).
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59 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Defense, November 2013), 4, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/ Documents/pubs/2013_Arctic_Strategy.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).
60 DoD, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 5-6.
61 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interest in the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 2016), 3, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-for-release.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).
62 Ibid., 9-12.
63 Ibid., 13.
64 Ibid., 13-14.
65 John L. Conway III, “Toward a US Air Force Arctic Strategy,” Air and Space Power Journal Online 31, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 69, http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-31_Issue-2/V-Conway.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).
66 Ibid., 70.
67 DoD, Report to Congress, 5.
68 Ibid., 4.
69 Mia Bennet, “2011 Unified Command Plan Streamlines U.S. Military Responsibilities in the Arctic,” Cryopolitics Online (May 9, 2011): http://www.cryopolitics.com/2011/05/09/2011-unified-command-plan-streamlines-u-s-military-responsibilities-in-the-arctic/ (accessed February 12, 2018).
70 Navy Task Force Climate Change, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014-2030 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, February 2014), 15, www.navy.mil/docs/USN_arctic_roadmap.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).
71 Ibid., 8.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 17-18.
74 Andreas Kuersten, “Assessing the U.S. Navy’s Arctic Roadmap,” Center for International Maritime Security Online (June 21, 2015): http://cimsec.org/assessing-the-u-s-navys-arctic-roadmap/17117 (accessed February 7, 2018).
75 Conway, “Toward a US Air Force Arctic Strategy,” 70-71.
76 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 21.
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77 USNI News, “Report to Congress of Coast Guard Icebreaker Program, USNI News
Online (December 13, 2017): https://news.usni.org/2017/12/13/report-congress-coast-guard-icebreaker-program (accessed February 18, 2018).
78 Dan Lamothe, “In a Changing Arctic, a Lone Coast Guard Icebreaker Maneuvers Through Ice and Geopolitics, The Washington Post Online (September 4, 2017): https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-a-changing-arctic-a-lone-coast-guard-icebreaker-maneuvers-through-ice-and-geopolitics/2017/09/03/dfad84d4-7d12-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.0e77f951e096 (accessed March 14, 2018).
79 U.S. Coast Guard, USCG Arctic Strategy, 14.
80 Nathan Fry, “Survivability, Sustainability, and Maneuverability: The Need for Joint Unity of Effort in Implementing the DoD Arctic Strategy at the Tactical and Operational Levels,” Military Review Online (November-December 2014): 60, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/ military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20141231_art012.pdf (accessed January 7, 2018).
81 David Vergun, “Paratroopers Leap into Arctic Tundra for Spartan Pegasus,” Army News Service Online (February 24, 2017): https://www.army.mil/article/183108/paratroopers_leap_into_arctic_tundra_for_spartan_pegasus (accessed February 19, 2018).
82 Christopher P. Cavas, “Cave-Dwellers: Inside the U.S. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway,” Defense News Online (September 20, 2015): https://www.defensenews. com/digital-show-dailies/modern-day-marine/2015/09/20/cave-dwellers-inside-the-us-marine-corps-prepositioning-program-norway/ (accessed February 19, 2018).
83 Hope H. Seck, “Marine Leaders Highlight Norway Unit’s Role as Deterrent to Russia,” Military.com, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/12/21/marine-leaders-highlight-norway-units-role-deterrent-russia.html (accessed February 19, 2018).
84 U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Core Missions,” Air Force News Online (August 15, 2013): http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/466868/air-force-core-missions/ (accessed December 14, 2017).
85 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2016), 5, 6, 8, https://www.defense.gov/ Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Report_to_Congress_on_Resourcing_the_Arctic_Strategy.pdf (accessed December 14, 2017).
86 Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), “Air Force Units,” http://www.jber.jb.mil/Units/Air-Force/ (accessed December 1, 2017).
87 Starr, Brown, and Cohen, “U.S. F-22s Intercept Russian Bombers, Fighters.”
88 DoD, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy, 6.
89 Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, “Air Force Units”; News Release, “Air National Guard Receives First HC-130J Combat King II,” Lockheed Martin, June 1, 2017, http://news.lockheedmartin.com/2017-06-01-Air-National-Guard-Receives-First-HC-130J-Combat-King-II (accessed December 14, 2017).
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90 “Army, Air Force Deploy Strykers North of the Arctic Circle, Defense News Online,
Defense Media Activity (November 5, 2015): https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/ 627875/army-air-force-deploy-strykers-north-of-the-arctic-circle/ (accessed December 1, 2017).
91 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), 18,
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf (accessed September 23, 2017).
92 DoD, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy, 6.
93 Arctic Council, “Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic,” May 15, 2013, 5-8, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/ 11374/529 (accessed September 23, 2017).
94 DoD, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy, 6; JBER Public Affairs, “Alaska Air National Guard Rescue Squadrons Conduct Precision Parachute Training at JBER,” January 30, 2018, http://www.jber.jb.mil/News/News-Articles/Article/1428261/alaska-air-national-guard-rescue-squadrons-conduct-precision-parachute-training/; Fact Sheet, “Guardian Angel,” U.S. Air Force, March 18, 2013, http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/ Article/104472/guardian-angel/ (accessed March 12, 2018).
95 Arctic Council, “Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic,” May 12, 2011, 16-18, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/ 11374/531 (accessed September 23, 2017).
96 Steven Groves, “Accession to Convention on the Law of the Sea Unnecessary to Advance Arctic Interests,” The Heritage Foundation Online (June 26, 2014): https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/accession-convention-the-law-the-sea-unnecessary-advance-arctic-interests (accessed December 19, 2017).
97 U.S. Air National Guard, 176th Wing, “176th Air Defense Squadron,” http://www.176wg.ang.af.mil/Units/176OG/176ADS/ (accessed December 1, 2017).
98 U.S. Air National Guard, 176th Wing, “Alaska Rescue Coordination Center,” http://www.176wg.ang.af.mil/Units/11RCC/ (accessed December 1, 2017).
99 DoD, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, 18-19.
100 Sherman, “The Arctic Heats Up,” 35.
101 Andrew Holland, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats, National Security in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: How a Lack of Attention to the Arctic Is Harming America’s Interests, December 10, 2014, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20141210/102783/HHRG-113-FA14-Wstate-HollandA-20141210.pdf (accessed November 5, 2017).
102 Lamothe, “In a Changing Arctic, A Lone Coast Guard Ice Breaker Maneuvers.”
103 Navy Task Force Climate Change, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap, 15.
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104 Jeff Glor , “Arctic Air Base gets $40 Million Upgrade in Face of Increasing Missile
Threats,” CBS News Online (May 30, 2017): https://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-thule-air-base-arctic-jeff-glor/ (accessed February 21, 2018); “Raytheon Wins 5-Year North Warning System Contract,” CBC News Online (April 01, 2014): http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ north/raytheon-wins-5-year-north-warning-system-contract-1.2594075 (accessed February 21, 2018).
105 Leslie Wickman, “Near-Term Space Support for Arctic Operations,” Center for Space Policy and Strategy Online (March 2017, 4): http://www.aerospace.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/06/Arctic_Space_Support.pdf (accessed February 21, 2018).
106 Conway, “Toward a US Air Force Arctic Strategy,” 77.
107 Ibid., 68.
108 DoD, Report to Congress on Resourcing the Arctic Strategy, 7-8.
109 General Lori J. Robinson, “Statement of General Lori J. Robinson, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command,” Congressional Record Online (April 16, 2017), 14-15, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Robinson_04-06-17.pdf (accessed November 15, 2017).
110 Mathew Strong, “Exercise VIGILANT SHIELD 17 Takes Off in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories,” NORAD News Online (October 19, 2016): http://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/ Article/979834/exercise-vigilant-shield-17-takes-off-in-yellowknife-northwest-territories/ (accessed February 21, 2018).
111 Allen and Whitman, Arctic Imperative, 16.
112 Air Force Public Affairs, “AF Senior Leaders Visit Arctic,” U.S. Air Force News Online (September 08, 2017): http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1302719/af-senior-leaders-visit-arctic/ (accessed March 13, 2018).
113 Ibid.
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