ARCENEAUX Inst Design Military Rule and Reg Transition in Ar

8/6/2019 ARCENEAUX Inst Design Military Rule and Reg Transition in Ar

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P e r g a m o nBull. Latin Am. Res., Vol. 16. No. 3. pp. 327-350. 19970 1997 Society for Latin A merican Studies

Published by Elsewer Science Ltd. Printed in Great Britain0261-3050197 S17.00 + 0.00

PII : SO261-3050(96)00025-3

Institutional Design, Military Rule,Transition in Argentina (1976-1983):of the Remmer Thesis

C. L. ARCENEAUX

and Regimean Extension

Departmen t of Political Science, University of California at Riverside,Riverside, CA 92521, USA

A b s t r a c t - I n this essay, I argue th at institutions in military regimes have a significantimpact not only on regime d urability, but also on the level of control the military islikely to exert when it withdraw s from rule. Borrowing from a typology of militaryregimes developed by Karen Rem mer, I note how the feudal regime engenders a levelof investment that drives it to remain in office despite the inability of thisinstitutional arrangem ent to contain politicisation in the armed forces. The obstinacyof the feudal regime thus inevitably leads it toward collapse. The argume nt is testedwith a detailed case study of the Proceso regime in Argentina. 0 199 7 Society forLatin American StudiesKey words-Argentina, military rule, democ ratic transition, institutions, civil-militaryrelations, military withdrawal

INTRODUCTIONKaren Remmers Military Rule in Latin Am erica stands out in the scholarship on militaryrule. Unlike other studies of the armed forces which centre on military repression, economicoutcomes, socio-political changes, or other consequences of military rule, Rem mers studyprovides a model which distinguishes different forms of military rule by institutional designand links them to regime durability. Her inquiry into the inner working s of military rule is awelcome advance in scholarship on the armed forces (Pion-Berlin, 1995 ).

One criticism of Rem mers work is that she applies the model to only one case, thePinochet regime in Chile, for detailed emp irical analysis. This leaves the model at arelatively untested status, an d invites scrutiny into whether or not the model has furtherimplications. Indeed, as I will demonstrate by applying the model to the Proceso militaryregime in Argen tina (19761983), the model not only gives insight into the determinan ts ofregime durability, but also insight into the determinan ts of regime transition mode. Th ispaper thus contributes both at a theoretical level with an extension of the Rem mer model,and at an empirical level with a penetrating inquiry into the institutional mec hanism s ofmilitary rule during the Process-an endeavour lacking or residing at only a journalisticlevel in current scholarship.REM MER S MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND REGIME D URABILITYRem mer uses two variables to classify military regimes+oncentration of authority andlevel of fusion between military and government roles. W hile acknow ledging that some


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328 C. L. Arceneauxregimes lie at intermediate levels, she argues that the two variables allow us to distinguishfour ideal type institutional designs and links the ideal types to regime durability. Militarygovernmen ts with a high concentration of authority and high fusion, sultanistic regimes,do best, lasting an average of 25.1 years. On the other hand , those w ith low concentrationand high fusion, feudal regimes, do worst, averaging 6.5 years. Military governments withhigh concentration and low fusion, monarchic regimes, la st an average of 6.9 years.Finally, military governmen ts with low concentration and low fusion, oligarchic regimes,average 16.3 years.

Her explanation for the differences in durability is that certain institutional designs forgeregime unity better than others, and that regimes with unity are better able to weatherpolitical crises. Specifically, the greater the fusion of military and government roles thegreater the need for concentrated authority so that government crises do not become crisesfor the military institution. Sultanistic regimes main tain a close linkage between themilitary and government, and quell military politicisation by centralising power.Conversely, feudal militaries allow the military institution to be flooded with politicaldebate withou t any mech anisms for control. On the other dimension of the typology, wefind that the lesser the fusion between military and government roles, the greater the need todisperse authority within the armed forces to main tain a linkage between the military andthe government. Monarchic militaries fail this task by separating military and governmentroles and concentrating authority. Consequently, they isolate the military ruler from themilitary ins titution. On the other hand , wh ile oligarchic militaries also separate militaryand government roles, they ma intain a linkage because collegial rule opens a num ber ofpaths to the institution (Remmer, 1991 : 39-42).

A statistical test consisting of twelve South A merican military governmen ts and adetailed case study on the sultanistic Pinochet regime support the hypothesised relation-ship between institutional design and regime durability. But is the limits of the Rem mermodel? In an examination of South Am erican transitions, Heligo Trindade notes that themore far-reaching the changes which had taken place in the structure of society, the morethe end of the authoritarian regime tended to take the form of a negotiated transition(1991: 301).* Indeed, it is quite reasonab le to expect that those military regimes ab le todictate significant changes during rule will also be able to dictate the terms of theirwithdraw al. The question thus arises, does the Rem mer model, which effectively revealsmechanisms related to regime durability, also impart insight into the determinan ts oftransition mode? A closer look at the consequences of fusion between military andgovernment roles tells us that it does.

Fusion can be directly correlated with the level of investment of a military government,or the desire to prolong rule. The greater the fusion, the more likely it is that the militarywill view the transition process as involving corporate interests (O Donnell and Schmitter,1986 : 34). Also, with greater fusion, the military becomes more likely to use government tobenefit the military as an institution. Rem mer, in a statistical analysis that uses militaryexpenditures as an indicator, notes that military claims on political resources are morelikely to increase when the military and government are fused (Rem mer, 1991 : 193-19 7).

Investment me ans that different regim es have different motives toward transition. Forregimes with fusion between and military and government roles, withd rawal appears costlyto regime leaders, and there is a great incentive to prolong rule. The problem is that theinstitutional design of the regime may not be capable of fulfilling th is desire. A sultanisticregime has capable institutions, and if extraneous circumstances pressure it to withdraw ,


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 329the high level of penetration through the military and government by a single ruler shouldallow it to weigh rationally investment in rule against reasons to withdraw voluntarily fromrule. On the other hand, the incentive to prolong rule and the capacity to meet this desireproves disas trous for the feudal regime because its institutional design ensures tha t it canonly become weaker over time. Indeed, it is this obstinacy that leads some feudal regimesto reckless measures concocted to shore up support. Cavarozzi captures this attribute offeudal regimes when he writes in reference to the Proceso: When confronted withobstacles, the Argentine military seemingly blindly push ed ahead anyw ay (1992: 222). Wecan see then tha t the mechan ics of military rule in the feudal regime inevitably push ittoward transition by collapse.

In the following case study, I apply the Rem mer model to the Argentine Proceso. I thendiscuss the deleterious impact of feudal institutions on the search for a political programand a coherent economic project. Although failure in these areas was obvious, theinvestment of the regime encouraged it to press on. In the final section I note how thisinability to face failure led to the collapse of the regime and how even during this time, theregime remained completely isolated from society and preoccupied with the still unresolvedissue of military unity. Wh ile a sound defeat in the Falkland s/Malvinas Islands wa s theimm ediate cause of the collapse, this analysis will show that the fate of the Proceso wa sdraw n much earlier by the establishment of feudal institutions.

THE PROCESO DE REORGANIZACION NACIONAL AS A FEUDAL REGIME24 March 1976 saw yet another golpe in Argentina. The new regime, labelled the Proceso deReorganization National by the comm anders in chief, would last until December 1983 .There was little institutional change during the Proceso. It was feudal at its inception andat its collapse. A rmy, navy and air force personnel tilled and partitioned government officesat all levels and were equally represented in the supreme organ of the regime, the MilitaryJunta. The Aug ust 1978 designation of the president as a fourth ma n, separate from theMilitary Junta, did increase the authority of the office, but power w as already so heavilytiled toward the Military Junta that the increase did little to dilute the overall dispersementof authority, The only real movem ent from the feudal arrangement, the three-monthwithd rawal from the junta by the air force and navy after the June 1982 defeat in theFalklands/M alvinas, wa s too brief and too late to alter significantly the trajectory of theregime.The dispersion of authorityThe Argentine armed forces approached military rule in 1976 with the memory of theOng aniato still fresh in their minds. The 19661973 period stood as a watershed for thenotorious divisions that seemed to arise whenever the military involved itself in politics. Thesolution, it wa s presumed, would be to divide the government among the services3 In thisway, it wa s assum ed that each wou ld be equally responsible and thus more prone tocomprom ise than conflict (Fontana, 1987 : 4546 ).4

The foundational docum ents of the regime established three institutions to lead theProceso: the Military Jun ta, the Legislative Advisory Comm ission (Com ision deAsesoram iento Legislative--CAL), and the president. The Military Junta consisted ofthe commanders in chief of the armed forces. The Military Junta could not meet outside the


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330 C. L. Arceneauxpresence of any mem ber, and although regulations stated that decisions would require onlya majority (unanimity only to appoint or remove the president), there was always a strongeffort for unanimity (Fontana, 1987 : 30, n. 40). The CAL was created to exercise pow ers oflegislative consultation (to the president) as a representative of the armed forces.6 Eachservice was authorised to appoint three mem bers from their own ranks to this nine-mem berbody.

Unlike the other two institutions, the president could not mirror the armed forces. Thearmy initially secured the office by reasoning that a s the most powerful service, this wouldbest serve the war against subversion. The armys institutional weight allowed them toextend their hold on the office through the entire Proceso. Nonetheless, portions of theexecutive office were divided between the services. Ministry,7 secretary, and subsecretarypositions were conveniently allocated, as were a num ber of administrative positions.

The constitution was used as a base from which to define the powers of each institution.The president was granted all the executive and legislative powers, m inus those pow ersrelated to military m atters,8 and minus the power to designate Suprem e Court m embers, theattorney general, and the general prosecutor of the Office of Adm inistrative Investigations.All of these powers w ere usurped by the Military Junta.

As a legislative advisory body and not a legislative body proper, the CA L d id not have theauthority to legislate. Rather, the CA L would identify legislation of significanttranscendence. The body would deliberate on such legislation an d had the authority toveto it when it was initiated by the president. In reality, the CAL wa s not the deliberativebody described in the foundational docum ents. W ith their superior officers in the MilitaryJunta, the CA L was more of an extension of this body than an independent body (V asquez,198547). Its role became essentially limited to establishing the order in which laws werepromulgated. But as an institution that placed more military personnel in government andfound itself divided among the services, the body served to deepen the dispersion ofauthority along service lines.

The M ilitary Junta, as called for by Article 1 of the Es t a t u t o , was the supreme organ ofthe Proceso. Although the president was invested with both executive an d legislativepow ers, his subordination to the Military Junta was designed to ensure that the equalrepresentation of the armed forces wou ld not be upset. The junta designated the president,and had the authority of dism issal. M oreover, the juntas duty to supervise the completionof the basic objectives and concurrent policies during the entirety of the Proceso entailed astrict oversight role over the president. The movement of the executive from the MilitaryJunta in Augu st 197812wa s matched by the creation of the Military Com mittee. Consistingof the president and M ilitary Junta, it was given responsibility for all matters of nationalsecurity and was designed to institutionalise junta consultation in this area. Finally, theMilitary Junta itself was granted legislative roles through two processes-by the initiativeof any one of its mem bers, and in its role as arbitrator when the president and the CA Ldisagreed on policy.i3

From the above we can see that the institutional design called for by the foundationaldocum ents of the regime dispersed authority, primarily along service lines. W hile mostgovernments migh t be ideally portrayed as a pyramid with a political leader at the peak, theProceso could be st be portrayed as three near equal pyramids, each of which independentlyextended deep into the government and had as their peak a service comm ander in theMilitary Junta. But there was also a sense in which authority wa s dispersed vertically,especially w ithin the army. T his occurred over time mainly as a result of internal repression.


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 331In the negotiations before the golpe, General Luciano Benjam in (III Army Corps

comm ander) had army comm ander in chief Jorge Videla agreed to allocate extensiveauthority to the corps comm anders after the coup to assist the antisubversive campaign(Vasquez, 1985 : 28). Althoug h the other two services also involved themselves, responsi-bility was primarily allocated to the army, w ith the country divided into five zones eachcontrolled by a corps comm ander. These zones were further divided and placed under theresponsibility of infantry and cavalry brigade com manders, who in turn divided thesesubzones and placed them under officers who led regiment and battalion divisions. Theseofficers had direct authority over about 340 clandestine detention centres, fully staffed withmilitary personnel (Pion-Berlin, 1989 : 1022103). Along w ith this repressive bureaucracy,the corps comm anders were also granted the authority to establish special war councils(consejos de guerra especiales es tables) to supervise judicial proceedings of war crimes underrepressive laws (de Drom i, 1988 : 234).14

Control over repressive activities by the Military Junta wa s more formal than real.15 Tojustify the unprecedented arrests and decrees that allowed for these arrests, the governmentconstantly alluded to discretionary powers gran ted to the executive in a state of siege.16Legal procedures related to habeas corpus and norms of due process were ignored. Thesediscretionary powers filtered down the hierarchy, deteriorating lines of responsibility andencouraging a sense of impunity in the security personnel. Moreover, the character of manylaws was conductive to a vertical dispersion of authority. Because many repressive lawsreferred to positions, beliefs, or affinities rather than physical acts as crimes, they werereadily open to interpretation at the lowest administrative levels (Groisman , 1984 ; Spitta,1983 : 80-82). Thus, the corps comm anders had both a mass ive bureaucracy at theirdisposal and am ple latitude to use their authority.18

The vertical dispersion of authority significantly influenced the Proceso. Still, thehorizontal dispersion of authority along service lines was the greater obstacle for any movestoward a concentration of authority. The characterisation of the regime as anescalafdnocracia (government of the e s c a l u f d n m i l i t a r - t h e military promotion list) isaccurate (Lazara, 1988 : 236). Because of the explicit attempt to represent the armed forcesinstitutionally, it is no surprise that the Proceso cannot be identified with any singleindividual. Across tim e, seven presidents and four juntas led the Proceso. Their rotationprohibited any movem ent toward a personalisation of power.

Fu s i o n o f g o v e rn m e n t a n d m i l i t a ry r o l e sUpon assum ing governm ent, the military m oved quickly to replace civilian public officialswith military officers. Like the dispersement of authority, this action w as a direct responseto the experience of the armed forces during the Onganiato, when the military felt isolatedfrom the government, yet was held responsible for its actions. T he direct participation ofthe armed forces, it wa s assum ed, would guarantee support for the government in thearmed forces (Fontana, 1987 : 45-6).The A c t a p a r a e l P r o ce s o d e R e o rg a n i z a c id n N a t i o n a l , publicly issued the day of the golpe,dismissed the President and executive staff, governors, vicegovernors, federal intervenors,the National Congress and the provincial congresses, the Supreme Court and the provincialsuperior tribunals, the general secretary of the nation, and the secretary of the treasury. Itwa s the first move by the military to place its personnel in government. W ith the exceptionof the congresses, which were simply dissolved, and the courts, which were tilled with


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332 C. L. Arceneauxsympathetic judges (Groism an, 1987 ),19 military personnel filled these posts under laws21.273 and 21.257.

The distribution of government posts between active military personnel, retired militarypersonnel, and civilians leaned heavily toward the first. Just after the golpe, active officerswere primarily found in the military junta, the president, the cabinet, secretaries an dsubsecretaries of the president, the CA L, and as intervenors in comm unication med iums,private b usiness administered by the state, and labour unions. Retired officers were mainlyconfined to provincial governorships, and civilians assum ed roles chiefly as Supreme Courtmem bers, secretaries of state, mayors, and as presidents of state businesses an d banks.*Active military personnel wou ld remain dom inant for the duration of the regime, althoughretired officers and civilians would make gains in some areas.*

The greatest num ber of military personnel in government positions was found inadministrative posts. Recalling the capacity of labour unions to mob ilise politically,hund reds of military officers were stationed as federal intervenors in unions (Abos, 1982 : 7).And with strong sentimen ts in the military to main tain the size of the state, and the mu tualdistrust amon g the services which made each reluctant to allow privatisation in the areasallocated to them, the num ber of military personnel in administrative positions was notgreatly affected by the regimes neoliberal econom ic program.** A nother indication ofmilitary involvement in adm inistration is given by the Com ision National de Respons-abilidad Patrimonial (CON ARE PA).23 CON AR EPA was commissioned with, amongother du ties, collecting the assets of individuals and businesses guilty of corrupt activities orassisting subversion, and placing intervenors in charged busines ses (de Drom i, 1988 : 237-242). Finally, the repressive apparatus introduced thousands of military personnel to thedaily politics of the regime. Soldiers w ere systematically rotated in and out of anti-subversive activities so that the hand s of as many as possible would be dirtied and theirindividual interests wou ld be tied to the more sinister actions of the regime (Pion-Berlin,1989: 103; Dabat, 1984: 136).

The depth of the fusion between military and government roles is also illustrated by thesubstan tial use of superior officers in the policy-making process. While policy-making onlyinvolved dozens of officers and thus paled in comparison to the thousands involved inadministration, the quality of the personnel was higher. That is, the policy-making processdrew dozens of officers at the highest levels of each force into daily national politics a ndthereby increased the opportunity for factional growth at the peak of the armed forces. Adiscussion of the legislative process will clarify the insertion of military personnel in thisprocess.

Legislation could be initiated by either the president or the Military Junta.24 The billwould then go to the CA L which, in plenary session and within seventy-two hours, wou ldestablish whether or not the bill qualified as one of significant transcendence. If it did not,the bill would be sanctioned and prom ulgated. If it did, it would be handed to one of theeighty working subcom missions of superior officers headed by a mem ber of the CA L,which w ould coordinate a study of the bill with the relevant executive. office(s). The studywould be limited to twenty days, save bills related to the budget or other complex bills,which would be given thirty days. After the study, the bill would go back to the floor of theCA L, which in plenary session would send a final decision to the president within seventy-two hours. If the president disagreed with the final decision of the CA L, the bill would besent to the Military Junta, which would issu e a definite decision.

Although the Military Junta played a significant role in the daily processing of


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 333legislation, care wa s taken to defer much of the debate to subsidiary levels in the MilitaryJunta to create a veneer of harmony among the commanders. These subsidiary levels servedto incorporate more superior officers into the daily politics of the regime and thus broadenthe extent of military politicisation.

Each comm ander wa s equipped with an independent bureaucracy consisting of superiorofficers to whom bills wou ld be deferred the mom ent they entered the Military Junta.Know n as Area Designated Advisory Staffs (Personal de A sesoramien t o Des ignado por e lArea-PA DA ), each essentially mirrored the presidents cabinet and was coordinated bythe secretary general of the respective comm anders force. Wh en a bill entered the MilitaryJunta, the secretary general of each member wou ld direct it to his PA DA . This meant thatbills would initially be considered independently by each force. Each PAD A was authorisedto call on military and civilian experts for advice. After independent consideration, aninterservice harmo nisation team (equ ip0 de com pat ib i l i zac idn in ter fuerza s -ECI) would becreated for mem bers of each services PA DA . The EC1 wou ld then harmonise theappraisa ls from each service and draft a final bill. Like the PA DA s, the ECIs could call onmilitary and civilian experts. The bill would then be returned to the secretary generals, whowou ld meet at least once a week to review bills. If the EC 1 failed to find agreement on anyportion of the bill, or even on the fundamentals of the bill, it wou ld be up to the secretarygenerals to search for a consensus. Only if the secretary generals failed in this task w ould theMilitary Junta proper debate the bill. After the Military Junta reached agreem ent, thesecretary general of the Military Junta (a two-month position rotated among the secretarygenerals) would forge the exact language of the bill.

The Proceso wa s thus ruled by a military government in the fullest sense of the term.Military officers permeated the decision-mak ing, administrative, and repressive appara-tuses. The fusion between military and government roles was recognised from the start byVidela, who stated: the armed forces, as an institution, gave an institutional response to acrisis that was also institutional.25

THE STEADFAST MOVEM ENT TOWARD COLLAPSEW hen the Proceso military leaders assumed the reins of government, they were granted apassive sense of legitimacy from society. T he escalating economic crisis and the inability ofthe Peronist government to contain the rampant political violence had dampened socialsupport for civilian rule. Entering office with a licence to bring order and security back tothe country, the armed forces were generally accepted by Argentine citizens as their lasthope (Q uiroga, 1989: 4142).

But the political plans of the military went further than the restoration of order. P lanningfor the golpe had begun in Novem ber 1975 (Vasquez, 1985 : 1742 ). By the time of theintervention, the armed forces were comm itted to ending the cycles of civilian and militarygovernment that had characterised Argentine politics since 1930 . But the military couldnever move beyond its anti-subversive assignm ent. The war against subversion unified themilitary, and any moves beyond it engendered factionalism. Com missioned withgovernance, this wa s a formula that sim ply could not be sustained. Not even able toclarify its goals (much less effectively pursue them), the Proceso regime grew more andmore isolated from society over time. The vicious circle wa s completed as the failure toorganise a successful regime in any sense of the word intensified divisions within the armedforces.26


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334 C. L. ArceneauxTo evidence the deleterious impact of feudal institutions during the Proceso, we can

trace the problems encountered by the regime as it sought consensus in two areas, thepolitical program and the economic plan. By recognising how the arrangemen t of regimeinstitutions foiled progress in these areas, how these failures strengthened regime isolationand regime disunity, and how the investment of the regime made its leaders reluctant towithd raw, the importance of feudal institutions to the trajectory of the Proceso willbecome clear.

The search for a po l i t i ca l programThe desire to be more tha n an interim government between civilian rulers was announced inthe originating docum ents of the Proceso, issued the day of the golpe on 24 March 1976. Asnoted, the E s t a t u t o , A c t a , and law 21.256 outlined the institutional design of the newregime. Another document, L a P r o c l a m a , justified the intervention, pointing to the vacuumof power in the government, corruption, subversion, and economic decline. The basic goalsof the Proceso were delineated in E l P r o p & t o y O b j e ct i v e s B k i co s d e 1 P r o ce s o d eR e o r g a n i z a c i d n N a t i o n a l . Here the regime established its fundam ental proposition:

To restore the essential values that fundamentally serve in the integral m anagem ent ofthe State, emphasising the sense of morality, perfection, and efficiency, ind ispensablefor the reconstitution of the content and image of the Nation, to eradicate subversionand promote the economic development of national life based on the balanced andresponsible participation of all the distinct sectors toward the goal of assuring thelater restoration of a democratic, representative, and federal republic, adju sted toreality and the demands for solutions and progress of the Argentine people.

After the fundam ental proposition, nine basic objectives were listed:1. Create political institutions independent of sectarianism, personalism , or other

factions;2. Strengthen Christian values;3. Strengthen national security, eradicate subversion and the conditions that facilitate it;4. Establish a legal and social order;5. Establish a socioeconomic condition to capture capacity of country and citizens;6. Establish goodw ill in productive work, equality of opportunity for all;7. Establish harm onious relation among state, capital, and busine ss;8. Create an education system in accord with objectives, culture, and values of the

Argentine nation;9. Ensure self-determination in the world arena.27

A sixth docum ent, the B a s e s p a ra l a Z n t e rv e n c id n d e l a s Fu e rz a s A r m a d a s , summarised thearguments in L a P r o c l a m a an d El Propds i to . But the importance of the document is foundin its fourth section, Desarrollo de1 Proceso. This section stated that the Proceso wou lddevelop throug h three phases. The first was the assum ption of control. The second wouldbe the reordering of institutions. The third phase would be one of consolidation, but exactlywha t consolidation mean t, it was explicitly stated , w ould be explained at a later date.The failure to define consolidation opened a door of debate that wou ld challenge thefeudal institutions of the regime. Few officers disagreed with the fundam ental propositionof the basic objectives. But disagreemen t flourished as different regime members offered


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 33 5ideas on exactly how these objectives ought to be consolidated. The omission allowedofficers to debate a host of questions, including: How long should the Proceso last?; Shouldthere be an interim civil or civil-military government ?; W hat role should the traditionalpolitical parties play?; What marks the end of the subversive threat?; What strategies bestdiminish subversion?; To wha t extent should the military institutionalise itself in the futuredemocratic order?

The first cleavages found President Videla facing off against fellow junta mem berAdm iral Em ilio Massera and General Genaro Diaz Bessone. Masseras main concern washow the concentration of power in Videlas hand s affected his own personal aspirations.Although original agreemen ts between the services called for a retired officer to hold thepresidency, it was later agreed that it would be best to have the army commander retain thepresidency during the antisubversive camp aign. However, the air force and navy deman dedthat the retention of the presidency be considered a s i tuac idn de excepc iona l idad , subject torepeal once the subversive threat subsided (Fontana, 1987 : 47).

By early 1977 , Massera began to lead navy assertions that subversion was subsid ing, andtherefore the s i t u a c i d n ought to be repealed and a fourth man placed in the executiveoffice. Masseras plan was to retire and assum e the position of fourth ma n himself (deDrom i, 1988 : 205). Interestingly, Videla was able to stave off Massera with the tacit supportof army hardliners. Although their interests wou ld later diverge greatly, in early 1977 bothfound advantages in the s i t u a c i d n . The s i t u a c i d n gave Videla extensive powers as both armycomm ander and president, and the hardliners were accorded extraordinary powers as aresult of the antisubversive campaign (Fontana, 1987 : 59-60; Alvarez, 1992 ).

Massera made full use of the institutions accorded to him as he pursued hismegaloman iacal dreams . H is control of the Ministry of foreign R elations allowed him tovisit a num ber of countries in attempts to bolster h is international reputation as a leader ofthe Proceso, and to meet with Argentine exiles he viewed as potential allies. Massera metwith leaders of the Socialist International, right-wing Peronists, Frondizi desarro l l i s tas ,disenchanted politicians, and anyone else who would listen to him (Vasquez, 1985 : 131-135). Much of his campaign to assum e the presidency wa s paid for by illegal seizures oftorture victims goods at the notorious Navy mechanics School (Paoletti, 1986 : 145-160).M asseras abject lack of principle wa s epitomised by the fact that wh ile he fully supervisedthe torture centre, outside the country he criticised hum an rights abuses in Argen tina,placing full blame on the army to strengthen the position of the navy.29 Indeed, therepressive apparatus controlled by M assera w as an important tool in his power drive. InFebruary, 1977 , Massera had union leader Oscar Sm ith disappeared just before he wa s toconsummate an important labour agreement with the Videla government, and in July 1977he had the amb assador to Venezuela, Hidalgo Soli, d isappeared. SolL was the first andmost senior Radical party member to cooperate with the Videla government, and wasregarded as a potential interim presidential candidate.30

Masseras pressure to end the s i t u a c i d n was stepped up toward the end of 1977, as hebegan to question publicly the dual role held by Videla.31 But concern for army unity, andthe unity spu rred by the Beagle confrontation with Chile, led to the April 1978 MilitaryJunta decision that allowed a retired Videla to retain the presidency in August of that year(Fontana, 1987 : 67-68).32 Masseras failure to be appointed president was the beginning ofthe end for him. Retired in September 1978 , he wa s left without an institutional positionfrom w hich to influence the regime, and slowly faded even as his criticisms of the regimeintensified.


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336 C. L. ArceneauxThe other early threat to Videla came from Diaz Bessone, an important power player in

initiating the golpe. To appease his power asp irations, Videla allowed Diaz Bessone tocreate and head the Ministry of Planning in September 1976 . The ministry was charged withdrawing up the medium and long terms plans of the regime. A s a hardline nationalist, DiazBessone would use the institution to criticise the neoliberal economic program of Martinezde Hoz, and attempt to build a support base in agriculture and primary sector producers.33The core of his political program wa s to establish c o m i s i o n e s d e m o d e r n i z a c i d n to channelpublic participation in the regime. The c o m i s i o n e s would consist of individual citizens whorepresented the opinions and concerns of certain sectors and regions of the country. Theproposal wa s an obvious attempt both to underm ine political parties as alternative politicalchannels, and to bolster the power of Diaz Bessone by placing the c o m i s i o n e s under theMinistry of Planning.34

The c o m i s i o n e s d e m o d e r n i z a c i d n were part of Diaz Bessones P r o y e c t o N a t i o n a l , adocument drafted in mid-1977 to act as the political p lan of the Proceso. The documentcalled for a military government for ten to twelve more years, and constitutional reformpending input from the c o m i s i o n e s . Although the P r o y e c t o N a t i o n a l wa s approved by theMilitary Junta, it wa s made clear that it wou ld serve more as a general guideline than as astrict plan (Fontana, 1987 : 61). Constitutional reform was an intense subject of debate inthe armed forces; many w anted a less gradual opening, and the traditional political partieswere still viewed as legitimate actors by many officers. Interestingly, Videla and his moresoftline approach were strengthened v i s - c i - v i sDiaz Bessone in part because of Masseraspush for a resolution to the fourth man problem. Even army hardliners coalesced behindhim, realising that any resolution of the fourth man problem that did not favour Videlawould w eaken the army as a whole. Recognising that his document and ministry wouldhave little real influence, Diaz Bessone retired as Minister of Planning in December 1977 .35The falls of Massera and Diaz Bessone were not indicators of regime consolidation byVidela. Both failed to impress their political projects on the regime, but they successfullyoccupied Videla so that he was unable to push his own agenda. Rad ical Party leader Ra lilAlfonsin illustrated the lack of regime consolidation in December 1977 when he imploredthe government to unify its personnel, because it cannot have twelve voices of governmen t,but only one (Troncoso II, 1984 : 84). The stability of Videla was dependent upon armyhardliners, who supported him only so long as he did not push own agenda. Indeed, toremind Videla of his precarious situation, army hardliners wou ld often step up therepressive campaign to embarrass him when he made m otions toward a political opening,or they would disappear his softline supporters.36

But the departures of M assera and Diaz Bessone did invigorate Videla in the short run.About March 1978 , Videla announced that the Period of Ordering was nearing its end,and that a creative stage was about to begin and last roughly one year.37 Videlas hope w asto implem ent the political proposal designed by Secretary General of the President JoseVillarreal and his subsecretary Ricardo Yofre which emp hasised civil-military dialogue andgeneral elections within seven years (Vasquez, 1985 : 75-76). Videlas power seemed to bestrengthened with his appointment as the fourth man in Augu st 1978, and a ministerialreshuffle which largely favoured him (Fon tana, 1987 : 72).38 But the reality of the situationwas clarified by a late-1978 internal docum ent entitled, R e p o rt o n t h e N a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n .The pessimistic document stressed weak presidential authority, regime isolation, and thecontinued ill-effects of military factionalism (Vasquez, 1985 : 94-103 ).

The departures of Massera and Diaz Bessone could not allow the regime to strengthen


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 337itself because the feudal institutions which allowed their intrusions remained. No soonerhad they left than other opposition to Videlas consolidation gained ground, most notablyby General A lbano H arguindeguy. The friction between Videla and Harguindeguy wasalready apparent in 1977 , when Videla made allusions to a political opening whileHarguindeguy spoke pessimistically on the chances for such an opening (Troncoso II, 1984 :pass im) .39 As Interior Ministry, Harguindeguy saw himself as the central figure on thequestion of political opening. To check such aspirations, Videla had a new office created inthe late-1978 ministerial reform, the Advisor to the President on Political R eforms. Theoffice was given to a civilian and specifically designed to initiate support from the politicalparties, a move that Harguindeguy had publicly criticised (Fontana, 1987 : 7677 , 81-82).

Videlas drive to implem ent the Villarreal-Yofre plan was soon weakened by the morearduous endeavour to draft a political proposal that united separate official proposalsdrawn up between September 1977 and July 1978 by each service. An interservicecomm ission had been formed to resolve the major points of disagreemen t, which included:(1) whether or not to set a fixed date for transition; (2) whether or not to create an officialparty to represent the military; (3) whether or not to restructure the traditional parties; and(4) how much to open political activity. T hrough 1979 , negotiations between the servicescontinued. In regard to the political parties and political activity, the army under Videlatook the soft line, desiring a loosening of political activity and dialogue with the politicalparties. The air force took an opposing position, and the navy placed itself in between thetwo, although closer to the air force position. Harguindeguy dissociated himself from theofficial army position and aligned h imself closest to the navy position. In a num ber ofpublic statements viewed favourably by the navy and air force commanders, he called forthe restructuring of political parties and constitutional reforms to institutionalise themilitary and government. Harguindeguy s actions weakened Videlas attempt to assertarmy hegemony, and helped to lengthen negotiations on the interservice political proposal.Indicative of feudal institutions, regime leaders reacted to the inability to resolvedifferences in June 1979 by inviting all active duty generals, vice adm irals, and brigadiers tojoin in the debate (Fontana, 1987 : 79-83). Meanwhile, the need for a political p lan wasbecoming more urgent as the subversive threat dissipated and Argentine society demandedcertainty regarding the specific intentions of the regime.@ In part a response to governmentambivalence and the softer position of the army under P resident Videla and commanderRoberto Viola, III Army Corps comm ander General Luciano M enendez led anunsuccessful uprising from his garrison and called for the resignation of Viola as armycomm ander. Forced to resign and imprisoned , the influential hardliner declared: I amconvinced that the Argentine military is atypical, unconstitutional, and circumstantial, andthat it ought to exercise pow er in the military style to find grand solutions; only this canjustify its presence in power (Troncoso III, 1 984: 132-133).

The interservice political proposal was published under the title: L o s B a s e s P o l i t i c o s d e10s Fuerza s A rma das pa ra e l Proceso de R eorganiza c idn N ac iona l .41 It is significant that airforce pressu re led to a change in the title of the document from Proposito to Bases. Insum , the document could not be considered a strict delineation of the political project of theregime (de Drom i, 1988 : 416). It failed to specify time frames for opening political andpartisan activity, equivocated on questions of constitutional reform and the institutiona-lisation of the armed forces in a future government, and omitted any references to thecreation of an official political party (Fontana, 1987 : 89). Concerned more with militaryfactionalism than ideological clarification, the ritualistic publication of the document wa s


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33 8 C. L. Arceneauxindicative of military concerns rather than governmental concerns. It was greeted withdissatisfaction in Argentine society.42

The only significant process initiated by L o s B a s e s P o l i t i c o s was the dialogue with socialsectors and political parties.43 Headed by Harguindeguy, the process lasted from M arch toSeptember 1980 . Officially boycotted by both the Peronists and Radicals, the participantsconsisted m ainly of sympathetic political and economic groups, small parties, and economicgroups w ho met with Harguindeguy to voice their objections to the economic program (deDromi, 1988: 417; Troncoso IV, 1984:p a s s i m ) . Army corps comm ander Leopold0 Galtieri setthe tone at the outset w ith his statement: The political dialogue has begun. This does not meanthat tom orrow there will be elections. The ballot boxes are well guarded and will remain wellguarded (Troncoso IV, 1984 : 47). Likewise, Harguindeguy main tained the pessimistic tone onmilitary w ithdraw al at the conclusion of the dialogue, asserting: Insofar as the objectives canbe achieved in three years-something that seems particularly difficult to me-one could saythat this would be the last military government. But if the objectives are not achieved, th iswould not be the last military government (Troncoso IV, 1984: 118).W hile the armed forces remained politically amb ivalent through 1980 , their divisionsbecame more public as the Ma rch 1981 expiration date for Videlas tenure neared(Portantiero, 1987 : 268). Viola had been groomed for the office since he retired inDecember 1979, but opposition to him was strong in the navy and from army comm anderGaltieri. But Galtieri found it difficult to shore up support within the army, hav ingunderestimated the allies gained by Viola through the years as army chief of staff andcommander in chief. This led navy commander Armando Lambruschini to withdraw hisopposition for fear of stimu lating greater disunity in the armed forces (Fontana, 1987 : 124).

W ith the rise of Viola, many assum ed that the time of political definition had finallyarrived (de Drom i, 1988 : 345). As army commander in chief, Viola had originally pushedfor an official political party, labelled the Mov imiento de Opinion National, consisting ofunions, provincial parties, and disillusioned mem bers of the Peronist and Radical parties.But the idea lost support early on within the army for fear that it would bring into existencea new Peron (Visquez, 1985: 92-93; de Dromi, 1988: 418). Viola thus saw aper tura as thelast hope for the regime to gain suppo rt in society. He announced his wish for a politicalopening in his inauguration (de Dromi, 1988: 203-206) but the announcement was takenwith a grain of salt by the public. M ost were aware of the executive weakness caused byfeudal rule and realised that there existed substantial opposition to aper tura in the armedforces.44 Although the political parties championed Violas intentions, they were reluctantto support a precarious leader (Fontana, 1987 : 133).45

Every move made by Viola to initiate aper tura was blocked or underm ined by Galtieri(Pion-Berlin, 1987 : 217-21 8; Babin i, 1991 ). Galtieri was advantage d in three ways: he wasan active officer, as a mem ber of the junta he wa s a governmen tal superior to Viola, and hedid not suffer the daily wear of an executive. Violas only advantage lay in his limited abilityto influence policy as chief administrator (Babini, 1991). Galtieri laid the groundw ork forhis attack early, promoting Violas opponents and passing over his allies in the December1980 army promotions. Of the five corps comm anders, the only remaining Viola supporterleft was General Jose Villarreal. And lower in the army hierarchy, independen ts werenoticeably chosen over Viola partisans.46 The rise of Viola was thus more a cosmetic gainfor softliners than a real gain, as the hard line was emboldened by the gains made byGaltieri. Indeed, one mon th after Violas inauguration , the Military Jun ta issuedO r i e n t a t i o n s N o . 2 , in which it warned the President to cease the aper tura .


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 33 9Junta mem bers also began to remind Argentines publicly that power resides in the

Military Junta, and not the Presidency, and undermine moves by Viola (Fontana,1987 : 128-13 2). In one of Violas earliest moves to demonstrate reconciliation with thePeronists, he stated that Isabel Peron wou ld be released as a sign of goodw ill. N onetheless,he was soon rebuked by Galtieri, who declared that such an act wou ld force the junta torequest his resignation.47 Also, in August 1981 , Galtieri went to the United States andannounced that Argentina wou ld be willing to contribute troops to a mu ltinational force insupport of the Cam p David A ccords, know ing that Viola had recently affirmed theopposite (de Dromi, 1988: 346).

The major obstacle faced by Galtieri in his push to oust Viola came from navycomm ander in chief Lam bruschini, who feared that it wou ld cause greater disunity in thearmed forces. With the retirement of Lambruschini in mid-1981 and his replacement byJorge Anaya, a long-time Galtieri associate a nd personal friend, Violas ousting becam einevitable (F ontana, 1987 : 140-141). Finally, in December 1981 , Galtieri took advantage ofa health emergency that V iola wou ld later describe a s minor to have him declaredincapacitated and unfit for office. Galtieri him self then assumed the presidency. UnderGaltieri, the political isolation of the regime from society would becom e unde niable as heled Argentina to war, and the Proceso to collapse.

T h e i n a b i l i t y t o im p l em e n t a co h e re n t e co n o m i c p o l i c yEconomic policy during the Proceso w as subordinated to the corporate and politicalinterests of the military, as well as the short-term material interests of each service. Theneoliberal-monetarist-based agenda originally proposed by Martinez de Hoz wa s neverreally implem ented. Rather, it wa s applied piecemeal, and the result was a usuallyamb iguous and often contradictory approach to economic policy that harmed nearly everyeconomic sector. This is not to argue that a consistently applied neo liberal program wouldhave engendered economic growth, stability, and wide support from all sectors, but that thelack of coherence prevented the regime from targeting a n y economic groups as supportbases. Although one migh t point to the financial sector as a beneficiary, even it wasdevastated by 1982 (Dabat, 1984: 134).

Mostly military officers were impressed not so much with the economic program per se ofMartinez de Hoz, but with how the program could provide such simple answers toproblems that in their view had long plagued Argentine society (Fontana, 1987 : 55). Theoverriding concern of the armed forces was subversion, which it linked to the growth of animm oral culture (Spitta, 1983 ). Neoliberalism, by focusing on the growth of the populiststate and the privileged access of certain busine ss and labour groups, located the source ofthis immorality. Thus, w hile the military accepted neoliberalism as a mean s to stabilisegovernability in Argentine society and as an attempt to redefine power relations, theeconomic team valued neoliberalism as a goal in and of itself comm ensurate with economicgrowth a nd productivity (Fontana, 1986 ).48 This disjunction in the assum ed purpose ofneoliberalism would lead to conflict in day-to-day policy-making.

The feudal arrangemen t of the regime encouraged this underlying conflict. Thedispersion of authority increased the probability that any given policy would confront oneor more military sectors. The institutional hurdles faced by the economic team can be listedunder three headings: direct institutional confrontations; public criticisms; and indepen-dent implementation.


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340 C. L. ArceneauxOne direct institutional confrontation was with the Ministry of Planning. As noted, the

ministry served as a political base for General Diaz Bessone. R ecognising the overlap of thisnationalist-led ministry with his own ministry, Martinez de Hoz expressed his disquiet earlyon.49 A second institutional confrontation was inserted directly into the Ministry ofEconom ics. Decrees 223 and 274 of April 1976 established the Secretaria de Estado deProgramacion y Coordination Econom ica to study economic proposals subm itted to thestate by domestic and foreign busine sses. The committee consisted of five mem bers: eachservice appointed a mem ber, the Ministry of Labour appointed a mem ber, a nd the Ministryof Justice appointed a mem ber (in the case of proposals presented by foreign businesses, anappointee from the Ministry of Foreign relations was added) (de Drom i, 1988 : 317-318).One more direct institutional confrontation wa s the interministerial comm ission w hichcoordinated privatisations. It allowed the armed forces to filter privatisation efforts (deDromi, 1988: 312).

Public criticisms also allowed military officers to impede the economic program. We canview this as an institutional obstacle insofar as the importance of the criticisms wasdetermined by the institutional position of the officer making them. The first majorcriticisms of economic policy came from junta mem ber A dmiral M assera in October 1977 ,as he began to publicise a quasi-alliance with Frondizi desarro l l i s tas . Labour ministerGeneral Horatio Liendo, who tied Martinez de Hozs policies to labour unrest, followedsuit,50 as did Diaz Bessone, w ho led the attack on wage policy.5 Soon afterward, Masserawould use the navy publication La Gace ta A4ar inera as a forum to criticise economic policy(Troncoso II , 1984: 78). Other institutional statemen ts, such as the 20 July 1980 air forcepronouncement on the importance of air force industries, can be viewed as veiled warn ingsto Martinez de Hoz (Troncoso IV, 1984: 90). More obvious was General Oscar BartolomeGallinos (Director of the military industrial complex Fabricaciones Militares) publicassertion that economic policy in the Proceso depreciated the role that industry had playedin the development of the country (Troncosoo V, 1984: 27).52

A third obstacle to the neoliberal Martinez de Hoz agenda wa s the fact that the economicteam depended on military actors to implem ent certain policies. The Proceso economy wa sa militarised economy, in that military officers administered nearly every public sectorbusines s, and officers (retired and active) were placed in most large businesses and banks assupervisors (Ferrer, 1982 : 113). This significantly affected the Laws of Dispensibility(21.260 and 21.274), which were passed to reduce the total num ber of state employees. Thelaws rendered public employees with subversive, pa rtisan, or sectoral ties liable to dism issal(De Dromi, 1988: 394-395). A lthough hundreds were dismissed under these laws, mostwere promptly replaced. As it turned out, the laws were used more a s tools of dominationby supervisors than a s measu res to decrease the overall level of employment (Spitta,1983 : 83-84). Another example of difficulties in the policy process faced by the economicteam wa s directly related to the division of authority among the three services. Each serviceviewed its allotted portion of the state as a measure of power. Consequently, any potentialreduction would be viewed by the affected service as a reduction if its power v i s - d - v i s theother tw o services. Thus, even when the military was disposed to accept privatisation incertain areas, it often fought such measu res simply because of the institutional arrangemen tof the regime (Fontana, 1985 : 106-107).

In many policy areas, the anti-subversive drive led military leaders to weaken theeconomic teams sugges tions. F irst, fears that unemploym ent would spur greater subversiveactivity led the military to attack contradictory policies (Ferrer, 1982 : 110; Canitrot,


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 3411980).53 Second, many military leaders recognised the power that the Peronists held inArgentine society, and hoped for some sort of alliance with the right-wing sectors (Fontana ,1985 : 103). The proposal was presented to Videla just a few days before the golpe by somethirty colonels. The influence of their argumen t can be found in the fact that unions werenot dissolved during the Proceso, but frozen.54 Indeed, from 1976 to 1977 Generals Violaand Carlos D alla Tea met with labour leaders on a number of occasions in an attempt toestablish some sort of collaboration (Pozzi, 1988 : 115). It wa s not until the Novem ber 1979promulgation of the comprehensive repressive labour law 22.105 that one could argue thatthe military had a clear labour strategy (Abos, 1982 : 63-68). But even it would fail toanchor the regime in a clear strategy, as in little over a year the law wou ld stand at odds w ithViolas projected apertura.

Another current inimical to the economic team was the nationalist outlook that typifiedmost military hardliners. The nationalists viewed the economic team with suspicion fromthe start because of their international connections, anti-industrial comm ents, andirresponsible dism antling of the state (Fontana, 1985 : 104). Significantly, the nationalistsconcerns were not principally directed toward decreases in the military budget or theprovision of raw and strategic materials (areas where the state was likely to be involved inproduction). On the contrary, the economic team called for increases in the military budgetand accepted military participation in many areas of the economy. But the nationalistsconcerns were broader than this, and they looked upon almost every privatisation movemade by the internationalist and anti-industrial economic team with distrust (F ontana,1985: 103-l 104).55

The nationalists also argued that the narrow standa rds of output and efficiency used todecide where to direct resources did not consider larger issues of development, as in the case ofstate busines ses which aided development in border zones through job creation and theexploitation of local resources (Fontana, 1985 : 104). A similar confrontation was found intariff reductions.56 Although the economic team wa s cognisant of the armed forces interests inprotecting certain strategic and raw materials, it was largely taken by surprise by the intensityof military opposition to tarrif reductions in areas such as automobiles and electronics.57

Faced w ith military hurdles in almost every direction, Martinez de Hoz found him selfunable to apply his neoliberal plan consistently. Argentine policy was erratic in freeingprices, freezing wages, cutting fiscal policy, freeing trade, and stabilising monetary policy(Ferrer, 1981 : 1 &129). This fact was clearly draw n to the governments attention inAugust 1979 , when twelve businessmen met with Videla to indicate the need for a coherentpolicy in the economic sphere (Troncoso III, 1984: 114). Similar reasoning can be found ina July 1 980 statement issued by La Coordinadora de las Industrias de ProductosAlimen ticios: After more than four years after being installed in power, the economicteam s till owes industry its opinion on the industrial plan tow ard which it wishe s to arrive(Troncoso IV, 1 984: 91). Many busine sses were willing to accept the discipline of the freemarket as called for by the objectives outlined in the originating docum ents of the Proceso.In March 1979 , the Movimiento Industrial Argentino (which constituted of 160 industrialbusine ss branches and federations) issued a statement that proposed saving the philosophyand basic outline of the economic program announced in April 1976 , with theimplem entation of concrete m easures more in accordance with it . . .. Likewise, in thesame month the Consejo Empresario Argentino expressed its support for actions of thegovernment which carried out the objectives established by the Proceso-a clear messagethat the group viewed present government policy as deviant (Troncoso III, 1984: 67-69).


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342 C. L. ArceneauxThe erratic nature of economic policy was so consequential that even the sector which

was supposed to be its main beneficiary, agriculture, grew increasingly critical. The onlygroup to grant support consistently wa s the Sociedad Rural A rgentina. But the regimereceived stinging criticisms from several other agricultural groups (Troncoso, 1984 :pas-sim). 58 The impact of the incoherence in policy is recognised by Ferrer in his study ofeconomic policy under M artinez de Hoz: One of the greatest paradoxes of the Argentineexperience is the difficulty in identifying its beneficiaries (Ferrer, 1981 : 162).

The inability to implem ent a coherent policy had significant repercussions that added tothe fall of the economy. The instability in policy led many international busines ses to investelsewhere (Spagnolo and Cismondi, 1984 : 57-58). Econom ic failure further fed on itself asbusines ses went bankrupt and were absorbed by the largest creditors, the state banks.Indeed, the num ber of failed busines ses absorbed by the state outstripped the num ber ofstate businesses privatised by the state, so that state involvement in the economy during theProceso actually increased (Spitta, 1983 : 84; Ugalde, 1984 : 168-169). M oreover, theabsorption of busines ses contributed to the deficit, and further burdened fiscal policy.59Martinez de Hoz and his economic team were replaced w ith the inauguration ofPresident Viola in 198 1. From Viola, to Galtieri, and to Bignone, economic policy movedfurther aw ay from strict neoliberalism. Nonetheless, the agenda sou ght by Martinez de Hozremained the centre of debate. Moreover, by 1981 and especially with the overthrow ofViola, the dam age was irreversible. The economy was in ruins and the regime proved unableto weather the crisis.

GALTIERI, FALKLAND SMALV INAS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE PROC ESOBy the time Galtieri seized the reins of government, the Proceso had fallen into its deepestcrisis yet. Violas move from unpopular neoliberal policies failed to stifle economic decline.Union protests began to stir. And the political parties moved toward active opposition withthe creation of the Multipartidaria to coordinate planning . Lethargy and confusion hadflooded the Proceso, and its leaders were becoming increasingly isolated from society.60Most of all, the armed forces were in disarray over their inability to formulate a unifiedpolitical program and in frustration with economic decline.

For the military, withd rawal wa s not even considered as an option because of the highlevel of investment in the regime. M ilitary investment in the Proceso was corporate,material, and psychological. Having so thoroughly assum ed responsibility for governmen t,both in word through public proclamations and physically by placing military personnel ingovernment positions, the reputation of the armed forces as a corporate body becameinextricably linked to the success of government policy. M aterially, the armed forces reapedtremendous revenue both as an institution through budget increases and individuallythrough corruption (Spitta, 1983), double salaries from government positions,61 and warbooty from the antisubversive camp aign.62 The magnitude of government resourcesdirected tow ard the armed forces is indicated by the growth of Fabricaciones Militares. Bythe early 1980 s this complex of military-owned defence industries wa s the largestmanu facturing firm in the country, totalling 14 per cent of manufacturing GN P. Finally,involvement in the antisubversive campaign tied many officers to the principles of theProceso. Many officers vehemently supported the regime to justify the atrocious acts ofviolence they comm itted in the dirty war (Pion-Berlin, 1989 : 103; Dabat, 1984 : 136).

Against this background, Galtieri began to reach out to society in an almost populist


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 343mann er, mak ing several public appe arances outside the major cities.63 It wou ld be amistake to interpret Galtieris actions as an attempt to invigorate regime legitimacy. Simplyput, the Proceso had grown too autonomous to be concerned with questions of legitimacy(Fontana, 1986 : 32). Overcoming social isolation was simply a mea ns to deal with Galtierisgreater concern, military disunity. Galtieris plan was to implem ent a solid politicalprogram to unite the military. His strategy called for his popular election in 1984. His initialsupport base wou ld come from the conservative parties in the countrys interior. Theelection w ould pit him against retired navy comm ander Emilio Massera, who had beenwooing Peronist sectors. To ensure his own popular appeal an d election, G altieri would stirthe nationalist sentimen ts of the population with an invasion of the British-held Falklands/Ma lvinas Islands, over which Argentina claimed sovereignty. The action would furthersolidify Galtieris position insofar a s it wou ld appease hardline nationalists in the armedforces w ho had been pressing for a military adventure (Fontana, 1986 : 7), as well aspressure from Adm iral Anaya, to whom Galtieri wa s indebted for his support in Violasousting (Wynia, 1992: 9697).64The 2 April 1982 invasion initiated the strategy, which soon seemed headed for success.Popular support for the regime rode the rising nationalist sentiment. The CG T-Brasilunion confederacy, which h ad just led the first massive challenge to the regime in a 30March protest, issued the Prim er0 la Pa t r ia document to suspend its plan de lucha and showsupport. Likewise, the political parties were nearly unanimous in their support and thosewho refused to give support were ignored (Fontana, 1987 : 164-165).

But by the end of the British response in June, it was clear that the invasion was adisaster. Rather than unify the armed forces, the invasion exemplified the depth of thecurrent d ivision. Each force implem ented military strategies that paralleled their politicalpositions toward the war. The inability to coordinate military operations discouraged astrong response to the British manoeuvres and was an important factor in the defeat (deDromi, 1988: 354).

Galtieri, ignorant of the political situation that confronted him, moved strategically toshore up what support he could. His plan wa s to recognise defeat by a superior force withUS backing, and reassert Argen tine sovereignty over the islands. This would be done on 15June from the presidential balcony overlooking the Plaza de Mayo for charismatic appeal.The result was a congregation of protestors and Galtieri was forced to address the public inan unconvincing television appea rance.65

The Falklands/M alvinas defeat had thus triggered the inevitable-the collapse of theProceso. Passive obedience in society had irreversibly turned to active opposition. But thisopposition should not be overemphasised. The devastating effect that the Proceso ha d onboth civil and political society hindered a strong response by the opposition. Union s h adbeen infiltrated, the parties and other political organisations had been dissolved, an drampant repression had produced a culture of fear in the Argentine population.66Moreover, because most party leaders had adhered to official policy during the war, theircredibility as a viable alternative was weakened . Rather than take a more challengingoffensive, the Multipartidaria simply reissued its demand that the military w ithdraw frompower, first resolving problems related to hum an rights, corruption, external debt, and nowadded the additional problems created by the Falklands/M alvinas debacle (Fontana,1986: 14).

But the lack of a forceful opposition wa s not enough to allow the armed forces to avoidwithdraw al. Divided more deeply than ever before, the only point on which the forces could


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344 C. L. Arceneauxnow agree was withd rawal from rule. The regime had muddled through failure in thepolitical and economic spheres, but military defeat represented a failure in the area in whichthe armed forces ow ned its greatest expertise. The issue of who wa s responsible was ofparamo unt importance to the armed forces. Galtieri, as president, army comm ander, andMilitary Jun ta mem ber, shou ldered the greatest responsibility, and wa s replaced ascomm ander of the army by General Cristino Nicolaides on 17 June. F illing the presidentialposition soon became a matter of dispute, and the ultimate imposition of army GeneralReynaldo Bignone led the other two forces to withdraw from the Military Junta. On 22June the army announced that it would assum e total responsibility for the government andthe transition.

As the army negotiated with the air force and navy to reconstitute the Military Junta, itsown internal problems intensified. A highly nationalist group led by brigade-level officersbegan to push for the removal of all higher officers and dem anded that all proposedinvestigations of hum an rights abuse s be prohibited. Know n as brigadis tas , this group andother nationalist factions would have a significant affect on the transition and the regimesposition on hum an rights violations (Fontana, 1987 : 171).67

By 10 September, the high comm and of the air force and navy were replaced and theMilitary Junta wa s re-established. W ith the decision to withd raw from rule by early 1984,the government made the move for a negotiated transition with the opposition. Bignonesoon took on the role of regime softliner, and the Military Junta, being more open topressures from the brigadis tas and other nationalist groups, filled the hardliner role.

Bignone attempted to launch negotiations in mid-October with a publicised a genda thatincluded hum an rights investigations, Falklands/M alvinas, economic policy, the Chileanborder d ispute, and electoral regulations. Confirming the continued division in the armedforces, the Junta demanded that a number of issues be added, the most important of whichwere the stability of judicial personnel, existing union and social legislation, and theconstitutional presence of the armed forces in the subsequent regime.68 The partiesresponded with an unequivocal rejection6 and called for a 16 December street protest. Theunion leadership followed with the call for a 6 December work stoppage. The workstoppage and the 16 December m archa de la c iv i l idad were huge successes, and marked theresurgence of civil society in Argentina.70 At the same time, pressure from the lower rankscontinued, as illustrated by a 4 December military ceremony for Falklands/M alvinasveterans, in which hundreds of conscripts protested with shouts of down with the MilitaryJunta, and booed attending oflicers.7 Bolstered by these events, the opposition continuedto answe r government appeals for negotiations with mob ilisation (Farren, 1990 : 22-23).

Over the next few months, the cleavage betw een B ignone and the Military Junta widenedas Bignone showed some concurrence with opposition demands while the Military Ju ntaremained intransignent. Although the division nearly led to the resignation of Bignone, theparties ultimately damp ened their criticisms and dem ands, and agreed to negotiate. In thenegotiations, the Military Ju nta expected to discuss the institutional participation of thearmed forces in the new regime, and restrictions on hum an rights investigations. But theparties publicly announced that they wou ld reject any comm itments limiting the nextgovernment. In consequence, the negotiations ended in March and led only to the settingof the election date (30 October 1983) and the transfer of power date (30 January 1984 )(Fontana, 1986: 21-28).

The setting of the election date marked the end of regime attempts to negotiate. Althoughregime leaders then attempted to implem ent an alternative strategy of underground


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 345negotiations with likely election leaders and unions that largely failed (Cheresky,1985 : 26),72 for the most part regime leaders aim ed their efforts directly toward rebuildingmilitary unity by concentrating on the issue which least divided the armed forces-theantisubversive campaign.

The first government action wa s the 28 April publication of the Docum ent0 Fina l de laJu n t a M i l i t a r. The polemical document stated that all disappeared persons ought to beconsidered dead, denied the existence of clandestine detention centres, and insisted thatonly God and history could judge the acts comm itted in the subversive war.73 Othergovernment actions included a propagan da camp aign in which plans by subversives toinfiltrate the government and assassin ate union and party leaders were detailed.74

That the attention given to the hum an rights issue wa s designated more to cultivatemilitary unity than to impose a limitation on the next regime is evidenced by thepromulgation of the L e y d e P a c z f i c a c i d n N a t i o n a l (Law 22.924). Passed on 23 September,the decree granted an amnesty for subversive activities and excesses in its repressioncommitted between 25 May 1973 and 17 June 1982. Because the law was passed with fullrecognition that it wou ld be revoked by the next government, one can assum e that it wa sdesigned primarily for internal consum ption (Farren, 1990 : 92; Fontana, 1987 : 182).Indeed, the decree was pronounced unconstitutional in the courts even before thetransition.75

Upon assuming office on 10 December 1983,76 the Alfonsin Adm inistration was facedonly with a thin veneer of untenable threats and decrees. The new democracy wou ldrepresent a clean break with the previous authoritarian regime, which had spent theprevious seventeen m onths working more to shore up military unity than to placelimitations on the next regime.

CONCLUSIONKaren Rem mer presents us with a typology that illustrates institutional variances am ongmilitary regimes and links these distinctions to regime durability. In her work, she clearlyexemplifies how sultanistic institutions contributed to the durability of the Pinochetregime in Chile. In this essay, I have used the Remm er typology to examine two areas ofinquiry related to institutional design in military regimes. F irst, I have used the Procesoregime in Argen tina to examine the linkage between feudal institutions and military rule.The case illustrated how the fatal mixture of dispersed authority and fused government andmilitary roles contributed to the unencum bered politicisation of the armed forces. Theinability of the regime to establish a political program or a coherent economic policyillustrated the ill-effects of such politicisation. This application of the Rem mer typologyboth increases our confidence in its predictive power, and uncovers the mech anisms thatexplain the correlation between feudal rule and regime durability draw n by Rem mer.

This essay goes beyond the Remm er study in its second area of inquiry, that of therelationship between institutional design and regime transition mode. Here, I have arguedthat feudal institutions not only result in politicisation, but also in an increased investmentin rule. This inauspicious combination mean s that these regimes create an incentive tocontinue to rule, but an inability to do so. Consequently, we should expect feudal militaryregimes to press on in vain until they become so weak that regime collapse is unavoidable.In the Proceso case, this mean s that the Falklands/M alvinas invasion was less a cause ofregime collapse than a consequence of an already unfolding transition process.


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346 C. L. ArceneauxThe ability of the Rem mer typology to highlight factors that link institutional design and

regime transition in the feudal Proceso regime opens further research qu estions. In particular,the relationship between monarchic, oligarchic, and sultanistic institutional designs andregime transition ought to be examined. Such research w ould further increase our under-standing of the linkages between ins titutional design, military rule, and regime transition.NOTES

1. Support for this paper w as granted by the Institute on Glob al Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego,CA.. Final responsibility is mine.

2. Matsushita (1987) and Share (1987: 544) give similar arguments.3. The high comm and constantly emphasised the lack of personalism during the Proceso. The following

statement by army commander General Roberto Viola at a 1976 press conference is indicative: TheProceso de Reorgan ization Natio nal is the institutional response of the armed forces..Consequently, it is devoid of any type of personalism (Lazara, 1988 : 229).

4. Although each force came to view division as a medium for cooperation, the idea was initially imposedby navy commander Massera. When first approached on the idea of a golpe by the army in January1976, Massera linked navy support to the equal division of government (Vasquez, 1985 : 20).

5. The Estatu to Para el Proceso de Reorganizacidn Na ti onal (24 March 1976) and law 21.256 (Reglamientopara el Funcionamient o de la Junta Mil it ar, Poder Ejecutiv o N at ional y Comisi dn de AsesoramientoLegislative).

6. Article 3.3.2.1, law 21.256.7. Initially, the army received L abou r and Interior, the navy received Social Welfare and Foreign

Relations, the air force received Justice and Defence, and civilians were appointed to Educ ation andEconomy.

8. Th e power to act as comm ander-in-chief of the armed forces, declare war, declare a state of siege, orsupervise military promotions and assignments.

9. Sin proyectos para la CAL. La Opinidn, 24 December 1976, p. 12.10. Each service independently established the term of oflice for their CAL mem bers, and its presidency

(determined by the Military Junta) was rotated annually (de Dromi, 1988: 215).11. Article 1.4.2 , law 21.2 56. The basic objectives of the Proceso are listed under another docum ent that I

will discuss later.12. Before this time, General Jorge V idela was both P resident and, as comm ander ion chief of the army, a

member of the Military Junta.13. Fo r a contemp orary report on the dominan ce of the Military Junta, see Argentina : Low profile, Latin

Am erican W eekly Review 1 2(31), 11 August 1978, p. 246.14. Law s 21.264 and 21.461. The authority of the councils was extended under laws 21.268 (covering the

creation and transportation of arms or explosives) and 21. 272 (covering crimes against m ilitarypersonnel). Equivale nts to the army comm anders in charge of repression in the navy and air force hadthe same authority. Also see Creanse consejos de guerra y severas penas por atentados, La Prensa, 25March 1976, p. 5.

15. T his is not to imply tha t memb ers of the Military Junta or the president did not approve of repression,but that the precise application of repression was largely beyond their control. The condoning, andoften direct involvement by junta mem bers and presidents is well docume nted (see the journal El Diariodel Juicio (Buenos Aires) 1985-1986).

16. The state of siege was in effect until 28 October 1983 (decree 2834/8 3).17. For example, law 21.528 allowed the arrest of persons revealing a rebellious position (Groisman,

1984: 67).18. On the autonom y of the security forces, see Argentina: Ma rtial airs, Lat in Am erica 10(16), 16 April

1976, pp. 125-126 ; Argentina: Deeds speak louder than words, Lat in America 10(22), 4 June 1976,pp. 170-172.19. L aw 21.279 established the following hierarchy for judicial rulings to follow: (a) the basic objectivesestablished by the Military Junta; (b) the Estatuto; (c) the National Constitution (de Dromi, 1988 : 209-210).


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Regime transition in Argentina (19761983) 34720. See La cupula civico-militar, Curta Politica 32, June 1976 , p, 32. The article also notes that most

civilians were economists, lawyers, businessmen (especially rural businessmen), and administratorswith links to the 196221 963 and 1 9661 973 military governments. Notable was the lack of union orpolitical leaders.

21. A fter August 197 8, an attempt was made to ensure th at the president was a retired officer (Galtieriwould be the exception). The presence of retired officers and civilians would peak during theabbreviated Viola presidency (see El nuevo estilo de gobierno y 10s limites de realidad), vigenciu 48,May 1981.

22. I discuss the incongruence between the regimes neoliberal program and military interests in detailbelow.

23. Established by decree 3245 (21 October 1977).24. The process for the formation and sanction laws is dealt with in law 21.2 56, article 4 .25 . Clarin, 26 May 1976.26. Argentine military regimes have historically distinguished themselves with a concern for social

approv al (Philip, 198 4). This strengthened the isolation-division circle during the Proceso.27. A copy of the document can be found in La Prensa, 25 March 1976, p. 1.28. Ma ny hardliners also refused to confront Videla for fear of breaking military unity in the face of the

subversive threat. See El1 peso de la geome tria, Carta Politicu 40, February 1977, pp. 7-9; Variacionessobre un mismo tema, Carta Politica 54, May 1978.

29. Argentine navy uses rights issue in rift with army, Washington Post, 27 January 1978, p.A20;Argentina: Rocking the boat, Latin Americ an Political Repo rt 12(9), 3 March 1978, pp. 68869.

30. Argentina: Another near miss, Latin Ame ricu 1 l(8), 2 5 February 1977, p. 63; Argentina: The NavyWay, Latin America 11(29), 29 July 1977 , pp. 225-226 .

31 . La Nacidn, 4 August 1977; Confirmado, September 1971.32. On preliminary power consolidation by Videla, see Argentina : Videla alone, Latin American Political

Report 12(2), 13 January 1978, p. 1415.33. Las claves de1 plan, Redaccidn, 43, September 1976; Un proyecto national, La Opinidn 49, June 1977,

pp. 9910.34. Mentas sobre una reforma, La Opinidn 28, January 1977 , p. 11; Planeamiento: Designaciones, LaOpinidn 29, January 1977 , p. 11.35. Argentina: Videla Alone, Latin America Political Report 12(2), 13 January 1978, p. 14-15. Perhaps the

final straw came in December when Diaz Bessone announced he would draw up any plans toincorporate political parties, but was rebuked by Interior Minister Harg uindeg uy who stated that partyrelations was clearly in his doma in (I am the voice of the government in this matter). See Un anunciopara el future, La Opinidn 74, December 1977, p. 15; En nombre de1 gobierno, La Opinidn 78,December 1977, pp. 12-13.

36. See Argentina: Martial airs, Latin America 10(16), 16 April 1976, pp. 125-126 ; Argentina: Habeascorpses, Latin America 10(23), 11 June 1976, pp. 180-181 ; A rgentina: Police confusion, LatinAmerica 10(27), 9 July 1976, pp. 213-214 ; Argentina: a knife at Videlas throat, Latin AmericaPolitical Report 11(15), 22 April 1977, pp. 113-l 14; (Vats, 1987: 26).

37. Tras el Beagle, una transition decantadora, La Opinidn 88, March 1978, pp. 10-12.38. Also see Argentina: Videla tightens his grip, Latin America Political Report 12(43), 3 November 1978,pp. 337-338 ; A rgentina: The new men, Latin America Political Report 12(44), 10 November 1978,pp. 349-350.

39. Also see Sin dialog0 con 10s partidos, La Opinidn 39, March 1977, p. 12.40. Las dudas de1 presidente, Redaccidn, 73, March 1979.41 . Se e text in CZarin, 20 December 1979.42. En que consiste el plan po litico?, Redaccidn 83, January 1980.43. Even the dialogue was surrounded by negotiations and conflict, especially in regard to how much

control the junta or president ought to exert over it, and who would be appointed to the governmentteam to lead it (Fontana, 1987 : 85-86).

44. El nuevo estilo de gobierno y 10s limites de realidad, Vigencia 48, May 1981 ; Exit0 del proceso yestructura de1 poder, Vigenciu 49, June 198 1.45. Hay dudas sobre la democracia, Redaccidn 98, April 198 1.

46. Argentina Right wingers move up in reshuffle of army comm and, Latin American Weekly Review81(14), 3 April 1981, p. IO.


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Regim e transition in Argentina (197 6-198 3) 34974. See reports in La Nucidn, 20 and 21 May 1983. Also see Los estertores de1 rCgimen autoritario,

Reduccidn 125, July 1983, pp. 12-14.75. Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Latin America, 29 September 1983 , p. B4; Foreign Broadcast

Information Service-Latin America, 3 October 1983, p. B5.76. Originally established for March 1984, then January 1984, this moved forward date further exemplifies

the weakness of the military regime. W hile Bigno ne had once spoken of a num ber of things which m ustbe arranged before handing over power, it later becam e clear to him that he was in no position tonegotiate. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Latin America, 18 January 1983, p. Bl.

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