1
C orporate governance in its current form is a dangerous sham. It does not deliver what it says on the tin for most organi- sations because they are not covered by the Corporate Governance Code. Worse still, it encourages politi- cians, civil servants and business leaders to churn out platitudes in an effort to convince the public that everything is under control. They tend to see corporate governance as a silver bullet to solve any lack of organisational direction or manage- ment. It is not. The whitewash of the Financial Services Authority’s report on the failings of the Royal Bank of Scot- land board is the latest manifes- tation of not taking enforcement seriously, as set out in the directors’ duties under the 2006 Companies Act. The term “governance” derives from the classical Greek, kubernetes, and has two meanings. First, the helmsman of a ship, from which the present direction-giving notions derive. Second, and often not appre- ciated by boards, is the concept of cybernetics — the feedback systems that show if the direction taken was the one intended. So, effective corporate govern- ance is about the real-time learning of a board. It involves balancing the irresolvable dilemma of any director — how do you drive the enterprise forward while keeping it under prudent control? Sadly, most corporate governance tends to be seen only as a tick-box exercise to be completed once a year before organisations get on with the “real” work of managing. This is against the word and spirit of the law. Effective corporate gov- ernance can only be developed in a national legal framework of laws of property and contract, and with speedy redress through the courts. Britain is well positioned for this. However, it makes little of it. What can be done to rectify this? At national level, government needs to understand better what effective corporate governance is. Its biggest mistake is the failure to apply the act and the code to all registered organisations — private, public and not-for-profit. South Africa has recently done so and it is concentrating minds wonderfully. Here, government proclaims the need for corporate governance while writing daft laws and regulations that often cut across the well-con- structed Companies Act 2006 and the curate’s egg of the 2010 Corp- orate Governance Code. For example, the government en- couraged Monitor, the independent regulator of NHS foundation trusts, to follow a version of the Combined Code, the 2010 code’s forerunner, as best practice, yet has not created the trusts as legal entities. So the directors have no ultimate authority over organisations they “direct”. Matters are made worse by the civil service insistence that the chief executive rather than the chairman is the accountable officer. This means that they can short-cir- cuit their boards and go straight to the Department of Health if they dis- agree with board decisions. Matters are then made worse by the introduction of two boards. The new board of governors has been given draconian powers to select and dismiss the chairman, rather than this being a key function of the board of directors. It is worth noting that the Fin- ancial Services Authority and the Financial Reporting Council have quietly set themselves up as comp- anies limited by guarantee, so that they have a legal basis under the Companies Act. Will NHS founda- tion trusts ever have the courage to demand the same? The negative, tick-box attitude is still strong but there are some forces pushing for corporate governance to be taken more seriously. The seven non-exhaustive duties of a director (see panel below) codify 300 years of common law in the Companies Act 2006. Will the government and the courts have the courage to apply them? Maybe the Bribery Act 2010 will act as a spur. In spite of what the French may say, there is no “Anglo-American” approach to corporate governance. America has a “principles-based” system, which means there is a lot of boxes to tick and they must all be ticked. But, once you have done so, you can do anything else. Enron was 100% compliant at the time of its demise. The UK and many Common- wealth countries use a “comply or explain” system: if a company wishes to do something outside the code but within the law, it must get the agreement of the shareholders to do so. This has been taken further in South Africa where the new King 3 code has moved to “apply or explain”, so companies have to give examples of what they are doing if they deviate from the code. In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley — the legislative crackdown that fol- lowed Enron — America seems to be teetering on the edge of a corporate governance collapse, if the current party politicisation seen through the negative business responses to the recent SEC proxy access ruling is typical. It may seem unlikely but Britain and South Africa are seen to have the most advanced systems of corporate governance in the world. Why should this be so? Britain has completely revised its Compa- nies Act and additionally has three separate initiatives, all backed by at least secondary legislation running in parallel — the 2010 Combined Code of Corporate Governance; uniquely, the Stewardship Code for shareholders, introduced last year; and the ongoing Walker review of UK banking. It looks an impressive structure but the regulatory mechanism is faulty. UK corporate governance does not have its own regulator but is a minor subset of the Financial Reporting Council and is, therefore, weak and not independent. Most worryingly, the remit of the code extends only to listed companies. So this rarely feeds through to improving the attitude and behav- iour of directors. South Africa’s King 3 review applies to all organisations — private, public and charities — has a conceptual base of sustainabil- ity and is seeking to make “apply or explain” real. Again, the challenge is to achieve effective implementation. But a deeper issue in getting any code to improve the quality of the board linked with the quality of busi- ness output concerns the lack of rig- orous selection, induction, develop- ment, appraisal and deselection of board members. More imagination is needed in the selection and induction of suffi- ciently diverse directors, and much more external help is required in the rigorous and regular appraisal of the board, its committees and each indi- vidual director. n Bob Garratt is a visiting professor at Cass Business School and the Uni- versity of Stellenbosch, South Africa. His latest book, The Fish Rots from the Head: Developing Effective Board Directors (Profile Books), is available post-free for £8.50 from The Sunday Times Bookshop on 0845 271 2134 or thesundaytimes.co.uk/ bookshop. YOU are working in a team on an important project and depend on others delivering on time — your career rests on it. You email a crucial team member about his progress, and he replies: “I’ll ....... have it ready in two weeks.” Consider the following 10 words that might go in the dotted space: definitely, hopefully, potentially, probably, possibly, likely, maybe, try to, unlikely. Think about each word and put a confidence percentage next to each. Thus, you may believe that if he says “definitely” you have a 90% expectation that it will be done, while “possibly” yields only 30%. It is most fun to do this exercise in a multinational company because wide variations occur. It shows how people code and then decode what they think rather differently. Just as in some cultures it is impossible to say no, so in others probabilities are coded rather subtly. So to say one cannot or will not do something sounds rude or insubordinate, and the statement is coded. The British under-exaggerate, the Americans over-exaggerate, but with luck they understand the codes of their own people. Problems arise when dealing with those who are not from the same country and coded messages are misunderstood. This issue is also about notions of time. All cross-cultural researchers are aware that people think and talk about time differently. Some countries are time-bound (Germany, Britain, Switzerland), whereas others are time-blind (Spain, Portugal, Greece). Time-bound societies emphasise schedules, deadlines, time-keeping, a fast pace of life. Time-blind societies are more relaxed and casual about time. Hence what is late in one society is not necessarily so in another. As societies become more time-bound, they have a more competitive attitude to time, and so “fast” is better. Time-bound societies see time as linear, time-blind societies see it as cyclical. Time-bound societies centre work round clocks, schedules, delivery dates, agendas, deadlines. This can make for serious misunderstandings at work. Then there is the time-blind culture’s distinction between sacred time and profane time. The former is for eating, family and sleeping. Profane time is used for everything else. Hence in Spain, meetings can be interrupted; time is not dedicated solely to the meeting. There is also the distinction between mono- and polychronic time. Time-bound societies are monochronic — they do one thing at a time. Time-blind societies are polychronic, happily ignoring appointments, deadlines and tolerating interruptions. Third, there is the issue of time-orientation: past, present and future. The British are thought to be interested more in the past and so do not invest so much in the future, whereas the Germans have a longer view of the future, investing in research, education and training. The understanding and use of time is crucial in business. Not only does it lead to how, when and where work is done, but people with conflicting ideas and theories may have very different conceptions and expectations. This can lead to miscommunication and animosity. As with cultural differences, there are individual differences. One distinction is between the time estimator and the time contractor. To the former “I shall see you at 6.30” means any time around 6.30 (so it could be 6.05 or 6.45) while to the latter 6.30 is a contract. If a time estimator is married to or works with a time contractor, all hell frequently breaks loose because their expectations are challenged. Equally there are those fixated on the past, obsessed with the present or those looking only to the future. Recently Philip Zimbardo, a professor of psychology at Stanford University in California, identified five key approaches to time perspective. n The “past-negative” type who focuses on negative personal experiences that still have the power to upset, causing feelings of bitterness and regret. n The “past-positive” type who takes a nostalgic view of the past, with a “better safe than sorry” approach that may hold him back. n The “present-hedonistic” type who is dominated by pleasure-seeking impulses and is reluctant to postpone feeling good for later gain. n The “present-fatalistic” type who does not enjoy the present but feels trapped in it. n The “future-focused” type who is ambitious, focused on goals, and has a sense of urgency. Our sense of time is shaped by personality and culture. Also, organisations have unique time cultures. Some do time-urgency seriously. Others seem much more relaxed. Some are amnesic about the past, believing it pointless to look back. Others are obsessed with the future, paying strategy consultants to “predict” and control it. n Adrian Furnham is professor of psychology at University College London We must make boards better Why do we only pay lip service to corporate governance when we are so well placed to develop the best practices, asks Bob Garratt ON YOUR HEAD ADRIAN FURNHAM Punctuality: do the Greeks really have a word for it? GEOFFREY HOWE has been appointed a non-executive director at Close Brothers, the investment bank. Howe, 61, is currently chairman of Nationwide building society and of Jardine Lloyd Thompson. Previously he was a non-executive director of Investec and JP Morgan Overseas Investment Trust, a director of Robert Fleming and managing partner of Clifford Chance. n Amanda Mackenzie has joined Mothercare as a non-executive director. Mackenzie, 47, is global marketing and communications director at Aviva, the insurer, and a director of the National Youth Orchestra. n Geoffrey Cullinan has been appointed to Electra Private Equity as a non-executive director. The 60-year-old was a director of Bain & Co from 1997 to 2005. Earlier he was chief executive of Hamleys and a senior non-executive director of Datamonitor. n Paul Mountford has become a non-executive director at Volex, the supplier of power cords and cable assemblies. Mountford, 52, who is president of emerging markets at Cisco Systems, previously served on the boards of Palm and Phyworks. n Catherine Claydon has been appointed a non-executive director of Dunedin Income Growth Investment Trust. Claydon, 41, who worked for Goldman Sachs International from 1992 until 2007, is also a director of Witan Investment Trust and the London Metal Exchange. n Simon Webb has been appointed group finance director by Devro, which makes collagen products for the food industry. The 46-year-old was group finance director of De La Rue, the banknote printer, until May last year. n Eddie Wisniewski is the new finance director of Desire Petroleum, the Falklands oil explorer. Wisniewski, 50, has been a non-executive director at Desire since 2005 and previously worked for Clyde Petroleum and Alstec in finance roles. Close calls for Howe BOARD MOVES DIRECTORS must bear in mind these seven duties in all their activities and obtain professional advice if unsure of what is required in any given situation. n To act within the powers of the company and to exercise powers only for the purpose for which they were conferred. n To promote the success of the company and, in doing so, have regard to the likely consequences in the long term and to the interests of the employees. n To exercise independent judgment. n To exercise the care, skill and diligence expected of a director with knowledge, skill and experience. n To avoid conflicts of interest. n Not to accept benefits from third parties. n To declare any interest in a proposed transaction or arrangement. Late departure: John Cleese fell foul of an obsession with time in Clockwise Bob Garratt believes cases such as the report on the RBS board’s failings show that we don’t take corporate governance seriously FRANCESCO GUIDICINI Seven duties of directors 2 APPOINTMENTS thesundaytimes.co.uk/appointments 09.01.11 [email protected]

APPOINTMENTS BOARDMOVES Wemustmakeboardsbetter · 2017-06-22 · C orporate governance in its current form is a dangeroussham.Itdoes notdeliverwhatitsays onthetinformostorgani-sationsbecausetheyarenotcovered

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Page 1: APPOINTMENTS BOARDMOVES Wemustmakeboardsbetter · 2017-06-22 · C orporate governance in its current form is a dangeroussham.Itdoes notdeliverwhatitsays onthetinformostorgani-sationsbecausetheyarenotcovered

Corporate governance inits current form is adangerous sham. It doesnot deliver what it saysonthe tin formost organi-

sations because they are not coveredby the Corporate Governance Code.Worse still, it encourages politi-

cians, civil servants and businessleaders to churn out platitudes in aneffort to convince the public thateverything is under control. Theytend to see corporate governance asa silver bullet to solve any lack oforganisational direction or manage-ment. It is not.The whitewash of the Financial

Services Authority’s report on thefailings of the Royal Bank of Scot-land board is the latest manifes-tation of not taking enforcementseriously, as set out in the directors’duties under the 2006 Companies Act.The term “governance” derives

from the classical Greek, kubernetes,and has two meanings. First, thehelmsmanof a ship, fromwhich thepresent direction-giving notionsderive. Second, and often not appre-ciated by boards, is the concept ofcybernetics — the feedback systemsthat show if the direction taken wasthe one intended.So, effective corporate govern-

ance is about the real-time learningof a board. It involves balancing theirresolvable dilemma of any director— how do you drive the enterpriseforward while keeping it underprudent control?Sadly, most corporate governance

tends to be seen only as a tick-boxexercise to be completed once a yearbefore organisations get on with the“real” work ofmanaging.This is against theword and spirit

of the law. Effective corporate gov-ernance can only be developed in anational legal framework of laws ofproperty and contract, and withspeedy redress through the courts.Britain is well positioned for this.However, it makes little of it. Whatcan be done to rectify this?At national level, government

needs to understand better whateffective corporate governance is. Itsbiggest mistake is the failure toapply the act and the code to allregistered organisations — private,public and not-for-profit. South

Africa has recently done so and it isconcentrating minds wonderfully.Here, government proclaims theneed for corporate governancewhilewriting daft laws and regulationsthat often cut across the well-con-structed Companies Act 2006 andthe curate’s egg of the 2010 Corp-orate Governance Code.For example, the government en-

couraged Monitor, the independentregulator of NHS foundation trusts,to follow a version of the CombinedCode, the 2010 code’s forerunner, asbest practice, yet has not created thetrusts as legal entities.So the directors have no ultimate

authority over organisations they“direct”. Matters are made worse bythe civil service insistence that thechief executive rather than thechairman is the accountable officer.This means that they can short-cir-cuit their boards and go straight totheDepartmentofHealth if theydis-agreewith board decisions.Matters are then made worse by

the introduction of two boards. Thenew board of governors has beengiven draconian powers to selectand dismiss the chairman, ratherthan this being a key function of theboard of directors.It is worth noting that the Fin-

ancial Services Authority and theFinancial Reporting Council havequietly set themselves up as comp-anies limited by guarantee, so thatthey have a legal basis under theCompanies Act. Will NHS founda-tion trusts ever have the courage todemand the same?The negative, tick-box attitude is

still strong but there are some forcespushing for corporate governance to

be taken more seriously. The sevennon-exhaustive duties of a director(see panel below) codify 300 years ofcommon law in the Companies Act2006. Will the government and thecourts have the courage to applythem? Maybe the Bribery Act 2010will act as a spur.In spite of what the French may

say, there is no “Anglo-American”approach to corporate governance.America has a “principles-based”system, which means there is a lotof boxes to tick and they must all beticked. But, once you have done so,you can do anything else. Enronwas

100% compliant at the time of itsdemise.The UK and many Common-

wealth countries use a “comply orexplain” system: if a companywishes to do something outside thecode but within the law, it must getthe agreement of the shareholdersto do so.This has been taken further in

South Africa where the new King 3code has moved to “apply orexplain”, so companies have to giveexamples of what they are doing ifthey deviate from the code.In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley —

the legislative crackdown that fol-lowed Enron— America seems to beteetering on the edge of a corporategovernance collapse, if the currentparty politicisation seen throughthe negative business responses tothe recent SEC proxy access rulingis typical. It may seem unlikely butBritain and South Africa are seen tohave the most advanced systems ofcorporate governance in the world.Why should this be so? Britain

has completely revised its Compa-nies Act and additionally has threeseparate initiatives, all backed by atleast secondary legislation runningin parallel — the 2010 CombinedCode of Corporate Governance;uniquely, the Stewardship Code forshareholders, introduced last year;and the ongoing Walker review ofUK banking.It looks an impressive structure

but the regulatory mechanism isfaulty. UK corporate governancedoes not have its own regulator butis a minor subset of the FinancialReporting Council and is, therefore,weak and not independent. Mostworryingly, the remit of the codeextends only to listed companies.So this rarely feeds through to

improving the attitude and behav-iour of directors. South Africa’s King3 review applies to all organisations— private, public and charities —has a conceptual base of sustainabil-ity and is seeking to make “apply orexplain” real. Again, the challenge isto achieve effective implementation.But a deeper issue in getting any

code to improve the quality of theboard linkedwith the quality of busi-ness output concerns the lack of rig-orous selection, induction, develop-ment, appraisal and deselection ofboardmembers.More imagination is needed in

the selection and induction of suffi-ciently diverse directors, and muchmore external help is required in therigorous and regular appraisal of theboard, its committees and each indi-vidual director.n Bob Garratt is a visiting professorat Cass Business School and theUni-versity of Stellenbosch, SouthAfrica.His latest book, The Fish Rots fromthe Head: Developing EffectiveBoard Directors (Profile Books), isavailable post-free for £8.50 fromTheSundayTimesBookshop on0845271 2134 or thesundaytimes.co.uk/bookshop.

YOU are working in a team on animportant project and depend on othersdelivering on time— your career rests onit. You email a crucial teammember abouthis progress, and he replies: “I’ll . . . . . . .have it ready in twoweeks.”Consider the following 10 words that

might go in the dotted space: definitely,hopefully, potentially, probably, possibly,likely, maybe, try to, unlikely.Think about eachword and put a

confidence percentage next to each. Thus,youmay believe that if he says “definitely”you have a 90% expectation that it will bedone, while “possibly” yields only 30%.It is most fun to do this exercise in a

multinational company because widevariations occur. It shows how peoplecode and then decode what they thinkrather differently. Just as in some culturesit is impossible to say no, so in othersprobabilities are coded rather subtly. So tosay one cannot or will not do somethingsounds rude or insubordinate, and thestatement is coded.The British under-exaggerate, the

Americans over-exaggerate, but with luckthey understand the codes of their ownpeople. Problems arise when dealing withthosewho are not from the same countryand codedmessages aremisunderstood.This issue is also about notions of time.

All cross-cultural researchers are awarethat people think and talk about timedifferently. Some countries aretime-bound (Germany, Britain,Switzerland), whereas others aretime-blind (Spain, Portugal, Greece).Time-bound societies emphasiseschedules, deadlines, time-keeping, a fastpace of life. Time-blind societies aremorerelaxed and casual about time.Hencewhat is late in one society is not

necessarily so in another. As societiesbecomemore time-bound, they have amore competitive attitude to time, and so“fast” is better. Time-bound societies seetime as linear, time-blind societies see itas cyclical. Time-bound societies centrework round clocks, schedules, deliverydates, agendas, deadlines. This canmakefor seriousmisunderstandings at work.Then there is the time-blind culture’s

distinction between sacred time andprofane time. The former is for eating,family and sleeping. Profane time is usedfor everything else. Hence in Spain,meetings can be interrupted; time is notdedicated solely to themeeting.There is also the distinction between

mono- and polychronic time. Time-boundsocieties aremonochronic— they do onething at a time. Time-blind societies arepolychronic, happily ignoringappointments, deadlines and tolerating

interruptions. Third, there is the issue oftime-orientation: past, present and future.The British are thought to be interested

more in the past and so do not invest somuch in the future, whereas the Germanshave a longer view of the future, investingin research, education and training.The understanding and use of time is

crucial in business. Not only does it lead tohow,when and where work is done, butpeople with conflicting ideas and theoriesmay have very different conceptions andexpectations. This can lead tomiscommunication and animosity.As with cultural differences, there are

individual differences. One distinction isbetween the time estimator and the timecontractor. To the former “I shall see youat 6.30”means any time around 6.30 (so itcould be 6.05 or 6.45) while to the latter6.30 is a contract. If a time estimator is

married to or works with a timecontractor, all hell frequently breaks loosebecause their expectations are challenged.Equally there are those fixated on the

past, obsessed with the present or thoselooking only to the future. RecentlyPhilip Zimbardo, a professor of psychologyat Stanford University in California,identified five key approaches to timeperspective.n The “past-negative” type who focuseson negative personal experiences that stillhave the power to upset, causing feelingsof bitterness and regret.n The “past-positive” type who takes anostalgic view of the past, with a “bettersafe than sorry” approach thatmay holdhim back.n The “present-hedonistic” type who isdominated by pleasure-seeking impulsesand is reluctant to postpone feeling goodfor later gain.n The “present-fatalistic” type who doesnot enjoy the present but feels trappedin it.n The “future-focused” type who isambitious, focused on goals, and has asense of urgency.Our sense of time is shaped by

personality and culture. Also,organisations have unique time cultures.Some do time-urgency seriously. Othersseemmuchmore relaxed. Some areamnesic about the past, believing itpointless to look back. Others are obsessedwith the future, paying strategyconsultants to “predict” and control it.n Adrian Furnham is professor of psychologyat University College London

Wemust make boards betterWhy do we only pay lip serviceto corporate governance when weare so well placed to develop thebest practices, asks Bob Garratt

ON YOURHEADADRIANFURNHAM

Punctuality: do the Greeksreally have a word for it?

GEOFFREYHOWE has beenappointed a non-executivedirector at Close Brothers, theinvestment bank.Howe, 61, is currently

chairman of Nationwidebuilding society and of JardineLloyd Thompson. Previously hewas a non-executive director ofInvestec and JPMorganOverseas Investment Trust, adirector of Robert Fleming andmanaging partner of CliffordChance.nAmandaMackenzie hasjoinedMothercare as anon-executive director.Mackenzie, 47, is globalmarketing and communicationsdirector at Aviva, the insurer,and a director of the NationalYouth Orchestra.nGeoffrey Cullinan has beenappointed to Electra PrivateEquity as a non-executivedirector. The 60-year-old was adirector of Bain & Co from 1997 to2005. Earlier he was chiefexecutive of Hamleys and asenior non-executive director ofDatamonitor.n PaulMountford has become anon-executive director at Volex,the supplier of power cords andcable assemblies. Mountford, 52,who is president of emergingmarkets at Cisco Systems,previously served on the boardsof Palm and Phyworks.n Catherine Claydon has beenappointed a non-executivedirector of Dunedin IncomeGrowth Investment Trust.Claydon, 41, whoworked forGoldman Sachs Internationalfrom 1992 until 2007, is also adirector ofWitan InvestmentTrust and the LondonMetalExchange.n SimonWebb has beenappointed group finance directorby Devro, whichmakes collagenproducts for the food industry.The 46-year-old was groupfinance director of De La Rue,the banknote printer, until Maylast year.n EddieWisniewski is the newfinance director of DesirePetroleum, the Falklands oilexplorer.Wisniewski, 50, hasbeen a non-executive director atDesire since 2005 and previouslyworked for Clyde Petroleum andAlstec in finance roles.

Closecalls forHowe

BOARD MOVES

DIRECTORSmust bear inmind these seven dutiesin all their activities and obtain professional advice ifunsure of what is required in any given situation.n To actwithin the powers of the company and toexercise powers only for the purpose for which theywere conferred.n To promote the success of the company and, indoing so, have regard to the likely consequences in

the long term and to the interests of the employees.n To exercise independent judgment.n To exercise the care, skill and diligence expectedof a director with knowledge, skill and experience.n To avoid conflicts of interest.nNot to accept benefits from third parties.n To declare any interest in a proposed transactionor arrangement.

Late departure: John Cleese fell foul of an obsession with time in Clockwise

Bob Garratt believes cases such as the report on the RBS board’s failings show that we don’t take corporate governance seriously

FRANCESCOGUIDICINI

Seven duties of directors

2 APPOINTMENTS thesundaytimes.co.uk/appointments [email protected]