T H E C O L L E C T E D P H I L O S O P H I C A L PAPERS OF

G. E. M. A N S C O M B E

VOLUME THREE

Ethics, Religion and Politics

Basil Blackwell • Oxford

First published in 1981 by Basil Blackwell Publisher 108 Cowley Road O xford O X4 iJF England

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© in this col lect ion G . E. M. A n s c o m b e 1981

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Anscom be, Gertrude Elizabeth MargaretTh e collected philosophical papers o f G. E. M. Anscom be

V ol. 3: Ethics, religion and politics

1. Philosophy, English — Addresses, essayslecturesI. Title192'.08 B1618

ISBN 0-631-12942-1

Typeset in Photon Baskerville Printed and bound in Great Britain at Th e Cam elot Press Ltd, Southam pton

12 Faith

In the late 1960s so m e sentence in a serm o n w o u ld o ften b eg in : “ W e used to

b elieve t h a t . . .” . 1 alw ays h eard this p h rase w ith an a larm ed sin k in g o f the

heart. I h ad altern ative exp ectatio n s. T h e m o re h o p e fu l o n e w as fo r som e

a b su rd lie. F o r exa m p le: “ W e used to b elieve that a n y o n e w as safe fo r

H eaven i f he k ep t the C h u rch ru le s .” “ W e used to b e lieve that there w as n o

w orse sin than to m iss m ass o n S u n d a y .” T h e w o rse o n e w as o f h earin g so m eth in g like “ W e used to b elieve that there w as so m eth in g special a b o u t

the p r ie s th o o d ; ” W e used to believe that the C h u rch w as h ere fo r the salva­

tio n o f so u ls .”

N o w there w as a “ W e used to b e lieve . . .” w h ich I th in k co u ld have b een

said w ith so m e tru th an d w h ere the im p lied re je c tio n w a sn ’t a disaster. T h ere

w as in the p re ce d in g tim e a p ro fessed en th u siasm fo r ratio n ality , p erh aps

in sp ired b y the tea ch in g o f V atican I a gain st fideism , certain ly carried a lo n g

b y the p ro m o tio n o f n eo -th o m ist studies. T o the ed u cated laity and the

c le rg y tra in ed in those days, the w o rd w as that the C a th o lic C h ristian faith

w as rational, a n d a p ro b le m , to those a b le to fee l it as a p ro b lem , w as h o w it

w as gratuitous. - a sp ecial g ift o f grace. W h y w o u ld it essentially n eed the

p ro m p tin g s o f grace to fo llo w a p rocess o f re a so n in g ? It w as as i f w e w ere

assu red there w as a ch ain o f p ro o f. First, G o d . T h e n , the d ivin ity o f Jesus

C h rist. T h e n , his estab lish m en t o f a C h u rch w ith a P o p e at the h ead o f it and

w ith a teach in g co m m issio n fro m him . T h is b o d y w as read ily iden tifiab le .

H e n ce y o u c o u ld dem o n strate the truth o f w h a t the C h u rch taught. Faith,

in d eed , is n o t the sam e th in g as k n o w le d g e — b u t th at co u ld b e a cco u n ted fo r

b y the extrinsic c h a ra cter o f the p ro o fs o f the defide d o ctrin es. T h e k n o w led ge

w h ich w as co n trasted w ith faith , w o u ld b e k n o w le d g e b y p ro o fs intrinsic to the su b ject m atter, n o t b y p ro o fs fro m so m e o n e ’ s h a vin g said these things

w ere true. F o r m atters w h ich w ere strictly ‘o f fa ith ’ in trin sic p ro o fs w ere n o t

p o ssib le , an d that w as w h y faith co n trasted w ith ‘k n o w le d g e ’ .

T h is is a p ic tu re o f the m o re extra v ag an t fo rm o f this teachin g. A m o re

so b er v a r ia tio n w o u ld relate to the C h u rch that o u r L o r d establish ed. In this

v a r ia n t o n e w o u ld n ’ t iden tify the ch u rch b y its h a vin g the P op e, b u t

o th erw ise ; a n d o n e w o u ld d isco ver that it h a d a P o p e a n d that that w as all

r ig h t. T h is m o re so b er fo rm h a d the m e rit o f a llo w in g that the b e liever w as co m m itted to the C h ristian faith , ra th e r th an su gg estin g that he h ad as it

w ere sign ed a b la n k ch e q u e to b e filled o u t b y the P o p e in n o m atter w h at

sum .

A y et m o re so b er va ria n t w o u ld have a v o id e d tra d in g o n the cu ltu ral in-

This paper has not previously been published. It was delivered as a W iseman Lecture at

O scott College.

The Philosophy o f Religion

h eritan ce fo r w h ich the n am e o f Jesus w as so h o ly that it w as easy to go

straight fro m b e lie f in G o d to b e lie f in je s u s as G o d ’s Son. In this m o re sober

varian t o n e w o u ld b e aw are o f the d ep en d en ce o f the N ew T estam en t o n the O ld : o n e w o u ld b e c learly co n scio u s o f the m e a n in g o f ca llin g o u r Lord “ C h rist” .

T h e ‘so b er v a r ia n ts ’ w o u ld have a d isad van tage fo r the p ro p ag an d ists o f the ra tio n a lity (n ear d em o n strab ility) o f fa ith - th o u g h a grea t ad va n ta ge in

respect o f h o n esty an d tru th fu lness. T h e d isad van tage w as that n o o n e could

su p po se it q u ite easy fo r a n y o n e to see that w h at Jesus estab lish ed was

m atch ed b y the C a th o lic C h u rch that w e kn o w . I f it w as ju s t a m a tte r o f his

h avin g fo u n d e d a C h u rch w ith a P o p e, then it w as easy in d eed ! B u to th e rw ise it w as obvious that le a rn in g an d skill w o u ld b e re q u ired to m ake the id e n ­

tification. A n d the co n sid e ra tio n s an d argu m en ts w o u ld b e m u ltifa r io u s and difficu lt to b e sure a b o u t. H en ce the p ro b le m m o st co m m o n ly felt, am o n g st

the m o re in te llectu a l en q u irers, as to the ch aracter o f the certainty ascribed to

faith. T h e so -ca lle d p re am b le s o f faith co u ld n o t p o ssib ly h ave the so rt o f

certain ty that it h ad . A n d i f less, then w h ere w as the v a u n ted ra tio n a lity ?

B ut there w as a g ra v er p ro b lem . W h at a b o u t the ‘ fa ith o f the s im p le ’ ? T h e y co u ld n o t k n o w a ll these things. D id they then h ave so m e in fe rio r

b ran d o f fa ith ? S u rely n o t! A n d anyw ay, d id those w h o stu d ied re a lly think

they kn ew all these th in g s? N o : b u t the im p licatio n w as that the k n o w le d g e

was there so m eh o w , p erh a p s scattered th ro u g h d ifferen t lea rn ed heads, p erh ap s m ere ly th e o retica lly an d abstractly availab le . In the b e lie f that this

w as so, o n e w as b e in g ra tio n a l in h a vin g faith . B u t then it h ad to be

a ck n o w led ged that a ll this w as p ro b lem a tic - a n d so a d h eren ce to fa ith was

rea lly a m atter o f h a n g in g o n , a n d b o th its b e in g a gift an d its voluntariness w o u ld at this point b e stressed.

I som etim es h e a r a cco u n ts o f the tim es o f darkness b e fo re V a tica n II

w hich strike m e as lies. I h o p e that I have n o t b een g u ilty o f ly in g in w h at I

have said here. T h is at least is m y reco llectio n o f h o w it w as in so m e p re se n ­tations, so m e d iscussion s, so m e a p o lo g e tic .

W as, an d is n o lo n g e r , n o t n ecessarily b ecau se b etter th o u gh ts a b o u t faith

are n o w c o m m o n ; there is a va cu u m w h ere these ideas o n ce w ere p ro m in en t.

B u t all these co n sid era tio n s, p ro o fs, argu m en ts an d p ro b le m s a re n o w o u t o f fash ion , fo r vario u s reaso n s w h ich I w o n ’ t discuss.

T h e p assin g a w ay o f these o p in io n s is n o t to b e regretted . T h e y attach ed the ch aracter o f ‘ra t io n a lity ’ en tire ly to w h at w ere ca lled the p re am b le s and

to the p assage fro m the p re am b le s to faith itself. B u t b o th these p ream b les

an d that p assage w ere in fact an ‘ id e a l’ co n stru ctio n - an d b y ‘ id e a l’ I d o n ’t

m ean o n e w h ich w o u ld h ave b een a g o o d d e ve lo p m e n t o f th in kin g, i f it h ad

o ccu rred in an in d iv id u a l; I m ean rath er ‘fa n c ifu l’ , in d eed d rea m ed u p a c­

co rd in g to p re ju d ic e s : p re ju d ices, that is, a b o u t w h at it is to b e re a so n a b le in h o ld in g a b elief.

T h e r ig h t d e sig n a tio n fo r w h at a re ca lled the “ p re a m b le s” o f faith is n o t

that b u t a t least fo r p a rt o f them , “ p re su p p o sitio n s” . L et m e e x p la in this in a

Faith 115

sim ple exa m p le. Y o u receive a letter fro m so n e o n e y o u kn o w , let’ s call h im

Jon es. In it, he tells y o u that his w ife has d ied . Y o u b e lie ve him . T h a t is, y o u

n ow b e lieve that his w ife has d ied because y o u b e lieve him. L et us call this ju st

w hat it used to b e ca lled , “ h u m an fa ith . T h a t sense o f fa ith still occu rs in

o u r la n g u ag e. “ W h y ” , so m eo n e m*ly b e asked, d o y o u b e lieve su ch -an d -

suchP” , an d he m ay re p ly “ I ju s t to o k it o n fa ith - so -a n d -so to ld m e ” .N o w this b e lie v in g Jon es, that his w ife has d ied , has a n u m b e r o f p re su p ­

p o sitio n s. In b e lie v in g it you p resu p p o se (1) that y o u r f r ie n d jo n e s exists, (2)

that this letter re a lly is fro m him , (3) that that re a lly is w h at the letter tells you .In o rd in a ry circu m stan ces, o f cou rse, n o n e o f these thin gs is likely to b e m

d o u b t, b u t that m akes n o differen ce. T h o se three co n victio n s o r assu m ption s

are, lo g ica lly , p resu p p o sitio n s that>'o« have i f y o u r b e lie f that J o n e s ’ w ife has

d ied is a case o f y o u r b e lie v in g Jon es.N o te that I say they areyour p resu p p o sitio n s. I d o n o t say that y o u r b e lie v ­

in g J o n e s en tails those three thin gs; o n ly that y o u r b e lie v in g J o n es entails

that y o u believe those three things.In m o d e rn u sage “ fa ith ” tends to m ean re lig io n , o r re lig io u s b elie f. B u t

the co n cep t o f fa ith has its o rig in a l h o m e in a p a rtic u la r re lig io u s tradition .

I f a B u d d h ist speaks o f “ his fa ith ” , sayin g fo r ex a m p le that his fa ith o u g h t

n o t to b e in su lted , h e m ean s his re lig io n , a n d h e is b o rr o w in g the w o rd

“ fa ith ” w h ich is re a lly a lien to his tra d ition . In the tra d itio n w h ere that

co n cep t has its o rig in , “ fa ith ” is sh o rt fo r “ d iv in e fa ith an d m ean s b e lie v ­

in g G o d ” . A n d it w as so used, a m o n g the C h ristian th in kers at least, that

faith , in this sense, co u ld n o t b e a n yth in g b u t true. F aith w as b e lie v in g G o d ,

as A b ra h a m b elie ve d G o d , an d n o false b e lie f co u ld b e p a rt o f it.I w a n t to say w h at m ig h t b e u n d e rsto o d a b o u t fa ith b y so m eo n e w h o did

n o t have a n y; so m eo n e, even, w h o d o es n o t n ecessarily b e lieve that G o d

exists, b u t w h o is a b le to th in k ca refu lly a n d tru th fu lly a b o u t it. B ertrand

R ussell ca lled fa ith “ certain ty w ith o u t p r o o f ” . T h a t seem s co rrect. A m b ro se

B ierce has a d efin itio n in his D e vil’ s D ictio n a ry; “ T h e a ttitu d e o f m in d o f o n e

w h o believes w ith o u t eviden ce o n e w h o tells w ith o u t k n o w le d g e things

w ith o u t p a ra lle l” . W h a t sh o u ld w e th in k o f this?

A c c o rd in g to fa ith itse lf fa ith is b e lie v in g G o d . I f the p resu p p o sitio n s are

true, it is, then, b e lie v in g o n the best p o ssib le g ro u n d s so m eo n e w h o speaks

w ith p erfect k n o w led ge . I f o n ly the p re su p p o sitio n s w ere given , B ierce

w o u ld b e a silly fe llo w an d R ussell w o u ld b e co n fu ted . B u t is there even the

p o ssib ility o f ‘b e lie v in g G o d ’ ? T h is is h a rd to grasp : it is itse lf o n e o f the

‘ th in gs w ith o u t p a ra lle l’ .A n yw ay, in gen era l, ‘fa ith com es b y h e a r in g ’ , th at is, those w h o have taith

learn w h a t they b e lieve b y faith , learn it fro m o th er p eo p le . So so m eo n e w h o

so believes b elieves w h at is to ld h im b y a n o th e r h u m an , w h o m ay b e very

ig n o ra n t o f eve ry th in g excep t that this is w h a t h e has to tell as the co n te n t o f

faith . So B ie rce ’s D evil m ay b e righ t. Q n e w h o has n o t evidence believes o n e

w h o has n o t k n o w le d g e (except o f that o n e th in g): a t least, he believes w h at

the latter says a n d he gets w h at he believes fro m the latter; y et a cco rd in g to

The Philosophy o f Religion

faith he believes G o d . I f so, then a cco rd in g to faith a sim p le m an - a m an

w ith n o kn o w le d ge o f evid en ce - m ay have faith w h en h e is tau gh t b y a m an

ign o ra n t o f eve ry th in g e xcep t that these are the things that faith believes. M o re than that, a cco rd in g to faith this s im p le m an an d his teach er have a

b e lie f in n o w ay in fe r io r to that o f a very learn ed and clever p e rso n w h o h a s

faith.

//■faith is like that, even i f it is b e lie v in g G o d , then it fo llo w s that the Bierce

d efin itio n is r ig h t a fter all. F o r everyo n e is to have faith an d few can be

learn ed, an d their le a rn in g d o e sn ’ t give them a su p erio r k in d o f faith. E veryo n e is to ru n : a n d few are ro ad -sw eep ers.

It is c lear that the to p ic I in tro d u ce d o f believing somebody is in the m id d le o f o u r target. L et us g o b a ck to J o n e s, and in vestigate believing Jones, w h en you

read in his lettei that his w ife has died. Y o u c a n ’ t call it b e lie v in g J o n e s ju s t i f

Jon es says so m eth in g o r o th e r an d y o u d o b e lieve that very th in g that he says.

F o r y o u m igh t b e lieve it anyw ay. A n d even i f it ’s so m e o n e ’s sayin g so m eth in g

that causes y o u to b e lie ve it, that d o esn t have to b e b e lie v in g him. H e m igh t

ju st b e m a k in g y o u rea lize it, ca llin g it to y o u r atten tio n - b u t y o u ju d g e the

m atter fo r y o u rse lf. N o r is it even sufficient that his say in g it is y o u r evidence that it is tru e .1 F o r su p p o se that y o u are co n vin ced that h e w ill b o th lie to

yo u , i.e. say the o p p o s ite o f w h at he rea lly believes, an d b e m istak en ? T h a t is,

the o p p o site o f w h at he thinks w ill b e tru e; an d he w ill say the o p p o site o f

w hat he thinks. So w h at h e says w ill b e true a n d y o u w ill b e lieve it becau se he says it. B u t y o u w o n ’ t b e b e lie v in g him !

O rd in a rily , o f co u rse, w h en y o u believe w h at a m a n says, this is because

y o u assum e that he says w h at he believes. B u t even this d o e sn ’ t g ive us a

sufficient c o n d itio n fo r y o u r b e lie v in g to b e b e lie v in g him. F o r h ere a g a in one

can co n stru ct a fu n n y so rt o f case - w h ere y o u believe that w h a t h e believes

w ill b e true, b u t b y a ccid en t, as it w ere. H is b e lie f is q u ite id io tic , he believes

w hat h e ’s g o t o u t o f a C h ristm as crack er fo r e xa m p le. In fact, u n k n o w n to

him b u t k n o w n to y o u , w h at has b een p u t in the crackers fo r their p a rty arc

actual m essages w ith so m e p ra ctical im p o rt. Y o u k n o w that the m essages in

the b lu e crackers are a ll true, an d the ones in the red crackers a ll false. He

believes any o f them . A n d n o w he tells y o u so m eth in g , an d y o u b e lie ve it

because he says it an d y o u b e lieve he is sayin g w h a t h e b elieves, and because

y o u k n o w that this th in g that h e believes co m es o u t o f a blue cracker. T h a t

w o u ld n ’t b e b e lie v in g him. B u t w h en y o u b e lieve y o u r h isto ry teacher, fo r

exam p le, it is e n o u g h that y o u b elieve w h at he says becau se h e says it a n d yo u

d o n ’ t th in k h e ’s ly in g a n d y o u th in k w h at he believes a b o u t that w ill b e true. I m ean, that is e n o u g h fo r y o u to b e b e lie v in g him.

So the to p ic o f b e lie v in g someone is p retty difficult. O f co u rse i f y o u co u ld

p u t in that y o u b e lie ve the p erso n knows w h at he is te llin g y o u , these

difficulties d o n ’t arise. Y o u b elieve w h at he says becau se he says it a n d y o u

b elieve that he kn o w s w h eth e r it is so an d w ori’ t b e ly in g . T h a t ’s w h y this p a r ­

1 I asked M ary Geach to construct a case to show this. She responded with w hat follows.

Faith 117

ticular p ro b le m w o n ’ t n o rm a lly arise a b o u t that letter fro m y o u r friend

Jon es tellin g y o u his w ife has ju s t died.

N o w there is a n o th e r q u estio n a b o u t w h at it is to b e lie ve so m eo n e, w hich

con cern s the p resu p p o sitio n s. I said that jyou p re su p p o se that J o n es exists,

did w rite the letter, and d id say that in it, i f y o u b e lieve him to the effect that

that w as so. I d id n ’ t say that the m ere fact o f y o u r believing Jones p re su p p o sed

those things. N o w w h a t in fact are w e to say h e re ? S u p p o se so m eo n e has a

h o a x p e n -frie n d - I m ean , the p en -frie n d is rea lly a co n triva n ce o f his

sch o o l-fe llo w s w h o a rra n ge fo r their letters to b e p o sted fro m C h ica g o to

E n glan d an d m ake the n o n -existen t co rresp o n d en t tell their frien d all sorts

o f things. A n d su p p o se he believes the things in the u su al so rt o f w ay in w h ich

p e o p le b e lieve things they are told . Is he believing the pen-friend? W h at a re w e

to say? W o u ld n ’ t w e say that som e an cien t b e lie ve d the o racles o f the g o d s?

A n d w o u ld n ’ t it then b e rig h t to say he b e lie ve d the g o d w h o se o ra c le it w as ?

I f y o u insist o n sayin g that the d e lu d ed vic tim does n o t ‘b e lieve the p en -

fr ie n d ’ becau se the p en -frie n d d o e sn ’ t exist, y o u w ill d ep rive y o u rs e lf o f the

clearest w ay o f d escrib in g his s itu ation : he b e lie ve d this n o n -e xiste n t p e r ­so n ” . A n d , so m ew h a t ab su rd ly , y o u w ill h ave to say that his o w n exp ressio n

o f b e lie f “ I b e lie ve h e r” , is not an e xp ressio n o f b e lie f, o r n o t a p ro p e r one.

W h at then w o u ld b e the p ro p e r o n e ? W e h a d b e tte r settle fo r sayin g that the

v ictim believes the p en -frie n d , and that the a n cien t w as b e lie v in g A p o llo -

w h o d o es n o t exist. A n d d o e sn ’ t the sam e p o in t h o ld fo r the case w h ere the

letter-w riter does exist, b u t y o u have m isu n d e rsto o d w h at h e w ro te , o r m is­

taken ly su p p o sed that this letter is fro m h im ? E sp ecia lly i f the m istakes w ere

qu ite re a so n a b le ones.N o w let us th in k so m e m o re a b o u t the p re su p p o sitio n s. O rd in a r ily the

p resu p p o sitio n s o f b e lie v in g N sim p ly d o n o t co m e in q u estio n . I get a letter

fro m so m eo n e I k n o w ; it does n o t o ccu r to m e to d o u b t that it is fro m him .

S u p p o se that the d o u b t does o ccu r fo r so m e reaso n . T h e letter p erh ap s says it

is fro m h im - the very th in g to raise a d o u b t! N o w I take it as o b vio u s that, i f I

d ecid e to b e lieve that the letter is fro m h im , I w o n ’ t d o so o n the gro u n d s on

w h ich I b e lieve him w h en the letter says his wife-is d ead . F o r I b e lieve his w ife is d ead b ecau se he says so. B u t the rea so n w hy I b e lie ve the letter is fro m h im

is n o t that he says so. His cred ib ility is n o t m y w a rra n t fo r b e lie v in g that the

letter is fro m h im . E ven i f the letter b eg in s “ T h is is a letter fro m y o u r o ld frien d J o n e s ” an d I ju s t b elieve that stra igh t o f f an d un critica lly , I b elieve the

sentence, and b e lieve that the letter is fro m J o n e s becau se the sentence says

so, b u t I co u ld n ever say I b e lieved it b e cau se I b e lie ve d him. T h is is the sense

in w h ich the p resu p p o sitio n s o f fa ith are n o t them selves p art o f the con ten t

o f w h a t in a n a rro w sense is b e lieved b y faith .N o w let us ch a n ge the case. S u p p o se a p riso n e r in a d u n g e o n , to w h o m

there arrives a letter sayin g: ‘T h is letter co m es fro m an u n k n o w n frien d , N .2

2 This developm ent o f a case which I considered (see “ W hat is it to believe som eone? in V olu m e II), o f a letter from an otherwise unknown person, is taken from Peter Geach. See The

Virtues (Cam bridge, 1977).

x 1 8 The Philosophy o f Religion

It p ro p o ses to h elp h im in va r io u s n eeds w h ich he is in vited to com m u nicate

by specified m eans. P erh ap s it a lso h o ld s o u t h o p e o f escape fro m the prison T h e p riso n e r d o e sn ’ t k n o w i f it is a h o a x o r a trap o r is gen u in e , b u t h e tries

the chan nels o f co m m u n ica tio n and he gets so m e o f the thin gs that he asks fo r; h e also gets fu rth er letters o sten sib ly fro m the sam e sou rce. T h ese letters

som etim es co n ta in in fo rm a tio n . W e w ill su p p o se that h e n o w believes that N exists an d is the a u th o r o f a ll the letters; and that h e b elieves the in fo rm atio n

as co m in g fro m N . T h a t is, his b e lie f in that in fo rm a tio n is a case o f believin g N. H is b e lie f that N exists and that the letters co m e fro m N is, ju s t as in the

m o re o rd in a ry case, n o t an ex a m p le o f b e lie v in g so m eth in g o n N ’s say-so O n the o th er h a n d , as w e are su p p o sin g the case, he d o es n o t h ave prior

k n o w led ge o f N ’s existen ce. A n d it co u ld h a p p e n that he, like the m a n w ho

u n critica lly accepts the letter b e g in n in g “ T h is is fro m J o n e s ” , believes the

o p e n in g c o m m u n ica tio n T h is is fro m an u n k n o w n frien d — call m e N ”

straight o ff: ju s t as h e ’d likely b e lieve straigh t o f f that a w h isp ered o r tapped

co m m u n ica tio n p u rp o rtin g to co m e fro m the n ext cell is a com m unication fro m a n o th e r p riso n e r. E ven so the beliefs w h ich are cases o f b e lie v in g N and the b e lie f that N exists a re lo g ica lly d ifferent. T h is b rin gs o u t the d ifference

betw een p re su p p o sitio n s o f b e lie v in g N an d b e lie v in g su ch -an d -su ch as

c o m in g fro m N . “ P re -su p p o sitio n s” d o n ’ t h ave to b e tem p o ra rily p rio r beliefs.

Suarez said that in every reve latio n G o d reveals that h e reveals. T h at

soun ds like say in g: every letter fro m N to the p riso n e r in fo rm s h im that the

in fo rm a tio n in the letter is fro m N , an d every b it o f in fo rm a tio n fro m N is

a cco m p a n ied b y a n o th e r b it o f in fo rm a tio n that the first b it w as fro m N . Put

like that there is an ab su rd ity , an in fin ite regress. B u t it sh o u ld n o t b e p u t like

that. R ath er: in every b it o f in fo rm a tio n N is a lso c la im in g (im p lic itly o r

e x p lic itly , it d o e sn t m a tte r w hich) that h e is g iv in g the p riso n e r in fo rm atio n .

A n d n o w w e co m e to the difficulty. In a ll the o th er cases w e h ave b een c o n ­

sidering, it can b e jn a d e c lear what it is fo r so m eo n e to b e lie ve so m eo n e. But

w hat can it m ean to b e lie ve G o d ? C o u ld a learn ed clever m a n in fo rm m e o n the a u th o rity o f his lea rn in g , that the evid en ce is that G o d has sp o k en ?

N o . T h e o n ly p o ssib le u se o f a learn ed clever m an is as a causa removens pro-

hibens. T h e re are gross o bstacles in the received o p in io n o f m y tim e an d in its

ch aracteristic w ays o f th in kin g, a n d so m eo n e lea rn ed an d clever m a y b e a b le to d isso lve these.

F o rg ettin g that a b o u t ‘h e a r in g ’ - i.e. fro m teachers - sh o u ld w e p ictu re it

like this: a m a n hears a vo ice sayin g so m eth in g to h im a n d h e believes it is

G o d sp eakin g, a n d so h e believes w h at it says - so h e b elieves G o d ? B u t w h at

does he b elieve w h en h e ‘ believes it is G o d sp ea k in g ’ ? T h a t G o d h as a v o ice-

b o x ? H a rd ly . In re la tio n to the b e lie f that it is G o d sp eakin g, it d o e sn ’t

m atter h o w the v o ice is p ro d u c e d . T h e re is a R a b b in ica l idea, the B ath Q o l,

the ‘d a u g h te r o f the v o ic e ’ . Y o u h ear a sen ten ce as y o u stand in a cro w d - a

few w o rd s o u t o f w h at so m eo n e is sayin g p erh a p s: it leap s o u t a t y o u , it ‘speaks to y o u r c o n d it io n ’ . T h u s there w as a m an stan d in g in a cro w d an d he

Faith 1 1 9

heard a w o m a n sayin g “ W h y are y o u w astin g y o u r tim e ? ” H e h a d b een

d ith erin g a b o u t, p u ttin g o f f the qu estio n o f b e c o m in g a C a th o lic . The voice struck h im to the h eart and he acted in o b ed ie n ce to it. N o w , he d id n o t have

to sup pose, n o r d id he sup pose, that that re m a rk w as not m ad e in the course o f so m e exch an g e betw een the w o m an a n d her c o m p a n io n , w h ich had

n o th in g to d o w ith h im . B u t he b elieved that G o d h ad sp o k en to h im in that voice . T h e sam e th in g h a p p e n e d to St A u gu stin e, h e a rin g the ch ild s cry,

“ T o lle , le g e ” .N o w the criticia l d ifferen tiatin g p o in t is this. In all those o th er cases it is

clear w h at the o n e w h o ‘believes X ’ means b y “ X sp ea k in g ” , even w h en w e

ju d g e that X d o e sn ’ t exist. F o r e xa m p le, w h a t the b e lie ve r in the o racle m eans b y “ A p o llo sp ea k in g ” . B u t it is n o t c lear w h at it can m ean fo r G o d to

speak.F or A p o llo , o r J u g g ern a u t, is sim ply the g o d o f such and such a cult. N o te,

I am n o t here fo llo w in g those w h o ex p la in deity as “ the o b ject o f w o rsh ip ” .

T h a t d e fin itio n is useless, because they have to m ean b y “ w o rs h ip ” “ the

h o n o u r p aid to a deity” . D ivin e w orsh ip is the sp ecial sort o f h o n o u r

in ten d ed to b e p a id , the special sort o f address m a d e, to a deity. T h is m ay b e

o ffered to w h at is n o t d iv in e, to a stone o r a n o th e r sp irit o r a m a n ; o r to w hat

d o e sn ’ t exist at all.So w h en I say “ A p o llo w as the g o d o f su ch -an d -su ch a cu lt , I am ca llin g

a tten tio n to the q u e stio n : w h at w o u ld it m ean to say “ T h ese w ere n o t - n o n e

o f them w ere - the tem ples and o racles o f A p o l lo ” - p recisely o f the tem ples

an d o ra cles o f A p o llo ? W h at w o u ld it m ean to say that Shiva w as n o t the go d

o f d e stru ctio n ? Shiva is the g o d o f this w o rsh ip , w h ich is the cultus o f a g o d

o f destru ctio n .In this sense, G o d is n o t the g o d o f su ch -an d -su ch a w orsh ip . T h is is

so m eth in g that can b e seen by an atheist to o , even th o u g h he h o ld s that there

is in an y case n o such th in g as deity. F o r he can see, i f he thinks a b o u t it, that

“ G o d ” is n o t a p ro p e r n am e b u t is e q u iva len t to a ‘ defin ite d escrip tio n (in

the tech n ical sense). T h a t is, it is e q u iva len t to “ the o n e an d o n ly true g o d ” ,

“ the o n e and o n ly real d e ity ” . T h e p o in t o f p u ttin g in “ tru e” an d “ rea l” is

that those w h o b e lie ve there is o n ly o n e deity h ave so m u ch o cca sio n to speak

o f d eities that they d o n o t b elieve to exist. W e then sp eak o f A p o llo , Shiva

and J u g g e rn a u t as go d s w h o are n o t go d s. A n ath eist believes that G o d is

a m o n g the g o d s w h o are n o t go d s, becau se he believes that n o th in g is a deity.

B ut he sh o u ld b e a b le to reco gn ize the id en tity o f “ G o d ” w ith “ the o n e and

o n ly g o d ” . ,It is becau se o f this equ iva len ce that G o d ca n n o t b e fo rm a lly identified as

the g o d o f su ch -an d -su ch a cu lt o r su ch -an d -su ch a p eo p le . T o say that G o d

is the g o d o f Israel is to say that w h at Israel w o rsh ip p e d as g o d w as ‘ the o n e

and o n ly g o d ’ . So it could s ign ifican tly b e d en ied . A n d it could b e seen to b e

true - even b y o n e w h o b elieved that the d e scrip tio n ‘ the o n e a n d o n ly g o d ’ is

v a cu o u s. . .A n d so w e can say this: the su p p o sitio n that so m eo n e has faith is the sup-

120 The Philosophy o f Religion

p o sitio n that h e believes that so m eth in g - it m ay b e a v o ice , it m ay be

so m eth in g he has b een tau gh t - com es as a w o rd fro m G o d . Faith is then the b e lie f he a cco rd s that w ord .

So m u ch can b e d iscern ed b y an u n b eliever, w h eth er his attitu d e is p o te n ­

tially o n e o f reveren ce in face o f this p h e n o m e n o n o r is o n ly hostile. B u t the

C h ristian adds th at su ch a b e lie f is som etim es the truth , an d that the co n ­sequ en t b e lie f is o n ly th en w h a t he m eans by faith .