An Experimental Approach to Assessing the Influence of ... Resources(Cools et al., 2011; Guilfoos et al., 2016; Kuwayama and Brozovi c, 2013). Research Motivation How do these modeling

An Experimental Approach to Assessing the Influence ofInformation on Conservation Impacts

A. Hrozencik J. Suter D. Manning C. Goemans

Department of Agricultral and Resource EconomicsColorado State University

CBEAR-MAAP, 2017

Hrozencik, Suter, Manning, Goemans (CSU)An Experimental Approach to Assessing the Influence of Information on Conservation ImpactsCBEAR-MAAP, 2017 1 / 28

Outline

1 Introduction

2 Literature

3 Study Area

4 Methodology

5 Results

6 Conclusion


Background

Recent research in environmental and natural resource economicsmodels the interaction between humans and natural systems toinform resource management policy making (Smith et al., 2009).

Forest Management (Yousefpour and Hanewinkel, 2009; Cools et al.,2011; Spies et al., 2014).Fisheries (Finnoff and Tschirhart, 2008; Dichmont et al., 2010; Salaet al., 2013).Water Resources (Cools et al., 2011; Guilfoos et al., 2016; Kuwayamaand Brozovic, 2013).

Research Motivation

How do these modeling efforts affect the attitudes of resource usersimpacted by conservation policies?

Importance of these attitudes when agri-environmental policy making occurslocally


Background


Forest Management (Yousefpour and Hanewinkel, 2009; Cools et al.,2011; Spies et al., 2014).

Fisheries (Finnoff and Tschirhart, 2008; Dichmont et al., 2010; Salaet al., 2013).Water Resources (Cools et al., 2011; Guilfoos et al., 2016; Kuwayamaand Brozovic, 2013).

Research Motivation




Background


Forest Management (Yousefpour and Hanewinkel, 2009; Cools et al.,2011; Spies et al., 2014).Fisheries (Finnoff and Tschirhart, 2008; Dichmont et al., 2010; Salaet al., 2013).

Water Resources (Cools et al., 2011; Guilfoos et al., 2016; Kuwayamaand Brozovic, 2013).

Research Motivation




Background



Research Motivation




Background



Research Motivation




Background



Research Motivation




Research Question

Primary

How does information on conservation impacts influence resource users’support for specific policies?

Secondary

How does heterogeneity in resource availability and demand interact withthe effect of information?


Research Question

Primary

How does information on conservation impacts influence resource users’support for specific policies?

Secondary

How does heterogeneity in resource availability and demand interact withthe effect of information?


Literature

Impacts of agricultural research

Zilberman and Heiman (1997), Alston et al. (2009)

RCTs to evaluate extension services

Cole and Fernando (2013), Vasilaky (2012)


Literature

Impacts of agricultural research

Zilberman and Heiman (1997), Alston et al. (2009)

RCTs to evaluate extension services

Cole and Fernando (2013), Vasilaky (2012)


Study Area

Colorado

Nebraska

Kansas

0 175 35087.5 Miles

²

Republican River Basin

Study Area

OklahomaNew Mexico

Texas

South Dakota

Wyoming 109 deg. 2' 28.538'' W40 deg. 57' 5.657'' N

94 deg. 35' 57.042'' W37 deg. 1' 41.179'' N


Study AreaImportance of groundwater

Republican River Basin ofColorado

Covers area of over 7 thousandsquare miles

Over 3,000 active irrigation wellswhich account for over 92% ofall groundwater extraction(Robson and Banta, 1995)

Only 57 surface water rights inthe Basin which supply less than4% of all irrigation water(Maupin et al., 2014)

²0 10 205 Miles

Colorado

LegendActive Irrigation WellGWMD BoundariesHigh Plains Aquifer Boundary

Nebraska

Kansas


Study AreaAquifer characteristics

Well capacity

Physical constraint on thevolume of water a well canpump in a given unit of time(Lamm et al., 2007)

Recent research indicates wellcapacity’s importance inproducer decision making(Foster et al., 2014)

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²0 10 205 Miles

LegendWell Capacity (gal./min.)

! 0 - 400 # 400 - 800 X > 800


Study AreaAquifer characterisitics

²0 10 205 Miles

LegendGWMD Boundaries

2009 Saturated ThicknessHigh : 300 ft. Low : 0 ft

²0 10 205 Miles


Change in Saturated Thickness High : 0 ft. Low : -40 ft.


Study AreaGroundwater management

Republican River Basin ofColorado

Water resources managed by 7local Groundwater ManagementDistricts (GWMDs)

No conservation policiescurrently implemented in theBasin

Some regions of the Basinpredicted to exhaustgroundwater resources by 2050(Haacker et al., 2016)

²0 10 205 Miles

Colorado

LegendGWMD BoundariesHigh Plains Aquifer Boundary

Nebraska

KansasArikaree

Plains

Central Yuma

W-Y SandHills

FrenchmanMarks Butte


MethodologyOutline

Quantify conservation policy impacts with hydroeconomic model ofthe Republican River Basin

Employ randomized control trial that varies amount of policy impactinformation provided to groundwater users

Utilize survey instrument to measure support for specific conservationpolicies


MethodologyOutline





MethodologyOutline





Groundwater Management Policies

Irrigated acreage fee ($/acre)

Pumping fee ($/acre-foot)

Quantity restriction (acre-feet/well)

Policy Levels

We quantify economic and aquifer impacts for each type of policy atlevels that create a 10% and 25% reduction in Basin-widegroundwater extraction

Fee Redistribution

The hydroeconomic model assumes that revenue from fee basedpolicies is redistributed via lump sum transfers at the GWMD level






Policy Levels


Fee Redistribution







Policy Levels


Fee Redistribution







Policy Levels


Fee Redistribution







Policy Levels


Fee Redistribution



Quantifying Policy Impacts

Hydroeconomic model (Hrozenciket al., 2016)

Represents heterogeneity ingroundwater demand by derivingspatially-explicit water-yieldproduction functions

Dynamically links producerdecision-making and aquiferconditions through time

Predicts variation in policyimpacts across groundwaterusers

Basic Model Components

Agronomic Model

(Aquacrop)

Economic Model

Hydrologic Model

(MODFLOW)


Information RCT

Following the Dillman (2000) method, a pre-survey mailer explainingthe groundwater management policies under consideration andintroducing the survey was sent out a week prior to the initial surveymailing.

The pre-survey mailer served as the platform for the information RCTas well as a brief description of the modeling process.

Control groupTreatment 1: Basin informationTreatment 2: Basin and GWMD-specific information

Orthogonality test reveals balance of physical characteristics acrosstreatment arms.


Information RCT






Information RCT



Control group

Treatment 1: Basin informationTreatment 2: Basin and GWMD-specific information



Information RCT



Control groupTreatment 1: Basin information

Treatment 2: Basin and GWMD-specific information



Information RCT






Information RCT






Information TreatmentsTreatment 1

Basin-wide policy impacts

Change relative to baseline in:Policy Type Policy Level Year 1 Year 50

Water use Profits Profits Sat. thickness(%) (%) (%) (feet)

Irrigated acreage fee $270/acre -10% -9.72% -14.76% 5.31


Pumping fee $72/acre-foot -10% -2.93% -2.53% 4.36


Quantity restriction 240 acre-feet -10% -4.22% -2.41% 4.42



Information TreatmentsTreatment 1

Basin-wide policy impacts


Water use Profits Profits Sat. thickness(%) (%) (%) (feet)








²0 10 205 Miles

Colorado

LegendGWMD BoundariesHigh Plains Aquifer Boundary

Nebraska

KansasArikaree

Plains

Central Yuma

W-Y SandHills

FrenchmanMarks Butte

²0 10 205 Miles


2009 Saturated ThicknessHigh : 300 ft. Low : 0 ft


Information Treatment

Sand Hills GWMD policy impacts


Basin GWMD GWMD GWMD GWMDWater use Water Use Profits Profits Sat. thickness

(%) (%) (%) (%) (feet)

Irrigated acreage fee $270/acre -10% -0.29 % -1.70 % -2.27% 0.54


Pumping fee $72/acre-foot -10% -7.22 % -1.53 % -2.53% 4.56

Pumping fee $168/acre-foot -25% -14.76% -5.88 % -1.70% 8.76

Quantity restriction 240 acre-feet -10% -13.97 % -5.91% -1.32% 7.55



Information Treatment

Sand Hills GWMD policy impacts



(%) (%) (%) (%) (feet)



Pumping fee $72/acre-foot -10% -7.22 % -1.53 % -2.53% 4.56

Pumping fee $168/acre-foot -25% -14.76% -5.88 % -1.70% 8.76




Information Treatments

Plains GWMD policy impacts



(%) (%) (%) (%) (feet)

Irrigated acreage fee $270/acre -10% -47.87% -32.40% -39.41% 17.83


Pumping fee $72/acre-foot -10% -12.59% -5.08 % -9.54 % 4.21

Pumping fee $168/acre-foot -25% -44.09% -23.43% -25.17% 14.98

Quantity restriction 240 acre-feet -10% -0.66 % -3.30 % -5.98 % 0.07



Information Treatments

Plains GWMD policy impacts



(%) (%) (%) (%) (feet)



Pumping fee $72/acre-foot -10% -12.59% -5.08 % -9.54 % 4.21

Pumping fee $168/acre-foot -25% -44.09% -23.43% -25.17% 14.98




Survey Instrument

The survey instrument was distributed in two mass mailings to allirrigated agricultural producers and land owners in the RepublicanRiver Basin (N = 1, 045).

The survey collected information of groundwater stakeholders supportfor specific groundwater conservation policies.

A total of 285 surveys were returned for a response rate of 27.3%.

Respondents supporting at least one conservation policyBasin 40.43%Northern GWMDs 34.36%Southern GWMDs 48.70%


Survey Instrument






Survey Instrument






Survey Instrument






ResultsEmpirical specification

Survey response model

Pr (Response = 1)i = Φ(β0 + β1 ∗ treatment1i + β2 ∗ treatment2i + β3 ∗ wellcapacityi )


ResultsSurvey response model

(1) (2)Pr(Response) Marginal Effects

Well Capacity -0.000116 -0.0000383(0.000124) (0.0000408)

Treatment 1 -0.0832 -0.0275(0.100) (0.0331)

Treatment 2 -0.276∗∗ -0.0910∗∗

(0.102) (0.0332)

Constant -0.410∗∗

(0.110)

N 1045 1045χ2 8.671

Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01


ResultsSurvey response model

(1) (2)Pr(Response) Marginal Effects

Well Capacity -0.000116 -0.0000383(0.000124) (0.0000408)

Treatment 1 -0.0832 -0.0275(0.100) (0.0331)

Treatment 2 -0.276∗∗ -0.0910∗∗

(0.102) (0.0332)

Constant -0.410∗∗

(0.110)

N 1045 1045χ2 8.671



ResultsEmpirical specification

Policy support model

Pr (PolicySupportk = 1)i = Φ(β0 + β1 ∗ treatment1i + β2 ∗ treatment2i + β3 ∗ wellcapacityi )k = irrigated acreage fee, pumping fee, quantity restriction


ResultsPolicy support model

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Restriction ME Acreage Fee ME Pumping Fee ME

Well Capacity -0.000834∗∗ -0.000273∗∗ -0.0000221 -0.00000316 -0.000705∗∗ -0.000203∗∗

(0.000258) (0.0000803) (0.000328) (0.0000470) (0.000268) (0.0000755)

Treatment 1 -0.0805 -0.0264 0.231 0.0330 0.162 0.0467(0.190) (0.0620) (0.273) (0.0392) (0.202) (0.0583)

Treatment 2 -0.0424 -0.0139 0.343 0.0491 0.395∗ 0.114∗

(0.200) (0.0653) (0.275) (0.0397) (0.208) (0.0591)

Constant 0.00358 -1.595∗∗ -0.476∗∗

(0.214) (0.311) (0.225)

N 285 285 285 285 285 285χ2 11.18 1.687 11.50





Well Capacity -0.000834∗∗ -0.000273∗∗ -0.0000221 -0.00000316 -0.000705∗∗ -0.000203∗∗

(0.000258) (0.0000803) (0.000328) (0.0000470) (0.000268) (0.0000755)

Treatment 1 -0.0805 -0.0264 0.231 0.0330 0.162 0.0467(0.190) (0.0620) (0.273) (0.0392) (0.202) (0.0583)

Treatment 2 -0.0424 -0.0139 0.343 0.0491 0.395∗ 0.114∗

(0.200) (0.0653) (0.275) (0.0397) (0.208) (0.0591)

Constant 0.00358 -1.595∗∗ -0.476∗∗

(0.214) (0.311) (0.225)

N 285 285 285 285 285 285χ2 11.18 1.687 11.50





Well Capacity -0.000834∗∗ -0.000273∗∗ -0.0000221 -0.00000316 -0.000705∗∗ -0.000203∗∗

(0.000258) (0.0000803) (0.000328) (0.0000470) (0.000268) (0.0000755)

Treatment 1 -0.0805 -0.0264 0.231 0.0330 0.162 0.0467(0.190) (0.0620) (0.273) (0.0392) (0.202) (0.0583)

Treatment 2 -0.0424 -0.0139 0.343 0.0491 0.395∗ 0.114∗

(0.200) (0.0653) (0.275) (0.0397) (0.208) (0.0591)

Constant 0.00358 -1.595∗∗ -0.476∗∗

(0.214) (0.311) (0.225)

N 285 285 285 285 285 285χ2 11.18 1.687 11.50



ResultsPolicy support model, north-south


North

Well Capacity -0.000965∗∗ -0.000303∗∗ -0.000641 -0.0000916 -0.000989∗∗ -0.000284∗∗

(0.000384) (0.000117) (0.000450) (0.0000648) (0.000380) (0.000107)

Treatment 1 -0.514∗ -0.161∗ 0.0246 0.00352 -0.00352 -0.00101(0.277) (0.0857) (0.337) (0.0482) (0.269) (0.0774)

Treatment 2 -0.271 -0.0850 0.226 0.0323 0.255 0.0732(0.284) (0.0887) (0.341) (0.0488) (0.280) (0.0803)

Constant 0.121 0.0379 -0.921∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.134 -0.0384(0.352) (0.110) (0.425) (0.0597) (0.346) (0.0993)

South

Well Capacity 0.0000147 0.00000462 0.00111 0.000159 -0.000206 -0.0000594(0.000507) (0.000159) (0.000782) (0.000112) (0.000545) (0.000157)

Treatment 1 0.348 0.109 0.753 0.108 0.389 0.112(0.278) (0.0866) (0.579) (0.0832) (0.312) (0.0891)

Treatment 2 0.206 0.0647 0.843 0.120 0.623∗ 0.179∗

(0.299) (0.0936) (0.580) (0.0835) (0.324) (0.0917)

Constant -0.417 -0.131 -2.718∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.895∗∗ -0.257∗∗

(0.312) (0.0969) (0.723) (0.105) (0.353) (0.0980)

N 285 285 285 285 285 285χ2 64.44 151.6 87.89



ResultsPolicy support model, Southern GWMDs


South

Well Capacity 0.0000147 0.00000462 0.00111 0.000159 -0.000206 -0.0000594(0.000507) (0.000159) (0.000782) (0.000112) (0.000545) (0.000157)

Treatment 1 0.348 0.109 0.753 0.108 0.389 0.112(0.278) (0.0866) (0.579) (0.0832) (0.312) (0.0891)

Treatment 2 0.206 0.0647 0.843 0.120 0.623∗ 0.179∗

(0.299) (0.0936) (0.580) (0.0835) (0.324) (0.0917)

Constant -0.417 -0.131 -2.718∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.895∗∗ -0.257∗∗

(0.312) (0.0969) (0.723) (0.105) (0.353) (0.0980)

N 285 285 285 285 285 285χ2 64.44 151.6 87.89



ResultsPolicy support model, Southern GWMDs


South

Well Capacity 0.0000147 0.00000462 0.00111 0.000159 -0.000206 -0.0000594(0.000507) (0.000159) (0.000782) (0.000112) (0.000545) (0.000157)

Treatment 1 0.348 0.109 0.753 0.108 0.389 0.112(0.278) (0.0866) (0.579) (0.0832) (0.312) (0.0891)

Treatment 2 0.206 0.0647 0.843 0.120 0.623∗ 0.179∗

(0.299) (0.0936) (0.580) (0.0835) (0.324) (0.0917)

Constant -0.417 -0.131 -2.718∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.895∗∗ -0.257∗∗

(0.312) (0.0969) (0.723) (0.105) (0.353) (0.0980)

N 285 285 285 285 285 285χ2 64.44 151.6 87.89



ResultsPolicy support model, Northern GWMDs


North

Well Capacity -0.000965∗∗ -0.000303∗∗ -0.000641 -0.0000916 -0.000989∗∗ -0.000284∗∗

(0.000384) (0.000117) (0.000450) (0.0000648) (0.000380) (0.000107)

Treatment 1 -0.514∗ -0.161∗ 0.0246 0.00352 -0.00352 -0.00101(0.277) (0.0857) (0.337) (0.0482) (0.269) (0.0774)

Treatment 2 -0.271 -0.0850 0.226 0.0323 0.255 0.0732(0.284) (0.0887) (0.341) (0.0488) (0.280) (0.0803)

Constant 0.121 0.0379 -0.921∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.134 -0.0384(0.352) (0.110) (0.425) (0.0597) (0.346) (0.0993)

N 285 285 285 285 285 285χ2 64.44 151.6 87.89



ResultsPolicy support model, Northern GWMDs


North

Well Capacity -0.000965∗∗ -0.000303∗∗ -0.000641 -0.0000916 -0.000989∗∗ -0.000284∗∗

(0.000384) (0.000117) (0.000450) (0.0000648) (0.000380) (0.000107)

Treatment 1 -0.514∗ -0.161∗ 0.0246 0.00352 -0.00352 -0.00101(0.277) (0.0857) (0.337) (0.0482) (0.269) (0.0774)

Treatment 2 -0.271 -0.0850 0.226 0.0323 0.255 0.0732(0.284) (0.0887) (0.341) (0.0488) (0.280) (0.0803)

Constant 0.121 0.0379 -0.921∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.134 -0.0384(0.352) (0.110) (0.425) (0.0597) (0.346) (0.0993)

N 285 285 285 285 285 285χ2 64.44 151.6 87.89



Conclusion

Evidence of information fatigue decreasing response rate whendetailed information on policy impacts provided to recipients

Resource availability decreases support for implementation of someconservation policy

Spatial differences in resource availability influence resource userssupport for specific policies


Conclusion





Conclusion





Thanks!


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Documents

An Experimental Approach to Assessing the Influence of ... Resources(Cools et al., 2011; Guilfoos et al., 2016; Kuwayama and Brozovi c, 2013). Research Motivation How do these modeling