164-11

September 14, 2011

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information

Center

Analysis of four propaganda displays in May – July 2011: background, analysis and

conclusions

Overview

1.In May – July 2011 the State of Israel faced four propaganda displays which, in our

assessment, constituted part of the broader anti-Israel delegitimization campaign. The

events encompassed a variety of methods and took place on land, sea and air.

2.The events were orchestrated by anti-Israel networks and activists, from the Middle East

and worldwide, that routinely participate in the delegitimization campaign against Israel.

Some were local ad-hoc initiatives that arose mostly from online social networks. They aimed

to bring the issue of the Palestinians refugees’ “right of return” to the forefront through large-

scale protests against Israel in the PA-administered territories and along Israel’s borders with

its Arab neighbors.

3.The following is a general description of the four propaganda displays (in

chronological order):

a.The Nakba Day events:

1.The events took place on May 15, 2011, and were organized to mark the

anniversary of Israel’s establishment, considered by Palestinians to symbolize

their defeat in the 1948 War of Independence. The main idea this year was to

conduct unusually massive events (in comparison with previous years) to

express the Palestinian refugees’ “right of return” to Israel through

rallies and propaganda demonstrations along Israel’s borders with Syria,

Lebanon and Jordan, and attempt a violent invasion of Israeli territory.

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2.Mass demonstrations were also planned in the PA-administered territories and

in other Arab or Muslim countries (Egypt). The demonstrators were mobilized

mostly through social networks with the tacit approval (or even encouragement)

of Syria, which considered it a means to shift attention from the popular protest

against the Assad regime to Israel.

3.In practice, the focal point of the events was Majdal Shams, a Druze village

in the northern Golan Heights, where Syrian security forces did not prevent

rioters from approaching the border fence, after which they broke through and

invaded the village. Four rioters were killed and dozens were wounded in the

violent confrontation between them and IDF soldiers. On the Israeli-Lebanese

border, the Lebanese army unsuccessfully tried to contain the incident. About

ten rioters were killed and dozens were wounded in an attempt to invade Israeli

territory. Smaller demonstrations took place in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza

Strip, where the PA and Hamas made efforts to contain them and keep them

from getting out of hand.

b.The Naksa Day events:

1.The events took place on June 5, 2011, marking the defeat of the Arab

countries in the Six Day War in 1967. The main idea behind the events was

to duplicate what was considered the success of the Nakba Day events

and hold mass rallies along Israel’s borders with Arab countries to try

and invade Israeli territory. Once again online social networks played a

major role in mobilizing rioters and bringing them to the borders, and once again

the Syrian regime allowed (and apparently also encouraged) the events on the

Israeli-Syrian border.

2.In practice, the focal points of the Naksa Day events were two locations on

the Golan Heights—Majdal Shams and Quneitra—where about one thousand

rioters massed (mainly Syrian civilians and Palestinians residing in Syria) and

attempted to invade Israeli territory. IDF forces had prepared in advance

and prevented the rioters from breaking through the border. Twenty-

four rioters were killed in the violent confrontation.

3.The events were not widely covered by international media. The deadly

results of the clashes on the Israeli-Syrian border drew strong internal

Palestinian criticism of the pro-Syrian terrorist organizations that had

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encouraged the incident, and violent protests broke out in Al-Yarmuk refugee

camp on the outskirts of Damascus. In Lebanon, however, the Lebanese army

prevented the rioters from approaching the border this time. Smaller

demonstrations were held in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, supervised and

controlled by the PA and Hamas.

c.The international flotilla to the Gaza Strip—Freedom Fleet 2 (in late June):

1.The flotilla was organized by a coalition spearheaded by four

networks taking part in the delegitimization campaign against Israel.

They participated in the Mavi Marmara flotilla and, for the past year, their

steering committee and nationally-based networks were involved in planning the

flotilla, fundraising, enlisting activists, and purchasing vessels. One of the

organizations, the Turkish IHH, withdrew from the coalition shortly before the

flotilla set sail due to the Turkish government’s own political considerations. The

remaining coalition members were two umbrella networks from Europe (FGM

and ECESG) and an ad-hoc network from the United States called U.S. Boat to

Gaza. They were joined by an Arab, radical Islamic and predominantly Jordanian

group which had purchased its own ship (Noor) shortly before the flotilla’s

planned date of departure. That ship did not take part in Freedom Fleet 2.

2.The organizers’ main idea was to dispatch to the Gaza Strip an

upgraded flotilla which would challenge Israel and be difficult to stop, deface

Israel in global public opinion, and provide political and propaganda assistance

to the Hamas de facto administration in the Gaza Strip. The idea was not

acted upon due to several reasons, mainly the withdrawal of Turkey and the

IHH, the difficulties imposed by the Greek government on the departure of

Freedom Fleet 2 vessels from its ports, and the numerous reservations about the

flotilla voiced on the international scene by the UN, the United States and West

European countries. Another contributing factor was Israel’s preparation for the

flotilla, which proved effective and could be partially credited for its failure.

3.In practice, instead of an upgraded flotilla consisting of 15 vessels, including

two large passenger ships, the organizers were planning to send ten smaller

ships or yachts (of which only one set sail). One of them reached the naval

blockade area on the Gaza Strip border; it was a French yacht called Dignité/Al-

Karama that carried ten activists, three journalists and three crewmembers

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(most of them French nationals). The yacht was intercepted by the Israeli navy

on July 19 without any violence and without generating the international

media storm the organizers were hoping for.

d.The “fly-in”—arrival of anti-Israel activists in Israel’s Ben Gurion

International Airport on July 8:

1.This propaganda display was organized by several dozen groups and networks

mostly from Judea and Samaria and Western countries, particularly France

and the United States. Conspicuous among them were anti-Israel networks in

France and the ISM group affiliated with the radical left in the United States.

The main idea behind the propaganda display was to have hundreds of

activists flown in to Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport on regular

commercial flights. There the activists intended to conduct propaganda activities

and use passive resistance against any attempts by Israel’s security forces to

deport them. If an opportunity presented itself, they then intended to leave the

airport to take part in a series of anti-Israel activities in Judea and Samaria or

even in Israel (Bil’in-style demonstrations and protests). One of the stated

purposes of the organizers was to protest the restrictions imposed by Israel on

the arrival of anti-Israel activists from Ben Gurion International Airport to Judea

and Samaria.

2.In practice, the State of Israel had prepared in advance for the event.

By appealing to various airlines and using diplomacy, Israel was able to

prevent some 350 activists from boarding flights to Israel from

airports in Europe. Another 130 activists (mostly from France and Belgium)

arrived in Israel, where they were detained and deported. According to

Palestinian sources, several dozen Palestinians managed to reach Judea and

Samaria. Apparently some of them took part in violent demonstrations near the

Qalandia roadblock in northern Jerusalem and other friction points between the

Palestinians and Israeli security forces. Contrary to the expectations of the

organizers, the event was largely ignored by international media.

4.While markedly different, these four propaganda displays constitute, in our assessment,

part of the delegitimization campaign against Israel, inspired by its successes in the

Goldstone Report affair and the Mavi Marmara flotilla. Some of the events were long in the

planning (it took about a year to plan and organize what was expected to be an upgraded

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flotilla). Other events were the result of ad-hoc initiatives undertaken in advance of important

dates in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict. In two cases (the

flotilla and the fly-in) the events were orchestrated by umbrella organizations and

activists taking part in the delegitimization campaign. In the two remaining cases (the

Nakba and the Naksa) a major role was played by Palestinian and Arab activists who used

social networks to help mobilize supporters. Their aim was to bring the methods used in

the popular protests against the Arab regimes (and sometimes its slogans) into

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to these events, the networks and activists

involved in the delegitimization campaign continued with their “routine” activities (defacing

and boycotting Israel, prosecuting top Israeli officials, and more).1

5.The recent events vividly illustrated the ideologically heterogeneous character of the

umbrella networks, groups and individual activists operating against Israel. The flotilla and

the fly-in were the work of a coalition that included networks and activists affiliated

with the radical left in Europe and the United States. They joined forces with Islamist

elements whose part in the flotilla event became less significant after the IHH and

its Turkish allies withdrew. And once again, between these two ideological extremes were

NGOs, social activists and even activists of Jewish or Israeli descent. However,

ideologically, the hardcore of the coalition responsible for the flotilla are activists and

networks that deny the very existence of the State of Israel and support Palestinian demands

in their most absolutist incarnations, including the Palestinian refugees’ “right of return”. As in

the past, they were joined by those who criticize the Israeli government’s policy towards the

Palestinians but do not deny its right to exist. Such cooperation between

delegitimization and criticism of the policy pursued by the Israeli government was

also a characteristic of prior propaganda displays including the Mavi Marmara

flotilla in 2010.

6.The events were the initiative of NGOs and individual activists, which was

particularly evident this time following the politically-motivated withdrawal of Turkey

(and the IHH) from the flotilla’s organization. Without a state to sponsor them, the

flotilla’s organizers were at a considerable disadvantage. However, in two cases (the

1 These activities, conducted in the first half of 2011, had little success. For example, the Israeli Apartheid Week, which took place on dozens of campuses and locations in Western countries in March, received no public or media attention. Earth Day, held on March 30, received limited coverage. Contributing factors included the “retraction” issued by Justice Goldstone in April 2011, which undermined the credibility of the Goldstone Report, and the coming publication of the Palmer Commission report (which determined that the closure imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip is legal).

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Nakba and the Naksa) the Syrian regime allowed the events to take place on the

Golan Heights border and, in our assessment, even encouraged them, engendering

friction and violence. This can be contrasted with the attempts made by administrations and

security forces in Lebanon, Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip to contain the incidents and

keep them from getting out of hand. In our assessment, it is possible that the Iranians, who

support the Syrian regime, acted behind the scenes to encourage protests on the Syrian and

Lebanese borders. One such example was a visit by the Iranian ambassador in Lebanon and

other Iranian officials to the demonstration site in Maroun al-Ras on Naksa Day.

7.It is our assessment that, in the organizers’ view, the results of the recent

events were largely negative. On one hand, they once again demonstrated their

perseverance, ability to connect and cooperate on the basis of an anti-Israel platform, and

ability to mobilize and motivate anti-Israel activists from various countries across the globe to

take part in a series of projects aimed against Israel. On the other hand, it became

evident that there was a wide gap between the (sometimes unrealistic) plans and

expectations of the delegitimizers and their ability to put their ideas into action.

This was particularly true since Israel—which at times had the support and understanding of

the international community—had prepared in advance to foil these ideas and learned the

lessons from previous events.

8.In the recent propaganda displays there was usually a noticeable gap between

intent and planning on one hand and results on the other: the planned upgraded

flotilla was eventually reduced to one small yacht with a handful of French activists on

board; it was intercepted by the Israeli navy without attracting media attention. The plan to

motivate masses of people to invade Israeli territory through its borders and

emphasize demands for the “right of return” was reduced to violent, deadly clashes between

rioters on the Syrian and Lebanese borders and the IDF, with one local “success” (the

invasion of Majdal Shams on Nakba day) which the organizers could not duplicate on Naksa

Day. The plan to undermine the legitimacy of the blockade on the Gaza Strip and

hamper the IDF’s freedom of action had the UN, the United States, and West European

countries calling into question the very legitimacy of the flotilla campaign (strengthened by

the publication of the Palmer Report). The goal of vilifying the State of Israel in world

public opinion (particularly in Western countries) wasn’t achieved either, which was clearly

demonstrated by the lack of media interest in the events—particularly the flotilla, which

was supposed to serve as the leading event.

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9.This begs the question of why the organizers of the events failed this time. It is our

assessment that the answer can be found in a variety of reasons and factors, most

important of which are:

a.The application of past lessons and proper preparation by all levels of

Israel’s political and military systems. Having taken several blows in the

delegitimization campaign (the Goldstone Report and the Mavi Marmara flotilla), Israel

prepared in advance for the recent events. The IDF, which made preparations for the

Nakba Day events, was unable to prevent the invasion of Majdal Shams. However, it

learned the lessons of that incident and the scenario did not repeat itself on Naksa

Day. Israel’s diplomatic and PR activity ahead of the flotilla helped prevent its

departure from Greek ports and contributed towards its delegitimization in the UN and

Western countries. Furthermore, we believe that the easing of the blockade on the

Gaza Strip about a year ago, following the Mavi Marmara event, weakened the

organizers’ claim about the purpose of the flotilla being to break the “siege”.

In addition, Israel’s effective preparation for the fly-in completely disrupted its

organizers’ plans.

b.Reservations voiced by the international political system about the events:

1.The Nakba Day and Naksa Day events, whose objective was basically

to bring the issue of the Palestinian refugees’ “right of return” to the

forefront, gained no support or interest from the international

community. Apparently the international community fully understood that the

aim of the events was to undermine any political settlement between Israel and

the Palestinians, and was well aware of the possible escalation they could

precipitate (what is more, the Palestinians themselves tried to keep the events

on a low profile and prevent an escalation in the PA-administered territories).

The international community was also aware of the link between the popular

protests in Syria and the Syrian regime’s conduct with regard to the events on

the Golan Heights. The organizers of the fly-in were likewise unable to gain

political or PR support from the international community, whose reaction to the

events in Ben Gurion International Airport was one of relative indifference.

2.Of particular importance were the widespread objections to the

flotilla voiced by the international political system. The main reason for

such objections, shared by the UN, the United States and Western countries,

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was the desire to prevent the repeat of the deadly Mavi Marmara

incident and avoid a new political deterioration, coupled with the

understanding that there are proper channels of delivering

humanitarian aid to Gaza Strip residents that do not involve a

provocative flotilla (contributing factors were the Israeli government’s policy

of easing the transfer of goods to the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian government’s

decision to ease movement through the Rafah Crossing). And so, the

delegitimization campaign against Israel, with the flotilla as its crown

jewel, inspired by the “success” of the Mavi Marmara, boomeranged on

its organizers. This has become more of an issue after the publication of the

Palmer Commission report, which accepts Israel’s basic claim that the closure on

the Gaza Strip is legal, discrediting the “illegal siege” narrative that constitutes a

fundamental component of the flotilla and convoy campaign.

c.Misjudgment by the organizers of the delegitimization campaign, who failed

to apply the lessons learned in previous events:

1.The organizers attempted to recreate the Nakba Day events, but were

met with more effective Israeli preparation on Naksa Day. They

attempted to recreate or even top the “success” of the Mavi Marmara

flotilla; this time, however, they were met with an effective response

from Israel and international reservations stemming from changes in the

political map and lessons learned in the Mavi Marmara incident. Even Turkey,

which had played a key role in the previous flotilla, was wise to sense the

change that occurred in the international political environment and, at the last

moment, reconsidered its involvement (and the involvement of the IHH) in the

flotilla.

2.Without Turkish governmental support, the organizers encountered

considerable difficulties raising enough funds to purchase vessels

(requiring large sums of money) for an upgraded flotilla. Eventually they did

purchase about ten yachts and small ships; however, without a large flagship

like the Mavi Marmara, the upgraded flotilla was not as effective as the

organizers hoped for. The plan to depart from Greek ports (rather than from

Turkish ports) while relying on “popular pressure” exerted on the Greek

government was fundamentally flawed given the Greek government’s

good relations with Israel, coupled with the internal unrest prevailing in

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Greece at the time as a result of the economic crisis, which shifted attention

away from the flotilla campaign.

d.The propaganda failure of the organizers, stemming from the lack of

dramatic developments in the flotilla campaign. This time, the events planned

by the organizers did not develop into a dramatic confrontation like the Mavi Marmara

incident. The media preferred to cover the popular protests in Arab countries and

devoted even more attention to local events in Greece in Western countries, which

dominated the headlines. In addition, the international media realized the flotilla’s

potential for violence and didn’t buy into its organizers’ claims that the flotilla

participants were “peace activists” providing “humanitarian aid” to Gaza Strip residents.

The claim about a supposed “humanitarian crisis” in the Gaza Strip didn’t generate

much interest either (owing in part to an article about the real situation in the Gaza

Strip published in The New York Times shortly prior to the flotilla’s departure).

Consequently, the four events were largely ignored by the international

media,2 deflating the delegitimizers’ plans.

What’s next?

10.The networks and activists taking part in the delegitimization campaign were not

discouraged by their recent failures. It is our assessment that they are learning their

lessons, demonstrating resolve to continue the delegitimization campaign against Israel and

preparing for new propaganda displays in the second half of 2011 (in addition to the

routine anti-Israel activities that take place in various countries worldwide). Huwaida Arraf,

the most prominent figure in the coalition that organized the flotilla, said in an interview that

the organizers are now taking their vessels out of Greece and preparing for their next

strategic moves against Israel. She reiterated that the organizers are determined to

keep challenging Israel as long as the “occupation”, “colonization”, and “violent

suppression” of the Palestinians continue (Jadaliyya.com, July 28, 2011).

11.It is our assessment that, despite the recent failures suffered by the delegitimization

campaign, conditions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on the regional scene in

the next several months may lead to a resumption or even escalation of the

campaign against Israel. In this context, the Palestinians’ application intent to apply to the

2 Only Israeli media, and to a lesser extent Arab/Palestinian media, paid considerable attention to the events.

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UN, the ongoing turmoil in Arab countries, and the inflammatory rhetoric of the Turkish prime

minister can be pointed out as three ensembles with the potential of pumping new energy

into the anti-Israel delegitimization campaign both from the Palestinians and from the

coalition of delegitimizers and critics of Israel’s policy across the globe.

Appendices

13.The following are four appendices that summarize the recent events:

a.Appendix 1: The flotilla to the Gaza Strip

b.Appendix 2: Initiative to send anti-Israel activists on commercial flights to Ben

Gurion International Airport and to the PA-administered territories (the fly-in)

c.Appendix 3: Nakba Day events

d.Appendix 4: Naksa Day events

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Appendix 1

The flotilla to the Gaza Strip

The logo of Freedom Fleet 2 (derryfriendsofpalestine.org)

Overview

1.Preparations for the departure of Freedom Flotilla 2 began in June 2010, immediately after

the Mavi Marmara incident. The organizers’ intent was to sail a widely-publicized international

flotilla to the Gaza Strip, bigger than its predecessor: it was supposed to consist of about

15 vessels (including the Mavi Marmara) and some 1500 participants from over 100

countries, as well as twenty-two international organizations.

2.The umbrella networks and organizations behind the Mavi Marmara flotilla, particularly the

Turkish IHH, started planning its departure already in June 2010. Ad hoc networks

established in various countries across the globe launched intensive propaganda, fundraising,

and recruitment activities. Originally, the flotilla was to depart on May 31, the

anniversary of the Mavi Marmara incident. However, its departure was postponed due

to internal Turkish considerations (the elections in Turkey); eventually it was decided that the

flotilla would set sail from Greek ports in late June 2011.

3.In terms of its ideological make-up, the recent flotilla, similarly to the Mavi Marmara flotilla,

was organized by a heterogeneous coalition that involved cooperation between

essentially dissimilar networks and individuals. On one end of the ideological scale

were networks and activists of a strongly radical Islamic orientation (the IHH and

radical Islamic groups in Turkey, Arab activists with an Islamic orientation, as well as

organizations and activists operating in Europe affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and

sometimes Hamas). On the other end were umbrella networks and groups affiliated

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with the radical left in North America and Western Europe. In between there were

social activists, some of them affiliated with the delegitimization campaign, while others

hold critical views towards Israel’s policy. They do not necessarily deny Israel’s right to exist

or oppose an Israeli-Palestinian agreement based on the principle of two states for two

nations.

The goals

4.Even though the organizers of the flotilla said all along that its purpose was to deliver

humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and/or lift the “siege” of the Gaza Strip, in practice there

was very little aid on board the vessels.3 For example, the ship sent by the organizers of

the flotilla in the United States carried mostly thousands of support and sympathy letters for

the people of the Gaza Strip, collected across the United States.

5.As in the previous flotilla, the true objectives of the flotillas were clearly political

and propaganda-oriented, fitting in with the overall objectives of the anti-Israel

delegitimization campaign: vilifying Israel in world public opinion, isolating it,

undermining its diplomatic relations with other countries, tying its hands in the

war on terrorism (i.e., depriving it of its right to inspect vessels that may carry weapons to

the Gaza Strip terrorist organizations), and providing political and propaganda backing to the

Hamas de facto administration in the Gaza Strip.

The planning

6.The organizers of the flotilla were definitely inspired by the results of the Mavi Marmara

flotilla and sought to enhance its efficiency to make things more difficult for Israel and

stop it from preventing the flotilla’s arrival in the Gaza Strip. The organizers planned to use

various methods to achieve that objective, some of which were:

a . Considerable increase of the number of vessels compared to the previous flotilla

(the original intention was to have as much as 13-15 vessels, including two large

passenger ships).

3 Similarly to the previous flotilla, where there was no significant amount of humanitarian aid cargo either.

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b.Increase of the number of passengers on board the vessels (the Mavi Marmara

alone was expected to carry 500 passengers; as noted by Bulent Yildirim, the hope was

to reach an overall number of 1500 passengers).

c.Increase of the flotilla’s international representation (the plan was to include

participants from over one hundred countries and about 22 international organizations).

d.Inclusion of numerous public figures and celebrities, particularly from Western

European countries, the United States, and Canada, with which Israel has good relations

(politicians, artists, and media personalities).

e.Extensive media coverage—the advance preparations demonstrated the importance

of media for the organizers of the flotilla, which was supposed to document the

confrontation with the IDF and help in the propaganda and legal battle with Israel.4

f.Enlistment of Jews or even Israelis to the flotilla to increase its legitimacy (and

media appeal).

7.The organizers were planning to make it difficult for the IDF to take control of the

vessels by using provocations and various kinds of “passive resistance” to make it

difficult to process any detained flotilla participants (using legal means). Flotilla activists were

training in Greece (and probably in other countries) in the use of “passive resistance”

tactics. Past experience has shown that such tactics have the potential of escalating into

violence, at times even hard violence.5

4 The organizers attributed considerable importance to the media campaign that would accompany the flotilla. The list of passengers that were supposed to take part in the flotilla featured a large number of journalists (over one tenth, according to the organizers’ expectations). During a briefing that the activists were given in the flotilla preparation workshops, they were instructed to transfer information from the vessel to the outside world until the last moment using satellite communications. They were also told to conceal their electronic storage devices in case of arrest and to use it after their release. It is our assessment that they were to be used for propaganda and legal purposes.

5 For more information see our June 27, 2011 Information Bulletin: “The Canadians and Americans about to set sail with the flotilla from Greece participated in a short training workshop covering various topics and centering on “passive resistance” to IDF soldiers. Several flotilla organizers said the training was meant to present a “nonviolent” response to an Israeli attempt to take control of the ship. However, the flotilla's hard core, including Arab participants, may use violent methods. In addition, documentation of passenger resistance was apparently practiced and the participants were taught how to hide electronic storage devices from the IDF soldiers”.

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The organizers

8.Preparations for the departure of the flotilla, called Freedom Flotilla 2, began immediately

following the Mavi Marmara incident in June 2010. Already then the organizers of the

previous flotilla, mainly the Turkish IHH, began planning a new flotilla that would be more

difficult for Israel to contend with. A joint leadership was formed for that purpose, and ad hoc

networks established in various countries across the globe launched intensive efforts to raise

funds and enlist volunteers. Originally, the flotilla was to depart on May 31, the

anniversary of the Mavi Marmara incident. However, the departure was postponed

to late June due to internal Turkish considerations (the elections in Turkey)

9.As was the case with the previous flotilla, three umbrella networks and organizations

were at the helm of the preparations. Over the course of a year, they showed

persistence and determination to launch the flotilla in spite of logistical and political

difficulties. Once again, the IHH was a leading member of the flotilla (the IHH is an Islamist

anti-Israel and anti-West organization based in Turkey and supported by the Turkish

authorities). It partnered with two umbrella networks “specializing” in flotillas:

ECESG, a European network based in Britain with a significant representation of

organizations and activists affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood; and Free Gaza

Movement (FGM), an umbrella network affiliated with the radical left in the United States.

For the purposes of the recent flotilla, it was fronted by an ad hoc network called U.S. Boat

to Gaza. These networks were to be joined by a predominantly Jordanian Arab/Islamic

group.

10.These “core organizations”, from which the IHH withdrew about two weeks before the

flotilla’s departure, laid out the policy and strategy of the flotilla (a role they had also

played in the Mavi Marmara flotilla). For that purpose, the networks once again

established a joint steering committee that held periodical coordination meetings and

briefings attended by high-ranking activists from the core networks and other groups. Such

coordination meetings were held in Athens, Paris, Amsterdam, Madrid, Rome, and other

locations. The core networks were joined by local groups and activists from Europe

(Scandinavia and Western Europe, particularly Britain), North America (the United States

and Canada), and Asia.

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Participants of the steering committee meeting held in Rome (the flotilla website, February 24, 2011)

The media campaign that accompanied the preparations for the flotilla

11.Over the course of the year, the preparations for the flotilla were accompanied by a

media campaign in which a significant role was played by Turkey and the IHH

(until the latter’s withdrawal from the flotilla about two weeks before its scheduled departure

date). The media campaign mostly focused on aggrandizing the flotilla and the IHH. In

addition, it was aimed to deter Israel from an attempt to stop the flotilla, as well as

allay the concerns of the international community over a possible repeat of a Mavi

Marmara-like violent confrontation. As part of the media campaign for the flotilla, the IHH

made efforts to commemorate the nine “shaheeds” killed on board the Mavi Marmara and to

disseminate hatred against Israel. After the IHH’s withdrawal, the Western partners stepped

up their media campaign, while the IHH preferred to keep a low media profile.

12.The main messages of the IHH (until its withdrawal) included the following:

a.Attempts to deter Israel through incendiary speeches that stressed the

willingness of the IHH to sacrifice shaheeds for the achievement of its purposes, and

by threatening that Israel was in for a “surprise”. It is in this context that one should

consider Yildirim’s statement that if Israel attempted to intercept the flotilla, its

organizers intended to remain at sea for a long time (the activists were required to

commit to a minimum of three weeks). During that time, Bulent Yildirim said, the

organizers of the flotilla would be able to launch acts of protest to isolate Israel on the

international scene. These messages of deterrence were given added weight by

Turkey’s foreign minister, who said that Turkey would “react appropriately to any

additional Israeli provocation at sea”.

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b.Alleviation of international concerns over a possible repeat of violence by

stressing that the passengers would carry no weapons (“not even a single pocket

knife”, a phrase used by Bulent Yildirim in an interview in the midst of preparations for

the confrontation on board the Mavi Marmara). In this context, a top IHH official said

that the organization was willing to have the ships’ cargo inspected by UN or European

observers (in the past, during the Mavi Marmara flotilla, the Turkish authorities

stressed that the passengers’ cargo had been inspected when they boarded in

Istanbul; in practice, the cargo included numerous weapons and a great deal of

military equipment).

c.The “independence” of the IHH and the Turkish government’s non-

involvement in the flotilla: a claim heard often at a press conference convened by

Bulent Yildirim on May 20 was that the IHH was an “independent” organization, and

that the government of Turkey did not intervene in its affairs. It was a claim reiterated

by Turkey’s foreign minister Davutoglu. In practice, the flotilla was postponed and

eventually cancelled as a result of pressure exerted by the Turkish government on the

leaders of the IHH.

d.IHH leader Bulent Yildirim stressed that the flotilla was just one part of a larger

campaign still to take place, saying that Israel was in for a surprise: “The flotilla is

part of a larger campaign. We are still working and preparing a surprise”.

The renovated Mavi Marmara, which was supposed to be the flagship of the flotilla (IHH website, May 22, 2011). It was supposed to carry approximately 500 passengers.

13.The organizers of the flotilla suffered a defeat in their media campaign, which could be

seen mostly in the numerous reservations about the flotilla expressed on the

international scene. Of particular interest were the United States’ reservations over

the very fact of the flotilla taking place and the participation of United States citizens in it. In

a press briefing, a spokeswoman for the Department of State expressed her concern about

17

the involvement of American citizens in a flotilla that could be “provocative” and “dangerous”

(“We are concerned about any of our citizens involved in a situation that could be

provocative, that could be dangerous…”).6 She further noted, “if people around the

world want to help the people of Gaza, we believe that the mechanisms established by

both Egypt and Israel are sufficient to achieve that objective […]”. The

spokeswoman said that Israel had the right to defend itself against weapons

smuggling, but added that the United States called on all sides to exercise restraint

(Department of State website, June 27, 2011). After the foreign ministers of the United

States and other Western countries called on their citizens not to take part in the flotilla, even

Turkey’s foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu suggested that the organizers of the flotilla wait

and see how the situation evolves with the opening of the Rafah Crossing.

14.In summary, it can be said that the media campaign which preceded the flotilla

ended in a failure. The IHH and its leader Bulent Yildirim, the key parties of the campaign,

withdrew from the flotilla, making it clear that the IHH was not an independent organization

but one that takes instructions from the government of Turkey. Israel was not deterred and

the concerns of the international community over a possible repeat of violence were not laid

to rest, as seen on European media. Even the “surprise” threat issued by Bulent Yildirim

turned out to be hot air.

The execution of the flotilla: main events

15.According to the original plan, the upgraded flotilla was to depart on May 31, the

anniversary of the Mavi Marmara incident. The departure date was postponed to June 12

because of the elections in Turkey. After the elections, the date was set to late June. About

two weeks before the flotilla’s departure the IHH announced that the Mavi Marmara could not

join the flotilla due to “technical difficulties”. The participation of a Turkish cargo ship that

was supposed to take part in the flotilla was cancelled as well. It is our assessment that

the cancellation had to do with a politically-motivated appeal from the Turkish

government rather than “technical difficulties, as IHH leader Bulent Yildirim

claimed.

16.The withdrawal of the IHH and its Islamist allies marked a change in the nature

of the flotilla. From a predominantly Turkish/Islamic flotilla (like the Mavi Marmara), it

6 She then reiterated once again that the flotilla was “dangerous” and “provocative”.

18

became one directed by Western anti-Israel groups accompanied by social and human

rights activists sympathizing with the Palestinian cause. The Arab/Muslim participants were

supposed to be represented by a predominantly Jordanian Arab group whose ship (Noor),

purchased at the last moment, was unable to set sail. Arab/Islamic activists also had a

significant role in the ECESG—one of the core networks—and in some national networks in

various countries.

17.Despite the blow they suffered as a result of the IHH’s decision to withdraw from the

flotilla, the other participating organizations tried to portray business as usual,

deciding to launch the flotilla without the IHH and even turn its withdrawal into a

PR advantage. An announcement issued by the Free Gaza Movement (FGM) said that,

without the Mavi Marmara, it was no longer an Islamic Turkish flotilla as Israel claimed.

Furthermore, the FGM said that the flotilla would consist of hundreds of activists and dozens

of organizations from across the globe, and would have more vessels than the first flotilla—

even without the Turkish ship. Rami Abdo, a flotilla organizer on behalf of the ECESG, said

that, after a meeting (of the flotilla steering committee) held in Istanbul on June 20, it was

decided that the flotilla would depart on June 25.

18.After Turkey’s withdrawal, the number of flotilla participants was reduced to

327 activists (about one fifth of what was initially planned), including 37 media

personalities. They were supposed to depart from Greece to the Gaza Strip on ten small

ships/yachts carrying about 3000 tons of supplies (such as medicines and cement). The

organizers of the flotilla established an ops room of sorts in Athens, with FGM

leaders Huwaida Arraf, Adam Shapiro, Greta Berlin, and Ewa Jasiewicz (according to

the FGM website) and top ECESG activists Rami Salah Abdo and Dr. Arafat Madi Shukri.

In London, the FGM established a “media office”.

Members of the Swedish delegation at a training workshop for

the flotilla (HeneryAscher.blogg.se, June 27, 2011). The FGM’s Huwaida Arraf (left), one of the most prominent figures among the organizers of the

flotilla, at a press conference held in Athens on June 27. The tattoo on her left arm says “Palestine” (U.S.

to Gaza website).

19

19.However, on the eve of the departure from Greece, the organizers encountered a

number of difficulties that prevented their ships from setting sail to the Gaza Strip

(eventually only one French yacht was able to depart). The difficulties included mainly the

following:

a.The government of Greece imposed administrative and political difficulties

on the flotilla, and eventually prohibited the ships from departing to the Gaza

Strip. On July 1 the Greek foreign minister officially announced that any departure

from Greek territory of ships sailing under Greek flag (or any other flag) to

the territorial waters of the Gaza Strip was forbidden. After the announcement

the coast guard was given instructions to use all possible means to implement the

decision.7

b.Malfunctions discovered on two ships prevented their departure. On June 27

a malfunction was discovered on the propeller of the Greek-Swedish-Norwegian ship

Juliano. On June 30 a malfunction was discovered on the Irish ship MV Saoirse, docked

in a Turkish port. The ship sustained some damage. The malfunctions made it

necessary to move the vessels to shipyards for repairs. The organizers of the

flotilla laid the blame at Israel’s door, but could not prove their allegations

(in one of her interviews Huwaida Arraf repeatedly accused Israel of sabotaging the

ships, but admitted that she was unable to prove the accusations).

20.In light of the above, the Greek foreign minister suggested that the flotilla

should be canceled and the humanitarian aid on board the ships be transferred to

the Gaza Strip through the port of Ashdod or the port of Al-Arish, in coordination

with the UN (Greek Foreign Ministry website, July 4). The organizers of the flotilla

categorically rejected the proposal, which, in their view, would have deflated their plan

of challenging Israel, and claimed that delivering the aid in the way suggested by the foreign

minister would shift public attention away from the “siege” on the Gaza Strip. They also

7 The Greek stance was condemned by Hamas spokesmen and the organizers of the flotilla. For example, top Hamas official Ismail Radwan condemned Greece for stopping the ships from setting sail to the Gaza Strip. By doing so, he said, Greece was taking part in the “Zionist criminal piracy”, protecting the “Zionist enemy”, and in fact participating in the “siege” on the Gaza Strip (Palestine-info, July 1, 2011). Other Hamas spokesmen called on international organizations to pressure the government of Greece into letting the flotilla set sail. The FGM’s Huwaida Arraf, a senior figure among the organizers, admitted that they had known that it would be difficult for them to depart from Greece due to the country’s exposure to American and Israeli pressure. She added that they had been counting on “popular pressure” exerted on the government of Greece and on legal considerations that would prevent the government from stopping the ships (jadaliyya.com).

20

condemned the Palestinian Authority and Abu Mazen himself for their willingness to

accept such a solution, saying it was like stabbing the organizers in the back (Safa, July 4,

2011). After the flotilla’s failure, Huwaida Arraf claimed that the Palestinian Authority’s

“disregard” for the Gaza Strip had contributed to the tolerant stance of other countries

towards the Israeli “siege” of the Gaza Strip.

21.Despite the growing political, logistical, and administrative difficulties, the

organizers of the flotilla did not abandon the plan to depart for the Gaza Strip,

banging against the wall with bullheaded persistence. While the vessels were staying

in Greek ports, several attempts were made to set sail (by the American, Canadian, and

French ships). This was done without the approval of the Greek authorities and

became a cat-and-mouse game with the Greek coast guard, which repeatedly

brought the ships back to their port of origin. After a three-week stay in Greece, the

flotilla participants dispersed to their homes.

22.An exception was the French ship Dignité/Al-Karama, which set sail from the Greek

island of Kastelorizo on July 16, falsely declaring the Egyptian port of Alexandria as its

official destination. On board the ship were ten activists (most of them French), three

journalists, and three crewmen. It sailed under French flag and was the only Freedom Flotilla

2 ship that was able to depart. Even though Alexandria had been declared as the ship’s

official destination, on July 18, when it approached Port Said, its passengers announced that

they intended to reach the Gaza Strip (AFP, July 18, 2011).

23.The Israeli navy contacted the ship and told the passengers that they were approaching

an area under naval closure. The navy also informed the passengers of legal

alternatives of getting to the Gaza Strip through the border crossings, and gave

them an opportunity to turn back before IDF soldiers boarded the ship (IDF Spokesman’s

website, July 19, 2011). When no response was given, in the afternoon of July 19

navy commandoes boarded the French ship and seized it without special incident.

It was escorted to the port of Ashdod, where the passengers were transferred to Israeli

police and immigration authorities.

21

Details on the ships that were supposed to take part in the flotilla (following the withdrawal of the IHH and the two Turkish ships)

Overview

24.Due to the high costs involved in purchasing the ships, the organizers were

unable to raise the necessary funds for the purchase of 13-15 ships, let alone large

passenger ships, as they originally planned. Eventually, after the withdrawal of the IHH with

its two ships, the organizers in the various countries managed to provide 10 small vessels for

the flotilla, without a prominent flagship like the Mavi Marmara in the previous flotilla (which

could have given the flotilla more weight and make the Israeli interception more difficult).

25.Given the financial and logistical difficulties, many networks chose not to purchase their

own ship and made arrangements for their activists to join ships or yachts acquired by other

networks. Most of them were counting on the IHH’s Mavi Marmara to carry their activists, but

suffered a severe logistical blow when the IHH withdrew from the flotilla shortly before its

departure.

26.What follows is a brief description of the nine ships that were supposed to set sail from

Greek ports to the Gaza Strip:8

Audacity of Hope (United States)

27.A passenger ship from the United States named after a book by President Obama (2006).

It carried about 40 passengers and 10 journalists. The ship was planning to set sail

from Greece, and was reportedly seaworthy. It carried no humanitarian aid. According to the

organizers, the ship’s cargo included support letters from the people of the United States to

Gaza Strip residents. One of the passengers was Greta Berlin, a senior figure in the FGM, an

umbrella network that co-organized the flotilla.

28. On July 1 the Audacity of Hope attempted to set sail for the Gaza Strip without

the approval of the authorities. The Greek coast guard stopped the ship, brought it

back to port, and detained its captain on charges of disturbing sea traffic,

8 The organizers of the flotilla, including Huwaida Arraf, claimed that the flotilla would consist of ten ships. The tenth ship, the ECESG’s Freedom for All, apparently did not set sail for Greece. Another ship called Noor was purchased by an Arab group on the eve of the flotilla’s departure.

22

endangering passengers’ lives, and disobeying police orders. The ship’s crew was

asked to remain on board. The passengers stayed on board as well in a show of solidarity with

the captain and his crew. On the following day, eight activists announced a hunger strike near

the Unites States embassy in Athens. The hunger strikers were detained by the Greek

authorities and released shortly afterwards

The Greek coast guard on board the American ship (http://irishshiptogaza.org)

Guernica (Spain)

29.A Spanish passenger ship supposed to carry 30 passengers (about half of what was

initially planned). While in Greece, the ship encountered administrative difficulties

that prevented it from setting sail. Some activists belonging to the Guernica delegation held

a hunger strike near the Spanish embassy in Greece to help receive a departure permit

for the ship.

Tahrir (Canada)

30.A Canadian passenger ship named after Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the main site of the

Egyptian demonstrations. On board the ship were delegations from Canada, Australia,

Belgium, Denmark, and Germany—a total of 46 passengers (thirty-two people from

Canada, four from Australia, four from Belgium, five from Denmark, and one from Germany).

The ship was also supposed to carry nine journalists from Denmark, Canada, Germany,

Turkey, Russia, and Israel (including Amira Hass, a reporter for Israeli daily Haaretz). The

Tahrir’s cargo included food, medicines, and medical equipment.

31.The ship docked at Crete’s Agios Nikolaos port. It made an unauthorized attempt to set

sail for the Gaza Strip on the evening of July 4. Shortly after its departure, the ship was

intercepted by a Greek coast guard vessel and brought back to port. Its passengers

attempted to resist the Greek coast guard: they confronted with the Greeks and had

23

installed two wooden boards on the way to the helms room to make any takeover attempt

more difficult. When the coast guard demanded to speak to the captain, all passengers

claimed they were the captain. Once the ship was brought back to port, the passengers

refused to disembark.

Activists on board the Canadian ship Tahrir confronting with Greek security forces (http://www.tahrir.ca/node/1976, July 4, 2011)

32.After about three weeks in Greece, members of the Canadian delegation announced they

would not be taking part in the flotilla and returned to Canada. The Canadian network

published an announcement saying that, although they were unable to reach the Gaza Strip,

they would remain active and committed to the struggle to end the “siege”.

Louis Michel (France)

33.A French passenger ship that carried 24 passengers and 6 journalists. The ship was

supposed to depart from the port of Marseilles. However, it eventually departed from Corsica

as a result of difficulties and pressure, including a pro-Israel demonstration near the port. The

ship reached Greece but was not given permission to proceed to the Gaza Strip.

The French ship Louis Michel (http://notmytribe.com)

24

Dignité/Al-Karama (France)

34.A small French passenger ship, Dignité/Al-Karama, departed from the port of L’Ile Rousse

in Corsica on June 25 and rendezvoused with the other ships in Greece. Following its arrival

in Greece, the ship repeatedly attempted to set sail for the Gaza Strip but was stopped by the

Greek coast guard every time. Eventually it did manage to depart by falsely informing the

Greek authorities that its destination was the Egyptian port of Alexandria.

35.On July 16 in the afternoon, the ship set sail from the Greek island of Kastelorizo. It

carried ten activists (most of them French), three journalists, and three crewmen. Some of

the more prominent passengers included Greek professor Vangelas Pissias, member of the

flotilla steering committee and key player in the flotilla project; and Dror Feiler, an Israeli-

born Swedish left activist, who plays an important part in the flotilla project. Even though the

port of Alexandria was declared as the ship’s official destination, on July 18, as the ship

was approaching Port Said, its passengers announced that they intended to reach

the Gaza Strip (AFP, July 18, 2011).

36. When the ship reached the naval blockade region and did not respond to orders to turn

back, it was boarded by the Israeli navy on July 19 in the afternoon. The ship was

escorted to the Israeli port of Ashdod, where the passengers were transferred to the Israeli

police and immigration authorities.

http://notmytribe.comKarama (-The French ship Dignité/Al

Stefano Chiarini (Holland, Italy)

37.A passenger ship sailing under Togo flag, with delegations from Italy, Holland, Germany,

Switzerland, Malaysia, and two representatives from Norway. In total, it was supposed to

carry 65 passengers and 5 journalists. According to a Dutch media report, the purchase of

the ship was partially funded by elements in Italy affiliated with the Union of Good,

25

particularly the ABSPP organization. The ship apparently departed from the Italian port of

Genoa and reached the Greek port of Corfu.

38.After about three weeks spent in Greece, most of the activists returned to their countries

of origin. A few activists remained in the island of Corfu to try and bring the ship back to

Italy. Togo, on its part, threatened to de-register the ship.

The Italian ship Stefano Chiarini

(http://www.freedomflotilla.it, July 9, 2011)

Saoirse (Ireland)

39.An Irish passenger ship with 20 passengers and 2 journalists. On June 30, the

organizers of the ship said that it had been sabotaged, pointing the finger at Israel. According

to the announcement, the ship sustained “considerable damage”.

The Irish ship

26

Juliano (Greece, Norway, Sweden)

40.A passenger ship named after Juliano Mer-Khamis, an Israeli actor murdered in the Jenin

refugee camp. The ship carried delegations from Greece, Sweden, and Norway—a

total of 25 passengers and 4 journalists. One of the passengers was Dror Feiler, the

spokesman for the Swedish delegation.9 The ship docked at the Greek port of Piraeus, where

a malfunction was discovered. The organizers claimed that Israel had sabotaged the ship.

Even with the malfunction repaired, the ship was unable to set sail.

Juliano dry-docked for repairs (http://www.shiptogaza.se, photo by Kalle Larsson)

Methimus (Greece, Norway, Sweden)

41.A cargo ship carrying delegations from Greece, Sweden, and Norway (a total of 15

passengers). The ship sailed under Panama flag and docked at the port of Piraeus. It was

supposed to set sail for the Gaza Strip on June 30 but was unable to depart.

Methimus at the port of Piraeus (Marintraffic.com)

9 Dror Feiler was denied entry into Israel for 10 years.

27

Appendix 2

Sending anti-Israel activists on commercial flights to Ben Gurion International Airport and to the PA-administered territories (the

fly-in)

A poster released by a network of anti-Israel organizations and activists from the PA-administered territories and from across the globe, calling to arrive in Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport on July 8,

2011 and then depart to Judea and Samaria for a week of solidarity with the Palestinians

(bienvenuepalestine.com)

Overview

1.On July 8, 2011, a propaganda display was supposed to take place at Israel’s

Ben Gurion International Airport. Several hundred activists were supposed to arrive in

the airport from Western Europe (particularly France) and the United States, and then go to

Judea and Samaria to take part in a series of anti-Israel activities in Judea, Samaria, and

even Israel (Bil’in-style demonstrations and protests). The propaganda display was

aimed to show solidarity with the Palestinians, embarrass Israel in world public opinion, and

in particular protest the limitations imposed by Israel on the arrival of anti-Israel activists

(“peace activists”) from Ben Gurion International Airport to Judea and Samaria.

28

2.In principle, the organizers considered the event an expansion of the flotilla and

convoy campaigns, shifting attention from the Gaza Strip to Judea, Samaria, and

East Jerusalem. This was motivated by their belief that the flotillas and convoys focus on

the Gaza Strip while Israel (“the Israeli colonial rule”) continues enforcing its “racist” policy of

“apartheid” across “historical Palestine”, including the Negev and the Galilee, violating

fundamental human rights and engaging in “ethnic cleansing”. The terminology used by

the organizations responsible for the event (reflected in an announcement posted on

their website in March 2011) is a clear indication that they do not recognize Israel

and belong to the international coalition involved in the anti-Israel

delegitimization campaign.

The imagery and symbolism used by the anti-Israel activists who took part in the fly-in

Left: photograph of a burning Israeli flag from the Facebook page of Umm Nawal. Right: photograph from the Facebook page of Claire Boulette showing a figure (possibly Boulette

herself) wrapped in the Hezbollah flag.

3.In practice, the State of Israel had prepared in advance for the event. By appealing to

various airlines and using diplomacy, Israel was able to prevent some 350 activists

from boarding flights to Israel from airports in Europe. Another 130 activists

(mostly from France and Belgium) arrived in Israel, where they were detained and

deported. According to Palestinian sources, several dozen Palestinians managed to

reach Judea and Samaria. Apparently some of them took part in violent demonstrations

near the Qalandia roadblock in northern Jerusalem and other friction points between the

Palestinians and Israeli security forces. Contrary to the expectations of the organizers,

the event was largely ignored by international media. The organizers referred to the

event as “Bienvenue Palestine”, “Fly-in action”, or “Ahlan wa-Sahlan fi Filastin” (in Arabic).

29

Planning and expectations

4.Preparations for the fly-in began as early as in February-March 2011. The event was

scheduled to take place on July 8, the anniversary of the decision of the International Court in

the Hague according to which the security fence is illegal. The main idea was to send

several hundred (500-600) activists to Ben Gurion International Airport on regular commercial

flights at the same time.

5.The activists were supposed to arrive in Israel and inform the Israeli authorities of

their intent to visit the PA-administered territories (unlike their previous tactic of trying to

conceal the purpose of their arrival and pretend to be innocent tourists). In the organizers’

view, such activity would turn the individuals arriving in Israel into a “collective”, and the

entire event into a “mass solidarity action”. Once in Ben Gurion International Airport,

those activists allowed entry were supposed to take part in a week of anti-Israel

activity in Judea, Samaria, and even Israel, accompanied by Palestinians and

apparently coordinated in advance with supporters in Israel.

6.In the initial stages of planning, the event was orchestrated by fifteen mostly

Palestinian local organizations from Judea, Samaria, and East Jerusalem, joined by

pro-Palestinian networks in the Western world. Among them, of particular note was the

International Solidarity Movement (ISM), a network involved in sending activists and

volunteers from abroad to weekly demonstrations in Bila’in, Ni’lin, and other friction points in

Judea and Samaria. The leaders of the ISM play a major role in the flotilla campaign within

the FGM. The ISM also specializes in disrupting IDF activities in the PA-administered

territories.

7.A report published on the website of the FGM, one of the most prominent organizations

involved in the delegitimization campaign, said that the passengers arriving in Ben Gurion

International Airport would come from countries whose residents do not need a visa to enter

Israel, including some previously refused entry by Israel. When the passengers reached

Israel, a likely possibility taken into account was that they would receive deportation orders,

in which case they were required to use tactics of non-violent resistance. According

to the website, past experience had shown that, in case of such resistance, the captain would

refuse to let the deported passengers on the plane. Lawyers would be contacted in advance

to help the deportees; they were to claim that the volunteers had to be allowed to remain in

Israel at least until their case was heard in court. They estimated that some of those

30

cases would also reach Israel’s Supreme Court and the International Court in the

Hague, with considerable media coverage.

The execution

8.The planned propaganda display was launched on and around July 8, despite

Israel’s public warnings. Starting July 6, hundreds of activists and ordinary passengers

arriving on commercial flights from Europe started to converge on Ben Gurion International

Airport for protests and at friction points in Judea and Samaria and in Israel proper.

9.The Israeli Police Department deployed hundreds of policemen in the airport in

advance. Israel also appealed to various European countries and airlines, providing them

with lists of suspicious passengers. Along with the lists was a warning that the individuals

would not be permitted to enter Israel and a notice that the airlines would be responsible for

their airfare back to their countries of origin. Approximately 350 activists were denied

permission to board flights to Israel from airports in France, Britain, Belgium, Greece,

Switzerland, Holland and Germany. Dozens of them demonstrated and protested at the

airports, without achieving actual results or drawing much attention from the

media.

Activists forbidden to depart for Israel demonstrate at the Charles De Gaulle Airport in Paris (http://bienvenuepalestine.com, July 8, 2011)

10. The first activists landed at Ben Gurion on July 6. However, as planned, the

greatest number arrived on Friday, July 8, when a relatively large group of activists

arrived in the airport. Approximately 400 passengers were interrogated on arrival by officials

from Israel’s population and immigration authority. Six were deported immediately. One

hundred and twenty-four passengers and activists were taken to holding facilities and then

deported. The following is a by-country distribution of activists denied entry:

31

Number of activistsCountry

50France

41Belgium

16Germany

12United Kingdom

4United States

3Holland

1Austria

1Australia

1Ireland

1Spain

130Total

11.According to statements from the Ben Gurion Airport authorities, the activists

arrived in organized groups. They said they had planned their trips thoroughly and had

been briefed on how to deal with detentions at the airport. Some of them

responded with extreme verbal abuse. Several dozen extreme leftist Israelis who had

come to demonstrate solidarity with the activists began rioting in the arrivals hall. Three of

them were detained and taken to the airport police station for questioning.

12.However, according to claims from Palestinian sources, several dozen activists

did manage to reach Judea and Samaria. Apparently, on entry they claimed to be

ordinary tourists and did not reveal their genuine objective (i.e., anti-Israel activity in Judea

and Samaria). Some of them participated in the violent demonstrations organized near the

Qalandia checkpoint on July 9 and at other friction points (Ma’an News Agency and Hamas’

Paltoday website, July 9, 2011).

32

Anti-Israel activists at the Ben Gurion International Airport (http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress, July 8, 2011).

33

Appendix 3

Nakba Day events

Overview

1.As every year, the Nakba Day was marked on May 15, the anniversary of Israel’s

establishment, considered by Palestinians to symbolize their defeat in the 1948 War of

Independence. The main idea this year was to conduct mass events in various locations to

express the Palestinian refugees’ “right of return” to Israel. Also planned were such

provocations as a violent invasion of Israel through its borders with Arab countries to

emphasize the message of the “right of return” and challenge the Israeli authorities.

2.The thinking behind the Nakba Day and Naksa Day events could be seen in an article by PA

deputy information minister Dr. Al-Mutawakkil Taha. In an article titled “Tsunami on the

Border”, Dr. Al-Mutawakkil Taha said that the Nakba Day and Naksa Day events were

only the initial expression of “tremendous forces”. These forces, according to Taha,

extend from the ocean to the Persian Gulf (i.e., the territory of the Arab world), and they

come with a purpose “to restore the lost paradise, Palestine, with their footsteps

and their masses, that will shake the entire world.” When the moment of decision

comes, he said, these forces “can uproot the barbed wire fences erected between

Palestine and the Arab world surrounding it” (the article was published by several Arab

news agencies, including PNN, on June 13, 2011).

A Palestinian with a key (the symbol of the right of return) breaks through the barbed wire fence (between Arab countries and Israel) to realize “the right of return” (Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, May 16, 2011)

34

3.In areas controlled by the PA and Hamas, as well as on the Israeli-Jordanian

border, local authorities (or local powers) made efforts to contain the events and

keep them under control. However, on the Israeli-Syrian border, in the Druze village of

Majdal Shams in the northern Golan Heights, the Syrians enabled (and possibly even

encouraged) rioters to approach the border fence, where they broke through and invaded

Israeli territory. Most of them returned to Syria after making their presence felt in Majdal

Shams, where they shouted slogans for the “right of return” to Palestine. The violent

confrontation between them and IDF soldiers resulted in four dead rioters and several

wounded IDF soldiers and rioters. On the Israeli-Lebanese border, the Lebanese army

unsuccessfully tried to contain the event, which spun out of control and culminated in an

attempt to invade Israeli territory. Approximately ten rioters were killed and several dozens

were wounded.

4.The most prominent theme expressed in the demonstrations was the full realization of

the Palestinian refugees’ so-called “right of return” to the State of Israel, to the places

they abandoned or were expelled from in 1948 (i.e., elimination of the State of Israel as a

Jewish state). The “right” was described as “sacred,” and no one had the authority to deny or

partially modify it, or to agree to settling the refugees in Arab countries. The various

speeches, slogans and placards held by demonstrators stressed that the return of the

refugees involved jihad to “liberate Palestine from the [Mediterranean] sea to the [Jordan]

river.”

5.The idea of the “right of return”, with which broad sectors of the Palestinian

society agree, is regarded by those behind the anti-Israel delegitimization

campaign as a tried and true means to sabotage any peace process, or at least to

put severe limitations on those conducting such a process (i.e., Mahmoud Abbas and

the Palestinian Authority). It also makes it impossible to advance a solution based on the

principle of two states for two peoples, i.e., the Jewish people and the Palestinian people.

Terminology drawn from the Arab protest movements was used in some of the

protest sites, with the slogan “the people want to topple the regime” being replaced by “the

people want to liberate Palestine”.

35

6.Statements made by Hamas figures after the Nakba Day events reflected their satisfaction

and the aspiration to turn the events into a model for similar actions. The Hamas

information bureau in Damascus issued a press release praising those who participated in the

events for their “adherence to the right of return and for opening the door to a new era in

the history of the struggle against Israel”. In practice, however, the events in the PA-

administered territories, the Arab world, and Western countries were of limited

scope and gained poor media coverage. The exception was the incident near Majdal

Shams, where the rioters’ invasion of the village was seen as precedent-setting “success”.

The attempt to duplicate that “success” on Naksa Day, however, failed.

Summary of events in various locations

Syria

7.The Nakba Day events went out of control in the Druze village of Majdal Shams

in the northern Golan Heights. Thousands of demonstrators, most of them Palestinians,

were organized and bussed in from Damascus and other locations in Syria, in our

assessment with the knowledge and encouragement of the Syrian regime.

8.The demonstrators massed in Syrian territory across from the village of Majdal Shams.

During the demonstration several hundred of them broke through the border fence

unrestrained by the Syrian army. They confronted the IDF forces there and invaded Majdal

Shams. Most of them returned to Syria and some were detained by Israel. Four were killed

during the violent confrontation with the IDF soldiers and several dozen were wounded. More

After the Arab regimes are toppled, it will be Israel’s turn: a cartoon published in Hamas’ newspaper

Felesteen on May 15, 2011 for Nakba Day. The statue of an Arab dictator is toppled, while the statue of a Jew is

concerned that it may be next. The caption reads “Nakba Day—first, purification and then total victory”.

Brainwashing the younger generation with the “right of return:” Gazan children carrying signs reading “We will certainly return to…Acre” and “We will certainly

return to…Ashdod.” The key at the lower right symbolizes the so-called “right or return;” upper left, the Hamas emblem (Palestine-info, May 15, 2011).

36

than 10 IDF soldiers were injured. The Syrian media represented the invasion as the

realization of the Palestinians’ so-called “right of return.”

9.The rioters who invaded Majdal Shams gathered around the statue of the Druze leader

Sultan al-Atrash, waved Palestinian and Syrian flags and shouted “Liberate the Golan Heights”

and “Liberate Palestine,” and called for the return to various places in Israel which they left in

1948. Young Palestinians told the media they aspired to “return to the homeland of Palestine”

and “to tell the world that the right of return is a sacred principle which will not be waived”

(Haaretz, May 16, 2011).

10.In one exceptional case, one of the invaders, a Syrian citizen named Hassan Hijazi,

reached Jaffa where, he claimed, he found “his family’s” house. On May 15 he told Al-Arabiya

TV that he was a communications engineer who belonged to a group which had organized

a protest through Facebook. He said the Syrian and UN forces had not tried to prevent

the demonstrators from entering Israel because they were aware there would be casualties.10

10 Anwar Raja, in charge of propaganda for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC, Ahmed Jibril’s organization) said that the “popular activity” had been carried out “under Syrian political aegis” (Al-Dunya TV, May 15, 2011). The PFLP-GC came under severe internal Palestinian criticism following the bloody events of Naksa Day.

Demonstrators on the Syrian side of the Druze village of Majdal Shams shout “The people want to liberate

Palestine,” a slogan borrowed from the recent Arab protest movements (Photo courtesy of Israel Channel 2,

May 15, 2011).

One of the demonstrators who invaded Israel: “We have realized the right of return

to Palestine” (Photo courtesy of Israel Channel 2, May 15, 2011).

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Lebanon

Large Hebrew and Arabic sign in Maroun al-Ras, the focal point of the protests on the Israeli-Lebanese border: “May 15, the people want to

return to Palestine” (Flickr website).

11.In Lebanon the main Nakba Day event was held in Maroun al-Ras under the

aegis of Hezbollah and with a Lebanese army presence. There were thousands of

participants, most of them Palestinians, who were bussed to the site. Tents were erected for

representatives of the media.

12.At the end of the ceremony the demonstrators marched to the Israeli-Lebanese

border carrying signs calling for the “return" to "Palestine.” One of the slogans was “The

people want to return to Palestine,” borrowed from the slogans of the protest

movements in the Arab countries (Radio Nur, May 15, 2011). There was much media

coverage of the violent confrontations which broke out between a group of demonstrators

who reached the border and IDF soldiers. Ten people were killed and scores wounded (some

by the Lebanese army when its soldiers opened fire in an attempt to contain the event and

prevent an invasion of Israeli territory).

Rally at Maroun al-Ras before the demonstrators went to the border (Flickr

website)

A mob of demonstrators on their way from Maroun al-Ras to the Israeli border to break through the fence (Al-Jazeera TV website,

May 15, 2011).

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13.One of the speakers at Maroun al-Ras was Ali Barakeh, Hamas representative in

Lebanon. In his speech he stressed that more than 63 years after the Nakba, the “right of

return” was approaching. He claimed that the “right of return” was a sacred right for both

individuals and the Palestinian people as a whole, and it could not be discussed or revoked.

He also called on all the citizens of Israel (whom he referred to as “settlers”) to leave

their lands and return to where they came from, because they had settled on Arab

land. He added that the Palestinian cause was an issue for the entire Arab world and that the

“right of return” of the Palestinians was also an issue for all Arabs. He said that the

demonstrations of May 15 were only the beginning of the third intifada “at home

and abroad,” and that the Palestinian people would continue “popular actions” abroad and

“armed resistance” within until all Palestine had been liberated and the occupation ended.

14.Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah issued a statement praising those who

demonstrated against Israel and confronted the IDF. He appealed to the demonstrators,

saying that they gave “a new meaning” to Nakba Day. “…your return to your homes,

fields, lands and holy places is a right, a goal…to which blood, lives and many

casualties will be dedicated” (Al-Intiqad, May 16, 2011). Other Hezbollah activists said

that the events of May 15 were the “return to Palestine” and “adherence to the right of

return” (Al-Manar TV and Al-Intiqad, May 15, 2011).

Demonstrators throw stones at IDF soldiers on the other side of the border (Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV's website,

May 15, 2011).

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Judea and Samaria (PA)

15.In general, Nakba Day events in Judea and Samaria were relatively limited in

scope because they were successfully contained by the Palestinian security forces.

The “right of return” was also emphasized in the PA-administered territories. A rally was

held in Ramallah at Yasser Arafat’s grave, attended by senior Palestinian Authority figures.

From there the demonstrators marched to Al-Manara Square, waving “Palestine” flags and

black flags inscribed “There is no substitute for the right of return.” Nakba Day rallies

were also held in other locations in Judea and Samaria.

A headline in the PA-affiliated daily Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda: “Israeli massacre against ‘the people want return’ processions” (Al-Hayat al-Jadeeda, May 16, 2011).

Nakba Day rally whose theme was “Adherence to the land and no substitute for return” (Al-Jazeera TV, May

15, 2011).

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16.Saeb Erekat, member of the PLO’s executive committee, said Israel and the Israeli

government were responsible for turning Palestinians into refugees. He said the plan to

restore 10,000 refugees a year for ten years was not a Palestinian idea but rather the idea of

former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. He claimed that Mahmoud Abbas had never

mentioned any number and would not do so without consulting Jordan, Egypt and Syria

(Palestinian Authority TV, May 15, 2011).11

17.Fatah spokesman Osama al-Qawasmeh, interviewed from Ramallah by the Iranian

Arabic TV channel, said of the May 15 events that the various marches proved to Israel that

the Palestinian refugees did not intend to waive their “right” to return to their

lands, on the contrary, they clung to it even more. He said the large number of

participants at the events showed that “the colonialist Israeli settlement project” had failed,

and that today Fatah adhered more than ever to the “right of return” (Al-Alam TV,

May 16, 2011).

The Gaza Strip

18.Nakba Day events in the Gaza Strip were relatively limited in scale. The main incident

occurred near the Erez crossing on the Palestinian side, where there were violent

confrontations between scores of rioters and IDF soldiers. One rioter was killed and dozens

were wounded.

19.Senior Hamas figures gave inflammatory speeches in favor of jihad and the return of the

Palestinian refugees to Palestine. Hamas’ propaganda office issued a press release

emphasizing that Hamas had no intention of waiving the “right of return” or the right of

“resistance” (i.e., terrorism). The statements made were the following:

a.Ismail Haniya, head of the de facto Hamas administration, gave a sermon in the Al-

Omari mosque in Gaza City for Nakba Day. He said that Nakba Day marked an

important turning point, which would eventually lead to “the end of the

Zionist project on the soil of Palestine.” He called the last 100 years “the

century of jihad and firm stance.” The Palestinians, he said, rejected a permanent

11 The statement was made in response to a document revealed by Al-Jazeera TV as part of its exposure of documents dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations when Ehud Olmert was prime minister. In the document (the report of a meeting between the NSU and Mahmoud Abbas, March 24, 2009) Mahmoud Abbas says he is aware that a massive influx of refugees into the territory of the State of Israel would mean its end.

41

settlement of the refugees and their expulsion, and would not accept an alternative to

the “return.” “Anyone who waives the ‘right of return’ has fallen,” he said. He also said

that the Palestinians “trample on the Geneva Document” because it waives the “right of

return”12 (Al-Aqsa TV, May 15, 2011).

b.Ismail Radwan, senior Hamas figure, said at a rally near the Erez crossing, that as

long as Palestinians breathed they would return to Haifa, Jerusalem,

Ashkelon and the other Palestinian cities and villages. He said that the “right

of return” was “a sacred, historic, legitimate right” and that no one could

waive it (Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV, May 15, 2011).

c.Taher al-Nunu, spokesman for the de facto Hamas administration, said that the

assemblies and gatherings held for Nakba Day in the various countries were proof

that the date for the fulfillment of “the divine promise of victory,

strengthening and the return to the houses and holy places” was

approaching. He emphasized the adherence of the Hamas administration to the

Palestinian principles of freedom, independence, the return of all the refugees, and

rejection of any kind of “alternative homeland” [for the Palestinian refugees in the Arab

states in which they were currently living] (Palestine-info, May 15, 2011).

20.The Fatah movement in the Gaza Strip also emphasized the theme of “right of

return”. On May 14 it held a Nakba Day ceremony in Gaza City with the theme “The

reconciliation [with Hamas] [is] a guarantee for the return.” More than 1,500 Palestinians

attended, waving Fatah flags and pictures of Mahmoud Abbas and Yasser Arafat. Senior

Fatah figure Abdallah al-Ifranji, speaking for Mahmoud Abbas, gave a speech stressing the

importance of the reconciliation agreement (AFP, May 14, 2011). Zakaria al-Agha, a

member of Fatah’s central committee, spoke at a rally held near the Erez crossing. He

said that the Palestinians would not waive the “right of return” in exchange for anything

(Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV, May 15, 2011).

12 The Geneva Document proposes a permanent Israeli-Palestinian agreement based on the 2000 Clinton outline. One of its articles refers to mutual recognition of the right of the Jewish people and the Palestinian people to their own states. Another article deals with a full solution to the problem of the refugees based on their transfer to the Palestinian state and reparations.

42

Women and children at a demonstration in the Gaza Strip. The headbands read “Return.” The women hold cards with the names of villages abandoned by the

refugees in 1948. The child (upper right) holds a picture of a key, the symbol of the Palestinians’ desire to “return.”

Jordan

21.Thousands of people participated in demonstrations near the Israeli embassy in

Amman, the Jordanian capital, and in the region of the Allenby Bridge near the

border. The march to the bridge called itself “the march of return.” The participants

The Palestinians’ hearts and minds focus on the “right of return,” symbolized by the

key (Al-Dustour, May 16, 2011).

Jordanian Nakba Day poster, emphasizing the Arab nature of “Greater Palestine”

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carried signs reading “Return, return,” “We will redeem you, Palestine, with our soul and

blood,” “Millions of shaheeds are marching to Jerusalem,” “The right of return is sacred,”

“Despite you, Zion, we return, return,” etc. The demonstrators confronted the Jordanian

security forces. One was killed and several dozen were wounded.

22.While the Jordanian security forces made efforts to contain the events, sources in the

Jordanian administration expressed support for the demonstrators’ demand to

realize the “right of return.” Taher al-Adwan, minister of information and spokesman for

the Jordanian government, noted on his Facebook page on May 15 that Jordan strongly

supported the “rights of the Palestinians,” especially the “right of return.” He said that the

government of Jordan supported any “national effort” designed to show that “Jordan will not

waive the right of return”. Ma’rouf al-Bakhit, the prime minister of Jordan, also expressed

support for the “right of return” at a Nakba Day ceremony held in the Hittin refugee camp. He

said that a Palestinian state established without the “right of return” and Jerusalem was not

the state they desired, and would mean the direct destruction of the national Palestinian

project (Jordanian News Agency, May 16, 2011).

Egypt

23.There were violent anti-Israeli demonstrations throughout Egypt, attended by thousands.

The largest was held near the Israeli embassy in Cairo. Some broke through the blockades

and reached the embassy courtyard. About 20 demonstrations were injured.

24.Scores of demonstrators gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square before leaving for Rafah. They

organized a protest rally where they called for the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador to

Egypt, demanding to close the embassy and to allow the Palestinians the right to return to

Palestine (Al-Youm al-Saba’a, May 15, 2011). The slogans included “We swear by the blood

of Sheikh Yassin, we will reach you, Palestine,” “Millions of shaheeds will reach Jerusalem,”

and “The people want to liberate Palestine” (Al-Youm al-Saba'a, May 15, 2011).

Turkey

25. A small Islamist delegation from Turkey referring to itself as the “Palestine

Return Day March” took part in the Nakba Day events. Six of the delegation’s

participants were on board the Mavi Marmara last year. The organizer of the Turkish

delegation, and one of its members, was an anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and anti-Western

journalist named Nureddin Şirin, who in 2008 publicly called to eradicate the regimes of

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President Mubarak and Jordan’s King Abdullah, who allegedly “betrayed the Muslims”. The

delegation’s contact in Turkey was an Islamist journalist named Hakan Albayrak, who in 1994

was the chief of the IHH humanitarian aid mission in Bosnia and in 2003 was sentenced to 15

years in prison for opposing Ataturk’s reforms. In 2008, both journalists led an anti-Israel,

anti-West demonstration in front of the Israeli embassy in Turkey for Nakba Day.

Nureddin Şirin during his stay with the Turkish delegation in Jordan (Al-Jazeera TV, May 15, 2011)

26.In Jordan the Turkish delegation took part in a procession referred to as the “March of

Return”, which left the village of Karameh and moved in the direction of Allenby Bridge. Its

participants were Palestinians and Jordanians carrying such slogans as “Return, return”, “The

sacred right of return”, “Millions of shaheeds are marching to Jerusalem”, and “With our soul

and blood we shall redeem you, Palestine”. They refused to follow the instructions issued by

the Jordanian security forces, tried to force their way towards the border, and clashed with

the security forces. One demonstrator was killed and dozens were wounded in the violent

confrontations. According to the head of the Turkish delegation, the front line of the

procession that confronted the Jordanian security forces consisted of activists who had come

from Turkey. Five of them were wounded, and their bus was damaged.

Members of the Turkish delegation in Jordan on Nakba Day. Left: carrying a poster that reads, “The Turkish convoy for the return to Palestine”. Right: waving Turkish flags (Velfecr, May 19, 2011).

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Appendix 4

Naksa Day events

Overview

1.Events marking Naksa Day, the anniversary of the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day

War (1967), were an attempt to duplicate what was seen as the “success” of the

Nakba Day events. The organizers, Palestinian and Arab activists who employed online

social networks, portrayed their activity as a new tactic in the struggle to achieve

their goals vis-à-vis Israel.

2.Specifically, calls were heard for extensive protest events in various locations on or

around June 6. Such events included mass rallies along Israel’s borders with Arab countries

to challenge IDF soldiers. In practice, Naksa Day events once again focused on the

Syrian border, where 24 rioters were killed in violent clashes with IDF soldiers. In

other locations—Lebanon, Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza Strip—the events were

relatively peaceful, and all demonstrations were contained by local security forces.

Details of the events

Syria

Syrian demonstrators at the Israeli border near Majdal Shams (Al-Jazeera TV, June 5, 2011).

3.On June 5, the Naksa Day events were focused on two locations on the Israeli-Syrian

border: Majdal Shams (northern Golan Heights) and Quneitra (central Golan Heights).

About one thousand demonstrators (mostly Palestinians residing in Syria and Syrian citizens)

Demonstrations near Majdal Shams (Wafa News Agency, June 5, 2011)

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massed in those two locations. The Syrian media reported 24 rioters dead in confrontations

that broke out there. Some residents of Majdal Shams joined the demonstrations as well,

throwing stones at the security forces and waving the flags of Palestine and Syria. The

demonstrations and gatherings continued into the morning of June 6, although to a lesser

degree.

4.Once again, online social networks played a major role in mobilizing

demonstrators. The Syrian regime enabled the rioters to reach the area, and its media

reported the events live for propaganda capital and to draw local and international

attention away from the country’s internal crisis. The rioters repeatedly tried to break

through the security fence and crossings along the border and invade Israeli territory, and

were driven back by IDF forces. In Quneitra rioters threw stones and Molotov cocktails at IDF

forces.

5.IDF soldiers, who had been briefed in advance, responded with riot control measures,

warning the rioters a number of times not to cross the border. After all options for issuing

warnings had been exhausted, IDF soldiers fired at the legs of rioters who tried to break

through the fence and invade Israel. At one point the Israeli forces allowed teams of Syrian

Red Crescent workers to evacuate the wounded, but rioters captured the Red Crescent flags

and waved them as they continued their rampage.

Lebanon

6.In Lebanon, as opposed to Syria, the events were not violent. Between several

dozen and several hundred Lebanese participated in demonstrations. They were held in the

eastern sector, Maroun al-Ras (where Nakba Day demonstrations had also been held) and at

the border crossing near Metulla (the Fatma Gate). The Lebanese army prevented the

demonstrators from reaching the border. The Iranian ambassador to Lebanon and

other Iranians visited Maroun al-Ras during the demonstrations.

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The Iranian ambassador to Lebanon and other Iranians tour the border during the Naksa Day demonstrations (Daily Star,

Lebanon, June 5, 2011).

Judea and Samaria

7.There were relatively small demonstrations throughout Judea and Samaria, primarily at

three focal sites:

a.The city of Tubas (near Nablus): A demonstration was held, attended by

commanders of the Palestinian security forces and other senior Palestinian Authority

figures (Wafa News Agency, June 5, 2011).

b.Deir al-Hatab (east of Nablus): Palestinians marched to the nearby

settlement of Elon Moreh. They confronted the Israeli security forces and set

an olive grove on fire. The Israeli security forces responded with riot control

measures (Safa News Agency, June 5, 2011).

c.Bethlehem: A march was held, attended by dozens of Palestinians who confronted

the Israeli security forces. The Israeli security forces responded with riot control

measures (Ma’an News Agency, June 5, 2011).

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A masked Palestinian youth uses a sling to hurl a stone at Israeli security forces

during a demonstration in Bethlehem on Naksa Day (Wafa News Agency, June 5, 2011).

Left: Masked Palestinians attempt to cross the security fence (Safa News Agency, June 5, 2011). Right: Palestinian demonstrators confront IDF forces near Bethlehem (Wafa News Agency, June 5,

2011).

East Jerusalem

8.Hundreds of Palestinian rioters confronted Israeli security forces at the Qalandia checkpoint

in northern Jerusalem. They tried to break through the checkpoint and threw stones at the

Israeli security forces, which responded with riot control measures. A stone hit an IDF soldier,

inflicting minor injuries. The Palestinian media reported 90 wounded rioters. A peaceful

demonstration was held at the Damascus gate.

49

Masked Palestinian rioters throw stones at the Israeli security forces at the Qalandia checkpoint in Jerusalem (Left: Palestine-info, June 5, 2011. Right: Safa News Agency, June 5, 2011).

The Gaza Strip

9.A number of demonstrations were held in the Gaza Strip; the largest were in Khan Yunis

(central Gaza Strip) and Beit Hanoun (northern Gaza Strip). The demonstrators marched

toward the Israeli border crossings, but were stopped by the internal security forces of

the de facto Hamas administration (Wafa News Agency, June 5, 2011).

Hamas’ internal security forces stop Palestinian demonstrators’ attempt to reach the Erez crossing

in the northern Gaza Strip (Hamas’ Safa News Agency, June 5, 2011)

Strong internal Palestinian criticism of Naksa Day events in Syria

10.The Naksa Day events failed to capture the attention of Palestinian, Arab, and

international media. What is more, the deaths of 24 demonstrators stirred an argument

in the Palestinian public and drew serious internal Palestinian criticism.

11.The criticism was directed at the Syrian-sponsored Palestinian terrorist organizations

based in Damascus, accusing them of responsibility for sending Palestinian youths to

demonstrate in the Golan Heights, even though they knew of the IDF’s preparations for

preventing attempted invasions of Israeli territory. The criticism focused on Ahmed

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Jibril’s organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command

(PFLP-GC), which is affiliated with the Syrian regime and has been handled by it for

decades.

12.The criticism resulted in violent confrontations in Al-Yarmuk refugee camp near

Damascus. The families of the dead accused members of pro-Syrian organizations, including

a senior PFLP-Habash activist, saying his organization had incited the young men to go to the

Golan Heights “to serve the political interests of others.” Al-Jazeera TV reported that during

clashes in Al-Yarmuk refugee camp a number of Palestinians were killed and 20 were

injured. The PFLP-GC headquarters were set on fire by local Al-Yarmuk refugee camp

residents.

Palestinians in Al-Yarmuk refugee camp watch as the PFLP-GC headquarters go up in flames (electronic-intifada.net, June 6, 2011).

13.The affair shows that events such as Nakba Day and Naksa Day in the Syrian

sector are not spontaneous or “popular”, and that in some incidents they have been

instigated by the Syrian regime and in our assessment by Iran and Palestinian

terrorist organizations. Their aim is to exploit the events for the benefit of the Syrian

regime, which is clearly interested in shifting attention away from the suppression

of the escalating popular protests to the events on the Israeli-Syrian border.