An introductory essay Miklós Rosta – … What makes a New Public Management reform successful? An institutional analysis 1 An introductory essay Miklós Rosta – [email protected]

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What makes a New Public Management reform successful? An institutional analysis1

An introductory essay

Miklós Rosta – [email protected]

Corvinus University of Budapest

April, 2011

Introduction

In this current study I’m offering a recommendation for the development of a model

that could provide us with an answer to the following question: which factors influence the

successful introduction of the reforms related to the New Public Management (NPM)

movement? The question is relevant, since the East-Central European countries have just

embarked on transforming their public administrations according to the NPM during the past

years.

The introduction of the management techniques associated with the New Public

Management movement has been on the agenda since the 80s in the developed capitalist

countries. Numerous developed capitalist democracies have been successfully utilizing these

techniques, although in certain countries they only rhetorically connected to the NPM, still the

depth and the width of the reforms exhibit significant differences even in the case of the

Western European countries.2 (Goldfinch - Wallis [2009]), (Pollitt – van Thiel – Homburg

[2007]) While in the case of the developed countries the literature reports numerous

successes, for the countries of the periphery the introduction of the NPM instruments in most

cases ended with failure.3 It is not surprising that the experts are discouraging developing

1 The preparation of this paper was supported by the TÁMOP 4.2.1. framework-contract, in the research project called „ Knowledge based economy in Hungary, the conditions of the strengthening the motivation to innovate and increasing the R+D performance”. The author thanks Prof. Dr. András Blahó, Prof. Dr. Prof. Balázs Hámori, Prof. Dr. Katalin Szabó and Dr. László Tóth and Zsolt Horváth for their helpful suggestions and comments on the draft of the paper. 2 The scientific literature of the NPM is characterized by the hegemony of authors with an Anglo-Saxon focus, who have decisively analyzed and considered as exemplary the practices of the Anglo-Saxon countries. It follows that they consider numerous NPM reforms taking place in continental Europe as unsuccessful, since they differ from the “ideal-typical” versions. 3 Many studies have been published about the results of the attempted reforms taking place in the developing countries. See, for instance: about the environmental reasons for failures of the developing countries: (Polidano [1999]) study, or about the NPM reforms of the public administration of the African countries, see: (Balogun

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countries from applying NPM. (Lapsley [2009]), (Williams [2000]), (Hughes [2008]),

(Dunleavy – Margetts – Bastow – Tinkler [2005]) In reality, the question is: what caused that

certain states have been successful, while other countries had failed to transform their public

administration in accordance with the NPM guidelines?

Some of those studies detailing the failures of NPM reforms stem from the bias of the

authors: professionals who question the achievements of the movement think of it as if it had

a well defined system of objectives, and that there are normatively described paths and

instruments helping to obtain these objectives. However, in reality this is not the case. The

beauty of the NPM is exactly that the movement means more of an approach with which the

efficiency of public administration can be increased. According to (Pollitt – van Thiel –

Homburg [2007], p. 2.), the NPM is nothing else than a shopping center, where the

governments and the experts of countries can select management instruments closest to their

taste4. The question is for who, what and when it is practical to “purchase”, and how should

the “purchased” instruments be mixed, so that the results would turn out favorably. According

to the model described in the current study, this fundamentally depends on the environment,

on the institutional system.

In this study I introduce an institutional model that – according to my hypothesis – is

able to answer the question of why the NPM movement is successful in certain countries and

why it is most of the time unsuccessful in others. The model could provide an answer to the

question of what institutional factors the success of the introduction of the NPM reform

depends on, and also what are the reasons behind the failed attempts of the past. If with the

help of the model we can identify those factors, which determine the success of the

introduction of the NPM techniques, then it would enable us to provide recommendations on

those groups of management instruments, which could be introduced successfully in a given

[2003]). The NPM reform of South Africa has been analyzed extensively in the literature. (Cameron [2009]) published an interesting paper about this. Finally, there is an illuminating paper about the transformation of the local public administration system in Malawi: (Tambulasi [2009]). The Public Management Review had dealt with the relationship between the developing countries and the NPM in an entire issue (Volume 3, Issue 3 of 2001). 4 „From this point of view, therefore, variation might be explained as ‘selective shopping’ from a varied and

somewhat contradictory shop (the NPM).” (Pollitt – van Thiel – Homburg [2007], p. 2.)

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country. Also, we could call attention to those NPM techniques that in an event of being

introduced could even lead to opposite results to the objectives.5

Briefly about the New Public Management

The New Public Management, or as it is found in numerous studies the “new

managerilism”, has evolved as a reform movement and as a scientific school during the late

1970s and early 1980s primarily in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Hood [1991]), (Barzelay

[2001]). The movement has set out on its conquering path with the prime ministerial term of

Margaret Thatcher commencing in 1979 and with the presidential term of Ronald Reagan

commencing in 1980, so the initial steps can be linked to the conservative, neo-liberal

economic movement (Mascarenhas [1993], p. 319.); (Deakin – Walsh [1996]); (Pollitt

[1993]).6

The main objective of the scientific and political movement associated with the new

NPM was to transform the traditional public administration in order to develop a more

efficient, more adaptive and because of that a more effective operation. According to the

supporters of the NPM, market coordination – in the decisive majority of the cases – is more

capable of an effective allocation than bureaucratic coordination.

5 The recommended model has numerous limits. Because of the difficulties associated with data collection and modeling, and also the methodological weaknesses of the statistical instruments in economics, the model employs significant simplifications. The author is aware of that besides the application of the modeling technique the preparation of case studies is indispensible for answering the above questions. The preparation of case studies is a good complement to the statistical analysis, because it requires another type of scientific approach. Because of the volume restrictions I dispense with the detailed introduction of the weaknesses of the described model. Now, I just call attention to the fact that the model can only provide theoretical recommendations on the certain techniques related to the NPM movement (for instance, the introduction of PPP or performance-based wages), since currently we do not have sufficient amount of data to prepare an analysis that could ensure a valid assessment. Therefore, we can only forecast the success on the aggregate level and not on the levels of the given techniques. 6 “The New Right” and neo-liberalism as a school of economic policy has been standing in the crossfire during the past years. See, for instance: (Stilwell [2009]) paper, in which he interprets the numerous problems of the global economy as the effect of The New Right, namely the neoliberal economic policy. For details on neo-liberalism and on the neoliberal state, see: (Harvey [2005]). About Margaret Thatcher’s prime ministerial performance, I recommend to the interested Reader two chapters of (Evans [2001], pp. 53-78.). However, some authors do not link the NPM to the new right and to the neoconservative – neoliberal economic policy. For more details on the theoretical background of the NPM in economics, see: (Gruening [2001]).

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„Thus co-ordination may be achieved by hierarchy, network or market (Kaufmann,

Majone and Ostrom, 1986; Thompson, Frances, Levacic and Mitchell, 1991). The

main thrust of NPM reforms has been, de facto, that market and network forms of co-

ordination – especially market forms – should wherever possible be substituted for

hierarchical co-ordination.” (Pollitt - Bouckaert [2000], p. 80.)7

It follows that according to the advocates of the NPM, the reduction in government

spending and the raising of the quality standards of public services can be achieved through

the strengthening of market coordination and competition. In the Anglo-Saxon countries the

advocates of the NPM wished to actualize these abstract ideas into practice through

suggesting a stronger presence of market coordination in the organizations of the public

sphere, while putting special emphasis on the stronger application of the management

techniques of actors of the private sphere. The acceptance of the primacy of market

coordination, and at the same time the demand for the rolling back of bureaucratic

coordination in the field of public services, signals that the foundations of NPM in economics

is linked to Hayek and Mises – namely to the new Austrian school – and to “a rage of

influential new right thinkers” (Dunleavy [1986], p. 15.) namely to the representatives of

public choice theory, so among others to Buchanan, Tullock, Betton and Niskanen.8

Aside from formulating abstract objectives, the advocates of the NPM had diversified

expectations and they attempted to actualize these through a diversified toolkit. According to

(Hood [1991], p. 3.) the NPM can be linked to four “administrative megatrends”:

“(i) attempts to slow down or reverse government growth in terms of overt public

spending and staffing (Dunsire and Hood 1989);

(ii) the shift toward privatization and quasi-privatization and away from core

government institutions, with renewed emphasis on 'subsidiarity' in service provision

(cf. Hood and Schuppert 1988; Dunleavy 1989).

7 According to (Pollitt – Bouckart [2000], pp. 93-94.), countries most committed to market coordination are: United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and in some cases Finland and Sweden. The authors call this group of countries: “marketizers”. 8 We can read an intriguing analysis of Mises’ and Niskanen’s bureaucracy theory in: (Carnis [2009]). (Larbi [1999]) and (Gruening [2001]) provide an excellent overview of the political economic basis of the NPM. The foundations of public choice theories and their link to the NPM and to the privatizational processes associated with that are summarized by (Dunleavy [1986]) and (Cuervo – Villalonga [2000]).

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(iii) the development of automation, particularly in information technology, in the

production and distribution of public services; and

(iv) the development of a more international agenda, increasingly focused on general

issues of public management, policy design, decision styles and intergovernmental

cooperation, on top of the older tradition of individual country specialisms in public

administration.” (Hood [1991], p. 3.)

During the realization of the aforementioned objectives by Hood, the countries of the

centre applied various management techniques, which are summarized by (Schedler – Proeller

[2002], p. 165.) in the following table.

Table 1.

Generic element categories of NPM

Category Characteristics / objectives Examples Organizational restructuring Delegation of responsibility

Reduction of hierarchy Political and managerial roles

City managers Holding structure

Management instruments Output orientation Entrepreneurship Efficiency

Performance agreements Products Performance-related pay

Budgetary reforms Closer to private sector financial instruments

Cost accounting Balance sheet Profit and loss statements

Participation Involvement of the citizen Neighbourhood councils E-democracy

Customer orientation Quality management

Gain legitimacy in service delivery Re-engineering

One-stop shop Service level agreements E-government

Marketization Privatization

Reduction of public sector Efficiency gains through competition

Contracting out Public – private partnerships

Source: Based on Schedler – Proeller ([2002], p. 165.)9

9 As we can see the formulations of (Hood [1991]) and (Schedler – Proeller [2002]) do not entirely match. This is no accident, since both in practice and in theory there had been significant changes taking place during the 11 years that set apart the births of the two pieces. However, the early works of Hood up until today have been the starting-points of the works dealing with the NPM. (Hood [1991]), (Dunleavy - Hood [1994]), (Hood [1995]).

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The “classic” version of the NPM has been introduced primarily in the Anglo-Saxon

countries: United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, United States of America and Canada.

(Pollitt – Bouckaert [2000]) In continental Europe it was the Netherlands that applied first and

most penetratingly the NPM instruments.10 (Hemerijck - Huiskamp - de Boer [2002]), (Pollitt

– van Thiel – Homburg [2007])

The Scandinavian countries were also open to the application of the NPM instruments;

however, they did not aim to simply copy the instruments that had been successfully

implemented in the Anglo-Saxon countries, rather they employed these management

techniques tailored to their own institutional environments. (Green-Pedersen [2002]), (Lotz

[2006]), (Goldfinch – Wallis [2009]) The objectives were fundamentally the same: they

wished to create a more effective and more efficient public administration, but for this they

significantly altered the previous toolkit of the NPM, they instituted something else and doing

it differently than the Anglo-Saxon countries. The emphasis has shifted from the reduction of

the role of the state to the encouragement of citizen participation, to the inclusion of the

citizens into the decisions pertaining to public affairs and into their executions. The other

Western European counties – France (Cole – Jones [2005]), (Wollmann [2008]) Germany

(Reichard [2003]), (Wollmann [2000]), Italy (Ongaro [2009]), Spain (Barzelay – Gallego

[2010]), (Ongaro [2009]) – have also adapted the NPM toolkit with more or less success,

which means that they have tailored the Anglo-Saxon institutional innovations to their own

informal and formal institutional environments.11

10 Three chapters of the book of (Pollitt – van Thiel – Homburg [2007]) also analyze the differences between the British and the Dutch reforms: (van Thiel – Pollitt [2007], pp. 52-70.) introduces the differences in the governance of the executive agencies, (Klijn – Edelenbos – Hughes [2007], pp. 71-89.) compare the PPP co-operations, while (Pollitt [2007], pp. 149-164.) examines the differences in the performance indicator systems employed by hospitals. 11 The reforms significantly differed in their depth and width (Bouckaert et al. [2009]). Certain countries, for instance Austria and Denmark, had employed the NPM instruments moderately and only in certain fields. On Denmark for instance see the paper of (Greve [2006]), which introduces the realized NPM reforms in the Danish central public administration, or see the working paper of (Blom-Hansen – Christiansen – Fimreite – Selle [2009]), in which the authors analyze the reform experience of the regional public administration in Denmark and Norway. On Austria, see: the writing of (Promberger – Rauskala – Cecon [2004]) and (Hammarschmid – Meyer [2005]). In the particular countries the reforms took place on various levels of public administration and they affected various fields, so while in France the reforms were carried out on the levels of the central public administration, in Germany the reforms effected mainly the local governments. (Hoffmann-Martinot – Wollmann [2006]).

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The model

The subject of the current study can be only studied through an interdisciplinary

approach. I rely on the findings of economics, especially on the findings of the new

institutional school (North [1990])12, (Williamson [1998]) on the findings of sociology,

primarily on the findings of economic sociology (Granovetter [1990]) and (Nee [2003]), and

the findings on cultural analyses (Hofstede [2008]).

I share (Kornai [1999]) point of view, according to which social processes cannot be

understood by static models, only a historical review can provide adequate information for

understanding the process. The model described in this current study is still static, because of

methodological reasons. However, with improvements it can be made dynamic. During the

development of the model, I set out from (Williamson [1998]) and (Williamson [2000])

works, which position the changes of the specific institutional levels in time, stating that the

informal institutions in the long run (102 and 103 years), the formal institutions in the medium-

term (10 and 102 years) are unchanged, while changes to the factors linked to the government

is possible even in the short run (1 and 10 years).13

12 Other works by Douglass North that are considered as the foundations of the new institutional economics: (North [1984]), (North [1991]). 13 However, for the collection of the data for the model I did not consider the various Williamsonian time frames. The reason is that for a model based on Williamson’s approach it would have been enough to collect data for the informal and formal institutions at a single point of time, for the year of 1980. Still, I did not do that, because the proxy variables linked the informal and formal institutions in my opinion do not have those characteristics that the informal and formal institutions, they change even in the short run.

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Figure 1.

The Economics of Institutions

Source: (Williamson [2000], p. 597.)

Level Frequency Purpose

Embeddedness:

informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms

religion

L1

L2

L3

L4

Institutional environment:

formal rules of the game – esp. property (polity,

judiciary, bureaucracy)

Governance:

play of the game – esp. Contract (aligning

governance structures with transactions)

Resource allocation and employment (prices and

quantities; incentive alignment)

102 to 103

10 to 102

1 to 10

continuous

Often noncalculative; spontaneous […]

Get the institutional environment right.

1st order economizing

Get the governance structures right.

2nd order economizing

Get the marginal conditions right.

3rd order economizing

L3: transaction cost economics

L 4: neoclassical economics / agency theory

L 1: social theory

L 2: economics of property rights / positive

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The first level in Figure 1. contains those factors, which – according to our hypothesis

– fundamentally influence the successful introduction of the NPM reforms. These factors are

often simply considered by the new institutional economists as givens. According to

(Williamson [1998]) those rules belong to here, which might even be unconsciously followed

by the members of the society. (North [1991], p. 97.) has called this block as informal

institutions, and he has included in this category social norms, traditions and customs. In this

block of our model we also employ the concept of culture in terms of Hofstede’s

understanding, since as (Hofstede [2008], p. 35.) writes:

“The culture practically consists of the unwritten rules of the social game.”

According to (North [1991]) the informal institutions have a decisive influence on the

economic process, the explanation of which is primarily attributed to (Granovetter [1990]),

who has contributed to the understanding of the influence of the informal institutions with the

introduction of the concept of embeddedness.14

The second level contains those formal rules that have been termed as formal

institutions by (North [1984]): the system of property rights, the constitution and laws. These

are the formal rules of the game, which gain form and become significant in the social sphere

created by the informal institutions. (North [1984], p. 8.) characterizes the relationship

between the informal and the formal institutions as the following:

„We may say that institutions consist of a set of constraints on behavior in the form of

rules and regulations; a set of procedures to detect deviations from the rules and

regulations; and, finally, a set of moral, ethical behavioral norms which define the

contours and that constrain the way in which the rules and regulations are specified

and enforcement is carried out.”(North [1984], p. 8.)

The regulating power of the formal institutions can differ from culture to culture; in

certain societies it is stronger, while in others it is weaker. The contribution of the formal

institutions to regulate the social processes (as formal rules of the game) depends

14 The new institutional school has been dealing with the concept of institutions in details, see: (North [1990]), (Williamson [2000]), (Hodgson [2006]), (Aoki [2005]).

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fundamentally on the informal institutions. There are numerous questions left open in regards

to these relationships and mechanisms, in any case based on research findings it is

unequivocal that these processes are historically determined.15 (Greif – Tabellini [2010]),

(Greif [2006]) The changing of the formal rules of the game is also a slow process, which –

according to (Williamson [1998]) – take place primarily as a result of external factors: civil

wars, economic crises, foreign occupation, collapse of political systems.

For the third and the forth factors, namely for the change of governance and resource

allocation, we can bring up examples even from our own lives. These levels apply to the

current functioning of the system inside the framework marked out by the informal and

formal institutional levels. While the first two levels regulate the content of the actors’

actions, means that the emphasis is on the question what, on these levels the emphasis is on

the question of how. The answer given to the question of how significantly influences the

efficiency of the system, since the regulation of the coordination mechanisms, the

determination of the ratio of the market and bureaucratic coordination take place on these

levels. However, this regulation can neither go against social norms and values in the long

run, nor formal institutional regulations. While the third level refers to governance activity,

the fourth level calls attention to the neoclassical microeconomic foundations of market

coordination. At this level, (Williamson [1998]) determines the criteria for the establishment

of the market equilibrium, which refers to the coordination of prices and quantities. I consider

it important to note that it could appear to the superficial observer that certain government

interventions or some charismatic leader can change the culture of the society in the short run.

In relation to this, it worth to quote the ideas of (Hofstede [2008], pp. 38-43.), according to

whom culture is like an onion. At its core we can find those social values, which are

immensely tenacious, so they barely change over time and at a given time can be considered

as unchangeable. The outer layers of the onion consisting of rituals, heroes, symbols –

collectively termed “practices” by Hofstede – are changes more easily and more often through

time. Even though many politicians claim that they are capable of changing them, even the

practices that provide the outer layer of the cultural values cannot be easily changed during

one political cycle. However, it is a fact that temporarily as a result of a current decision,

certain symbols can increase in strength, their use can become more frequent, but this does

not mean the culture and the values of society are altered.

15 About the difference between the informal and the formal institutions, see: (Redmond [2005])

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When combining the cultural concept of (Hofstede [2008]) with (Williamson [1998])

institutional economics, we need to keep in mind that “embeddedness” is considered by

Williamson as the first level, while it means the most inner core of Hofstede’s cultural onion,

namely the values. (Hofstede [2008], p. 43.) make a distinction between the various levels of

culture: national level; regional, ethnic, religious, lingual affiliation level; gender level;

generation level; social class level; and in the case of employees the organizational level.

Hofstede assigns the national, the gender and the cultural levels to the first level of

Williamson’s model.

The uniqueness of the NPM reforms stems from that changes generated by them

designate cultural changes. The undeclared aim of the NPM movement is the attitude change

in the public sphere, namely the alteration of the organizational culture of the public sector.16

However, the organizational structure can be changed even in the short run, and this is not

only stated by Hofstede, but by experts of change management and proven by successful

practical examples. It follows that the organizational culture is not located in the first level of

the Williamson’s model, more like it is connected on the third level.17

The described model, based on which I wish to examine the possibility of a successful

introduction of the NPM reforms, is quite simple, static, all together it contains two

explanatory and one result blocks. Because of simplification, I do not indicate separately the

interaction between the various blocks in Figure 2., since the main direction of causality

according to my hypothesis is unequivocally goes from block 1. through 2 to the explanatory

variable. All this, however, does not mean that during the statistical analysis we would not

shed light on the interactions; it only means that during the depiction of the model I consider

it sufficient to highlight the main cause and effect relationships.18

16 (Shein [1983], 1-2. old) define organizational culture as: “the pattern of basic assumptions which a given group has invented, discovered or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” 17 Here, I would like to refer to (Luhmann [2006]) social system theory, according to which a social system is predominantly defined by its environment. This current study examines exactly that whether the bureaucratic public administration – which we can consider as one independent system – can be changed successfully by the influence of an external reform, if the reform does not fit into the environment of the system, which I define here as the shell surrounding the system. (Luhmann [2006], p. 38.] in fact has a more radical assertion: “…a system is the difference between system and environment”. 18 When constructing the model, I was inspired by (Kornai [1993], pp. 380-388.) explanatory theory of the workings of socialism and by the model linked to that.

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Fig

ure

2.

The

cau

sali

ty b

etw

een

the

dete

rmin

ing

fact

ors

of th

e su

cces

sful

intr

oduc

tion

of

the

NP

M

The

aut

hor’

s ow

n di

agra

m

Inform

al institutions

Info

rmal

rul

es o

f th

e ga

me

(nor

ms,

trad

ition

s, h

abit

s)

(Nor

th [

1990

]) a

nd (

Wil

liam

son

[199

8])

Em

bedd

edne

ss

(Gra

nove

tter

[19

90])

, (W

illia

mso

n [1

998]

) an

d (N

ee [

2003

])

Nat

iona

l val

ues

in th

e H

ofst

edei

an s

ense

(H

ofst

ede

[200

8])

Form

al Institutions

For

mal

rul

es o

f th

e ga

me

(con

stit

utio

n, la

ws)

, (N

orth

[19

90])

and

(W

illia

mso

n [1

998]

)

The probability of

the successful

introduction of the

NPM technique

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In the course of the analysis I have processed data from 31 countries in order to be

able to draw relevant conclusions. Besides 27 European countries I have included Australia,

Canada, New Zealand and the United State of America. I have complemented the database of

the European countries with the Anglo-Saxon countries, because the NPM reform movement

had developed the earliest and it transformed the public sphere at the most depth and width in

these countries. After reviewing the literature, we can conclude that so far nearly 60 countries

have attempted to introduce the NPM reforms, with significantly differing results.19 All this is

important, because if the model fulfills our hopes, then the database can be further extended,

and by doing so, the reliability of the regression analysis can be further strengthened.

The datasets of the model for the each country come from different time frames, since

the various countries joined the NPM reforms waves at different times. I have set three time

periods for the countries under examination. In the case of the first wave, the beginning of the

NPM reforms is dated back to about the early 1980s. During this period mostly the Anglo-

Saxon countries were the forerunners of the NPM movement, it were the USA, Australia, the

United Kingdom and New Zealand together with the only continental European country of the

Netherlands, who had introduced the reforms. In the case of these countries, I have filled the

model with data from the 1980s and I labeled them as innovators, since it is unequivocal that

the instruments and the underlying approach of the NPM movement had been worked out and

lifted into the public discourse by the experts and politicians of these countries. The next

group – in which the developed Western European countries belong to –, had adopted the

NPM reforms during the 1990s. These countries were labeled as adaptors, since they have not

only schematically instituted the Anglo-Saxon versions of the NPM reforms, but they have

tailored them to their own institutional environment.20 In the case of the adaptor countries I

used data from the 1990s. Finally I analyzed the Central-Eastern- European countries, which I

labeled as imitators.21 They had mostly got to the level of development necessary for the

19 After reviewing the literature, I have found studies about the NPM reforms of the following countries: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Uganda, United Kingdom, USA, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 20 I have included the following countries into the group of adaptors: Finland, Sweden, France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Switzerland, Spain. 21 I have included the following countries into the group of imitators: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Croatia.

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implementation of the NPM methodology during the beginning of the new millennium. In

order to catch up the Central-Eastern-European countries are forced to implement the reforms

in a rush, primarily because the public is dissatisfied with pace of development, and also

because the European Union is also expecting imitation instead of adaptation from them. In

the case of the imitators I have worked with the data for year 2000. The logic behind the

various time periods is that the cause must precede the effect. It follows that for instance in

the case of the reform introduced in 1984, we cannot work with the data of the World Value

Survey from 2000; we can only use data from before 1984.

In summary, in the briefly introduced model I searched for an answer to the question

of: what reform should a given country undertake, if we consider its institutional environment

and its historical traditions, or in other words, if we know the country’s characteristic informal

institutions (Block 1.) and the formal institutions (Block 2.).

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21

Pro

xy-v

aria

bles

Info

rmal

inst

itut

ions

The name of the

proxy-variable

Source

Period

Question

A16

5.-

Mos

t pe

ople

can

be

trus

ted

Gen

eral

ly s

peak

ing,

wou

ld y

ou s

ay th

at m

ost p

eopl

e ca

n be

trus

ted

or th

at y

ou

can'

t be

too

care

ful i

n de

alin

g w

ith

peop

le?

E08

5.-

Con

fide

nce:

Ju

stic

e S

yste

m

Ple

ase

look

at t

his

card

and

tell

me,

for

eac

h it

em li

sted

, how

muc

h co

nfid

ence

yo

u ha

ve in

them

, is

it a

gre

at d

eal,

quit

e a

lot,

not v

ery

muc

h or

non

e at

all

?

E07

6.-

Con

fide

nce:

T

he C

ivil

Ser

vice

s P

leas

e lo

ok a

t thi

s ca

rd a

nd te

ll m

e, f

or e

ach

item

list

ed, h

ow m

uch

conf

iden

ce

you

have

in th

em, i

s it

a g

reat

dea

l, qu

ite

a lo

t, no

t ver

y m

uch

or n

one

at a

ll?

Trust

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

E07

5.-

Con

fide

nce:

P

arli

amen

t P

leas

e lo

ok a

t thi

s ca

rd a

nd te

ll m

e, f

or e

ach

item

list

ed, h

ow m

uch

conf

iden

ce

you

have

in th

em, i

s it

a g

reat

dea

l, qu

ite

a lo

t, no

t ver

y m

uch

or n

one

at a

ll

A00

8.-

Fee

ling

of

happ

ines

s T

akin

g al

l thi

ngs

toge

ther

, wou

ld y

ou s

ay y

ou a

re…

A17

0.-

Sat

isfa

ctio

n w

ith

your

life

A

ll th

ings

con

side

red,

how

sat

isfi

ed a

re y

ou w

ith

your

life

as

a w

hole

thes

e da

ys?

Optimistic /

Pessimistic -

Happy / Sad

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

C00

6.-

Sat

isfa

ctio

n w

ith

fina

ncia

l si

tuat

ion

of

hous

ehol

d

How

sat

isfi

ed a

re y

ou w

ith

the

fina

ncia

l sit

uati

on o

f yo

ur h

ouse

hold

?

22

C03

3.-

Job

sati

sfac

tion

O

vera

ll, h

ow s

atis

fied

or

diss

atis

fied

are

you

wit

h yo

ur jo

b?

C05

9.-

Fai

rnes

s:

One

sec

reta

ry is

pa

id m

ore

Imag

ine

two

secr

etar

ies,

of

the

sam

e ag

e, d

oing

pra

ctic

ally

the

sam

e jo

b. O

ne

find

s ou

t tha

t the

oth

er e

arns

$50

a w

eek

mor

e th

an s

he d

oes.

The

bet

ter

paid

se

cret

ary,

how

ever

, is

quic

ker,

mor

e ef

fici

ent a

nd m

ore

reli

able

at h

er jo

b. I

n yo

ur o

pini

on, i

s it

fai

r or

not

fai

r th

at o

ne s

ecre

tary

is p

aid

mor

e th

an th

e ot

her?

Fairness

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

E

035.

- In

com

e eq

uali

ty

Now

I'd

like

you

to te

ll m

e yo

ur v

iew

s on

var

ious

issu

es. H

ow w

ould

you

pla

ce

your

vie

ws

on th

is s

cale

? 1

mea

ns y

ou a

gree

com

plet

ely

wit

h th

e st

atem

ent o

n th

e le

ft, 1

0 m

eans

you

agr

ee c

ompl

etel

y w

ith

the

stat

emen

t on

the

righ

t, or

you

ca

n ch

oose

any

num

ber

in b

etw

een.

A)

Inco

mes

sho

uld

be m

ade

mor

e eq

ual

The

re s

houl

d be

gre

ater

ince

ntiv

es f

or in

divi

dual

eff

ort.

A03

5.-

Impo

rtan

t ch

ild

qual

itie

s:

tole

ranc

e an

d re

spec

t for

oth

er

peop

le

Her

e is

a li

st o

f qu

alit

ies

whi

ch c

hild

ren

can

be e

ncou

rage

d to

lear

n at

hom

e.

Whi

ch, i

f an

y, d

o yo

u co

nsid

er to

be

espe

cial

ly im

port

ant?

Ple

ase

choo

se u

p to

fi

ve.

A12

5.-

Nei

ghbo

urs:

Peo

ple

of a

dif

fere

nt r

ace

On

this

list

are

var

ious

gro

ups

of p

eopl

e. C

ould

you

ple

ase

sort

out

any

that

yo

u w

ould

not

like

to h

ave

as n

eigh

bour

s?

A12

9.-

Nei

ghbo

urs:

Im

mig

rant

s/fo

reig

n w

orke

rs

On

this

list

are

var

ious

gro

ups

of p

eopl

e. C

ould

you

ple

ase

sort

out

any

that

yo

u w

ould

not

like

to h

ave

as n

eigh

bour

s?

Tolerance

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

F11

8.-

Just

ifia

ble:

Ple

ase

tell

me

for

each

of

the

foll

owin

g st

atem

ents

whe

ther

you

thin

k it

can

al

way

s be

just

ifie

d, n

ever

be

just

ifie

d, o

r so

met

hing

in b

etw

een,

usi

ng th

is

23

hom

osex

uali

ty

card

. Hom

osex

uali

ty.

F12

0.-

Just

ifia

ble:

ab

orti

on

Ple

ase

tell

me

for

each

of

the

foll

owin

g st

atem

ents

whe

ther

you

thin

k it

can

al

way

s be

just

ifie

d, n

ever

be

just

ifie

d, o

r so

met

hing

in b

etw

een,

usi

ng th

is

card

. Abo

rtio

n.

E00

3.-

Aim

s of

re

spon

dent

: fir

st

choi

ce

If y

ou h

ad to

cho

ose,

whi

ch o

ne o

f th

e th

ings

on

this

car

d w

ould

you

say

is

mos

t im

port

ant?

Mai

ntai

ning

ord

er in

the

nati

on; G

ivin

g pe

ople

mor

e to

say

in

impo

rtan

t;go

vern

men

t dec

isio

ns; F

ight

ing

risi

ng p

rice

s; P

rote

ctin

g fr

eedo

m o

f sp

eech

The role of the

state

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

E

037.

- G

over

nmen

t re

spon

sibi

lity

Now

I'd

like

you

to te

ll m

e yo

ur v

iew

s on

var

ious

issu

es. H

ow w

ould

you

pla

ce

your

vie

ws

on th

is s

cale

? 1

mea

ns y

ou a

gree

com

plet

ely

wit

h th

e st

atem

ent o

n th

e le

ft, 1

0 m

eans

you

agr

ee c

ompl

etel

y w

ith

the

stat

emen

t on

the

righ

t, or

you

ca

n ch

oose

any

num

ber

in b

etw

een.

Ind

ivid

uals

sho

uld

take

mor

e re

spon

sibi

lity

pro

vidi

ng f

or th

emse

lves

- T

he s

tate

sho

uld

take

mor

e re

spon

sibi

lity

to e

nsur

e th

at e

very

one

is p

rovi

ded

for.

E03

6.-

Pri

vate

vs

stat

e ow

ners

hip

of

busi

ness

Now

I'd

like

you

to te

ll m

e yo

ur v

iew

s on

var

ious

issu

es. H

ow w

ould

you

pla

ce

your

vie

ws

on th

is s

cale

? 1

mea

ns y

ou a

gree

com

plet

ely

wit

h th

e st

atem

ent o

n th

e le

ft, 1

0 m

eans

you

agr

ee c

ompl

etel

y w

ith

the

stat

emen

t on

the

righ

t, or

you

ca

n ch

oose

any

num

ber

in b

etw

een.

Pri

vate

ow

ners

hip

of b

usin

ess

and

indu

stry

sh

ould

be

incr

ease

d -

Gov

ernm

ent o

wne

rshi

p of

bus

ines

s an

d in

dust

ry s

houl

d be

incr

ease

d

Bureaucratic

coordination /

market

coordination

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

E03

9.-

Com

peti

tion

go

od o

r ha

rmfu

l

Now

I'd

like

you

to te

ll m

e yo

ur v

iew

s on

var

ious

issu

es. H

ow w

ould

you

pla

ce

your

vie

ws

on th

is s

cale

? 1

mea

ns y

ou a

gree

com

plet

ely

wit

h th

e st

atem

ent o

n th

e le

ft, 1

0 m

eans

you

agr

ee c

ompl

etel

y w

ith

the

stat

emen

t on

the

righ

t, or

you

ca

n ch

oose

any

num

ber

in b

etw

een.

Com

peti

tion

is g

ood.

It s

tim

ulat

es p

eopl

e to

wor

k ha

rd a

nd d

evel

op n

ew id

eas.

- C

ompe

titi

on is

har

mfu

l. It

bri

ngs

out t

he

wor

st in

peo

ple

24

C06

0.-

How

bu

sine

ss a

nd

indu

stry

sho

uld

be

man

aged

The

re is

a lo

t of

disc

ussi

on a

bout

how

bus

ines

s an

d in

dust

ry s

houl

d be

m

anag

ed. W

hich

of

thes

e fo

ur s

tate

men

ts c

omes

clo

sest

to y

our

opin

ion?

A02

9.-

Impo

rtan

t ch

ild

qual

itie

s:

inde

pend

ence

Her

e is

a li

st o

f qu

alit

ies

whi

ch c

hild

ren

can

be e

ncou

rage

d to

lear

n at

hom

e.

Whi

ch, i

f an

y, d

o yo

u co

nsid

er to

be

espe

cial

ly im

port

ant?

Ple

ase

choo

se u

p to

fi

ve.

A04

2.-

Impo

rtan

t ch

ild

qual

itie

s:

obed

ienc

e

Her

e is

a li

st o

f qu

alit

ies

whi

ch c

hild

ren

can

be e

ncou

rage

d to

lear

n at

hom

e.

Whi

ch, i

f an

y, d

o yo

u co

nsid

er to

be

espe

cial

ly im

port

ant?

Ple

ase

choo

se u

p to

fi

ve.

C06

1.-

Fol

low

ing

inst

ruct

ions

at w

ork

Peo

ple

have

dif

fere

nt id

eas

abou

t fol

low

ing

inst

ruct

ions

at w

ork.

Som

e sa

y th

at

one

shou

ld f

ollo

w in

stru

ctio

ns o

f on

e's

supe

rior

s ev

en w

hen

one

does

not

ful

ly

agre

e w

ith

them

. Oth

ers

say

that

one

sho

uld

foll

ow o

ne's

sup

erio

r's in

stru

ctio

ns

only

whe

n on

e is

con

vinc

ed th

at th

ey a

re r

ight

. Wit

h w

hich

of

thes

e tw

o op

inio

ns d

o yo

u ag

ree?

Obedience (Power

distance)

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

E01

8.-

Fut

ure

chan

ges:

Gre

ater

re

spec

t for

au

thor

ity

Her

e is

a li

st o

f va

riou

s ch

ange

s in

our

way

of

life

that

mig

ht t

ake

plac

e in

the

near

fut

ure.

Ple

ase

tell

me

for

each

one

, if

it w

ere

to h

appe

n w

heth

er y

ou th

ink

it w

ould

be

a go

od th

ing,

a b

ad th

ing,

or

don'

t you

min

d?

Taking

responsibility / not

taking

responsibility

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

A03

2.-

Impo

rtan

t ch

ild

qual

itie

s:

feel

ing

of

resp

onsi

bili

ty

Her

e is

a li

st o

f qu

alit

ies

whi

ch c

hild

ren

can

be e

ncou

rage

d to

lear

n at

hom

e.

Whi

ch, i

f an

y, d

o yo

u co

nsid

er to

be

espe

cial

ly im

port

ant?

Ple

ase

choo

se u

p to

fi

ve.

25

A17

3.-

How

muc

h fr

eedo

m o

f ch

oice

an

d co

ntro

l

Som

e pe

ople

fee

l the

y ha

ve c

ompl

etel

y fr

ee c

hoic

e an

d co

ntro

l ove

r th

eir

live

s,

and

othe

r pe

ople

fee

l tha

t wha

t the

y do

has

no

real

eff

ect o

n w

hat h

appe

ns to

th

em. P

leas

e us

e th

e sc

ale

to in

dica

te h

ow m

uch

free

dom

of

choi

ce a

nd c

ontr

ol

you

feel

you

hav

e ov

er th

e w

ay y

our

life

turn

s ou

t. External factors /

internal factors

determinate the

life

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

C

034.

- F

reed

om

deci

sion

taki

ng in

jo

b

How

fre

e ar

e yo

u to

mak

e de

cisi

ons

in y

our

job?

Ple

ase

use

this

car

d to

in

dica

te h

ow m

uch

deci

sion

-mak

ing

free

dom

you

fee

l you

hav

e.

E01

7.-

Fut

ure

chan

ges:

Mor

e em

phas

is o

n in

divi

dual

Individualistic /

Collectivistic

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

E

032.

- F

reed

om o

r eq

uali

ty

Whi

ch o

f th

ese

two

stat

emen

ts c

omes

clo

sest

to y

our

own

opin

ion?

A. I

fin

d th

at b

oth

free

dom

and

equ

alit

y ar

e im

port

ant.

But

if I

wer

e to

cho

ose

one

or th

e ot

her,

I w

ould

con

side

r pe

rson

al f

reed

om m

ore

impo

rtan

t, th

at is

, eve

ryon

e ca

n li

ve in

fre

edom

and

dev

elop

wit

hout

hin

dera

nce.

B. C

erta

inly

bot

h fr

eedo

m

and

equa

lity

are

impo

rtan

t. B

ut if

I w

ere

to c

hoos

e on

e or

the

othe

r, I

wou

ld

cons

ider

equ

alit

y m

ore

impo

rtan

t, th

at is

, tha

t nob

ody

is u

nder

priv

ileg

ed a

nd

that

soc

ial c

lass

dif

fere

nces

are

not

so

stro

ng.

C01

2.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: n

ot to

o m

uch

pres

sure

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

Risk taking / risk

avoidance

(Uncertainty

avoidance)

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

C

013.

- Im

port

ant

in a

job:

goo

d jo

b se

curi

ty

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

26

E04

5.-

Maj

or

chan

ges

in li

fe

Now

I w

ant t

o as

k yo

u so

me

ques

tion

s ab

out y

our

outl

ook

on li

fe. E

ach

card

I

show

you

has

two

cont

rast

ing

stat

emen

ts o

n it

. Usi

ng th

e sc

ale

list

ed, c

ould

yo

u te

ll m

e w

here

you

wou

ld p

lace

you

r ow

n vi

ew?

1 m

eans

you

agr

ee

com

plet

ely

wit

h th

e st

atem

ent o

n th

e le

ft, 1

0 m

eans

you

agr

ee c

ompl

etel

y w

ith

the

stat

emen

t on

the

righ

t, or

you

can

cho

ose

any

num

ber

in b

etw

een.

One

sh

ould

be

caut

ious

abo

ut m

akin

g m

ajor

cha

nges

in li

fe Y

ou w

ill n

ever

ach

ieve

m

uch

unle

ss y

ou a

ct b

oldl

y

E04

6.-

New

and

ol

d id

eas

Now

I w

ant t

o as

k yo

u so

me

ques

tion

s ab

out y

our

outl

ook

on li

fe. E

ach

card

I

show

you

has

two

cont

rast

ing

stat

emen

ts o

n it

. Usi

ng th

e sc

ale

list

ed, c

ould

yo

u te

ll m

e w

here

you

wou

ld p

lace

you

r ow

n vi

ew?

1 m

eans

you

agr

ee

com

plet

ely

wit

h th

e st

atem

ent o

n th

e le

ft, 1

0 m

eans

you

agr

ee c

ompl

etel

y w

ith

the

stat

emen

t on

the

righ

t, or

you

can

cho

ose

any

num

ber

in b

etw

een.

Ide

as

that

hav

e st

ood

the

test

of

tim

e ar

e ge

nera

lly

best

-N

ew id

eas

are

gene

rall

y be

tter

than

old

one

s

C01

2.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: n

ot to

o m

uch

pres

sure

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C01

3.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: g

ood

job

secu

rity

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C01

5.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: g

ood

hour

s

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

Working culture

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

C01

6.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: a

n op

port

unit

y to

use

in

itia

tive

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

27

C01

7.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: g

ener

ous

holi

days

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C01

8.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: th

at y

ou

can

achi

eve

som

ethi

ng

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C01

9.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: a

re

spon

sibl

e jo

b

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C02

0.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: a

job

that

is

inte

rest

ing

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C02

1.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: a

job

that

m

eets

one

´s

abil

itie

s

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C02

4.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: a

use

ful

job

for

soci

ety

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C02

5.-

Impo

rtan

t in

a jo

b: m

eeti

ng

peop

le

Her

e ar

e so

me

aspe

cts

of a

job

that

peo

ple

say

are

impo

rtan

t. P

leas

e lo

ok a

t th

em a

nd te

ll m

e w

hich

one

s yo

u pe

rson

ally

thin

k ar

e im

port

ant i

n a

job?

C06

1.-

Fol

low

ing

inst

ruct

ions

at w

ork

Peo

ple

have

dif

fere

nt id

eas

abou

t fol

low

ing

inst

ruct

ions

at w

ork.

Som

e sa

y th

at

one

shou

ld f

ollo

w in

stru

ctio

ns o

f on

e's

supe

rior

s ev

en w

hen

one

does

not

ful

ly

agre

e w

ith

them

. Oth

ers

say

that

one

sho

uld

foll

ow o

ne's

sup

erio

r's in

stru

ctio

ns

only

whe

n on

e is

con

vinc

ed th

at th

ey a

re r

ight

. Wit

h w

hich

of

thes

e tw

o

28

opin

ions

do

you

agre

e?

Political view (left

- right)

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

E03

3.-

Sel

f po

siti

onin

g in

po

liti

cal s

cale

In p

olit

ical

mat

ters

, peo

ple

talk

of

"the

left

" an

d "t

he r

ight

." H

ow w

ould

you

pl

ace

your

vie

ws

on th

is s

cale

, gen

eral

ly s

peak

ing?

D01

8.-

Chi

ld n

eeds

a

hom

e w

ith

fath

er

and

mot

her

If s

omeo

ne s

ays

a ch

ild

need

s a

hom

e w

ith

both

a f

athe

r an

d a

mot

her

to g

row

up

hap

pily

, wou

ld y

ou te

nd to

agr

ee o

r di

sagr

ee?

D01

9.-

A w

oman

ha

s to

hav

e ch

ildr

en to

be

fulf

ille

d

Do

you

thin

k th

at a

wom

an h

as to

hav

e ch

ildr

en in

ord

er to

be

fulf

ille

d or

is

this

not

nec

essa

ry?

D02

2.-

Mar

riag

e is

an

out

-dat

ed

inst

itut

ion

Do

you

agre

e or

dis

agre

e w

ith

the

foll

owin

g st

atem

ent?

Mar

riag

e is

an

out-

date

d in

stit

utio

n

Liberal /

Conservative

thinking

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

F12

6.-

Just

ifia

ble:

ta

king

sof

t dru

gs

Ple

ase

tell

me

for

each

of

the

foll

owin

g st

atem

ents

whe

ther

you

thin

k it

can

al

way

s be

just

ifie

d, n

ever

be

just

ifie

d, o

r so

met

hing

in b

etw

een,

usi

ng th

is

card

. Tak

ing

the

drug

mar

ijua

na o

r ha

shis

h.

Religion

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

F02

4.-

Bel

ong

to

reli

giou

s de

nom

inat

ion

Do

you

belo

ng to

a r

elig

ious

den

omin

atio

n?

29

1999

F

034.

- R

elig

ious

pe

rson

In

depe

nden

tly

of w

heth

er y

ou g

o to

chu

rch

or n

ot, w

ould

you

say

you

are

a

reli

giou

s pe

rson

?

F11

4.-

Just

ifia

ble:

cl

aim

ing

gove

rnm

ent

bene

fits

Ple

ase

tell

me

for

each

of

the

foll

owin

g st

atem

ents

whe

ther

you

thin

k it

can

al

way

s be

just

ifie

d, n

ever

be

just

ifie

d, o

r so

met

hing

in b

etw

een,

usi

ng th

is

card

. Cla

imin

g go

vern

men

t ben

efit

s w

hich

you

are

not

ent

itle

d to

F11

5.-

Just

ifia

ble:

av

oidi

ng a

far

e on

pu

blic

tran

spor

t

Ple

ase

tell

me

for

each

of

the

foll

owin

g st

atem

ents

whe

ther

you

thin

k it

can

al

way

s be

just

ifie

d, n

ever

be

just

ifie

d, o

r so

met

hing

in b

etw

een,

usi

ng th

is

card

. Avo

idin

g a

fare

on

publ

ic tr

ansp

ort.

F11

6.-

Just

ifia

ble:

ch

eati

ng o

n ta

xes

Ple

ase

tell

me

for

each

of

the

foll

owin

g st

atem

ents

whe

ther

you

thin

k it

can

al

way

s be

just

ifie

d, n

ever

be

just

ifie

d, o

r so

met

hing

in b

etw

een,

usi

ng th

is

card

. Che

atin

g on

tax

if y

ou h

ave

the

chan

ce.

Rule and norms

breaking

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

F11

7.-

Just

ifia

ble:

so

meo

ne a

ccep

ting

a

brib

e

Ple

ase

tell

me

for

each

of

the

foll

owin

g st

atem

ents

whe

ther

you

thin

k it

can

al

way

s be

just

ifie

d, n

ever

be

just

ifie

d, o

r so

met

hing

in b

etw

een,

usi

ng th

is

card

. Som

eone

acc

epti

ng a

bri

be in

the

cour

se o

f th

eir

duti

es.

Nationalism

s

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y / E

urop

ean

Val

ue S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

G00

6.-

How

pro

ud

of n

atio

nali

ty

How

pro

ud a

re y

ou to

be

…..?

State intervention

in the economy

Inte

rnat

iona

l Soc

ial

Sur

vey

Pro

gram

me

Rol

e of

Gov

ernm

ent

II. 1

990,

Rol

e of

G

over

nmen

t III

. C

uts

in g

over

nmen

t sp

endi

ng

Her

e ar

e so

me

thin

gs th

e go

vern

men

t mig

ht d

o fo

r th

e ec

onom

y. P

leas

e sh

ow

whi

ch a

ctio

ns y

ou a

re in

fav

our

of a

nd w

hich

you

are

aga

inst

. Cut

s in

30

gove

rnm

ent s

pend

ing

Fin

anci

ng p

roje

cts

to c

reat

e ne

w jo

bs

Her

e ar

e so

me

thin

gs th

e go

vern

men

t mig

ht d

o fo

r th

e ec

onom

y. P

leas

e sh

ow

whi

ch a

ctio

ns y

ou a

re in

fav

our

of a

nd w

hich

you

are

aga

inst

. Gov

ernm

ent

fina

ncin

g of

pro

ject

s to

cre

ate

new

jobs

Les

s go

vern

men

t re

gula

tion

of

busi

ness

Her

e ar

e so

me

thin

gs th

e go

vern

men

t mig

ht d

o fo

r th

e ec

onom

y. P

leas

e sh

ow

whi

ch a

ctio

ns y

ou a

re in

fav

our

of a

nd w

hich

you

are

aga

inst

. Les

s go

vern

men

t re

gula

tion

of

busi

ness

Sup

port

indu

stry

to

deve

lop

new

pr

oduc

ts

Her

e ar

e so

me

thin

gs th

e go

vern

men

t mig

ht d

o fo

r th

e ec

onom

y. P

leas

e sh

ow

whi

ch a

ctio

ns y

ou a

re in

fav

our

of a

nd w

hich

you

are

aga

inst

. Sup

port

for

in

dust

ry to

dev

elop

new

pro

duct

s an

d te

chno

logy

Sup

port

dec

lini

ng

indu

stri

es to

pro

tect

jo

bs

Her

e ar

e so

me

thin

gs th

e go

vern

men

t mig

ht d

o fo

r th

e ec

onom

y. P

leas

e sh

ow

whi

ch a

ctio

ns y

ou a

re in

fav

our

of a

nd w

hich

you

are

aga

inst

. Sup

port

for

de

clin

ing

indu

stri

es to

pro

tect

jobs

19

96, R

ole

of

Gov

ernm

ent I

V.

2006

Red

ucin

g th

e w

orki

ng w

eek

to

crea

te m

ore

jobs

Her

e ar

e so

me

thin

gs th

e go

vern

men

t mig

ht d

o fo

r th

e ec

onom

y. P

leas

e sh

ow

whi

ch a

ctio

ns y

ou a

re in

fav

our

of a

nd w

hich

you

are

aga

inst

. Red

ucin

g th

e w

orki

ng w

eek

to c

reat

e m

ore

jobs

Pro

vide

a jo

b fo

r ev

eryo

ne

Kee

p pr

ices

une

r co

ntro

l

State

responsibility

Inte

rnat

iona

l Soc

ial

Sur

vey

Pro

gram

me

Rol

e of

Gov

ernm

ent

II. 1

990,

Rol

e of

G

over

nmen

t III

. 19

96, R

ole

of

Gov

ernm

ent I

V.

2006

P

rovi

de h

ealt

h ca

re

for

the

sick

On

the

who

le, d

o yo

u th

ink

it s

houl

d or

sho

uld

not b

e th

e go

vern

men

t's

resp

onsi

bili

ty to

31

Pro

vide

dec

ent

stan

dard

of

livi

ng

for

the

old

Pro

vide

indu

stry

w

ith

the

help

it

need

s to

gro

w

Pro

vide

indu

stry

w

ith

the

help

it

need

s to

gro

w

Red

uce

inco

me

diff

eren

ces

betw

een

rich

and

po

or

Giv

e fi

nanc

ial h

elp

to u

nive

rsit

y st

uden

ts

Pro

vide

dec

ent

hous

ing

for

thos

e w

ho c

an’t

aff

ord

it

Power distance-

index

Individualism

index

Hof

sted

e da

teba

se

Cultures and Organizations 3rd edition 2010

http

://w

ww

.gee

rtho

fste

de.n

l/re

sear

ch--

vsm

/dim

ensi

on-d

ata-

mat

rix.

aspx

32

Masculinity index

Uncertainty

Avoidance index

Long-Term

Orientation index

Indulgence versus

Restraint

Language family

Eur

opea

n C

omm

issi

on

33

Pro

xy-v

aria

ble

For

mal

inst

itut

ions

The name of the proxy-

variable

Source

Period

Question

Belong to labour unions

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y /

Eur

opea

n V

alue

S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

A06

7.-

Bel

ong

to la

bour

uni

ons

Ple

ase

look

car

eful

ly a

t the

fol

low

ing

list

of

volu

ntar

y or

gani

sati

ons

and

acti

viti

es a

nd s

ay…

a)

whi

ch, i

f an

y, d

o yo

u be

long

to?

E02

5.-

Pol

itic

al a

ctio

n: s

igni

ng a

pe

titi

on

Now

I'd

like

you

to lo

ok a

t thi

s ca

rd. I

'm g

oing

to r

ead

out

som

e di

ffer

ent f

orm

s of

pol

itic

al a

ctio

n th

at p

eopl

e ca

n ta

ke,

and

I'd li

ke y

ou to

tell

me,

for

eac

h on

e, w

heth

er y

ou h

ave

actu

ally

don

e an

y of

thes

e th

ings

, whe

ther

you

mig

ht d

o it

or

wou

ld n

ever

, und

er a

ny c

ircu

mst

ance

s, d

o it

Political participation

Wor

ld V

alue

S

urve

y /

Eur

opea

n V

alue

S

urve

y

WV

S 1

981,

199

0,

1995

, 200

0

EW

S 1

981,

199

0,

1999

E02

6.-

Pol

itic

al a

ctio

n: jo

inin

g in

bo

ycot

ts

Now

I'd

like

you

to lo

ok a

t thi

s ca

rd. I

'm g

oing

to r

ead

out

som

e di

ffer

ent f

orm

s of

pol

itic

al a

ctio

n th

at p

eopl

e ca

n ta

ke,

and

I'd li

ke y

ou to

tell

me,

for

eac

h on

e, w

heth

er y

ou h

ave

actu

ally

don

e an

y of

thes

e th

ings

, whe

ther

you

mig

ht d

o it

or

wou

ld n

ever

, und

er a

ny c

ircu

mst

ance

s, d

o it

.

34

E02

7.-

Pol

itic

al a

ctio

n: a

tten

ding

la

wfu

l dem

onst

rati

ons

Now

I'd

like

you

to lo

ok a

t thi

s ca

rd. I

'm g

oing

to r

ead

out

som

e di

ffer

ent f

orm

s of

pol

itic

al a

ctio

n th

at p

eopl

e ca

n ta

ke,

and

I'd li

ke y

ou to

tell

me,

for

eac

h on

e, w

heth

er y

ou h

ave

actu

ally

don

e an

y of

thes

e th

ings

, whe

ther

you

mig

ht d

o it

or

wou

ld n

ever

, und

er a

ny c

ircu

mst

ance

s, d

o it

.

E02

8.-

Pol

itic

al a

ctio

n: jo

inin

g un

offi

cial

str

ikes

Now

I'd

like

you

to lo

ok a

t thi

s ca

rd. I

'm g

oing

to r

ead

out

som

e di

ffer

ent f

orm

s of

pol

itic

al a

ctio

n th

at p

eopl

e ca

n ta

ke,

and

I'd li

ke y

ou to

tell

me,

for

eac

h on

e, w

heth

er y

ou h

ave

actu

ally

don

e an

y of

thes

e th

ings

, whe

ther

you

mig

ht d

o it

or

wou

ld n

ever

, und

er a

ny c

ircu

mst

ance

s, d

o it

E02

9.-

Pol

itic

al a

ctio

n: o

ccup

ying

bu

ildi

ngs

or f

acto

ries

Now

I'd

like

you

to lo

ok a

t thi

s ca

rd. I

'm g

oing

to r

ead

out

som

e di

ffer

ent f

orm

s of

pol

itic

al a

ctio

n th

at p

eopl

e ca

n ta

ke,

and

I'd li

ke y

ou to

tell

me,

for

eac

h on

e, w

heth

er y

ou h

ave

actu

ally

don

e an

y of

thes

e th

ings

, whe

ther

you

mig

ht d

o it

or

wou

ld n

ever

, und

er a

ny c

ircu

mst

ance

s, d

o it

.

Size of Government

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

(Wor

ld B

ank,

W

orld

D

evel

opm

ent

Indi

cato

rs

(var

ious

issu

es);

1980

, 199

0 an

d 20

00.

Gen

eral

gov

ernm

ent c

onsu

mpt

ion

spen

ding

as

a pe

rcen

tage

of

tota

l co

nsum

ptio

n (I

MF

Int

erna

tion

al

Fin

anci

al S

tati

stic

s) Area 1-A

Data

Thi

s co

mpo

nent

is m

easu

red

as g

ener

al g

over

nmen

t co

nsum

ptio

n sp

endi

ng a

s a

perc

enta

ge o

f to

tal c

onsu

mpt

ion.

T

he r

atin

g fo

r th

is c

ompo

nent

is e

qual

to: (

Vm

ax −

Vi)

/ (V

max

− V

min

) m

ulti

plie

d by

10.

The

Vi i

s th

e co

untr

y’s

actu

al g

over

nmen

t con

sum

ptio

n as

a p

ropo

rtio

n of

tota

l co

nsum

ptio

n, w

hile

the

Vm

ax a

nd V

min

wer

e se

t at 4

0 an

d 6,

re

spec

tive

ly. T

he 1

990

data

wer

e us

ed to

der

ive

the

max

imum

an

d m

inim

um v

alue

s fo

r th

is c

ompo

nent

. Cou

ntri

es w

ith

a la

rger

pro

port

ion

of g

over

nmen

t exp

endi

ture

s re

ceiv

ed lo

wer

35

Inte

rnat

iona

l M

onet

ary

Fun

d,

Inte

rnat

iona

l F

inan

cial

S

tati

stic

s (v

ario

us

issu

es);

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

N

atio

nal

Acc

ount

s.)

rati

ngs.

In

cont

rast

, as

the

rati

o ap

proa

ches

the

max

imum

va

lue,

the

rati

o m

oves

tow

ard

zero

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

Inte

rnat

iona

l M

onet

ary

Fun

d,

Gov

ernm

ent

Fin

ance

Sta

tist

ics

Yea

rboo

k (v

ario

us y

ears

);

Wor

ld B

ank,

W

orld

D

evel

opm

ent

Indi

cato

rs

(var

ious

issu

es);

In

tern

atio

nal

Mon

etar

y F

und,

In

tern

atio

nal

1980

, 199

0 an

d 20

00.

Tra

nsfe

rs a

nd s

ubsi

dies

as

a pe

rcen

tage

of

GD

P (

IMF

In

tern

atio

nal F

inan

cial

Sta

tist

ics)

Area 1-B

Data

Thi

s co

mpo

nent

is m

easu

red

as g

ener

al g

over

nmen

t tra

nsfe

rs

and

subs

idie

s as

a s

hare

of

GD

P. T

he r

atin

g fo

r th

is c

ompo

nent

is

equ

al to

: (V

max

− V

i) /

(Vm

ax −

Vm

in)

mul

tipl

ied

by 1

0.

The

Vi i

s th

e co

untr

y’s

rati

o of

tran

sfer

s an

d su

bsid

ies

to G

DP

, w

hile

the

Vm

ax a

nd V

min

val

ues

are

set a

t 37.

2 an

d 0.

5,

resp

ecti

vely

. The

199

0 da

ta w

ere

used

to d

eriv

e th

e m

axim

um

and

min

imum

val

ues

for

this

com

pone

nt. T

he f

orm

ula

wil

l ge

nera

te lo

wer

rat

ings

for

cou

ntri

es w

ith

larg

er tr

ansf

er

sect

ors.

Whe

n th

e si

ze o

f a

coun

try’

s tr

ansf

er s

ecto

r ap

proa

ches

that

of

the

coun

try

wit

h th

e la

rges

t tra

nsfe

r se

ctor

du

ring

the

1990

ben

chm

ark

year

, the

rat

ing

of th

e co

untr

y w

ill

appr

oach

zer

o.

36

Nat

ions

Nat

iona

l A

ccou

nts

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

Inte

rnat

iona

l M

onet

ary

Fun

d,

Gov

ernm

ent

Fin

ance

Sta

tist

ics

Yea

rboo

k (v

ario

us is

sues

);

Wor

ld B

ank,

W

orld

D

evel

opm

ent

Indi

cato

rs

(var

ious

issu

es);

In

tern

atio

nal

Mon

etar

y F

und,

In

tern

atio

nal

Fin

ance

Sta

tist

ics

(var

ious

issu

es);

W

orld

Eco

nom

ic

For

um, G

loba

l C

ompe

titi

vene

ss

Rep

ort (

vari

ous

issu

es);

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

Nat

iona

l A

ccou

nts.

1980

, 199

0 an

d 20

00.

(Sw

itze

rlan

d fr

om th

e ye

ar 2

003;

Est

onia

fr

om th

e ye

ar 2

004;

C

zech

Rep

ubli

c fr

om

the

year

200

3.)

Gov

ernm

ent e

nter

pris

es a

nd

inve

stm

ent (

IMF

, Gov

ernm

ent

Fin

ance

Sta

tist

ics

Yea

rboo

k)

Area 1-C

Data

Dat

a on

the

num

ber,

com

posi

tion

, and

sha

re o

f ou

tput

sup

plie

d by

Sta

te-O

pera

ted

Ent

erpr

ises

(S

OE

s) a

nd g

over

nmen

t in

vest

men

t as

a sh

are

of to

tal i

nves

tmen

t wer

e us

ed to

co

nstr

uct t

he z

ero-

to-1

0 ra

ting

s. C

ount

ries

wit

h m

ore

gove

rnm

ent e

nter

pris

es a

nd g

over

nmen

t inv

estm

ent r

ecei

ved

low

er r

atin

gs. W

hen

ther

e w

ere

few

SO

Es

and

gove

rnm

ent

inve

stm

ent w

as g

ener

ally

less

than

15%

of

tota

l inv

estm

ent,

coun

trie

s w

ere

give

n a

rati

ng o

f 10

. Whe

n th

ere

wer

e fe

w

SO

Es

othe

r th

an th

ose

invo

lved

in in

dust

ries

whe

re e

cono

mie

s of

sca

le r

educ

e th

e ef

fect

iven

ess

of c

ompe

titi

on (

e.g.

, pow

er

gene

rati

on)

and

gove

rnm

ent i

nves

tmen

t was

bet

wee

n 15

% a

nd

20%

of

the

tota

l, co

untr

ies

rece

ived

a r

atin

g of

8. W

hen

ther

e w

ere,

aga

in, f

ew S

OE

s ot

her

than

thos

e in

volv

ed in

ene

rgy

and

othe

r su

ch in

dust

ries

and

gov

ernm

ent i

nves

tmen

t was

bet

wee

n 20

% a

nd 2

5% o

f th

e to

tal,

coun

trie

s w

ere

rate

d at

7. W

hen

SO

Es

wer

e pr

esen

t in

the

ener

gy, t

rans

port

atio

n, a

nd

com

mun

icat

ion

sect

ors

of th

e ec

onom

y an

d go

vern

men

t in

vest

men

t was

bet

wee

n 25

% a

nd 3

0% 0

of th

e to

tal,

coun

trie

s w

ere

assi

gned

a r

atin

g of

6. W

hen

a su

bsta

ntia

l num

ber

of

SO

Es

oper

ated

in m

any

sect

ors,

incl

udin

g m

anuf

actu

ring

, and

go

vern

men

t inv

estm

ent w

as g

ener

ally

bet

wee

n 30

% a

nd 4

0%

of th

e to

tal,

coun

trie

s re

ceiv

ed a

rat

ing

of 4

. Whe

n nu

mer

ous

SO

Es

oper

ated

in m

any

sect

ors,

incl

udin

g re

tail

sal

es, a

nd

gove

rnm

ent i

nves

tmen

t was

bet

wee

n 40

% a

nd 5

0% o

f th

e to

tal,

coun

trie

s w

ere

rate

d at

2. A

rat

ing

of z

ero

was

ass

igne

d w

hen

the

econ

omy

was

dom

inat

ed b

y S

OE

s an

d go

vern

men

t in

vest

men

t exc

eede

d 50

% o

f to

tal i

nves

tmen

t.

37

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

Wor

ld E

cono

mic

F

orum

, Global

Competitiven

ess

Rep

ort

1995

and

200

0.

(Lat

via,

Lit

huan

ia,

Est

onia

, Slo

veni

a,

Rom

ania

, Cro

atia

fr

om th

e ye

ar 2

001.

)

Judi

cial

inde

pend

ence

(G

loba

l C

ompe

titi

vene

ss R

epor

t) Area 2-

A

Thi

s co

mpo

nent

is f

rom

the Global Competitiven

ess Rep

ort

’s

surv

ey q

uest

ion:

“Is

the

judi

ciar

y in

you

r co

untr

y in

depe

nden

t fr

om p

olit

ical

infl

uenc

es o

f m

embe

rs o

f go

vern

men

t, ci

tize

ns,

or f

irm

s? N

o—he

avil

y in

flue

nced

(=

1)

or Y

es—

enti

rely

in

depe

nden

t (=

7).

” T

he q

uest

ion’

s w

ordi

ng h

as v

arie

d sl

ight

ly

over

the

year

s. A

ll v

aria

bles

fro

m th

e Global Competitve

ness

Rep

ort w

ere

conv

erte

d fr

om th

e or

igin

al 1

-to-

7 sc

ale

to a

0-t

o-10

sca

le u

sing

this

for

mul

a: EFW

i = (

(GCR

i − 1

) ⁄ 6

) ×

10.

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

Wor

ld E

cono

mic

F

orum

, Global

Competitiven

ess

Rep

ort (

vari

ous

issu

es

1995

and

200

0.

Impa

rtia

l cou

rts

(Glo

bal

Com

peti

tive

ness

Rep

ort)

Area 2-

B

Thi

s co

mpo

nent

is f

rom


ess Rep

ort

’s

surv

ey q

uest

ion:

“T

he le

gal f

ram

ewor

k in

you

r co

untr

y fo

r pr

ivat

e bu

sine

sses

to s

ettl

e di

sput

es a

nd c

hall

enge

the

lega

lity

of

gov

ernm

ent a

ctio

ns a

nd/o

r re

gula

tion

s is

inef

fici

ent a

nd

subj

ect t

o m

anip

ulat

ion

(= 1

) or

is e

ffic

ient

and

fol

low

s a

clea

r,

neut

ral p

roce

ss (

= 7

).”

The

que

stio

n’s

wor

ding

has

var

ied

slig

htly

ove

r th

e ye

ars.

v N

ote

The

“R

ule

of L

aw”

rati

ngs

from

th

e W

orld

Ban

k’s Gove

rnance

Indicators P

roje

ct h

ave

been

us

ed to

fil

l in

omit

ted

coun

trie

s in

the

prim

ary

data

sou

rce

sinc

e 19

95.

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

Wor

ld E

cono

mic

F

orum

, Global

Competitiven

ess

Rep

ort (

vari

ous

issu

es)

1995

and

200

0.

(Cro

atia

fro

m th

e ye

ar

2001

.)

Pro

tect

ion

of p

rope

rty

righ

ts

(Glo

bal C

ompe

titi

vene

ss R

epor

t)

Area 2-C

Thi

s co

mpo

nent

is f

rom


ess Rep

ort

’s

surv

ey q

uest

ion:

“P

rope

rty

righ

ts, i

nclu

ding

ove

r fi

nanc

ial

asse

ts a

re p

oorl

y de

fine

d an

d no

t pro

tect

ed b

y la

w (

= 1

) or

are

cl

earl

y de

fine

d an

d w

ell p

rote

cted

by

law

(=

7).

”

Rule of Law

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

1995

and

200

0.

Inte

grit

y of

the

lega

l sys

tem

(I

nter

nati

onal

Cou

ntry

Ris

k T

his

com

pone

nt is

bas

ed o

n th

e Intern

ational Country Risk

Guide’

s P

olit

ical

Ris

k C

ompo

nent

I f

or L

aw a

nd O

rder

: “T

wo

38

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

PR

S G

roup

, Intern

ational

Country Risk

Guide

(var

ious

is

sues

)

Gui

de) Area 2-E

m

easu

res

com

pris

ing

one

risk

com

pone

nt. E

ach

sub-

com

pone

nt e

qual

s ha

lf o

f th

e to

tal.

The

‘la

w’

sub-

com

pone

nt

asse

sses

the

stre

ngth

and

impa

rtia

lity

of

the

lega

l sys

tem

, and

th

e ‘o

rder

’ su

b-co

mpo

nent

ass

esse

s po

pula

r ob

serv

ance

of

the

law

.”

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

Wor

ld B

ank,

Doing Business

(var

ious

issu

es)

All

dat

a fr

om th

e ye

ar

2005

.

Leg

al e

nfor

cem

ent o

f co

ntra

cts

(Wor

ld B

ank’

s D

oing

Bus

ines

s)

Area 2-F

Thi

s co

mpo

nent

is b

ased

on

the

Wor

ld B

ank’

s Doing Business

esti

mat

es f

or th

e ti

me

and

mon

ey r

equi

red

to c

olle

ct a

cle

ar-c

ut

debt

. The

deb

t is

assu

med

to e

qual

200

% o

f th

e co

untr

y’s

per-

capi

ta in

com

e w

here

the

plai

ntif

f ha

s co

mpl

ied

wit

h th

e co

ntra

ct a

nd ju

dici

al ju

dgm

ent i

s re

nder

ed in

his

fav

or. Z

ero-

to-1

0 ra

ting

s w

ere

cons

truc

ted

for

(1)

the

tim

e co

st (

mea

sure

d in

num

ber

of c

alen

dar

days

req

uire

d fr

om th

e m

omen

t the

la

wsu

it is

fil

ed u

ntil

pay

men

t) a

nd (

2) th

e m

onet

ary

cost

of

the

case

(m

easu

red

as a

per

cent

age

of th

e de

bt).

The

se tw

o ra

ting

s w

ere

then

ave

rage

d to

arr

ive

at th

e fi

nal r

atin

g fo

r th

is s

ub-

com

pone

nt. T

he f

orm

ula

used

to c

alcu

late

the

zero

-to-

10

rati

ngs

was

: (V

max

− V

i) /

(Vm

ax −

Vm

in)

mul

tipl

ied

by 1

0.

Vi r

epre

sent

s th

e ti

me

or m

oney

cos

t val

ue. T

he v

alue

s fo

r V

max

and

Vm

in w

ere

set a

t 725

day

s an

d 82

.3%

(1.

5 st

anda

rd

devi

atio

ns a

bove

ave

rage

) an

d 62

day

s (1

.5 s

tand

ard

devi

atio

ns

belo

w a

vera

ge)

and

0%, r

espe

ctiv

ely.

Cou

ntri

es w

ith

valu

es

outs

ide

of th

e V

max

and

Vm

in r

ange

rec

eive

d ra

ting

s of

eit

her

zero

or

ten

acco

rdin

gly.

Regulation of Credit, Labor,

and Business

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

1990

and

200

0

Aus

tral

ia,

Net

herl

ands

, New

Z

eala

nd, U

nite

d

Hir

ing

and

firi

ng r

egul

atio

ns

(Glo

bal C

ompe

titi

vene

ss R

epor

t)

Area 5-B(ii)

Thi

s su

b-co

mpo

nent

is b

ased

on


ess

Rep

ort

’s q

uest

ion:

“T

he h

irin

g an

d fi

ring

of

wor

kers

is

impe

ded

by r

egul

atio

ns (

= 1

) or

fle

xibl

y de

term

ined

by

empl

oyer

s (=

7).

” T

he q

uest

ion’

s w

ordi

ng h

as v

arie

d sl

ight

ly

39

Wor

ld B

ank,

Doing Business

(var

ious

issu

es)

Kin

gdom

and

US

A a

re

from

199

0 ov

er th

e ye

ars.

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

Wor

ld B

ank,

Doing Business

(var

ious

issu

es)

1980

, 199

0 an

d 20

00

Cro

atia

is f

rom

200

1.

Cen

tral

ized

col

lect

ive

barg

aini

ng

(Glo

bal C

ompe

titi

vene

ss R

epor

t)

Area 5-B(iii)

Thi

s su

b-co

mpo

nent

is b

ased

on


ess

Rep

ort

’s q

uest

ion:

“W

ages

in y

our

coun

try

are

set b

y a

cent

rali

zed

barg

aini

ng p

roce

ss (

= 1

) or

up

to e

ach

indi

vidu

al

com

pany

(=

7).

” T

he q

uest

ion’

s w

ordi

ng h

as v

arie

d sl

ight

ly

over

the

year

s.

Eco

nom

ic

Fre

edom

of

the

Wor

ld –

Fra

ser

Inst

itut

e

Wor

ld B

ank,

Doing Business

(var

ious

issu

es)

1990

and

200

0

Aus

tral

ia,

Net

herl

ands

, New

Z

eala

nd, U

nite

d K

ingd

om a

nd U

SA

are

fr

om 1

990

Pri

ce c

ontr

ols

(Int

erna

tion

al

Inst

itut

e fo

r M

anag

emen

t D

evel

opm

ent’

s W

orld

C

ompe

titi

vene

ss Y

earb

ook)

Area

5-C

(i)

The

mor

e w

ides

prea

d th

e us

e of

pri

ce c

ontr

ols,

the

low

er th

e ra

ting

. The

sur

vey

data

of

the

Inte

rnat

iona

l Ins

titu

te f

or

Man

agem

ent D

evel

opm

ent’

s (I

MD

) World C

ompetitiven

ess

Yea

rbook

(var

ious

edi

tion

s) w

ere

used

to r

ate

the

46 c

ount

ries

(m

ostl

y de

velo

ped

econ

omie

s) c

over

ed b

y th

is r

epor

t. F

or

othe

r co

untr

ies,

oth

er s

ourc

es w

ere

used

to c

ateg

oriz

e co

untr

ies.

Cou

ntri

es w

ere

give

n a

rati

ng o

f 10

if n

o pr

ice

cont

rols

or

mar

keti

ng b

oard

s w

ere

pres

ent.

Whe

n pr

ice

cont

rols

wer

e li

mit

ed to

indu

stri

es w

here

eco

nom

ies

of s

cale

m

ay r

educ

e th

e ef

fect

iven

ess

of c

ompe

titi

on (

e.g.

, pow

er

gene

rati

on),

a c

ount

ry w

as g

iven

a r

atin

g of

8. W

hen

pric

e co

ntro

ls w

ere

appl

ied

in o

nly

a fe

w o

ther

indu

stri

es, s

uch

as

agri

cult

ure,

a c

ount

ry w

as g

iven

a r

atin

g of

6. W

hen

pric

e co

ntro

ls w

ere

levi

ed o

n en

ergy

, agr

icul

ture

, and

man

y ot

her

stap

le p

rodu

cts

that

are

wid

ely

purc

hase

d by

hou

se-h

olds

, a

rati

ng o

f 4

was

giv

en. W

hen

pric

e co

ntro

ls a

ppli

ed to

a

sign

ific

ant n

umbe

r of

pro

duct

s in

bot

h ag

ricu

ltur

e an

d m

anuf

actu

ring

, the

rat

ing

was

2. A

rat

ing

of z

ero

was

giv

en

whe

n th

ere

was

wid

espr

ead

use

of p

rice

con

trol

s th

roug

hout

40

vari

ous

sect

ors

of th

e ec

onom

y.

The name of the proxy-variable

Source

Coordination Index

Kne

ll, M

. - S

rhol

ec, M

. [20

05]:

Em

ergi

ng V

arie

ties

of

Cap

ital

ism

in C

entr

al a

nd E

aste

rn E

urop

e.

Wor

king

Pap

er. V

ersi

on o

f 19

Sep

tem

ber

2005

, Con

fere

nce

Pai

sley

Uni

vers

ity,

23-

24th

of

Sep

tem

ber,

200

5.

Legal system

Sie

ms,

M. M

. [20

06]:

Leg

al O

rigi

ns: R

econ

cili

ng L

aw &

Fin

ance

and

Com

para

tive

Law

. Cen

tre

for

Bus

ines

s R

esea

rch,

Uni

vers

ity

Of

Cam

brid

ge W

orki

ng P

aper

No.

32.

Uni

vers

ity

of C

ambr

idge

, T

rum

ping

ton

Str

eet,

Cam

brid

ge, C

B2

1AG

Mar

kus

Tep

e, K

arin

Got

tsch

all,

and

Ber

nhar

d K

itte

l [20

10]:

A s

truc

tura

l fit

bet

wee

n st

ates

and

m

arke

ts?

Pub

lic

adm

inis

trat

ion

regi

mes

and

mar

ket e

cono

my

mod

els

in th

e OECD. Socio-

Eco

nomic Rev

iew

Vol

. 8.,

No.

4.,

pp. 6

53-6

84

Min

orit

y go

vern

men

t (si

ngle

par

ty o

r co

alit

ion)

Coa

liti

on

Gre

at-c

oali

tion

Type of government

One

-par

ty in

maj

orit

y

Con

serv

ativ

e

Lib

eral

The political

ideology of the

government at the

beginning of the

given decade

Soc

ial d

emoc

rat

The political

Con

serv

ativ

e

http

://w

ww

.ele

ctio

ns.o

rg.n

z/el

ecti

ons/

syst

em-o

f-go

vern

men

t.htm

l

Eur

opea

n E

lect

ion

Dat

abas

e (h

ttp:

//w

ww

.nsd

.uib

.no/

euro

pean

_ele

ctio

n_da

taba

se/i

ndex

.htm

l)

Lij

phar

t, A

. [19

94]:

Dem

ocra

cies

: For

ms,

per

form

ance

, and

con

stit

utio

nal e

ngin

eeri

ng. E

urop

ean

Jour

nal o

f P

olit

ical

Res

earc

h, V

ol. 2

5., N

o. 1

., pp

. 1-1

7.

ww

w.ip

u.or

g

Fáb

ián,

Gy.

- K

ovác

s, L

. I. [

2004

]: P

arla

men

ti v

álas

ztás

ok a

z E

uróp

ai U

nió

orsz

ágai

ban

(194

5-20

02).

Osi

ris

Kia

dó, B

udap

est

Ber

g, C

. - C

arli

ne, P

. - K

aufm

ann,

B. -

Lei

nen,

J. -

Wal

lis,

D. (

eds.

) [2

008]

: The

Ini

tiat

ive

for

Eur

ope

Han

dboo

k 20

08. T

he G

uide

to tr

ansn

atio

nal d

emoc

racy

in E

urop

e. T

he I

niti

ativ

e &

R

efer

endu

m I

nsti

tute

Eur

ope,

Bru

xell

es

41

Lib

eral

ideology of the

government in the

given decade

(1980/90, 1990/2000,

2000/2010)

Soc

ial d

emoc

rat

Fir

st p

ast t

he p

ost

Tw

o-R

ound

Sys

tem

Lis

t Pro

port

iona

l Rep

rese

ntat

ion

Electoral system

Mix

ed M

embe

r P

ropo

rtio

nal S

yste

m

One

cha

mbe

r Type of parliament

Tw

o ch

ambe

r

Bot

h lo

cal a

nd n

atio

nal

Onl

y lo

cal

Onl

y na

tion

al

Possibilities to hold

a referendum

Not

pos

sibl

e at

any

leve

l

Participation in the election (%) (quality of dem

ocracy)

Percentage of women in Parliament

http

://e

lect

ionr

esou

rces

.org

/

Vat

ter,

A. [

2009

]: L

ijph

art e

xpan

ded:

thre

e di

men

sion

s of

dem

ocra

cy in

adv

ance

d O

EC

D

coun

trie

s? Euro

pea

n Politica

l Scien

ce Rev

iew

, Vol

. 1.,

No.

1.,

pp.1

25–1

54.

Documents

An introductory essay Miklós Rosta – … What makes a New Public Management reform successful? An institutional analysis 1 An introductory essay Miklós Rosta – [email protected]