Arabian Peninsula Background Notes APBN-009 · This is an Arabian Peninsula Background Note (APBN) written by J.E. Peterson N.B. This background note is a preliminary attempt to present

This is an Arabian Peninsula Background Note (APBN) written by J.E. PetersonN.B. This background note is a preliminary attempt to present in summary form the essential details of a particular set of circumstancesor event in Arabian Peninsula history. It lays no claim to being comprehensive or fully accurate. Although considerable effort has been madeto assure the reliability of the information it contains, its accuracy is limited to the information contained in the sources listed in the note.The contents of this note may be freely quoted and cited provided both the author and source are given. A complete listing of APBNs iscontained on www.JEPeterson.net.

Please cite in the following manner:Peterson, J.E. “The Experience of British Counter-Insurgency Campaigns and Implications for

Iraq.” Arabian Peninsula Background Note, No. APBN-009. Published on www.JEPeterson.net,July 2009.

© J.E. Peterson, 2009

Arabian Peninsula Background Notes

APBN-009August 2009

The Experience of British Counter-InsurgencyCampaigns and Implications for Iraq

The war and civil strife in Iraq are now intheir sixth year. Much has been written on thewar and the demoralizing American experiencein dealing with it. A burgeoning literature hasexamined the rationale for going to war andhow and why the aftermath of the toppling ofSaddam Husayn was handled so ineptly.Considerable attention has centered on theproblem of Iraq’s persistent insurgency andefforts to counter it.

Two historical parallels have receivedworthwhile attention. The first – and mostobvious – is the British experience in invadingthen-Ottoman Mesopotamia during WorldWar I, legitimized (at least in internationaleyes) by the creation of a League of Nationsmandate and the founding of a new state. Theparallels with the present situation have beenobserved in such respects as military invasion,establishment of a new government by theoccupying power, and, subsequently, theemergence of insurrection.1

The second, even more popular, historicalparallel is Vietnam. Numerous observers have

maintained, correctly, that Vietnam is not Iraqand that the nature of the combat, theopposition, and the terrain are markedlydifferent. Nevertheless, the parallel holdsvalidity in terms of US policy-making.Deceptive tactics were employed to rationalizethe requirement for war, mistaken assumptionswere made about how the initial engagementwould spell success, and then the deepeningand protracted spirals of involvement areremarkably similar.2

The intention here is not to cover groundalready well and capably trod. Instead, thisstudy examines the relevance to Iraq of ahistory of British counter-insurgency efforts –particularly those taking place after World WarII and in the Third World.

British Counter-Insurgency EffortsAfter World War II

While the origins of each of these conflicts

APBN-009 (August 2009) British Counter-Insurgency Campaigns and Iraq J.E. Peterson p. 2

naturally were distinct and unique, by andlarge they tended to fit in the category broadlydefined of revolutionary war. That is, theysought to overthrow existing governments andgain independence, employing guerrilla warfareand terrorist tactics to achieve their aims.3 Themost relevant of these are briefly summarizedbelow.

Malaya.4 In the post-World War II era, theCommunist takeover of China provided theearliest example of a successful “revolutionarywar” strategy. But the Malayan insurgency of1948 to 1956, with a Communist frontcomposed of largely ethnic Chinese battlingthe British and mostly Malayan plantationworkers, was defeated by successful Britishcounter-insurgency strategy, notably relianceon effective intelligence, extensive patrollingthat hampered guerrilla movements andrefuges, and cultivation of popular supportwith progressive moves towards the granting ofMalayan independence. The United Statesmade use of the lessons of the emerging Britishmodel of counter-insurgency warfare in thePhilippines but failed to apply them inVietnam.5

Kenya.6 The origins of the Mau Maurebellion in Kenya lay in the grievances of theKikuyu over “stolen land” worked by the whitepopulation. Under the leadership of JomoKenyatta, some dissident activities began in1948. The so-called Mau Mau grewincreasingly extremist over the following yearsbut the government seemed ill-prepared torespond effectively. By 1953, more than10,000 British troops were fighting theinsurgency, along with 15,000 police and20,000 home guard. Their efforts, however,were hampered by the expanse of territory tobe contained and the rough forest terrain. Amile-wide “prohibited area” was established todeny the Mau Mau sanctuary in the ForestReserves, complemented by a 50-mile long

ditch filled with sharpened stakes and barbedwire, and the forests were bombed whilestringent measures were introduced to controlthe civil population. Frank Kitson, then ayoung British officer, introduced “pseudo-gangs” to infiltrate Mau Mau gangs and gainintelligence. Massive sweeps were carried outto capture or kill Mau Mau insurgents and thecapture of the remaining leader effectivelyended the war in 1956. Kenyatta was freed in1961 and became president of an independentrepublic in 1963.

Cyprus.7 The Cyprus insurgency began inthe early 1930s when Greek Cypriots beganopposing British rule and calling for unionwith Greece. Following World War II, GeorgeGrivas organised harassing activities against theBritish through the EOKA and the Britishdecision in 1954 to move its Middle East landand air headquarters from Suez to Cyprus,thus indicating its intentions to keepsovereignty over the island, inflamed thesituation. The following year, EOKAorganised protests and began attacking police.Negotiations with moderate Greek Cypriotswere halted in 1956 when ArchbishopMakarios was exiled to the Seychelles, leavingleadership in the hands of the more extremeGrivas. In response, EOKA stepped up itsattacks and the government responded withheavy-handed tactics that alienated much ofthe population. British security measures wereattenuated because of the Suez War that year,allowing the small EOKA forces to expandtheir activities, while British recruitment ofTurkish Cypriots into the police widened theconflict into a Greek-Turkish divide. Twoyears later, Britain offered sovereignty inreturn for permanent base rights: Makariosagreed and Grivas was forced to disbandEOKA and relocate to Greece.

Oman.8 Since the 19th century, Oman hadbeen divided between a hereditary régime, the


Sultanate, based on the coast and a semi-independent theocracy, the Imamate, in theinterior. It was the intention of the coastalruler, Sultan Sa‘id bin Taymur, to peacefullyreassume control over the interior upon thedeath of the theocracy’s highly respectedreligious leader. But the latter lived until 1954when external Arab politics intruded onOman. The leader’s replacement was heavilyinfluenced by his brother and a prominenttribal leader. The Sultanate’s small, British-officered forces easily captured the Imamate’scapital in late 1955 and its leaders eithercapitulated or fled the country. But theyreturned in 1957 with Saudi and Egyptian helpand briefly regained control of the interiorbefore being forced to retreat to a plateau highin the mountains. Although the local forcesfaced no resistance from the generalpopulation, they were unable to dislodge thesmall core of Imamate leaders and followersfrom their aerie, from which they regularlydescended to plant mines and carry out otheracts of sabotage. It took two squadrons ofBritain’s Special Air Service (SAS), justcompleting their operations in Malaya, toascend the mountain and force the hard-coreto flee to Saudi Arabia. This action broughtthe insurgency to an end although minelayingand other sabotage continued on a low-leveluntil 1970.

Aden.9 By the mid-20th century, thestrategic harbor of Aden at the southern tip ofthe Arabian Peninsula had become a Britishcrown colony while a network of treaties ofprotection bound the various tribes and pettyrulers in the surrounding hinterland to Britainas the Aden Protectorate. A strong labormovement emerged in Aden and adoptedpolitical overtones as some of its leadersopposed a continued British presence. Theattempt to create a Federation of South Arabiato unite urban Aden and the undeveloped

Protectorate never achieved its intendedlegitimacy and the start of a serious insurgencywas marked by an attempted assassination ofthe British High Commissioner for Aden in1963. With the declaration of an “emergency,”attention focused on the mountainous regionof Radfan north of Aden. British attempts topacify the area faced increasingly violentopposition, fueled by Egyptian assistance andenhanced by sanctuary in neighboring NorthYemen. A struggle for control of theinsurgency emerged between the Egyptian-backed FLOSY (Front for the Liberation ofOccupied South Yemen) and the more radicalNLF (National Liberation Front). Theinsurgency increasingly employed terrorismagainst British targets in Aden itself at thesame time that it was busy displacing thetraditional rulers across the Protectorate. By1967, the British Labor governmentannounced that, despite Aden’s importance asBritain’s last major base in the Middle East, itwould withdraw its forces and negotiate withthe NLF on the terms for independence.

Dhufar.10 The insurgency in Dhufar, thesouthern province of Oman, began in the early1960s as a protest against the repressive rule ofSultan Sa‘id bin Taymur. Essentially anationalist movement at first, the insurgencygradually turned farther to the left. Monthsafter a Marxist régime emerged in neighboringSouth Yemen, Marxist elements in the Dhufarinsurgency took control of the front. Despitetheir British leadership, the undermanned andunder-equipped Sultanate’s forces graduallywere forced to retreat to the small coastalplain. In 1970, the Sultan was overthrown byhis son, Qabus bin Sa‘id, a Sandhurst product,who declared his intention to modernize thecountry. Britain provided additional support,the Sultan expanded his armed forces andprovided them with new weapons andequipment, and later Jordan and especially


Iran provided troops. But as the Sultanate’scapabilities grew, so did those of the front,which received sanctuary and political supportfrom South Yemen and military assistancefrom China and the Soviet Union. TheSultanate forces gradually were able to clearsuccessive zones of the mountainous provinceand force the insurgents to concentrate in thewest. At the same time, the Sultan offeredamnesty and membership in home guards tosurrendering insurgents and emphasized civildevelopment. A final push in 1975 liberatedthe western zone of Dhufar, forcing nearly allinsurgents and all of the supporting SouthYemeni troops to retreat across the border.

The application of counter-insurgencystrategy to defeat these movements evolvedover time. As insurgency concepts develop, somust counter-insurgency theory. Whileinsurgencies were transformed into guerrillawarfare and revolutionary goals, so incumbentauthorities were forced to adapt their strategies.It was recognized from an early date thatconventional responses to guerrilla activities,let alone terrorist tactics, were useless. Butarmies tend to be configured to fightconventional wars and small wars tend to beunglamorous, time-consuming, without clear-cut victories, often politically ambiguous, andinexpedient in terms of typical training andorganization. It is not surprising, therefore,that armies traditionally have disliked fightingsmall wars and that police or gendarmerieshave played important roles in such conflicts.11

Undoubtedly the most crucial factor indeveloping strategies to overcome armeddissidence has been experience in the field.Various writers have commented on thedifference between British and Americanapproaches. Perhaps because of Britain’simperial outlook, it tended to view eachinsurgency uniquely. The British treated theMalayan Emergency, for example, as a local

problem requiring the granting of unusuallatitude for the local commander and the armyand police forces involved. The Kennedyadministration, however, came to viewinsurgencies as one aspect of a Communistgrand design. Thus, they formed one part ofthe global strategic picture and, because theCold War was seen to have a zero-sum basis,they must be managed centrally fromWashington.12 Vietnam, of course, was theprincipal testing ground for this conceptionbut also a clear illustration of its failure.

British Counter-Insurgency Theoristsand Their Strategies

Not surprisingly, the “brush-fire” wars thatengaged the British generated a considerableamount of theorizing about “counter-insurgency” methods, in large part meant toguide British military policy in futureconflicts. In particular, three “working”theorists were important in exerting impact onBritish operational thinking and formulatingBritish strategy on the subject.

Robert Thompson’s ideas grew out of hisexperiences as a field officer and then a staffofficer in Malaya during the “Emergency” inthe 1950s and then as head of the BritishAdvisory Mission to Vietnam in the early1960s. His earlier writings were largely specificto the Vietnam case study but the third of hisbooks on the subject encompassed explanationof what he termed “revolutionary war” and therole of the Soviet Union and CommunistChina in promoting it.13

Building on his experience in Malaya,Thompson elucidated five principles ofcounter-insurgency. Governments should havea clear political aim, function within the law,establish a co-ordinated overall plan


encompassing both political and militaryobjectives, place emphasis on counteringpolitical subversion, and secure their base areabefore conducting a military campaign.Additional points including placing relianceon police above the military and the necessityof operations by small units in order to carrythe offensive to the insurgents.14

These principles were subsequentlyreformulated in terms of six essential factorscontributing to the successful containment ofMaoist insurgencies in Malaya and thePhilippines. These were: Î the recognitionthat political action designed to prevent theinsurgents gaining popular support shouldtake priority over purely military action; Ï therequirement for complete civil-military co-operation; Ð the need for co-ordination ofintelligence; Ñ the separation of the insurgentsfrom the population through the winning ofhearts and minds; Ò the appropriate use ofmilitary force to support pacification; and Ólasting political reform to prevent therecurrence of insurgency.15 While othercountries slavishly applied the same principlesto significantly different circumstances, theBritish approach was hailed as being flexible inrecognizing that different social and economicconditions required alterations in tactics.16

Julian Paget was a serving British officertasked with developing measures to counter theanti-British groups in Aden in the second halfof the 1960s. He had also served in Palestinein 1945 to 1948. The outcome of hisresearches from earlier conflicts and hisexperience in Aden was a book titled Counter-insurgency Operations: Techniques of GuerrillaWarfare.17

Writing in the mid-1960s, Julian Paget, laidout what he regarded as the essentialrequirements for counter-insurgencyoperations. These were: â civil-militaryunderstanding, ã a joint command and

control structure, ä good intelligence, åmobility, and æ training. These dovetailedwith conditions that Thompson had observedearlier. Furthermore, Paget stressed that“These requirements are different from thosein conventional warfare in several ways, and itis not sufficient merely to adapt conventionalwarfare methods to meet the special conditionsof counter-insurgency campaigning.”18

Frank Kitson had seen action with theBritish Army in Kenya and Malaya before aWar Office appointment involved him in theplanning for the 1950s operations in Oman.Subsequently, he saw action in Cyprus as well.Although his ideas of counter-insurgencywarfare took form during his involvement withthese wars, their exposition in book form didnot appear until the 1970s.19 Kitson’s LowIntensity Operations caused a stir on itspublication in 1971. His central thesis wasthat the British Army had been trainedprimarily for conventional warfare whereasmost of its operations since World War II hadinvolved small wars. He therefore advocatedgreater emphasis on counter-insurgencytraining and stressed that responsibility forintelligence should rest with the army ratherthan the police. But since his book appearedat a time when Northern Ireland was becomingparticularly troublesome, controversy aroseover the application of his ideas to urbanunrest rather than colonial or Third-Worldconflicts.20

Meanwhile, Kitson emphasized thecomplementarity of defensive and offensiveoperations in the framework of a co-ordinatedpolitical and economic plan. He classifieddefensive operations as “those designed toprevent insurgents from disrupting thegovernment’s programme. ... [O]ffensiveoperations ... are those designed to root out theinsurgents themselves.”21 There must be abalance between the two: too little reliance on


defensive operations gives insurgents theopportunity to score successes and underminepro-government morale while insufficientattention to offensive operations allowsinsurgent movements to grow and thus requiremore and more resources to be devoted toquelling the problem. Kitson saw part of thepolitical aspect as countering insurgentpropaganda, a difficult act to accomplish giventhe delicate nature of offensive operations inareas of uncommitted or hostile populations.While defensive operations involve guardingand protecting assets, as well as maintaininglaw and order, another priority is thwartinginsurgent attempts to cultivate support fromthe population. This involves a “hearts andminds” campaign and a close relationshipbetween civil and military authorities.22

As mentioned above, many of Kitson’sideas were formed as a result of hisobservations in Kenya in particular (where heseems to have acquired his insistence on theimportance of “trackers”), and in Malaya, aswell as northern Oman and later in Cyprus.Operations in Kenya were more dependent onthe application of large-scale force and wereless successful in accomplishing “hearts andminds” aspects, although some long-termreform was carried out and an accelerated pathto independence was instituted.23

Tactics Developed in British Wars

With time and experience, these strategistswere able to identify and codify a significantnumber of tactics and approaches. Thefollowing discussion lists some relevant tacticsthat were incorporated into the body of Britishcounter-insurgency theory and providesexamples – particularly in Oman – of wherethey were used effectively.24

The Centrality of Intelligence. The creation ofeffective intelligence – beyond, strictlyspeaking, military (or operational) intelligence– played a key role in countering allinsurgencies. For Oman in the 1950s and1960s, this factor consisted mostly of “tribal”intelligence: determining relations betweentribes, assessing the extent of shaykhly authoritywithin tribes, and maintaining files of suspects.After 1970, there was a shift to a broader basedintelligence, with a strong urban focus,reflecting changing threats to internal security.

The Evolution of Appropriate Counter-MeasuresAgainst a Mix of Insurgent Tactics. As Pagetobserved, “Insurgency may consist of guerrillawarfare, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, oronly some of them, according to thecircumstances.”25 The Imamate movement inOman only flirted with these tactics and sowas only intermittently successful. ThePopular Front for the Liberation of Oman(PFLO) in the south of that country, however,studied the Maoist textbook thoroughly andapplied as many principles to its cause aspossible. Still, in many ways, the applicationto Dhufar was an imperfect fit.

At the same time, many shared insurgenttactics emerged independently ingeographically separated battlegrounds. Acommon feature has been the ad hocfashioning of available weapons and a growingproficiency in their use. In this sense, allmodern insurgencies display tacticalsimilarities. As another writer remarkedrecently,

The pattern of Iraqi activity thus far looksremarkably similar to that in Palestine withroadside bombs, which have also been used byHezbollah in Lebanon, and other so-calledimprovised explosive devices; ambushes ofsoft-skinned vehicles; opportunistic rocket-propelled grenade and shooting attacks onmilitary personnel; attacks on civilian membersof the Coalition authorities and foreign


personnel working in some way for theCoalition; attacks on Iraqi ‘collaborators,’ mostrecently police and army recruits; and attackson economic targets such as power stations, oilinstallations, and pipelines. There has also beenan increase in the number of attacks upon‘soft’ targets, principally civilian gatherings.This does not reflect the tactics employed inPalestine during the Mandate but does reflectinsurgencies elsewhere and an increasingconfluence between insurgent and terroristmethods.26

Appropriate Use of Forces: Army vs. Police.Before World War II (and even as late as the1950s), British counter-insurgency operationswere better known as “imperial policing.”Insurgencies almost always consist of guerrillawar. By definition, conventional armies arenot well suited for guerrilla war. Indeed,countering insurgencies often consists in themain of policing rather than waging war.Should police forces, therefore, be in thevanguard of counter-insurgency efforts insteadof regular army? Activities of insurgentsresemble those of criminals and thus can bebetter dealt with by the police with the army insupport. Furthermore, defeating insurgentsdepends on effective intelligence, which thepolice can acquire more efficiently than thearmy.27 This was not possible in either Omancampaign since no police force, local ornational, existed in the 1950s and the RoyalOman Police, established after 1970, were notphysically present in Dhufar until after the warended there. Instead, all intelligence wasconcentrated in the army.

Appropriate Use of Forces: Special Forces. Itshould be remembered that Britain’s SpecialAir Service (SAS) was important to the successof both campaigns in Oman, but it was notprimarily an SAS show in either war. Thefoundations for success in the 1950s werepacification of the countryside throughextensive patrolling (by both Sultanate andBritish forces) and the development of good

civil-military relations. The SAS role came atthe very end. Although it is unlikely that theImamate leaders would have been dislodgedfrom al-Jabal al-Akhdar massif except by theSAS, it should be noted that the campaign ofbombings and mining continued in Omandespite the absence of the leaders. If they hadremained on the mountain plateau, it isunlikely to have made much practicaldifference.

In Dhufar, the SAS units (operating underthe euphemism, British Army Training Teams[BATT]) played an essential role indemonstrating for the first time the benefits ofgovernment to the jabbalis (mountain people)and in organizing and leading the firqat (homeguard units of surrendered tribesmen), whichnot only countered the forces of the Front ontheir own terms but increasingly reducedgrassroots support for the Front. Nevertheless,the successful prosecution of the war requiredlong, dangerous years of combat by 10,000members of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, backedby other British, Jordanian, and Iranian units,as well as artillery, air, and defensive support.

Successful Creation and Use of Local ArmedForces. The key military element in theSultanate’s success in the 1950s was thecreation of a trained and professionallycommanded Sultanate army. Again, the keyelement in Dhufar was the development of alarger, better trained, more highly motivated,and professional armed forces. While theOmanis and the Baluch constituted the rank-and-file in Dhufar, Omanization in the officerranks was making headway well before the endof the war. Although British and otherexternal assistance was considerable, in the endthe war was won on the ground by local forces.

Support of Local Population and “Hearts andMinds.” The insurgents in Oman failed to winor sustain support throughout the targetpopulations. This was particularly the case in


northern Oman where continued activity cameto be viewed as tribally, rather than nationallyor Imamate, based. In Dhufar, the Frontalienated the population by its anti-Islamic zealand tribal connections became increasinglyparamount as the war progressed. Availablemanpower decreased with mountingdefections. In the Dhufar case, thereplacement of the régime provided thedefining moment when the momentum beganto shift back to the government. Sultanatevictory in Dhufar was due to winning heartsand minds through civil development projects.While this was a substantial factor in southernOman, it was of less importance in northernOman. This difference may reflect a growthand evolution in popular expectations betweenthe two periods.28

Separating Insurgents and Population.“Isolating the populace from the insurgentssucceeded in Malaya and Kenya in denyingmobility to the insurgents, because it deprivedthem of intelligence, food and shelter. Withoutintelligence about the Security Forces, theinsurgents have to move more cautiously forfear of attack or ambush; without easy accessto food, they have to move farther afield andto known areas to obtain their own supplies.Without the shelter that the villages offered,they have to stay in the jungle or forest.”29

This was less of a factor in Dhufar given thesmall population, its being scattered throughthe region, the transhumant nature of society,and the primacy of tribal ties.

“There are two basic requirements to bemet before the support of the local populationcan be won by the counter-insurgent forces,either in the short or the long term. Firstly, theGovernment must demonstrate itsdetermination and its ability to defeat theinsurgents, for no one likes backing a loser,particularly in an insurgency. Secondly, theGovernment must convince the populace that

it can and will protect its supporters againstthe insurgents, for no one likes being shot asthe reward for loyalty.”30 The Sultanaterecognized the priority of establishing carefulcivil-military relations from the 1970 coup on.The “hearts and minds” campaign,spearheaded initially by the BATT teams,emphasized improving the lives of both thepeople of the coastal towns and the jabbalis.These first medical and veterinary initiativeswere followed by civil development efforts thatfollowed the army into safe areas across theJabal. This approach paralleled closely theearlier strategy in Malaya.31

Denial of Bases and Sanctuary. “Guerrillasneed a base somewhere from which to operate,and from where they can be organized andcontrolled. It will usually be in a highlyinaccessible area, difficult to locate or toattack; it may be in the theatre of operations,or, on occasions, it may be outside the theatreof operations altogether, as in the Korean andVietnamese wars.”32 This held true in northernOman in only the limited resort to the fastnessof al-Jabal al-Akhdar when nearly allmomentum had been lost. In Dhufar,however, it took two important forms. First,the stores of arms, ammunition, othersupplies, and medical facilities wereconcentrated in the Shirshitti cave complex onone side of a steep canyon. The complex wasimpregnable to bombing and an ambitiousattempt to seize control from the groundended in nearly disastrous failure in 1974.Second, the sanctuary of Hawf and othernearby towns in South Yemen providednumerous benefits. The role of the Front’s“capital” at Rakhyut was more symbolic thanof military importance and it was easilycaptured as government operations began toclear the western sector.

Establishment of Firm Bases. The strategy inthis regard was composed of a number of


essential components. “Offensive action neednot be on a large scale, and may consist onlyof active and aggressive patrolling from a firmbase, in order to dominate the areas requiredby the insurgents. ... The firm base thusestablished should be expanded gradually andsystematically, so that the insurgents areexcluded from complete areas one afteranother.”33 In Dhufar, firm bases began withthe towns, including army and air facilities,secured behind perimeter wire. In the yearsafter 1970, Sarfayt was established on thewestern border while posts were createdthroughout the mountains, beginning in theeast.

Division of Theater into Zones. Acomplementary strategy was to divide Dhufarinto zones (eastern, central, and western) andto eliminate insurgent “space” and neutralizethe Front’s presence in each zone beginning inthe east. In the latter stages of the war, thesedivisions became more tangible with thecreation of the Leopard, Hornbeam, andDamavand Lines. These tactics were eerilysimilar to Chiang Kai-shek’s campaign againstthe Communists in the early 1930s.34

Establishment of a Home Guard. “As eacharea is freed of insurgent domination, itshould be handed over to the local ArmedForces or Home Guard for protection and tothe civil authorities for administration. Thisnot only frees trained troops for moreoffensive operations, but also gives theGovernment an opportunity to win thesupport of the populace by wise and beneficentgovernment.”35 The “local armed forces” inOman were already the forces doing theclearing in most cases but the “home guard” inDhufar was the firqah system administered bythe BATT units under the supervision of theSultan’s Armed Forces (SAF).

Mobility to Aggressively Pursue the Offensive.“Once the Security Forces are released from

local operations around the populated areas,they can set about pursuing the insurgentsfarther afield, following them up relentlesslywherever contact is made and harassing themat every opportunity. This calls for mobility toenable them to outmarch and outmanoeuvrethe enemy, and can be achieved in several ways.The troops must be lightly equipped andsuitably organized for small-scale operations,and must be fully airportable; the air forcescan contribute tremendously to the mobility ofthe ground troops, particularly by the use ofhelicopters, which did more than any othermeasure to deprive the insurgents of theirmobility in Cyprus, and in Malaya; in Vietnamthey are the basis of almost all tacticalmobility. Air supply also plays an importantrole.”36 Gradually as the SAF built up after1970, it moved from its defensive posture to anoffensive one involving more patrolling andcontacts in the mountains and theestablishment of permanent positions on theJabal (including the capability to remain onthe Jabal through the monsoon instead ofwithdrawing every year). The arrival of theAgusta Bell helicopters, beginning in early1970, made an enormous difference in thefield while the increase in fixed-wing aircraftpermitted more substantial bases to be createdthroughout the region.

Advantage of Obscurity. Another advantageof both wars in Oman was their generalobscurity. Vietnam is the most famousexample of how the war effort was affected byadverse publicity and extensive televisioncoverage but Britain also faced similarproblems in Aden and Northern Ireland.37

The wars in Oman, on the other hand, werelittle known outside the country and attractedlittle interest even in Britain. The secrecysurrounding them, however, generated a smallbut persistent attack on Britain and its“puppet” the Sultanate, especially by the Arab


League in the 1950s and various leftistorganizations in Europe.

Impact of Technology. “Unconventional warsremain less affected by technology than theirconventional counterparts primarily becausetechnological innovation in warfare hasconcentrated on enhancing firepower. Anoverreliance on this kind of innovationcontributed to the disaster of Vietnam.Technological improvements in transportationand logistics have, however, enhanced thecounterinsurgency capabilities of the securityforces. The helicopter was the unsung hero ofthe post-imperial era.”38 Although the war inDhufar made good use of helicopters andother aircraft, advanced communications, andeven Iranian naval vessels at the end, it waswon mainly on the ground in small contacts.In part, this approach was necessary in orderto spare the civilian population, livestock andtheir forage areas, from damage. It took yearsto expand the ranks of the SAF and to create aprofessional armed force, as well as to developthe firqat, but these soldiers – of differentethnicities and nationalities – fought longcampaigns of close contact in hardshipconditions and fought well. The equal tenacityof the Front’s fighters contributed to the longduration of the small war. All of these wars, ofcourse, would have been fought far differentlyif they had been chronologically located in anera of computers and smart munitions.

Broader Lessons of Oman. Sultanate successwas conditioned on both political and militaryfactors. Among the political factors, a keyaspect was the establishment of firm controlover the territory in question, as well assupervising and policing local affairs in a fairand just manner. More generally, wherecounter-insurgency succeeded in these wars, itwas due as much, or even more, to politicalconsiderations than to military victory.39

Relevance of the British Experienceto Iraq

While Britain indisputably was fightingcolonial/imperial wars, Iraq can and should beconsidered in terms of an imperial war as well.The same underlying factors exist in Iraq, suchas resistance to foreign occupation and theproblem of how to establish a legitimate andfunctional government to replace that foreignpresence. The profusion of insurgent groupsand goals – even the so-called “negative” ornihilist goals – should not be allowed todetract from the argument. Fundamentally,these factors have fallen within the parametersof modern insurgent wars.40

Certainly, the British wars discussed aboveexhibited significant dissimilarities from theIraqi experience. Malaya was a “classical”Communist insurgency, overlaying a principalethnic division. Cyprus was an anti-colonialindependence movement, overlaying tensionsbetween the Greek and Turkish communities.Oman in the 1950s was a religious/tribalinsurrection overlaying an anti-colonialmovement. Aden was quintessentially an anti-colonial movement. Oman (Dhufar) was anirredentist insurgency that eventually becamea Marxist movement. Most of theseinsurgencies took place in difficult terrain –mountains or jungles – that afforded goodshelter and places to hide. Most did notencompass urban warfare, except Cyprus andAden; a better example of urban fighting liesin Northern Ireland. In general, however,insurgencies have become more urban-basedsince the 1960s.41

Most of these earlier conflicts consisted ofwhat Thompson termed “revolutionary wars.”Iraq, however, represents a multiplicity ofsources of varying ideologies and, even moreimportantly, differing goals – not all of which


are limited to or even principally directed atchanging the state in Iraq. Some of theinsurgent forces simply seek negative results.The mix includes resistance to Americanoccupation, jihadism (pan-Islamic extremism),and elements of civil war in jockeying forposition between ethnic and sectariancommunities and for position inside specificcommunities (especially the Shi‘ah).Nevertheless, much of the opposition exhibits“revolutionary” goals – defined in this contextas an attempt to completely overthrow theexisting system. In this sense, even theSaddamists can be seen as revolutionary in thiscontext. Is Iraq different? Fundamentally,probably not.

[Iraq] has been characterized as perhaps anexample of a ‘net war’, in which loose groupsoften diametrically opposed to one anothergravitate towards one another to carry outattacks, trade weapons or intelligence, and thendisperse never to cooperate again. Yet, thepattern of insurgency in Iraq looks remarkablysimilar to that in Palestine in the Mandateyears or Cyprus in the 1950s with the samedependence upon roadside bombs and IEDs.There was the same transition from amateur tomore sophisticated insurgent operations inAden in the 1960s, the same transition fromshorter to longer-range attacks in the Dhofar inthe 1970s. The increasing attacks on soft targetsreflect many previous urban campaigns, whilethe suicide bombings clearly reflect Islamicpractises in Lebanon, Israel and elsewhere.42

In addition, many of the tactics ofinsurgency and of counter-insurgency emergingover the last half century are germane to Iraq.

It has been suggested above that the basicpatterns of insurgency have not changedmaterially, and, indeed, that there aresimilarities between the emerging situation inIraq and some earlier insurgencies in theMiddle East. It follows, therefore, that theessentials of counterinsurgency also haveremained fairly constant and that the kind ofbasic requirements for success that can beidentified in campaigns since 1945 still hold

good. ... These are as applicable to offensive ordefensive insurgency as to irregular conflictsfalling short of insurgency. Equally, they are asapplicable to Iraq as they were once to theBritish mandate in Palestine, or to Aden,Algeria, and Oman. Where they were notadhered to, as in Palestine, Aden, and Algeria,counterinsurgency failed; where it was, as in theDhofar, counterinsurgency succeeded.43

Furthermore, many of these points havebeen enshrined in the recently releasedArmy/Marine Corps counter-insurgencymanual, the first revision in 20 years for thearmy and in 25 years for the marine corps. Asthe preface states, “Counterinsurgencyoperations generally have been neglected inbroader American military doctrine andnational security policies since the end of theVietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual isdesigned to ... merge traditional approaches toCOIN with the realities of a new internationalarena shaped by technological advances,globalization, and the spread of extremistideologies – some of them claiming theauthority of a religious faith.”44

Relevance of Aden to Iraq

The insurgency in Aden displayed anumber of aspects familiar to recent headlinesfrom Iraq.45 It embraced both a sustainedguerrilla war in the hinterland and an equallypersistent campaign of urban violence. At thesame time, Britain’s presence in Aden had beenconsidered particularly important as nearly allBritish bases elsewhere in the Middle East andeastern Indian Ocean had been abandonedalready. The largest military constructionprogram in British history to date was carriedout in Aden in the late 1950s, RAFKhormaksar on the outskirts of Aden was thebusiest RAF airfield outside Britain in the early1960s, and by 1964 there were more than 8000


British troops in Aden, not includingdependents.46

The British presence in Aden and southernYemen began with the occupation of Aden in1839. Aden became a crown colony in 1937when responsibility for the area was transferredfrom the British Government of India to theColonial Office in London. Meanwhile,gradually increasing control or influence wasexercised over Aden’s hinterland. Treaties ofprotection – involving British responsibilityfor foreign affairs and defense but not internaladministration – were signed with variousstatelets in the western region during the 19th

and early 20th centuries, spurred in part byhostilities with Ottoman forces moving downfrom North Yemen in the 1870s and duringWorld War I. Later forward policies in theeast brought the states there under Britishprotection as well. The contrast in politicalinvolvement between Colony and Protectoratewas mirrored by economic and socialdifferences. Aden, possessing one of the mostimportant harbors on the sea route betweenBritain and India, became a heavily populatedand prosperous port city with a diversepopulation of Europeans, Arabs, and SouthAsians. Most of the Protectorate, on the otherhand, saw little change in its economic statusand continued to be ruled by hereditaryfamilies deriving from a complex tribal socialmilieu.

The Radfan campaign opened a year aftera 1962 revolution in North Yemen installed agovernment hostile to the British presence insouthern Yemen. The government of theYemen Arab Republic distributed propagandain the Protectorate and supplied arms to tribaldissidents in Radfan, an isolated mountainousarea north of Aden and adjacent to NorthYemen that had long resisted British authority.The traditional form of punishment in Radfanhad been “air control” but by the 1960s this

was considered politically unacceptable.47 Thusa ground operation was organized to providea “demonstration of force.” When local forceswere unable to hold the territory secured, alarger British force was organized. This forcefaced the obstacles of rough terrain, anexceedingly hot climate, a lack of intelligence,and logistical shortcomings. AlthoughRadforce of 1963-1964 was a military success,what had been planned as a one-battalionoperation requiring three weeks had grown tobrigade strength and took three months. Allthe Protectorate was henceforward relativelyquiet with a low level of dissidence until June1967 – at which time dissidence broke into theopen and led to the overthrow of all theFederal rulers.

At the same time, however, the focus ofinsurgency moved from rural guerrilla war tourban terrorism in Aden. Grenades werethrown at British targets, cars were sabotaged,British soldiers were shot at and killed, thelocal populace was intimidated by propaganda,threats, and assassinations (and, in particular,civil administrators and police officers), thelocal security forces were paralyzed byinsurgent threats and penetration, attacks onlocal police disrupted intelligence gathering,and an effective propaganda campaign wascarried out internationally.48

On 14 October 1963, the nationalistsdecided to pursue a “full revolutionarystruggle” – thus the date became theanniversary of the revolution. A campaign ofterrorist attacks ensued shortly afterwards. Thenumbers of terrorist incidents increaseddramatically from 36 in 1964 with 36 casualtiesto 286 in 1965 with 239 casualties to 510 in1966 and 573 casualties and finally toapproximately 2900 in the first ten months of1967 with 1248 casualties. This made a totalof 3732 incidents and 2096 casualties.49

The 1964 Defence White Paper announced


that it expected South Arabia to achieveindependence by 1968. Thus, the dissidentgroups and their supporters (Egypt inparticular) began jockeying for position afterindependence. The aims of the nationalistswere to undermine the positions of both theFederal and British Governments in such a wayas to discredit them, and also to open up theway for a revolution leading to theiroverthrow; and to force the British towithdraw their military base from Aden. Themethods that they adopted in order to achievethese aims were: intimidation of the localpopulace by every possible means;neutralization of the intelligence system of theGovernment; discrediting the Government andthe Security Forces in every possible way;gaining maximum control by infiltration andsubversion of Government bodies, andparticularly those controlling the affairs of thepeople; and building up the maximumpropaganda locally and worldwide for theircause and against that of Britain and theFederation.50 Accordingly, an increasinglycomplex approach to counter-insurgencystrategies was required.

The increasingly fraught and violentsituation required a careful mix and balanceamong the many elements at play.51 First,relations between civil authorities werecomplex, with principal figures being the HighCommissioner (and behind him competitionbetween the Colonial and Foreign Offices inLondon); the Federal Minister for InternalSecurity; and the Chief Minister of Aden State(ardent nationalist ‘Abd al-Qa’im Makkawi).

Military authorities were equallycomplicated, consisting of the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East and his subordinateService commanders (Aden was just one oftheir responsibilities throughout the region);Commander Aden Brigade (with strainedrelations with a second brigadier at Little Aden

principally responsible for up-countryoperations). When situation became moreserious, it was obvious that a two-star wasrequired to take charge and the GeneralOfficer Commanding Middle East Land Forceswas tasked with overall command.

Civil police formed the last part of thetriumvirate. These consisted of the AdenPolice (mostly Arab with some senior Britishcommanders under the High Commissioner);the Police Special Branch (Arab and Britishpersonnel under the High Commissioner); andthe Federal Armed Police (largely drawn fromup-country Arabs for riot duties; technically itwas a federal unit but fell under control of theHigh Commissioner and was based in AdenState). The police evinced divided loyalties andwere troubled by realization that in anindependent state they might be required toserve the very same people that they nowhunted as enemies.

Intelligence was gathered wherever possiblebut was very scarce. The special branch playedthe biggest role but troops in the field wererequired to gather what they could. Civil-military relations were strained by the attitudeof the Federal government (led by ChiefMinister Makkawi), by the desire of mostpeople for the British to leave, and by thenature of British soldiers defending themselvesby fire in ambiguous circumstances.

In the final stages of the war, the fight wasalso hampered by the attitude of the Britishgovernment and conflicting opinionsregarding the importance of and motivationsfor remaining in Aden.52 The 1966 DefenceWhite Paper announced that Britain wouldwithdraw all military forces at Aden’sindependence in 1968, thus abrogating itsdefense treaties with the Federation and otherProtectorate rulers. This cut the ground undertheir agreement to cooperate and causedBritish forces to lose all local support (as


everyone had to plan forward to the day whenthey would be subject to local political forces).Britain was forced to assume direct control ofthe Federal government and, by early 1967, thecommander of British forces was obliged toorder the army to take control of internalsecurity with the weakened police in support,rather than the more logical reverse.

At the same time, the nationalists beganconcerted large-scale actions aimed at exertingcontrol over strategic locations of Aden, suchas Shaykh ‘Uthman. At the same time,hostilities between the National LiberationFront (NLF) and the Front for the Liberationof Southern Yemen (FLOSY) erupted into theopen. The NLF had been backed originally byNasir’s Egypt and had reluctantly merged withits rivals into the Egyptian-backed FLOSY.This did not last long and the NLF withdrew,subsequently carrying out a campaign ofassassination that effectively doomed theirremaining rivals in FLOSY (the latter’sposition was weakened by Egypt’s defeat in theJune 1967 war and the evacuation of its forcesfrom Yemen).

As the time before independenceshortened, there arose the problem of apreponderance of ‘Awlaqis in senior positionsin the army and police. Since the ‘Awlaqis hadalways cooperated with the British, it wasbecoming increasingly clear that their jobswere threatened and, in some cases, their livesas well. (After independence, most ‘Awlaqiswere purged, leading to a loss ofprofessionalism in the security forces.) Enmitybetween officers of different tribes provokedmutiny on 20 June 1967. British forces werefired upon with loss of life and Crater fell intothe hands of mutineers and the NLF. Forpolitical reasons, British forces felt unable tomount a drive to regain control and it tooktwo weeks for the gradual re-assumption ofBritish supremacy in Crater.

By August, it was clear that the NLF-ledinsurgency was taking control of the situation.In rapid succession, the NLF killed or expelledthe Protectorate rulers who were unable toresist following the withdrawal of all Britishforces from the Federation in June.Meanwhile, the South Arabian Army (SAA)found itself in the middle between the Federalgovernment and the nationalists, and thereforeincapable of taking any action. At the sametime, the Federal government effectively ceasedto exist.

With this sequence of events, the onlyremaining duty for the British was to completesuccessfully a full withdrawal from Aden itselfand the date was brought forward to 29November 1967. Whether the withdrawalwould be peaceful was kept in suspense due tocontinuing negotiations between the Britishgovernment and the NLF in Geneva. Thedeteriorating situation forced the SAA to takedecisive action and they declared for the NLFeven as they were forceful in putting a stop toNLF/FLOSY infighting. All allegiance to theFederal government was terminated and theforce restyled itself the “Arab Armed Forces inOccupied South Yemen.” Many of the‘Awlaqis had been pro-FLOSY and left thearmy at this time.

The Lessons of Aden and OtherInsurgencies

Certainly, there are many differencesbetween Aden in the 1960s and Iraq in the2000s. Aden had been in British hands forwell over a century and the British outlook wastempered by its East-of-Suez rundown.Nevertheless, there are a number of aspects ofthe Aden war that can help illuminatedifficulties in Iraq.


• The war in Aden had two aspects. On theone hand, parts of the Protectorate(particularly Radfan) exhibited a“traditional” tribal resistance to centralauthority. This was fanned by outsidesupport and agitation into a sustained anti-British movement. On the other hand,urban labor and political unrest in Adenitself gradually gained momentum andeventually demonstrations and peacefulopposition descended into sabotage andterrorism. The campaign in Adenreinforced earlier British experience inPalestine and Cyprus that urbaninsurgencies are far more difficult tocounter than rural ones.

• The British position in Aden suffered fromthe political unworkability of its attempt tomerge two radically different politicalentities together: the urban, advanced AdenState with a rural, virtually unchangedhinterland in the Protectorate.

• The struggle for independence in Adenbegan with a variety of diverse bases ofopposition and advocated means to achievethem. These ranged from the conservativeSouth Arabian League based in theProtectorate and the relatively moderatePeople’s Socialist Party that had grown outof the trade union movement in Aden tothe NLF and FLOSY. The multiplicity ofanti-British elements not only disappearedover time but the most radical groupeventually trumped.

• Outside sanctuary and external assistance tothe insurgents was of key importance. Thesanctuary was primarily in North Yemenwhere the NLF and FLOSY had theirheadquarters and supplies. North Yemenhad been hostile to the British in Adenduring the days of the Imamate and becamemore so after the 1962 revolution. Equallysignificant was the role played by Egypt

during this period. Egypt had played a vitalrole in North Yemen’s 1962 revolution andan Egyptian army dominated republicanareas until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. ThusCairo was able to easily provide funds,weapons, and supplies, and to manipulateAdeni insurgents, safe from Britishinterference.

• The country as a whole exhibited dividedloyalties. There was no sectarian divide asin Iraq but tribal differences and suspicionswere possibly as serious. They threatened todestroy local security forces. At no timewere these security forcees capable ofreplacing British authority.

• The effort on the ground was hampered byuncertain resolve back in London. Newtimetables for withdrawal were periodicallyissued and dates were regularly advanced.Thus, those individuals and groups thatBritain had earlier persuaded to cooperatein the creation of a Federal governmentwere completely undermined.53

• The early “amateur” nature of insurgentattacks on British and Federal targetsevolved into more effective andsophisticated methods as the warprogressed.54

• In the last months of the war, an escalatingpattern of threats and assassinations againstlocal administrators, security officers, andcivilians as a whole dampened anyenthusiasm or even reluctant willingness tocooperate with the British and themoribund Federal government.

• As the war wore on, the weakness and lackof legitimacy of indigenous governmentforced the British political and militaryestablishment to take increasing charge ofeven routine affairs. This in turn provokedmore attacks on British civilian as well asmilitary targets.The relevance of many of these points to


Iraq should be obvious but it may be helpfulto draw a number of specific conclusions fromAden and the other British counter-insurgencywars. Foremost among these must be carefulconsideration of the extreme difficulty indevising and creating a viable successorgovernment. Political systems cannot beimposed but must grow naturally out of theenvironment. Similarly, it is exceedinglychallenging to create and administer effectivelocal security forces. A strong, sustained effortis not always enough. Tailoring efforts to localcriteria and providing only as much guidanceand supervision as is absolutely necessary iscrucial.

Divisions among insurgent groups oftenhave a way of working themselves out –frequently through violence. Frequently, themore radical or extremist faction tends to winout. The longer a conflict persists, the lesssuccessful or relevant a solely military responsebecomes. That is, continued resistance tendsto legitimize and strengthen the opposition.The escalation of forces deemed necessary tofight the war on the ground is often notenough to do the job and escalations aregenerally matched by increases in enemycapabilities.

It is worth repeating often that politicalconcerns require priority over military goals.These include the importance of a “hearts andminds” emphasis, the devising of a viablesuccessor government, and recognition of thepolitical limitations of effective counter-insurgency operations in both rural and urbanenvironments.55

At the same time, the lack of – or volatilityof – resolve at home creates facts in the theater

and accelerates withdrawal – although generallynot fast enough. It is vital to know when tocall it quits. It was perhaps easier for Britainbecause the wind-down of East-of-Suez andimperial obligations was seen as inevitable: itwas better to leave for political and financialreasons than to stay and pursue a militarysolution.56

Finally, the imperial power should beprepared to deal politically with all possibleopponents. To repeat the frequently employedparaphrasing of Yitzhak Rabin, you don’tmake peace with your friends, you make peacewith your enemies. Because of the prolongedBritish presence in Aden and the escalatingwar, the British found themselves left with nochoice but to turn the country over to theNLF, the element that they most wished toavoid.

The British experience in fightinginsurgencies provides multiple lessons for Iraq,both positively and negatively. Fundamentally,success was achieved when local politicalconsiderations were favorable and receivedproper attention. In the long run, theseconsiderations played a more important role insuccessful resolution of the insurgency thanthe application of military force, even whenthe latter was appropriate and nuanced. Whenthe political situation was unfavorable orhostile, such as in Aden or Algeria, no amountof military response could suffice andwithdrawal became the only option. Recentdevelopments may make that conclusion mootfor Iraq. Nevertheless, it is clear that thepolitical outlook of Iraq remains volatile andthus the denouement of the present strugglecan only be regarded as uncertain.


1. Representative explications include Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Buildingand a History Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), Michael Eisenstadt and EricMathewson, eds., U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the British Experience (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003); and Judith S. Yaphe, “A War and Occupation inIraq: What Went Right? What Could Go Wrong?” Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer2003), pp. 381-399. Yaphe identifies a number of useful lessons for the US from the earlier Britishexperience, including never assuming that a campaign will be easy or that the people liberated willbe grateful and do not impose a system that cannot be protected or defended. She concludes that“As nation-builders, the British created an impressive array of institutions – a monarchy, aparliament, a Western-style constitution, a civil service, and an army. We will certainly do thesame. They established a government that would protect British interests at the least possible costto the British taxpayer. The US will try to do the same. They appointed Iraqis to highly visiblepublic posts but denied them real authority or responsibility. Years of British occupation andmanipulation would result in the rise of nationalist groups – Arab and Iraqi – opposed to foreignoccupation and protectorates, imposed treaties and constitutions, and the creation of political andmilitary institutions intended to consolidate foreign and not Iraqi control. They would alsoproduce a disturbing pattern of military revolts, political repression, ethnic cleansing, and civilunrest. Let us hope this pattern does not repeat itself.” Ibid., p. 399.

2. Representative works include: Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” ForeignAffairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March-April 2006), pp. 2-14; Robert K. Brigham, Is Iraq Another Vietnam?(New York: PublicAffairs, 2006); Kenneth Campbell, A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, andthe Hard Lessons of War (New York: Paradigm, 2007); John Dumbrell and David Ryan, eds.,Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, Lessons, Legacies, and Ghosts (London: Routledge, 2006); and John Mueller,“The Iraq Syndrome,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6 (November-December 2005), pp. 44-54.

3. An encompassing typology of insurgent movements that have operated during the post-WorldWar II period identifies six types. Secessionist movements seek to withdraw from an entity. Revolutionary insurgent movements seek a new and radically transformed régime along Marxistlines. Restorational movements also desire to replace existing régimes but instead wish to restorean elitist character to the entity. Reactionary insurgents differ from restorationists by lookingback to a golden age as their example. Conservative insurgent movements wish to maintain theexisting régime despite the attempts of authorities to change it. Reformist movements are similarto secessionists but define their goal more narrowly as autonomy and better treatment within theexisting polity. Bard E. O’Neill, “Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis,” in Bard E. O’Neill,William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. 3. The 2006 Army/Marine Corps manual on insurgency provides thefollowing definitions. “Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed atthe overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggledesigned to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or

Notes:


other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military,paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeatinsurgency (JP 1-02).” United States Army Headquarters and United States Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC, 15 December 2006; Army FieldManual 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5), p. 1-1.

4. Good concise summaries of all these campaigns can be found in Robert B. Asprey, War in theShadows: Guerrillas in History (New York: William Morrow, 1994); Malaya is covered on pp. 563-574. The Emergency is also covered, inter alia, by Michael Dewar, Brush Fire Wars: MinorCampaigns of the British Army since 1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press; London: Robert Hale,1984), pp. 27-44; and John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland(Houndmills, UK; New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 31-59. A more thorough treatment is to befound in Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960(Singapore; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

5. Charles Maechling, Jr., “Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire,” in Michael T. Klareand Peter Kornbluh, eds. Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorismin the Eighties (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 23-24.

6. Asprey, War in the Shadows, pp. 624-642; Dewar, Brush Fire Wars, pp. 50-62; Newsinger, BritishCounterinsurgency, pp. 60-83. Recent critical studies of the war and its effects include CarolineElkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt,2005); and David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End ofEmpire (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005).

7. Asprey, War in the Shadows, pp. 643-656; Dewar, Brush Fire Wars, pp. 68-82; Newsinger, BritishCounterinsurgency, pp. 84-107.

8. J.E. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy (London: Saqi, 2007),pp. 63-182. Many of the other works on counter-insurgency cited in this article also discuss thetwo Oman campaigns.

9. See footnote 45 below for sources.

10. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, pp. 183-399.

11. Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their OpponentsSince 1750 (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 25.

12. Maechling, ‘Counterinsurgency’, pp. 24-25.

13. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malay and Vietnam(London: Chatto & Windus; New York: Praeger, 1966); ibid., No Exit From Vietnam (London:Chatto & Windus, 1969); ibid., Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969 (London: Secker &


Warburg; New York: Taplinger, 1970).

14. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, p. 107.


16. Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, ‘Introduction’, in Beckett and Pimlott, eds., Armed Forcesand Modern Counter-Insurgency (London : Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), p. 6.

17. Julian Paget, Counter-insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Walker,1967). Paget’s account of the war in Aden was also published as Last Post: Aden 1964-67 (London: Faber, 1969).

18. Paget, Counter-insurgency Operations, pp. 156-157.

19. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (London: Faber,1971); ibid., Bunch of Five (London: Faber, 1977).


21. Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 292.

22. Kitson, Bunch of Five, pp. 294-296.

23. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, pp. 129-130.

24. A number of these comments are derived from my recent book, Oman’s Insurgencies.

25. Paget, Counter-insurgency Operations, p. 20.

26. Ian F.W. Beckett, “Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. ArmyWar College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2005), pp. 7-8.

27. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 95; Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 1-2. The Army/Marine Corpscounterinsurgency manual recognizes the key role of the police: “The primary frontline COINforce is often the police—not the military. The primary COIN objective is to enable localinstitutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.” Counterinsurgency, p. 6-19. But it alsoobserves that “the police are only a part of the rule of law. Police require support from a law code,judicial courts, and a penal system. Such support provides a coherent and transparent system thatimparts justice. Upholding the rule of law also requires other civil institutions and a HN ability tosupport the legal system.” Ibid. The manual provides the example of Malaya in how to create andenhance an effective police organization.


28. The use of strong methods to gain intelligence or intimidate the enemy generally has beencounter-productive. “In Algeria, of course, intelligence was often obtained throughinstitutionalized torture, where the attempt to separate insurgents from population by the erectionof physical barriers and through large-scale resettlement also tended to alienate the populationrather than win hearts and minds.” Beckett, “Insurgency in Iraq,” p. 16. As another examplefrom Malaya, “the indiscriminate shooting of rural Chinese squatters fleeing army patrols, theburning of rural homes, and the brutal treatment meted out by the police, all served to swell theranks of both the guerrilla army and the communists’ political-support organizations.” Stubbs,Hearts and Minds, p. 256.



31. Dewar, Brush Fire Wars, p. 178.



34. ‘The communist soviets were sealed off and progressively divided with networks of over 3,000well-defended and fortified blockhouses, and new roads patrolled by armoured cars and aircraft.Four categories of area were identified – safety zones, adjacent to bandit areas, semi-bandit areasand full-bandit areas – and co-ordinated mobile columns were used progressively to drive thecommunists against the blockhouse lines. It was not unlike the methods used by the Britishagainst Boer commandos. Robbed of mobility, by October 1934, the communists were forced toabandon their base areas and try to break out of the encirclement, initiating that great epic ofChinese communist history, the “Long March”.’ Beckett, Modern Insurgencies, p. 72.


36. Paget, Counter-insurgency Operations, pp. 175-176.

37. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, pp. 147-148.

38. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, p. 148. Mockaitis also notes the enormous advantage thatcomputer technology offers to counter-insurgency forces. Ibid., p. 149. It was not yet available foruse in Dhufar of course but the effectiveness of the computer and the Internet has more recentlybeen demonstrated in resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq.

39. Thomas R. Mockaitis makes the point that the “methods” developed by the British to fightthese wars are far less relevant to today’s situation than the underlying principles. “Some of thesemethods were made possible by the extraordinary control that a colonial power could exercise oversubject peoples and cannot easily be duplicated. The only two governments still employing


British-style emergency regulations are South Africa and Israel. The former is a pariah, and thelatter is coming under increasing world criticism.” British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (London: Macmillan in association with King’s College, London, 1990).

40. “Despite this success [in fighting insurgencies] and the abysmal failures of the French inIndochina and Algeria and the Americans in Vietnam, critics of the British approach have rightlypointed out that it was inseparably connected to imperialism. Even the most successful post-warcampaigns were little more than holding actions that could stem but not stop the flow ofnationalism and perhaps hand over to the most pro-British of the nationalist parties. Britishmethods they further note, depended on an extraordinary degree of colonial control not likely tobe repeated in future campaigns. ... Even mistakes such as the use of internment in Aden andNorthern Ireland can only be understood in terms of the colonial legacy.” Mockaitis, BritishCounterinsurgency, p. 2.

41. “Compared to earlier periods when protracted rural insurgency was difficult to contain buturban insurgency generally easily contained, the sheer growth of population has arguablydiminished the former advantages of the security forces in urban areas.” Ian Beckett, “The Futureof Insurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 31-32.

42. Beckett, “Future of Insurgency,” p. 33.

43. Beckett, “Insurgency in Iraq,” p. 15.

44. Counterinsurgency, p. vii.

45. The following discussion is based largely on Paget, Last Post: Aden; R.J. Gavin, Aden UnderBritish Rule, 1839-1967 (London: C. Hurst, 1975); David Lee, Flight from the Middle East: A Historyof the Royal Air Force in the Arabian Peninsula and Adjacent Territories, 1945-1972 (London: HMSO,1980); David Ledger, Shifting Sands: The British in South Arabia (London: Peninsular, 1983); JosephKostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press,1984); Karl Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire (Houndsmill, UK: Macmillan, 1991); Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishmentof Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); andJonathan Walker, Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia 1962-1967 (Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount, 2005). See also Peter Hinchcliffe, John T. Ducker, and Maria Holt, Without Glory inArabia: The British Retreat from Aden (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).

46. Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968 (London: Oxford University Press,1973, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 209-210; Pieragostini, Britain, Aden andSouth Arabia, p. 187; Gavin, Aden, p. 344.

47. For more details regarding “air control” or “air policing” in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf,see J.E. Peterson, Defending Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 28-40. Following WorldWar I, the Royal Air Force (RAF) secured its continued existence by touting its superior and


cheaper ability to police British-controlled territory in the Middle East, especially Iraq and Aden. As a consequence, the RAF played a prominent role in the region’s post-World War II counter-insurgency campaigns, as detailed in Lee, Flight from the Middle East.

48. Paget reproduces a translation of an NLF circular titled “How to Disturb the British.” Among the recommendations are rendering their air conditioners useless, pouring sugar in the gastanks of their vehicles, puncturing tires, breaking water papers in houses and offices, and settingfire to anything inflammable. Paget, Last Post: Aden, p. 263.

49. Paget, Last Post: Aden, p. 115. Paget also asserts that 57 British servicemen were killed and 651wounded during the war. But Jonathan Walker points out that these figures were for Aden Stateonly and did not include lightly wounded casualties. He estimates the total number of killed atabout 200 and wounded at over 1500. Aden Insurgency, p. 285.

50. Paget, Last Post: Aden, p. 114.

51. The following summary draws from Paget, Last Post: Aden, pp. 125-133.

52. “Both the Conservative and Labour Governments held two sometimes complementary,sometimes conflicting images of the British presence at Aden. One was of Aden as a military assetto be employed in the furtherance of Britain’s world role. The other was of Aden as a colonialresponsibility in the post-colonial world: a territory to be prepared for independence.” Pieragostini, Britain, Aden and South Arabia, p. 183.

53. “Increasingly, indeed, federal officials and even local governments in the emirates, sultanates,and sheikhdoms either left the country altogether or threw in their lot with the insurgentmovements. In any case, intelligence had never been forthcoming freely from the population, andthere was now little incentive to cooperate. Arab members of the Special Branch already had beentargeted by the insurgents, and the local police forces were thoroughly infiltrated, both the SouthArabian Police and Aden Armed Police mutinying in one particularly notorious incident in June1967, killing 22 British servicemen and taking control of the Crater district of Aden for 15 daysuntil order was restored.” Beckett, “Insurgency in Iraq,” p. 12.

54. “In Aden between 1965 and 1967, there was a cognate transition from amateur attacks inwhich insurgents often blew themselves up – in one early attack the insurgent threw the pin ratherthan the grenade – to more effective and more numerous incidents. Incidents thus rose from 286in 1965, to 540 in 1966, and to 2,900 in 1967, with grenades, road mines, and sniping taking mostBritish lives.” Beckett, “Insurgency in Iraq,” p. 8.

55. Examples of this point in Aden include the prohibition for political reasons of the decades-long tool of air control as a response to rural unrest, and the soft and gradual approach requiredto regain control of the Crater district in Aden following a mutiny in the South Arabian Armywithout alienating the population.


56. There is a large body of literature on the British “end of empire.” Darby, British Defence Policyis a particularly pertinent and useful work.

Documents

Arabian Peninsula Background Notes APBN-009 · This is an Arabian Peninsula Background Note (APBN) written by J.E. Peterson N.B. This background note is a preliminary attempt to present